30 - opp to var mot

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THESOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 07-cv-61693 (JAL)________________________________________________

)SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, )

)Plaintiff, )

))

v. )))

JOSEPH J. MONTEROSSO, and )LUIS E. VARGAS, )

)Defendants. )

________________________________________________)

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT LUIS E. VARGAS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Of Counsel: Jeffery T. Infelise (DC 546998)Cheryl J. Scarboro Special Florida Bar No. A5501154

[email protected] Reid A. Muoio Special Florida Bar No. [email protected] MitchellSpecial Florida Bar No. [email protected] F Street NEWashington, D.C. 20549(tel) (202) 551-4904 (Infelise)(fax) (202) 772-9362 (Infelise)

January 28, 2008 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission

Case 0:07-cv-61693-JAL Document 30 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/28/2008 of 29

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... iii

PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 3

I. Standards Of Review .................................................................................................. 3

II. The Complaint Properly Alleges Claims Upon Which Relief May Be Granted ........................................................................................................ 4

A. The Complaint Properly Alleges Scienter Claims ........................................ 4

1. The Complaint Properly Alleges That Vargas Is Liable For Primary Fraud Violations ............................................................ 4

2. The Complaint Properly Alleges That Vargas’ Fraud Was Material ..................................................................................... 6

3. The Complaint Properly Pleads Scienter ........................................... 8

B. The Complaint Properly Alleges Non-Scienter Claims .............................. 10

1. Section 17(a)(2)-(3): Non-scienter Fraud ......................................... 10

2. Aiding and Abetting Claims ............................................................ 10

C. Rule 13b2-1: Falsifying Books and Records ............................................... 11

D. Rule 13b2-2: False Statements To Auditors ............................................... 12

III. The Complaint Pleads Fraud With Adequate Particularity .................................... 13

A. The Complaint Adequately Informs Vargas Of The Nature Of His Participation In The Fraud ............................................................... 13

B. The Complaint Does Not Rely Upon Conclusory Allegations To Impute Conduct To Vargas .................................................................... 15


ii

C. The Use Of The Words “False” and “Cause” In The Complaint Does Not Violate Rule 9(b) ........................................................................ 17

IV. The Complaint Satisfies the Requirements Of Rule 10(b) .................................... 18

V. Vargas’ Motion for A More Definite Statement Should Be Denied ............................................................................................... 20

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 20


iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Anderson v. District Board Of Trustees of Central Fla. CommunityCollege, 77 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996) ................................................................ 19, 20

Appalachian Enterprise, Inc. v. Epayment Solutions Ltd., No. 01-cv-11502,2004 WL 2813121 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2004) ..................................................... 13, 14

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, – U.S. –, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) .............................. 7, 9

Bradbury v. S.E.C., -F.3d-, 2008 WL 108728 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2008) .......................... 7

Bruhl v. Price Waterhousecoopers International, No. 03-23044cv, 2007WL 997362 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2007) ...................................................................... 13

Brunette v. Dresser Industrial, Inc., 849 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1988) ............................. 14

Castro v. Sec. of Homeland Security, 472 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) ............................ 3

Cippola v. County of Rensselaer, 129 F. Supp. 2d 436 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) ...................... 18

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) .............................................................................. 3

Cordova v. Lenman Brothers, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2007 WL 4287729(S.D. Fla. 2007) ................................................................................................... 13, 14

In re Eagle Building Technology, Inc. Sec. Litigation, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1318(S.D. Fla. 2004) ........................................................................................................... 9

Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000) ......................................... 8

In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y.2004) ........................................................................................................................... 6

Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) ........................................ 3

Green v. C.B. Fleet Holding Co., No. 07-80589-civ, 2008 WL 113668(S.D.Fla. Jan. 8, 2008) ........................................................................................ 19, 20

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) .............................................................. 3


iv

In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litigation, 115 F. Supp. 2d 620 (E.D. Va.2000) ......................................................................................................................... 10

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) ..................... 3

In re Parmalat Sec. Litigation, 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) .............................. 6

Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004) ................................. 8

Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) .................................................... 4

In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litigation, 351 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D. Md.2004) ........................................................................................................................... 6

Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (11th Cir. 1986) ............................ 10

S.E.C. v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1982) ......................................... 8, 9

S.E.C. v. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y.2006) ......................................................................................................................... 11

S.E.C. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., --, F. Supp. 2d -- 2007 WL 4480025(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007) .................................................................................... 5, 7, 9

S.E.C. v. DiBella, 2005 WL 3215899 (D. Conn. Nov. 29, 2005) ................................... 11

S.E.C. v. Digital Lightwave, 196 F.R.D. 698 (M.D.Fla. 2000) .................................. 9, 20

S.E.C. v. Dunlap, No. 01-8437cv, 2002 WL 1007626 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 27,2007) ......................................................................................................... 5, 11, 14, 19

S.E.C. v. Gad, No. 07-civ-8385, 2007 WL 4437230 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007) .......... 7, 8

S.E.C. v. Gane, 2005 WL 90154 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2005) ............................................ 7, 9

S.E.C. v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2004) ........................................................ 6

S.E.C. v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1982) ........................................................ 5, 9

S.E.C. v. Lucent Technology, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D.N.J. 2005) ....................... 5, 9

S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998) ............................................................ 11

S.E.C. v. Nacchio, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.Colo. 2006) ................................................ 5


v

S.E.C. v. Physicians Guardian Unit Investment Trust, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1342(M.D. Fla. 1999) ......................................................................................................... 3

S.E.C. v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y.1997) .............................. 10, 11, 12

S.E.C. v. Solow, 2007 WL 1970806 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2007) ........................................ 6

S.E.C. v. U.S. Environmental, Inc., 155 F.3d 107 (2d. Cir. 1998) ............................... 6, 7

In re Suprema Specialities, Inc. Sec. Litigation, 438 F.3d 256 (3d Cir.2006) ....................................................................................................................... 4, 9

TSC Industrial, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) ........................................... 7

In re Twinlab Corp. Securities Litigation, 103 F. Supp. 2d 193 (E.D.N.Y.2000) ........................................................................................................................... 7

Watts v. Florida International University, 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) ..................... 7

Ziemba v. Cascade International, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001) ....................... 4, 7

REGULATIONS

17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 ................................................................................................... 12

17 C.F.R. § 240.3b .................................................................................................... 12, 13


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THESOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 07-cv-61693 (JAL)________________________________________________

)SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, )

)Plaintiff, )

))

v. )))

JOSEPH J. MONTEROSSO, and )LUIS E. VARGAS, )

)Defendants. )

________________________________________________)

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT LUIS E. VARGAS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7.1, plaintiff,

the Securities and Exchange Commission (“the Commission”), respectfully submits its

memorandum of law in support of its opposition to the defendant, Luis E. Vargas’ (“Vargas”)

motion to dismiss the Commission’s complaint or, in the alternative, for a more definite

statement. For the reasons set forth below, the Court should deny both motions.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 21, 2007, the Commission filed a complaint against defendants

Monterosso and Vargas alleging that from about July 2004, through September 2006, they

engaged in a fraudulent scheme to generate fictitious revenue for GlobeTel Communications

Corp. (“GlobeTel”). Specifically, they created false invoices that appeared to record purchases

and sales by three of GlobeTel’s, wholly-owned subsidiaries that never occurred. The Complaint

further alleges that as a direct result of defendants’ fraudulent scheme, GlobeTel issued periodic


Vargas’ statement of “Procedural History” includes numerous allegations of fact1

that are not included in the Complaint and supported only by the ipse dixit of counsel’s argument. Many of these allegations are false, but the Commission does not respond to them because theyare not part of the Complaint and irrelevant to the resolution of the motions before the Court.

2

reports, registration statements and press releases that misled investors because they materially

overstated GlobeTel’s financial results for at least the period from the third quarter of 2004

through the second quarter of 2006. Compl. ¶ 1.

The defendants’ fraudulent scheme involved the creation of false invoices by Monterosso

and Vargas that made it appear that GlobeTel’s three wholly-owned subsidiaries, Centerline

Communications, LLC (“Centerline”), Volta Communications, LLC (“Volta”), and Lonestar

Communications, LLC (“Lonestar”) engaged in the buying and selling of telecom “minutes” with

other telecom companies. In reality, there were no transactions under the so-called “off-net”

program. Two of GlobeTel’s subsidiaries, Volta and Lonestar, did no business. The third

subsidiary, Centerline, reported millions of dollars in business with Vargas’ private company,

Carrier Services Inc. (“CSI”), that never occurred. Compl. ¶ 3. In order to substantiate the

fictitious revenue reported in the fake invoices, the defendants obtained call detail records

(“CDRs”) and submitted them to GlobeTel as documentation for the calls billed on the invoices.

All the CDRs obtained were false in that the calls documented in the CDRs were not related in

any way to “minutes” bought or sold by GlobeTel’s subsidiaries. Compl. ¶ 42, 43, 48, 49, 53, 54.

As a result of defendants’ fraudulent scheme, GlobeTel’s books, records and accounts

falsely and inaccurately reflected the company’s financial condition, Compl. ¶ 85, and caused

GlobeTel to falsely report to its investors and auditors $119 million in nonexistent revenue that

accounted for approximately 80 percent of the revenue GlobeTel reported during this period.

Compl. ¶ 2. In addition, the false invoices and false CDRs were material, false and misleading

statements to GlobeTel’s accountants and auditors. Compl. ¶¶ 87-90. 1


3

On December 5, 2007, and again on December 17, 2007, Vargas filed unopposed motions

to extend the time to respond to the Commission’s Complaint, which were granted by the Court.

Dkt. Nos. 8, 10, 18, 19. On January 11, 2007, Vargas filed a motion to dismiss the

Commission’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), 8(a), 9(b) and 10(b) and

what is styled as a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e), although the

relief requested in the motion is dismissal of the Commission’s complaint. Dkt. Nos. 21 & 22.

ARGUMENT

I. Standards Of Review

In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should accept the

factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Castro v. Sec. of Homeland

Security, 472 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11 Cir. 2006). “[A] complaint should not be dismissed forth

failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957); Castro, 472 F.3d at 1336; Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11 Cir.th

2006). The Commission’s “complaint must be sustained if relief could be granted ‘under any set

of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’” National Org. for Women, Inc. v.

Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994).

The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide the defendant with sufficient notice and enable

him to prepare answers to allegations of fraud. S.E.C. v. Physicians Guardian Unit Inv. Trust, 72

F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1352 (M.D. Fla. 1999). As noted in Physicians Guardian, 72 F. Supp. 2d at

1352: “[W]hen considering the question of whether or not a pleading of fraud is alleged with

adequate particularity in a securities law context, this Court must not read Rule 9(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to abrogate the notice pleading requirements of Rule [8] of the


“Mem. at ___,” refers to Defendant Luis E. Vargas’s Memorandum of Law in2

Support of his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or, Alternatively, for a More Definite Statement.

4

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” See also Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202

(11 Cir. 2001). “Rule 9(b) does not require nor make legitimate the pleading of detailedth

evidentiary matter.” Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 1979). Pleading

additional evidentiary details would contravene the standards of Rule 8 while serving neither

purpose of Rule 9(b) – putting a defendant on notice and enabling him to prepare an answer.

II. The Complaint Properly Alleges Claims Upon Which Relief May Be Granted

Vargas’ various arguments concerning why the claims in the Commission’s complaint

should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) are without merit because they are based upon a

misreading of the allegations in the complaint and a misunderstanding of the law.

A. The Complaint Properly Alleges Scienter Claims

1. The Complaint Properly Alleges That Vargas Is Liable For PrimaryFraud Violations

In his motion, Vargas incorrectly suggests that the Complaint does not allege violations of

Sections 17(a), 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because there is no allegation that he had any role in

GlobeTel’s decision to record or publish its revenue statements, Mem. at 8-9, 10, 16. 2

The allegations state a claim for primary fraud violations by Vargas because they allege

he used deceptive devices and his own false statements to cause GlobeTel to make false

statements to investors. In the words of Section 10(b), Vargas “directly or indirectly . . .

employ[ed a] manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.” When a defendant creates false

documents, knowing they will be used to prepare a company’s financial reports, he may be held

liable for violation Section 10(b). See, e.g., In re Suprema Specialities, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d

256 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing dismissal where corporate executives had created false invoices);


5

S.E.C. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 363 F. Supp.2d 708, 711-12 (D.N.J. 2005) (denying motion to

dismiss by defendant who negotiated with customer, then created false paperwork that caused

Lucent to overstate revenue); S.E.C. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., – F. Supp.2d –, 2007 WL

4480025 *9-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007) (denying motion to dismiss against defendants who

created false documents that caused company to inaccurately record income).

Vargas cannot avoid liability for his role in the fraudulent scheme merely because he did

not personally prepare GlobeTel’s false statements that mislead investors, because he acted with

scienter to cause those misrepresentations. See S.E.C. v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 134-35 (7th

Cir. 1982) (affirming judgment against defendant who made false statement to individual who

drafted circulars sent to investors); S.E.C. v. Nacchio, 438 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1281-82 (D.Colo.

2006).

Although he has not directly raised this argument, Vargas implies that the Complaint does

not properly plead materiality because it does not allege that the misrepresentations to investors

were not attributable to him. This argument fails because, unlike a private plaintiff, the

Commission need not allege that a false statement was attributed to an individual defendant. As

discussed more fully in the Commission’s opposition to Monterosso’s motion to dismiss, courts

have declined to apply this “Bright Line Rule” to actions brought by the Commission because it

is not required to allege or prove reliance, which is the basis of the rule in private plaintiff cases.

See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Collins & Aikens Corp., – F. Supp.2d –, 2007 WL 4480025 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.

21, 2007) (declining to apply “bright line test” against the SEC); S.E.C. v. Power, -- F. Supp.2d -

-, 2007 WL 4224368, *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2007) (denying dismissal where executive created

sham transaction, was involved in accounting, and the company recognized improper revenue);

S.E.C. v. Dunlap, No. 01-8437cv., 2002 WL 1007626, *5 n.7 (S.D. Fla. March 27, 2002)

(Ziemba “has only tangential value” to a case brought by the Commission).


6

Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) are broad and “encompass much more than illegal trading activity:

they encompass the use of ‘any device, scheme or artifice,’ or ‘any act, practice, or course of

business’ used to perpetuate a fraud on investors.” In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig.,

351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 372 (D. Md. 2004). See also In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d

472, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 336-

37 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Courts have recognized that the Commission has broader authority to

enforce securities laws than a private party, and may bring claims based upon fraudulent devices

and schemes, as well as false statements. See S.E.C. v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1298-1301

(11 Cir. 2004) (defendant liable for insider trading notwithstanding he made no materialth

misrepresentations to investors); S.E.C. v. Solow, No. 06-81041cv, 2007 WL 1970806 (S.D. Fla.

May 10, 2007) (denying motion to dismiss although defendant’s misrepresentations were made

to his broker-dear, not to investors); S.E.C. v. U.S. Environmental Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 110-11

(2d. Cir. 1998) (broker primarily liable when he “participated in the fraudulent scheme or other

activity proscribed by the securities laws”).

The allegations in the Complaint properly plead that Vargas engaged in a fraudulent

scheme, or practice or course of business that directly caused material misrepresentations to be

made in conjunction with the offer, purchase or sale of GlobeTel securities. Therefore, it

sufficiently pleads a violations of Sections 17(a), 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

2. The Complaint Properly Alleges That Vargas’ Fraud Was Material

Vargas first claims that the Complaint fails to allege specific facts that any representation

or omission by Vargas was material. Mem. at 7-8. He argues that the facts alleged could not

mislead GlobeTel executives who Vargas claims “stepped into the shoes of investors for

purposes of applying the material misrepresentation or omission rule,” and therefore could not be


7

considered material. Id. Vargas’ argument misconstrues the requirements of the law and ignores

the allegations in the complaint.

To establish a violation of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act or Section 10(b) of the

Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, the Commission must show “(1) a misrepresentation

or omission, (2) that was material, (3) which was made in the offer and sale of a security (Section

17(a)(1)) or in connection with the purchase or sale of securities (Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5),

(4) scienter, and (5) the involvement of interstate commerce, the mails, or a national securities

exchange.” S.E.C. v. Gane, No. 03-61553cv, 2005 WL 90154, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2005);

see also Ziemba, 256 F. 3d at 1202. The test for materiality is not whether the executives at

GlobeTel believed the representations concerning the amount of revenue being generated by

Centerline. Rather, the issue is whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable

investor would have believed GlobeTel’s reporting of approximately $119 million in nonexistent

revenue as a result of Vargas’ and Monterosso’s fraudulent scheme was important. See TSC

Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); S.E.C. v. Kirkland, 521F.Supp.2d 1281,

*21 (M.D.Fla. 2007) (“ ‘Material information’ is defined as information that is substantially

likely to be important to a reasonable investor in deciding whether to purchase, sell, or hold

securities.”); see Bradbury v. S.E.C., –F.3d–, 2008 WL 108728, *6 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2008)

(“investors must have the opportunity to assess the ‘total mix’ of information”).

Moreover, “[b]ecause materiality is generally a question of fact, it is unlikely that a cause

of action turning on materiality would be dismissed as a matter of law.” In re Twinlab Corp.

Secs. Litig., 103 F.Supp.2d 193, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); S.E.C. v. Gad, No. 07-civ-8385, 2007 WL

4437230 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007). Therefore, the Complaint need only allege facts concerning

the materiality of Vargas’ fraudulent scheme that are at least “plausible.” Watts v. Florida Int’l

Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11 Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, – U.S. –,th


8

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see Gad, 2007 WL 4437230 at *2 (applying “plausible on its

face” standard to materiality).

The Complaint alleges that Vargas’ fraudulent scheme caused GlobeTel to report

approximately $119 million in revenue that did not exist in its eight periodic filings, three

registration statements, and nine press releases. Compl. ¶¶ 56-84. It is, at the very least, plausible

that a reasonable investor would have considered important the fact that 80 percent of the

revenue GlobeTel reported during this period was fictitious. See, Ganino v. Citizens Utilities

Co., 228 F.3d 154, 164-66 (2d Cir. 2000) (overstatement of less than two percent was material).

3. The Complaint Properly Pleads Scienter

Vargas’ argument that the Complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to establish he acted

with scienter, Mem. at 8, fails when the allegations in the complaint are examined in light of

existing precedent.

The Complaint alleges facts that demonstrate Vargas’ scienter under either test

enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit: a defendant’s acts of knowing misconduct or a defendant’s

acts that demonstrate recklessness. See S.E.C. v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th

Cir. 1982). In weighing scienter, courts look to an aggregate of all allegations, not merely single

allegations. Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1016-17 (11th Cir. 2004).

Specifically, the Complaint alleges that: (1) Vargas created hundreds of false invoices and CDRs,

Compl. ¶ 36; (2) the invoices were false because Centerline, Volta and Lonestar had not bought

or sold anything and the CDRs were false because they did not record transmissions that had any

connection to the three subsidiaries, Compl. ¶¶ 36, 39-55; (3) some of the invoices appeared to

be sent by two companies owned by other individuals, Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, 46; and (4) copies of

invoices purporting to be to or from Ron Hay’s companies, were not sent to Hay. Compl. ¶ 43.

Thus, the Complaint contains numerous allegations that Vargas engaged in knowing


9

misconduct when he created false invoices and false CDRs for transactions he knew never

occurred and for companies where he did not work, and submitted them to GlobeTel. The

creation of documents that are known to be false is evidence of scienter. See, e.g., Carriba, 681

F.2d at 1324 (scienter shown where defendant failed to correct “glaring omissions” false

statements in prospectus he reviewed); Kirkland, 521 F. Supp.2d at *21-*22 (creating fake leases

to create impression of business success is evidence of scienter); In re Suprema Specialities, 438

F.3d at 278-79 (creating false invoices is evidence of scienter); see also S.E.C. v. Digital

Lightwave, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 698, 701 (M.D.Fla. 2000) (scienter plead when SEC alleged that

defendant knew that he was recording revenue fraudulently). The Complaint also alleges that

Vargas tried to conceal his fraud by not forwarding to Hay copies of the invoices that appeared to

come from or be sent to his company. See, Lucent, 363 F. Supp.2d at 717-18 (scienter

sufficiently pleaded by alleging defendant tried to hide agreements from his company’s chief

accountant); see also, Holschuh, 694 F.2d at 143-44.

Additionally, the allegations establish that Vargas had a strong pecuniary motive to create

fictitious revenue for GlobeTel; an allegation that is relevant to recklessness. Tellabs, Inc. v.

Makor Issues and Rights, Ltd., – U.S. –, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2503 (2007); Gane, 2005 WL 90154 at

*15. The Complaint alleges that: CSI would received payment from GlobeTel only if CSI

generated revenue for GlobeTel, Compl. ¶ 21-23; CSI was unable to generate the revenue

required by the agreement with GlobeTel, Compl. ¶¶ 24-32; Vargas was the sole shareholder of

CSI, Compl. ¶ 1; and, as a result of meeting the revenue goals in the agreements with GlobeTel,

CSI received at least $180,000 from GlobeTel and total payments of $1 million. Compl. ¶ 95.

An inference of recklessness is further supported by the allegations that Vargas created

hundreds of false invoices over a period of two years and that these invoices accounted for

approximately 80 percent of GlobeTel’s revenue during that period because the length and


10

magnitude of the fraud are indicia of the recklessness. See In re Eagle Building Tech., Inc. Sec.

Litig., 319 F. Supp.2d 1318, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (magnitude of fraud is relevant to establish

scienter); In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp.2d 620, 639 (E.D. Va. 2000); see also

S.E.C. v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

B. The Complaint Properly Alleges Non-Scienter Claims

1. Section 17(a)(2)-(3): Non-scienter Fraud

Vargas’ argument that the First Claim for Relief does not properly allege a violation of

Section 17(a)(2) and (3) because it does not specify how much money he received, Mem. at 10, is

specious. As explained above in Section II.A.3., the Complaint alleges clearly that Vargas

obtained money as a result of the fraudulent scheme. Compl. ¶ 95-96. The law does not require

the Complaint to allege a sum certain, as evident from Vargas’ failure to cite a single precedent

to support his argument.

Vargas’ argument that the First Claim is deficient because it fails to allege any material

misrepresentation by him is again based upon his confusion of the requirements of a suit brought

by a private party with one brought by the Commission. As we explain above in Section II.A.2.,

the Complaint properly pleads Vargas’ involvement in a fraudulent scheme that directly caused a

material misrepresentation, so he may be liable for a primary violation of the securities laws.

2. Aiding and Abetting Claims

In order to state aiding and abetting claims, like those in the Third, Fourth and Fifth

Claims for Relief, the Commission must allege facts showing that (I) there was a primary

violation of the securities laws, (ii) the defendant had general awareness that his role was part of

an overall activity that is improper, and (iii) that the defendant knowingly and substantially

assisted the violation. Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1045 (11 Cir. 1986). th

Vargas argues that the Complaint has not properly plead aiding and abetting because it


Vargas’ failure to differentiate between the three counts is grounds to deny his3

motion with respect to these claims for relief. See S.E.C. v. Dunlap, 2002 WL 1007626, *7(S.D. Fla. 2002) (defendant bears the burden of proving that no claim has been stated).

11

fails to allege scienter. Mem. at 11. Vargas’ motion makes only a cursory argument about these

claims and does not distinguish between them. However, as a matter of law, Vargas’ argument3

fails with respect to the Fourth and Fifth Claims because scienter is not an element of any claims

under Section 13 of the Exchange Act. See S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir.

1998).

With respect to the Third Claim, that involves a claim of fraud, the Commission

identified in Section II.A.3. above, the allegations that support the claim that Vargas acted with

scienter. Those same allegations support the claim that Vargas acted with scienter when he aided

and abetted GlobeTel’s violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

Finally, the allegations identified in Section II.A.1. above support the claim that Vargas

committed a primary violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 105-b when he caused GlobeTel to

make material misstatements. Therefore, they also support a claim that he provided “substantial

assistance” to GlobeTel’s violation of the same provisions. Those detailed allegations

distinguish the Complaint from the cases cited by Vargas. See SEC v. Cedric Kushner

Promotions, Inc., 417 F. Supp.2d 326, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting motion for summary

judgment because facts did not support the aiding and abetting allegation); SEC v. DiBella, No.

04-cv-1342, 2005 WL 3215899 *10 (D. Conn. Nov. 29, 2005) (denying motion to dismiss).

C. Rule 13b2-1: Falsifying Books and Records

The Sixth Claim alleges that Vargas violated Rule 13b2-1, which provides that "[n]o

person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record, or account"

maintained pursuant to Section 13(b)(2)(A). Scienter is not an element of a Rule 13b2-1


Monterosso qualified as an “officer” as early as 2004 when he took over4

GlobeTel’s entire Centerline subsidiary, reported to GlobeTel’s CEO, supervised its employees,negotiated contracts and ran the entire wholesale telecommunications business. Compl. ¶ 10. This conduct qualifies as “routinely performing” the functions of a vice president.

12

violation. McNulty, 137 F.3d at 741; Softpoint, 958 F. Supp. At 865-66. Any unreasonable

conduct directly or indirectly resulting in falsification of corporate records is within the scope of

Rule 13b2-1. Id. at 866. The Complaint meets this standard by alleging that Vargas created false

invoices and CDRs and submitted them to GlobeTel, knowing they would be relied upon by

GlobeTel’s accountants to make entries in GlobeTel’s general ledger and other documents.

Compl. ¶¶ 85-90, 121-22. Thus, the Complaint properly alleges that Vargas both directly (the

invoices) and indirectly falsified or caused to be falsified GlobeTel’s books and records.

D. Rule 13b2-2: False Statements To Auditors

The Sixth Claim also alleges violations of Rule 13b2-2, which prohibits officers,

directors or any other person acting under the direction thereof from misleading an accountant

engaged in the audit or review of the financial statements of that issuer where the people know or

should have known that the action would render the financial statements materially misleading.

17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2. For purposes of the Exchange Act, the term “officer” is defined to

include a “vice president . . . and any person routinely performing corresponding functions.” 17

CFR § 240.3b.

The Complaint properly alleges that Vargas violated Rule 13b2-2(b) when he created and

submitted invoices and CDRs at Monterosso’s direction. Compl. ¶ 124-25. Vargas misled

auditors throughout this period by providing false invoices and false CDRs, knowing the auditors

had requested them to confirm the “off-net” transactions. Compl. ¶¶ 91-93. Vargas became a

“person acting under the direction of an officer” at least by May 2005 when Monterosso was

hired by GlobeTel as Centerline’s president. Compl. ¶ 10. In his motion, Vargas misreads Rule4


See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b.

13

13b2-2 and argues that it only applies to officers and directors. As discussed above, Rule 13b2-

2(b) applies to people, such as Vargas, acting under the direction of an officer.

III. The Complaint Pleads Fraud With Adequate Particularity

Vargas asserts that the Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to satisfy the

specificity requirements of Rule 9(b). Mem. at 13. It appears that Vargas’ claim is based upon

three arguments: (1) the Complaint improperly alleges actions taken by “Monterosso or Vargas,

at Monterosso’s direction;” (2) the Complaint contains conclusory allegations that impute

conduct of one defendant to both; and (3) the Complaint uses the terms “false” and “cause”

outside the words ordinary meaning. Id. None of Vargas’ arguments have merit.

A. The Complaint Adequately Informs Vargas Of The Nature Of HisParticipation In The Fraud

Vargas does not claim that the Complaint lacks specificity concerning the conduct and

misrepresentations that constitute the fraud. Neither does he claim that the Complaint is

ambiguous with respect to when the conduct occurred. Vargas’ only argument is that the

Complaint lacks specificity because it improperly “lumps” Monterosso and Vargas together,

when it refers to conduct by “Monterosso or Vargas, at Monterosso’s direction. Mem. at 13.

Unlike the cases upon which Vargas relies to support his argument, the Complaint does

not refer to Monterosso and Vargas collectively as a group. See Cordova v. Lehman Bros., Inc.,

– F.Supp.2d –, 2007 WL 4287729, *6 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (complaint repeatedly referred to six

unrelated defendants collectively as “Financial Institution Defendants”); Bruhl v. Price

Waterhousecoopers Int’l, No. 03-23044cv, 2007 WL 997362, *3-*4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2007)

(complaint referred to two separate corporate entities collectively as “Citco Defendants”);

Appalachian Enter., Inc. v. ePayment Solutions Ltd., No. 01-cv-11502, 2004 WL 2813121, *6-*7


The other cases cited by Vargas either are inapposite or do not support his5

argument. See Brunette v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1277, (10 Cir. 1988) (whether theth

complaint was sufficient to put defendants on notice of the unplead cause of action); S.E.C. v.Dunlap, No. 01-8437-civ, 2002 WL 1007626, *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2007) (pleading sufficienteven though the complaint referred to individual defendants and corporation collectively).

14

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2004) (complaint did not differentiate between acts taken by 17 different

defendants, or explain how the defendants were interrelated). 5

Also, unlike the cases upon which Vargas relies, the Complaint does not contain general

allegations of fraud in the passive voice without attributing the actions to any particular

defendant. See Cordova , 2007 WL 4287729 at *6 (use of the passive voice to allege fraud

obscured “exactly who made the statements or committed the fraudulent acts”). The Complaint

alleges the fraudulent acts in the active voice. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 36, 37, 99. Although Vargas cites

Cordova, Mem. at 14, he does not cite one instance where the Complaint employs the passive

voice to describe his conduct.

The Complaint clearly raises the inference that Monterosso and Vargas acted in concert to

perpetrate their fraud. It alleges that, prior to dealing with GlobeTel, Vargas worked as

Monterosso’s bookkeeper. Compl. ¶ 17. It also alleges that after Vargas started his own telecom

company, Monterosso handled all the negotiations for the company. Compl. ¶ 18. Additionally,

after CSI entered the agreement with GlobeTel, Vargas reported to Monterosso throughout their

work for GlobeTel. Compl. ¶ 24. The Complaint also alleges that Vargas personally requested

additional invoices from a telecom company that Monterosso had previously contacted to obtain

invoices. Compl. ¶ 27-28. Thus, the allegations in the Complaint assert that Monterosso and

Vargas were inextricably related and that they acted in concert to perpetrate the fraud in this case.

Cf. Appalachian Enter., 2004 WL 2813121 at *6.


The Complaint does not violate Rule 8(a) for all the same reasons it does not6

violate Rule 9(b).

Vargas concedes that the claims of relief allege that both he and Monterosso7

committed the fraudulent acts alleged. Mem. at 15.

15

The allegations that actions were taken by “Monterosso or Vargas, at Monterosso’s

direction” reflect the relationship between the two defendants and assert that Monterosso was

responsible for all the actions taken either by him or by Vargas. The allegations describing the

extent of Monterosso’s involvement does not create ambiguity concerning Vargas’ role. The

complaint alleges that all of the invoices and all of the CDRs submitted to GlobeTel that

purported to represent “off-net” telecom business were fraudulent. Compl. ¶¶ 40-55. These

allegations clearly put Vargas on notice that he must defend against the assertion that he created

false invoices, obtained false CDRs and submitted false invoices and CDRs to GlobeTel.

Vargas’ argument that the Complaint impermissibly “lumps” the defendants together

hinges on the use of “or” when the factual allegations refer to actions by “Monterosso or

Vargas.” As explained above, the use of “or” does not impermissibly “lump” the defendants

together in a manner that courts have found to violate Rule 9(b). Rather, the factual allegations6

specifically identify both defendants by name and allege that both defendants committed the acts

alleged while recognizing the relationship between them. Any ambiguity about Vargas’ role

created by use of the term “or” is eliminated in each of the claims for relief that allege

Monterosso and Vargas committed the fraudulent acts alleged. Compl. ¶¶ 99, 100, 104, 109,7

114, 118, 121, 125.

B. The Complaint Does Not Rely Upon Conclusory Allegations To ImputeConduct To Vargas

Vargas’s claim that the Complaint only includes “conclusory allegations” concerning his

conduct and attempts to impute Monterosso’s conduct to Vargas is incorrect. Mem. at 15.


As explained in Section II.A.3., above, the Complaint adequately pleads scienter8

on the part of Vargas.

16

Vargas first argues that the Complaint attempts to impute the experience of Monterosso

to Vargas to show that he acted with scienter. Mem. at 15. However, the Complaint8

unambiguously sets forth the factual basis for the Commission’s assertion that Vargas had

“extensive experience in the wholesale telecom business,” including his work as Monterosso’s

bookkeeper while Monterosso operated a wholesale telecom switch, Compl. ¶ 17, and the fact

that, in 2003, Vargas began operating his own telecom business utilizing Monterosso’s switch.

Compl. ¶ 18. Vargas’ argument goes to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the extent of

Vargas’ experience, not the sufficiency of the pleading.

Vargas also argues that the Complaint contains only conclusory allegations concerning

his knowledge of what GlobeTel would do with the “off-net” invoices and CDRs. Mem. at 17.

This argument is patently incorrect. Rule 9(b) expressly provides that “malice, intent,

knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.” The Complaint

complies with this standard by alleging Vargas knew how the false invoices and CDRs would be

used by GlobeTel. However, the Complaint also includes allegations establishing the basis for

alleging Vargas had knowledge of GlobeTel’s use of the false invoices and CDRs:

(1) the purpose of the agreement between GlobeTel and Vargas’ company,CSI, was to “build telecommunications revenue . . .” Compl. ¶ 19;

(2) Vargas knew GlobeTel could not record revenue generated by Centerline’s“off-net” telecom business without invoices and CDRs, Compl. ¶ 35;

(3) GlobeTel’s finance department requested CDRs from Vargas to prove thatVolta, Lonestar and Centerline had actually engaged in the telecomtransactions for which invoices had been submitted, Compl. ¶ 88;

(4) Vargas knew GlobeTel’s auditors had specifically requested CDRs inorder to compare them to the invoices and confirm that the telecom


17

“minutes” had actually been bought and sold, Compl. ¶ 92; and

(5) Vargas knew the fake invoices and CDRs relating to “off-net” revenuewould be presented to GlobeTel’s independent auditors. Compl. ¶ 93.

These allegations create a plausible inference that Vargas knew that GlobeTel would use the

fraudulent invoices and CDRs to record revenue that would be incorporated into GlobeTel’s

filings and other reports of revenue.

C. The Use Of The Words “False” and “Cause” In The Complaint Does NotViolate Rule 9(b)

Vargas’ argument that the Complaint’s use of the words “false” and “cause” violates the

specificity requirements of Rule 9(b) lacks any factual or legal basis.

With respect to the use of the word “false,” Vargas concedes, Mem. at 16, that the

Complaint explains specifically why the CDRs are alleged to be false–they were not related in

any way to the telecom “minutes” bought or sold by GlobeTel’s subsidiaries. Compl. 42, 48, 53.

The CDRs may document some calls that were made somewhere, but they were false to the

extent they were presented as documenting the calls for which Vargas submitted invoices to

GlobeTel. Vargas cannot claim to be “confused” by the Complaint when his argument

demonstrates he understands the allegations against which he must defend. Vargas’ argument is

actually that the facts alleged are insufficient to prove that the CDRs were false; a factual dispute

that is not relevant to resolution of his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9(b).

Vargas argues the Complaint improperly uses the word “caused” to describe how the fake

invoices had an effect upon GlobeTel’s financial statements and thus, had a connection with the

offering, sale or purchase of GlobeTel securities. Vargas’ argument again assumes the

Commission must establish that the misrepresentations must be directly attributed to him. See

Mem. at 16 (“The SEC has not and cannot allege that Monterosso or Vargas prepared GlobeTel’s

books, records and accounts.”) However, as we demonstrated in Section II.A. above, this


18

requirement does not apply to the Commission which has broader authority to bring suit to

enforce the securities laws. See Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,

–U.S.–, slip op. at 10 (Jan. 15, 2008) (“It is true that if business operations are used, as alleged

here, to affect securities markets, the SEC enforcement power may reach the culpable actors.”).

The Commission’s claims against Vargas are not based upon misrepresentations that he

personally made to potential investors. Rather, the Complaint alleges that Vargas gave false

document to GlobeTel knowing its accountants would rely upon them to report revenue in

GlobeTel’s books, records, filings and press releases. There is no ambiguity in the Complaint

and, therefore, no Rule 9(b) violation.

IV. The Complaint Satisfies the Requirements Of Rule 10(b)

Vargas argues that the Complaint also fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 10(b) for

two reasons: (1) it “lumps” Vargas and Monterosso together in each count; and (2) it “lumps”

together causes of action. Mem. at 18-19. Both arguments fail.

As explained in Sec. III.A. above, each of the claims for relief allege Monterosso and

Vargas, committed the fraudulent acts alleged. This does not constitute an impermissible

“lumping” together of the defendants. Rather, each count alleges that both Vargas and

Monterosso violated the securities laws and alleges that they both engaged in the conduct.

Apparently, Vargas’ argument is that the Commission must plead separate claims for relief

against Vargas and Monterosso even when identical conduct is alleged against both of them.

This standard for pleading is not required by Rule 10(b). See Cippola v. County of Rensselaer,

129 F.Supp.2d 436, 444-45 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (proper to combine allegations against multiple

defendants where it is alleged that all defendants engaged in the same conduct).

Although Vargas argues all the claims for relief are flawed because they impermissibly

“lump” together causes of action, he only explains his assertion with respect to the First Claim


Vargas’ failure to provide any argument concerning the other claims for relief9

foreclose his motion to dismiss with respect to those claim. Dunlap, 2002 WL 1007626, at *7.

19

for Relief, which alleges a violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. Mem. at 18-19. 9

Rule 10(b) provides, in pertinent part: “Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or

occurrence . . . shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the

clear presentation of the matters set forth.” (Emphasis added). In addition, Rule (8)(e)(2)

provides, in pertinent part: “A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense

alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or in separate counts or defenses.” (Emphasis

added). Together, the two rules require separate counts when claims arise out of different

transactions or occurrences. This is consistent with the precedent in this circuit. See Anderson

v. Dist. Bd. Of Trustees of Central Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11 Cir. 1996); Greenth

v. C.B. Fleet Holding Co., No. 07-80589cv, 2008 WL 113668, *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2008).

In this case, all the claims for relief arise from the same “off-net” program and, therefore,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorize combining different claims. However,

none of the counts contain more than one claim. Each counts seeks relief based upon specific

sections of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act or the rules thereunder. Each claim for relief

sets forth its elements, Compl. ¶¶ 98, 103, 108, 113, 117, 121-24, and each count identifies the

allegations that support the claim. Compl. ¶¶ 99-100, 104-05, 109-10, 114, 118, 121-25. These

claims are not the type of “shotgun” pleadings condemned in Anderson, that makes it “virtually

impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”

77 F.3d at 366.

Vargas’ single argument concerning Rule 10(b) is that the First Claim does not specify

which subpart of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act he violated. Mem. at 18-19. Vargas cites no

authority for his proposition that different subsections of Section 17(a) must be alleged in


20

different counts, because there is none. The First Claim alleges that Vargas violated all three

subsections of Section 17(a). It includes the text of all three subsections and identifies the factual

allegations that support the claim. This form of alternative pleading is expressly recognized as a

proper way to state a claim: “When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of

them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the

insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements.” Rule 8(e)(2). The First Claim for

Relief, like all the other claims for relief, comply with the requirements of Rule 10(b).

IV. Vargas’ Motion For A More Definite Statement Should Be Denied

Rule 12(e) provides that a more definite statement of a pleading is required when it is “so

vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” The standard for

granting a motion to dismiss is “unintelligibility, not lack of detail.” Digital Lightwave, 196

F.R.D. at 700. For all the reasons explained above, Vargas’ motion for a more definite statement

should be denied, because the Complaint presents clear and precise claims for relief. Anderson,

77 F.3d at 366.

However, if the court were to conclude that any portion of the Complaint is ambiguous or

vague, the correct remedy is not dismissal, but amendment of the Complaint to remove any

ambiguity. Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366; Green, 2008 WL 113668 at *2 (“Even in far more

egregious ‘shotgun pleadings,’ the remedy is not dismissal.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny Vargas’ motion to dismiss and his

motion for a definite statement in their entirety.


January 28, 2008 Respectfully submitted,

s/Jeffery T. Infelise Of Counsel: Jeffery T. Infelise (DC 546998)Cheryl J. Scarboro Special Florida Bar No. A5501154

[email protected] Reid A. Muoio Special Florida Bar No. [email protected] MitchellSpecial Florida Bar No. [email protected] F Street NEWashington, D.C. 20549(tel) (202) 551-4904 (Infelise)(fax) (202) 772-9362 (Infelise)

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 28, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiff’sMemorandum of Law in Support of its Opposition to Defendant Luis E. Vargas’ Motion toDismiss the Complaint, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement with the Clerk of thecourt using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on allcounsel of record or pro se parties identified on the attached Service List in the manner specified,either via transmission of Notices of electronic filing generated by CM/ECF or in some otherauthorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive electronicallyNotices of Electronic filing.

s/Jeffery T. Infelise Jeffery T. Infelise


SERVICE LIST

Walter J. Mathews, Esq. Mark David Hunter, Esq. D. Patricia Wallace, Esq. [email protected] and [email protected] Leser Hunter Taubman & Taubman, PLLCWalter J. Mathews, P.A. 407 Lincoln Rd., Suite 500Courthouse Law Plaza Miami beach, FL 33139700 S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 300 Tel. 305-604-5547Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 Fax. 305-604-5548 Tel. 954-463-1929 Attorney for DefendantFax. 954-463-1920 [Joseph J. Monterosso]Attorney for Defendant [electronic] [Luis E. Vargas][electronic]


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