GUIDE to Pre-Reading for Culture Masterclass: The following four pieces are for pre-reading in preparation for the DtF Culture Masterclass. After you have read these you are asked to complete the accompanying preparatory exercise before the Masterclass when you will be using it as the basis for a further exercise.

The AIMS of the Masterclass: To assist participants to better understand culture To raise awareness of the unconscious drivers of cultural patterns To practice using and take away some tools to assist personal effectiveness and to facilitate different conversations with colleagues that can strengthen

wider participation in behaviours that influence a healthy culture.

The Masterclass will not repeat in detail the content of this pre-reading, but will build on it and refer to it as a backbone, integrating with the other contributions we use in the Masterclass. You do not need to have a detailed grasp of this material, use it to develop a general awareness of how it offers meaning to behaviours we are all part of in the workplace.

The purpose of the pre-reading is to initiate you into key thinking related to organisational culture change, as developed specifically by Chris Argyris, often with Donald Schon. Chris Argyris died recently in 2013 at the age of 90, and his impact on organisational learning and understanding is unparalleled.

Overview

Feedback and learning

Our starting point is Argyris’s argument that people have mental models (“frames”) that direct the way they plan, implement and review their actions. One example is our use in DtF of the values – goals – actions framework. Values are one example of mental models – others are attitudes, beliefs, assumptions and expectations.

Argyris’s more sophisticated framework is:

Governing variables – action strategies – consequences

Governing variables are the mental models that determine how we choose to behave. Usually, there is a complex mix of values, attitudes, assumptions and beliefs that people are trying to keep within acceptable limits. For example, faced with a “difficult conversation”, a person might be working with values of being truthful, respectful and avoiding hurting others. They also bring their assumptions about the other person’s resilience and openness to feedback and beliefs about how best to ensure the situation is addressed effectively. Very often there is a trade-off among governing variables because they are not mutually consistent.

Action strategies are the choices people make about how best to behave or which decision to make, to reflect the optimum balance of their governing variables. (The Brexit Referendum or the Crocodile River exercise in Robin’s Workshop demonstrate this process).

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The consequences of action may turn out to be what was intended and/or unexpected/ unintended.

Thus, faced with a difficult conversation, a person may have governing variables of being truthful, avoiding hurting others and addressing the situation effectively. S/he adopts an action strategy that reflects these as best they can.  This may take the form of watering down the potentially upsetting message.  This strategy has intended consequences of being truthful whilst minimising upset for the other. However, an unintended consequence is that the situation has not really been addressed and problems recur.

The consequences of action provide feedback about both the effectiveness of the behaviour directed by the action strategy and about the governing variables that informed the choice of action strategy. Intended consequences validate the choices we made. Unintended consequences indicate an opportunity to learn.

feedback

In this respect, Argyris makes an important distinction between two ways in which we can use feedback about the consequences to reflect and learn.

He suggests that the normal first response to a mismatch between intention and outcome is to search for another action strategy that will satisfy a status quo alignment with governing variables.

For example a new strategy to deal with the difficult conversation might be to be very frank and very clear that it is not intended to be hurtful. The change is in the action only, not in the governing variables.  Argyris calls this process single-loop learning. 

Another possible response would be to examine and change the governing variables themselves.  For example, the person might reflect on his value of being truthful.  This may lead to demoting this value and promoting another of his values such as being open-minded.  The associated action strategy might be to first seek to understand the other person’s perspective, whilst acknowledging the possibility that this might challenge what he believes to be the truth.  Therefore in this case both the governing variable and the action strategy have changed.  This is called double-loop learning. 

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Double-loop learning is seen as the more effective way of making informed decisions about changing the way we design and implement action. Consequently, Argyris’s approach is to focus on double-loop learning. 

What we say influences our behaviour often is not what actually does

Most importantly Argyris further asserts that the mental models that guide people’s actions are largely unconscious and can be quite different to what people say are their reasons for behaving in certain ways. In other words, the logic we offer to explain why we do what we do does not always stand up to close examination.

He contends that while there is considerable difference between people in how they describe what directs their choice of behaviour, when we examine what people actually do there seem to be just two strategies which he labelled Model I and Model II. Model I, which is the more commonly adopted strategy, inhibits double-loop learning. It is a strategy aligned with our hard-wired disposition to seek to confirm rather than disconfirm what we already believe. It reflects our tendency to protect ourselves against the discomfort of dealing with dissonance in our own thinking and a socialised avoidance of providing feedback that we believe will be uncomfortable or hurtful to others.

The second article, and main part of the pre-reading is a paper taken from the research of Liane Anderson that sets out the work of Argyris and his colleague Donald Schon about this misalignment of what we say and what we do and the competitive and defensive nature of the Model I strategy.

Defensive routines and culture change

The culture of a social group is the norms and expectations that guide the behaviour of its members. Very often these attitudes and beliefs are unconscious: people are not aware of the mental models underpinning their ways of working and, therefore, are blind to the fact that they can choose to behave differently. Culture change is commonly referred to as winning “hearts and minds” – influencing people to make changes in their shared mental models.

Given the prevalence of Model I, it is not surprising that Argyris goes on to say that most of our social systems are governed by Model I irrespective of significant differences in the cultural norms within and between different organisations and institutions. He says this is the major reason for failure to learn and adapt.

Argyris describes how the socialised Model I leads to what he calls defensive routines. Defensive reasoning inhibits the learning necessary to bring about shared double loop learning i.e. culture change. When a culture is toxic, as in Mid Staffs, it is extremely difficult to shift because almost everyone in the system has become part of the problem, by buying into or tacitly colluding with the counter-productive behaviours. This validates the observation that change exposes rather than causes organisation dysfunction. Defensive routines cover up the error and the conflict that surfaces when the status quo is destabilised.

The first reading, part of the first chapter of a book by William Noonan, sets out how our disposition to Model I reasoning leads us into avoiding using feedback for the needed reflection and challenge to bring about shared double-loop learning.

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The third reading provides some examples of defensive routines.

There is a well-developed science to inform our efforts to bring about culture change in our teams and organisations. What this body of knowledge tells us is that leading culture change is situation dependent.

When the environment is reasonably stable and predictable, culture change can be a programmed activity in which leaders prescribe the values and required behaviours that they believe will create more effective ways of working. Beverley Alimo-Metcalfe provided an evidence-based approach for bringing about culture change in this way. Ros Gray’s master class introduced programmed approaches for bringing about change in the wider context of quality improvement; using for example, Kotter’s 8 step process, Bob Lloyd’s Quality Measurement Process and PDSA in relation to Deming’s Lens of Profound Knowledge.

However, in more complex settings, cultural change tends to be emergent as a consequence of leaders experimenting with new ways of working. Ros Gray mentioned “planned experimentation” and described how individual leaders like Jen Rodgers and Kate Granger inspired systemic change through personal initiatives. The later master classes on systems thinking (Martin Fischer) and adaptive leadership (Keith Grint) will provide a more in depth exploration of culture change strategies in complex contexts.

It is also important to note that culture is not homogenous across an organisation. There are always sub-cultures rubbing up against each other. Edgar Schein1 has proposed that organisations fail to learn how to learn because, in every organisation, some of its sub-cultures have their roots outside the organisation and are therefore more fundamentally entrenched in their particular assumptions. These are the managerial sub-culture (managers share a set of mental models irrespective of what sector they work in) and the professional sub-cultures. Within each profession there are strong loyalties that transcend membership of any particular organisation; for example, surgeons tend to have the same professional values and beliefs that inform similar ways of working, the world over.

In whatever context you are seeking to change or reinforce culture, you are dealing with double-loop learning. For this to happen it remains central to the psychology of change to develop a non-defensive, open and authentic (Model II) approach in dealing with unintended outcomes, inconsistency, resistance and error.

Tools that help

The fourth reading is a brief description of three tools developed by Argyris to enable us to reflect on how our own thinking contributes to unintended outcomes in our interaction with others. These are tools that can help us move towards Model II in leading culture change.

I hope that you enjoy this journey into Culture as much as we have in developing it for our Masterclass.

Robin Burgess and Malcolm Young

1 Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organisational Learning Edgar H. Schein in Sloan Management Review, Fall 1996

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1. Discussing the Undiscussable: A Guide to Overcoming Defensive Routines in the Workplace W. R. Noonan (Jossey-Bass Business & Management)

CH. ONE - FRAMING THE ISSUE: THE WORK OF CHRIS ARGYRIS

Innovation, ingenuity, and thinking outside the box are often cited as hallmarks of successful organizations, but in practice, their occurrence is rare. More likely, the “way things work around here” is a litany of missed deadlines, low morale, strained relationships, and inept problem solving. In fact, many organizations manage to operate far below the standards of excellence they strive for. Why is that the case? No one sits down and says, “Okay, here’s our plan for lowering morale in the company.” No one asks, “What can we do to run this project into the ground?” We are human beings who desire to succeed, to foster creativity, to be competent, and to value the dignity of work. Yet we find ourselves being ineffective, settling for less, and caught in escalating cycles of unproductive behaviour toward each other. We also tend to cover up inefficiency to protect ourselves, and come to see those actions as necessary, realistic, and even caring. How does this happen?

I have written this book to help people and their companies sort out these puzzles of human behaviour. My inspiration and the foundation for this book is the work of Chris Argyris. Professor Argyris has dedicated his life’s work to the topic of human behaviour in organizations. His research has shown that our reactions to conditions of threat and embarrassment create patterns of behaviour that he refers to as organizational defensive routines. These routines are predictable and ubiquitous in the world of work, and ultimately they do not serve the best interests of an organization. Understanding how each one of us participates in these dynamics is an important step toward creating a productive workplace. Learning how to mitigate or even avoid the resulting discord and loss of productivity is another. My goal is to … make Chris Argyris’s work more accessible and practical.

What Is an Organisational Defensive Routine?

Organizational defensive routines arise when we find ourselves under the conditions of threat or embarrassment. In reaction to these conditions, we engage in a characteristic mode of defensive reasoning and behaviour. We think, “The problem is not me, but you.” If both parties are thinking in the same defensive mode about each other, then the stage is set for some nasty behaviour. Although we would not think of ourselves as being unreasonable or ill intended, we readily concoct private explanations about why others do what they do. We make attributions about each other’s motives and intentions and hold other parties accountable for the difficulty when we find ourselves at odds with one another.

In the privacy of our own minds, we hold our positions with a high degree of certainty. It is hard to listen when you think the other person is dead wrong. Yet we will be the first to call “Unfair!” if we don’t think the other person is listening to us. None of what we are thinking is spoken directly to the person involved. In fact, when and if we share our emotionally charged assessments, theories, and explanations, we generally do so only with those individuals who we feel will be sympathetic to our views. These private conversations are held behind closed doors, in the hallways and break rooms. Nothing is discussed in public meetings, and rarely, if ever, do the targets of those third-party conversations ever find out what we really think.

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The result is “open secrets,” “undiscussables,” or the “elephant in the room.” Most everyone can think of some example of this, often accompanied by a juicy story. What is often left out of the story is the teller’s complicit participation in it. There is no awareness of how he or she might be involved in creating the open secret, the undiscussable, or the elephant in the room. These dynamics become a routine part of the workplace culture. Whole departments become encased in assumptions and expectations that feed predictable, vicious cycles of human behaviour.

As organisational defensive routines take hold of a company’s culture, the consequences are increasingly troubling. I have observed companies in which defensive routines proliferate to the point where the organizational culture becomes so toxic to working relationships that the organization’s productivity suffers dramatically.

Defensive routines become so ingrained in our social behaviour that they become an accepted part of the “way things work around here.” What becomes apparent is that the organization, project, or team isn’t all that it’s cracked up to be. No one is walking the talk, and everyone knows it. When this realization dawns on us, our first reaction is usually sadness, disappointment, or a physical sensation of being let down. People talk of being deflated and dispirited. There is a loss of animation. Animation, by the way, derives from the Latin word animus (m.) or anima (f.), “soul.” That definition holds true here. There is a loss of soul. But even that isn’t the whole story. Along with that loss comes a sense of helplessness.

Organizational defensive routines are experienced and reported as being external to anyone’s control or influence. We distance ourselves from any sense of personal responsibility. We don’t realize that we might be as much a part of the problem as the next person. No one knows how to break the cycle and start afresh. This self-fueling, counterproductive process exists in all organizations and plays out in one-to-one interactions, in groups, and across organizational divisions, time and again, to the detriment of all. These situations are depressing, to put it mildly. They are also much more common than we’d like to think, in organizations of all sizes, shapes, and geographies. But there is a way to break the cycle. And although the process is difficult, it is doable and very much worth the effort. …Translated into the language of action science, knowledge must be actionable if it is to be at all useful. I recognised in Chris Argyris’s work a program of attraction for those with an appetite for reflection. He prescribes a different way of thinking and acting that holds the promise of greater learning, reduction of error, and a fair exchange between conflicting views. Simply said, he offers us a better, more excellent way of behaving in the workplace.

In my world of philosophy, demonstrations of the best of human action are called virtues. The word virtue comes from the Latin virtus, which is a translation of its Greek counterpart, arête, “excellence.” The antidote to the vicious cycle of human behaviour exhibited in defensive routines is a virtuous one in which we act well or most excellently with each other. I made the connection between virtues and Chris Argyris’s work one night when he spoke to a small group of us gathered at a friend’s house. Argyris said, “People think that because I am a social scientist, I am interested in the truth. I am not interested in the truth as much as I am in justice: how to treat people with respect and dignity in the workplace.” And at that moment, my heart was won over to his work. From my youthful days to adulthood, I was always involved in issues of justice. My generation acted to correct injustices and instilled in me a firm belief that things could change and that I could be part of that effort.

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My confidence in my ability, as one individual, to change the world has tempered over the years, but I still believe in the pursuit of justice. Instead of trying to change the world, I now focus closer to home. Thomas Merton, a Trappist monk who lived and died during the turbulent 1960s, once said, “Social justice is how you treat the person next to you.” Every encounter I have has become an opportunity to act justly.

That evening, Argyris’s statement confirmed a connection between his work and the passion I felt for the cardinal virtue of justice. Acquiring the mind-set and skill set proposed by Argyris for a more just workplace is a matter of learning new behaviour through practice. When watching Argyris interact with workshop participants, I would always hear him say, “So, how would you do it? What would you say?” He was interested in seeing if people could produce the behaviour they thought would be effective and well intended. He, like other practitioners of action science, was also offering the person a chance to practice.

We learn to do something well by doing it. Practice involves the repeated necessary actions for perfecting a craft. It is the cultivation of good habits. There are good “habits of practice,” a definition for virtues used by Thomas Aquinas, to be found in Argyris’s work. Like any virtuous activity, these habits of practice don’t come naturally, but come about only by doing them. Practice is something we can do, and if we do it well, we can alter the destructive path of defensive routines.

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2- Argyris and Schön’s theory on Congruence and Learning - Liane Anderson (1997)Based (with some added paragraphs and quotes) on a chapter from: Anderson, L.  (1994).  Espoused theories and theories-in-use: Bridging the gap (Breaking through defensive routines etc.   Unpublished Master of Organisational Psychology thesis, Univ. of Qld.  

Contents Introduction   Models of theories in use   Single loop and double loop learning   Models I and II  

IntroductionArgyris and Schon's work over the past twenty years has been concerned with examining conscious and unconscious reasoning processes (Dick & Dalmau, 1990).  This has precedents in the work of Freud and Jung; in models such as the Johari Window (Luft & Ingham in Hanson, 1973 p.  114), and in Rulla, Imoda and Rideck's (1978, in Dick and Dalmau, 1990) Ideal Self and Actual Self.  It is based on the belief that people are designers of action.  They design action in order to achieve intended consequences and monitor to learn if their actions are effective.

In other words, Argyris and Schon (1974) assert that people hold maps in their heads about how to plan, implement and review their actions.  They further assert that few people are aware that the maps they use to take action are not the theories they explicitly espouse.  Also, even fewer people are aware of the maps or theories they do use (Argyris, 1980).

To clarify, this is not merely the difference between what people say and do.  Argyris and Schon suggest that there is a theory consistent with what people say and a theory consistent with what they do.  Therefore the distinction is not between "theory and action but between two different "theories of action" (Argyris, Putnam & McLain Smith, 1985, p.82).  Hence the concepts Espoused theory and Theory-in-use:

Espoused theory The world view and values people believe their behaviour is based on  

Theory-in-use The world view and values implied by their behaviour, or the maps they use to take action

To reiterate they are suggesting that people are unaware that their theories-in-use are often not the same as their espoused theories, and that people are often unaware of their theories-in-use.

They assert that these theories of action determine all deliberate human behaviour.  An example from Argyris's (1987, p93) research may serve to clarify this distinction.  When asked about how he would deal with a disagreement with a client, a management consultant responded that he would first state his understanding of the disagreement, then negotiate what kind of data he and the client could agree would resolve it.  This represents his espoused theory (or the theory behind what he says) which is of joint

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control of the problem.  A tape recording of the consultant in such a situation however, revealed that he actually advocated his own point of view and dismissed the client's.  This indicated his theory-in-use (or the theory behind what he did), which more closely approximates his unilateral control of the problem and a rejection of valid information exchange.

Argyris (1987, p93) suggests that one reason for insisting that what people do is consistent with a theory, is the contention that what people do is not accidental.  People design the action that they take and are therefore responsible for the design.  His assertion is that although they design the action they are often unaware of the design and of its difference from their espoused design.

This raises the question, if people are unaware of the theories that drive their action (Theories-in-use), then how can they effectively manage their behaviour?  Argyris (1980) suggests that effectiveness results from developing congruence between Theory-in-use and Espoused theory.

The models and conceptualisations developed by Argyris and Schon are for the purpose of helping people to be able to make more informed choices about the action they design and implement.  To this end they have developed models which seek to explain the processes which create and maintain people's theory-in-use.

Models of theories-in-useWhen someone is asked how he would behave under certain circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is this theory-in-use. (Argyris & Schön 1974:6-7)

Making this distinction allows us to ask questions about the extent to which behaviour fits espoused theory; and whether inner feelings become expressed in actions. In other words, is there congruence between the two? Argyris (1980) makes the case that effectiveness results from developing congruence between theory-in-use and espoused theory. For example, in explaining our actions to a colleague we may call upon some convenient piece of theory. We might explain our sudden rush out of the office to others, or even to ourselves at some level, by saying that a ‘crisis’ had arisen with one of ‘our’ clients. The theory-in-use might be quite different. We may have become bored and tired by the paper work or meeting and felt that a quick trip out to an apparently difficult situation would bring welcome relief. A key role of reflection, we could argue, is to reveal the theory-in-use and to explore the nature of the ‘fit’. Much of the business of supervision, where it is focused on the practitioner’s thoughts, feelings and actions, is concerned with the gulf between espoused theory and theory-in-use or in bringing the latter to the surface. This gulf is no bad thing. If it gets too wide then there is clearly a difficulty. But provided the two remain connected then the gap creates a dynamic for reflection and for dialogue.

To fully appreciate theory-in-use we require a model of the processes involved. To this end Argyris and Schön (1974) initially looked to three elements:

Governing Variable Action Strategy Consequences – both intended and unintended

The construction Argyris and Schon developed in order to explain theories-in-use is shown in figure 1.

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Figure 1.  Model explaining the process of developing theories-in use.

Governing variables are values which the person is trying to keep within some acceptable range.  We have many governing variables.  Any action will likely impact upon a number of these variables.  Therefore any situation may trigger a trade-off among governing variables.

Action strategies are strategies used by the person to keep their governing values within the acceptable range.

These strategies will have consequences which are both intended -- those the actor believes will result -- and unintended.

An example may help to illustrate this process.  A person may have a governing variable of suppressing conflict, and one of being competent.  In any given situation she will design action strategies to keep both these governing variables within acceptable limits.  For instance, in a conflict situation she might avoid the discussion of the conflict situation and say as little as possible.  This avoidance may (she hopes) suppress the conflict, yet allow her to appear competent because she at least hasn't said anything wrong.  This strategy will have various consequences both for her and the others involved.  An intended consequence might be that the other parties will eventually give up the discussion, thereby successfully suppressing the conflict.  As she has said little, she may feel she has not left herself open to being seen as incompetent.  An unintended consequence might be that she thinks the situation has been left unresolved and therefore likely to recur, and feels dissatisfied.

To sum up, we can see that there are a number of elements to Argyris and Schon's model which help explain how we link our thoughts and actions.  These elements are:

1. Governing Variables (or values)  

2. Action Strategies  

3. Intended and unintended Consequences for self  

4. Intended and unintended Consequences for others  

5. Action strategy effectiveness.

In this respect Argyris and Schon's work parallels, to some extent, the work of Dick and Dalmau (1990).  They describe an 'information chain' to make sense of relationships and the information needed to resolve difficulties.  This information chain was informed to some extent by the work of Argyris and Schon, and developed to explain and inform behaviour.  ….  The information chain and its relation to Argyris and Schon's concepts are outlined in Figure 2.

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The boxed area (coloured) in Figure 2 represents the part of the process which usually remains undiscussed or implicit.  It is this information about our beliefs, feelings and intentions, that is often necessary to solve relationship problems effectively.  Similarly, it is this information on beliefs, feelings and intentions which Argyris (1974) refers to as helpful in producing valid information on which to base decisions.

Argyris and Schon's terminology Dick and Dalmau's information chain

Action strategy (of the other person) Actions (of the other group or person)

Consequences Outcomes (what you feel obliged to do or prevented from doing)

Governing values (in use)

Beliefs (what you think the other group is trying to achieve, as well as general beliefs)

Feelings (how you sometimes feel when this happens)

Governing values (espoused)

Intentions (what you intend to do in response)

Action strategy (your own) Reaction (what you actually do)

Consequences Outcomes (for you and others)Figure 2. Argyris & Schon's concepts in relation to Dick and Dalmau's (1990) information chain.

These conceptual frameworks have implications for our learning processes.  As mentioned previously, the consequences of an action may be intended or unintended.  When the consequences of the strategy employed are as the person intends, then there is a match between intention and outcome.  Therefore the theory-in-use is confirmed.  However, the consequences may be unintended, and more particularly they may be counterproductive to satisfying their governing values.  In this case there is a mismatch between intention and outcome.  Argyris and Schon suggest that there are two possible responses to this mismatch, and these are represented in the concept of single and double-loop learning.

Single-loop and Double-loop learningIt is suggested (Argyris, Putnam & McLain Smith, 1985) that the first response to this mismatch between intention and outcome is to search for another strategy which will satisfy the governing variables.

For example a new strategy in order to suppress conflict might be to reprimand the other people involved for wasting time, and suggest they get on with the task at hand.  This may suppress the conflict and allow feelings of competence as the fault has been laid at the feet of the other party for wasting time.  In such a case the new action strategy is used in order to satisfy the existing governing variable.  The change is in

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the action only, not in the governing variable itself.  Such a process is called single-loop learning.  See Figure 3.

Another possible response would be to examine and change the governing values themselves.  For example, the person might choose to critically examine the governing value of suppressing conflict.  This may lead to discarding this value and substituting a new value such as open inquiry.  The associated action strategy might be to discuss the issue openly.  Therefore in this case both the governing variable and the action strategy have changed.  This would constitute double-loop learning.  See Figure 3.

Figure 3.  Single and double-loop learning

In this sense single and double-loop learning bear close resemblance to what Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974) call First and Second Order Change.  First Order Change exists when the norms of the system remain the same and changes are made within the existing norms.  Second Order Change describes a situation where the norms of the system themselves are challenged and changed.

Double-loop learning is seen as the more effective way of making informed decisions about the way we design and implement action (Argyris, 1974).

Consequently, Argyris and Schon's approach is to focus on double-loop learning.  To this end, they developed a model that describes features of theories-in-use which either inhibit or enhance double-loop learning.  Interestingly, Argyris suggests that there is a large variability in Espoused theories and Action strategies, but almost no variability in Theories-in-use.  He suggests people may espouse a large number and variety of theories or values which they suggest guide their action.  However Argyris believes that the theories which can be deduced from peoples' action (theories-in-use) seem to fall into two categories which he labels Model I and Model II.

The governing values associated with theories-in-use can be grouped into those which inhibit double-loop learning (Model I) and those which enhance it (Model II).

Models I and IIModel I is the group which has been identified as inhibiting double-loop learning.  It has been described as being predominantly competitive and defensive (Dick & Dalmau, 1990).  The defining characteristics of Model I are summarised in Table 1.

Argyris claimed that virtually all individuals in his studies operated from theories-in-use or values consistent with Model I (Argyris et al.  1985, p.  89).  Argyris also suggests most of our social systems are Model I.  This assumption implies predictions about the kinds of strategies people will employ, and about the resulting consequences.  These predictions have been tested repeatedly by Argyris and not been disconfirmed (Argyris, 1982, Chap.  3), though I am unaware of studies by anyone other than Argyris which have tested these predictions.

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Table 1.  Model I theory-in-use characteristics

The governing Values of Model I are: Achieve the purpose as the actor defines it Win, do not lose Suppress negative feelings Emphasise rationality

Primary Strategies are: Control environment and task unilaterally Protect self and others unilaterally

Usually operationalised by: Unillustrated attributions and evaluations eg. "You seem

unmotivated" Advocating courses of action which discourage inquiry e.g. "Lets

not talk about the past, that's over." Treating ones' own views as obviously correct Making covert attributions and evaluations Face-saving moves such as leaving potentially embarrassing

facts unstated

Consequences include: Defensive relationships Low freedom of choice Reduced production of valid information Little public testing of ideas

_____Taken from Argyris, Putnam & McLain Smith (1985, p.  89).

The Model I world view is a theory of single loop learning according to Argyris and Schon.  Therefore Model I has the effect of restricting a person to single-loop learning.  Being unaware of what is driving one's behaviour may seriously inhibit the likelihood of increased effectiveness in the long-term.

Argyris (1980) suggests that (as mentioned previously) the primary action strategy of Model I is: unilateral control of the environment and task, and unilateral protection of self and others.  The underlying strategy is control over others.  Such control inhibits communication and can produce defensiveness.  Defensiveness is a mechanism used in order to protect the individual.  Model I theory-in-use informs individuals how to design and use defences unilaterally, whether to protect themselves or others, e.g. "I couldn't tell him the truth, it would hurt him too much".

In order to protect themselves individuals must distort reality.  Such distortion is usually coupled with defences which are designed to keep themselves and others unaware of their defensive reaction (Argyris, 1980).  The more people expose their thoughts and feelings the more vulnerable they become to the reactions of others.  This is particularly true if these others are programmed with Model I theory-in-use and are seeking to maximise winning.

The assertion that Model I is predominantly defensive has another ramification.  Acting defensively can be viewed as moving away from something, usually some truth about ourselves.  If our actions are driven by moving away from something then our actions are controlled and defined by whatever it is we are moving away from, not by us and what we would like to be moving towards.  Therefore our potential for growth and

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learning is seriously impaired.  If my behaviour is driven by my not wanting to be seen as incompetent, this may lead me to hide things from myself and others, in order to avoid feelings of incompetence.  On the other hand, if my behaviour is driven by moving towards something, for example: wanting to be competent, honest evaluation of my behaviour by myself and others would be welcome and useful.

In summary, Model I has been identified as a grouping of characteristics which inhibit double-loop learning.  Model I is seen as being predominantly defensive and competitive, and therefore unlikely to allow an honest evaluation of the actor's motives and strategies, and less likely to lead to growth.  Defensiveness protects individuals from discovering embarrassing truths about their incongruent or less-than-perfect behaviour and intentions.  The actor further protects herself by reinforcing conditions such as ambiguity and inconsistency which help to further mask their incongruence from themselves and others.  Becoming aware of this incongruence is difficult, as is doing something about it.  According to Argyris and Schon (1974) this is due to the strength of the socialisation to Model I, and the fact that the prevailing culture in most systems is Model I.  An added complication is that anyone trying to inform them of the incongruence is likely to use Model I behaviour to do so, and therefore trigger a defensive reaction (Dick and Dalmau, 1990).

Therefore, Model I theories-in-use are likely to inhibit double-loop learning for the following reasons.  Model I is characterised by unilateral control and protection, and maximising winning.  In order to maintain these, the actor is often involved in distortion of the facts, attributions and evaluations, and face-saving.  Doing such things is not something we would readily admit we involve ourselves in.  Therefore, in order to live with ourselves we put in place defences which hamper our discovery of the truth about ourselves.  If we are unwilling to admit to our motives and intentions we are hardly in a position to evaluate them.  As evaluating our governing values (which may be equated with intentions) is what characterises double-loop learning, Model I theories-in-use may be seen as inhibiting this process.

Despite all the evidence which suggests that peoples' theory-in-use is consistent with Model I, Argyris has found that most people hold espoused theories which are inconsistent with Model I.  Most people in fact, espouse Model II, according to Argyris.  The defining characteristics of Model II are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2.  Model IIThe governing values of Model II include:

Valid information Free and informed choice Internal commitment

Strategies include: Sharing control Participation in design and implementation of action

Operationalised by: Attribution and evaluation illustrated with relatively directly

observable data Surfacing conflicting views Encouraging public testing of evaluations

Consequences should include: Minimally defensive relationships

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High freedom of choice Increased likelihood of double-loop learning

No reason is offered for why most people espouse Model II, however it seems reasonable to assume that this is because Model II values are the more palatable in terms of the way we like to see our (Western) society.  Freedom of Information Acts, the Constitution, America's bill of Rights, all seem to be drawing heavily from Model II values.  Dick and Dalmau (1990) suggest that people often show a mix of Model I and Model II espoused theories.  This seems probable, as most people will readily admit to being driven to win at least in some situations.  Some professions in fact, are based almost entirely around the concept of winning and not losing, such as Law, sport and sales.

The behaviour required to satisfy the governing values of Model II though, are not opposite to that of Model I.  For instance, the opposite of being highly controlling would be to relinquish control altogether.  This is not Model II behaviour because Model II suggest bilateral control.  Relinquishing control is still unilateral, but in the other direction.  Model II combines articulateness about one's goals and advocacy of one's own position, with an invitation to others to confront one's views.  It therefore produces an outcome which is based on the most complete and valid information possible.  Therefore,

"Every significant Model II action is evaluated in terms of the degree to which it helps the individuals involved generate valid and useful information (including relevant feelings), solve the problem in a way that it remains solved, and do so without reducing the present level of problem solving effectiveness." (Argyris, 1976, p21-22)

If we go back to the information chain model put forward by Dick and Dalmau (Figure 2), valid information has to do with expressing our beliefs, feelings, and intentions (the highlighted area in Figure 2).

Given the above considerations, the consequences for learning should be an emphasis on double-loop learning, in which the basic assumptions behind views are confronted, hypotheses are tested publicly, and processes are disconfirmable, not self-sealing.  The end result should be increased effectiveness.

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3- Examples Of Defensive Routines

a) The poor performerEvery time we shy away from confronting an issue head-on, we create that extra layer of ambiguity. A decision is fudged in a meeting so that everyone can go away with their chosen interpretation of what has been agreed. That means they can effectively do what they like and still claim to be doing what they agreed to do. Eventually, the ambiguity has to be reined in, so new controls and procedures are put in place and so it goes on. Or, as in the following case, the attempt to manipulate the other into seeing and accepting a different perspective backfires and creates the anger and hostility that it was hoped to avoid.

Mavis had arranged to meet Peter. She believed that his performance as a middle manager was unsatisfactory and she planned to demote him to a more operational role. Her views were that he was conscientious, delivered when given clear objectives but was not proactive in solving problems and did not adequately support his staff. She had surmised that his lack of proactivity stemmed from an inability to cope with the demands of doing more than the minimum required: he was afraid to take initiative without guidance or permission: he was a social isolate and lacked any close relationship inside or outside work to help him handle his feelings of stress.

Mavis had told Peter the meeting was a performance review and had asked him to prepare for the meeting by bringing his assessment of his own performance. Her aim was to have him see himself as she and others (including his staff) saw him. Her intended strategy was to work with his self-assessment to get Peter to validate her conclusions about his weaknesses. Mavis did not want to get into a “yes you did”/”no I didn’t” situation with Peter. She knew demotion would be hurt Peter and wanted to avoid recriminations that he had been treated unfairly.

The meeting did not go well. Mavis asked Peter about each of his key areas of responsibility. Two of his projects had been good enough and she accepted that. Two were well behind schedule but Peter explained that there had been problems with getting the information he needed from other departments and with staffing capacity. Mavis asked if he believed he had done everything he could to address these problems – he said he had. Mavis was surprised but did not contradict him at that point. Instead, she asked him about what he had done to support and develop his staff. Mavis thought that his answers validated her view that he had failed to appreciate how resentful his staff were about his dictatorial style, his failure to involve them, his lack of interest in their ideas and his failure recognise their contribution

Mavis told Peter that she thought he had not done enough to progress his key areas of responsibility and he not done enough to support his staff. Peter was upset when he heard her intention to demote him. Mavis felt threatened by Peter’s demands for examples; much of her evidence was second hand from people who did not want to be open with Peter because they were afraid of him.

Peter saw Mavis’s lack of evidence to support her decision as an opportunity to resist it. She had asked him to be open about his self-assessment but was not being open about the reasons for her conclusions. His trust in her was ebbing rapidly. Peter did not point out the contradiction.

In the end, by focussing on his admissions about tasks that had not been completed on time, Mavis got Peter to admit to failures.

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He was demoted; there were recriminations.

b) Decentralisation from HQ

Another fascinating feature of conflict avoidance is that we avoid talking about the avoidance. To discuss conflict avoidance or embarrassment avoidance would, in itself, be uncomfortable. Therefore, we don’t just create strategies to avoid conflict, we create strategies to avoid talking about avoiding conflict.

This is most obvious in the stories we tell ourselves when we know we have bottled out of an uncomfortable conversation. “It wasn’t the right time to discuss it.” “It would have been inappropriate in an open meeting.” “I don’t think he’s ready to hear that message yet.” “I’m just giving him a chance to improve on his own.” And my personal favourite, “I’m keeping my powder dry until I’ve got some more data.” We create elaborate stories to tell ourselves that avoiding a conflict situation was the right thing to do. Sometimes the stories are so good that we begin to believe them ourselves.

The Corporate Management Team announced decentralisation of responsibilities to general managers. The general managers felt trusted and started using their additional power. However, shortly afterwards, Headquarters became alarmed at a budget overspend and acted decisively. Their strategy was diplomatic, telling general managers that they were not being by-passed whilst at the same time re-introducing centralised controls on spending. Neither HQ nor the general managers acknowledged that this was a mixed message.

General managers said amongst themselves that HQ never really meant decentralisation; they only trust us when things are going well; they are more concerned about the budget than about us. No general manger tested out these views with HQ. To do so would have made the mixed message discussable and may have led to a clearer but more threatening response from HQ. General managers knew that their bosses felt let down by the overspend but nobody wanted to talk about that. The general managers strategy was also diplomatic. They said they understood the mixed message.

The general mangers were then caught in a double bind: - if they comply with the new financial controls then their subordinates will see them as unable to stand up to HQ; if they resist the new controls, HQ will see them as difficult or disloyal. Their strategy was to comply whilst stating difficulties about complying and, at the same time, to avoid revealing their feelings of frustration. In this way, they hoped to get away with minimum disruption to the initiatives they had taken during their short period of autonomy.

HQ continued to adopt a reasonable attitude. They knew what the general mangers were really thinking but accepted their agreement to comply with the mixed message. HQ listened to their complaints about the consequences of having to comply with the controls, said they understood but retained the requirements. General managers concluded that HQ was not open to influence and mistrust grew.

General managers tried to find ways round the controls. HQ got wind of this and this reinforced their view that the managers were not acting in the best interest of the organisation.........and so on.

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c) A Difference of Opinion

When none of what we are really thinking is spoken directly to the person involved, we deal with them by arguing for our predetermined standpoints. Afterwards, when and if we share our emotionally charged assessments, theories, and explanations, we generally do so only with those individuals who we feel will be sympathetic to our views. These private conversations are held behind closed doors, in the corridors and canteens. Nothing is discussed in business meetings, and rarely, if ever, do the targets of those third-party conversations ever find out what we really think. The result is “open secrets,” “undiscussables,” or the “elephant in the room.”

Paula Russell, director of planning and performance, was talking with Bob Wheeler, director of finance. Russell asked Wheeler to prepare an additional weekly report summarising selected financial data. Wheeler balked at Russell’s request and listed several reasons why an additional summary was unnecessary. Russell, who was determined that such a report be prepared, patiently answered Wheeler by explaining why she needed the supplementary data. Wheeler responded by defending his position.

Wheeler continued to question the validity of Russell’s request, and both of them inwardly became critical of the other. Their dialogue appeared calm and friendly and they may not have been aware of their own judgmental feelings, but these feelings became obvious. The longer the conversation went on, the greater their frustration became until each began to evaluate the other as stubborn, unreasonable, or downright stupid.

As the conversation progressed, each prepared rebuttals while the other was speaking. Energy was focused on winning and overcoming rather than on listening and problem solving. Both of the speakers began to feel superior to the other. Inwardly each started to question why the other could not see the logic or “correctness” of his or her views and began to think of the other as being inferior in intelligence and savvy.

The energy of their arguments locked the opponents into the correctness of their original views. Any tentativeness either may have had originally about his or her position gradually was replaced with convictions of certainty. Eventually Wheeler capitulated and a compromise was negotiated. However, their feelings about each other remained negative and Wheeler’s commitment to following through with the agreed-on action was low. In all likelihood, their feelings about each other will be manifest in future encounters. Wheeler admitted to having lost the battle but not the war.

d. Examples of Defensive Routines from Ros Gray’s masterclass

Ros Gray provided us with an example of a run chart in a health board report where it seemed to be the case that a 5 point shift in an unwanted direction had been explained as random variation. If this was not the result of a misunderstanding about how best to interpret the data then, we might suppose the author was watering down what might be unpalatable feedback about the quality of the service. As Ros said, a savvy health journalist might invite a more challenging interpretation.

Ros also described how the implementation of a new report form had been subverted by the users who had clandestinely reverted to using the old, poorly photocopied but familiar form. This was more than resistance to change because the resistance was covert, presumably to avoid the anticipated difficulty that would arise if objections to the new form were made explicit.

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4- Three Tools developed by Argyris

Argyris developed 3 key tools or principles to get beyond the limitations we experience through operating unconsciously with the often contradictory mental models we carry: The Ladder of Inference, balancing Advocacy & Inquiry, and the Left Hand Column (LHC).

The Ladder of Inference describes the leaps of meaning we make based on assumptions influenced by our mental models. To overcome this requires getting more information to bring to the surface and to test our assumptions i.e. balancing Advocacy with Inquiry. The Left Hand Column gives us a tool to progress this ability to get beyond subjective assumptions and leaps of meaning which block progress and effective communication.

i) The Ladder of Inference

This is how Peter Senge (1990: 182-3) talks about his own experience of Argyris as a teacher: “Despite having read much of his writing, I was unprepared for what I learned when I first saw Chris Argyris practice his approach in an informal workshop… Ostensibly an academic presentation of Argyris’s methods, it quickly evolved into a powerful demonstration of what action science practitioners call ‘reflection in action’…. Within a matter of minutes, I watched the level of alertness and ‘presentness’ of the entire group rise ten notches – thanks not so much to Argyris’s personal charisma, but to his skillful practice of drawing out… generalizations. As the afternoon moved on, all of us were led to see (sometimes for the first time in our lives) subtle patterns of reasoning which underlay our behaviour; and how those patterns continually got us into trouble. I had never had such a dramatic demonstration of my own mental models in action… But even more interesting, it became clear that, with proper training, I could become much more aware of my mental models and how they operated. This was exciting”.

The ability, demonstrated here, to engage with others, to make links with the general and the particular, and to explore basic orientations and values is just what Argyris talks about when exploring the sorts of behaviours and beliefs that are necessary if organizations are to learn and develop.

Peter Senge has described the 'Ladder of Inference' which is based on our inner confidence that 'our [subjective] map of the reality is the truth', and 'the truth is obvious' as a sequence of cognitive steps [Peter Senge et. al. (1994), p. 243]:

1. We receive data through our senses (observation).2. We select data from what we observe (filter, subtraction). 3. We add meaning to the data (colour, augmentation). 4. We draw assumptions on the basis of the selected data and the meaning we

added. 5. We adopt beliefs (mental models) about the reality and continue to select

data (as per step 2) that correspond to these beliefs. 6. We act upon our beliefs.

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Figure 1: How we shape our mental maps (from Senge, 1994, adapted by Ian Metcalf)

The distinction between the two aspects of how we “colour” – cultural and personal – is important. In part, our inferences are shared. For example, if I notice that he has interrupted me three times in the meeting, my assumption that this is rude would probably be shared by others in the meeting because that is a common interpretation in our culture. But there are other cultures where interruption is not viewed negatively. Rather it is seen as evidence of engagement and motivation around the topic. The problem is that when group norms are shared there is less likelihood that group members become aware that other “frames” might enable better outcomes.

Our inferences are also personal. Our own attitudes and beliefs add an extra dimension to how we interpret what we have paid attention to. These are much more likely than shared mental models to come into our awareness through feedback from others and discovering conflicting mindsets.

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To become open to better understanding how we “colour” our experience requires Balancing Advocacy with Inquiry.

ii) Balancing Advocacy with Inquiry Most behaviour in organisations is based on advocating one’s own position and perception (to win, i.e Model I). The diagram below demonstrates in green the three behaviours needed in balance to overcome this (with the liability of their overuse provided in red).

Inquiry is the art or skill of exploring other’s points of view and the reasoning behind them. We can all learn to improve our conversations.  With new skills we can do a better job of balancing advocacy and inquiry and moving down the ladder of inference.  This will lessen actions arising from unfounded assumptions and will improve and accelerate organisational learning and innovation.   If we each improve our conversation skills then we can improve our team conversations and maybe someday even our public dialogue.  

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Argyris’s tool for improving Inquiry is to map the data from a situation or conversation in two columns, including crucially the Left Hand Column (LHC) to record what is not expressed but impacts greatly on the interaction. (This LHC tool below is the basis of your preparatory exercise).

iii) Left Hand Column

“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless yet be determined to make them otherwise.” F. Scott Fitzgerald. Many conversations appear to be in deadlock, with everyone seeming to have opposing views and no way out presenting itself. It is through powerful inquiry and opening up people’s Left Hand Column (LHC) that we see possibilities.

The LHC as a tool was devised by Argyris, in the 1970’s. Imagine you have a conversation with a peer and it doesn’t go very well. After the conversation, you could take a piece of paper and create a 2 column table. In the right hand column you record what was said in the conversation, ideally word for word (or your best recollection). After you have done this, in the LHC you write your thoughts and feelings during the conversation (which were not expressed). This is a reflective tool designed to help you learn how you might approach a similar conversation, or the next conversation with the person, differently.

The purpose of the LHC is to become more aware of the assumptions, thoughts and feelings that govern our conversations and contribute to blocking us. Our aim is to develop a way of talking about what is in our LHC in a way that improves the chances of having a successful conversation. We can also use Inquiry to try and uncover what’s in the other person’s LHC.

Remember, it’s important to think about what you say. It’s good to be honest, but constructive. Saying “You haven’t got a clue what you’re talking about” is unlikely to get a positive reaction. However, owning your own part by saying something like “I’m having difficulty following your reasoning. Could you explain a little more about what has led you to that conclusion”, is likely to move the conversation forward and increase your understanding of where the other person is coming from.

In his book ‘Discussing the Undiscussable’, (see first excerpt for pre-reading) Bill Noonan gives three pieces of advice linked to the LHC. [ You will recognise these being applied in Action Learning and in the Preparatory Exercise for the Culture Masterclass ].

1. Resist jumping to quick solutions.

2. Articulate a neutral description of the problem.

3. Check to see if others have additional information that adds or modifies existing

data.

4. Reduce blame by investigating what others might have been up against that led

them to think and act in the way they did.

You may not get it right every time, but you will find that conversations become much more valuable and meaningful if you use some of the techniques described here.

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Recap on dynamics underlying Culture (Argyris, Pre-reading).

Individually and collectively we experience, largely unconsciously:

• Defensive Routines: our reactions to conditions of threat and embarrassment create patterns of behaviour that are predictable and ubiquitous in the world of work and result in discord and loss of productivity. Understanding how each of us participates in these dynamics can assist a more effective workplace.

• Espoused theories and Theories in Action which are often in conflict (what I say and do often contradict) because I cannot acknowledge what I am protecting.

• We leap to assumptions in a way Argyris describes in the Ladder of Inference.

• Single loop learning - change the actions, but keep to the same rules/norms

• Double loop learning – question and change actions AND governing rules

• Model I Theories (winning, defensive, controlling, rational, overlook feelings impact, make assumptions, restricted information) – within Single loop learning

• Model II Theories (shared control, choice, feedback, develop trust and vulnerability, include feelings as data, balance Inquiry with Advocacy, questioning of norms, open information) – into Double loop learning.

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