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BEYOND THE LAW: Understanding the Political Dynamics of Grassroots

Democracy in Vietnam

HAI Hong NGUYEN

Bachelor of English Studies (Hanoi National University-Vietnam)

Bachelor of Law (Hanoi Law University-Vietnam)

Master of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Lund University-Sweden)

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at

The University of Queensland in 2014

School of Political Science and International Studies

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Abstract

Existing analytic approaches to the implementation of grassroots democracy (GRD) in Vietnam

tend to look at this policy as a response by the Vietnamese party-state to address the crises of the

Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV’s) legitimacy and governance. GRD is commonly viewed as a

top-down policy of the CPV and has been formalized by a legal framework, making it compulsory

nation-wide. As illustrated by a series of rural unrests in the 1990s, amid the economic reforms

launched by the party in the late 1980s, the CPV recognized the need to increase its communication

mechanisms at the interface between local authorities and the people at the grassroots. While

valuable, existing approaches overlook the specificity and variance of local conditions, as well as

the root causes of the unrest. On the other hand, the CPV’s approach in using GRD as a legal tool is

based on its objective of restoring stability in rural areas, without losing control over the

implementation process. These approaches, therefore, limit our understanding of why GRD is

implemented successfully in one commune, but not in another even within the same province or

between provinces. They tend to focus on what goes wrong (structural problems), rather what goes

right (local resources). Additionally, they prioritize skepticism of the CPV’s adoption of GRD,

disputing that it contains any ‘sincerity’ (thực tâm) as a political reform in the countryside. This

further reinforces a common perception of Vietnam by Western scholars that the country is not a

democracy (by liberal democratic theories’ standards) and that no democracy exists at any level.

The gap left by existing approaches suggests an alternative approach is required to evaluate the

ongoing implementation of Vietnamese GRD and its impacts on Vietnamese polity in general, and

the CPV as the ruling party in particular. The research also reviews and articulates with research on

how the Communist Party of China (CPC) has used GRD mechanisms (somewhat successfully) to

rejuvenate its autocratic regime, while also facilitating what some scholars refer to as ‘smart

authoritarianism’. The thesis thus investigates the conditions that support the implementation of

GRD goals, which in turn has an impact on the the CPV’s legitimacy and capacity to govern in the

countryside.

The new approach proposed by this thesis is informed by major theories in the contemporary

international discourse on democratization. The theories under review in this thesis include:

modernization theory, human empowerment theory, and social capital theory. These theories

propose the conditions that facilitate democracy emerging, functioning and surviving. Based on the

conditions drawn from these theories, as well as considering the seminal aim of GRD, that is to

address the root causes of rural unrest; this thesis constructs an analytic framework constituting

independent variables. This enables not only an understanding of the dynamics of GRD in

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Vietnamese rural areas, but also of its impacts on the CPV’s legitimacy and governance at the

grassroots, as well as on the local governance system.

This framework is then used to analyze the implementation of GRD in three provinces – Thái

Bình, Hưng Yên, and Đà Nẵng. These case-studies show that the implementation of GRD is highly

contextual and produces varied results. The analysis further demonstrates that whatever the results

are, the ongoing implementation of GRD is resulting in impacts on the party-state apparatus, state-

peasantry relations, and cadre-peasant relations in the countryside. These findings are significant in

supporting the thesis’s argument that GRD has created a mutually empowering mechanism for both

the party-state and the peasantry. The CPV thus uses GRD as a mechanism to reduce tensions

between the state and the peasantry, between party members and the peasants, and help facilitate

stability in rural areas. This ultimately reinforces the CPV’s legitimacy and grip on power. On the

other hand, GRD gives power to the peasantry to raise their voices, hold the local authorities

accountable, as well as to express their demands. While peasant demands are not always met by the

authorities, that is something that rarely happened before the emergence of GRD. It also shows that

the change in state-peasantry relations – that is, the way the local authorities and party members

communicate with the peasants, and respond to the peasant’s demands - goes hand-in-hand with the

local governance reforms. Finally, the findings inform us that successful implementation of GRD

does not necessarily weaken the party-state’s ability to govern society, but has the capacity to

reduce structural-social tensions. Therefore in the future, the thesis opines that a democratic

transformation of some form - without violence - is possible in Vietnam. The thesis hence

contributes to ongoing debates about the durability of revolutionary regimes, and the literature on

political regime types and political and social change in Southeast Asia.

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Declaration by author

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or

written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly

stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical

assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial

advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis

is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree

candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for

the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have

clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and,

subject to the General Award Rules of The University of Queensland, immediately made available

for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright

holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the

copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis.

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Publications during candidature

Textbook

Hai, Hong Nguyen (Eds). 2014. United Nations Security Council: Rules, Procedures, Working Methods and Reforms. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House (forthcoming).

Book Chapters

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2014. “Political Parties, Civil Society and Citizens Movements in Vietnam” in Political Parties and Citizen Movements in Asia and Europe, edited by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Stockholm, Sweden: IDEA.

Articles in Foreign Journals, Newspapers and Forums

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2014. Preparing for the worst: The Vietnam-Sino Defense Hotline. The Indo-Pacific Review, 5 November

Hai, Hong Nguyen and Charles Knight. 2014. “A Break with Beijing?: Hanoi Considers its Options” World Affairs Journal (WAJ), November/December

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2014. “Grassroots Democracy and Inequality Reduction in Rural Vietnam: The Case of Thái Bình in 1997 and Now”. Asian Journal of Political Science (AJPS) no. 22(1): 71-92

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Does Hanoi deal with Beijing for its people, or for itself? East Asia Forum (ANU), 12 January.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Civil Society and Democratization in Vietnam, East Asia Forum (ANU). 2 February.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Influential Factors in Vietnam-US Relations, East Asia Forum (ANU). 16 March.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Chinese Foreign Minister Stumbles in ASEAN, Asia Sentinel. 9 May.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Can Vietnam have one party, two-candidate system? East Asia Forum (ANU), 10 May.

Hai, Hong Nguyen and Stephen McLoughlin. 2013. Vietnam and Australia towards a strategic partnership, Asia Sentinel. July 2013

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. US-Vietnam ties: Time for a Rethink? The Diplomat, 25 July.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Vietnamese civil society bringing political change, East Asia Forum (ANU). 11 October.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Shoots of hope for Vietnamese Democracy, East Asia Forum (ANU). 13 December. (Reproduced in the Global, a publication in Hong Kong)

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2012. Time to reinterpret ASEAN’s Consensus Principle, East Asia Forum. 27 July 2012.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2012. Anti-corruption in Vietnam falls short, East Asia Forum (ANU). 18 August.

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2012. Wen Jiabao’s Legacy and Chinese Politics Today, East Asia Forum (ANU). 24 November.

Articles in Vietnamese Journals

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2014. National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region (Cơ

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quan nhân quyền quốc gia khu vực châu Á-Thái Bình Dương), Social Science Information Review. (1): 11-19

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. Understanding Trust Capital in Political Science: The case of Obama's re-election (Tìm hiểu về vốn niềm tin trong chính trị học: Trường hợp tái thắng cử của Obama), Social Science Information Review. (4): 37-42

Hai, Hong Nguyen and Hoang Mai Huong. 2012. Strengthening the implementation of grassroots democracy in order to protect human rights better (Tăng cường thực hiện dân chủ ở cơ sở để bảo vệ quyền con người được tốt hơn), Social Science Information Review. (2): 15-24

Hai, Hong Nguyen and Hoang Thanh Phuong. 2012. “Legitimacy of R2P Revisited- The case of NATO attacks in Libya” (Xem lại tính chính danh của R2P qua trường hợp các cuộc tấn công của NATO ở Li-bi-a), Social Science Information Review, (5): 46-53. [(Reproduced in English) in the International Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, (26, June 2012): 151-162)]

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2011. “Concerning the teaching and learning in English at specialized department at tertiary level in Vietnam today” (Về giảng dạy và học bằng tiếng Anh tại các khoa chuyên ngành cấp đại học ở Việt Nam hiện nay). Social Science Information Review, (1): 10-21

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2011. “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – A New Concept and Tool in International Relations” (Trách nhiệm bảo vệ (R2P)-Khái niệm và Công cụ mới trong quan hệ quốc tế). Social Science Information Review, (6): 24-30

Books translated

Hai, Hong Nguyen. 2013. National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 780 pages

Publications included in this thesis

No publications included

Contributions by others to the thesis

No contributions by others

Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another

degree

None

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Acknowledgements

In the School of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS) at the University of

Queensland, I owe a great debt to my principal supervisor, Dr Melissa Curley, who travelled with

me along the way, from the beginning of this research. With her rich expertise in Southeast Asia

and special interest in Vietnam, she provided me myriad valuable inputs and guidance at every

stage of this research. She always posed questions where more clarification or in-depth analysis is

needed. Her enthusiasm, support and encouraging words: “Nearly there”, at the final stage inspired

me enormously to complete this research. I would also like to thank Associate Professor David

Martin Jones for his supervision. I benefited a lot from his wide knowledge of democratic theories

and political regimes. His advice on Chinese regime’s adaptation tactics for survival reinforces the

aim of my research. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr Noel Morada for his supervision and

leading me through the initial stage of my research. Others, including Professor Tim Dunne and Dr

Barbara Sullivan, provided excellent comments on my Statement of Intent (SOI) paper.

Among other academic and support staff of POLSIS, I wish to thank Dr Rae Wear for her

chairing my Research Higher Degree (RHD) milestones and advice relating to my candidature; and

Vanessa Salam for her excellent administrative assistance.

My special thanks go to my friend, Dr Charles Knight at Macquarie University, who tirelessly

proof-read my drafts. It was him who made my papers readable because of my terrible English

writing. I really enjoyed his friendship. I also thank my former office-mate, Dr Stephen

McLoughlin in the Asia Institute at Griffith University, for his good company and assistance.

Within my personal circle, I wish to thank my mother and mother-in-law for their moral support,

and my father and father-in-law, who could not stay in this life until they could see my research.

Support from other members within my families is also a great inspiration for me. Above all, I wish

to dedicate this research to my beloved wife and sons, without their support I would not have been

able to travel to Australia nor have had the energy to study. They are the driving force for me to

complete this research.

The University of Queensland provided a scholarship for the three and a half years of my

studies, while the School of Political Science and International Studies provided a supplementary

research grant for fieldwork. I wish to thank these institutions.

Finally, I wish to thank Vietnamese friends for their invaluable assistance in arranging my

interviews with the local communities; Vietnamese scholars and high-ranking officials whose

identities are not mentioned here for having conversations with me to share their thoughts of

Vietnamese polity. These also become inputs for my research. Words of thanks must also go out to

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all the villagers, peasants and residents in three provinces: Thái Bình, Hưng Yên, and Đà Nẵng, for

their kind responses to my questions. These people’s life made up the core of this research.

Keywords

Communist Party of Vietnam, Đổi Mới, Economic Reform, Development, Grassroots Democracy,

Modernization, Social Capital, Thái Bình, Hưng Yên, Đà Nẵng

Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC)

ANZSRC code: 160606, Government and Politics of Asia and the Pacific, 100%

Fields of Research (FoR) Classification

FoR code: 1606, Political Science, 100%

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures 12

List of Abbreviations 16

Name Conventions 19

Introduction 20

Existing Approaches and Scholarly Gaps 24

Definitions 26

Grassroots Democracy in Context 27

Conditions of Democracy 28

Research Design 30

Thesis Organization 30

Chapter 1: Methodology and Case Study Approaches 33

Introduction 33

Methodology 33

Qualitative research method 33

Case study method 34

Case study design 35

Selection of case studies 35

Challenges in data collection 37

Practical case study approaches in field work 38

In Thái Bình province 39

In Đà Nẵng city 41

In Hưng Yên province 43

Notes on using data collected in field work 45

Chapter 2: A Review of Grassroots Democracy 46

Introduction 46

Grassroots Democracy before Đổi Mới 48

The Pre-Colonial Era 48

Village governance Structure 49

Hương Ước (Village Conventions) 52

The Colonial Era 53

The Post-Colonial Era up to Đổi Mới 55

Village Democracy or Autonomy 56

The Village-Village Relationship 56

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The Village-State Relationship 57

Critiques of the Village Governance Structure 58

‘Village Democracy’ or ‘Village Autonomy’: Just A Legacy 60

Grassroots Democracy in Đổi Mới era 60

Đổi Mới and Rural Unrest in the 1990s 61

Đổi Mới and Root Causes of Rural Unrest 61

Rural Unrest in the 1990s 62

Grassroots Democracy in China 63

A Party Concept or a Political Reform 66

From A Party Directive to a Legal Framework 66

The CPV and the Socialist Democracy 69

Initial Cases to Consider 72

Two Village Electoral Cases 72

An Initial Assessment: A Mutually Empowering Mechanism 73

Conclusion 74

Chapter 3: Conditions and Democracy 76

Introduction 76

Modernization and Democracy 77

Lipset’s Modernization and Conditions of Democracy 78

Critiques of Modernization Theory 82

Human Empowerment and Democracy 85

Social Capital and Democracy 91

Putnam’s Thesis: Traditional Cultural Factors and Democracy 92

Definition and Components 96

Conclusion 97

Chapter 4: An Analytic Framework 99

Introduction 99

Independent Variables 101

Causal Mechanisms 103

Inequality and Democracy 104

Corruption and Democracy 108

Governance and Democracy 111

Human Rights and Democracy 114

Operationalization of the Analytic Framework 117

Conclusion 121

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Chapter 5: Thái Bình 123

Introduction 123

Background 124

Overview of Thái Bình 125

Unrest in 1997-1998 127

Reflections of Unrest in 1997-1998 130

Grassroots Democracy and Independent Variables 131

Inequality 132

Corruption 142

Governance 146

Human Rights 150

Rule of Law 153

Social Capital 156

Conclusion 159

Chapter 6: Hưng Yên 160

Introduction 160

Background 161

Overview of Hưng Yên 162

Văn Giang-Ecopark 166

Ecopark Project 167

Unsatisfactory Compensation 168

Violent Land Eviction 169


Inequality 171

Corruption 175

Governance 178

Human Rights 184

Rule of Law 187

Social Capital 189

Conclusion 193

Chapter 7: Đà Nẵng 195

Introduction 195

Background 197


Inequality 200

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Corruption 207

Governance 210

Human Rights 218

Rule of Law 220

Social Capital 224

Conclusion 230

Chapter 8: Case-study analysis: Explaining variation 232

Explaining variation between cases 232

Development 232

Leadership 234

Vibrant civic networks 236

Conclusion 237

Conclusion 239

Final thoughts 240

Appendixes 242

Appendix 1: Field work interviews in Thái Bình 242

Appendix 2: Field work interviews in Đà Nẵng 243

Appendix 3: Field work interviews in Hưng Yên 244

Appendix 4: Field work interviews in Hà Nội 244

Appendix 5: Model of governance structure and local democracy in Vietnam 245

Appendix 6: Consolidated list of legal documents on grassroots democracy 246

Bibliography 247

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List of Tables & Figures

Box 1: Definitions of Governance 112

Box 2: Definitions of Good Governance 113

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Characteristics of liberal democracy and socialist democracy 70

Table 2: Conditions conducive to democracy based on Lipset’s modernization theory 85

Table 3: Conditions conducive for democratization based on human empowerment theory 89

Table 4: Conditions conducive for Democracy based on social capital theory 97

Table 5: Analytic Framework 100

Table 6: Independent Variables 103

Chapter on Thái Bình

Table 7: Average monthly income per capital in 1996 and 1999 by province 126

Table 8: Poverty rate by region and province/city 136

Table 9: Monthly income per capita by sources of income in province 2010 136

Table 10: Thái Bình socio-economic statistics between 2000 and 2005 137

Table 11: Monthly income per capita by sources 139

Table 12: Contributions by villagers for infrastructure construction between 2000 and 2003 143

Table 13: Complaints and Denunciations by Issues 146

Table 14: Complaints and Denunciations Settlement between 2001and 2004 148

Table 15: Compiled PCI Results in 2007-2012 148

Table 16: Penalty application to party members and government officials 153

Table 17: 2011-2012 Comparative Results of Participation at Local Level in Thái Bình 156

Chapter on Hưng Yên

Table 18: Average monthly income per capital in 1996-1999 by province 162

Table 19: Average monthly income of the poorest and the richest in Hưng Yên in 1994 163

Table 20: Gini coefficients between rural and urban areas in Hưng Yên in 1994 163

Table 21: Monthly income per capita by sources of income between 2002 and 2010 164

Table 22: Proportion of monthly income per capita by sources of income 164

Table 23: Facts of Ecopark Project 169

Table 24: Revenue, Cost and Profit of Ecopark Project 169

Table 25: Poverty rate by region and province/city 173

Table 26: Status of complaints and denunciations in Hưng Yên 2002-2013 180

Table 27: Compiled PCI Results of Hưng Yên in 2007-2012 182

Table 28: 2011-2012 Comparative Results of Participation at Local Level in Hưng Yên 190

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Table 29: People’s participation in infrastructure decision-making in Hưng Yên 190

Chapter on Đà Nẵng

Table 30: The average monthly income per capita in 1994 197

Table 31: Change of labor ratio in three economic sectors between 1997 and 2010 199

Table 32: Non-party members elected in CPC and VBH between 1998 and 2005 200

Table 33: Satisfaction level of people using public services by districts in 2012 203

Table 34: Poverty reduction rate between 2001 and 2012 204

Table 35: National and Đà Nẵng poverty lines by years 204

Table 36: Poverty rate in four major cities 204

Table 37: Proportion of monthly income per capita by sources of income in Đà Nẵng 205

Table 38: Monthly income per capita by sources of income between 2002 and 2010 205

Table 39: Dialogues between governments and citizens in 2008-2011 in Đà Nẵng 212

Table 40: Complaints and denunciations in Đà Nẵng between 2008 and 2011 213

Table 41: Compiled PCI Results of Đà Nẵng between 2005 and 2010 214

Table 42: GRD Transparency in Đà Nẵng 217

Table 43: Penalty application to party members and government officials 221

Table 44: Score of “Law and Order” sub-dimension of Đà Nẵng by year 222

Table 45: Participation at Local Level in Đà Nẵng in 2011 and 2012 225

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Vietnamese Village/Commune Democracy 50

Figure 2: CPV’s Theoretical Model of Socialist Democracy 70

Figure 3: CPV’s De Facto and De Jure Model of Socialist Democracy 71

Figure 4: Lipset’s Modernization Theory Model 79

Figure 5: Conditions of democracy 81

Figure 6: Human Empowerment Model 86

Figure 7: The human empowerment path towards democratization 88

Figure 8: Path to Making Democracy Work Model 93

Figure 9: Vicious Correlation of Types of Inequality 108

Figure 10: Causal link between corruption and democracy 109

Chapter on Thái Bình

Figure 11: Citizen Assessment on Types of Corruption 2011 145

Figure 12: Citizen Assessment on Types of Corruption 2012 145

Figure 13: Transparency and access to information 149

Figure 14: Time cost of regulatory compliance 149

Figure 15: Proactivity of provincial leadership 149

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Figure 16: Business support service 149

Figure 17: Legal institutions 150

Figure 18: Public Administrative Procedures in Thái Bình in 2012 152

Figure 19: Public Services Delivery in Thái Bình in 2012 (Snapshot from the middle) 152

Chapter on Hưng Yên

Figure 20: Hưng Yên Economic Structure Transformation 165

Figure 21: Văn Giang Economic Structure in 2004 and 2012 166

Figure 22: Control of Corruption in Hưng Yên in 2011 176

Figure 23: Control of Corruption in Hưng Yên in 2012 176

Figure 24: Levels of Nepotism in Hưng Yên in 2011 177

Figure 25: Levels of Nepotism in Hưng Yên in 2012 177

Figure 26: Accountability in Hưng Yên in 2010 179








Figure 34: Public Services Delivery in Hưng Yên in 2012 186

Chapter on Đà Nẵng

Figure 35: Economic Structure Transformation in Đà Nẵng between 1997 and 2008 198

Figure 36: Targeted Economic Structure of Đà Nẵng by 2015 198

Figure 37: Corruption in Đà Nẵng in 2010 208



Figure 40: Level of nepotism in Đà Nẵng 2011 209

Figure 41: Level of Nepotism in Đà Nẵng in 2012 209

Figure 42: Accountability in Đà Nẵng in 2010 (A short cut from the top) 210

Figure 43: Accountability in Đà Nẵng in 2011 (A short cut from the next top) 210

Figure 44: Accountability in Đà Nẵng in 2012 (A short cut from the next top) 211

Figure 45: Domestic Violence Prevalence in Đà Nẵng 214




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Figure 51: PCI 2011 of Đà Nẵng and other Cities 217

Figure 52: PCI 2012 of Đà Nẵng and other Cities 217

Figure 53: Đà Nẵng’s PAR score and ranking in 2012 218

Figure 54: Quality of Public Administrative Procedures (a short cut from the top) 219

Figure 55: Quality of Public Services Delivery (a short cut from the top) 220

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List of Abbreviations

BNC-TUTB: Thái Bình Provincial Party Commission for Internal Affairs

CI: Confidence interval

CISB: Community Investment Supervision Board

CPC: Communist Party of China

CPV: Communist Party of Vietnam

CPVMMC: Communist Party of Vietnam Mass Mobilization Commission

CTHADS-TB: Thái Bình Administration of Civil Penalty Enforcement

CPVCPE: Communist Party of Vietnam Commission for Propaganda and Education

CPE-ĐN: Committee for Propaganda and Education of Đà Nẵng Municipal Party Committee

DOLISA-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs

DPI-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Department of Planning and Investment

DPI-TB: Thái Bình Provincial Department of Planning and Investment

DPS-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Department of Public Security

ECNA: Economic Committee of the Vietnamese National Assembly

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FEI: Foreign Economic Information Joint-Stock Company of Hưng Yên

FF-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Fatherland Front

FH: Freedom House

GRD: Grassroots Democracy

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GoIV: Government Inspectorate of Vietnam

GoV: Government of Vietnam

GoVO: Government Office

HCMYU: Hồ Chí Minh Communist Youth Union

HĐND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Council

HĐND-HY: Hưng Yên Provincial People’s Council

HĐND-VG: Văn Giang District People’s Council

HKH- ĐN: Đà Nẵng Association for Learning Promotion

IS: The Institute of Sociology (under the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences)

MOF: Ministry of Finance

MTTQ-TB: Thái Bình Provincial Fatherland Front

NPAA: National Public Administration Academy

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PAPI: The Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI is a policy tool that monitors and measures the performance of governance and public administration (including public service delivery) of all 63 provinces in Vietnam based on citizens’ experiences and perceptions. It is jointly developed by the CPV-led Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES), and the United Nations Programme (UNDP) in Vietnam.)

PAR: Public Administration Reform

PAR INDEX: Public Administration Reform Index (PAR Index is a tool consisting of a set of indicators to monitor and measure administration reforms in different areas, including: institutional reform, organizational reform, personnel quality improvement and reform, public administration reform; and, administration modernization.)

PC-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Court

PCI: The Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI was developed in 2005 by the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). the PCI has come to be seen as a critical tool for measuring and assessing the standards of economic governance in Vietnam’s 63 provinces from the perspective of private sector businesses, covering business-critical issues of entry costs, compliance costs, land access, informal charges and governance qualities on pro-activity, transparency, labor development and legal institutions.)

PEII: Provincial Economic Integration Index (PEII is an annual report compiled by the National Committee on Economic Co-operation of Vietnam. The main goal of PEII is to identify the ability for economic integration of each province or city. The report includes surveys of the opinions of local residents and enterprises. It also addresses the impact of integration on the social welfare of people, and businesses' abilities to develop enterprises.)

PIB: People’s Inspection Board

PM: Prime Minister

RFA: Radio of Free Asia

RWB: Reporters Without Borders

SCNA: Standing Committee of the National Assembly

DoHA-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Department of Home Affairs

SO-ĐN Statistics Office of Đà Nẵng

TI: International Transparency

TUĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal Party Committee

TUHY: Hưng Yên Provincial Party Committee

TUTB: Thái Bình Provincial Party Committee

TT-TB: Thái Bình Provincial Inspectorate

UBBC-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal Electoral Commission

UBKT-TB: Thái Bình Provincial Party Commission for Inspection

UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Committee

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

VCCI: Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry

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VFF: Vietnam Fatherland Front

VFU: Việt Nam Farmers’ Union

VND: Vietnamese Currency Unit (known as Đồng)

VPTDTW: Central Office for Admission of Citizen Complaints and Denunciations

VVA: Việt Nam Veterans’ Association

VWU: Việt Nam Women’s Union

WB: World Bank

WJP: World Justice Project (WJP was initially founded in 2006 as a presidential initiative of the American Bar Association (ABA). In 2010, it was turned into an independent and non-profit organization, which develops communities of opportunity and equity by advancing the rule of law worldwide. AJP engages leaders in countries across the globe and from all work disciplines to advance the rule of law. For further details about WJP, visit: www.worldjusticeproject.org)

WU-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal Women’s Union

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Name Conventions

As far as possible, Vietnamese names are spelt in full. This happens in most situations where

Vietnamese names are used, because they are very often mentioned in this thesis. Where repeat

mention of a person's name is necessary, or when a person needs to be addressed, his or her given

name rather than the family name is used, in keeping with the Vietnamese practice of addressing

people by first names. An exception is made with regard to Hồ Chí Minh, who is addressed by his

full name as a sign of respect. Names of frequently cited sources are abbreviated.

As far as possible as well, Vietnamese names and terms are also spelt with their diacritics and

tone marks. Exceptions are when such are not used in the original text that I quote.

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INTRODUCTION

After two generations of Vietnamese successively fought French and American forces, Vietnam

formally became a reunified country under the rule of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in

mid-1976.1 In the following decade, the CPV installed state-socialist economic institutions, the base

of Vietnam’s command economy. Peasant resistance and the rapid erosion of the state-socialist

economic institutions were inter alia pressures to trigger a deep economic crisis from the late

1970s, seriously eroding social trust and threatening the CPV’s legitimacy (CPV 1991, Vasavakul

1995, Luong 2003b, CPV 2005, Kerkvliet 2005, London 2009, Thayer 2010). In response to this

crisis, the CPV introduced the policy of economic reform, known as Đổi Mới, in 1986 at its 6th

national congress, shifting away from the command economy.

Within a decade, Đổi Mới brought impressive economic results. The average economic growth

rate in the 1991-1995 period was 8.2 percent or an average of 7.1 percent in ten years, between

1988 and 1997; the inflation rate decreased from 67.1 percent in 1991 to 12.7 percent in 1995 and 5

percent in 1996; the poverty rate fell from 75 percent in 1984 to 34.7 percent in 1997/1998. Before

the Asian financial crisis in 1998, Vietnam was labelled a ‘tiger’ or ‘dragon’ economy in Asia

(CPV 1996, Dollar and Litvack 1998, Glewwe, Gragnolati, and Zaman 2000, Abuza 2001a, Adams

2002).

In contrast with the opening-up of the economy, the CPV continued to tighten its political

control. The CPV emphasizes democratization in the economic, not political, sphere (Bình

1990b:1) because it fears that the latter brings growing opposition voices and that it might have to

surrender power (Abuza 2001a:88-89). By the mid-1990s, the CPV had seen massive rural unrest.

Unrest was generally attributed to root causes of inequality, corruption, local government’s

unresponsiveness to grievances, and lack of democracy; and embodies the paradox of the CPV’s

Đổi Mới: economic liberalization on one level, monopoly of political power on the other. In

Vietnam’s rural areas, the party-state regime gave local party secretaries, who tend to be also the

chairmen of people’s committees, absolute power. These men abuse power for personal gain and

alienate themselves from the poor peasants. Đặng Phong described the situation this way:

The role of the state as the only and supreme arbiter in matters of property rights for every type of land throughout the whole country has given local officials the absurd right to give land to this person or that, not least to themselves. This system of administering land rights has created a group of people who have accumulated large land holdings not through land clearing or market transactions, but by abusing their power or

1 Vietnam was militarily reunified in 1975 after communist troops entered Sài Gòn, former name of Hồ Chí Minh City now, and the American-backed southern regime declared surrender on 30 April 1975.

21

their position. This of course is unjust and illegal and causes discontent among the peasants (1995:181, cited in Abuza 2001a: 84).

The situation shows the decay of the party-state apparatus, and not surprisingly, sees a critical

tension in state-peasantry relations and cadre-peasant relations. Moreover, it demonstrated that the

central government could not control its lower levels. Most dramatic was the unrest in the northern

province of Thái Bình, 80 kilometres from Hanoi, in 1997 (to be revisited in detail in Chapter Five).

The threats to its legitimacy and capacity to govern in the countryside led the CPV to undertake a

number of rural political reforms, including the adoption of democratic regulations in the commune

or equivalent level [known as ‘grassroots democracy’ (GRD), which is discussed more deeply in

Chapter Two].

The aim of GRD, initially adopted in 1998 by a party directive for experimental application and

later made compulsory nation-wide in 2007 by a parliamentary ordinance, is to address the root

causes of unrest, restore stability and renew the CPV’s legitimacy and capacity to govern in rural

areas. Politically speaking, in many senses, GRD should be recognized as a ‘sincere’ (thực tâm)

rural political reform of the party-state. It creates mechanisms through which the peasants can raise

their voice, hold local authorities accountable, elect directly their village leader, and empowers the

villagers by allowing them to develop and implement their own village rules (named as Hương

Ước, which is explored in-depth in Chapter Two). These mechanisms also enable the CPV to

manage the peasant grievances and agitation, and subsequently reduce tension in the cadre-peasant

relation (Mattner 2004, UNDP 2006).

For more than a decade, supported by other factors, GRD has facilitated the CPV to rejuvenate

its governing capacity and reinforce its legitimacy and grip on power in more stable rural areas.

Let’s take Đà Nẵng as an example. This central coastal city emerges as a case of successful

implementation of GRD. It has been recognised and ranked ‘the most dynamic developing city’,

which is ‘most liveable’ and with the best public services (Dien 2013, Huangqiu 2012, Linh 2012).

Like many other provinces across the country, Đà Nẵng also faces peasant grievances and protests

concerning urbanization, land use and management policies (TTCP 2013). Yet, these protests did

not turn into violence, and it appears that the peasants are satisfied with the way their grievances are

addressed by local authorities. The community perception in the city is that ‘high social consensus

has been reached’ (UBNDtpĐN 2012) and ‘people trust what the Party says; people follow when

the Fatherland Front and mass organizations mobilize; people support what the government does’

(Thanh 2010a). Other provinces, including Hồ Chí Minh City - Vietnam’s biggest and most

modernized city, and Hà Nội - the capital city very often see peasant protests, and have gone to Đà

22

Nẵng to learn experiences in applying GRD successfully to city planning, land clearance for

construction, re-settlement and administrative reform (VD 2012).

Few provinces, not surprisingly, can apply Đà Nẵng’s good practices. Peasant dissatisfaction

remains significant in many other parts of the country. Recent high-profile violent protests occurred

in the Tiên Lãng district of Hải Phòng, a northern seaport city 120 kilometres south of Hanoi, in

early 2012. The case was extensively covered by national and foreign media after Đoàn Văn Vươn,

a shrimp farmer, and his brother used homemade landmines and an improvised shotgun to engage

security forces who came to evict him and re-possess his farmland (Quân 2012, VnExpess 2012,

Đô and Thế 2012a, BBC 2013e). The eviction was reportedly linked with corruption and land mis-

management by local authorities, and was subsequently declared by the Prime Minister to be

‘illegal’ (Ponnudurai 2012, Brown 2012b, Brown 2012a, Đô and Thế 2012b, GoVO 2012a, TU-HP

2012). The Tiên Lãng incident makes many recall the Thái Bình crisis in 1997 because it shows the

dysfunction of local political institutions and mass organizations, and the local authorities’

ignorance of GRD. The incident can be seen to threaten the CPV’s legitimacy or illustrate a failure

of GRD.

The cases of Đà Nẵng and Tiên Lãng are two contradictory sides of the implementation of GRD.

Clearly whatever results GRD produces, they have implications for the CPV’s legitimacy and local

governance therein. In Đà Nẵng, the party-state apparatus is more open, transparent and responsive;

cadres and party members show respect to the people. In Tiên Lãng, it is completely opposite.

Local authorities there do not respect the peasants, ignore state law, and use armed forces to repress

legitimate rights of the peasants. These cases present the following challenge to resolve: whether

the failure or success of GRD is because of structural (long-term) problems, which relates to the

policy itself and institutional aspects, or social (short-term) problems, which are associated with the

social conditions, including local resources.

Although GRD is regarded as ‘a political policy aimed at protecting the rights and benefits of the

people…giving opportunity to the people to participate in local governance and social activities for

their own benefits’ (Bảo 2010:13), there are three problems concerning the way it is framed,

interpreted and implemented by the CPV. Firstly, the legal framework of GRD provides pre-

established contents and procedures; it is rigid, inappropriate and not implemented in a way that

recognises equality in the cadre-peasant relations. If local party members do not enforce GRD, for

example, no punishment is imposed on them. In contrast, the people always face risk with

allegations of abusing freedom and democracy to overthrow the regime and destabilize public

order.

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Secondly, the seminal aim of GRD is to empower the people, giving them a legal tool to protect

their own benefits and democratic rights. However, the notion does not link with the creation of

necessary economic conditions that are necessary for the people to realise their democratic rights.

Hồ Chí Minh, the CPV’s founding father, once articulated that ‘the people only know the value of

freedom and democracy when they have adequate food to eat, to have sufficient clothes to wear, to

have a decent shelter to live in, and to get access to education’ (HoChiMinh 2000(c):152).2

Economic development, urbanization, high living-standards, good education and others have

empirically been shown as causal mechanisms for democracy to emerge, function and survive

(Lipset 1959, Robinson 2006, Helliwell 1994). Disconnecting GRD from these mechanisms invites

failure.

Thirdly, though GRD is created for the people (Duong 2008:26), it has not yet generally been

able to improve social trust in the party-state apparatus, party members and cadres. GRD aims to

prevent corruption, increase civil service provision, and hold public officials accountable for their

misconducts, but the people are losing their trust in the regime when corruption remains rampant

and ethical decay of party members and cadres increases (Sang 2013, Hải 2012a, Chương 2013).

These problems are associated with most peasant protests (Hải 2013a). Furthermore, mass

organizations like the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU),

Vietnam Farmers’ Union (VFU), Hồ Chí Minh Youth Union (HCMYU), and Vietnam Veterans’

Association (VVA) have a key role to play in implementing GRD, protecting the rights and benefits

of their members, but their actual performance has made the people distrustful. The effect has been

to discourage the people from participating in local governance as they believe that ‘nothing will

change old ways’ (Duong 2008:28). Trust, civic engagement and active civic organizations as

components of ‘social capital’ are considered as ‘the key to making democracy work’ (Putnam

1993a:185).

There are many questions asked about the Tiên Lãng-Hải Phòng protest, the success of Đà Nẵng,

and the problems of GRD discussed above. For example, why do some provinces pursuing pro-

economic development experience peasant protests but others do not; and what has made Đà Nẵng

different from Hải Phòng and other provinces? A more specific question in this context is: what are

the overlooked variables that give insight into why Đà Nẵng implemented GRD more effectively

than Hải Phòng and others in the party-state where all political decisions are made top-down? If we

can identify these then perhaps Vietnam constitutes an excellent experiment in GRD where we can

isolate the independent variables for its successful implementation. Despite growing scholarly

attention drawn to GRD in the past decade, there remain gaps in our understanding of the

2 Original quote in Vietnamese: "Dân chỉ biết đến dân chủ khi người dân được ăn no, mặc ấm, có nhà ở và được học hành".

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implementation of this party policy in Vietnam, and what can account for these differences between

and within specific geographical locations.

Existing Approaches and Scholarly Gaps

Since Vietnamese GRD was adopted by a CPV policy document (Directive No.30) in 1998, it has

attracted a handful of scholarly works purely focusing on it (Sáu and Thông 2003, 2005, Zingerli

2004, Trang 2004, Mattner 2004, Bảo 2007, 2010, Duong 2008, Hải 2008, Larsen 2011, Tortosa

2012). During 2010-2011, the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) funded

the project: ‘Grassroots democracy in Vietnam. Responsible Institution’, though its final report is

not available yet, except a draft paper of one of the project members (Jorgensen 2012) that this

researcher was provided informally. Additionally, GRD has been also discussed in the literature on

a broader political context in Vietnam (see: McCormick 1998, Abuza 2001a, Vu 2003, Thayer

2010, Luong 2005, 2010, Wells-Dang 2010, Fforde 2011). More studies on Vietnamese GRD might

be beyond the knowledge of this researcher, though that they are not mentioned here does not affect

the summary of existing approaches and scholarly gap in the literature on this topic below. The

studies thus far have offered a number of approaches that can be generalized as follows:

1. GRD is part of the social development process, subject to the impact of economic reform,

but an important factor to support the national modernization and industrialization (Sáu and

Thông 2003, 2005, Bảo 2007, 2010)

2. GRD is a party political project with limited success because it is a party-controlled

process (Zingerli 2004, Trang 2004, Duong 2008, Larsen 2011)

3. Some conditions are needed to facilitate the implementation of GRD (Hải 2008, Tortosa

2012, Jorgensen 2012)

4. GRD is part of political reforms, decentralization and its emergence associated with social

problems under the impact of economic liberalization (McCormick 1998, Abuza 2001a, Vu

2003, Mattner 2004, Luong 2005, 2010, Wells-Dang 2010, Fforde 2011).

Theses studies analyse different aspects related to Vietnamese GRD, though they mainly focus on

the practical aspects – that is the responses from the government to challenges. In other words, they

analyse what goes wrong (structural problems), rather than what goes right (local resources), and

the government’s responses to fix the problems. The gaps left by the existing approaches are:

First, they basically overlook contemporary democratic theories when looking at Vietnamese

GRD. There are two problems concerned with this. Firstly, they isolate Vietnamese GRD as a

phenomenon from the mainstream literature on democratization. In other words, Vietnamese GRD

25

is not connected to the general trend of democratization. Secondly, without looking at the

theoretical foundations, these studies cannot explain adequately potential impacts of GRD on

Vietnamese politics in future.

Second, none of these studies to date have fully explored and assessed Vietnamese GRD on the

basis of the root causes that give rise to the policy in 1998. This makes them unable to explain why

GRD is not nationally successful.

Third, none of these studies have drawn adequate attention to local conditions and the role of

social capital. This makes them unable to explain why Western democratic ideas cannot work in

local democratization given that Vietnam’s one-party state still enjoying its legitimacy thanks to

economic progress (Vasavakul 1995).

Finally, and the most important one, none of these studies have evaluated the actual implications

of the implementation of GRD on the CPV’s legitimacy, survival and governability in the

grassroots. Without seeing these implications, it is hard to understand sufficiently and correctly the

intent of the CPV when it adopted GRD.

Taking into account these gaps and other general analyses of politics and democratic

development in Vietnam since Đổi Mới (Thayer 1992, 2009b, Tonnesson 1993, Vasavakul 1995,

1998, Kerkvliet 1995b, 2005, Brown 1998, Mydans 2006, Lockhart 2007, London 2009), this

research proposes an alternative approach to Vietnamese GRD by studying the conditions that

support the implementation of this party policy. Hence, the lead research question for this thesis is:

What are the variables that support the implementation of grassroots democracy goals in

Vietnam?

The secondary, and related, research question is:

What impacts does the implementation of grassroots democracy bring on the party-state

apparatus, the state-peasantry relation, the cadre-peasant relation, and ultimately the

Communist Party of Vietnam as the ruling party, in terms of its legitimacy, governance and

political control?

The lead research question will be explored in three provinces: Thái Bình, Hưng Yên, and Đà Nẵng

as case studies3. These case-studies are utilised to examine how, in specific contexts, GRD is

delivered in the presence or the absence of national and local resources. In other words, the research

attempts to identify, beyond the state law, independent variables that support the performance of

3 Vietnam has 64 provinces and cities under the jurisdiction of the central government. Of these, only four major cities are given the provincial status. These include Hà Nội (the country’s Capital city, in the North), Hồ Chí Minh City (in the South), Đà Nẵng (in the Centre), and Hải Phòng City (in the North). It should be noted here by the way that all provinces have their own (capital) cities, but status of these cities cannot be comparable with the other four cities. The rationale and logics of the selection of case studies are canvassed in detail in Chapter One.

26

GRD in these provinces. The implementation of GRD is embedded in the realm of state-society

relations; therefore its impacts on the issues proposed in the secondary question are also explored.

Definitions

The difficulty in identifying independent variables stems not only from variations in methodology,

but also from the lack of a clear definition of GRD. Before defining GRD, it is necessary to clarify

what is meant by democracy. Orwell (1946:162) said that there is no agreed definition of

democracy. There are as many definitions of democracy as the users of the concept (see: Lipset

1959, May 1976, Przeworski 1991, Lakoff 1996, Dahl 1998). With the wave of democratization

dominating the research agenda in the past two decades (Huntington 1991(a)), and the reversal of

newly arisen democracies back to authoritarian regimes (Diamond 1997), there are powerful

theoretical and empirical reasons to unravel the complexity of the concept of democracy. This

complexity is further illustrated by the fact that there are different models of democracy (Held

1996).

Based on his observations of the waves of democratization, Bunce (2001:45) suggests three

characteristics of democracy as a regime, namely: freedom, uncertain political results, and certain

procedures. He (2001:46) further elaborates each of these characteristics requiring certain pre-

conditions as follows: First, freedom implies ‘full array of civil liberties and political rights’, which

are enjoyable on the condition of equality universally applicable to everyone in the political

community. Second, uncertain political results means competitive institutionalized elections, which

are regularly held on the basis of fairness and freedom. This will determine whether popularly

elected politicians operate in an order called democracy and are fully accountable to their

constituents. Finally, certain procedures refer to a functioning rule of law and an effective

governance system. Bunce (2001:46) concludes that new democracies fail because they cannot

make these pre-conditions consistently available.

For the purpose of this research, Bunce’s above definition of democracy is adopted. This

researcher offers the following two explanations. First, Vietnam is experiencing democratization

driven by economic reforms. GRD is part of this process. Hence, this research of a particular

political context that applies a definition of democracy drawn from international experiences of

democratization shows that it is not isolated from the general knowledge in the field. Furthermore,

Bunce’s definition provides an ‘analytical leverage’ of conditions conducive for democracy to

emerge, function and survive, which is identical with the aim of this research. Second, Bunce’s

democracy is comparable with that offered by Lipset (1959:71) as the basis of his explanation for

modernization theory, also known as the pre-conditional democratic approach, which is explored in

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Chapter Three. The conditions drawn from modernization theory are used to develop the analytic

framework in Chapter Four to evaluate GRD in case-studies in Chapter Five, Six, and Seven of this

thesis.

Based on Bunce’s definition of democracy, GRD therefore simply means democracy with the

three characteristics implemented at the grassroots level. The term ‘grassroots’ (cơ sở), within the

scope of this research, applies to the commune and village level in the countryside or the

equivalents in the urban area.4

Grassroots Democracy in Context

In Vietnam, the emergence of GRD was associated with the CPV’s Directive No.30-CT/TW on the

Implementation of Grassroots Democracy, adopted in 1998 initially as a political project to “regain

trust of the peasants in the regime and restore political stability for development” (Sáu and Thông

2003, 2005, Bảo 2010) after the disturbances in Thái Bình province (McCormick 1998: 140, Abuza

2001a: 83-88, Thayer 2010:435, Larsen 2011: 316). The CPV articulated this project as a concrete

step to formalize the pre-existing motto: ‘people know, people discuss, people do, people supervise

and inspect’ (dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra)(Hiền 2004a:30). Since 1998, a series of

government and parliamentary regulations, the most recent of which was the Ordinance on The

Implementation of Democracy at Commune, Ward and Township Level in 2007,5 has been enacted

to make GRD implementation compulsory nation-wide (Hải 2012b). However, Hoàng Chí Bảo, a

leading Marxist democratic theorist of the CPV, noted that GRD should not be ‘wrapped neatly

within the Ordinance’, but supported by a combination of different institutions: national laws

(constitution and law), regulations (by-laws), and sub-national regulations (village, customary

rules) (2010:14). This implies that the Ordinance’s content can be found in other legal documents,

and the implementation of GRD needs to go beyond the state law and take into account other

conditions, including local resources.

While Vietnamese GRD provides more freedoms for the people at the ‘rice-roots’ level, at least

in respect of village elections, it remains part of socialist democracy, which is theorized by the CPV

as the state ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’ (nhà nước của dân, do dân, vì dân) under

the leadership of the CPV (Trọng 2011c:80-90). Mattner (2004:126) decoded the actual aim of

GRD in this sense by contending that it is a mechanism that aims to absorb:

4 The term ‘grassroots’ (cơ sở) also applies to democratic practice in public offices and state-owned enterprises. However, this is beyond the scope of this research. 5 In the Vietnamese system of legal documents, Ordinance is not a law, but its authority is just behind law. See full text of Ordinance: 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11, 20 April 2007. More on the legal framework on grassroots democracy will be reviewed in Chapter One of the thesis.

28

popular discontent into the formal structures of the party-state… Popular discontent should be uttered through established political channels provided by the state, instead of resulting in unrest or even wholesale rejection of the political system.

Nevertheless, in the party-state, the cadre-peasant relationship, on the one hand, is still influenced

by kinship and/or Confucian culture, and on the other, state power is more often manipulated by

local party members and cadres, who are mandated to function in the name of the CPV and law (Lai

1997a:7, 17), while democratic rights of the peasants are not always respected (Trang 2004:148).

This makes, in most cases, GRD a formalistic procedure and overall a failure, which is illustrated

by continuing peasant complaints and protests across the country.

In Other Political Contexts

Beyond Vietnam, GRD has been operationalized rather differently and not primarily legally. Across

Americas (the United States, Canada, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador), Europe (Ireland), Africa

(Senegal) and Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand), GRD has been considered a ‘fashion’

by which peripheral people are empowered by themselves to participate in local governance, to

influence the policy-making, and to assert their rights (Angeles 2004, Prasartset 2004, Patterson

1996, Helmus 2009, Ito 2008, Schugurensky 2001). The literature on GRD in these environments

shows that human empowerment is very much associated with a vibrant and independent civil

society (for a sampling, see: Stout 2010, Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999, Tadem 2012, Kaufman

and Alfonso 1997, Colleen 1989). The way GRD is conceptualized therein also illustrates that it is

not framed in the state law, meaning that there is no law particularly prescribing what GRD should

be or look like as it is in Vietnam, and more crucially that it is hence entirely beyond the state

control. Obviously, this is a different conception from that of the CVP. Moreover, GRD for

empowerment purposes within development goals in a liberalizing, transition country like

Indonesia is a very different economic-political agenda to what the CPV has envisioned in

Vietnam.

Conditions of Democracy

Does democracy need pre-conditions? Neubauer (1967) claimed it does. While rejecting the need

for absolute preconditions, Diamond (2003:1,14) argues that certain fundamental conditions

obviously facilitate democracy to emerge and survive. Helliwell (1994:225) agrees with this

argument. Empirical studies have shown that conditions conducive for democracy to emerge,

function and survive include, but are not limited to: industrialization, modernization, economic

development, urbanization, wealth, education, peace, respect of human rights and the rule of law,

29

equality, social capital, good governance and leadership (see: Yolton 1955, Lipset 1959, 1960,

1994, Putnam 1993a, Clark 1994, Helliwell 1994, Tierney 1989, Varshney 1998, Alfredsson 2002,

Diamond 2003, Haus and Sweeting 2006, Tilly 2007, Chu et al. 2008, Welzel 2009). Looking at the

conditions from another perspective, Huntington (1991(a), 1991(b), 2009) and Diamond (1992a,

1997, 2003) warned that some of them in their negative form, such as inequality, disrespect of

human rights and the rule of law, and bad governance, can lead to the reversal of democracy to

authoritarianism. This recognises that democratization is not a teleological process, and indeed

transitions to democracy can be reversed, as some might suggest is the current case in Thailand. It

also highlights the focus in later debates on democratization about the ‘quality’ of democracy, and

that what encourages ‘quality’ could be said to help further ‘consolidate’ democracy in transitional

contexts.

Although there is still much controversy regarding the causal mechanism between conditions

and democracy, the transformation from authoritarianism to democracy across Asia (Malaysia,

Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and Mongolia), Latin America (Argentina, Peru, Paraguay and

Mexico), Africa (Zambia, South Africa, Ghana and Kenya), and post-communist East and Central

Europe (Serbia, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia) in the wave of democratization are good

examples to learn about the intrinsic linkage between them (Levitsky and Way 2002).

Since embarking on Đổi Mới in the late 1980s, Vietnam has constantly enjoyed high economic

growth, a condition that has been theorized and empirically shown as an initial step in the

democratization process (Lipset 1959, Shin 1994, Helliwell 1994, Ray 1998, Reiter 2001,

Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009, Inglehart and Welzel 2009, Diamond 2012). While Vietnam is

not yet recognised as 'democratic', the CPV’s GRD policy provides its citizens with 'democratic

rights' comparable to the characteristics that work for liberal democracies (Hải 2012b:1). Some

factors have been indicated as the keys for the functioning of GRD. For examples, the CPV

emphasises the ‘human factor’ and its related dimensions such as competence and consciousness of

local cadres and villagers, and the role of leadership (CPV 2010, Trọng 2013). However, Welzel

argues that one particular factor should not be favoured over all others to explain the emergence,

deepening and survival of democracy (Welzel 2009:75). Thus, focusing only on high economic

growth while neglecting other conditions like local cultural norms and social networks precludes an

understanding of why GRD is effective in one but not in another province. Similarly, emphasizing

the role of leadership without paying due attention to the availability of necessary resources (the

rule of law, check and balance procedures, funds and so on) undermines the democratic practice

and makes the government ‘not of and by the masses, but of and by the elites’ (Cronin 1987:36).

Therefore, the more comprehensive an index of conditions as independent variables is taken into

30

account, the better the understanding of the performance of GRD, regardless the context in

question.

Research Design

Given the large number of localities (sixty-three provinces and cities) across Vietnam and the

diverse societal situations in each of these localities, this thesis adopts the case study method.

Following this research strategy, three provinces were selected for analysis of the correlation

between independent variables and the quality of GRD. These provinces are: Thái Bình, Hưng Yên,

and Đà Nẵng. Local cadres and residents in these selected case studies are the target interviewees.

Primary (or first-hand) data collected from field work will supplement and verify the validity as

well as the credibility of the existing secondary data, and determine the quality of GRD in these

provinces. More details relating to the methodology and practical approaches to the case studies

will be described in Chapter One.

Thesis Organization

The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter One explains the methodology and case study

approach. In addition to the discussion of challenges in field work data collection in Vietnam, this

chapter also describes practical approaches adopted to each case study.

Chapter Two provides an overview of GRD in Vietnam. It traces the historical roots of GRD in

Vietnamese culture; and discusses GRD within the CPV’s broader view of democracy. This chapter

aims to argue that in evaluating Vietnamese GRD, historical and cultural characteristics, social

problems during Đổi Mới, and political regime characteristics of Vietnam must be taken into

account. For instance, when talking about GRD, attention must be drawn to Hương Ước, a statutory

convention created by the villagers themselves to govern the community life. Similarly, GRD is not

fully understood without investigating the CPV’s socialist democracy. Scholars who have

conceptualized GRD in a way that ignores these characteristics, or contradict it with liberal

democratic model characteristics, fail to explain why the regime has not been democratically

transformed, and the CPV did not face the same problems their counterparts in the former Soviet

Union or Eastern European countries had in late 1980s and early 1990s.

Chapter Three reviews democratic theories dominating the research agenda on democratization

and democracy. Its main purpose is to identify conditions of democracy and their causal

mechanisms. Three theories are examined in this chapter: modernization theory, human

31

empowerment theory, and social capital theory. These theories offer conditions to formulate the

analytic framework in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four identifies independent variables, which are then incorporated into the analytic

framework. These independent variables are a combination of some conditions drawn from the

theories discussed in Chapter Three and the root causes of rural unrest in Vietnam in the 1990s. The

causal mechanisms between these variables and democracy are explored as the basis of the

argument for an analytic framework needed to evaluate the implementation of GRD goals in

Vietnam.

Chapters Five, Six, and Seven are case studies, which test the analytic framework based on the

data gathered in the three provinces: Thái Bình, Hưng Yên, and Đà Nẵng. It is obvious that there

are many differences between these three provinces, though the analyses highlight the fact that the

implementation of GRD is profoundly complex and contextual, meaning that the structural (long-

term) aspects cannot be generalized, and the social (short-term) conditions should not be

undermined. Rather, the implementation of GRD is effective when both structural and social

variables are improved and conducive.

Chapter Eight presents reflections on the case studies. While there are many points of

comparison among them, the results from three cases show that three variables most affect the

implementation of GRD goals therein. These are: development, leadership and vibrant civic

networks. These variables not only highlight what makes GRD results in one different from the

other province. They also re-emphasize the political dynamics of GRD in Vietnam’s one-party

state.

This thesis asks the question: “What are the variables that support the implementation of

grassroots democracy goals?”; and a secondary but related question: “What impacts does the

implementation of grassroots democracy bring on the party-state apparatus, the state-peasantry

relation, the cadre-peasant relation, and ultimately the Communist Party of Vietnam as the ruling

party, in terms of its legitimacy, governance and political control?” It is concerned with going

beyond the notion that within Vietnam’s one-party state, there is no democracy.

The contribution of this thesis is three-fold. First, it shows a need to go beyond the state law.

Examining the case studies demonstrates that democracy can still flourish at the local level while it

may be absent at the national level when necessary conditions have not arrived. Second, the success

of GRD helps reinforce the legitimacy and survival of the CPV. To stay in power, the party is very

much reliant on the support of its constituents in the countryside, which houses nearly seventy

percent of the population. Effective GRD can provide the stability; reduce tensions between the

state and the peasantry, between party members and the peasants in rural areas in Vietnam. This in

32

turn mitigates and negotiates the challenges (including those related to governance and legitimacy)

facing the CPV. Finally, the success of GRD can also lay the groundwork for further governance

reforms. These reforms will certainly facilitate the emergence of a greater democratic culture that

can promote a democratic transformation in future. It should be noted that the thesis does not aim to

address the latter point in substantive detail, although aspects of it are canvassed briefly in the

thesis’ conclusion given recent political developments in Vietnam.

33

1

Methodology and Case Study Approach

Introduction

This chapter discusses the research design for this study. There are two main sources of data used

as the basis of this thesis’ arguments: first, it is secondary data retrieved from archival documents

which include books, journal articles, government reports, non-governmental organizations (NGO)

and international organizations reports, and online sources including state media and social

networking sites (private blogs); second, it is primary (or first-hand) data collected from field work.

The discussion in this chapter focuses on the methodology and case study approach related to the

second source. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section revisits key theoretical

issues related to the research design. As this thesis uses case studies to testify an analytic

framework which is developed to assess the quality of GRD, there is explanation for why the case

study method will be employed as the strategy for conducting qualitative research. The second

section is case study design. It begins with the selection of case studies. The rationale and the logic

behind the selection will be justified. It then continues with a discourse on challenges with regards

to the collection of data which is particularly related to politically sensitive topics in Vietnamese

context tightly controlled by the party-state. The final section describes practical case study

approaches in the fields for this study. It then provides some notes on using data collected in field

work.

Methodology

Qualitative research method

According to Berg (1989:2), qualitative research refers to the ‘meanings, concepts, definitions,

characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things’. This method includes participatory

observation, interview, historical analysis, document and textual analysis, ethnographic research,

and unobtrusive techniques (Berg 1989:3). Significantly, Berg (1989:6) asserts that qualitative

research techniques provide a means of uncovering the perceptions of others, exploring how people

construct and give meaning to the living environment, and understanding how people learn about

34

and make sense of themselves and others. Woods concurred with this assertion and further argued

that researchers who adopt this method are most interested in the following:

[How] meanings that the participants attach to their behaviours, how they interpret situations and what their perspectives are on particular issues… how understandings are formed, how meanings are negotiated, how roles are developed, how a curriculum works out, how a policy is formulated and implemented [emphasis added] (Woods 2006:3-4).

For Woods, qualitative researchers are interested in processes, not products of matters, because:

Social life is ongoing, developing and fluctuating, thus it never arrives or ends. Some forms of behaviour may be fairly stable, others variable, others emergent. Some forms of interaction proceed in stages or phrases. This again emphasises for the researcher the need for long and sustained immersion in the field in order to cover whole processes and produce ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) that will encompass this richness (Woods 2006:4).

This study has been conducted using the qualitative research method as it is best suited for

validating the framework developed in Chapter Four. The views and perception of people at the

grassroots (villagers/peasants in the countryside and residents in urban area) are the determining

factor to assess the quality of GRD. Accordingly, qualitative research method is suited for this

study as it enables the investigator to understand the political dynamics as well as the reality versus

the figures and statistics provided by the local authorities.

Case study method

Qualitative research design has been categorised into five major types which include:

phenomenological studies, ethnographic studies, grounded-theory qualitative research, biographical

studies, and case studies (Hancock and Algozzine 2006:9). For the purpose of this study, case study

design will be employed.

A case study refers to an in-depth examination of a single instance of some social phenomenon

(Babbie 2010:309). Schramm (1971) contended that the essence of a case study is ‘to illuminate a

decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what

result’. However, different researchers use the case study design for different purposes –

exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory (Balzacq 2011:32-33). This study uses case studies for

exploratory and explanatory purposes. It explores what variables that support the implementation of

GRD, and how GRD has been implemented in Vietnam’s one-party state. It explains how the

implementation of GRD has impacted on the CPV’s legitimacy, its capacity to govern in the

countryside, and local governance reforms. This study employs a multiple case (comparative) study

design instead of a single case.

A multiple case study approach enables the researcher to explore differences within and between

cases (Yin 2003:50). Moreover, the multiple case study design is considered to be more powerful

and convincing, thus it can provide more insights than the single case study design (Vaus

35

2001:227). According to Balzacq (2011:33), if the investigator concurrently analyses several cases,

multiple case study design can facilitate the understanding of different kinds of issues. This study

adopts the multiple case study design. Specifically, it uses three case studies for comparative

purposes.

The next section canvasses the selection, the rationale and the logic behind the selection of case

studies. It then continues with some challenges with regards to the collection of data for this study.

Case study Design

Selection of case studies

This study selects three case studies based on the following four criteria: first, a province that

experienced unrest which contributed to the CPV’s adoption of grassroots democracy (GRD). This

aims to assess impacts of the implementation of GRD in the past fifteen years (from 1998 to 2012 -

the time when the first field work was conducted), on the province and especially how GRD has

been perceived and how the implementation of GRD has contributed to restoring political stability

in the once protest site. Among the provinces which experienced unrest in the 1990s and meet this

criterion, the most suitable is Thái Bình province (details of rural unrest in the 1990s and the

disturbances in Thái Bình are described in Chapter Two and Chapter Five). It was the violent

peasant protests in this province in 1997-1998 that created an ‘earthquake’ in Vietnamese political

life in this period, leading to the emergence of GRD (detailed description of the progress of these

protests is provided in Chapter Five).

The second criterion is a province that at the time of this study conducted has and is

experiencing unrest, which is ideally attributed to the same causes that provoked violent peasant

protests in Thái Bình in 1997-1998. This aims to investigate why the unrest happened? How has

GRD been implemented there? Initially, the case of Tiên Lãng district in Hải Phòng city (described

in the Introduction) emerged as the most suitable for this. However, only a few months after the

case of Tiên Lãng, another violent peasant protest involving thousands of people took place (details

of the protest are described in Chapter Six). The protest was in Văn Giang district of Hưng Yên

province, neighbouring with Hải Phòng city. Though both Tiên Lãng and Văn Giang cases were

nationally and internationally known because of their nature at that time, but the former was a

conflict of interest between an individual peasant and the commune authority where he lived (of

course, the commune authority was given support from Hải Phòng city government). While the

latter case was more complicated, involving hundreds of peasants, and showed the decay of

governance at the grassroots level. Considering the nature and scope of the incident, this study

selected Hưng Yên as the second case study.

36

The third criterion is a province that has been nationally known for its modernization, both in

socio-political and economic terms, in the past fifteen years as of the time this study was conducted.

This aims to investigate the correlation between modernization and the implementation of GRD in

the province. The most suitable case in this regards is Đà Nẵng city which has been the fastest

modernizing city in the country for more than a decade. It has been also an excellent example in

handling properly public complaints and protests, having no protracted complaints or protests

involving a large number of people. Hence, an additional but related investigative question for this

study is how GRD correlates with the city’s management of complaints and protests to reduce the

tension in local cadre-resident relations, and how GRD correlates with increased support and trust

of the residents in the city government given the Government Inspectorate’s recent report alleging

that Đà Nẵng leaders committed serious mistakes in land planning and use (GoIV 2013).

The last criterion is representation of different geographical regions. This aims to compare

outcomes of the implementation of GRD among case studies, and indicate what variables are the

most influential factors that make the case studies different from one to another. Thái Bình province

(the first case study) is southeast; Hưng Yên province (the second case study) is northeast, and Đà

Nẵng city (the third case study) is in the centre of the country. There is a question why a province

(for example: Hậu Giang, Kiên Giang, Tiền Giang) in the Mekong river delta6 which is Vietnam’s

southernmost region is not selected as a case study? The question is reasonable and demonstrates a

limit of this study. However, this limit can be justified by the first three case study selection criteria

discussed above. Furthermore, though Vietnam is divided into eight geographical regions,7 each of

which consists of five or more provinces, this division is only significant in terms of administration

and does not reflect social, cultural and economic similarities. Another justifiable explanation for

this limit is the question of geographical representation itself. If the question about the absence of a

province in the Mekong River Delta from this study counts, then it can be asked why not a

mountainous and ethnic minority-populated province in Vietnam’s northernmost region (for

instance: Điện Biên, Lai Châu) is selected as a case study. And, so on. An appropriate response to

this question for now is that the study of GRD in other provinces can be reserved for another

research project which has a larger or smaller scope, depending on the research objectives.

The last point that can be made with regard to the selection of the three above-mentioned case

studies is that they all have problems with land acquisition and compensation, a common

phenomenon in Vietnam, and face peasant protests.

6 Mekong river delta region (or Đồng bằng sông Cửu Long in Vietnamese) encompasses thirteen provinces. 7 They include: Red River Delta (Đồng bằng Sông Hồng), North Central Coastal Vietnam (Bắc Trung Bộ Việt Nam), North Eastern Vietnam (Đông Bắc Việt Nam), North Western Vietnam (Tây Bắc Việt Nam), Central Highlands (Tây Nguyên), South Central Coastal Vietnam (Nam Trung Bộ Việt Nam), South Eastern Vietnam (Đông Nam Bộ Việt Nam), and Mekong River Delta (Đồng Bằng Sông Cửu Long)

37

Challenges in data collection

Three key challenges are related to this study. The first challenge is the study topic. In Vietnam’s

one-party state, there are many topics which are considered politically ‘sensitive’. A ‘sensitive’

topic can be broadly interpreted from the CPV’s regulations that it ‘contradicts policies, guidelines

and resolutions of the party and laws of the state’ (CPV 2011a). Consequently, it can also be any

thing that is defined an offence prescribed in Article 79 (activities aiming to overthrow the people’s

administration), Article 88 (conducting propaganda against the state), Article 87 (undermining

national unity), and Article 258 (abuse the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom

of belief, religion, assembly, association and other democratic freedoms to infringe upon the

interests of the State, the legitimate rights and interests of organizations and/or citizens) in the

current penal code.

Some particular sensitive topics include civil society, human rights (especially those in the

category of political rights like freedom of press and expression, freedom of assembly and

association, freedom of religion), democracy, criticizing the state’s policies in regards to China, and

questioning the monopoly power of the CPV (HRW 2013b, Tuyển 2014). There are various

instances that the state-party’s police repressed assemblies and demonstrations, or arrested activists

involved in the above topics (see examples in annual and case reports of the Human Rights Watch:

HRW 2011a, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). Hence, it creates a general psychological fear in the majority of

the populace that it would be better not to talk about these topics. State officials are also reluctant to

talk about these topics. This study is conducted on the most sensitive topic which is democracy

relating to the question of the CPV’s monopoly power.

It is difficult to organize interviews on these sensitive topics in public places. Even if such

interviews could be conducted, a number of related questions can be asked about: the presence of

local cadres on site which would then affect the credibility of interviewees’ responses and the risk

of respondents after the interviews. This study carried out interviews in two (Thái Bình and Hưng

Yên) of three locations where the topic of democracy was particularly sensitive. The disturbances in

Thái Bình province in 1997 were attributed to the loss of democracy. The same was also true for

the case of Văn Giang in Hưng Yên province. In three case studies, most interviews were

conducted at the respondents’ private house without the third party’s presence.

The second challenge is accessibility and unexpected dangers in getting access to a study

location. Outsiders, including journalists, have limited access to locations that experience unrest

and are labelled ‘hot spots’ because local authorities tend to prevent them from investigating the

problem. Cases like this include Thái Bình province in 1997 (HRW 1997b), Gia Lai province (in

the Central Highlands) in 2001 (HRW 2011b, 2002, Reuters 2001) and Mường Nhé in Điện Biên

38

province in 2011 (BBC 2011d). Local cadres from those ‘hot spots’ also tend to avoid and deny

answering questions on issues related to the unrest. Consequently, it is difficult to conduct

interviews with both local cadres and residents to inquire the problem. This study investigates one

of such cases, which is Văn Giang in Hưng Yên province. A practical approach to this case study is

presented in a later part of this section.

The third challenge is the availability of information. Vietnam has a state-censored press. The

state media produces a handful of censored reports on sensitive topics, while foreign journalists are

under strict surveillance and not permitted to access to ‘hot spots’ in question as in the case of Thái

Bình (HRW 1997b). Furthermore, these party-dictated reports tend to blame the victims (that are

villagers, residents and activists) for causing public disorder and political instability rather than

state policies and/or poor performance of local authorities. In other words, the actual root causes of

unrest are not revealed in the state media reports. Therefore, alternative sources of information must

be sought. Blogosphere is a helpful source in this regards. This study employs a great deal of blog

reports on related case studies.

Practical Case Study Approaches in Field Work

Field work was conducted after the ethical clearance application, including a statement of

challenges and difficulties of doing field work, particularly in the case of Hưng Yên province, was

approved by the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of

Queensland where this study was sponsored. As a matter of rule, before each of field interviews, the

purpose of interview was clearly explained to interviewees. Permission from interviewees was also

sought to record the conversation.

The ‘practical approach’ here means personal relations were used to make direct contact with

interviewees without sponsorship of any authorities or academic institutions in Vietnam. There are

two explanations for this. First, it is the sensitivity of both the topic and the locations where

investigation is conducted. Challenges in this regards are discussed above. Second, it is the

advantage of being an insider who is a compatriot of interviewees, can speak the same language,

and understand the political system and culture. This is particularly significant and helps reduce

difficulties, including dangers, of doing field work on politically sensitive topics in Vietnam. It is

hard for an external researcher to experience the same conditions. In what follows, practical

approaches to each of three case studies are described in details.

39

In Thái Bình province

Two field trips to Thái Bình, a principal and a follow-up, were conducted. The first trip was thirty

days (between 19 June and 22 July 2012). Since Thái Bình is not far from Hanoi, this researcher

had bus-in and bus-out rides every four days (got in on Monday and came back on Friday, rarely

stayed over the weekend).

Before going to Thái Bình, a set of questions for investigation was prepared like these:

• What is the general living condition in the commune?

• What have cadre-peasant relations been like since 1998?

• Do peasants participate in local governance and how?

• Can peasants elect directly village leaders, chairmen of the people’s committee?

• How can cadres win trust of the peasants?

Since it was impractical to study five districts that experienced peasant protests in 1997, Thái Thụy

district was chosen for two reasons. First, it experienced unrest resulting from the same problems

with the other four districts. Second, it is the largest and has more communes than others.8 Within

Thái Thụy, Thụy Dân commune was selected because it lies at the centre of the district and was a

CPV’s revolutionary base during the liberation wars. From the CPV’s perspective, a commune like

Thụy Dân has, and is expected, to follow CPV policies without question. Within Thụy Dân, An

Tiêm village (which witnessed protests in 1997) was chosen for field interviews.

Twelve in-depth interviews with twenty villagers (see Appendix 1), including current and former

leaders of the commune, village leaders, representatives of mass organizations.9 Given the fact that

talking about democracy is still sensitive, rather than talking to people through formal channels

with interviews arranged by local government officials, this researcher chose to access these people

in an informal way.

8 In total, five districts have 271 communes. Each commune on average has three villages; each of the village has about 100 households. Five districts have 811 villages. Thái Thụy has forty-eight communes, while others have on average thirty to thirty-five communes. 9 Among these twenty people, two were current leaders of the commune (Chairman of the People's Committee, and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee), one former and the current village chiefs, two villagers who were considered "the brain" of the protests in 1997, one former principal of a secondary high school, one current land administration officer, the current chair of the village fatherland front, members of commune peasants’ association, women’s union, veterans’ association, and other villagers, including women.

40

Map of An Tiêm village within Thụy Dân commune (Thái Thụy district – Thái Bình)

A native man, who was born in An Tiêm village but currently, is a cultural research officer working

for one of the most politically influential and central think-tanks in Hà Nội, coordinated all the field

interviews. He could do that because most of his relatives were living in the village. Thanks to his

relationship with the villagers, field interviews became very informal talks and opportunistic and

sensitive questions could be asked to pursue villagers' personal thoughts.

The interviewees were divided into two categories: local cadres (commune and village leaders)

and villagers. Direct communication was used with both these categories, though the approaches

taken to access them were a bit different. With local cadres, the native man directly contacted them

and organized interview at their private houses. With the villagers, the snow-balling method

(Biernacki and Waldorf 1981, Beauchemin and Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011) was used to arrange

opportunistic interviews with one and other villagers who were either directly involved in or aware

of the protests in 1997. From this experience, one lesson that can be learned is that the snow-balling

method only works and is effective when credibility and informality is achieved. Field interviews

with An Tiêm villagers could not have been like informal talks without assistance of the native

man.

Before a conversation, the respondents were informed of the purpose of the interview. All the

talks were held in Vietnamese and private settings (except the native man who was there to

facilitate the conversation, there were only the interviewer and interviewee). The interviews were

recorded with permission from the interviewees.

Participatory observation method was also employed in field work to enable this researcher to

feel and see the democratic spirit in the village’s activities. Most appropriate is the villagers’

meetings. It would be hard for a non-Vietnamese researcher who also cannot speak Vietnamese and

understand the nuances of the local culture to apply this method.

An Tiêm Village

41

A second follow-up field trip to Thái Bình was conducted for five days in mid-September 2013

to inquire about any changes in the past year, and to collect more data to substantiate this thesis’

arguments. During this trip, no conversation with local cadres was held, but there were brief talks

with the villagers that were interviewed last time. Nothing had changed since then.

In Đà Nẵng

In Đà Nẵng, Hải Châu district was selected because it is located at the centre of the city. Within Hải

Châu, among thirteen urban wards (phường), equal to communes in rural areas, Thạch Thang was

chosen for investigation. There are two explanations for this. First, rural and agricultural communes

were investigated in Thái Bình and Hưng Yên. That an urban ward is chosen for inquiry is thus

meaningful for comparison. Moreover, GRD applies to communes (in rural areas), wards (in urban

areas), and towns (combinations of rural and urban areas). Therefore, it would be a shortcoming if

no survey was done for urban areas. Second, the target groups under investigation in Thái Bình and

Hưng Yên were mainly peasants, who were assumed to have limited access to mass media,

including the Internet. This affected their understanding of democracy in general and GRD in

particular. Whereas, in Đà Nẵng, they were urban residents, including business people. These urban

residents are more likely to access various types of mass media, including the Internet. Hence, they

are assumed to have better understanding of democracy and GRD.

Google Map of Thạch Thang ward (Hải Châu District – Đà Nẵng City)

There were two field-trips, a principal and a follow-up, to Đà Nẵng. The principal was taken for

thirty days (from 26 July to 25 August 2012). Since it is far from Hà Nội, a break after a fortnight

intensive investigation was taken. In Đà Nẵng, field interviews were conducted with leaders of

Thạch Thang ward and mass organizations (VFF and VWU), leaders and residents of two urban

residential groups (tổ dân phố) – Group No.23 and Group No.24 (though the latter was the main

focus). Unlike the approaches applied to Thái Bình and Hưng Yên case studies, through personal

42

relations, direct contact with a young female cadre of Thạch Thang ward people’s committee was

made. This female cadre offered help to coordinate and arrange interviews with leaders of the ward,

mass organizations (VFF and VWU’s) leaders, and leaders of some residential groups. With her

assistance, interviews were conducted with: at Thạch Thang ward, the vice-chairman cum deputy

party secretary, a young female administrative cadre, chairwoman of VWU, and chairman of VFF;

the leader of Residential Group No.24, and a female deputy-leader of Residential Group No.23. The

conversations with these people were held either in their private offices or a common room behind

a closed door at the headquarters of Thạch Thang ward people’s committee.

In the community, with the assistance of residential group leaders, households in their

neighbourhoods were randomly selected for interview. It was done so for two reasons. First, if the

residential group leaders could freely nominate a household, they would select ‘red addresses’ (địa

chỉ đỏ), which means households were pre-selected. Second, they would advise interviewees on

responses which only [emphasis added] described good things. The residential group leaders also

agreed to the two following working rules: first, they would be off site for free talks with the

respondent. This aimed to avoid the presence of residential group leaders influencing the

respondent’s answers, particularly those questions relating to the role of residential group leaders.

Second, the respondents would come from various walks of life with different jobs and

occupations. This aimed to have a diversity of views on GRD. Eventually, there were fifteen

community-based interviews were conducted. On average, two persons from each household (wife-

husband, or brothers and/or sisters) participated in the interview. In total thirty-two residents were

interviewed.

Field observations were also conducted during each fortnight. Observations concentrated on

activities within Thạch Thang ward headquarters (for instance, attitude and behaviour of local

cadres in contact with the residents, handling submissions by the residents, transparency of

administrative procedures). A considerable amount of time was also spared for looking around

bookstores in the city to find relevant publications, and making copies of work reports at the

Department of Home Affairs (DoHA), which is responsible for preparing GRD reports and local

governance reforms. There was no interview with leaders of DoHA because of the two following

reasons: first, DoHA was not on the contact list and planned interviews. The visit to its office to

collect work reports was recommended by the leader of Thạch Thang ward. Second, the leader of

DoHA was taking leave for an intensive course on political theory annually organized by the CPV

in Hanoi. The care-taker deputy leader of DoHA was too busy and could not make time for an

interview. Only a short interview was conducted with the head of a division responsible for

preparing DoHA’s report on GRD, which will be submitted to leaders of the city.

43

A second follow-up field trip was conducted for fourteen days, from the last week of September

to the end of the first week of October in 2013. It aimed to collect more updated information and

materials. There was a big change in the city leadership since the last field trip. The party boss cum

chairman of Đà Nẵng people’s council, Nguyễn Bá Thanh, was dispatched to Hà Nội to lead the

CPV’s anti-corruption commission. Mr. Thanh’s influence on Đà Nẵng was so enormous that many

asked a question: ‘What would Đà Nẵng be like after Mr. Nguyễn Bá Thanh has gone to Hà Nội?’

(Diện 2013b)

In Hưng Yên province

In Hưng Yên, Văn Giang district - that had and was experiencing a nationally-known violent

peasant protest relating to land clearance and compensation (a description in detail of the protest is

provided in Chapter Six) - was selected for field work. Within Văn Giang district, interviews were

planned for peasants from three communes, namely, Xuân Quan, Phụng Công, and Cửu Cao which

had a land eviction. However, they could have been conducted with peasants from the first two

communes (see Appendix 3), while a peasant from Cửu Cao was not ready for an interview because

she feared that she and her family could be retaliated by thugs (Interview I, Appendix 3). No

interviews with local cadres, including representatives from local mass organizations like Vietnam

Fatherland Front (VFF), Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU), and Vietnam Farmers’ Union (VFU),

were conducted because it was advised by a member of the national inter-agency steering

committee for human rights that ‘don’t touch it’ (Interview III, Appendix 4).

The field trip to Văn Giang had many difficulties, including unexpected dangers, which were not

fully foreseen in the preparatory process. It seemed anyone that attempted to investigate the

eviction would risk their life. On the eviction day, for example, two reporters from the Radio Voice

of Vietnam were caught watching and beaten by police even after they identified themselves as

journalists (AP 2012b, Telegraph 2012, Dũng and Thuận 2012). Some sources without

corroboration reveal that the reason for such ‘heavy-handed’ repression is that an investor in the

Ecopark project had ties to relatives of a top leader in the central government. One day before the

eviction, Hưng Yên government warned journalists not to practise on the site. In field conversations

(see Appendix 3), peasants from Văn Giang said that the security became worse after the eviction.

Local authorities deliberately ignored or tolerated an army of thugs (bare-headed hooligans), drug-

addicted and HIV/AIDS infected persons to watch, threaten and attack members of households that

did not agree to concede land to the investors (Dân 2013). This allegation was further confirmed by

Văn Giang peasants in field interviews (Interviews I-VI, Appendix 3). The peasants in the area did

44

not dare to contact outsiders, or meet journalists for interviews. Fear pervades the whole region

(Interview VIII, Appendix 3).

The state media provided few reports on the eviction, while social networks (personal blogs)

carried full news coverage and updated the event ‘every single hour’ (Hưng 2012). This became a

potential source of information to explore. Concerns about accuracy and veracity of information

extracted from these news sites are real. However, in Vietnam’s party-state, ‘unorthodox’ media

(báo lề trái) ironically becomes the ‘orthodox’ source (báo lề phải) providing news about tension

between the state and society. Furthermore, data collected from direct interviews with the peasants

in field work could help this study verify the credibility of the online information.

All possible available contacts were used to organize interviews with Văn Giang peasants.

Nevertheless, the peasants denied any requests for interviews as they were so concerned about their

personal security (Interview VIII, Appendix 3). Finally, through personal relations, a lawyer who

worked for a law firm in Hanoi and had a sister living with her husband in Văn Giang town, offered

help. He talked to his sister who then agreed to arrange an interview with some peasants from the

three above-mentioned communes in Văn Giang.

Văn Giang is not far from Hà Nội centre, just 10 kilometres to the west, across the Red River. It

took nearly one hour to go there by motorbike, and had to travel quite early in the morning to avoid

being watched by local thugs. The lawyer’s sister had a big five-story house which, not far from the

centre of Văn Giang district, reserved its first level for a jewellery shop. She looked rather young,

while her husband was a bit older in his forties. In Vietnam, they are considered a rich and wealthy

household. They had been also coerced to cede a plot of land to local authorities, but did not agree

and were threatened. The husband said that they paid a price for this when his truck was set on fire

while parking in front of the house (Interview I, Appendix 3). He suspected that thugs were paid to

do that as a warning for his refusal to cede the land (Interview I, Appendix 3).

The couple said that it would not be safe to conduct interviews in the communes (Interview I,

Appendix 3). Hence, they had invited some peasants to their house and offered the living room for

interviews. The wife took her bike, put on a facial mask and a conic hat to go off for approximately

thirty minutes. When she came back, there were five other people with her. Three of them were

middle-aged women who looked austere but agile, each wearing a conic hat and a muffler scarf to

veil the face. The rest two men were one old and one young. They are all peasants, among them two

women and a man were from Xuân Quan commune, the other two were from Phụng Công

commune.

One woman from Xuân Quan commune said with a choked voice:

45

We are not afraid of anything because what we are saying here is the truth from the experience of our families, as well as of other landless households. We… the people are extremely… miserable so and so we have … nothing … to lose (Interview II, Appendix 3).

Another woman from Phụng Công commune added:

No matter who you are, a journalist or an official from any state agency, we are not afraid to speak out. We have to thank you, if you bring our misery to the public attention so that other people understand our problem and help us (Interview V, Appendix 3).

The interview lasted approximately ninety minutes. The man who kindly hosted the interview

(Interview I, Appendix 3) commented that these peasants, especially the woman from Phụng Công

(Interview V, Appendix 3), had told the truth about the Ecopark project, the life of local

communities, and what was happening in Văn Giang.

A second follow-up field trip to Hưng Yên was planned in September and October 2013, but it

was cancelled because it was advised by sources through personal relations that nothing has

changed and it was still dangerous to go there for investigation.

Notes on using data collected in field work

All the field audio records were transcribed into text which was then translated into English for

referencing by the researcher himself to ensure accuracy and confidentiality. They are now kept in a

locked box at a highly secure place. References in this thesis, including direct quotes, related to

villagers’ statements are extracted from field interviews in 2012 (see Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4 ).

Though the respondents did not request anonymity, their names are not spelled out to protect

personal identities.

46

2

A Review of Grassroots Democracy

Introduction

This chapter aims to provide an overview of GRD development in Vietnam. It focuses on the

historical roots of GRD in Vietnam’s culture, its genesis in the context of economic reforms, and its

status within the CPV’s broader view of democracy. It is argued that in evaluating Vietnamese

GRD, historical and cultural characteristics, social problems during Đổi Mới, and political regime

characteristics of Vietnam must be taken into account. This means any scholarly attempt that

conceptualizes GRD in a way that ignores these characteristics or contrasts it with liberal

democratic model characteristics, would fail to explain why the regime has not been democratically

transformed and the CPV did not face the same problems their counterparts in the former Soviet

Union or Eastern European countries had during the third wave of democratization (Huntington

1991(a), 1991(b), 2009).

Vietnamese GRD, as argued by the government officials, is rooted in an ancient cultural notion

called 'village/commune’ democracy (dân chủ làng xã), which appears in records going back to the

Lê and Nguyễn dynasties (Duong 2008:4). The rationale of these arguments is based on its two

components: the village/commune governance structure and the emergence of what is known as

Hương Ước (village convention) during these dynasties. The scholarly discourse in Vietnam on this

notion has also concentrated on these two components (for a sampling, see: Thục 1961, Doãn 1996,

Đính 1998, Lê 1999, 1994, Hương 2003, 2004).

Village/commune democracy continued in the Vietnamese countryside society during the

colonial era (1862-1945) and the era of wars for national liberation and unification (1945-1975)

(see: Chesneaux 1954, Duiker 1983, 1995, Corfield 2008, Wilcox 2011), although it existed as a de

facto concept, rather than a formalized local governance structure. In the early 1980s,

village/commune democracy experienced a new development with an initiative for people at the

grassroots level. The initiative, which became a well-known motto: ‘people know, people discuss,

people do, and people supervise and inspect’ (dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra), was

formalized in the CPV’s political documents (Tuấn 1997:7-12). It aimed at promoting civic

47

engagement in local governance, and laid the groundwork for the inception of GRD later (Hiền

2004a, CPVMMC 2005, 1997).

In 1998, following violent farmer protests in Thái Bình incurred by the decay of the local party-

state apparatus, the loss of the party’s control over its local agencies, and tension in cadre-peasant

relations, the CPV formalized the notion of village/commune democracy and the motto in a policy

document (known as Directive No.30) as a mean to amend these structural deficiencies. The

concept ‘grassroots democracy’ emerged from this document and later was transformed in a series

of government and parliamentary regulations.

The aims of GRD are quite straightforward: creating more transparent, accountable and

responsive local government, while empowering the peasants through direct village elections and

by participating in local governance with regard to those issues that affect their lives. Perversely,

the key tenet of GRD is not what liberal democratic theorists expect; that is, to enable the peasants

to democratically participate in local governance, rather the CPV retains core leadership role,

meaning that the party controls its implementation. This appears to be a contradiction at the very

core of Vietnamese GRD from a liberal democratic perspective, for it emerged both as a centrally

directed measure of control and a loosening or modification of certain mechanisms of control,

culminating in skepticism of the CPV’s sincerity (thực tâm) in implementing GRD. For example,

Zingerli (2004:56) called it a stop-gap political policy, implying that it aims to address the crises of

the CPV’s legitimacy and governability in the short term, but not to create a durable democratic

local governance structure for the long term in the countryside. Mattner (2004:126) considered

GRD as a party-controlled mechanism to reduce tension in state-peasant relations, preventing

political unrest or even wholesale rejection of the political system.

The argument of these scholars is not without merit. Nevertheless, while the discourse on GRD

has shown the importance of the concept, there are some missing factors in the picture that need to

be highlighted in order for us to understand better the emergence of GRD. For example, the

discordant root causes that gave rise to GRD, or the theoretical foundations of the concept. This

chapter attempts to better contextualize these gaps.

The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section explores the historical roots of GRD.

Here, characteristics of village/commune democracy – village governance structure and Hương

Ước – are examined. This is followed by a discussion about the real nature of village/commune

democracy based on in-depth analysis and critiques of its components. The first part concludes with

an assessment that the notion ‘village/commune democracy’, though now becomes a legacy, still

has certain influences in Vietnamese countryside.

48

The second section focuses on GRD in Đổi Mới era, which started from the late 1980s. The

background and root causes, to begin with, are revisited in order for us to understand the emergence

of GRD as a political concept of the CPV through the passing of policy and legal documents. While

GRD should be hailed as a political reform, it cannot go beyond the CPV’s ‘socialist democracy’.

This will be discussed in this part to clarify why GRD is led by the party and its importance to the

wider political context. Finally, two village electoral cases are presented as positive examples of

GRD – an empirical study and a narrative of a real story by a blogger. The cases suggest some

conditions that support the implementation of GRD and at the same time enable this researcher to

offer an initial argument that GRD is a mutually empowering mechanism for the CPV and the

peasantry. This has impacts on the CPV’s legitimacy and capacity to govern in the countryside, and

the reform of local governance in future.

Grassroots Democracy before Đổi Mới

This section explores the historical roots of GRD. The period that the village/commune democracy

extends from the Le dynasty in the 15th century (1464), which marks the emergence of Hương Ước

(Ngọc 2003:62-74), up to the late 1980s when the Đổi Mới economic reforms programme started.

The Pre-Colonial Era

The focus of this section is on two components of village/commune democracy – village

governance structure and Hương Ước. Before discussing these components, it is crucial to clarify

what are meant by village and commune, and how they become a combined term in Vietnamese

politics.

Village (làng) has two characteristics: first, a community of residents who descend from the

same family lineage, having a way of living, psychology, ethical system and traditions different

from other communities; second, separated from other villages by a defined boundary, and not a

state administrative unit (Quý 2000:517-18, Đính 1998:25). Commune (xã) is a state administrative

unit and can be one or comprise multiple villages (Ngọc 2003:63). Though they are different, yet

village and commune are inseparable concepts that are central to the making of a Vietnamese nation

over the millennia (Doãn 2001 & 2004, Đính 1985, Hoa 1990).

Anthropological-sociological research indicates that villages were initially recognised as the

lowest administrative level in the Vietnamese feudal state (HVCTQGHCM 2001:113, Ngọc 2012,

Tấn 1987). In the tenth century, under the first Vietnamese feudal state autonomous from Chinese

feudal authorities, a commune composed by several villages was established and labelled as the

49

state administrative unit at the grassroots level (VSH 1977:315, 1998:510). Since then, in

Vietnamese countryside, the state administrative apparatus (commune) and the village governance

structure co-existed (Ngọc 2003:63), and the two concepts - village and commune - have become

synonymous (Ngọc 2012:2).

The importance of village/commune in Vietnamese politics was recognized by Vũ Đình Hòe, a

well-known Vietnamese scholar and veteran politician, in a memoir as follows:

To learn the history of how the Vietnamese nation was created, we must understand the village/commune community; and to re-build Vietnam as a state, we must begin with the re-construction of the village/commune community. This is simply because without Vietnamese village/commune, there will be no Vietnamese state (1997:318).

Famously, more than a half century ago, the French scholar Paul Mus made the same evaluation of

the role of the village in Vietnamese politics. Mus commented:

The nationalism or communism, the programs and roles of the political parties, or similar questions can only be understood properly if they have been appraised from the standpoint of the villages. Since time immemorial these villages have become the key to the social structure of the country and to its outlook on life (1949:265).

The village/commune community as emphasized by Hòe is the social structure indicated by Mus.

Crucially, village culture was built around traditions of mutual support and unity (Gourou 1936,

VSH 1977, Thêm 1996). This allowed them to resolutely resist anything alien to the indigenous

community, including the king's law as expressed in a Vietnamese old proverb: ‘the king’s law

bows to the village’s rules’ (luật vua thua lệ làng)(Phúc 2008, Mus 1949:266, Lê 1994:6,

1999:112). Conversely, external elements must adapt to and accept Hương Ước (village

convention) and village culture if they want to intrude in (Quý 2000:518).

Village Governance Structure

Each Vietnamese ancient village was originally based on a single homogeneous family.

Nevertheless, in the course of territorial expansion under different Vietnamese feudal dynasties, this

homogeneity was broken. The village tolerated a more diversified composition of members who

were not inter-related. Since a village now constituted two or more heterogeneous families, there

was a need to develop common principles and norms to govern behaviours and activities between

individuals and among families. Village/commune hierarchical institutions were created by the

villagers themselves to ensure these principles and norms would be observed.

This village/commune governance structure has been described as the village/commune

democracy operating within the centralized system of absolute monarchies, similar to a federal

system in which each village was a communal state (Thục 1961:5). Based upon the accounts by

different scholars (for example, see: Rambo 1973, Từ 1984, Lê 1999, 1994, Hương 2004), there

50

were some characteristics to support what this researcher calls ‘the Sub-monarchical Democratic

Behaviour (SDB)’ paradigm.

The first characteristic of the SDB paradigm is the power structure within the Vietnamese

ancient village/commune. The literature on village/commune democracy offers three circles that

best describe this power structure (Từ 1984, HVCTQGHCM 2001, Hương 2004). Figure 1 below

gives more details about this.

As shown in Figure 1, The first circle (I) positioned at the centre is represented by lý dịch or lý

trưởng (the village chief/mayor), who was elected by the villagers and approved by the higher

authority (Hương 2010:24). Lý trưởng had duties to enforce decisions made by the village and

directions imposed by the Royal Court. The Royal Court’s top-down directions mainly focused on

levy collection, conscription, and maintenance of public order and security in the community

(Papin 2002, Rambo 1973:255-293). The second circle in the middle (II) is hội đồng kỳ mục or kỳ

dịch (the council of notables). The village elders, landowners, and ranks-and-files recognized by the

Royal Court were automatically eligible to sit in Hội đồng kỳ mục without popular voting (Từ

1984:55-57, 1996:280).

Figure 1: Vietnamese Village/Commune Democracy

Hội đồng kỳ mục had two roles: being the governing body of the village, and the legitimate

representative for the benefit of the villagers in all sorts of related issues. Kỳ mục (the notables) had

power to make decisions, adopt and work out guidelines and major activities within the village such

as festivals, repairs of temples and pagodas. All villagers were expected to implement these

decisions and to follow the guidelines. Hội đồng kỳ mục was also held accountable for reminding lý

dịch to accomplish the Royal Court’s directions. The third outer circle (III), is cuộc họp dân làng

(the greater villagers’ meetings)(Hương 2010:25). All adults and heads of households (who were

usually men), from the age of eighteen or above, could attend the meetings and were entitled to

51

discuss freely with lý dịch how the decisions and guidelines adopted by hội đồng kỳ mục would be

implemented. Furthermore, if a final decision could not be made by hội đồng kỳ mục, the villagers’

meeting would be held to provide advice. It was the village power structure and its operations that

reflect the second characteristic of the SDB paradigm: state-village/commune relations.

The second characteristic of the SDB paradigm articulates the fact that the feudal state took a

passive stance toward the peasants, and accepted the village governance structure (Rambo

1973:273, Hương 2004:20-23). Excluding tasks that the commune authority was obliged to

undertake, the state’s directions such as collecting taxes (including personal and farm levies),

recruiting toilers (corvees) and ensuring military conscription (Woodside 1971:157), the commune

authority could autonomously determine other issues within its jurisdiction. The power to make

decisions at the local level was vested in hội đồng kỳ mục, rather in lý dịch. In Vietnamese ancient

village/commune, a wide range of issues were subject to the jurisdiction of hội đồng kỳ mục,

including, for instance: the village/commune governance structure itself; making policies and rules

to govern the village/commune life; providing codes of conduct and behavioural rules (Hương Ước)

that were applied equally to all villagers; settlement of civic disputes as well as dealing with minor

criminal offences within the village; establishing funds and the budget of the village; and, creating

self-management groups in parallel with other village institutions in order to keep and maintain

order within the village. The decision-making process of hội đồng kỳ mục was similar to

parliamentary democracy.

The third characteristic of the SDB paradigm is the existence of certain autonomous groups

operating in parallel with village institutions. Typical among these groups was Giáp (Chi 1996:196-

206), which was created and run by men in the village. Those who were eighteen years old could

join voluntarily in this group. All members of the group enjoyed equal rights, benefits and duties

without any distinction on the basis of their status or background. As such, equality was the

foundational principle of Giáp. Within the broad context of the village, Giáp played a role as a

source of additional advice to the above village institutions.

The fourth characteristic of the SDB paradigm affecting the village power structure is Hương

Ước (village convention), a document laying out the rules that applied to all villagers (see: Úc

2003a). Specifically, Hương Ước was designed to govern daily behaviour and conduct of the

villagers, and reinforced the notion: ‘the king’s law bows to the village’s rules’, meaning that

within the village’s boundary the village rules overrode the king’s law.

Building on these four characteristics, Thục (1961), Từ (1984) and Thịnh (2010) argue that the

village governance structure offers a democratic model. Others like Lê (1994:19-40) considers it an

evidence of democratic traditions in Vietnamese ancient culture. Among the four characteristics,

52

Hương Ước is conceived to be the most crucial one in making the village governance structure

work as a democratic institution (Thịnh 2010:235). This is because, as Bảo (2007:108) argues, it

provides a legal framework within which the village as a small society can function in a democratic

order, rather in anarchy. Furthermore, the way that Hương Ước is constructed is democratic (Mền

and Đính 1982:44-49, Mền 2003:48-61).

Hương Ước (Village Convention)

Hương Ước is a combined term, in which "Hương" literally means village and "Ước" is interpreted

as statutes, rules, regulations or law. Despite the village governance structure existing in parallel

with the state administration since the founding of Vietnam as a nation-state in the 10th century, the

concept Hương Ước was only formalized in a Royal Code (Hồng Đức thiện chính thư) in the 15th

century (1464) of the Lê dynasty (Chi 1996:233, Ngọc 2003:62-74, 2012:3).

Hương Ước (see: Mền and Lợi 2001, Hiền 2013), is commonly defined as the ‘village code’,

providing rules that govern all aspects of life and activities within the village, and are ethically

binding upon the villagers (Mền and Đính 1982, Từ 1984, Bính 1990, Biền 1996, Đính 1998, Giao

2000, Doãn 2001). Each village had its own Hương Ước, different from one to another in terms of

contents and format, demonstrating the autonomy of the village (Hoạch 2003:27-47). In

Vietnamese pre-colonial, and present, village culture, community ethical values over-ride the state

law (Hương 2003:90). Therefore, villagers were expected to comply with these ethical values. In

the past, if a villager breached the code and failed to comply with penalties imposed by the village,

he and his family would be insulted by other villagers to the extent that he, and even the family,

would end up leaving and never returning to the village.

The democratic value of Hương Ước can be seen in three dimensions: the construction process,

the regulatory contents, and the implementation. Ethnographic studies show that the construction of

Hương Ước was done by the villagers themselves, even though local incumbent state officials or

high-ranking officials in the Royal Court descended from the relevant village participated in the

process (Mền and Đính 1982:44-49, Mền 2003:48-61). Inclusive participation of the villagers in

formulating the village code was significant and influential in two other ways: regulatory content

and implementation. Issues that were regulated by Hương Ước vary, ranging from worshiping,

festive activities and funerals to distribution of farmland - an extremely important issue in

Vietnamese agrarian society. As a product of democratic deliberations and popularly accepted,

Hương Ước are expected to be implemented by all villagers on a voluntary basis.

The egalitarianism in Hương Ước is noticeable. Equality is not only considered a cultural

tradition, but becomes a principle that keeps the village united and maintains the relationships

53

among heterogeneous families and all members of the village. Equality in this sense is narrowly

defined as equity, meaning that everyone enjoys the same interests and undertakes the same duties

regardless their background and status. Conflicts arise if the principle is not stringently followed.

Hương (2003:91) argues that only by upholding this principle, could stability and order be

preserved in the village/commune community. At this stage, if we could stop for a moment to recall

the violent peasant protests in Thái Bình in 1997, it was inequality as the sufficient condition that

became the last straw causing the crisis (Hải 2014a).

Village/commune democracy is further reinforced through the implementation of Hương Ước.

While inclusive participation and equality are the two key principles to guarantee democratic

development of the village code and a democratic life among villagers, transparency and openness

are the two other principles to ensure democratic and effective implementation of the code (Đính

1985:35, 1998:81, 2000:5). This argument is based on the fact that in the feudal society the state

law was not made available to the awareness of the villagers. This phenomenon is called ‘law

blindness’ (Hương 2003:88). Furthermore, the state law was not rigidly enforced and was

manoeuvred by corrupt and greedy mandarins (quan) at both the central and local levels. The decay

of the state apparatus, the crises of the state-peasantry relations and the mandarin-peasant relations

are illustrated by folk proverbs like: ‘money can buy law’ (kim ngân phá lệ luật); ‘mandarin’s

admission of petitions for opportunist money’ (quan thấy kiện như kiến thấy mỡ); ‘thugs rob at

night time, mandarins rob in day time’ (cướp đêm là giặc, cướp ngày là quan); ‘money can tear a

legal document’ (nén bạc đâm toạc tờ giấy)(Thịnh 2010:236). In this context, that the villagers

tended to rely on Hương Ước – the law created by them – to protect their interests and rights is

understandable.

Vietnamese village/commune democracy as expressed by the two components - village

governance structure and Hương Ước – faced the impact of external factors over the course of time.

However, it proved to be resilient. The following sub-sections walk through different historical

periods to see how village/commune democracy and its components were perceived and

implemented.

The Colonial Era

The discussion about Vietnamese village/commune democracy in this section is mainly related to

the durability of the village governance structure and Hương Ước during the colonial era.

Vietnam’s colonial era began in 1862 (when the Nguyễn dynasty ceded three provinces in the

South and the island of Poulo Condore to France) and lasted until 1945 (when Vietnam declared

independence from France, even though the French remained in Vietnam until the battle of Điện

54

Biên Phủ and the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954)(Duiker 1983:25-40). For almost a

century, the French attempted several times to reform and replace the pre-existing village

governance structure and traditional Hương Ước with ones that were supportive of the colonial

authority’s ruling policies (Chi 1996:209, Ngọc 2003:69-70, 2012:6-7). Furthermore, these reforms,

which were known as ‘cải lương hương chính’ (or restructuring the village administration and

rewriting Hương Ước)(Hương 2013:26), aimed to ‘prevent villagers from joining together to

counter the government’ (Ánh 1992:107). Nevertheless, the colonial authority failed to achieve all

its political goals due to staunch resistance of the villages (Hoàng 2008:9). Pasquier, the French

General-Governor in Vietnam (1928-1934), acknowledged the resilience of Vietnamese

village/commune in this way:

Village/commune is a small republic… It is a complicated and democratic organization, in which its notables have to act collectively. It has existed for so long with established traditions. Hence, we should leave it untouched, otherwise we may put it into crisis and jeopardy (1907:63, cited in Doãn 2004: 37, Dương 1985:82)

Although the village/commune democracy’s components demonstrated their resilience, the colonial

authority’s reform plans had also certain impacts on them. For instance, lý dịch and lý trưởng who

used to be elected by the villagers and approved by a Royal mandarin at higher level, now had to be

approved by the local colonial authority headed by a French official. Understandably, the colonial

authority wanted to control lý dịch/lý trưởng, who had to implement top-down exploitative policies

without protecting the villagers’ interests. Moreover, the contents of Hương Ước were also

modified at the directions and to achieve the political goals of the colonial authority (Ngọc

2003:69-70). In this context, village/commune democracy became formalistic and only

substantively significant where indigenous cultural issues like festive activities or repairs of the

communal house were discussed.

There are two things we learn from the above accounts. Firstly, the three concentric circle

construct of the village did not change, but the power structure of the village was controlled by the

colonial authority. This is an important distinction to avoid confusion between the organizational

construct and the power structure of the village. Also, it indicates that all reform plans of the French

aimed at Vietnamese village/communes were not scrapped. Secondly, Hương Ước remained the

village code, but accommodated more content imposed by the colonial authority to serve its

political purposes. When the Vietnamese communists came to power, they considered these

modified components of the village/commune democracy as a legacy of the colonialism, which

must be rejected, overthrown, and eradicated.

55

The Post-Colonial Era up to Đổi Mới

The timeframe under which Vietnamese village/commune democracy is investigated in this section

begins with the post-colonial era marked by Vietnam’s declaration of independence from the

French in 1945 up to the mid-1980s before Đổi Mới economic reforms started. The focus here is

also on the two components of the village/commune democracy under the rule of the communists.

Vietnam during this period experienced two major wars and other short armed conflicts with its

neighbours until the mid-1980s. These wars and armed conflicts were results of the ideological

clashes under the pretext of the East-West Cold War. This affected the way the communists treated

village/commune democracy and its components.

Politically speaking, the Vietnamese communists had a revolutionary goal: fight and overthrow

colonialism and the foreign rule to liberate and unite the country, and abolish the legacies of

feudalism and semi-feudalism (see, for example: CPV 1980, Kolko 1986, Bello 2007, Trọng 2011d,

Marr 2013). Hence, they would not accept any things related to colonialism. As indicated above,

though the three concentric circle construct of the village was a Vietnamese peasants’ creation, its

power structure and Hương Ước were manoeuvred by the colonial authority during the colonial era,

making them more or less the relics of colonialism. Consequently, when the communists came to

power in 1945, they did not encourage the construction and implementation of Hương Ước (Ngọc

2003:70). In 1953, the Vietnamese communists carried out a large land reform campaign in the

north to abolish landlords who made up an important element in Hội đồng kỳ mục – the central

circle in the village governance structure – and were protégés of the colonial authority (Moise

1976). Deeming the village governance structure, especially the central circle, as a legacy of

colonialism, in 1954, the Vietnamese communists dissolved this structure (Úc 2003b:12).

Consequently, village/commune democracy became void after having lost its foundations.

The recent re-emergence of Hương Ước in Vietnamese society was associated with Vietnam’s

Đổi Mới economic reforms in the mid-1980s. Some scholars suggested that Hương Ước as ‘village

statutes’ was re-created following the ‘peasant household responsibility contract system’ – an

initiative of the peasants – was transcribed in the CPV’s Resolution No.10 in 1988 (known as

‘Contract No.10’), which regulates the distribution of farmland to peasant households for long-term

usage (Úc 2003b:12). Previously, in 1984, the CPV formalized another political initiative of people

at the grassroots level, ‘people know, people discuss, people do, and people supervise and inspect’

(dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra), which aimed to enable the people to participate in local

governance (CPV 1986:75-76, Tuấn 1997:7-12, Cúc 2002:10-11, Hương 2010:26-27). The

initiative became a breakthrough in political and governance reforms in Vietnamese countryside, as

well as the groundwork for the genesis of GRD later.

56

It is clear that the notion ‘village/commune democracy’ and its components were not explicitly

recognized by the Vietnamese communists, creating a large space for Vietnamese scholars to

debate whether or not Vietnam has democratic traditions (see: Lê 1994, Từ 1996, Hương 2004,

Thịnh 2010, Hương 2010). The debate is further driven by perceptions like ‘the king’s law bows to

the village’s rules’ (phép vua thua lệ làng) that still prevails in many parts of Vietnamese

countryside, and the emphasis on Hương Ước as an informal legal document supporting the

implementation of GRD (Bảo 2007, Úc 2003a, Hiền 2013, Đính 2000). Did village/commune

democracy really exist in Vietnamese society before the post-colonial era? If not, what was it? The

following sub-section examines the real nature of ‘village/commune democracy’ based on in-depth

analysis and critiques of its components.

Village Democracy or Autonomy

By identifying whether it is ‘village democracy’ or ‘village autonomy’, this sub-section aims to

clarify the status of the village in the broader context of the state. In other words, it defines the

state-village relationship. This fits the ultimate goal of this thesis, which is to see what the cultural

norms meant for the implementation of GRD, which in turn impacts on state politics, the CPV and

future local governance reforms.

To call it ‘village democracy’ or ‘village autonomy’, we need to understand the characteristics of

the village and the real nature of its governance structure. That Vietnamese traditional

village/commune was organized as an autonomous, rather than as a democratic model. This is

based on two main dimensions: the village-village relationship, and the village-state relationship. It

commences with the labelling of Vietnamese village/commune as ‘a small republic’, which is

‘autonomous within the limits of local interests’ (Pasquier 1907:63, cited in Duong 1985: 82). This,

in a narrow context, indicates the independence and autonomy of each village; and, in a broader

context, the independence and autonomy of the village from the state.

The village-village relationship

This dimension is symbolized by three characteristics: geographic boundary, culture and beliefs,

and customary rules. The boundary of each village is an indication of the limit within which the

villagers had jurisdiction over their lands and facilities. Hence, the villagers resisted any attempts to

encroach this boundary. Vietnamese history narrates numerous cases where inhabitants between

two adjacent villages fought against each other to protect their boundaries and assert sovereignty

over village land (for a sampling, see: Hưu et al. 1272-1697:87). The second autonomous

characteristic, culture and beliefs, is illustrated by the fact that each village has its own communal

57

house dedicated to pay tribute to a person who founded or had a great contribution to the village

and was therefore declared by the villagers as the village saint (Khánh 2014:30-45). Festive

activities organized by villages also differ from each other. Furthermore, characteristics of the

culture and personality of each village can be recognized in proverbs like, for example: ‘trai Cầu

Vồng Yên Thế, gái Nội Duệ Cầu Lim’ (men of Cầu Vồng Yên Thế, women of Nội Duệ Cầu Lim),

‘văn chương Xuân Mỹ, lý sự Thủy Khê’ (literature [written] by Xuân Mỹ [villagers], arguments

[made] by Thủy Khê [villagers])(Hoa 1990: 75-90). The last autonomous characteristic in this

dimension is customary rules of each village. The village rules here are Hương Ước, which as

indicated above are written by villagers in response to their specific needs in daily activities. In

many cases, Hương Ước of one village contradicts that of another village (Hoàng 2008:6). This

further reinforces the autonomy of each village.

Village autonomy in the village-village relationship is an expression of Vietnamese villages’

resilience against aliens. This autonomy can even be observed in a broader context, which is in the

village-state relationship.

The village-state relationship

It must be clarified at the outset that the concept ‘state’ here simply means the authority, and is not

necessarily synonymous with that of a ‘state’ in our modern sense. This is because the modern state

has far greater capacity than pre-colonial monarchy or colonial era rule.

The village-state relationship can be seen in two aspects: the village governance structure, and

Hương Ước. This relationship reinforces the construct of the village as ‘village autonomy’ (not

village democracy).

The village governance structure as shown in Figure 1 above has three circles. Lý dịch/lý trưởng

(village chief/mayor), positioned at the centre, was approved by the state, though he was elected by

the villagers. In most cases, the state did not reject the electoral results submitted from the village.

This made the state’s approval a procedural requirement. Moreover, lý dịch/lý trưởng was not the

decision-maker within the village. He played the role as ‘the middle-man’ and ‘record keeper’ in

the village-state relationship, overseeing and encouraging the villagers to implement the state’s

directions on tax collection or military conscription (Doãn 2004:65). The decision-making body in

the village was Hội đồng kỳ mục, the second layer in the goverance structure circle. The state did

not intervene in and had no influence on the composition and creation of this body. In terms of

power ranking within the village, lý dịch/lý trưởng was lower than those sitting in Hội đồng kỳ mục

(Đính 1985:37-42). During the colonial era, the authority abolished and replaced Hội đồng kỳ mục

with Hội đồng tộc biểu (council of heads of the family clans) in 1921, but had to allow the re-

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establishment of Hội đồng kỳ mục in face of the resistance of the villagers (Chi 1996:209). This is a

clear indication of the village autonomy in the village-state relationship. The state could not impose

its political will on the village without acceptance of the villagers. Village autonomy was further

consolidated by the role of the third circle – cuộc họp dân làng (greater villagers’ meeting), which

gave the final voice when Hội đồng kỳ mục had not been able to make a decision.

The second characteristic that most demonstrates village autonomy in the village-state

relationship is the existence and implementation of Hương Ước in the village in parallel with state

law. Hương Ước contained content extracted from state law (on public affairs like levy collection)

and the villagers’ own rules (on the village affairs like the repair of temples, festivals and funerals).

Since the fifteenth century, Hương Ước was accepted by the state as the village code, prescribing

all activities in the village. The state approved the contents of Hương Ước autonomously written

and submitted by the villagers. As discussed above, the colonial authority failed to force the

villagers to change all the contents of Hương Ước in a way that best benefited the authority. This

recalls us to the proverb: ‘the king’s law bows to the village’s rules’ (phép vua thua lệ làng), which

indicates village autonomy with the state.

The above discussion of the two dimensions: village-village relationship and village-state

relationship shows the village’s autonomy in dealing with its own ‘internal affairs’ and resisting

any interventions from the external forces, including the state. Following are some critiques of the

village governance structure, which tends to be seen as a democratic model.

Critiques of the village governance structure

Though Hội đồng kỳ mục was the decision-making body, its members were not elected by the

villagers. Those having a high status or power in society like cai đội (army officers), chánh and phó

tổng (commune governor and deputy-governor), cựu lý trưởng and phó lý (former village chiefs

and vice-chiefs) and so on would automatically sit in this body. Furthermore, those who had money

could buy a seat in Hội đồng. The common villagers were excluded from the decision-making

process. This by all definitions is not a democratic institution. Hương (2004:23) argues that the way

that Hội đồng was created and worked was at odds and undemocratic.

The third circle, cuộc họp dân làng (greater villagers’ meeting) appears the most democratic

venue where villagers in theory deliberated communal affairs. Nevertheless, the actual significance

of this meeting was minimal because: first, the meeting was only marshalled when Hội đồng had

discussed but could not reach an agreement on the issue; second, only men and incumbent officials

were entitled to participate in the meeting, especially the one held to elect the village mayor or

commune governor. This clearly demonstrated gender and social status-based discrimination and

59

the absence of inclusiveness (this is also true for all pre-modern democratic forms in the world);

third, in most cases, the meeting was convened to complete a procedure, rather than to create a

forum for public debate. Villagers’ participation in the meeting was virtually passive. The meeting

was a miniature replica of ‘parliamentary democracy’, but it was cosmetic and, more crucially, not

‘by’ and ‘of’ nor ‘for’ the people.

The existence of some associations functioning in parallel with the village governance structure

like giáp (organized by age), họ (by kinship), phe (by interest), phường (by occupation) was seen as

an indication of village democracy (Chi 1996:221-30). Nevertheless, their democratic nature needs

to be reconsidered. Let’s take giáp as an example. Giáp was an association based on voluntarism

without a democratically elected governing body. Hence, its structure was easily broken. Though it

was a venue to discuss many issues in the village, its opinions were not weighed by the village

decision-making body. Moreover, giáp was only able to deliberate and contribute opinions on those

issues that would not affect the economic, political and social benefits of the villager community.

Even that, holding consultations of Hội đồng kỳ mục with giáp was not a statutory requirement.

Hence, the role of giáp was not highly esteemed. The same situation applied to other associations.

One aspect that might be recognized as positive of these associations is that they were the venues

gathering villagers from different quarters of village society, creating civic networks that could

contribute to reducing any potential tensions within the society. The role of these associations in

this sense, as Thịnh (2010:235) argues, was to create ‘social capital’ in the countryside, a condition

that Putnam (1993a) argues as necessary to make democracy work. Thịnh (2010:235) further

contended that by joining these associations, the villagers had some feelings of freedom and

autonomy.

Finally, scepticism about the village democracy seems plausible when the role of the

authoritarian central government is taken into account. During both the pre-colonial and colonial

eras, the central government entirely controlled the life of the village/commune in two ways.

Firstly, it set up an apparatus synchronized from the central to the grassroots level, aiming to

prevent any intention at the local level of breaking away from the central government’s control, or

creating a federal state composed of ‘real’ small republics (Pasquier 1907:63, cited in Doãn 2004:

37, Dương 1985:82). Secondly, lý dịch/lý trưởng (village chief/mayor) and chánh tổng (commune

governor) were approved by the government. Thirdly, Hương Ước were written by the villagers,

but approved by the government. This means the government could actually manipulate the

contents of Hương Ước to make sure that they would not contravene state law.

Ultimately the Vietnamese ancient village/commune is then an autonomous, rather than a

democratic model. The village governance structure and Hương Ước are substantive manifestations

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of this autonomy. Nonetheless, having called it ‘village autonomy’ does not necessarily deny the

democratic procedures undertaken within the ‘small republic’ as being discussed in Chapters Five,

Six, and Seven of the case studies.

Leaving aside this debate, what concerns this study now is how the CPV has treated it and what

does it mean for the new CPV-formalized democratic model in the countryside of GRD. The next

sub-section will demonstrate that ‘village democracy’ or ‘village autonomy’ is now treated as a

procedural legacy with the use of Hương Ước as a supplementary tool to support GRD.

‘Village Democracy’ or ‘Village Autonomy’: Just a Legacy

The CPV rejected the idea of village autonomy in the post-colonial era up to Đổi Mới. In fact, the

CPV never mentioned village democracy or village autonomy in its documents. This, firstly, gives

the CPV flexibility in inheriting progressive aspects of village autonomy, and the re-emergence and

formalization of Hương Ước in the state law is an example of this flexible policy. Secondly, the

CPV never accepted such a model existing within its jurisdiction, because village autonomy would

challenge its monopoly of power in the countryside. Furthermore, it might fear that village

autonomy could lead to the formation of a federal state if the village exists like a ‘small republic’.

Empirical studies shows that historical legacies have an impact on democratic development

(Wittenberg 2012), amid the discourse on rethinking the origins of democracy and considering non-

European or non-Western democratic traditions (for example, see: Muhlberger and Paine 1993,

Gagnon 2013). In separate field interviews, a well-known Marxist theorist of the CPV and a

charismatic and out-spoken high-ranking official acknowledged that Vietnam does not yet have a

democratic culture (Interviews I and II, Appendix 4). However, they and other scholars in Vietnam

agree that ‘village democracy’ or ‘village autonomy’, particularly Hương Ước, are legacies of

Vietnamese culture that can be treated as a supplementary tool to support the implementation of

GRD in the countryside (Sáu and Thông 2005). Given the CPV does not accept village autonomy,

that the party legally encourages the use of Hương Ước – the village code – to support GRD should

be considered a positive sign, which may exert in more or less impact on the local governance

system. The next section canvasses GRD in the Đổi Mới era.

Grassroots Democracy in the Đổi Mới Era

To provide a better understanding the emergence of GRD in the Đổi Mới era, this section

commences with the background and root causes of rural unrest in the 1990s. The implementation

of GRD in China is worth a brief discussion in this context, because the Communist Party of China

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(CPC) used GRD to deal with rural unrest caused by the same problems that the CPV faced. This is

followed by subsections on the development of GRD and the CPV’s ‘socialist democracy’. Finally,

two village electoral cases are presented as positive examples of GRD – an empirical study and a

blogger’s real story. The cases suggest some conditions that support the implementation of GRD

and at the same time enable this researcher to offer an initial argument that GRD is a mutually

empowering mechanism both for the CPV and the peasantry. This of course has impacts on the

CPV’s legitimacy and governing ability in the countryside, and the reform of local governance in

future.

Đổi Mới and Rural Unrest in the 1990s

The purpose of this section is to provide the background and the root causes of the rural unrests in

the first decade of Đổi Mới. These causes were structural (long-term) problems. In other words, it

was the CPV’s authoritarianism and corruption that created tension in cadre-peasant relations.

Đổi Mới and Root Causes of Rural Unrest

In 1986, at its Sixth Congress, the CPV officially launched an ambitious economic reforms

programme, known as Đổi Mới, to open up the economy as the party’s monopoly of power and

legitimacy were being challenged by peasant unrest in poverty-stricken rural areas (see: Irvin 1995,

Kerkvliet 1995b, 2005, London 2009). The CPV vowed to make Đổi Mới a 'comprehensive reform

policy' (chính sách đổi mới toàn diện), putting the people at the centre of the process (CPV 1986,

2005). McCormick (1998:129) interpreted the concept of ‘comprehensive reform' as a two-part

transformation policy implemented simultaneously both in economic and political terms. However,

in reality, the CPV only focused on the former – economic liberalization, and did little on the latter

– political reforms.

The CPV set out a clear vision with Đổi Mới: economic development first, political

democratization later (Bình 1990a, Uẩn 1991, SarDesai 1998). However, while economic progress

helped the CPV renew its legitimacy (Vasavakul 1995:289), limited political reforms further

deepened the decay of the party-state apparatus and led to an increase in party members and public

officials who had committed corruption, received bribes, and illegally appropriated state land and

assets (Wells-Dang 2010, Joiner 1990, London 2009). This gave rise to calls for political

liberalization and pluralism within the party (Duiker 1995-124, Abuza 2001a:76-82).

Nevertheless, in response to these calls, the CPV further strengthened its monopoly on power

and rejected political pluralism, and suppressed any opposition. Abuza (2001a:77) contended that it

was the CPV’s authoritarianism that allowed the elite unchallenged authority and its members stood

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above the law and acted in an arbitrary manner. This political elite enjoyed absolute privilege (TI

2006:15). In the countryside, where all types of inequality converged due to power asymmetry and

lack of political reform, party members abused their power for personal gain, ignoring the interests

of poor peasants (Hải 2014a:73). Depressed and irritated by the ‘ills of bureaucratism,

authoritarianism, alienation from the masses, despotism, oppression of the people, corruption, bribe

taking, and extravagant lifestyles’ of party members and public officials (Joiner 1990:1059),

peasant protests took place in many parts of the country in the 1990s.

Rural Unrest in the 1990s

From the mid-1980s, peasant protests became a common feature of Vietnamese politics (see: Kolko

1997, HRW 1997a, Stewart 1997(a), 1997(b), Vasavakul 1998, Hiền 2004a, UNDP 2006, Hùng

2008b, Thayer 2009a, Bảo 2010). Primary data cited by Kolko (1997:93) and Kerkvliet (1995b:74)

revealed: between 1988 and the mid-1990s there were about 200,000 written complaints, 120 acute

‘hot spots’, of which forty percent were categorized as ‘smouldering’, forty-nine percent ‘tense’,

and eleven percent ‘very fierce’. Most of these protests were related to land management,

compensation for land seizures, corruption and unfair tax payments. The protests, in some

instances, eventually turned into violence between the peasants and local authorities.

The most violent peasant protest in the first decade of Đổi Mới was in Thái Bình (1997), a south-

eastern agrarian province eighty kilometres from Hanoi. The literature on the case (Stewart 1997(a),

1997(b), McCormick 1998, Abuza 2001a, Vu 2003, Sáu and Thông 2003, 2005, Hiền 2004a,

Mattner 2004, Luong 2005, 2010, Lai 1997a, Bảo 2007, 2010, Wells-Dang 2010, Thayer 2010,

UBND-TB 2010) generally attributes the peasant protests to bad governance, corruption and

inequality. The case of Thái Bình came as an ideological shock to the CPV leadership for several

reasons. Firstly, it took place in a province traditionally considered a loyal stronghold of the CPV

during the national liberation wars. Secondly, it represented an unprecedented challenge to the

CPV’s legitimacy and capacity to govern in a rural area that had been tightly party-controlled since

1975. Thirdly, it exposed the limits of Đổi Mới when economic progress only benefited the elites

but not the poor peasants. Finally, it exposed the malaise of the regime in the countryside: abuse of

power, corruption, inequality, violation of fundamental human rights, disrespect of law, and

paralysis of the CPV-controlled mass organizations. Stewart (1997(a), 1997(b)) quoted Kerkvliet, a

Vietnam scholar and expert on agrarian reform, when saying that

Poverty, abusive officials, contending claims to land, heavy taxes and other levies have a long history in Vietnam, as the Communist Party knows better than most… If corruption and tax levies become major burdens on villagers and poverty deepens, the Communist Party will be in serious trouble.

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This warning has been actually seen by the CPV. One year before the disturbances in Thái Bình,

the CPV had already confessed:

The apparatus of the Party, State and mass organizations has been draggy in reorganizing, streamlining and improving performance quality; there remain many instances of bureaucratism and serious violations of the people’s democratic right (CPV 1996:22-23).

In an unprecedented frank admission, the CPV indicated the root causes of the protests:

Local authorities in some places have demonstrated negative practices and violations; making use of loopholes in the transition of the mechanism, governmental organizations in various places abused the land sales, tendering, project execution to mobilize excessive contributions of the people to infrastructure construction or to set up illegal funds and use public funds irregularly; committed corruption and gave bribes in pursuit of personal benefits; practiced mismanagement, causing loss of public funds. In the meantime, demands by the people for justice, democracy and transparency were not met; people were not virtually invited to participate in discussions, deliberations and making decisions on matters that were closely related to their lives, thus causing discontent and critical reaction from the people (Hiền 2004a:27).

The peasant protests embody the paradox of Đổi Mới by the CPV: economic liberalization vis-à-vis

monopoly of power. The size and scope of the Thái Bình protests are concrete manifestations of the

long-standing structural problems created by this paradox: the declining trust of the peasantry in

CPV’s rule, the decay of the party-state apparatus, and growing tension in cadre-peasant relations.

The CPV has now come to understand that its legitimacy and governability in the countryside were

really in crisis and being challenged.

These were exactly the same problems that the Communist Party of China (CPC) had confronted

after embarking on economic reforms in China in the late 1970s. Below is a brief discussion of how

the CPC has used GRD as a measure inter alia to improve governance and ultimately to regain its

legitimacy in rural areas. Noticeably, the Thái Bình protests took place when the CPC completed

experimental GRD in Chinese countryside (1987-1997) and made its implementation compulsory

nation-wide (in 1998). The success of GRD in enabling the CPC to achieve its political goals may

be a good lesson for the CPV to learn.

Grassroots Democracy in China

GRD in China emerged in the context of economic reforms started in the late 1970s and swelling

peasant pressures for change in the countryside, typically in the form of complaints and protests

(Economist 1996, Huang 2013). Initially undertaken as an experiment in southern China to allow

villagers to directly elect their own headmen and village committees (Epstein 1996, Wang 1997), it

has been made compulsory nation-wide since 1998 on the premise of a state law, the Organic Law

of Village Committees,10 and has gained growing scholarly attention.

10 See full text of the Organic Law, promulgated by Order No.9 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 4 November 1998.

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There are three main research streams on Chinese GRD. The first stream focuses on the

development, including the historical aspect, and implementation and operationalization of GRD

(Elklit 1997, Kelliher 1997, O'Brien 1994, 2001, O'Brien and Li 2000, Kennedy 2002, Zweig 2004,

He 2007, Weiping and Jiaxi 2011, Brown 2011). The second discusses the intrinsic linkage

between GRD and local governance (He 2013, Wang and Yao 2007). The third concentrates on the

impact of GRD on Chinese politics in general and the CPC in particular (Schubert 2003,

Shambaugh 2008, Wang 1997). Of three research streams, the third draws the most scholarly

attention. Also, the last two are identical with the aim of this thesis.

The distinction of these research streams is of relative significance because the implementation

of GRD credibly affects the local rural governance system (He 2013:306) and ultimately the CPC

as the ruling party in China (Shambaugh 2008:1). Nevertheless, it suggests a number of following

questions, which are relevant for this thesis: Why did the CPC devote itself to promoting

democratic practice at the grassroots level, which could potentially weaken its own power bases and

legitimacy in the long run? What are the implications of GRD for the larger political development

of China in the future? In fact, the answers for these questions can apply to the central questions put

forward by Shambaugh in China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (2008), such as:

Why has the CPC survived in power? Will the CPC endure as the ruling party in China?

Direct village elections mark the most sweeping abdication of the CPC’s power since 1949

(Economist 1996:33). In Maoist China, the CPC controlled the source of power, including the

appointment to political office (Oi and Rozelle 2000:513). In post-Mao and economic reform era,

though the CPC is still ruling the country, village leaders are no longer appointed by higher

authorities but subjected to popular voting in competitive elections (Li 1999, Shi 1999). This

changed the power structure and characteristics of the state-society relation in Chinese rural areas.

He Baogang described the impact of village elections on local governance this way:

Local governance in Chinese rural politics has witnessed a decrease in direct state interference… Village elections have had a direct impact on village power structures. Furthermore, the partnership between local governments and other social organizations has been strengthened, and both the market and the new rich have played an increased role in local rural governance. Village elections transfer and redistribute power in favor of elected village committees, which attract younger, higher educated and richer people. Elections have changed the behavior of village chiefs, who are now more responsible and accountable to villagers. Village elections create an institutional constraint on township leaders, who cannot dismiss village chiefs at their will… All this appears to challenge the party’s domination of the village power structure (2013:306).

While some scholars considered political developments at the grassroots level like these as smart

strategies used by the CPC to reinforce its legitimacy and survival (Shambaugh 2008, Brown 2011),

others hoped that a more democratic government would be installed in future in China (IRI 1995,

cited in Wang 1997:1432).

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Notwithstanding to the above positive changes in Chinese rural politics, China scholars in the

West are still suspicious of CPC-led reform policies (Shi 1999:385). They looked at these policies

‘as a gigantic repair project in order to correct the mistakes and aberrations of Maoism’ and argued

that the reforms are ‘doomed to failure, as long as the Communist Party claims the final say on

right or wrong for itself’ (Schubert 2003:2). The dual authority structure – the party [represented by

party secretaries] and the government [represented by village chiefs] – existing in every village

reinforces this suspicion (Oi and Rozelle 2000:513). As He (2013:306) indicated that this dual

authority structure allows the party secretaries to claim a final say where conflict occurs between

party secretaries and village chiefs. In other words, the CPC may not intervene in village elections,

but still keeps control of the village power structure.

The arguments by these China scholars in the West are justifiable, but a fresh and more objective

look at the importance of village elections, especially their true meaning for the CPC, is needed.

The Carter Center (1998:2, cited in Shi 1999:386) hailed village elections in China as ‘an important

and sincere initiative’ [of the CPC]. Wang (1997:1432) argued that the elections have created more

power for both the CPC and the peasantry. He found that the CPC wanted to promote GRD as the

only mechanism ‘to cope with the crises of legitimacy and governability in the countryside incurred

by the decay of the party-state apparatus in the grassroots, the loss of control of the state over its

local agencies, and tensions in cadre-peasant relations’ (1997:1440). Wang’s findings reinforced

what Schubert (2003), Shambaugh (2008), and Dickson (2006, 2010) have generally referred the

Chinese regime as ‘smart authoritarianism’.

Shambaugh (2008:103) observed, the CPC’s adaptational reforms like GRD ‘are intended to

collectively strengthen its ruling capacity’ and ‘have been sufficient to sustain the party in power…

and even to strengthen its grip’. Scholars who share this view with Shambaugh have branded the

regime in China as ‘resilient authoritarianism’ (Miller 2008, 2009, Nathan 2003, Heilmann and

Perry 2011, Wright 2010, McGregor 2010), or ‘disguised authoritarianism’ (Schubert 2003), or

‘populist authoritarianism’ (Dickson 2005). In a more neutral evaluation, Dickson described the

Chinese regime as a mixture of co-existing totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic characteristics

(2013:314). Whatever the model of the Chinese regime, it is now understandable that the CPC’s

reform endeavours, which are best described by Shambaugh (2008:104) in a constant cycle of

reform-readjust-reform-readjust, aim to create a flexible, adaptable and responsive regime. This

adaptability and responsiveness strategy adopted by the CPC is ultimately to gain sustainable

legitimacy and to protect survival of the party itself. GRD as the most influential reform in Chinese

rural politics has credibly enabled the CPC to achieve its strategy’s goals, and at the same time to

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defeat any predictions thus far of its collapse or regime transformation in China (Chang 2001,

Scalapino 1993, Baum 1996, Li 2007, 2012).

The above discourse on Chinese GRD and its impact on the CPC is highly relevant for this

thesis, because of the institutional resemblance between the two countries: being ruled by

communist parties and having the same institutions (McCormick 1998:122-123). Furthermore, both

the CPV in Vietnam and CPC in China faced the same crises of legitimacy and capacity to govern

in their respective rural areas. One question could be asked: Did the CPV adopt the same strategy of

the CPC to renew its legitimacy and to keep grip on power in the countryside? The answer would

probably be ‘yes’. However, as McCormick (1998:123) pointed out, though similar institutions

exist in Vietnam and China, they have been used differently for different purposes and in different

contexts. Moreover, the way that GRD is constructed and conceptualized differs between Vietnam

and China. This variation reserves to be a possible future research avenue. The next sub-section

explores the emergence of GRD in Vietnam. The question is: Is it a party concept or a political

reform?

A Party Concept or a Political Reform

GRD has gone from being a concept in the CPV’s policy documents to a formalized legal

framework, becoming a compulsory practice that influences the governance system in the

countryside. However, in the broader context of Vietnamese politics, GRD is only part of what the

CPV articulates to promote socialist democracy. In other words, the emergence of GRD should be

considered a political reform, rather than an ideology, and aimed at strengthening the survival and

monopoly of power of the CPV. To substantiate this argument, this section will focus on: firstly,

the formalization of GRD from being a new party concept to a compulsory practice provided by a

legal framework; and secondly, the status of GRD within a broader context: building the socialist

democracy.

From A Party Directive to a Legal Framework

In the aftermath of the Thái Bình protests, Đỗ Mười, the CPV Secretary-General, said that local

people should be encouraged to participate in the decision-making process (Abuza 2001a:85). He

proposed greater democratization in the grassroots, by which local development plans must be

made known to the people, and the people must be able to get involved in discussions, to directly

do the work, and to supervise and monitor local authorities (VNS 1998a). Mười’s proposal is not

something new, but is already prescribed in the constitution and laws. More specifically, he (1997)

used nuanced phrases to clarify the pre-existing motto: ‘people know, people discuss, people do,

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and people supervise and inspect’ (dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra). As noted above, this

motto had been formalized by the CPV in its political documents since the beginning of Đổi Mới,

but had gone unimplemented. Like Mười, President Trần Đức Lương called for the promotion of

‘grassroots democracy’ (dân chủ cơ sở) and making the peasants aware of their democratic and

legitimate rights (VNS 1998b).

Six months after the disturbances in Thái Bình, the CPV Politburo issued a policy document

(known as Directive 30-CT/TW) to direct the formulation and implementation of GRD, a new

concept adopted by the CPV probably to be distinct from the old concept ‘village democracy’

associated with ‘village autonomy’ as discussed above. The Directive clearly states that GRD aims:

To bring into full play the democratic rights of the people; to engage the people in state management, in supervision and monitoring the state apparatus; to eradicate decay, red-tape, bureaucratism, authoritarianism, democratic deficit and corruption (Hiền et al. 2004b:10).

The CPV Politburo afterward endorsed an experimental project of democratic village governance in

two villages in Hưng Yên province, ten kilometres east of Hanoi. It allowed the local people’s

council, a replica of the parliament, to share some decision-making power, which had been

monopolized by the villager’s party chief (Abuza 2001a:87). Based on the results of the project as

well as peasant satisfaction, the CPV Politburo directed the National Assembly and the Government

to adopt legal normative documents to make GRD compulsory nation-wide.

By 2005, Vietnam had a basic legal framework on GRD, consisting of the Government Decree

No.79, which is not a law, as the key document and other supportive legal documents such as the

Law on Anti-Corruption. However, while being the core of the GRD framework, Decree No.79 has

no legal sanctions against its infringements, making GRD a propaganda campaign, rather than a

legally binding norm. Without legal sanctions, the implementation of GRD was formalistic rather

than substantive, and depended on the will of local authorities (Phiêu 2005, Hải 2008). To fix this

problem and to make GRD compulsory, in 2007, the Standing Committee of the Vietnamese

National Assembly adopted Ordinance No.34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on the Implementation of

Democracy at the Commune, Ward and Township level, to supersede Decree No.79. The Ordinance

was not a law yet, though it embodies prohibitions with a view to making the implementation more

substantive. A consolidated list of legal documents on grassroots democracy is presented in

Appendix 6.

The motto ‘people know, people discuss, people do, and people supervise and inspect’ (dân biết,

dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra) is specified in the GRD framework in the following four

categories:

- Provision of information (dân biết): Local officials are obliged to provide detailed information about a broad range of issues, from national laws to local projects. This includes the decisions of commune people’s councils as well as commune budgets, land use plans, results of investigations against corrupt officials, and the enforcement of

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law and order. Information is to be disseminated in public meetings, or through written documents, public postings or public address systems - Consultation (dân bàn): Most local government initiatives require public discussion prior to being decided by commune people’s councils and committees. The regulations list long-term socio-economic planning, land use plans and the nomination of candidates to stand for commune people’s council elections. In addition, they also cover the mobilization of residents’ contributions to infrastructure construction as well as the implementation of national plans on environmental protection, health and water. The views of local residents are to be gathered through questionnaires, feedback boxes or public meetings. - Popular approval (dân làm): Local officials must seek majority popular approval for a number of activities, including public works that require contributions from residents. In addition, approval must be obtained for fund-raising plans, for various activities related to maintaining law and order, and for setting up boards to supervise construction projects. Implementation is to take place through public meetings or referendums. If the commune people’s committee deems decisions to be inconsistent with relevant laws, however, it can refer them to the district people’s committee for review. - Supervision (dân kiểm tra): There are a number of local issues which are ‘to be supervised and inspected by the people’, including the commune budget, land management, results of investigations against corrupt officials and social services. This always applies to the general activities of the people’s committee and the implementation of its decisions. Implementation is envisaged through the establishment of people’s inspection boards or through mass organizations. In addition, residents are entitled to make proposals and complaints, as well as request information from local officials about issues of concern to them.

Theoretically, GRD embodies some conditions proposed by Post (2006:28), which are conducive

for functioning democracy such as: human rights (the right to participation), the rule of law (the

legal framework), accountability (transparency, consultation). However, that the CPV reiterates its

core leadership in the implementation of GRD makes some scholars skeptical of its sincerity in

reforming the local governance in response to the peasant demands, as well as the durability of

GRD. Zingerli (2004:56, 70) argues that GRD is ‘a political project’, which is likely ‘to be

abandoned when political, economic and social circumstances change’, and more crucially is a

means for the CPV to legitimize its grip on power.

These views are accurate, because the CPV does not conceal its more ambitious political goal,

which is ‘to build and gradually improve the socialist democracy’ (1991a:2). The CPV states that:

Building socialist democracy is a fundamental content of the political reform in our country. It is necessary to put in place a concrete mechanism, and to undertake specific measures to materialize the motto “people know, people discuss, people do, people supervise and monitor” at the grassroots level where guidelines and policies of the party and state are implemented (1996:46).

It concludes:

Implementing socialist democracy is in essence to reform and improve of the political system (CPV 1991:90).

These statements indicate two important points: Firstly, political reform is a continuous process and

building socialist democracy is the utmost goal of the CPV. Secondly, GRD is only part of the

process and a condition to support socialist democracy. In other words, changes, if any, from the

implementation of GRD will impact on local governance reform, the building of the socialist

democracy, and ultimately the CPV’s grip on power. The next sub-section examines the CPV’s

concept of socialist democracy, through which one can better understand how socialist democracy

affects the implementation of GRD.

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The CPV and Socialist Democracy

The CPV took power in the North between 1954 and 1956, and has been the ruling party in a united

Vietnam since 1976. The CPV specifies its rule and role as ‘the leading force in the society’ in the

national constitution (Article 4, the 2013-revised Constitution). This is not normally done by most

political parties around the world (Robb 2010:396). The Preamble in the CPV’s Statute states : ‘The

party takes Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh’s Thoughts as its ideological foundation and a

beacon for its action…to come up with a correct political programme and revolutionary lines

suitable to the people's aspirations’ (CPV 2011a).

The CPV said it has two momentums to carry out Đổi Mới, one of which is democracy (Hiền

2004a:15-16). It has popularized the concept through its resolutions (1986, 1991, 1996, 2011b) and

publications in bookstores (Duong 2008:3). The CPV’s definition of democracy is based on the

democratic theory of Hồ Chí Minh, its founding father, who defined democracy as a regime in

which ‘the citizens are and act as the masters’ (dân là chủ và làm chủ)(HoChiMinh 2000(e):423,

515).

In response to the peasant protests in the 1990s, the elite of the CPV called for greater

democratization. Nevertheless, what they advocated was not a Western-style or liberal democracy

(Abuza 2001a:85-86). Instead, they emphasized socialist democracy. As mentioned earlier, building

socialist democracy is the ultimate goal of the CPV. So, what is ‘socialist democracy’? How does it

impact on GRD?

The CPV offers no direct textual definition of what is ‘socialist democracy’. Hence, the only

way we can understand it is by analyzing its characteristics. The core of the concept ‘socialist

democracy’ is the word ‘socialist’. Marxism-Leninism asserts that the communist party is the only

force leading society. By setting the goal of building a socialist democracy, the CPV reaffirms that

socialist democracy differs from liberal democracy, which is more frequently labelled by the party

as ‘bourgeois democracy’ that is characterized by political pluralism and the operation of

opposition parties (Nghĩa 2000:133).

While expressing its commitment to build a state ‘of the people, by the people, and for the

people’ (của dân, do dân, vì dân), and in which ‘the people are the masters’ (nhân dân làm chủ),

the CPV also emphasizes its absolute leadership in the society. The national 2013-amended

Constitution prescribes that the state power is divided (between the executive, legislative and

judiciary) but unified under the leadership of the CPV. The characteristics of liberal democracy

missing in Vietnam include: direct and free elections, independent checks-and-balances, opposition

voices, the rule-of-law, no private press, and free civil society. Table 1 below summarizes

characteristics of liberal democracy and the CPV’s socialist democracy.

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Table 1: Characteristics of liberal democracy and socialist democracy

Liberal Democracy CPV Socialist Democracy

- Multi-Party system

- Free and direct elections

- Rule-of-law

- Human rights and freedoms

- Free press (free speech)

- Free association

- Free and vibrant civil society

- One-party system

- Party-controlled elections

- Party-controlled rule-of-law

- Citizen rights and duties

- Party-controlled press

- Party-controlled association

- Party-controlled civil society

The above characteristics of socialist democracy are not simply those of a democratic model that

the CPV pursues at all costs, but they also reflect a fact that the CPV does not accept any challenge

to its monopoly of power. The following presents the CPV’s bluntest rejection of the liberal

democracy:

We do not accept the multiparty or pluralist concept both theoretically and practically…, that explains that a democratic society be identical with the existence of oppositional political parties challenging the leading authority of the communist party (NPAA 1991:11-19, cited in Nghia 2000: 131).

In practice, the CPV considers its socialist democracy as a model as ‘đảng lãnh đạo, nhà nước quản

lý, nhân dân làm chủ’ – that means: the party is the leader, the state is the manager, and the people

are the masters (see: Trọng 2011b). A leading Marxist theorist of CPV argued in a field interview

that this is a creative power-sharing model (Interview I, Appendix 4). By a figurative description,

this model can be represented by the equilateral triangle composed by the CPV (A), the State (B),

and the People/Society (C) as shown in Figure 2 below.

This theoretical model of the CPV’s socialist democracy emphasizes the principle of ‘collective

leadership’. Nevertheless, in Vietnam’s one-party rule, all the state’s power in practice is the

party’s. The party is the state or the government and vice versa. Úc (2007:6) called this a ‘two in

one’ model. The CPV asserts that in this model, as the ruling party, it ‘leads the state’ and ‘leads

the people’ (Trọng 2011b:257).

CPV (A)

STATE (B) PEOPLE/SOCIETY (C)

Figure 2: CPV’s Theoretical Model of Socialist Democracy

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The party-state regime in Vietnam suggests a more pragmatic interpretation of socialist democracy.

The model is now revised by the representation of a straight line with the party and state on one end

and the people/society on the other. Within this revised model of socialist democracy, the weight of

power is inclined to the side of the party and state as illustrated in Figure 3 below. The people-

entrusted authorities inherent in the model, including the National Assembly – the representative

organ of people’s power at the national level – and the People’s Council – the representative body

of people’s power at the sub-national level, become formalistic and procedural (Úc 2007:6). People

as the ‘masters’ have no substantive power or as this researcher labels it ‘dependent power’,

meaning that people’s empowerment is controlled by the party-state. This unbalanced linear

relationship gives the CPV organs and members absolute power. This asymmetric power structure

potentially alienates the party from the people, tolerates corruption, violations of human rights and

democratic deficit in the countryside.

Another principle of socialist democracy is ‘democratic centralism’. Hồ Chí Minh defined the

principle this way: ‘Collective leadership is democracy. Individual responsibility is centralism.

Collective leadership and individual responsibility is democratic centralism. Doing work without

following this principle is a violation of the democratic centralism’ (2000(d):505). Thus far, the

CPV has faithfully followed this Leninist-decision making principle with an emphasis on the CPV

leadership in society (Trọng 2011b:248-277).

The CPV though does not explicitly apply ‘democratic centralism’ to the GRD legal framework;

it emphasizes the leadership of the CPV in some important areas that affect its capacity to govern in

the grassroots. For example, GRD prescribes direct election of the village leader, but a shortlist of

candidates must be approved by the village party committee beforehand. This means the party still

controls the village leader. As Abuza (2001a:86-87) pointed out, the CPV leaders supported more

A & B C A & B

C

Figure 3: CPV’s De Facto and De Jure Model of Socialist Democracy

[Party-State] [People/society] [Party-State]

[People/society] Absolute Power

Dependent Power

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civic engagement in local governance in order to hold local party officials accountable and make

them less corrupt, but were not calling the party to surrender or share power.

This researcher argues that the emergence of GRD should be considered a political reform rather

than a ‘PR’ project. The passing of a legal framework to enable the peasants to get involved in the

local governance, which used to be monopolized by the village’s party secretary, does indeed

represent political reform, but also a tactic of the CPV in order to restore stability and to rejuvenate

its legitimacy in the countryside. Though the peasant protests demonstrate the paradox of political

reform in the country, there is no doubt that GRD has enabled the CPV to lessen the tension in

cadre-peasant relationship, and to continue its grip on power. This is because GRD has met the

peasants’ demands by creating a certain space of freedom of expression through mechanisms like

the villagers’ meeting (Hải 2008:14-20) or direct elections of village leaders, even though these

elections are still influenced by local party committees. The two village electoral cases that are to

be presented in the next sub-section illustrate that despite the local party committees’ attempts to

control the process; they had to accept the peasants’ candidates. This could not have happened

without GRD. The success of these cases offers a perspective on the implementation of GRD.

Initial Cases to Consider

This section presents two village electoral cases that have attempted to assess the extent of

democratic change in the party-state. The cases suggest some conditions need to be considered

because they support the implementation of GRD, and also enabled this researcher to offer an initial

argument that the implementation of GRD is a process that mutually empowers the party-state and

the peasantry by meeting the requirements of both sides. This of course has impacts on the CPV’s

legitimacy, capacity to govern in the countryside, and the reform of local governance in future.

Two Village Electoral Cases

The two village electoral cases to be presented here include one in an empirical study and another

narrated by a blogger.

In 1997, Malarney (1997) conducted an empirical study in Thịnh Liệt commune, ten kilometres

southwest of Hanoi. The study focused on the elections of the chairmen of Thịnh Liệt commune

people’s committee in 1989 and 1994 respectively. By law, to be elected, the candidates must be

approved by the local party committee. Among the candidates, in each of these elections, there was

one outstanding candidate approved and endorsed by the local party committee. By custom if a

candidate had been endorsed by the local party committee, he or she would be elected. However, in

the above-mentioned elections, the villagers did not vote for the party-endorsed candidate. As

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Malarney (1997: 900) found, the root causes of failure of the party-endorsed candidates were

‘virtue/ethics’ (đạo đức) and ‘prestige’ (uy tín) associated with their authoritarian style and corrupt

conduct. In Vietnamese society, these attributes are simply understood as cultural values embodied

inherently in each person who can earn them through social construction to become an honest and

good leader who is supposed to be the people’s servant (đầy tớ nhân dân). For the people in Thịnh

Liệt, because the party-endorsed candidates did not have such cultural values, they were not elected

to be village leaders.

The second case is about the election of the leader of Quỳnh Lan village, Vĩnh Quỳnh

commune, ten kilometres south of Hanoi, narrated by a blogger who himself (Thụy 2011) was

involved in the election. In the direct village election, the candidate hand-picked by the local CPV

committee was defeated by his contender directly nominated by the villagers. Like the first case,

‘ethics/virtue’, ‘trust’ and ‘prestige’ were the causes for the failure of the party-nominated

candidate. This candidate was criticized as not having the ethics of a leader such as ‘being

untruthful or dishonest’ (điêu chác) and ‘physically attacking other people with iron tools’ (đánh

người) and ‘not protecting people’s interests’.

The above two successful village electoral cases demonstrate the significance of GRD, reflecting

the changing dynamics of grassroots politics in Vietnam. More importantly, they show that some

factors really matter and in these cases those were cultural values. But that is only one aspect of the

social construct that supports the implementation of GRD. In other words, there are other

conditions, rather than the law, that need to be considered and may support the implementation of

GRD.

Initial Assessment: A Mutually Empowering Mechanism

The failure of party-endorsed candidates in the two village electoral cases embodies the tension in

the cadre-peasant relations due to the decay of the CPV’s members in a narrow sense and of the

party-state apparatus in a broader sense. This is because the peasant loss of trust in the CPV’s

members implies the loss of trust in the party-state apparatus. However, what happened in the cases

suggest new thinking about GRD.

Though both Malarney (1997) and Thụy (2011) did not explain the reaction of the respective

local party committees after the elections, they described the tension prior to the elections. That the

popularly-endorsed candidates won the elections and the local party committees accepted the

results obviously reduced tension in cadre-peasant relations. Based on these cases, this researcher

offers an initial argument that the implementation of GRD is a process that mutually empowers

both the CPV and the peasantry. Through GRD, the CPV can link peasant demands to state power

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as well as alleviate peasant dissatisfaction. On the other hand, GRD empowers the peasants by

creating a certain space of freedom of expression, directly electing their village leaders, holding the

CPV’s members accountable.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of GRD development in Vietnam. It accounts for the

historical roots of GRD in Vietnamese traditional culture, its genesis in the context of economic

reforms, and its status within the CPV’s broader view of democracy. The initial cases suggest that

some conditions that support the implementation of GRD need to be considered. They also support

an initial argument that GRD is a mutually empowering mechanism for the party-state and the

peasantry.

Vietnamese government reports have thus far confirmed the success of GRD, implying the

correctness of its action in passing a legal framework for GRD. This logically means grassroots

governance has improved and reduced the tension in cadre-peasant relations, reinforcing the CPV’s

legitimacy and governability. These are all represented by less peasant protests, declining peasant

complaints against bureaucracy and corruption, and increased public participation in the local

decision-making process. However, democratic deficit remains pervasive in the countryside and

peasant complaints remain significant (see: Văn 2010, Hải 2010, An 2011, AFP 2011). Peasant

protests against state expropriation of land and corruption have become commonplace in Vietnam.

In 2009, it was recognized as one of the five political risks that must be watched in Vietnam

(Marshall and Ruwitch 2009).

GRD is one of the rural political reforms that have enabled the CPV to stabilize rural areas and

to mitigate peasant dissatisfaction, which in turn renews its legitimacy and secures its continued

grip on power in the countryside. The practice has suggested that the implementation of GRD

should go beyond its established legal framework. This is further illustrated by the fact that in

Vietnam’s one-party rule, the implementation of law is subject to the discretion of the authorities in

the absence of independent checks-and-balances and a functioning civil society. Thus, it is

necessary to identify the conditions that support the implementation of GRD. The two village

electoral cases above indicate that, for instance, cultural values are a noticeable condition, though

more conditions need to be considered. In the ensuing Chapters Three and Four, this researcher will

review contemporary theories of democratization and propose an analytic framework to assess the

GRD progress. This framework is composed by independent variables drawn out from the

democratic theories and practices that show the root causes of rural unrest in Vietnam in the 1990s

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leading to the emergence of GRD. These variables will then be tested on case study analysis of

three provinces: Thái Bình, Hưng Yên and Đà Nẵng in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

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3

Conditions and Democracy

Introduction

This chapter aims to identify conditions of democracy, which are then labelled as independent

variables and incorporated in a framework (in Chapter Four) to analyse three case studies (in

Chapters Five, Six and Seven). In Chapter Two, this researcher noted, through two village electoral

cases, cultural values as a noticeable condition that affects local democratic practice given that

Vietnamese traditional society remains profoundly influenced by Confucian values. In the

meantime, the literature on democratic theories in the last two decades has focused on

deconstructing causal mechanisms between conditions and democracy.

Three theories dominating the international mainstream discourse on democratization are

examined in this chapter: modernization theory, human empowerment theory, and social capital

theory. This is because: modernization theory is the most influential in the field of research on the

correlation between socio-economic development and political democracy (Wucherpfennig and

Deutsch 2009:1); human empowerment theory is in fact the revised version of modernization

theory, built on the widest database – World Values Survey (Welzel 2006:876); and, social capital

theory has received more attention among social scientists in the last two decades, especially among

students of countries undergoing democratization (Dowley and Silver 2002:505). More crucially,

these theories are relevant to Vietnam given that Đổi Mới economic reforms have transformed both

the social and political spheres in the country (see: Kerkvliet and Porter 1995a, Fforde 1997, Luong

2003a).

Through the discussion of these theories, conditions of and for democracy are drawn out.

Nonetheless, only some but not all of these conditions can be applied to assess the implementation

of Vietnamese GRD. The ‘some’, as canvassed below, are the root causes of the peasant protests

that prompted the CPV to adopt GRD in 1998 to address the crises of its legitimacy and

governability in the countryside. Furthermore, Lipset (of modernization theory), Inglehart and

Welzel (of human empowerment theory), and Putnam (of social capital theory) would agree that

their theories can hardly be applicable to every political environment, and so can the conditions.

However, this does not mean that Vietnamese political setting is alien to these theories. Instead, it is

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the contradiction of these liberal democratic theories and the CPV’s perception of democracy

creates a large space to explore whether there can be an alternative framework to analyse and assess

the performance of local democratization in Vietnam. This would help fill in the theoretical gap of

how liberal democratic values can work in a one-party state like Vietnam, and to avoid criticism

that without adopting liberal democratic theories, there will be disapproval of a workable

democracy in Vietnam.

This chapter is organized in three sections, which discuss the theories. In the end of each of these

sections, there is a summary of conditions drawn from the relevant theories. In the conclusion, this

researcher proposes an analytic framework to evaluate the progress of Vietnamese GRD and hence

to better understand the survival of Vietnam’s party-state.

Before proceeding to the discussion of theories, it should be forthrightly mentioned here that the

culture theory is not examined in this thesis. By all means, this does not necessarily undermine the

importance of the theory. Three reasons account for its absence. First, there are substantial works

that already discuss the causal relationship between culture and democracy (for a sampling, see:

Weber [1930] 1992, Almond and Verba 1963, Harrison 1985, 1992, 1997, Inglehart 1988, 1990,

2000, Putnam 1993a, Huntington 1991(a), 1993, 1996b, 1996c, Diamond 1993, Muller and

Seligson 1994, Fukuyama 1995). Moreover, the linkage between culture and democracy is also

explored in human empowerment theory and social capital theory under investigation here,

excluding a commentary that modernization theory is in essence a cultural one (Wucherpfennig and

Deutsch 2009:2). Second, this researcher concurs with Inglehart’s argument that ‘all societies are

equally likely to be democratic’, rejecting the ‘elitist’ approach that considers one culture to be

more conducive to democracy than another (2000:92). Third, the two village electoral cases

discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis provide evidence that Confucian cultural values can

support, rather always hinder democracy as indicated by Huntington (1991(a):300-01). Taking the

cases for granted, this researcher assumes that many, not all, traditional values in Vietnamese

culture are conducive to democracy. An expansion of cultural values unconducive to democracy is

beyond the discussion here. Having said this, let’s now move on to sections on democratic theories.

Modernization and Democracy

This section is concerned with conditions conducive to democracy, particularly in the socio-

economic area. Firstly, it focuses on Lipset’s accounts (1959, 1960, 1994) of the correlation

between socio-economic development and democracy. This is followed by the discussion of

critiques and revisionist proposals of modernization theory. A summary of the conditions is

provided in the end of the section.

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For decades, the correlation between socio-economic development and democracy has been

studied extensively (see: Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959, 1960, 1994, Kornhauser 1960, Moore 1966,

Przeworski 1991, Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 1997, Diamond 1992b, Przeworski et al. 2000,

Boix and Stokes 2003, Lekvall 2013). Scholars who attempt to answer questions about theoretical

arguments and empirical evidence concerning this relation tend to look at what is commonly known

as modernization theory (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009:1) or democratic pre-condition

approach (for a discussion of this approach, see: Kurunmaki 2012:122-124).

Lipset’s Modernization and Conditions of Democracy

Modernization, as ‘a multifaceted process’ (Huntington 1968:52), was long found related to much

of cultural and societal change in European societies in both the literature of the late nineteenth

century (Marx [1850s]1958, Spencer [1876]1969, Maine [1861]1908, Tonnies [1887]1955,

Durkheim [1893]1964), and the early twentieth century (Turner 1992, Weber 1947, Schroeder

1998). However, modernization as the causal factor of democracy was first clearly and

systematically stated in Lipset’s seminal work, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic

Development and Political Development (1959), which laid out the research agenda to a new

generation of empirical social scientists (Diamond 2006:676) and was ranked among the top-ten

most frequent citations in the ‘flagship’ journal in sociology (Sigelman 2006:668).

According to Lipset, there is a theoretical link between development and democracy

(Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009:1). His well-known thesis – ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the

greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ (1960:31) – was complimented by Diamond

(2006:675-76) as simple and concise, but ‘theoretically rich in identifying a nexus of causal factors

leading from level of economic development to prospects for stable democracy’. Additionally,

Lipset’s observation – ‘perhaps the most widespread generalization linking a political system to

other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development’

(1959:75) had influence on a theoretical school that stresses the importance of an active

development state. This school assumes that the state has the most important role to play in

development, and that development first and democracy later (Carothers and Gramont 2013:207-8).

Lekvall (2013:27) argues that this school is particularly followed by authoritarian regimes, which

stress economic merits to maintain their legitimacy. This is particularly true for Vietnam’s

authoritarianism. After the country’s unification in 1975, economic merits have enabled the party-

state regime to keep its political legitimacy (see: Vasavakul 1995, Thayer 2009b, 2010, Hiệp 2012).

To establish the link, Lipset used two sets of indicators for analysis: first, the average income per

capita; and second, social aspects that are identified as related to economic development. The

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reason he probed these social aspects as a form of alternative measure of economic development

was that, ‘all the various aspects of economic development – industrialization, urbanization, wealth,

and education – are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political

correlate of democracy’ (1960:41). Notably, for Lipset, this list of factors constitute conditions, not

necessarily causes, for democracy (1960:41, cited in Wucherpfenning and Deutsch 2009:1).

The indicators are universally applied to all forty-eight countries, of which twenty-eight are

European and English-speaking countries and twenty are Latin American nations. These are then

classified into stable democracies and unstable democracies, stable dictatorships and unstable

dictatorships. The two sets of indicators produced similar results (Helliwell 1994:227). Figure 4

below simulates the correlation between socio-economic development and democracy.

Figure 4: Lipset’s Modernization Theory Model (adopted from Wucherfennig and Deutsch)(2009)

As shown in the model above, the growth of an independent, wealthy and highly literate middle-

class as the direct consequence of economic development has a key role to play in the emergence of

democracy. In this context, according to Lipset, the middle-class is the bourgeois who will stand up

against the state (1994:2). He then agreed with Moore by noting that “no bourgeois, no democracy”

(Moore 1966:418, Lipset 1994:2). While Przeworski and Limongli do not agree that modernization

helps democracy to emerge, they acknowledge the role of the rise of the middle-class in a market

economy, challenging a dictatorial regime and causing it to fall (1997: 157). Hence, Lipset was

right in asserting that the stability of the system depends on its legitimacy, which is best gained by

prolonged effectiveness (1994:8). In other words, legitimacy is important for regime survival.

By effectiveness, Lipset meant ‘the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which

it satisfies the basic needs of most of the population and key power groups’ (1959:86, 1994:8).

Alternatively speaking, it is about good governance and continuous economic development.

According to Lipset, another key cleavage that makes a political system legitimate is the

‘citizenship’ or ‘political equality’. Lipset’s account for citizenship was strongly informed by early

liberal democracy theorists including Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) and John Locke in

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Second Treatise of Government (1689), who tended to emphasize equality as a pre-requisite for

democracy. However, the preservation of equality is difficult in capitalist economies.

Inequality is believed to be an inherent product of capitalism (Muller 2013:30), while the latter

and private property ownership are considered by many a necessary condition for democracy

(Berger 1992: 11). Both Hobbes and Locke accept inequality as being obvious and inevitable in

capitalism (Fukuyama 2011:80-81). However, Post (2006: 29) warns that inequality can cause the

loss of democratic legitimacy, whereas Venieris and Gupta (1986), Alesina and Perotti (1996), and

Lowrey (2012) argue that inequality is the source of political instability, violence and civil unrest,

and undermines democracy. Without denying a high level of economic inequality in a free society,

Hayek (1960) suggests a solution to save the society by maintaining participation equality (Post

2006: 28-29).

Years ago, Lipset contended that participation equality is only feasible when workers in a free

society are granted full citizenship rights, both in socio-political and economic spheres (Lipset

1959:93, 1960:49). There are various ways and means for the workers in that society to enjoy those

rights. For instance, they can do so by freely and effectively participating in voluntary

organizations, which are independent of the central state power. Lipset (1959:84) noted that these

organizations have functions necessary to democracy. Actually, the network of voluntary

organizations suggested by Lipset constitutes what Tocqueville ([1835, 1840] 2001:238-243)

labelled as ‘civil society’ in his classic – Democracy in America in the nineteenth century. The civil

society, according to Lipset (1994:12) serves as a base for civic engagement in politics.

It is commonly acknowledged that to participate effectively in society, citizens need to be well

informed. In other words, effective participation depends on how citizens are enabled to access to

and are provided with information. In this aspect, Lipset (1994:3) concurred with Lerner (1958)

about the importance of a free media for democracy. As Lerner (1958) indicated, free media is one

of three factors (the other two include urbanization and education) that leads to increased political

participation and can be applied as an indicator to measure the level of modernization. Observing

changes in the six Middle Eastern countries stimulated by the Western industrial urbanism, led

Lerner to define modernization as ‘certain aspects of the cultural changes’ (Gulick 1959:135). This

definition clearly informed Lipset’s modernization theory when he also emphasized a value system

and democratic culture in a broad sense. Inglehart and Welzel (2010:551) express their agreement

with Lipset in asserting that socio-cultural changes shape human action.

Very often Lipset’s modernization has been misinterpreted as simple as economic development

(Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009:1). As Lipset (1959:104) pointed out, economic development is

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only one aspect of the total social system. This system encompasses various conditions, from

societal, political to economic and cultural, as demonstrated by Lipset in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Conditions of democracy (Lipset 1959:105)

Two points in Lipset’s model warrant further comment. First, Lipset suggested a number of

‘consequences’ on the right of democracy, such as political apathy and bureaucracy that might lead

to the reverse of the democratic system. Nonetheless, an expansion of this idea is beyond the scope

of this thesis. Second, the conditions appearing on the left of democracy are laid down to generalize

the causation. Within each of these conditions, there may be one or several sub-conditions or

variables like cultural values that constitute the causation.

In sum, Lipset’s thesis of modernization suggests socio-economic conditions conducive to

democracy. Though there is debate around whether modernization actually causes democracy to

emerge, clearly it helps democracy survive and be sustained (Przeworski and Limongi 1997,

Przeworski et al. 2000). Furthermore, as noted above, Lipset suggests that such aspects of economic

development as industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education should be treated as

conditions, not necessarily causes, for democracy. This preposition may offer an explanation why

authoritarian regimes like Vietnam can enjoy continued high economic growth for years but are not

yet transformed to democracies (Hải 2013a, 2013e). Vietnam’s party-state continues to stress

economic reforms that have led to the emergence of all conditions in Lipset’s model. However, the

state model that Vietnam is pursuing is not a democratic state, but one that emphasizes economic

liberalization and tight political control. Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng (2014a)

stressed in his 2014 New Year message the role of the state in promoting development, implying a

developmental state model that favours the notion ‘development comes first, democracy comes

later’. Thus far, Vietnam’s party-state has applied a smart strategy, which does not allow everything

CONDITIONS

Open class system

Economic wealth

Equalitarian value system

Capitalist economy

Literacy

High participation in voluntary organizations

DEMOCRACY

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lose from its control while reinforcing its legitimacy and grip of power. This strategy is being also

taken by the Chinese state which is implied in works by Shambaugh (2008) and Reilly (Reilly

2012) as smart authoritarianism or smart state. The conditions created by economic development in

Vietnam do not yet become sufficient sources for political transformation at the national level, but

they have created impacts on the local governance system. The fact that these conditions operate in

favour of the implementation of GRD is beyond serious doubts.

Although Lipset’s theory has been highly influential in the field of research and held up

remarkably by the number of most developed countries as democracy (except Singapore), it is not

immune from critiques. Lipset confessed that even though the causation model can be drawn (as

shown in Figure 5 above) but it does not mean “we have arrived at a complete theory of the

necessary and sufficient conditions” of the emergence of democracy (Lipset 1959:105). Below are

some critiques of modernization theory, focusing on two main areas: analytic problem associated

with data, and the correlation between economic development and democracy.

Critiques of Modernization Theory

Some scholars like Arat (1988), Helliwell (1994), Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009), Inglehart

and Welzel (2010) thought there are methodological flaws associated with Lipset’s modernization

theory. Others like O’Donnell (1973), Therborn (1977), Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), Hadenius

(1992), Przeworski et al. (1997, 2000), and Robinson (2006) do not find a positive correlation

between economic development and the emergence of democracy.

Lipset acknowledged that there were limits in this methodological approach, and that his views

were drawn from Western European countries and might not hold for others (1959:103-5, Dũng

2007:5). Helliwell (1994) pointed out two problems with Lipset’s analytic methods. The first is

related to Lipset’s measures of economic development. Helliwell (1994:227) argues that because

‘his measures of economic development derived from the period after that used to classify political

regimes, Lipset’s correlations were unable to establish whether it was economic development which

led to democracy or vice versa’. The second is concerned with the impact of World War Two on the

level of democracy. Helliwell (1994:227) challenged Lipset’s correlation between ‘low post-war

incomes and low pre-war levels of democracy that could not be used directly to support the

conclusion that low levels of income lead to low levels of democracy’ given the fact that many

European countries’ economic capacities were weak and their population’s post-war incomes were

consequently low in the aftermath of World War Two. Also concerning with data, Inglehart and

Welzel (2010:551), while noting a positive correlation between economic development and

democracy, recognized that empirical data did not exist when Lipset made this assertion, implying

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an analytic problem. Without making a sharp critique, Arat (1988:23) expects to see improved data

and measurement to verify the ‘validity of modernization theory and its evolutionary thesis of

democracy’.

Outstanding among scholars entirely rejecting the causation of economic development to

democratization are Przeworski et al. (1997, 2000), whose researches ‘hit the field of political

development like a bolt of lightning and immediately changed the landscape’ (Boix and Stokes

2003:517). Przeworski et al. proposed what is called as ‘endogenous’ process, in which poor

authoritarian countries develop and become democratic when they reach a ‘threshold’ of

development (1997:158). By using historical data and algebra to examine the dynamics of regimes,

they argued that ‘the emergence of democracy is not brought about by development. Rather,

democracy appears exogenously as a deus ex machine (causal mechanism). It survives if a country

is ‘modern’, but it is not a product of ‘modernization’. They then concluded: ‘This is therefore no

longer a modernization theory’(1997:159), implying a pronouncement of modernization theory as

dead. Notably, while rejecting modernization as the driving force of democratization, Przeworski et

al. (1997) recognized that modernization helps existing democracies to survive.

The above argument of Przeworski et al. regarding the causation of modernization to

democratization was challenged by Boix and Stokes (2003), who used their data to suggest that

modernization is conducive to both emergence and survival of democracy. Furthermore, the

‘endogenous’ model proposed by Przeworski et al. was challenged by modernization theorists.

Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009:3), while rejecting Przeworski et al.’s hypothesis of

‘endogenous’ process, argue that democracy can emerge at any stage of the development process

without necessarily depending upon the threshold reached. These two scholars continue criticizing

Przeworski et al.’s conclusion of the death of modernization theory. For them, the conclusion is

only ‘influential on verbal grounds’ and can convince ‘the inattentive or statistically less skilled

reader’ (2009:3). Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and Epstein et al. (2006) also declined to accept

Przeworski et al.’s conclusion, saying that it is a misinterpretation of modernization theory.

The above critiques do not deny the fact that modernization as a condition operates in favour of

democracy (Welzel 2009:81), though some problems associated with modernization theory are

noticeable, especially its methodological flaws and data analysis. More recent empirical data and

advanced technology-based quantitative analysis have allowed political economy theorists like

Boix (2003), Przeworski et al. (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006), Lucas (1988),

and Barro (1996, 1999) to reconsider the causal path in the relationship between economic

development and democracy. As these scholars noted, democratic development is not only driven

by economic development, but also by other factors, including institutional and cultural ones. This

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is reinforced by the fact that Inglehart and Welzel et al. (2000: 49, 2010: 552-553) argue that

although socio-economic development brings systematic changes in social, political, and cultural

life at different development stages (pre-industrial and post-industrial), it does not necessarily cause

traditional values to disappear. Collier (1975), Bollen (1979), and Linz and Alfred (1978) also

supported this argument.

Finding an alternative to the debate about whether economic development causes democracy to

emerge, Inglehart and Welzel et al. (1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) contend that the

earlier versions of modernization theory need revision. They propose six modifications (see in

footnote below).11 The revised modernization theory, also known as human empowerment theory,

is explored in the next section.

For years, at the high end of the development spectrum, Lipset’s modernization theory has been

proved right. All the most developed and industrialized nations, by official rank of the Centre for

Systematic Peace, are full democracies (except Singapore and Russia are seen as “weak democratic

regimes”)(Marshall and Cole 2011), and democracy has never broken down once established in a

relatively high wealthy nation (Przeworski et al. 2000). As noted above, Lipset’s modernization is

more often misinterpreted as simple as economic development, which is only one aspect of the

process. The consolidated model of conditions of democracy presented in Figure 5 above shows a

bunch of societal, economic, political, and cultural conditions, generated by modernization,

conducive to democracy. Leaving aside some methodological flaws, building on Lipset’s accounts

of the correlation between development and democracy, this researcher draws a list of initial

11 The following six modifications are drawn from different works of Inglehart et al:

1. Modernization does not follow a linear path. Industrialization brings about bureaucratization, hierarchy, centralization of authority. However, the post-industrial phase of modernization brings in increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression values, which erode the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and make democracy more likely to emerge. 2. Socio-cultural change is path dependent. Economic development tends to bring changes in people’s worldviews, but the fact that a society was historically shaped by religious and ethnic values, which leaves a lasting imprint and are not dying out. 3. Modernization is not Westernization. Industrialization began in the West, but the last decade has seen the fastest growth of East Asian economies. 4. Modernization is probabilistic, not deterministic. Economic development tends to transform a given society in a predictable direction, but the process and path are not inevitable. Many factors are involved; hence any prediction must depend on the historical and cultural context of the society in question. 5. Modernization does not automatically bring democracy. Industrialization can lead to democracy, fascism and communism. But post-industrial society brings socio-cultural changes that make democracy more probable. Highly-educated workers tend to demand for individual freedom, and prosperity brings growing emphasis on self-expression values that give high priority to free choice. Subsequently, democracy is increasingly wanted. Apparently, this demonstrates a link between economic development and democracy. 6. Finally, emerging self-expression values transform modernization into a human development process, giving rise to a humanistic society that promotes human emancipation and human empowerment in general. This reflects a human-centric modernization process.

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conditions below, which serves as a source of reference in order to develop a list of independent

variables to assess Vietnamese GRD progress later in chapter 3.

Table 2: Conditions conducive to democracy based on Lipset’s modernization theory

Conditions conducive to Democracy

Socio-economic development (industrialization, urbanization, wealth, education)

DEMOCRACY

Equality value (participation equality) High participation in network of voluntary organizations (civil society) Cultural values Citizenship rights (social, political and economic)

The conditions in column on the left in Table 2 represent systematic changes in the political, social,

and cultural life as a result of socio-economic development. Inglehart and Welzel et al. (1997, 2000,

2003, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) argue that these changes are part of the human empowerment

process, which is the most important driving force behind democracy and democratization.

Human Empowerment and Democracy

This section explores human empowerment theory, which is also known as the revised version of

modernization theory. According to Welzel (2009:81), modernization brings different conditions

that become resources to empower ordinary people, and once the masses’ capabilities are increased,

democratization is a likely result. This section aims to identify these conditions as causal

mechanisms for democratization.

Welzel (2009:74-75) identified democratization in three ways: the emergence (in a non-

democratic regime), the deepening (of democratic qualities of given democracies), and the survival

of democracy. He contended, ‘The emergence, the deepening, and the survival of democracy are

strictly distinct aspects of democratization’ (2009: 75). What can be freely interpreted from

Welzel’s proposition of democratization is that it is a political process. Gonzalez and King (2004:

195) concur with Welzel that democratization takes place not only in the form of transition from

authoritarianism to democracy, but also continues in a strongly-established democracy with reforms

and modifications of the institutions and practices. However, what concerns Welzel is not the

democratization process itself, but how democratization is sustained. He then finds the answer for

sustainable democratization this way: ‘democratization is sustainable to the extent to which it

advances in response to pressures from within a society’ (2009:75).

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The ‘pressures from within a society’ meant by Welzel are actually those from the masses,

empowered by the level of socio-economic development. Welzel argues that if the state authorities

can ‘preserve as much autonomy from mass pressures as possible’, democratization cannot happen

(2009:81). Revolutionary regimes like Vietnam, China and Cuba have successfully dealt with, by

adaptation tactics, mass protest to survive, keep grip on power, and control the democratization at

their wishes (Shambaugh 2008, Levitsky and Way 2013).

Building on a massive body of evidence, Inglehart and Welzel et al. in a series of works (see

some: 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010) define the

empowerment process consisting of three components: first, socio-economic development, which

also means modernization; second, cultural change, which is elsewhere referred to as self-

expression values, changing values or emancipative values, mass values and attitudes. This implies

a free or open society; and third, democracy, which means democratic institutions. Welzel

(2009:81) explains, when these components do together, it promotes human development, which is

synonymous with the increase of human choice and human empowerment.

Like Lakoff (1996:155), Inglehart and Welzel et al. argue that democracy aims to empower

ordinary citizens (2008a: 3). The human empowerment process is demonstrated in Figure 6 below,

drawn from work by Welzel and Inglehart (2008a, 2008b).

Figure 6: Human Empowerment Model

According to Inglehart and Welzel (2008a: 4, 2008b:129-30): Empowering economy creates action

resources that will empower people on the level of capabilities by supplying them the means, skills

and offering opportunities to enable them to govern their lives; Empowering culture leads to self-

expression values that will empower people on the level of motivations, inspiring them to be self-

confident in governing their lives; and, Empowering regime brings in democratic freedoms that will

empower people on the level of entitlements, granting them the civil and political rights to govern

both their public and private lives. In short, human empowerment is the people’s increased

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capabilities, motivations and entitlements. Welzel (2009: 87) argues, the process does not only

breed the emergence of democracy, but the more capabilities and motivations people have to enable

them to practice the entitlements, the more sustainable democracy becomes.

The three components above are inter-related in a sequential relationship that transforms human

empowerment towards democracy (Welzel and Inglehart 2008a: 8). Welzel and Inglehart (2008a: 8)

describe the sequence this way: Firstly, economic development creates resources that include rising

levels of education, expanding mass communication and growing social opportunities that can

create material, intellectual and social autonomy of the citizens. Secondly, after acquiring a sense of

autonomy, the citizens will challenge unlimited authority and become receptive to ideas of

individual freedom and equality. Concurrently, self-expression or emancipative values grow in

individuals due to either their lives in a certain culture or the impacts of action resources as a result

of economic development. Collectively, rising self-expression values will then lead to the growth

and support of civil and political rights activism or movements in non-democracies, and equal

opportunities activists or movements in democracies. This is an experience of a more open society.

The process is also labelled by Welzel and Inglehart (2006) as the ‘emancipative orientation

process’. Finally, there will be either formal adoption of democratic freedoms for past non-

democracies, or increasing efficiency of democratic freedoms for existing democracies.

In sum, economic development helps promote self-expression or emancipative values. Rising

self-expression values enable people to press for more civil and political rights, freedoms and equal

opportunities. However, since democratization is an incomplete process (Welzel 2009: 74-75, Tilly

2007: xi), this sequential relationship continues in both industrialization and post-industrial

societies. Sustainable democratization then becomes a concern.

Welzel (2009: 86) conditioned and tested sustainable democratization with the “master

sequence” in Figure 7 below. This sequence is similar to the one demonstrated in Figure 6 above,

though the difference between them is that the latter demonstrates more clearly the linear coherence

of the components. Furthermore, the former stresses what helps people govern their lives, whereas

the latter focuses on what helps people practice freedoms? While the first sequence directly leads to

the emergence of democracy, the second underlines what is required to sustain democracy. The

components in the master sequence can summarized as follows: material empowerment (economic

development/action resources), mental empowerment (culture/self-expression values), and legal

empowerment (democratic regime/democratic freedoms). Welzel (2009: 87) contends, the more

advanced material and mental components enable and make people more willing to practice

democratic freedoms, a more sustainable legal component develops, and then the more democracy

is sustained.

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Figure 7: The human empowerment path towards democratization

In conclusion, human empowerment theory has provided a framework that links all inter-related

components – economic, social, cultural and institutional factors – together. These are in fact

resulting conditions created by the modernization process. One thing seems clear - that all these

conditions come together and enable democracy to emerge, function and be sustained. The theory

differs from others when it stresses effective democracy rather than merely on one or another form

of democracy like participatory democracy (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992, Zittel and Fuchs 2007),

electoral democracy (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) or deliberative democracy

(Chambers 2003, Ryfe 2005). The rise of self-expression or emancipative values resulting from the

direct impact of economic development is the key for democracy to emerge and be sustained. It has

a central role in the human empowerment process. All in all, human empowerment is about

ordinary people’s improved capabilities, motivations and entitlements. By focusing on ordinary

people, this points to the fact that the masses, not the political elites, are the driving force for

democratization. Hence, Inglehart and Welzel (2008b:136) argue that ‘the major effect of

modernization is not that it makes democracy more acceptable to elites, but that it increases

ordinary people’s capabilities and willingness to struggle for democratic institutions’. Welzel

(2009: 87) adds to this argument by acknowledging that ‘the human empowerment path to

democracy is not the only path to democracy. But it is arguably the only path producing socially

embedded and hence sustainable democracy’.

Chabal (2006:589) called human empowerment theory ‘an update of the 1960s modernization

theory’. More specifically, Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009:5-6) see the theory as an argument

defending the claim that cultural change (cultural values) is a causal mechanism of democracy.

Though stressing the essential role of culture, Inglehart and Welzel (2005:47) contend that ‘culture

alone does not determine the outcome’, implying that other conditions resulting from socio-

economic development must also be counted. Building on the literature of human empowerment

theory discussed above, a list of conditions conducive for democratization can be drawn in Table 3

below.

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Table 3: Conditions conducive for democratization based on human empowerment theory

Conditions Human Empowerment Democracy

Economic development - high education - free mass communication - growing social opportunities - rising autonomy

HUMAN EMPOWERMENT

SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRATIZATION

(emergence, deepening, survival)

Cultural values - increasing individual freedom and equality - growth and support of civil and political rights, equal opportunity movements (civil society) - open society Democratic freedoms - civil and political rights, - the rule of law

By a comparison, the conditions under human empowerment theory (in Table 3) do not differ from

those under modernization theory (in Table 2). However, as noted above, building on a massive

body of evidence, Inglehart and Welzel et al. argue differently from classic modernization theorists

that ‘modernization does not follow a linear path’, meaning that socio-economic development, as a

condition, cannot directly lead to and sustain democracy. In this sense, this researcher concurs with

Welzel’s description of modernization as ‘a whole bundle of intertwined processes, including

productivity growth, urbanization, occupational specialization, social diversification, rising levels

of income and prosperity, rising literacy rates and levels of education, more widely accessible

information, more intellectually demanding professions, technological advancement in people’s

equipment and available infrastructure, including means of communication and transportation, and

so on’ (2009:81). The above discussion shows that the human empowerment path to democracy is

based on these conditions.

At the outset of this section, this researcher says that human empowerment theory is highly

relevant to the scholarship of democratization in Đổi Mới Vietnam. It is due to the four main

following reasons.

First, unlike other democratization theories, this theory does not emphasize any particular

attribute of democratization. For instance, Rodan (1997: 158) argues civil society as the most

effective political vehicle for democratization; while Vassilev (1999: 598) echoes other preceding

modernization theorists’ argument that modernization is the key determinant of democratization.

While these arguments have their merits, they also trigger debates that often do not satisfy other

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democratization theory proponents. This does not mean human empowerment theory is complete

and cannot escape critique.

Chabal (2006:589) challenges, with the proposition that the theory ‘relies on massive

questionnaires, which are closely bound with the western cultural context that has produced them.

This means that the evidence adduced to support the theory is very largely self-fulfilling or

tautological’. Others like Hadenius and Teorell (2005) identify two problems for the theory:

measurement and the sequential relationship. Inglehart noted that ‘a society’s position on the

survival and self-expression values index is strongly correlated with its level of democracy’, which

is based on the Freedom House ratings scores (Inglehart 2000:94). However, Hadenius and Teorell

said that the level of democracy, particularly for an ‘effective democracy’, of a given country is

based on both the Freedom House ratings and the Transparency International index of corruption in

a joint measurement (2005:89-90). Hence, they imply that the omission of corruption scores in the

measurement methodology represents a failure to measure accurately the level of democracy. They

took Singapore (a corruption-free but not democratic state) and Bolivia (a highly corrupt, but a

democratic state) as examples to substantiate their criticism. Hadenius and Teorell claimed that

there is no sequential relationship between the components in the human empowerment framework.

According to them, Inglehart and Welzel et al. failed to count the lag length between dependent

variables. Thus, they again implicitly criticized the authors for not remembering ‘correlation does

not prove causation’ (Hadenius and Teorell 2005).

These critiques are not unusual for a theory, though they raise questions about its applicability in

a non-western political environment. However, the theory is relevant for this thesis because it

provides a consolidated list of conditions conducive for democratization, which becomes a source

of reference for this researcher to identify which conditions support the implementation of GRD in

Vietnam.

Second, the theory links democracy with human empowerment. The ultimate aims of

Vietnamese GRD are to promote good governance and to empower the people by providing civil

and political rights as well as improving the people’s awareness so enabling them to participate

effectively in local governance (CPV 1998). Hence, findings in the research with regard to the

realization of civil and political rights, as well as improvement in people’s awareness are also the

basis on which to argue that GRD works when the people are empowered and the governance

system is improved to better serve the people.

Third, the three components that constitute human empowerment are identical with the three

factors—legal framework (legal empowerment), market economy (material empowerment), culture

(mental empowerment) that influence the goals set forth in the Vietnamese GRD regulations.

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Finally, human empowerment theory is reflective of liberal democratic ideas characterized by

democratic freedoms, equality, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Vietnamese GRD is a top-down policy strictly controlled by the CPV. The theory shows that

Vietnamese people in the grassroots can be empowered to implement GRD effectively without

necessarily challenging the CPV’s legitimacy and monopoly of power. Instead, it is a mutual

empowering mechanism as argued in Chapter Two of this thesis.

Human empowerment theory says that economic development causes cultural change, giving

rise to self-expression values. Welzel and Inglehart (2008a, 2008b) identified self-expression values

reflecting ‘a syndrome of interpersonal trust, tolerance and political activism’. These values are

particularly embedded in what is known as social capital. Berger (2000:103) argued that culture is

somehow synonymous with the concept of social capital.

In the past decades, social capital has become an influential concept in the modern world and

scholarly discourse across different disciplines (Schuller, Baron, and Field 2000:1). The concept

has been widely linked with the discussion of democracy (see: Putnam 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 2000,

Warren 1999, Uslaner 1999, Fukuyama 2000, 2001b, Dowley and Silver 2002). More recently,

social capital has become a theme of some studies on democratic practice and local governance in

Vietnam (see: Dalton et al. 2002, Dalton and Ong 2003, Newman, Tarp, and Broeck 2012). These

studies are significant in two ways. First, they used social capital as a general concept that includes

trust, civil society (network of civic organizations), and civic engagement to evaluate likely

political change in Vietnam given that an autonomous civil society discussed in democratic theory

is lacking in Vietnam (Dalton and Ong 2003). Second, they based analysis on data from the World

Values Survey, which is the main source of knowledge of human empowerment theory discussed

above. Having gone through these studies, this researcher observes that social capital is an

alternative to the current scholarship that has a missing link in accepting that democracy is taking

roots in Vietnam, and identifying other conditions rather than economic development supporting

the implementation of Vietnamese GRD. The next section explores causal mechanisms between

social capital and democracy.

Social Capital and Democracy

Putnam argues ‘social capital is the key to making democracy work’ (1993a:185). This section

investigates how social capital, as a concept that has been ‘routinized’ in everyday conversation and

policy discourse across all disciplines (for an overview of social capital literature, see: Field et al.

2000, 2003), supports democracy.

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In the past two decades, a growing body of literature has shown that social capital is conducive

to democracy (see: Sztompka 1996, Newton 1997, Uslaner 1999, Marsh 2000, Dowley and Silver

2002, Dalton and Ong 2002, 2005). The generalized research question in the field is how social

capital or more precisely the components of social capital – networks of civic associations, an

active culture of civic engagement, and trust – facilitate democracy to emerge and survive. The

most outstanding work is Putnam’s famous classic, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in

Modern Italy (1993a), which has been called ‘a great work of social science, worthy to rank

alongside de Tocqueville, Pareto and Weber’ (Economist 1993, cited in: Quigley 1996: 336). Given

the influence of his thesis in the field, leaving aside some criticisms of methodological and analytic

flaws (Sabetti 1996, Goldberg 1996, Levi 1996, Quigley 1996), in what follows, Putnam’s (1993a)

original account of the relation between social capital and the functioning of democracy will be

explored. It then presents Putnam’s definition of social capital, upon which a list of conditions

conducive to democracy is drawn as it is done in the previous two sections.

Putnam’s Thesis: Traditional Cultural Factors and Democracy

The context that sparked Putnam’s interest in conducting his empirical research was that in 1970

the Italians established an entirely new set of governments in twenty regions across the peninsula.

By a constitutional provision, these regional governments had the same formal structural

organization, and the same important powers, including the same fiscal resources. One noticeable

thing is that some regions were more economically advanced than others; some were traditionally

Catholic, while others deeply Communist; some followed a hierarchical societal structure; others

had a society based on horizontally organized networks; and so on. After observing the

performance of these newly-established regional governments for years, Putnam realized that some

of them failed, ending up with inefficiency and corruption (this happened with regional

governments in the south), while others were effective and responsive to the basic needs of the

citizens (this happened with regional governments in the north). These successes and failures

prompted Putnam to ponder: Why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail? What

makes democracy work?

The key question Putnam set as a guide for his research was this: What are the conditions for

creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions? (1993a:6). Though it aimed to

evaluate the institutional performance, later other questions concerning representative institutions,

the origins and conditions of effective government, and the role of social relationships were also

addressed (Maraffi 1994, Morlino 1995). Levi (1996:45) pointed out, Putnam attempted to establish

‘the link between the vibrancy of associational life, good governance and democracy’ through his

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inquiry. Among three plausible explanations (1993a:chapter 4) – socioeconomic, institutional, and

socio-cultural – for why democratic governments work, Putnam found that the socio-cultural was

the most compelling one (Quigley 1996:333). This explanation is actually built upon the operation

of what Putnam refers to a dense network of civic associations, an active culture of civic

engagement, and trust (1993b:102).

Putnam’s central claim at the heart of Making Democracy Work is that a democratic government

works (strong, responsive, and effective) when its citizens as part of a ‘civic community’ cooperate

with each other to undertake a ‘collective action’ and have a ‘shared responsibility’. This can be

done on the basis of a number of mutually agreed rules and ways, which include: equality, mutual

respect, trust, active participation in associational life. However, it is more crucial that this is the

key answer to Putnam’s pondering questions above. The Making Democracy Work process can be

represented in Figure 8 like this:

Figure 8: Path to Making Democracy Work Model

Putnam explains that the three components in the model above are deeply rooted in the history of

forming a ‘civic community’, which is traditionally organized in a horizontal structure, back in the

eleventh century in the north. Whereas, traditional society in the south holds and accepts the idea of

a hierarchically organized political structure (1993b:102).

A civic community, as Putnam defines, is ‘patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity’

(1993a:83) and ‘bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by

vertical relations of authority and dependency’ (1993a:88). More importantly, the

operationalization of this civic community, according to Putnam’s accounts, is based on civic

republicanism, which emphasizes the tenet of equality (1993a:86-91). However, not in every

society equality can be felt and achieved. Putnam contends that the validity of equality is where

‘citizens interact as equals, not as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners’ (1993a:88,

105). According to him, whether or not equality can be obtainable, it depends on the degree to

Democratic Governments Work (Strong, responsive, effective)

Shared Responsibility (equality, reciprocity)

Civic Community (Network of associations, active civic engagement, trust)

Collective Action (Cooperation)

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which authority and social interaction in the life of civic community is organized horizontally or

hierarchically, and this also determines the effectiveness of regional government (1993a:105).

Dalton and Ong (2002:15) contend that democracy is more likely to be effective and sustained

when citizens enjoy equal rights, develop a feeling of belonging in a community, and find their self-

interests identical with those of the community.

There are some manifestations that show the currency of the principle of equality in civic

community. Putnam observes political leaders in civic community are ‘readier to compromise’ and

are open with partisanship; ‘do not deny the reality of conflicting interests’; are ‘more enthusiastic

supporters of political equality’; and endorse ‘the regional reform as an opportunity to enlarge

grassroots democracy’, which in other words encourages ‘power to people’ (1993a:102-105).

A striking feature in the life of civic community is popular participation in government affairs.

By Putnam’s accounts, we know that civic engagement traditionally develops with the emergence

of voluntary organizations, communes and guilds in the 1200s in northern and central Italy. Though

membership of these communes was limited and dominated by men, they were organized like

republics with authority structures and operated based on legitimate rule through electing

procedures. As Putnam commented, though the communes were not democratic in our sense, active

participation of their members in deliberations was surprising and, in this context, ‘the success of

communal republicanism depended on the readiness of its leaders to share power with others as

equals’ (1993a:124-25). What surprises us is that these communes operated by statutes set out by

their members, and violation of these statutes ‘was met by boycott and social ostracism’

(1993a:125). This is similar to the practice of ‘village democracy’ in Vietnamese traditional culture

as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.

Civic voluntary organizations did not only provide the venue in which members could associate

with each other by profession; render assistance to each other; organize defence together; as well as

foster economic development; but also inculcated skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared

responsibility for collective endeavours among the members (Putnam 1993a:90). More importantly,

by participating in these associations, members could maintain and reinforce the norms and values

of the civic community.

Years ago, Tocqueville observed that these civic voluntary associations were social conditions

that sustained ‘Democracy in America’. He emphasized the important role of the associations this

way:

The Americans, of all conditions, minds, and ages, daily acquire a general taste for association, and grow accustomed to the use of it. There they meet together in large numbers, - they converse, they listen to each other, and they are mutually stimulated to all sorts of undertakings. They afterwards transfer to civil life the notions they have thus acquired, and make them subservient to a thousand purposes. Thus it is by the enjoyment of a

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dangerous freedom that the Americans learn the art of rendering the dangers of freedom less formidable ([1835, 1840] 2001:242).

More than two hundred years later, Putnam also attributes great importance to effective

performance of democratic governments in northern Italy to civic organizations like soccer clubs,

choral societies, bird-watching societies, and cooperatives. He observes, ‘civic associations

contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government, it is argued, because of their

‘internal’ effects on individual members and because of their ‘external’ effects on the wider polity’

(1993a:89).

As noted above, another attribute of civic associations is that they can facilitate cooperation

between members, harness different ideas for a common goal, and even create political movements

to press for political reform (Putnam 1993a:125). On this aspect, Tocqueville explains:

When an opinion is represented by a society, it necessarily assumes a more exact and explicit form. It numbers its partisans, and compromises them in its cause: they, on the other hand, become acquainted with each other, and their zeal is increased by their number. An association unites into one channel the efforts of diverging minds, and urges them vigorously towards the one end which it clearly points out ([1835, 1840] 2001:105).

It is more often than not that citizens who join civic associations, especially the professional ones,

are like-minded. This does not necessarily mean they do not have conflict of ideas or controversy

does not exist. Hence, collaboration for a common goal between members of the associations is the

pre-requisite for a concerted action. Nevertheless, the glue that sticks all the members together is

trust [emphasis added].

In civic communities in northern Italy, Putnam observed that citizens are trustful toward one

another. Indisputably, the relations of reciprocity and cooperation between citizens within the

community cannot be maintained without such inter-personal trust. Putnam found that ‘trust

lubricates cooperation’ in interactions between all stakeholders in civic community, including in the

legislature-executive, political party-political party relations, and then cooperation breeds trust

(1993a:170-71). This shows that cooperation and trust are interdependent variables; one is the

precondition for the other to develop.

According to Putnam, trust in modern society arises from two related sources: norms of

reciprocity and networks of civic engagement (1993a:171). He argues that even though the latter

fosters the former, they are mutually reinforcing and promote, not inhibit, economic growth

(1993a:171-75). Putnam concludes, the intrinsic link between trust, norms and networks in reality

bolsters strong society, strong economy, and strong state (1993a:176).

To sum up, Putnam indicated that the socio-cultural component built on networks of civic

organizations, active civic engagement, and trust, which are deeply rooted in traditional culture and

are features of a broader context – that is civic community – in northern Italy, is the most

persuasive attribute to answering the questions: Why do some democratic governments succeed and

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others fail? What makes democracy work, as noted above? Trust, norms and networks are

considered by Putnam as stocks of what has become an influential concept, social capital

[emphasis added] (1993a:177). Given the definitional diversity of the concept (for a sampling, see:

Bourdieu 1986, 1997, Coleman 1988, 1990a, 1997, Fukuyama 2000, 2001b) and components

associated with it (Harper 2001:6), in the sub-section below, this researcher presents social capital

as meant by Putnam, and then draws a consolidated list of conditions conducive for democracy

based on Putnam’s definition.

Definition and Components

In Making Democracy Work, Putnam defines social capital as:

features of social organizations, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions (1993a:167).

In a later paper, he adjusted the above definition by emphasizing the subjects – participants, instead

of society in general - that benefit from social capital. The revised definition is this:

By “social capital” I mean features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (1996:34).

The two definitions are almost identical, though the first version seems to be more often cited,

because it is associated with his classic ‘Making Democracy Work’. In the definition, we see again

three components as discussed above, namely: networks, norms and trust. However, as Putnam

indicated, the underlying manifestation that proves that social capital is working is civic

engagement, which ‘refers to people’s connections with the life of their communities, not only with

politics’ (1996:34). The vibrancy of associational life as discussed above is also noticeable. In fact,

the networks of civic voluntary associations, autonomous from the government, are actually more

often referred to as civil society in our modern sense, and that can be traced back and found in

works by Montesquieu (in the Spirit of the Laws, [1748] 1989), Tocqueville (in Democracy in

America, [1835, 1840] 2001) or more recently by Habermas (in An inquire into a Category of

Bourgeois Society, 1989) and Calhoun (in Civil Society and the Public Sphere, 1993).

Building on the discussion of Putnam’s thesis and definition of social capital above, a list of

conditions conducive for democracy can be drawn in Table 4 below.

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Table 4: Conditions conducive for Democracy based on social capital theory

Conditions conducive for Democracy

Network of Civic Organizations (civil society)

DEMOCRACY

(strong, responsive, effective democratic government)

Active civic engagement (popular participation) Trust (equality, cooperation, reciprocity)

In conclusion, empirical studies have shown that in one way or other, social capital is important for

democracy to emerge, function and survive, though results from the World Values Survey data

show that democracy affects social capital too (Paxton 2002:254). The list of conditions drawn

from social capital theory, together with the conditions derived from modernization theory and

human empowerment theory as discussed above, are a useful source of reference to develop the

analytic framework in Chapter Four of this thesis.

The use of these conditions, though not all of them, is a compelling evidence of the connection

of this thesis’s topic, which focuses on democratization in an authoritarian regime, to the

mainstream discourse dominated by the literature on liberal democracies. At the same time, it will

help this researcher to fill in the gap left by the literature on democratic development, which tends

to concentrate on what goes wrong, rather what goes right, given the fact that the local resources are

more often than not ignored.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored three theories – modernization, human empowerment, and social capital -

in the contemporary discourse on democratization and democracy. Each of these theories offers a

list of conditions conducive to democracy. These conditions, labelled as independent variables, are

utilized to develop an analytic framework in Chapter Four, which is then applied to case studies in

Chapters Five, Six and Seven of this thesis.

As noted above (in the Introduction ), most analyses of GRD in Vietnam have thus far focused

on what goes wrong, rather than what goes right, and in this context local resources tend to be

ignored. Furthermore, the root causes that led to the adoption of GRD are usually overlooked.

Hence, the progress of GRD and its impacts on local politics are not evaluated appropriately. To

address these problems, this researcher assumes that it is necessary to develop an analytic

framework, which is built on the conditions drawn from the above discussion of democratic

theories and the root causes of rural unrest in Vietnam in the 1990s. This combination serves

twofold: first, it addresses the above-indicated problems associated with the existing approaches to

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Vietnam GRD; second, it reconciles the international mainstream theories and local practices. This

aims implicitly to connect this study with the existing general knowledge of democratization,

democracy and GRD. The analytic framework will be developed in Chapter Four.

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4

An Analytic Framework

Introduction This chapter develops an analytic framework built on the conditions described in Chapter Three and

the root causes of rural unrest in Vietnam introduced in Chapter Two. These conditions and root

causes, hereinafter labelled ‘independent variables’, are mainly based on indices12 recently

developed by Vietnamese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government institutions

with technical and financial assistance from foreign partners like the United Nations Development

Program (UNDP) in Vietnam. The outcomes, positive or negative, associated with each of these

variables through the analysis of first-hand data (collected during field-work) and secondary data

(extracted from the indices and archival documents) not only illustrate the highly complicated and

contextual dynamics of GRD in Vietnam’s party-state, but also foreshadow its potential impact on

the CPV as well as the local governance system in the future.

The need to adopt a framework of variables that support the implementation of Vietnamese GRD

is clear, but its possible form is interpreted differently by different scholars. For instance, Tortosa

suggested that,

In the absence of a comprehensive alternative to the existing complex and apparently contradictory ideological framework, the attempts of the Party to combine market economy with political unity may only bring partially plausible initiatives such as the grassroots democracy regulations, but will not bring real political renewal (2012:123).

This view could be correct given what is going on now in Vietnam, but does not appropriately

value the implications of GRD for Vietnamese political change in the future. The case of Chinese

GRD, as discussed in the Chapter Two of this thesis, shows that it could both reinforce party rule

while still empowering people at the grassroots. The analytic framework developed in this chapter,

which is applied to case studies in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, enables us to understand the

implications of GRD in the context of Vietnam’s one-party state.

12 These indices include: The Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI), The Public Administration Reform Index (PAR Index), The Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), The Provincial Economic Integration Index (PEII). A brief explanation of these tools can be seen in the Abbreviations page.

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This chapter is organized in three sections. The first section identifies the independent variables.

This is followed by the discussion of causal mechanisms operating between six independent

variables and the dependent variable, democracy. As it was noted in Chapter Three, while the

independent variables are in essence the root causes of rural unrest in the 1990s in Vietnam, the

variance in these variables contributes to the differing extent of unrest between localities. In this

thesis, this variance (either at high or low level) will indicate how the independent variables impact

on the dependent variable. For example, high levels of, or increases in, inequality and corruption

are negatively correlated with the quality of GRD. This is understood as ineffective implementation

of GRD. In its polar opposite, low levels of, or reductions in, inequality and corruption are

positively correlated with the quality of GRD, which obviously informs effective implementation of

GRD. The same pattern applies to the other independent variables – good governance, social

capital, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law, as they impact on GRD. Table 5 below

provides an outline of the independent variables, their variance and positive or negative correlations

with the dependent variable.

Table 5: Analytic Framework

Independent variables 1. Inequality - Political inequality

- Economic inequality - Opportunity inequality

2. Corruption - Bribes (for land title, construction contracts and so on) - Public fund embezzlement

3. Governance

- Voice and accountability - Political stability and absence of violence - Government effectiveness and regulatory quality

4. Human Rights - Civil and political rights - Social, economic, and cultural rights

5. Rule of Law

- Sanctions for misconduct by government officials - Effective control of crime, life safety and security - Effective community-based dispute resolution system

6. Social Capital

- Civil engagement - Civil organizations - Trust - Leadership

Variance in the independent variables 1. High inequality 2. High corruption 3. Bad governance 4. Low adherence to human Rights 5. Low adherence to the rule of law 6. Low Social Capital

1. Low inequality 2. Low corruption 3. Good governance 4. High adherence to human rights 5. High adherence to the rule of law 6. High Social Capital

As shown in Table 5, there are six independent variables (in the column on the left). The progress

of these six variables is assessed over certain dimensions in the respective column on the right. The

simple binary variance in the independent variables, which nevertheless is informed by quantitative

and qualitative analyses, is presented in the two columns at the bottom of the table. The column on

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the left describes the negative correlation, while the column on the right displays the positive

correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable. It should be noted here

that the presentation of the variance in the independent variables in this format does not mean or

imply that they are inherently dichotomous. But rather it simply provides a qualitative measure of

GRD implementation drawn from analysis. This variance is further discussed in Chapter Eight. The

next section will describe the independent variables, as well as their inherent dimensions.

Independent Variables This section identifies the six independent variables which are based on the list of conditions drawn

out in Chapter Three and the root causes of rural unrest in Vietnam in the 1990s which led to the

emergence of GRD as indicated in Chapter Two. These conditions and root causes will not be

revisited here, but some other variables that are argued to operate as causal mechanisms for

democracy deserve mention.

Przeworski et al. (2000) attribute democratization to income inequality. Boix and Stokes

(2003:540) also found income equality conducive for democratization, arguing that “democracy is

caused not by income per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular,

income inequality”. Diamond et al. (2004b:2, 2004c:21) asserted that the eight following

dimensions affected the functioning of democracy: freedom, rule of law, vertical and horizontal

accountability, responsiveness, equality, participation and competition. Shin (1994:151) offers a

summary of propositions drawn from the third wave of democratization literature (O'Donnell and

Schmitter 1986, Huntington 1991(a), Diamond 1992a, 1992b, Karl and Schmitter 1994), and

variables facilitating and obstructing democratization as follows:

1. There are few preconditions for the emergence of democracy. 2. No single factor is sufficient or necessary to the emergence of democracy. 3. The emergence of democracy in a country is the result of a combination of causes. 4. The causes responsible for the emergence of democracy are not the same as those promoting its consolidation. 5. The combination of causes promoting democratic transition and consolidation varies from country to country. 6. The combination of causes generally responsible for one wave of democratization differs from those responsible for other waves.

These propositions add force to this thesis’ argument that a multi-variable analytic framework is

needed to evaluate Vietnamese GRD.

The variable – income inequality – stressed by Boix and Stokes (2003) and Przeworski et al.

(2000), and those asserted by Diamond et al. (2004b, 2004c) are actually the root causes of rural

unrests in Vietnam during the 1990s. Building on myriad variables suggested in both theoretical

and empirical literature that have been discussed thus far, as well as the root causes facilitating the

emergence of GRD in Vietnam, this thesis proposes six independent variables in an analytic

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framework. These are: inequality, corruption, governance, human rights, the rule of law, and social

capital. It is worth remembering that the CPV adopted GRD to explicitly to address such roots

causes of rural unrest (and ultimately to regain its legitimacy and governability in the countryside).

The following are the elements of the analytic plan:

- Inequality: This focuses on three types of inequality: political inequality, economic inequality

and opportunity inequality.

- Governance: This construct is based on the overlap of measurement scales of two worldwide

indices - the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and the Rule of Law Index; and, four local

quantitative indices - the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance

Index (PAPI), the Public Administration Reform Index (PAR Index), the Provincial

Competitiveness Index (PCI), and the Provincial Economic Integration Index (PEII). Within these

indicescertain selective coincident dimensions are examined. These include: voice and

accountability, political stability and absence of violence, and government effectiveness and

regulatory quality.

- Corruption: Here the analysis focuses on its two dimensions: bribes and public fund

embezzlement. These are the most common phenomena observable in Vietnam.

- Human rights: The analysis on this dimension assesses civil, political, economic, social and

cultural rights. A caveat is required: corruption and human rights are highly contextual. Moreover,

there is still lack of a common framework to measure these two elements, largely because of their

multi-dimensional nature. Hodess (2007:294) admits that ‘researchers continue to seek ways to

measure the largely hidden phenomenon of corruption’; while Landman (2004:910) argues

measuring human rights ‘is based on several assumptions’ and has its own ‘problems of

methodology’ (Barsh 1993). Hence, in this chapter, the discussion of the linkage between them and

democracy is necessarily generalized, while specific context-based analyses apply to the case-

studies.

- Rule of law: This describes three dimensions drawn from the World Rule of Law Index (WRL)

and PAPI: sanctions for misconduct by government officials; effective control of crime, life safety

and security; and, effective community-based dispute resolution system.

- Social capital: All three components of this construct are explored, namely: civic engagement

(popular participation), networks of civic associations (civil society organizations), and trust.

Leadership as a component of social capital is examined occasionally.

Reflecting this, the six independent variables are broken down for analysis as organized in Table

6 below.

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Table 6: Independent Variables

1. Inequality - Political inequality - Economic inequality - Opportunity inequality

2. Corruption - Bribes (for land title, construction contracts and so on) - Public fund embezzlement

3. Governance - Voice and accountability - Political stability and absence of violence - Government effectiveness and regulatory quality

4. Human Rights - Civil and political rights - Economic, social and cultural rights

5. Rule of Law - Sanctions for misconduct by government officials - Effective control of crime, life safety and security - Effective community-based dispute resolution system

6. Social Capital - Civil engagement - Civil organizations - Trust - Leadership

The above analytic plan is the basis of theoretical discussion of causal mechanisms that follows. In

the discussion below, to avoid repetition, two of the six variables are not examined: the rule of law,

and social capital. This should not be interpreted simply as a cutting job. There are two

explanations.

First, while the six independent variables are necessary and sufficient for an analytic framework

to evaluate the progress of Vietnamese GRD, they are inter-related, meaning that any improvement

or decay in one variable will affect or require action on the others. Within this , the intrinsic linkage

between the rule of law and democracy (Przeworski and Maravall 2003, Carothers 2006, Fukuyama

2013), and social capital and democracy (Putnam 1993a) has been theoretically and empirically

established. Thus, skipping the discussion of these two variables in this chapter does not in any way

undermine their importance.

Second, while the rule of law is considered part of [good and democratic] governance (for a

series of discussion on the rule of law as part of governance, see: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi

2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008, 2009), which is under investigation in this section, a relatively in-depth

discussion of the social capital variable is done in Chapter Three. Therefore, it would be repetitive

if the same things are already canvassed in other parts of this thesis. Instead, this economy provides

space for discussion of the other variables in the next section – causal mechanisms.

Causal Mechanisms This section examines the causal mechanisms between each of the four independent variables –

inequality, corruption, governance, and human rights – and their impact on the dependent variable,

democracy.

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Inequality and Democracy

Over the last two decades inequality discourse has become multi-disciplinary. Five major types of

inequality now are investigated: political inequality, economic inequality, opportunity inequality,

social inequality, and gender inequality (for a sampling, see: Acemoglu et al. 2007, Bermeo 2009,

Pickett and Wilkinson 2009, Marshall and Cole 2011, Dreze and Sen 2002, Brandt and Henry 2012,

Muller 2013). While social inequality is a generalized and all-embracing term that is used as a

synonym for many types of inequality, including political inequality (Hurst 2004, Neckerman 2004,

Butler and Watt 2007, Miller 1978), gender inequality is increasingly associated with development

studies (Bandiera and Natraj 2013, Hiller 2014). For the purpose of inequality analysis within the

scope of this thesis, this researcher focuses on the first three types of inequality, namely: political

inequality, economic inequality and opportunity inequality. This means inequality (in general

sense) exists when these three ‘sub’ types of inequality exist. Bermeo defines inequality as:

The condition of being unequal as regards the command of any resources deemed valuable for human well-being. These resources might include physical strength, political rights, wealth, income, or even qualities that are only indirectly observable (2009:21).

This definition might not be comprehensive, but it works for the purpose of this thesis because it

includes explicitly and implicitly a wide range of factors, including political, economic, social and

cultural dimensions. More importantly, it serves as the basis to define political, economic and

opportunity inequality.

Classic liberal democracy theorists like Thomas Hobbes (in Leviathan, 1651) and John Locke (in

Second Treatise of Civil Government, 1689), and more recent theorists like Friedrich A. Hayek (in

The Constitution of Liberty, 1960) emphasized aspects of equality as the core of democracy.

However, they also considered certain inequalities as being obvious and inevitable, and that a free

society is likely to accept a high level of economic inequality (Fukuyama 2011: 81), provided there

was equality of participation in governance in addition to human rights, the rule of law,

accountability and relatively equal access to resources (Post 2006: 28-29). Nevertheless, Post warns

that when the state treats one group unequally and equality is lost, it then loses democratic

legitimacy (2006: 29).

The preservation of equality is difficult when the state pursues a market economy. While

capitalism with a free market and private property ownership are considered a necessary condition

for democracy (Berger 1992: 11), inequality is also understood to be inherent in capitalism (Muller

2013). Nonetheless, and paradoxically, political economists suggest that such inequality is the

source of political instability, violence, civil unrest and undermines democracy (Venieris and Gupta

1986, Alesina and Perotti 1996, UNCRIMFS 2009, Lowrey 2012, Porter 2012).

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Empirical studies have shown that inequality increases the pressures for and thus the possibility

of democratization (Alesina and Perotti 1996, Papaionannou 2008, Kapstein and Converse 2008,

Ziblatt 2006, Huntington 1991(a), Boix 2003, 2010, Boix and Stokes 2003, Acemoglu and

Robinson 2001, 2006). Yet a paradoxical logic can be observed in many post-third wave

democracies in Asia, Latin America and Africa that reverted to authoritarian regimes (Kapstein and

Converse 2008), perhaps driven by inequality. Assuming a reciprocal interaction between

inequality and democracy, this thesis describes a ‘cause-and-effect’ relationship. The actual effect

of the potential cause depends on what are named ‘intermediary variables’.

Building on this, the ‘cause-and-effect’ relationship is described by a circle which may start with

‘a gain for democracy’, which is a transformation from authoritarian/non-democratic regimes to

democracies, followed by ‘a loss of democracy’, which is the reversion of democracy to

authoritarian/non-democratic regime. Inequality is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for this

transformation. Whether this circle is completed or not depends on the ‘Responsive Rule’, an

understanding of democracy defined by John May (1976:13) where the government was to be ‘by’

rather than ‘for’ or ‘for and by’ the people, and where the people have control over policies. As an

illustration, the Thái Bình peasant protests in 1997 in Vietnam embodied a weak ‘Responsive

Rule’, which did not respond to the public demands for resources, consequently breaking social

cohesion, reducing social trust, discouraging political and civil engagement, and provoking political

instability and violence. Inequality was determined as the root cause of the protests (Lai 1997a),

which is demonstrated in three types of inequality: political, economic and opportunity inequality.

Political Inequality

Political inequality tends ‘to be associated with the absence of political competition and

accountability’ (Acemoglu et al. 2007:2). A concrete manifestation of political inequality is

asymmetric political participation (Hùng 2008b). This theoretical assertion has a relatively strong

foundation in the works of Robert Dahl and Amartya Sen, but poorly linked with empirical data

despite attempts of Polity IV Project13 and The Economist (Marshall and Cole 2011, The Economist

2011). Variables used by these institutions to indicate political inequality include behaviours,

attitudes or social trust, which are unquantifiable. Others such as representation of minorities in

governance, unequal political participation of different social groups, or the influence of social

13 Polity IV Project, managed by the Center for Systematic Peace, a not-for-profit organization based in the United States, is a living data collection effort, which constantly monitors regime changes in all major countries and provides annual assessments of regime authority characteristics, changes and data updates. See Polity IV Project at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html

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groups on their political representatives, are also counted. Acemoglu et al. (2007: 17) attempted to

quantify political inequality through this political concentration equation14:

Political concentration means to some extent power concentration. This is particularly true in

autocracies. When power concentrates in one or a few office holders without checks and balances,

it tends to lead to abuse of power, corruption and violation of political rights. The office holders in

this view often manoeuvre perceptions of legitimacy in order to justify actions that bring benefits

for their families and friends. More often, political inequality threatens the development,

consolidation, and preservation of quality of democracy, though it may not necessarily lead to

regime change (Houle 2009). Power concentration brings economic benefits. Empirical research

has shown that political and economic inequality are highly correlated (Acemoglu et al. 2007:3).

Economic Inequality

Economic inequality is defined as a ‘measure of the distribution of material resources that emerges

from the ranking of all the economic actors in a unit of interest according to the amount of material

resources that they possess’ (Bermeo 2009:22). However, this definition is constrained and

exclusive, especially as it does not conceptualize economic inequality from an institutional

perspective. The point is that economic inequality is related to the possession, distribution and

accessibility of production means, and this is subject to power influence; therefore institutional

aspects really do matter. To gauge economic inequality, economists or political economists often

apply the Gini Index (or Gini co-efficients), which cover eighteen different items.15 It is constructed

to measure ‘the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among

individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution’.16 It

should be noted here, by the way, that economic inequality - different from income gap - can be

observed by the divergence in living conditions and standards as well as enjoyment of recreational

and cultural activities.

In agrarian societies like Vietnam, economic inequality is also expressed in land inequality,

which can be measured by ‘land Gini’ – the index of land possession inequality among landowners

14 In the equation, m represents for a location (municipality in their study) and t means time computed. 15 See further the scope of Gini index data at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI 16 Ibid.

Number of Different Individuals in Powermt

Number of major appointmentsmt

Pmt

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(Acemoglu et al. 2007: 15). Furthermore, land possession is associated with power asymmetry

measured by all means, including political power.

Land inequality concerns an unequal distribution of land, where political elites tend to control

relatively higher proportions than other rural citizens. Hence, equal land distribution can be seen as

one of the necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for likely democratization in an autocracy

(Ansell and Samuels 2007:10). If the assessment of economic inequality is pragmatically limited to

the possession of production means, difference of living conditions and standards as well as

possible enjoyment of recreational and cultural activities, economic inequality is credibly linked

with political inequality and impacts on opportunity inequality.

Opportunity Inequality

Opportunity inequality is abstractly defined as ‘inequality of all members of society in the same

space’, which can be measured by the level of difference of outcomes between members of the

society with regard to their own circumstances and characteristics (such as sex, colour, birthplace,

region, family background)(Kinh 2008: 1-2). Manifestations of opportunity inequality include

limited access to and enjoyment of services as well as participation in and contribution to society by

individuals. In reality, the more financial and political power one has, the more opportunity he or

she has to access to services and resources than others. In other words, political and economic

inequality more often than not creates opportunity inequality. This is probably universal but

particularly marked in one-party rule societies based on patron-client relations like Cambodia,

Laos, Vietnam and China (Gainsborough 2012, Appold and Phong 2001, Li 2012).

In these societies, political elites tend to have much greater opportunity to exploit public

facilities than ordinary citizens. This happens partly because independent checks and auditing as

well as accountability and transparency arrangements, (which are essential elements of good

governance) fall short. Children of those who are linked with political power have greater and more

direct opportunity to access economic resources and enjoy better living conditions, services, and

better access to employment in comparison to their peers. Known as ‘party princelings’ (thái tử

đảng), that is the children of party elites, they have very much greater opportunities to improve

their own lives (Kelly 2011, Barboza and LaFraniere 2012). This opportunity inequality is trans-

generational, meaning that it can be transmitted between generations (WB 2005: 5).

To sum up, political inequality, economic inequality, and opportunity inequality are inter-

related; one can be the cause or effect of the other as indicated in Figure 9 below.

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Figure 9: Vicious Correlation of Types of Inequality

The direction of the arrows in Figure 9 can be reversed, though change tends to take a linear path.

Stewart (2002, 2008) defines inequality between different social groups as ‘horizontal’, which is

linked with conflict and political instability (Cramer 2003, Johnson 2003, Thoms and Ron 2006,

Ostby 2007, Burdekin 2007, Ho 2007). When inequality causes conflict and political instability,

leading to the loss of democracy, it is seen as negative cause. In contrast, when inequality becomes

a driver for democratization (Boix 2003, Boix and Stokes 2003), even at a point in time when there

is associated violence and political instability, this is seen as positive cause (Wucherpfennig and

Deutsch 2009:4-5). In short, inequality is strongly associated with both democratic development

and consolidation (in the sense that it affects the quality of democracy). Inequality, especially

economic inequality, has another function, which is corruption (Uslaner 2009:127).

Corruption and Democracy

Setting aside cultural relativism in understanding what actually constitutes corruption (Lipset and

Lenz 2000, Moreno 2002, Barr and Serra 2010, Yeganeh 2014), it is often viewed as the biggest

obstacle to democratization and economic development (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005:109). To

call an act corrupt, it is more useful to look at its manifestations rather than definitions because

many corruption cases fall short of the definition (Caiden 1997:5, Philp 2006:45). However, there is

a general consensus that corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain (Voigt 2007:296,

Lipset and Lenz 2000:112) and usually involves clientelism, nepotism, patronage, and other forms

of favouritism (Welzel and Inglehart 2006:76). In this definition only those who are corrupt in their

capacity of holding state offices, regardless of their positions (though of course the higher the

position, the easier and greater the corruption), are counted as corrupt officials. Clearly, when

public officials are corrupt, the performance of public institutions where they work in is

undermined. The central concern is how corruption causes the emergence or affects the

performance of democracy? By putting forward this question, this researcher is aware that there

might be adversarial questions like: Can democracy take root in highly corrupt countries? Can

corruption be eliminated when the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy (newly

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established democracy) is finished or in a democracy with entrenched democratic institutions

(mature democracy)? In fact, corruption is everywhere and never disappears. It is not necessary to

get involved in the debate of the complicated relationship between corruption and democracy. The

discussion about the causal link between corruption and democracy here is highly contextual and

only serves the aim of this thesis, though it can shed light on one side of the relationship between

the two concepts (Werlin 2008, Johnson 2008, Campbell and Saha 2013, Saha et al. 2014).

There is little empirical data showing the direct impact of corruption on the emergence of

democracy. Latin America can provide examples of corruption-related government change by the

military in coups (Heymann 1997:327). However, a government set up through a military coup is

never recognized as a democratic one. Therefore this is is neither a direct impact of corruption nor

about regime change to democracy.

As indicated above, the causal link between corruption and democracy is associated with another

variable, which is inequality. Building upon a model of the sequential relationship between

inequality and corruption posited by Uslaner (2009:128), the causal link between corruption and

democracy can be described as in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10: Causal link between corruption and democracy

As shown in Figure 10, direct impact of corruption on the emergence of democracy is vague

(presented by a dot-line arrow). By contrast, corruption more evidently can lead to the loss of

democracy. Sandholtz and Taagepara (2005:109) argued that corruption corrodes democracy by

undermining fundamental principles of democratic governance. Agreeing with this, Welzel and

Inglehart (2006:76) said that corruption and its manifestations ‘disable the due formal procedures

on which democracy depends’. At this point, it is significant to know how corruption erodes

democracy and whether or not it is possible to say that democracy does not function properly due to

corruption.

Virtually all governments, whether democratic or authoritarian, operate through taxpayers’

money and resources. Corrupt government officials embezzle this money for the benefit of their

own, relatives and friends. They are willing to sacrifice the interests of the majority to the minority.

In that process, they distort public policies and paralyse public institutions, disabling democratic

controls over state power. Overall, a corrupt government needs to disempower the people to

maintain its position and privilege. In this sense, this government ‘is for the wealthy and well-

Inequality Corruption More inequality

Loss of democracy

Emergence of democracy Low Trust

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connected’ not ‘by and for the people’ (Heymann 1997:328). Welzel and Inglehart (2006:76)

argued that because human empowerment is at the heart of democracy, corruption affects the

effectiveness of a democratic government. In other words, the effectiveness of democracy can be at

least partially judged on the basis of two qualifiers: first, the absence of corruption, and second, the

level and degree of corruption of a government.

Heymann (1997:329) observed that in a democracy corruption may take place both at high and

low levels throughout a system, be widespread and systematic or sporadic and occasional. In this

sense, it would be utopian if one ever expected corruption to be completely absent. Assessment of

the effectiveness of democracy thus depends on the second qualifier, which is the level and degree

of corruption.

The two corruption indices that are most widely cited are the World Corruption Index developed

by the Transparency International (TI) and the World Governance Indicators, which include one on

control of corruption, developed by the World Bank (WB). The former links the rate of corruption

with international trade and investments, while the latter is part of a whole-sale measure of ‘good

governance’. Results shown in these two sets of database suggest that the more democratic a

country, the more it tends to reach the level of corruption-free (Denmark, New Zealand, Finland,

and Sweden). The reverse is also true for authoritarian regimes (Vietnam and China). This linear

democracy-corruption and autocracy-corruption association is reinforced by empirical evidence

provided by Chowdhury (2004) and Goel and Nelson (2005), who found that democratic countries

have lower, while less democratic countries have higher, incidence of corruption. Nevertheless,

Montinola and Jackman (Montinola and Jackman 2002) contested that the effect of political

competition as a characteristic of democracy on corruption is nonlinear. Two contrasting examples

in this case are Singapore and Bolivia. Data from the two indices tells that Singapore has an almost

corruption-free government, but is not a democracy; while Bolivia has a high degree of corruption,

but has strong characteristics of a democracy such as free and fair elections in which citizens’

political freedoms are respected (Whitehead 2001, Kaplan 2006). These two sample cases illustrate

why it is hard to establish a direct link between corruption and democracy.

In conclusion, the relationship between corruption and democracy is complex (Saha et al. 2014),

though the link between corruption and its impact on democracy is clear. As noted above,

corruption can indirectly (through inequality acting as the mediate variable) lead to the emergence

of democracy and directly affect the performance of democracy. Studies on the nexus between

corruption and inequality have established that the more inequality is associated with the higher

level of corruption, the more likely it is that democracy emerges (You 2008, Uslaner 2008, 2009).

This concurs with a growing body of evidence that suggests that corruption rises in newly

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democratizing states and declines when democracy is consolidated (Vanhansen 1992, Treisman

2000, Hicken 2001, Case 2002, Chowdhury 2004, Rock 2007, Dong 2011). Also, it is commonly

believed that corruption is reduced when democracy works (Kolstad and Wiig 2011). Yet,

democracy only works when its components, including the governing system, the rule of law,

transparency and accountability, are functioning well. These components will be discussed in the

ensuing sections.

Governance and Democracy

The concept of governance was first really deliberated in the 1950s at the country level and in the

1970s at the international level, but it has particularly generated intellectual debate and emerged on

the development agenda since the 1980s (Weiss 2000:795-96, Kjoer and Kinnerup 2002:2).

Leftwich (1993:606-10, 1994:366-70) attributed the later emergence of governance to four factors,

two of which are related to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the rise of pro-

democracy movements in developing countries and other parts of the world.17

While in theory ‘bad’ governance can be claimed for the collapse that led to the transition from

authoritarian regimes to democracies in Eastern European ex-communist countries as well as the

rise of these pro-democracy movements, no empirical studies have been conducted to establish this

linkage yet. On the other hand, the orthodox argument in the development community is that ‘good’

governance is very important for economic development (USAID 2002:6), which can lead to

democratization. This view captures the core of modernization theory. The causal mechanism

between governance and democratization is actually very weak. In the former claim, the burden of

evidence of preconditions to democratization as an effect of ‘bad’ governance is not easily shown.

Former Central and Eastern European communist nations were highly corrupt without economic

inequality (Uslaner 2009:127). How can governance fit in the corruption and democracy causal link

model in Figure 10 above? When comparing scores that rank Southeast Asian nations, on the

degree of liberal democracy (by Freedom House), and on the degree of governmental effectiveness

(by the World Bank), it is clear that the most democratic nations are not the best governed and the

reverse is also true, at least in economic development terms (Emmerson 2013:227, 230, Wilkin

2011). This weakness in demonstrating the causal mechanism of governance to democracy is

problematic for most of those studies that concentrate on how one supports the other.

One important thing in these studies is that the authors always attempt to define the meaning or

the scope of governance, and to identify components of governance for the sake of understanding

17 The other two factors are: the experience of structure adjustment lending, and the resurgence of neo-liberalism in the West.

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its operationalization (Bratton and Rothchild 1992, Hyden 1992, WB 1992, Crawford 1995, UNDP

1997, Maidment, Goldblatt, and Mitchell 1998, Marsh, Blondel, and Inoguchi 1999, Weiss 2000,

Pierce and Peters 2000, Smith 2007, Fukuyama 2013). A key issue is to heed the warnings of

confusing democracy with the quality of governance as proffered in analysis of Indonesian

democracy (Barton 2010, Mietzner and Aspinall 2010, Lussier and Fish 2012, Emmerson 2013,

Liddle and Mujani 2013).

Like the term ‘democracy’, definitions of governance or good governance are variously applied

by users for their own purposes and change from time to time (Weiss 2000:796, Kjoer and

Kinnerup 2002:1). Multi- and bi-lateral donors and organizations also develop definitions of

governance that provide a framework for their development aid programmes. The most widely cited

definitions are those developed by UNDP, a body focusing on human and sustainable development,

and the World Bank, an international financial institution concentrating on development aid agenda.

Box 1 below presents what governance is meant by UNDP and WB.

Box 1: Definitions of Governance

The World Bank ‘Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” and has “three distinct aspects: (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions’ (1994:xiv). UNDP ‘Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs” and comprises “the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences’ (1997:9).

While UNDP acknowledges the challenge facing all societies is to create ‘a system of governance

that promotes, supports and sustains human development’ (1997:8), the World Bank equates

economic crisis with ‘crisis of governance’ and seeks to expand the ‘minimalist’ role of the state to

ensure economic growth through structural adjustment programmes (WB 1989:4-6, Kjoer and

Kinnerup 2002). Clearly, both UNDP and the World Bank emphasize the need to have a good

governance system as presented in Box 2 below.

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Box 2: Definitions of Good Governance

The World Bank ‘Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law’ (1994:vii). UNDP ‘Sound governance is therefore a subset of governance, wherein public resources and problems are managed effectively, efficiently and in response to critical needs of society. Effective democratic forms of governance rely on public participation, accountability and transparency’ (1997:9).

There are two themes that can be drawn from these definitions of good governance. They are

administrative management and democracy. As the World Bank (1989) emphasized in its report on

Africa with the introduction of the concept of governance for the first time, the essence of

administrative management can be narrowed down to accountability and transparency. In an article

on the relationship between democracy and governance, Emmerson (2013:228) argued that

accountability ‘must be considered an aspect of democracy and not of governance’. Therefore, he

concluded that ‘an unaccountable government cannot be democratic’. Alfredsson (2002:19) and

Fukuyama (2013:350) concurred with Emmerson in asserting that governance and democracy are

mutually supportive, but not the same.

Though they are separate, both good governance and democracy are good for human

development. Since the emergence of the governance concept was closely associated with the

World Bank, for the analytical purposes of this thesis, the Bank’s concept of governance will be

used. There are two reasons for this. First, the Bank’s concept of governance has been used by most

other influential international and regional financial institutions, especially by the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) within its assistance programme linked with

participatory development, human rights and democratization (WB 1994:xiv). Second, the Bank has

developed a set of indicators to measure governance performance of all countries around the world,

while UNDP has none. The indicators are widely applied by different users, including donors for

practical purposes, academics for analysis, and others for normative description. Kjoer and

Kinnerup (2002:10-12, 18) contended that when governance is used as an analytical concept, it can

show the degree to which a government is accountable to its citizens and more likely respectful of

basic political and civil rights. Therefore this researcher uses these indicators here for academic

analysis.

The metric developed by the World Bank is known as World Governance Indicators (WGI), and

aims to measure six dimensions of governance. They are: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political

stability and violence; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of law; and

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(vi) control of corruption. In the next three case studies chapters, the first four dimensions are

analysed and assessed under the governance umbrella, while the last two dimensions are arranged

as separate sections for analysis. This allows for the examination of the political dynamics at

grassroots level in Vietnam.

A series of annual policy research working papers from the World Bank provide a

comprehensive definition of the indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005, 2006, 2007a,

2008, 2009). The definition states that: Voice and Accountability measures the extent to which

citizens are able to participate in elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a

free media; Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures the likelihood that the government

will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic

violence and terrorism; Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public services delivery,

the quality of civil services…and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies;

and Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound

policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Like any other analytical tools, the WGI is not beyond criticism (Arndt and Oman 2006, Knack

2006, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2006, Thomas 2009).18 However, given the fact that it has been

the set of indicators of governance most widely used by policy-makers and academics in recent

years (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007b:1), it remains a valuable tool to look at a

government’s performance.

In short, governance and democracy are interlinked. The causal mechanism in which governance

drives democratization is weak: it does not meet the burden of evidence. However, although

causality is not proven, governance is highly significant for the quality and performance of

democracy. In other words, bad governance means a government is objectively unaccountable and

not democratic, and the reverse is also true (Emmerson 2013:228, Kjoer and Kinnerup 2002:4,

Kerkvliet 2004:1). In a country where the government is democratic and accountable to its citizens,

human rights are more likely respected and protected. The next section will explore the relationship

between human rights and democracy.

Human Rights and Democracy

International discourses were once trapped in a debate about the conflict between human rights and

democracy when proponents of one often claimed limits on the other (Nathan 1997, Monshipouri

and Welch 2001, O'Connell 2006). The debate has not yet disappeared (Jeremy 1998a, Freeman

18 And, see responses to the criticisms in: Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007b. The World Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

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1996, Harvey 2004), though they are now widely considered to be interdependent and mutually

reinforcing (Aidoo 1993, Arat 1999, Evans 2001, Alfredsson 2002, Langlois 2003). Within the

human rights community, moves are even underway to look at democracy as a human right, and

pursued under a variety of labels: the right to democracy, democratic right or democratic

entitlement (Steiner 1988, Franck 1992, 1994, Ezetah 1996-1997, Marks 1997).

The harmonization of the two concepts like this can lead us to a forthright assumption that when

we talk about democracy, we implicitly include human rights. The assumption is further reinforced

by most studies that have found a linear and negative relationship between democracy and the

violation of human rights (Hibbs 1973, Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1991, Krain

1997, McCormick and Mitchell 1997, Davenport and II 2004). By the logic of this relationship, we

can expect that human rights are protected in democracies19 and violated in autocracies.

It seems that there is agreement that the components of democracy include accountability,

transparency, equality, the rule of law, participation and so on. However, there are certain

conditions necessary to hold a government accountable, which include but are not limited to: free

and inclusive elections in which citizens are equally able to participate, free association, and free

speech. For transparency, the freedoms of information, expression and the press are crucial

(Alfredsson 2002:25). All of these conditions are both de jure and de facto human rights, and

prescribed in the International Bill of Human Rights,20 especially the two 1966 Covenants – the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The final documents of the 1993 Vienna Human

Rights Conference read in part that: ‘Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people

to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in

all aspects of their lives’.21

In the third wave democratization literature, the violation of human rights is discussed in concert

with other causes that drive the transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies (Huntington

1991(a), Abeyta 1998, Zakaria 1997, Davenport 1999). There is then one question that might be

asked: Can the violation of human rights be the single and direct cause of democratization? The

19 However, in many democracies with functioning and well-established institutions, human rights of minorities and people with disabilities are still violated. See comments by Brian Burdekin below. 20 This is made up of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - UDHR (1948), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - ICCPR (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - ICESCR (1966), Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR-OPs), Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR-OPs) 21 Paragraph 8 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993. See full text of the document at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx

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third wave literature does not provide any empirical data on this, violation of human rights can

enable the emergence of democracy, but its necessity is unclear.

Experiences in South Africa of the apartheid government (Adler and Webster 1995), Myanmar

of the military junta (Win 2001), South Korea of Chun Doo Hwan regime (Ginsburg 2008),

authoritarianism in Peru (Abeyta 1998), Taiwan under the Kuomintang government (Chiou 1995,

Chu 1998), or in Central and Eastern ex-communist countries (Horne 2014) demonstrate that

human rights violations there were systematic, gross and institutionalized. They preceded a

transition in these countries. Nonetheless, they are not the only pre-conditions that might claim

causality. Other factors – economic, social and cultural – also plausibly contributed to the transition

in these countries too (Huntington 1991(a), 1991(b), 2009) – for example it was the economic

isolation of sanctions that led influential sections of the South African business community to press

for change. This means the violation of human rights is not a single sufficient factor, but part of a

causal link in the emergence of democracy.22

We now return to the question of the linkage between human rights protection and democracy.

The conventional wisdom of the linear relationship between human rights and democracy suggests

that human rights are protected in democracies and violated in autocracies. Some studies have

found that the relationship between democracy and human rights is not merely vertical, but can also

assume a U-shape, which is when human rights conditions may be improved in both democracy and

autocracy (Fein 1995, King 1998, Regan and Henderson 2002).

Davenport and Armstrong II (2004) found through statistical data from 147 countries between

1976 and 1996 that human rights violations are associated with the growth of democracy.

According to them, below certain values, democracy has no discernable impact on human rights

violation, which will decrease only after a threshold level of democracy has been passed

(2004:551). In other words, these findings demonstrate that human rights violation take place in

both democracies and autocracies. Brian Burdekin (2007:191), based on results from a national

inquiry on the rights of people with disabilities, bitterly admitted that “gross violations of human

rights, affecting hundreds of thousands of individuals, can still occur in a modern democracy

enjoying freely elected parliaments, an independent judiciary, free trade unions, and the rule of

law” when he referred to this problem in his home country, Australia.23 Freeman (1996:358) agreed

22 Under the new international norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), adopted at the World Summit in 2005, the international community can now take necessary measures, including a military intervention with permission of the United Nations Security Council, to stop systematic and gross human rights violations in a country. The operationalization of R2P in Libya in 2011 is an example, which to some extent facilitates regime change therein. However, this is another area of study and is not part of discussion within the scope of this thesis. 23 The problem of human rights violation that Burdekin mentioned here is the de facto and de jure discrimination against persons with disabilities. This problem was found in a national inquiry conducted in the 1980s under his supervision as the Federal Human Rights Commissioner of Australia. To know more about the inquiry, see: Burdekin,

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that ‘democracy does not necessarily respect human rights, especially those of unpopular minorities

and individuals’. He then concluded that ‘democratic government can violate human rights’

(1996:361). Thus it is hard to expect that human rights are protected only in democracies, or

assume that they are violated only in autocracies. In this sense, a more objective assessment is

needed.

Although human rights can be violated in democracies, it appears that a democratic government

is more likely to protect them better than an authoritarian one. This is simply because there are

checks-and-balances mechanisms that can potentially hold a democratic government, defined as

rule by the people (Held 1996:1-2), accountable. These mechanisms may include: a democratically

elected parliament, an independent judiciary, a free civil society and media. Furthermore, at the

very least, a functioning democracy allows a motivated majority of the people to change policies

that have negative impacts on their life by removing the rulers through a fair, free and inclusive

election, while this control is absent in authoritarian regimes (Langlois 2003:1017).

In short, human rights and democracy have complex dialectical relations. Human rights are

causally linked to democratization, but also often violated in the growth of democracy.

Nevertheless, it has been argued that democracy provides one of the main ways in which the people

can protect their human rights (Gould 2004:4), while conversely the sound protection of human

rights offered by democracy itself makes it be something that all ‘rational individuals would want if

they could get it’ (Bell 2000:4).

The above exploration of causal mechanisms between four independent variables – inequality,

corruption, governance, and human rights – and the dependent variable – democracy – confirms the

idea that they are intrinsically linked with each other, and provides a better understanding of the

impact of the former on the latter. This is that basis of their inclusion in the framework which is

applied to analyse the case studies in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven of this thesis. The next section

provides explanations for the operationalization of each independent variable in the case studies.

Operationalization of the Analytic Framework The context within which the variables in the proposed analytic framework are operationalized

begins with the Thái Bình peasant protests fifteen years ago, which prompted the CPV to adopt a

party policy that has since developed into a legal framework prescribing what is now known as

‘grassroots democracy’. It ends with the state of localities under investigation, with the cut-off date

Brian. 2007. National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Appendix XII: 189-193

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as of December 2013. The verification of this context is pivotal for data collection and evaluation of

the progress of GRD.

The analysis of case studies is not based on any assumption that there is a variance in the

independent variables in the first place. Neither is it assumed that there was an increase or reduction

in inequality or corruption, nor that governance was good or bad in one or another locality. Instead,

the variance in the independent variables is informed by longitudinal data analysis and in-depth

interviews as well as direct observations (both in field work). This approach in analysing the case

studies is fairly compatible with the reality that in Vietnam’s one-party state, it is hard to

forthrightly validate that some independent variables already exist like, for instance the good

governance [emphasis added] measure used by the World Bank. Let’s take the term ‘rule of law’ as

another example. By the World Justice Project’s definition and set of indicators of the rule of law,

Vietnam is not yet a rule of law state. In a farewell meeting with the CPV Secretary-General Nông

Đức Mạnh on 3 June 2004, Mr. Jordan Ryan, the then UNDP Resident Representative, bluntly told

Mạnh that Vietnam was a law-governed state [implicitly meaning that in this state the normative

principle ‘everyone is equal before the law’, the key tenet of the rule of law, was not respected] and

far from a rule of law state.24 This statement remains entirely true for today for Vietnam. These two

independent variables themselves – good governance and the rule of law – do not cause change, but

their dimensions have impacts on progress of the dependent variable. Hence, to facilitate the

analysis and evaluation of the progress of GRD (given its linkage with the independent variables)

the terms ‘good governance’ (where has positive correlation with GRD) and ‘rule of law’ are still

used in this thesis for pragmatic reasons and based on an assumption that they are universally valid

constructs even in a political environment where they do not exist at levels that would be expected

in a Western Liberal democracy. No matter how objectively the six independent variables are good

or bad, high or low, we can learn from an analysis of the dimensions associated with them as

canvassed above.

Building on the above-described context, particularly considering the Thái Bình disturbances in

1997 as the crises of the CPV’s legitimacy and capacity to govern in the countryside, two

hypotheses of the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable are

derived as follows: one is negatively correlated, meaning that GRD is unsuccessful; and the other is

positively correlated, meaning that GRD is successful. The table below shows the first hypothesis –

that is the negative correlation between the independent variable and the dependent variable.

24 Extracts from notes taken by this researcher, who was also attending the meeting.

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Negative correlation High inequality High Corruption Bad Governance Low adherence to human rights Low adherence to the rule of law Low social capital

As noted earlier, while the independent variables were considered the root causes, but their variance

as it appears in the table above led to the Thái Bình peasant protests in 1997-1998 (Lai 1997a,

McCormick 1998, Abuza 2001a, Vu 2003, Sáu and Thông 2003, 2005, Hiền 2004a, Mattner 2004,

Luong 2005, 2010, Bảo 2007, 2010, Thayer 2010, Wells-Dang 2010). Alternatively speaking, the

loss of democracy in Thái Bình in 1997 was found to be associated with an increase in inequality

and corruption, low adherence to human rights, the rule of law, and a reduction in governance [bad

governance] and social capital. Subsequently, if a case is found that the six independent variables

are negatively correlated with the implementation of GRD, as it was in the case of Thai Binh in

1997, it can be determined that GRD is unsuccessful. A question now arises: What constitutes a

case of success? In other words, how do the independent variables demonstrate that GRD is

successful? The table below provides the second hypothesis, which suggests a positive correlation

between the independent variables and the dependent variable.

Positive correlation Low inequality Low corruption Good governance High adherence to human rights High adherence to the rule of law High social capital

`

As shown in the table, GRD implementation is determined a successful case when there is a

reduction in inequality and corruption, high adherence to human rights and the rule of law, an

increase in governance [good governance] and social capital. In addition to these changes in the

independent variables that have positive impact on GRD, there is a significant benchmark that tells

positive progress of GRD. That is political stability.

Vietnamese GRD emerged as a political policy tool of the CPV to restore political stability

following rural unrest in the 1990s, particularly after the Thái Bình disturbances in 1997-1998.

Accordingly, in the CPV’s view, political stability can be seen as a successful outcome for GRD.

One related question arises: To what extent can the political situation of a given locality be

recognized as stable or unstable? When the violent protests took place in five of seven districts in

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Thái Bình fifteen years ago, involving tens of thousands of peasants, the province was considered

by the CPV to be politically unstable. Political instability in general may be defined as a situation

that takes place in a large area, impacts on or involves a majority of the population in an organized

fashion or potentially threatens the life and development of the community in the area: at this level

it tends to be violent. Conversely, if there is no violence, even if there are protests, there may be no

political instability recognized. Nevertheless, in Vietnam’s one-party state force can be applied to

create apparent political stability, (which is pseudo-political stability), to control the situation.

Therefore, political stability prima facie is necessary but insufficient to consider GRD

implementation in one locality a successful case, although it can contribute to the CPV’s

reinforcement of legitimacy, grip on power and regime survival.

A key issue is the variance in the independent variables and subsequently their impact on the

dependent variable. How can the variance in the independent variables be recognised? Three

sources of data help to validate this. First, the first-hand data, which was collected through in-depth

qualitative interviews with local communities. This qualitative data presents the feelings, thoughts

and viewpoints of the interviewees. The biggest concern about this data is the trustworthiness of

responses. The validity of the response data is qualified and supported by direct observations,

which are the second source, and to which this study devoted considerable time with the researcher

making extensive notes. The third and secondary source of data was publications which provided

quantitative information. These publications include reports of central and local governments, non-

governmental organizations, and indices such as PAPI, PAR, INDEX, PCI and PEII,25 which are

especially helpful for longitudinal comparisons.

Let’s take example of the two variables: inequality and corruption. These are the most visible

and critical problems in contemporary Vietnamese society. If the national figures in the above

indices related to these problems are taken into account, it is possible to see that they are different at

the provincial level. Furthermore, no identical results are found between provinces in dealing with

the problems. It depends on local conditions. That is why the data is useful to examine the

dynamics of GRD exercise in the countryside. To measure these variables, longitudinal figures

within a space of five to ten years are compared. Within Vietnam’s one-party state context, the

positive impacts of inequality and corruption on GRD are associated with a reduction in these two

variables, which are labelled in this thesis as ‘low inequality’ and ‘low corruption’. For other

independent variables, a positive correlation with the dependent variable is represented by an

increase in governance [labelled as ‘good governance’], adherence to human rights and the rule of

law [labelled as ‘high adherence’], and social capital [labelled as ‘high social capital’]. Cross-

25 See the Abbreviations page for brief explanations for what they are.

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checking with the political purpose of GRD and the variance levels of the six independent variables

that contributed to the Thái Bình disturbances in 1997-1998, this provides an acceptable evaluation

on the success of GRD.

In summary, the independent variables are used as indicators to measure the performance of

GRD in Vietnamese countryside in the past fifteen years since the CPV imposed it in 1998.

Through the variance in these independent variables, we can recognize whether there is change for

the better or if there is no change or even if the situation is still as bad as it was in Thái Bình in

1997-1998. Despite limitations, the thesis’s approach will certainly tell us that much and this will be

sufficient, in this context, to conclude whether the GRD goals are achieved or not. This will ultimately

impact on the legitimacy and governability of the ruling CPV in Vietnamese countryside, and on local

governance reforms in the future.

Conclusion This chapter has identified six independent variables which are incorporated into a framework for

analysis of the case-studies. It was argued in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis that other

conditions beyond the law are needed to support the implementation of GRD goals. These

conditions are the independent variables that are described and analysed in the text.

The purpose of the analytic framework is twofold. Firstly, it is constructed in a way that enables

readers to better understand why GRD is successful in one commune, but not in another. This

difference is seen even within one province that is composed of a dozen communes, and between

provinces. Secondly, it provides a guideline for the CPV to deal with obstacles that prevent GRD

from working in practice. The independent variables themselves may or may not exist in a given

locality. Therefore, they are an indication of what the local authorities should do to minimize their

negative impact or maximize their positive impact to make the GRD implementation a case of

success. The table below provides a synthesis of independent variables and their negative or

positive correlation with the dependent variable.

Negative correlation Positive correlation High Inequality Low Inequality High Corruption Low Corruption Bad Governance Good Governance Low adherence to Human Rights High adherence to Human Rights Low adherence to the Rule of Law High adherence to the Rule of Law Low Social Capital High Social Capital

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Though the independent variables that form the analytic framework are divided into two columns as

shown in the synthesis table above and are significant for GRD, they are not intended to be

exhaustive. This means other conditions or factors might be added. However, this thesis contends

that it is comprehensive enough to better understand the dynamics of the implementation of a top-

down GRD policy in Vietnam. The analytic framework is applied in the next three chapters (Five,

Six and Seven), which are the case studies on Thái Bình, Hưng Yên and Đà Nẵng respectively.

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5

Thái Bình

Administrative Map of Thái Bình Thái Bình within Việt Nam

Introduction

Thái Bình province created an earthquake in Vietnam’s political life in 1997 after five of its seven

towns experienced unrest, giving rise to the emergence of GRD. In the last 15 years, unlike some of

its neighbors, Thái Bình has not witnessed any subsequent major peasant protests. Agrarian villages

in the province have been relatively peaceful and have seen development such as newly constructed

houses. Many indicators extracted from two annual indices – the Provincial Competition Index

(PCI) and the Provincial Administrative Performance Index (PAPI) – such as quality of public

services and governance, show that Thái Bình is not the best performer, but it ranks relatively high

while corruption and corruption-related complaints have declined. These conditions and the

province’s political stability make it a suitable case for investigating the implementation of GRD in

in the last fifteen years.

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This chapter seeks to answer three questions:

• How have GRD goals been achieved?

• How has the implementation of GRD impacted on the local party-state apparatus, cadre-

peasant relations, and local governance reform?

• Has the implementation of GRD ultimately reinforced the CPV’s legitimacy and capacity to

govern in Thái Bình?

Using the analytic framework in Chapter Four, it was argued that although not all of the six

independent variables are positively correlated with the achievement of GRD goals (four of them

are in their high levels, but the the other two are positively improved although at lower levels or

fragile), GRD has significantly contributed to reducing local tensions. This easing has occurred in

both cadre-peasant relations (cadres consider themselves as ordinary villagers, not distant from the

rest of the community) and the state-peasantry relationship (less complaints against local

authorities’ performance), making local authorities more responsive and accountable to peasants

(public consultations held where peasants’ interests are affected) and creating more forums for the

peasants to raise their concerns (villagers’ meetings). This has made Thái Bình politically stable in

the last fifteen years. However, as the results also show, Thái Bình’s political stability remains

fragile because of the low level of peasant trust in the government and other elected bodies. In

addition, mass organizations are still weak, failing to play their role in protecting members’ rights

and interests.

Background

Thái Bình is a special case because it was the violent unrest there in 1997 that gave rise to the

emergence of GRD. No studies by non-Vietnamese scholars, have been found that have described

what actually happened on the ground in 1997. However it is clear that inequality, excessive

taxation, corruption, abusive power, lack of democracy, and violation of people’s democratic rights

were associated with the unrest (see in: McCormick 1998, Abuza 2001a, Vu 2003, Mattner 2004,

Luong 2005, 2010, Thayer 2010, Wells-Dang 2010). Thái Bình was also a community with

impeccable revolutionary credentials. This posed a difficult question for the Vietnamese authorities;

‘why peasants in a province which used to be considered a ‘flagship’ (lá cờ đầu) in agricultural

production and building a new countryside programme (chương trình xây dựng nông thôn mới),

deeply imbued with revolutionary tradition (giàu truyền thống cách mạng), behave so

outrageously?’ To begin to be able to answer this question it is necessary to revisit the peasant

protests in Thái Bình, in 1997. This also provides the basis for comparison of Thái Bình before and

after the emergence of GRD.

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Overview of Thái Bình

Thái Bình is a coastal agricultural province in the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam. It covers an

area of 1,542 square kilometres. In 2009, Thái Bình had 1,842,800 people with a population density

of 1,195 persons per square kilometers, of which the rural and urban population accounted for

92.77 percent and 7.23 percent respectively (GSO 2010a:4). Its provincial center - Thái Bình City –

is 110 km away from Hanoi to the southeast, and 70 kilometers from Hải Phòng to the southwest.

Thái Bình is adjacent to the five provinces and cities, i.e. Hải Dương in the north, Hưng Yên in the

north-west, Hải Phòng in the north-east, Hà Nam in the west, and Nam Định in the west and

southwest. To the east is the East Sea (in the Gulf of Tonkin).

Thái Bình has seven districts and one city, namely: Đông Hưng, Hưng Hà, Kiến Xương, Quỳnh

Phụ, Thái Thụy, Tiền Hải, Vũ Thư districts, and Thái Bình city. It encompasses 267 communes and

1,600 villages (GSO 2012:175). In 1997, five out of the seven districts that experienced violent

peasant demonstrations were Quỳnh Phụ, Hưng Hà, Tiền Hải, Đông Hưng and Thái Thụy (Ân and

Thanh 2010). However, not only peasants in the district but also others from nearby districts and

communes were involved in the riots. As a result, the political crisis in Thái Bình was province-

wide.

Following the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, from 1976 to 1980, Thái Bình’s economy was

characterized by collective farms. All peasants participated in Stalinist-style agricultural

cooperatives. While all cooperative members were nominally owners under this model, none was

personally responsible; and according to classic Marxist theory they worked according to their

capacity, and enjoyed benefits upon demand. In reality as elsewhere this model completely failed.

Peasants endured chronic poverty. For an agricultural province like Thái Bình that harvested five or

six tons per hectare during the wartime, agricultural production declined in peacetime, putting

peasants in economic hardship (Thám 2009:176).

In 1981, the CPV introduced new policies on agri the culture (known as 100/CT-TW Directive),

to boost agricultural production. As a result, rice production rose again in Thái Bình with the yield

of 6.2 tons per hectare in 1982, and by 1985 people had enough food to eat, and no longer

experienced chronic hunger (Thám 2009:178). However, between 1976 and 1985, Thái Bình’s

peasants were still generally poor. Despite the poverty, people enjoyed equality (Stewart 1997(a),

1997(b)). It should be noted that it was economic equality (in terms of living conditions), rather

than political equality, because all decisions, as Đặng Phong and Beresford pointed out, were made

top-down under the leadership of the CPV (Phong and Beresford 1998). Nevertheless, relative

economic equality existed with no absolute variance in living conditions. This combined with kin

relationships among families and neighbours as a cultural characteristic of Vietnam’s traditional

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society and that helped maintain social stability. While small-scale cases of corruption and

embezzlement occurred, corrupt officials did not dare to openly flaunt their wealth, and were often

detected (Thám 2009:176).

After the introduction of Đổi Mới policy in 1986, Thái Bình’s rural areas saw many changes.

Thái Bình came to the fore again as a ‘leading’ province of new rural construction. It was

considered the most developed province in the Northern Delta, as can be seen in the following

figures. In ten years between 1985 and 1995, it was among the top provinces in terms of

infrastructure development - power, roads, schools, medical centers. By 1996, it had nearly 5,000

kilometers of concrete and asphalt roads accessible to all villages; 131 new bridges and canals;

power lines installed in all communes, wards and towns on the province, with 98.3 percent of

households having access to electricity; 293 primary schools and 293 junior high schools, twenty-

nine secondary schools, 285 communes with medical centers, thirteen district hospitals and six

provincial hospitals; and three quarters of households possessing an audio-visual media (radio or

TV).

In the early 1990s, Thái Bình had a rice yield of eleven to twelve tons per hectare; and achieved

universal primary education, which made it second only to Hà Nội compared to other provinces in

the country (Đức and Lan 2003:769-771). In 1996, data on comparative average monthly per capita

income by province showed that Thái Bình ranked third of eleven provinces and cities in the Red

River Delta region, only behind Hà Nội and Hải Phòng (GSO 1999), as shown in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Average monthly per capital income in 1996 and 1999 by province

Average monthly per capital income in 1996 and 1999 by province

Unit: Thousand đồng (VND)

1996 1999 1996-1999 (%) Total 226.70 295.00 130.13 Red River Delta 223.30 280.30 125.53 Hà Nội 379.30 454.00 119.69 Hải Phòng 262.81 350.00 133.18 Vĩnh Phúc 180.88 215.70 119.25 Hà Tây 208.66 240.00 115.02 Bắc Ninh 215.05 260.50 121.13 Hải Dương 176.36 225.00 127.58 Hưng Yên 176.36 210.00 119.07 Hà Nam 176.60 212.00 120.05 Nam Định 176.60 221.60 125.48 Thái Bình 215.21 272.00 126.39 Ninh Bình 178.39 229.10 128.43

(Source: General Statistics Office’s Living Standards Surveys 1999) - Vietnamese currency unit is the Đồng (VND))(GSO 1999)

Before 1997, no other provinces in Vietnam had rural infrastructure which was as good as in Thái

Bình (Lai 1997a:10). Taking into account the above statistics and economic conditions in Thái

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Bình, and if the theoretical relationship between economic growth and development and

democratization holds as pointed out in Chapter Three, its peasants should have lived a democratic

life. The reality, however, was very different. Resentment by peasants turned into riots across the

province in 1997, making it ‘an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of Thái Bình’s

Communist Party’ (Tiếu and Dũng 2004:465).

Unrest in 1997-1998

When the unrest took place, there was a total media blackout; foreign journalists were banned from

visiting Thái Bình until late 1997; and the international staff of non-governmental organizations

had access to their projects in the province restricted (HRW 1997b:2-3). An intensive deployment

of security forces, put the province behind a curtain of secrecy, and all reports about the Thái Bình

peasant protests relied on accounts from former residents of Thái Bình and the state media (Stewart

1997(a), 1997(b)). The secrecy has recently been unveiled in a report which was quietly published

on the internet by the charismatic leader of a dozen-researcher team who had conducted a

sociological investigation in the aftermath of the protests on the direction of the then prime

minister. The report, ‘Preliminary Report on the sociological survey in Thai Binh late June, early

July 1997’ (Báo cáo sơ bộ về cuộc khảo sát xã hội học tại Thái Bình cuối tháng 6, đầu tháng 7 năm

1997) (Lai 1997a), is perhaps the most comprehensive fact-finding document related to the Thái

Bình peasant protests. Hence, the accounts of the Thái Bình disturbances in 1997-1998 that follow

are essentially extracted from that report.

According to the report, initial resistance by peasants against commune authorities began in late

1996. Villagers in some communes employed different legitimate forms of protest towards

authorities at the commune, district and provincial level. For instance: a representative acting on

behalf of all villagers submitted a multi-signature complaint and met with authorities at different

levels (in Tiền Hải, Đông Trà in early 1997) and a sit-in protest with a crowd of hundreds of people

organized in front of the gate of the provincial people’s committee. By mid-1997, approximately

120 of 260 communes in the province had seen protests at the commune level, and nearly 40

demonstrations had occurred at the provincial level. These protests were well organized and took

place peacefully.

The report noted that peasants’ complaints concentrated mainly on fee collection, opaque

spending and the democratic deficit. They alleged public fund embezzlement, noting the unusual

riches of some local cadres holding key positions in the commune government. They also

complained that these local cadres had built multistorey large private houses, and purchased

expensive household appliances. Although average living standards were then low, the commune

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officials and their families had an extravagant and even sumptuous lifestyle despite being “people’s

servants”. Having power and money, this group had effectively made themselves into a higher

social class compared to the rest in the commune, creating a distance between commune officials

and villagers and leading to a crisis of social trust in the government. As indicated in Chapter Two,

trust and equality were the key factors in maintaining both kinship-based relationships as well as a

kind of intimate neighbourhood, which had been the lifeblood of Vietnamese village society for

thousands of years. This means villagers expected equality between each other, and could not

accept and tolerate a power-based relationship.

Villagers’ outrage increased, however, when the commune authority's representatives failed to

respond to their complaints and none of these ‘officials and party members’ were disciplined and

punished. The local authorities simply acknowledged:

There were negative manifestations of some officials and party members who were retrograde and degenerate, abusing their positions and power to corrupt, suppress the people, degrade the reputation of the Party and the State. There were also some elements abusing increased democracy in the Đổi Mới process as well as the existing difficult circumstances to have radical acts, or even to assist the enemy to harass the internal unity and blacken the Party and the State (Lai 1997a:4).

From May 1997, protests and demonstrations became more frequent. Violence from both sides, the

authorities and villagers, was imminent. The authorities deployed anti-riot police to deter extremist

protesters whilst villagers now sought a target to vent their accumulated outrage, and this

exacerbated matters. As the crisis continued, the number of people involved in protests increased,

from dozens to hundreds and even thousands. Most peasant protests occurred in Quỳnh Hoa, Quỳnh

Hội and Quỳnh Mỹ (Quỳnh Phụ district), and Thái Thịnh (Thái Thụy district), but villagers from

other communes joined these protests, seizing the opportunities to resist corruption, inequality and

democratic deficit in the countryside. Participation in protests was socially diverse, including the

elderly, children, women, war veterans, party members, and retired officials. Such diverse social

representation in protests suggested the emergence of a social movement rather than local disputes

or rebellions against the government.

The peak of the crisis in Thái Bình during 1997 was the clash in An Ninh commune of Quỳnh

Phụ district that took place from the early evening of 26 June until early morning of 27 June.

Thousands of villagers stormed into the commune people’s committee headquarters to vandalize

everything inside and then violently clashed with officials present on the site and chased them from

the scene. Afterward, the crowd turned to attack the private houses of leaders and the man in charge

of the commune’s funds. The protesters burned and destroyed all household appliances and

violently clashed with family members. Many people on both sides were injured. In Thụy Dân

commune (Thái Thụy district), the commune accountant was reported to commit suicide by

hanging himself because of pressure from the villagers (Interviews III, IV, and VI, Appendix 1).

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The unrest continued for four more months and only ended in November 1997 after the Central

Government's intervention (Hương 2005, Khoan 2012).

Violent peasant protests in 1997 were in fact the release of pressure that had accumulated over

a span of ten years, between 1987-1997 (Tiếu and Dũng 2004:330). During this period, 300

disputes, complaints, petitions and denunciations related to land and land management, corruption

of local government officials, economic, financial and commune budget mis-management had

occurred. Within seven years (1987-1994), there were forty-eight land disputes, which became ‘hot

spots’. The tension critically increased in 1997-1998. In these two years, 242 out of 258 communes

(nearly ninety percent of administrative units in the province) saw peasant protests against

corruption and land mis-management. 43,000 peasants engaged in these protests. In May 1997,

peasants surrounded and threw bricks and rocks at the headquarters of the people’s procuratorate,

the police in Quỳnh Phụ district, seriously wounding eleven police officers. On the 26 of June, in

the morning, private houses and assets of twenty-four cadres in Quỳnh Phụ, Thái Thụy, and Kiến

Xương districts were burnt and destroyed by the outraged peasants; in the evening, thousands of

agitated peasants stormed in and vandalized the headquarters of the commune people’s committee;

burnt nine private houses of Thái Ninh commune cadres in Quỳnh Phụ district; burnt and destroyed

houses of several commune cadres in Thái Thụy district. In Quỳnh Phụ district, 300 peasants

arrested and detained the party-secretary cum chairman of Quỳnh Hoa commune. In July 1997,

being so scared of the peasant agitation, thirty-four cadres of Quỳnh Hoa commune voluntarily

resigned from office and returned the seals to the district (Khoan 2012).

Only once the unrest spread to the entire province and some of the regime’s symbols like the

statue of Hồ Chí Minh, the national and the CPV’s flags were destroyed, the CPV realized that its

legitimacy was being threatened, the decay of its state apparatus was deepening and the state-

peasantry relations were disconnected. Top leaders of the CPV blamed this unrest on corrupt local

officials (VNS 1998a, cited in Abuza 2001a:84). To restore stability, the CPV thought these

officials must be punished. By June 1998, twenty-one party committees were reproached and

disciplined; twelve party committees got warnings; 1,040 officials were dismissed from office;

forty high-ranking officials were subjected to supervision of the Central Party Committee and

provincial government, including the provincial party secretary. Deputy-secretaries and, members

of the provincial party standing committee, were disciplined; 560 officials were subjected to

supervision of the district and township governments, including: 101 secretaries and sixty-two

deputy-secretaries of commune party committees, 124 chairpersons fifty-one vice-chairpersons of

commune people’s committees, twenty-five chairpersons and eighteen vice-chairpersons of

commune people’s councils, seventy-three chairpersons and eighteen vice-chairpersons of

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commune cooperatives, 237 commune key officials, were replaced. Furthermore, fifty-one

corruption cases were prosecuted, involving 148 cadres (Tiếu and Dũng 2004, Ân and Thanh 2010,

Luong 2010, Khoan 2012).

Reflections of Unrest in 1997-1998

That the violent peasant protests were triggered when democratic rights were violated by corrupt

and abusive local cadres is self-evident. Most post-unrest studies emphasized that the main reason

of all reasons [emphasis added] that caused instability and the socio-political crisis in Thái Bình in

1997-1998 was the violation of democracy and the people’s democratic rights (Hương 2005:49,

Sơn 2000:10). However, this thesis argues elsewhere that inequality, created by the structural

problem, was both the necessary and sufficient condition of these protests (Hải 2014a).

The unrest in Thái Bình was a comprehensive socio-political crisis, which exposed societal

contradictions and conflicts that had long accumulated and then erupted when the peasants’

grievances exceeded their tolerance. It showed three serious problems that emerged as a result of

the paradox in the early stage of Đổi Mới: the deep decay of the party-state apparatus in the

countryside, increasing tension in cadre-peasant relations, and growing crises of legitimacy and

governability of the party-state. Also, it demonstrated the correlation between political instability,

violence and the loss of democracy. The unrest in 1997-1998 showed that there were pre-conditions

associated with the violation of democracy, which preceded political instability. These pre-

conditions, which are actually the independent variables that have negative correlation with the

dependent variable (democracy) as discussed in Chapter Four, are shown in table below.

Negative correlation High inequality High corruption Bad governance Low adherence to human rights Low adherence to rule of law Low Social Capital

In the next section, the analytic framework in Chapter Four will be applied to evaluate how the

implementation of GRD impacted on the party-state apparatus, cadre-peasant relations, and the

legitimacy and governability of the party-state in Thái Bình in the last fifteen years.

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Grassroots Democracy and Independent Variables

Although the province is not too far from Hanoi, getting there to conduct this research was not

straightforward. The principal researcher and his native friend, who facilitated field interviews, had

to spend nearly seven hours travelling by inter-provincial buses from Hanoi to the central town of

Thái Thụy district before hiring a motorbike to drive to the An Tiêm village of Thụy Dân

commune. As the researcher was travelling on the inter-commune road to the village, passing paddy

fields, a characteristic of agrarian rural villages in the northern delta region, he recalled a report

describing ‘crowds of villagers burning straw torches, rampaging from one village to another

through paddy fields to protest and destroy houses of commune leaders’ in 1997 (Lai 1997a:8).

Soon after arriving in the village, the researcher noted the houses on both sides of the road. His first

impression of the houses, compared with those he saw in other rural villages elsewhere in the

country, was that they were of average standard. Most of the houses were brick with tile roofs and

looked very old. Few were two-story concrete houses. According to the researcher’s native friend,

who was born and brought up there until he joined the army at the age of eighteen (two years before

the Thái Bình disturbances), there had not been many changes in the last fifteen years, and the

villagers remained poor. This surprisingly echoed what a peasant involved in the protests in 1997

said ‘when they talk about Đổi Mới, the countryside has not seen much change’ (Stewart 1997(b)).

Recent reports by the provincial authorities and the communes, which were considered "hot

spots" fifteen years ago like An Ninh (Quỳnh Phụ district), Bình Định (Kiến Xương district), Thụy

Dân (Thái Thụy district), have shown positive progress in the implementation of GRD, attributing

to it their social and political stability, better economic lives of the people, improved

neighborhoods, greater contribution to increasing trust in local authorities (ĐBX-BĐ 2005, XAN-

QP 2009, TUTB 2012). Thái Bình’s Party Committee recently issued a document acknowledging

that:

The implementation of GRD has resulted in a sea change in the attitudes of government agencies, public servants, party members, and people from all walks of life towards democracy and leadership. The capacity of party committees and the government has been improved significantly. The Fatherland Front and mass organizations, party members and civil servants are closer and more accountable to the people. The implementation of grassroots democracy has also empowered the people. This has contributed to the realization of the socio-economic development goals, the building of a new countryside, poverty reduction, and improving the people’s life (TUTB 2013).

These optimistic remarks suggest that GRD has been implemented effectively in Thái Bình.

Alternatively speaking, the independent variables have shown progress as compared with the level

they stood in 1997.

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Inequality


The following four dimensions are employed to assess political inequality: elections of the village

chief, the voices of villagers in decision-making; an equal applicability of rules between villagers

and government officials; and the behaviour of local officials towards villagers.

The GRD provides two forms of democracy: direct democracy – that is direct election of village

chiefs, and indirect democracy – that is villagers’ meetings and submission of opinions and

recommendations through mass organizations. Although GRD applies to the commune, ward and

township level, villagers cannot directly elect chairmen of the commune people’s committee. The

Law on the Organization of People’s Council and People’s Committee prescribes (NA 2003, Law

No.11/2003/QH11, 26/11/2003) that the people’s councils shall appoint and elect chairmen of the

people’s committees at the same level. By law, the people’s council is elected by villagers on the

basis of a list of candidates pre-nominated and approved by the local CPV standing party

committee for a 5-year term. In other words, the commune chairman, who must also be a member

of the people’s council, is elected by the villagers’ representatives. This is what might be called

‘indirect democracy’. Commune chairmen are often deputy party-secretaries. This guarantees

consistent leadership of the CPV in the party-state apparatus.

In Thụy Dân commune, all the commune leaders are party members. Non-party candidates find

themselves unable to be elected to the commune people’s council, yet alone becoming the

commune chairman. Given the lack of a democratic regime and a legal framework that would allow

them to directly elect their chairman; the villagers have no choice but to accept this political

inequality. At the village level, GRD prescribes the direct election of the village chief. This means,

in theory villagers can nominate and elect directly the village leader. Vietnam is, however, more

often known as having a ‘one party, one candidate’ electoral system. This is certainly true at the

central level where the CPV tightens its control over the elections (the selection and election of

deputies to the National Assembly as well as selection and election of members to the CPV Central

Committee), making all related procedures a formality. Nevertheless, at the sub-national,

particularly at the village level, it is more common to have more than one candidate for an electoral

post. This compulsory experiment, as provided in the GRD, is what was labelled the ‘one party,

two-candidate’ system (Hải 2013d). Having more than one candidate for the position of village

chief at least generates hopes for more political equality.

The Provincial Administrative Performance Index (PAPI) reports in 2011 and 2012 though do

not provide specific data about Thái Bình; rather they provide statistics at the national level. The

reports show that 51.50 percent and 52.27 percent of respondents in 2011 and 2012 respectively

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confirmed that there was more than one candidate for the election of the village chief (PAPI

2011:35-39, 2012:38-40). The overall score of public participation in village elections, which

includes an indicator of candidate numbers, shows that Thái Bình was recognized as the high

average and best performer in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Nevertheless, the data does not yet

substantiate whether political inequality is reduced or not. In reality it is a procedural rather than a

substantive matter because local cadres often ‘guide’ the election, from the nomination of

candidates to the voting. Furthermore, the local standing party committee ultimately determines

everything, including the election results. An old and highly respected man in An Tiêm village

described this process as follows:

Everything is only formality. Two or three candidates are nominated by the party committee. The villagers can nominate their own candidates. You can vote for the one you like, but it is often pre-decided. The villager-nominated candidates are rarely elected and accepted.

Where a villager-nominated candidate is elected and accepted, it would be considered a ‘sweet

joke’ (chuyện thật như bịa) (Trang 2004:142, Thụy 2011). Candidates who are party members

competing for village headship are preferred.

In Thái Bình, most village chiefs are party members (TUTB 2004b:5-6). In some communes like

An Đồng of Quỳnh Phụ district, all village chiefs are party members (Sơn 2000:31). Some village

leaders have said that even if they could have been nominated and elected by the villagers, it would

be hard for them to work effectively if they were not party members (Doanh 2012). Among those

the researcher had interviews with in An Tiêm village, some had been elected the village chief for

one term but did not stand for re-election for various reasons, including external ‘pressures’. In An

Tiêm and other villages in Thái Bình, short-listed candidates must be approved by the village party

committee before the election. This non-democratic mechanism is enunciated in a document issued

by the provincial government (UBND-TB 2009) which prescribes that the village chief, after being

elected, must work under the direction of the Party Committee. As such, even if the elected village

chief is not a party member, he/she will have to follow the party’s direction. A villager explained it

this way: ‘the villagers elect the candidates nominated by the party’ (đảng cử dân bầu). At the

national level, fifty percent of respondents said the selection of village candidates were problematic,

and almost forty-eight percent of respondents confirmed that they were suggested [by the party

committee] to vote for a particular candidate (PAPI 2012:41). This researcher argues that this is

‘cosmetic’ or ‘procedural’ democracy (Hải 2008).

GRD requires public consultations before local authorities make final decisions that affect the

villagers’ interest. Villagers can give their opinions on various issues, including local governance

performance to local authorities, either directly or indirectly through mass organizations like the

Fatherland Front, Veterans’ Association, Women’s Union and Peasants’ Union. Most villagers are

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members of at least one of these organizations. In Vietnam’s party-state, these organizations are

considered the CPV’s ‘extended arms’ (cánh tay nối dài), whose main functions are to bring the

masses together, educate and improve consciousness of their members of the party-state’s policies

and laws (Thayer 2008, 2009a, Hải 2013e). As compared with 1997, these organizations are now

more active (TUTB 2004a:4).

Villagers who are party members can attend periodic meetings of the local party committee,

through which they are updated on and discuss local policies. For instance, in Đông Hưng district,

between 2001-2003, there were 1,589 opinions from party members and villagers who attended

commune party committees; 4,314 suggestions to village party committees (HU-ĐH 2004:4), and

between 1999-2003, there were 2,356 recommendations from voters sent to their local

representatives (Minh 2003:3). Nevertheless, some villagers told this researcher that their opinions

were rarely accepted, again the making their participation merely a procedural issue.

The principle of absolute leadership of the CPV is preserved; therefore recommendations

submitted by the associations are only points of reference. The villagers believed that the final

decision was made by the commune leaders. Ironically, they articulated that their participation in

the meetings was abused to legitimize the pre-made decisions. As such, the villagers thought that

the role of mass organizations today was not very different from 1997, meaning that their operation

did not contribute to the important goal of creating a sharing community.

In some instances, decisions were made without public consultations. Let’s take the construction

of village roads as an example. As a procedure of GRD, local authorities must solicit public

opinions where villagers' contributions are mobilized26, and the villagers are entitled to supervise

the construction (SCNA 2007). It should be noted here that the villagers’ contributions can be either

in the form of levies, donations or labor power. However, in the conversation with this researcher,

Mr A (Interview I, Appendix 1) boasted that the committee could raise external funds for the

village main road construction without the villagers' contributions. In a subsequent interview, one

villager said that the committee found public consultation unnecessary in this case (Interview IV,

Appendix 1). Consequently, according to this villager, it caused agitation from a group of villagers

who had the road pass in front of their houses.

Unfair treatment as a consequence of political inequality also applied to the villagers who were

not party members. One villager was very frustrated telling this researcher that he was fined,

punished and not admitted to the party because of having a third child, yet the then commune party-

secretary who also had the same problem was not fined and punished. This had destroyed his trust 26 The term ‘mobilized’ is very often used by the CPV. In this context, the term carries with it the meaning that contributions are not just encouraged, but virtually levied. In other words, local cadres put pressure – moral suasion – on peasants to make contributions.

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in the CPV and the government. GRD has nothing to do with family planning, but the story

demonstrated that democracy and the rule-of-law still gave way to power where there were no

effective checks-and-balances to protect the villagers' interests.

One particular question asked in field interviews is the cadre-peasant relationship and

responsiveness of local authorities to the villagers’ demands in the wake of the 1997 disturbances.

Villagers who were interviewed conceded that their relations with local cadres have improved; local

cadres were not aloof from the rest of the community, behaved better, and kept a closer relation

with neighbours while local authorities were more responsive to the villagers’ request (Interviews

IV, XII, XV and XVII, Appendix 1). One villager said that he had no difficulty obtaining approval

of the people’s committee for his new house construction (Interview IX, Appendix 1).

Nevertheless, these villagers said that they rarely had business to do with the committee.

The conversations with villagers in An Tiêm reveal that political inequality remains, but is less

marked than before the application of GRD. The villagers now can nominate and at least know the

candidate for village leadership, even though the local CPV’s approval is still needed and the

village chief is subject to the direction of the local party committee. This is an improvement

because before 1997 the villagers were excluded from the process, and the party appointed the

village leader. Furthermore, it was the improved behaviour of local cadres, a closer cadre-villager

relationship, and responsiveness of the local authorities to even a few requests of the villagers that

had somewhat reduced villagers' dissatisfaction and promoted stability in one of the villages that at

experienced protests fifteen years ago.

Economic inequality

Living conditions represents the dimension used to evaluate inequality between local cadres and the

villagers. It is examined by direct of houses and the availability of household appliances such as TV

set, electric fans, refrigerators, motorbikes - which are essentials for daily life of the villagers. The

researcher’s first impression of An Tiêm village was poverty, though it looks wealthier than other

villages nearby. Thái Bình was among the five provinces in the Red River Delta region that

registered the greatest ratio of poorest households in the 2004-2010 period, and was also poorer

compared with the national rate, as shown in Table 8 below.

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Table 8: Poverty rate by region and province/city (Thái Bình)

Poverty rate by region and province/city Unit: %

2004 2006 2008 2010 2010* Whole country 18.1 15.5 13.4 10.7 14.2 Red River Delta region Hà Nội … … 6.6 … 5.3 Vĩnh Phúc … 12.6 11.3 … 10.4 Bắc Ninh … 8.6 7.5 … 7.0 Quảng Ninh … 7.9 6.4 … 8.0 Hải Dương … 12.7 10.1 … 10.8 Hải Phòng … 7.8 6.3 … 6.5 Hưng Yên … 11.5 10.3 … 11.1 Thái Bình … 11.0 9.8 … 10.7 Hà Nam … 12.8 11.6 … 12.0 Nam Định … 12.0 10.6 … 10.0 Ninh Bình … 14.3 13.0 … 12.2

(Source: General Statistics Office’s Result of the Vietnam Living Standard Survey 2010)(GSO 2010b:432)

The monthly income per capita in Thái Bình has decreased in comparison with other provinces in

the same region. Statistics in the 1996-1999 period showed that Thái Bình ranked the third of

eleven provinces (as shown in Table 7), but in 2010 the province was at the bottom of the list. As

shown in Table 9 below, the income level of three groups: the poorest, the moderate, and the

richest, in Thái Bình is lower than their counterparts in other provinces in the region. However, a

positive sign is that the income inequality in Thái Bình, between the poorest and the richest, is

better than most of the rest. One explanation is that GRD places limits on political inequality, which

has in turn caused a great deal of economic inequality in 1997.

Looking at Table 9 and making a longitudinal comparison between Thái Bình and other

provinces in the region through the lens of GRD's impact on economic development, one might feel

disappointed. Nevertheless, longitudinal economic statistics of Thái Bình by periods: before, during

and after the 1997 crisis, especially since the implementation of GRD, show a more positive

development trend. Economic statistics from the first two periods are presented in Table 7 above.

Table 9: Monthly income per capita by sources of income in province 2010

Monthly income per capita by sources of income quintile and province/city At current prices/ Unit: 1000 VNĐ

Red River Delta region Provinces

Q1* Q2 Q3* * Q4 Q5* ** Q5-Q1 Comparison

Hà Nội 541.9 981.3 1,469.9 2,239.2 4,833.5 8.9 Vĩnh Phúc 534.4 918.0 1,230.9 1,636.8 3,899.5 7.3 Bắc Ninh 470.6 975.2 1,521.7 2,151.9 3,811.8 8.1

* Quintile 1: the poorest group; ** Quintile 3: the moderate group *** Quintile 5: the richest group

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Hải Dương 441.0 811.2 1,125.5 1,512.2 2,633.6 6.0 Hải Phòng 510.3 864.6 1,219.1 1,805.9 4,068.6 8.0 Hưng Yên 420.2 739.9 1,006.2 1,328.4 2,490.0 5.9 Thái Bình 409.0 663.3 930.0 1,239.4 2,383.9 5.8 Hà Nam 418.4 691.4 937.6 1,243.0 2,456.0 5.9 Nam Định 458.9 731.7 1,019.1 1,340.4 2,634.6 5.7 Ninh Bình 373.4 671.6 968.5 1,375.2 2,621.0 7.0

(Source: General Statistics Office’s Result of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 2010 - Vietnamese currency unit is the Đồng (VND))(GSO 2010b:264)

Table 10 below displays additional socio-economic statistics for the period between 2000 and

2005.

Table 10: Thái Bình socio-economic statistics between 2000 and 2005

Items 2000 2004-2005 Ratio % + increase); - (decrease)

ECONOMIC GDP + 4.5% + 7.3% + 2.85% Food per capita 553kg 600kg + 7.83% GDP per capita 5.9 m/VNĐ + 8.53% Industry proportion 14.75% 21.73% + 6.98% Service 31.55% 33.51% + 1.96% Agriculture proportion 53.7% 44.76% - 8.94% Productivity per hectare 35 m/VNĐ 37.3 m/VNĐ + 23.6% Husbandry proportion 21% 29.8% + 8.8%

SOCIAL Population ratio 1.082% 0.94% - 0.142% Unemployment 2.3% 1.5% - 0.8% Poverty reduction 8.78% 5.9% - 3 Education (tertiary, high-school) 27% 31.7% + 4.7%

(Source: Thái Bình Department of Planning and Investment, Thái Bình Provincial Party Committee (TUTB)) (DPI-TB 2005:3-5, TUTB 2005a:7)

The impact of GRD on economic inequality shown by the difference of living conditions between

local cadres and the villagers, seems prima facie to be significantly positive. All field interviews

with the villagers of An Tiêm and leaders of Thụy Dân commune were conducted at their private

houses, enabling the researcher to observe directly their houses, household appliances and furniture.

This allowed him to visually compare the living conditions of the commune leaders and the

villagers. In 1997, the living conditions of local cadres differed strikingly from that of the villagers,

being much higher than the baseline level in the commune.

This difference was represented by the contrasting picture as follows: local cadres had large and

concrete houses, motorbikes, colour TVs, electric fans and refrigerators; while the villagers had

plain brick houses, bicycles, no colour TVs and no electric fans. Things seemingly have changed

towards a more equal rural society in the past fifteen years.

In 2012, through direct observations, it appeared that economic inequality had become blurred.

Mr A’s house was built of concrete and looked similar to that of many other villagers (Field

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observations in Interview I, Appendix 1). When being asked about the villagers’ trust in local

authorities and cadres, Mr A emphasized the issue of ethics and competence (Interview I, Appendix

1). For him, ethics meant the lifestyle, including the behaviour to the villagers. To illustrate his

lifestyle similar to that of other villagers, he showed this researcher his household appliances and

said:

When some friends visited me, they looked around my house and the garden. They then asked me: What’s the house of a commune chairman!? It does not look as good as that of an ordinary villager (Interview I, Appendix 1).

He then continued,

I myself grow rice in the farm and look after ducks like many others. For me, it is not the matter of power. I can step down from this position and take rest. If my family needs money, I would borrow money from the bank (Interview I, Appendix 1).

This implied that he would not engage in corruption or embezzle public funds. Looking around Mr

A’s house, it is hard to believe that it was the house of a commune leader because it looked like the

house of many other villagers and even uglier than that of well-off families in the village. The

interview was conducted at a set of wooden arm-chairs, nearby was a colour TV, two electric made-

in-China fans, a Samsung refrigerator and, in the front yard, a bicycle and a motorbike - they all

looked old. Mr A’s house, the household appliances and furniture as such would call for a rethink

of the aphorism ‘power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ (a quote of Lord

Acton (1887), cited in: Rogow and Lasswell 1963, Hogan 2006). However, it could be that there

were hidden material benefits to his power. The friends who visited him and spoke scornfully of his

house were also chairmen of other communes. This also meant he could be an exception, while

other commune officials could still be abusing power to make their families rich.

A field interview with Mr B, a leader of the commune party committee, was also conducted at

his private house (Interview II, Appendix 1). Mr B emphasized equality when he was asked about

the relationship between commune officials and villagers. He might be correct in some senses, but

it would be wrong or excessively idealistic if he thought equality could be achieved in the power

relationship. It would never be possible because the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is

always asymmetric.

Mr B’s house looked new, but it would be unsophisticated to think of corruption immediately.

He started the conversation by humorously asking the researcher’s native friend to let him know if

an organization in Hanoi was looking for a security guard; a job that is often given to a person

without any qualifications. It was a joke, though it demonstrated that he was behaving like an

ordinary person, not a ‘mandarin’ like his colleagues in 1997. Looking around his house when he

was making tea, this researcher realized that nothing was particularly special compared with the

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observable baseline living standards in the village. It seemed he understood his guest’s thinking. He

did not wait for the guest asking him about the source of his household income, a very sensitive

question, rather he voluntarily talked about it with a lofty voice that his family was keeping

breeding pigs for profit. Pointing at two big breeding pigs in the piggery, he said that after the

working hours he helped his wife to look after these two pigs for extra income. He then continued:

There was no difference of living conditions between the commune leaders and villagers. My daily life was very much similar to others’, no privilege over other villagers (Interview II, Appendix 1).

During the conversation, Mr. B kept emphasizing two Vietnamese proverbs: “tình làng nghĩa xóm”

and “hàng xóm láng giềng, sớm tối tắt lửa có nhau”, which literally mean good relationship

between neighbours characterized by good emotions, mutual assistance, and even self-sacrifice of

one’s benefits. Also to stress an equal relationship between cadres and villagers, Mr B said that he

frequently played chess with other men in their free-time (Interview II, Appendix 1).

A comparison of the living conditions between Mr. A (Interview I, Appendix 1) and Mr B

(Interview II, Appendix 1) with other ordinary villagers indicated an indistinct difference. There are

various attributes to it, though it is obvious that the sources of income of the villagers were more

diversified than in 1997 as shown in Table 11 below.

Table 11: Monthly income per capita by sources

Monthly income per capita by sources of income and province/city At current prices / Unit: 1000 VND

Total Salary/wage

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery

Non-agriculture, Forestry and Fishery

Others

Thái Bình 2002 282.6 65.1 114.8 48.7 54.0 2004 382.2 90.3 127.3 84.8 79.8 2006 514.0 145.4 149.6 114.3 104.7 2008 778.5 217.3 242.8 151.2 167.2 2010 1,129.2 518.1 251.3 216.3 143.5

(Source: General Statistics Office’s Result of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 2010)(GSO 2010b:241)

In early 1990s, eighty-one percent of income of the villagers in Thái Bình was from agriculture.

Now, there is at least one person in each family engaged in a non-agricultural job. Many even

joined the overseas labour export programmes or simply migrated to work in a non-agricultural

environment. In 2012, some communes in Thái Bình registered between seventy – eighty percent of

young people working far from home (Hiền 2012). Hence, the income levels would be different and

non-comparable.

The gap in living conditions could be concealed by commune officials. They may be smarter

than their predecessors in 1997 in concealing wealth in order to avoid scrutiny and so avoiding the

revulsion of the villagers. For instance, they might have bought a house for their children in a city

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far away from the village and out of sight of the villagers, or built a new house after they have

retired. In a field interview, Mr R said that commune officials now knew how to hide and nicely

cover their corrupt acts (Interview XV, Appendix 1). However even if the commune leaders are

indeed corrupt, the money they are taking and putting in their pockets is far less than the the absurd

misdirection of the contributions of the villagers in 1997 because GRD empowers the villagers to

scrutinize all the expenses from popularly contributed funds.


Two related dimensions: access to higher education and employment of children of local officials

and villagers, were investigated.

In 1997, children of commune officials had the necessary conditions and opportunities to enjoy

and access the best social services, including higher education and employment (Lai 1997a). In fact,

opportunity inequality as a sequence of political inequality (power asymmetry) and economic

inequality (prosperity asymmetry) can be found everywhere in the world (UN 2013, Oxfam 2014).

However, in Vietnam’s party-state where the patron-client relations influence the polity, democratic

institutions are absent, the principle of accountability and transparency is not highly respected:

opportunity inequality is obvious and resilient.

Children of Mr A and Mr B were not at home during field interviews. Mr A had two children,

one girl and one boy. He said that his son was about to graduate from a university in Hanoi, while

the daughter also finished her study at a college of finance in Hanoi last year and had been recruited

to work for a kindergarten in the province recently (Interview I, Appendix 1). He used the word

‘xin’, literally meaning ‘request for’ or ‘apply for’, when he talked about his daughter's recruitment.

Though he did not explain what he meant by ‘xin’, that is whether he arranged it for her or his

daughter did it herself; it could be interpreted from the inference of his words to be that he did it. It

is nothing special to work as an accountant at a rural kindergarten, but it is plausible that not

everyone would have heard about the forthcoming recruitment because it was not widely

publicized. Without a public announcement and competition, it would be no surprise if his daughter

was recruited thanks to the patron-client relations: his power thus would have enabled her to access

the opportunity. In Vietnam, like China, the élite’s children, called ‘red seeds’ (hạt giống đỏ) or

‘princelings’ (thái tử Đảng), often benefit from their parents’ power base. The following

Vietnamese proverb is in many instances still true:

A child of the king will become king A child of a pagoda's warden will continue sweeping the leaves of banyan tree (Con vua thì lại làm vua, con sãi ở chùa lại quét lá đa)

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It is not possible to assert that Mr A’s influence was behind his daughter's recruitment, but it would

be certainly have been the case back in 1997 when abuse of power was beyond the villagers’

scrutiny. GRD does not specifically aim to reduce opportunity inequality, but it prevents local

cadres from directly abusing power for personal gain, which is considered a corrupt act (see

definition of corruption in Chapter Three), by creating a mechanism for the villagers to audit their

performance.

Mr B had two sons. The first son had been an officer in the Vietnamese Navy for more than ten

years, and the second son graduated from a university last year and was working for the Korean

Samsung Electronics Company in Hanoi. Mr B was very proud of his sons' careers, particularly the

eldest. This is notable, because since Vietnam ended its border war with China in 1979 and started

a market economy, many young Vietnamese are reluctant to join and find ways to avoid joining the

military (DSCNA 2014). Unlike their parents, the young perceive life in the army as very hard and

it represents a loss of opportunity to study and do business to get rich. Mr B commented that young

soldiers even refused to be sent to the border areas, islands or to be recruited in the Navy because

these are the most dangerous fronts (Interview II, Appendix 1). The ‘orthodox revolutionary

heroism’ (chủ nghĩa anh hùng cách mạng) upheld by their parents and grandparents during the

national liberation wars is no longer appropriate in the market economy, giving way to pragmatism

and the cherishing of capitalism (Rinh 2014).

Ten years ago, Mr B was also a senior leader of the commune. In this position, he would have

been able to intervene in order for his son not to be recruited in the army. Many parents made use of

such power, exploited personal relationships or even gave bribes, in both rural and urban areas, to

prevent their children from joining the army (Rinh 2014). However, for Mr B, letting his son

become a Navy officer allowed him to prove that his family was like other families in the

commune, and that he did not abuse power to allow his son to enjoy privileges over peers in the

village. This is significant given that only six percent of young people, most of whom are

underemployed, children of poor peasants or ethnic minority parents, join the army (DSCNA 2014,

Rinh 2014). Mr B said that some of his son’s friends, instead of joining the army, went to South

Korea or Taiwan to work. Though he said his family was happy with his son’s choice (Interview II,

Appendix 1). The case of Mr B’s son may suggest that the popular saying ‘relatives of a royal

mandarin can enjoy privileges from his post’ (một người làm quan cả họ được nhờ), influenced by

Confucian culture, is not necessarily true where democracy is in operation.

It seemed there were now fewer young persons in the village. One piece of evidence was a

wedding ceremony, which was held about twenty metres away from the house of this researcher’s

friend. There was only a handful of young men and women at the function (Field observations, 23

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June 2012, An Tiêm village). According to some villagers (Interviews VI, VIII and XV, Appendix

1), young persons now are busy earning money in other parts of the country and only occasionally

come home. Many of them went abroad, mainly to South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia, to work,

leaving behind farming activities for women and retired people. Compared to the early 1990s, it is

clear that Vietnam’s expanded international cooperation and an increasingly liberalized economy

brought more opportunities for young persons in rural areas to earn a living from other sources,

rather than from agricultural production.

In 1997, political inequality was the dominant factor that created economic inequality and

opportunity inequality. Fieldwork research shows that political inequality remains in Thái Bình’s

countryside, but GRD operates as a reminder of the gap that local cadres cannot ignore. It has

motivated local cadres to change their behaviour, to have a closer relations with the villagers and to

be more responsive to the villagers’ requests. Similarly, GRD has enabled the villagers to engage in

local governance affairs, including the election of their village leaders, though their opinions are not

always were accepted. This represents a big change in a commune that saw violent protests fifteen

years ago. In short, inequality has been reduced, contributing to the implementation of GRD, but it

is still fragile as political inequality remains.

Corruption

Thái Bình’s control of corruption index shows a significant leap, from the community being at the

low average in 2011 (PAPI 2011:57) shifting to being a high average performer in 2012 (PAPI

2012:57). This indicates a decline both in terms of the number of corruption cases and the measures

taken by the authorities to fight this social malaise.

In 1997, there were three sources of corruption that prompted peasant outrage: (1) the levels of

money contributions by villagers to public facilities construction, (2) farmland distribution and

selling, and (3) bidding and construction of public facilities. After the unrest, the peasants

boycotted taxation and fund-raising because they thought that their money would be embezzled by

local cadres. As a result, the local budget was inadequate to cover costs for building new or

repairing crumbling public facilities. The province then had to rely on subsidies from the central

government and faced a high level of public debt (MOF 1997). However, the situation has changed.

Table 12 below provides statistics about contributions by villagers to the construction of various

types of infrastructure between 2000 and 2003 in the whole province.

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Table 12: Contributions by villagers for infrastructure construction between 2000 and 2003

Year State Budget (billion VNĐ) Villagers’ contribution (billion VNĐ)

2000 238 9.58 2001 368.5 21 2002 382.654 23 2003 350 28

(Source: Thái Bình Provincial Party Committee 2004)(TUTB 2004b)

Peasants’ contributions in villages and communes recognized as “hot spots” in 1997 was relatively

high. For example, in Vũ Thư district, between 1999 and 2003, the villagers contributed more than

twenty billion VNĐ (Kiếm 2004). In Thái Thịnh of Thái Thụy district, between 1998-2004,

peasants contributed more than 400 million VNĐ (or 24.3 percent) out of nearly two billion VNĐ

for capital infrastructure (ĐBTT-HUTT 2004:10). In An Ninh of Quỳnh Phụ district, the ‘hottest

spot’ in 1997, within ten years since 1998, the villagers therein contributed 7.3 billion VNĐ (or

almost fifty percent) out of fifteen billion VNĐ invested for infrastructure construction (XAN-QP

2009:6). These figures are really when one considers that corruption was one of the root causes that

prompted peasant riots in 1997.

In a field interview, Mr Q (Interview XIV, Appendix 1) in An Tiêm village was asked about

community contribution to public infrastructure construction such as roads. He said that the

villagers contributed largely in kind, rather than in cash, though local authorities still made public

the construction cost for certain projects. However, he added:

We just know what they tell us. We don’t know how much they have spent as people contributed in kind. Therefore, people are not able to detect corruption even if it happened (Interview XIV, Appendix 1).

He said they were only interested in auditing and monitoring of the projects to which they

financially contributed. Nevertheless, Mr P said in a field interview (Interview XIII, Appendix 1)

that for them it would be better if they did not have to make contributions.

Corruption in land management, including illegal land selling and distribution, is ‘very

widespread’ (Davidsen et al. 2011:26). In 1996-1997, as many as 528.85 hectares of land were

illegally allocated in Thái Bình, including 429.87 hectares at the communal level. The total value of

the illegally-allocated land was 202.1 billion VND (TUTB 2004c:10). By 2005, there were almost

no reports on illegal sales and distribution of land in the province (TUTB 2005b:5).

In the third quarter of 2012, ninety-six percent of the communes completed land redistribution

(dồn điền đổi thửa) – a component under the new rural area program directed by the central

government that enables peasants to exchange their plots where they were geographically

fragmented (Cường and Mẫn 2013). On the last day of his second week (7 July 2012) in An Tiêm,

when the researcher was about to return to Hanoi before the sunset for weekend break, he was

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invited to stay over to observe a villagers’ meeting held to discuss land redistribution. Attending the

meeting gave this researcher a real sense of GRD.

Before the meeting, the native friend briefly explained the rationale behind land redistribution

like this:

Each household, for example, used to have 5 hectares of cultivate land, which were split into five small plots scattered far away from one to another in different rice fields. This adversely affected the efficiency and labor productivity. Land defragmentation therefore allows households to swap their plots so that each of them would have a single plot or several plots in one paddy field to cultivate (Interview XXI, 7 July 2012, Appendix 1).

Obviously, reaching a consensus on this interest-oriented issue would be a challenge without

democracy. In Xuy Xá commune of Hanoi City, for instance, the redistribution was influenced by

‘interest groups’ and ended up in conflicts and clashes between peasants and local cadres (Quang

and Tùng 2013).

The meeting was held at the front yard of the village pagoda. Attendants in the meeting included

village leaders, the commune’s cadastral officer whose duties were to present the commune’s

proposals and took notes of villagers’ inputs to report to commune leaders, and concerned peasant

households (Field observations, 7 July 2012, An Tiêm village). The debate was lively and even

heated because not everyone was willing to sacrifice their own interests. The theme focused on

whether one household agreed to swap its plot with that of the other household. The redistribution

would mean that one household would have to travel further for ploughing. The meeting lasted for

three hours, starting from 7 p.m through 10 p.m, only to reach consensus involving five households.

After the meeting, several quick field interviews with villagers attending the meeting about this

issue were conducted.

Mr K (Interview IX, Appendix 1) said the commune people’s committee had organized dozens

of meetings like this, with each household sending one or two representatives, often both husband

and wife. In the meeting today, it seemed that men outnumbered women, and most of them were

elderly, while few young people turned up (Field observations, 7 July 2012, An Tiêm village).

Other villagers (Interviews X and XI, Appendix 1) talked about the role of the local authorities in

the land redistribution. These villagers said that the commune’s cadastral unit proposed how rice

fields would be split or swapped, and the peasants made the final decision. With regard to local

cadres’ interference in this business for the benefit of their families, relatives or friends, the

villagers said it was difficult to say because the communal authorities put forward the proposals,

and those who agreed to the proposal at the meeting could not complain later on (Interviews IX, X

and XI, Appendix 1).

PAPI 2012 report shows that Thái Bình scored "maximum" in the "no bribes for land title" sub-

index, as it did in PAPI 2011, as presented in Figures 11 and 12 below.

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Figure 11: Citizen Assessment on Types of Corruption 2011

(Source: The Vietnam Provincial Goverance and Public Administration Performance Index 2012)(PAPI 2011:64)

Figure 12: Citizen Assessment on Types of Corruption 2012

(Source: The Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index 2012) (PAPI 2012:64)

Mr N (Interview XII, Appendix 1) said that things have been improved because no such meetings

had been held before. Prior to 1997, all decisions on land distribution had been made by commune

leaders, without public consultations. Mr E (Interview V, Appendix 1) described the job of a land

administrator this way:

It is a tiring and challenging job. Each meeting is a battle. I would be scolded if I were not fair. However, things are still easy in this commune. In others, peasants always quarrel with each other.

Given the reports by authorities, and peasants’ responses, this researcher understands that

corruption might go beyond land distribution, and yet be difficult to spot. It is important, however,

that the villagers at least felt good and agreed that authorities no longer imposed their decisions as

they had done in the past.

Corruption in construction bidding and works is the most pervasive and complained about. It

occured everywhere, especially at the commune level (Tiến 2005:31). Construction budget includes

in-kind contributions by the peasants, the state budget and other mobilized resources. This

combination of resources posed a challenge to controlling corruption, especially in the absence of

oversight and independent audit. Prior to riots in 1997-1998, commune and village leaders made all

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construction-related decisions. Financial records and statements were ambiguous, and local cadres

failed to show accounting information to peasants at their request. In An Tiêm, the villagers said in

separate field interviews that an accountant committed suicide under public pressure in 1997

(Interviews III, IV and VI, Appendix 1).

Comparable results of citizens’ perception on corruption in 2011 and 2012 in Figures 11 and 12

show a positive change in Thái Bình. While ‘kickbacks on construction’ score in 2011 was only

about 50 percent, it almost reached the maximum in 2012, suggesting that GRD has had actual

impact in Thái Bình. A close look at the construction project implementation cycle at the communal

level in Thái Bình (Tiến 2005:45) shows a strict observance of the core principles of GRD, that is:

public participation, openness, transparency and accountability of the local government. However,

the researcher does not quite believe in such a “perfect outcome”. How do the villagers know that

there is no ‘kickback on construction’ when funding for inner-village road construction was raised

from external sources as in the case that Mr A described in a field interview (Interview I, Appendix

1)?

When Mr. S (Interview XVI, Appendix 1) was asked whether or not commune officials were

corrupt, he said that they certainly were but knew how to camouflage it. This matched with 92

percent of public officials who said that corruption has become more sophisticated and hard to

detect (WB and GoIV 2013:63). Mr. S acknowledged that it was hard to get evidence because “we

do not have power” (Interview XVI, Appendix 1). In fact, Mr. S’s frustrated comment was

vindicated by the central CPV chief Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s bitter admission that corruption was

everywhere, from the top to the lowest level, in a meeting with his voters in Hanoi (Hải 2012a).

Separate field interviews with Mr. A (Interview I, Appendix 1) and Mr. D (Interview IV, Appendix

1) about road construction by external funds suggested that it is hard to confirm that there is

virtually no ‘kickback on construction’. Instead, this researcher would argue that corruption

remains there, but to a lesser extent. This argument accords with the provincial data about the ratio

of petitions related to corruption and bribes as shown in Table 13 below.

Table 13: Complaints and Denunciations by Issues

Issues 2003 2005

Complaints (%) Land 20.5 24 Housing, property 4.7 6 Social policy 13.6 11 Tax, economic, credit 11.1 13 Denunciations (%) Corruption, bribes 8.3 2.9

(Source: Thái Bình Provincial Inspectorate 2003 and 2004)(TT-TB 2003, 2004)

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To sum up, both quantitative and qualitative data shows that GRD has contributed to reducing

corruption in Thái Bình’s rural communes as illustrated by increased financial contribution and a

decline in the number of complaints by the villagers. Prevailing corruption in Vietnam’s party-state

should be considered a structural problem of the regime, rather than undermining the role of GRD.

Governance

Voice and Accountability

In 2011 and 2012, Thái Bình was among the top five best accountability performers out of sixty-

three provinces. As indicated in PAPIs, three sub-dimensions are used to measure accountability,

namely: interactions with local authorities, people’s inspection boards (PIBs), and community

investment supervision boards (CISBs).27 The two later institutions, PIBs and CISBs, are mandated

to hold local authorities accountable. As shown in PAPI 2012, the aggregate score of accountability

for Thái Bình is 6.96, whereas the national high level is 5.65. Regarding public awareness of the

existence of PIBs and CISBs, Thái Bình ranked on the top with respective scores at 76.63 percent

and 43.92 percent (PAPI 2012:54-55). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that these

institutions are working effectively. For instance, the score for effective CISBs in Thái Bình was

‘Median’, equivalent to 87.94 percent (PAPI 2012:55). Looking at it another way, the role of these

institutions in holding the local government accountable is still limited.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence

The second dimension of governance includes two indicators: political stability and absence of

violence that is associated with the prevalence of peasant protests and related violence. Political

instability in Thái Bình in 1997 could be attributed to improper settlement of peasant complaints

and denunciations. In 1997, there were 66,812 citizens engaged in complaints and denunciations, an

increase of 7.8 times in comparison with 1996 (TUTB 2004a:2). The peasants in 1997-1998 unrest

not only demanded the respect of democratic rights, justice and equality, but also called for removal

of corrupt local cadres (Lai 1997a:17). In the 2001-2004 period, the number of complaints and

denunciations, as well as the number of citizens involved, steadily decreased as shown in Table 14

below.

27 Both PIBs and CISBs are provided in the grassroots democracy legal framework. See: Artilce 13 of the Ordinance 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 of 20 April 2007 on grassroots democracy; Decision No.80/2005/QĐ-TTg of 18 April 2005 on the promulgation of regulations on community-based investment supervision.

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Table 14: Complaints and Denunciations Settlement between 2001 and 2004

Content 2001 2002 2003 2004 Number of citizens joined complaints, denunciations

11,168 10,992 10,580 9,668

Number of complaints, denunciations received

2,651 1,919 1,555 1,516

Of which Complaints 2,264 1,395 1,287 1,251 Denunciations 387 524 287 265

Number of awards 1,666 (91.1%)

1,271 (92.8%)

967 (92.1%)

927 (93.5%)

Of which Complaints 1,475 (95.4%)

987 (93.5%)

872 (92.04%)

764 (93.3%)

Denunciations 190 (84.4%)

294 (92.7%)

179 (91.6%)

163 (94.2%)

(Source: Thái Bình Provincial Inspectorate 2003 and 2004)(TT-TB 2003, 2004)

The above data suggests that in recent times Thái Bình better handled one of the root causes that

gave rise to political instability. Nevertheless, this does not mean the citizens have been entirely

satisfied with the authorities’ settlement of their concerns. There are sometimes violent peasant

protests against unfair decisions by the local government. Most recently, for example, Đặng Ngọc

Viết, a peasant in Kỳ Bá ward of Thái Bình city, used a pistol and shot dead one and caused serious

injuries to four other officials of Thái Bình Provincial Centre for Land Development because his

family’s land was seized without adequate compensation (Dũng 2013a, BBC 2013a).

Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality

The PCI 2012 of Thái Bình shows that the province ranks above the average, but is not the best

performer in comparison with other localities in the Red River Delta region. Table 15 below

presents the PCI results between 2007 and 2012 of Thái Bình.

Table 15: Compiled PCI Results in 2007-2012

Year Scores Ranks Governance 2007 55.99 31 Mid-high 2008 54.27 28 Mid-high 2009 54.58 50 Mid-high 2010 60.04 22 High 2011 53.69 55 Mid-high 2012 58.37 22 High

(Source: PCI 2011-12)(VCCI 2011-2012)

The results in Table 15 above display an even progressive paradigm of governance of Thái Bình in

the past six years. However, Figures 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 below testify that the province still has

a lot of work to do, particularly in transparency and proactivity of leadership.

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Figure 13: Transparency and access to information

Figure 14: Time cost of regulatory compliance

Figure 15: Proactivity of provincial leadership

Figure 16: Business support service

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(Source: PCI 2011-12)(VCCI 2011-2012)

It is surprising that Thái Bình was given a relatively low score for the transparency dimension in

PCI 2012, whereas it concurrently claimed to be one of the top five provinces having the highest

score in PAPI 2012. For example, in Figure 13 above, Thái Bình stands almost at the bottom and

behind Hà Nam. However, in PAPI 2012, Thái Bình emerges on top of the list. However this

differentiation of rankings can be explained because PCI applies to the provincial level while PAPI

focuses on the commune level with a particular emphasis on the GRD exercise. However, from any

perspective, both PCI and PAPI show a positive result within the important dimension of ‘good’

governance.

The positive results of the three dimensions discussed above demonstrate Thái Bình’s efforts to

improve its governance system in the last fifteen years. GRD has had a significant dual role to play,

both as a means to empower the peasants to hold local authorities and cadres accountable and as a

driving force for reform. Nevertheless there is much to be done to further reduce the peasants’

dissatisfaction.

Human Rights

The human rights examined in this context are the right to vote, the right to participate in public

affairs, the right to access to health care, and the right to education. Periodical reports by Thái Bình

Provincial Party Committee on the exercise of GRD at all levels assert that people’s democratic

rights are respected (TUTB 2004a, 2012, 2013). Field observations of An Tiêm villagers’ meeting

on land redistribution (on 7 July 2012, An Tiêm village), and interviews with the villagers, to a

certain extent, reflect official statements on respect for human rights claimed in these reports.

Figure 17: Legal institutions

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Furthermore, the way local authorities communicated with the villagers is also evidence of respect

for human rights. In cadre-peasant relations, peasants are treated more equally.

In separate field interviews given to this researcher in October 2013, high-ranking officials28

from different party-state agencies and mass organizations which are directly involved in the

implementation of GRD from nine provinces of Vĩnh Phúc, Điện Biên, Ninh Bình, Bắc Cạn, Yên

Bái, Hồ Chi Minh City, Khánh Hòa, Tây Ninh, and Hậu Giang, emphasized public consultations as

a manifestation of respect of citizen’s rights in implementing a policy, project or program. These

interviews and those with An Tiêm villagers reveal that both local cadres and peasants have a fairly

simple understanding of human rights and democracy. The local cadres define democracy as public

meetings, which the peasants have the right to attend (Interviews in October 2013). The peasants

consider participation as democracy, and acknowledge that they have the right to participate (Mrs V

in Interview XIX and Mr Y in Interview XX, Appendix 1). However, the exercise of people’s rights

to democracy and participation, and the outward reflection of local authorities’ attitudes and

behavior, do not necessarily mean substantial respect for human rights, or evidence of substantive

democracy. Respect for human rights and substantive democracy should be concretely exhibited in

the quality of public services, decisions that are informed by the peasants’ concerns, and the

election of village leaders from different candidates, including those nominated by the villagers.

The PAPI 2012 report on the quality of public service, including public administration and

public service delivery, showed that Thái Bình was a high average performer in four important

areas, namely: (i) certification services, (ii) application procedures for construction permits, (iii)

application procedures for land use rights certificates, and (iv) application procedures for personal

documents. Figure 18 below shows the scores given to each of these areas of Thái Bình in 2012.

Comparing with 2011, Thái Bình’s public administrative procedures quality increased 4.20

percentage point in 2012, a significantly comparative improvement with many other provinces

(PAPI 2012:71). Some human rights-related indicators, such as ‘Treated with Respect’, ‘Satisfied

with Service’, gained the maximum scores (PAPI 2012:77). In field interviews, none of An Tiêm

villagers complained about the quality of administrative procedures or the attitudes and behaviour

of local cadres. They said that the incumbent commune and village leaders now are ‘good’ men

(Interviews XIII, XV, XVII and XVIII, Appendix 1). The ‘good’ meant by the villagers here can be

interpreted as ‘responsive’, ‘close to the villagers’, and ‘corruption-free’.

28 These officials came to the University of Queensland for a 2-week professional leadership and management training programme, funded by the Vietnamese Government. This researcher was the interpreter for them.

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Figure 18: Public Administrative Procedures in Thái Bình in 2012

(Source: PAPI 2012)(PAPI 2012:69)

The quality of public service delivery is another significant indicator used to assess the respect of

the villagers’ human rights. Ensuring accessibility, quality and availability of such basic services as

health care, education, public infrastructures and responsiveness of the authorities to basic needs

and demands of citizens is an important task of the state as the main duty-bearer. Scores given to

the quality of these public services show that Thái Bình is not the best, but the high average

performer, ranking twenty-eighth out of sixty-four provinces and cities, as shown in Figure 19

below.

Figure 19: Public Services Delivery in Thái Bình in 2012

(Snapshot from the middle)

(Source: PAPI 2012)(PAPI 2012:80) The high scores of the quality of public administrative procedures and public service delivery

demonstrate a correlation between the respect of basic human rights and the progress of GRD in

Thái Bình’s rural areas. Though much is needed to be done to enable the peasants to fully enjoy

these basic human rights, this shows an improvement compared with 1997.

Thái Bình

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Rule of Law

Sanctions for misconduct by government officials

In the aftermath of the 1997 protests, more than 500 officials were punished, including the

dismissal of Thái Bình party-secretary who was member of the CPV Central Committee. This

demonstrated the CPV’s earnestness in restoring the peasants’ trust and stamping out the ‘rampant

abuse of power that afflicts much of the countryside’ (UBKT-TB 1999:2-3, Marshall 1997). More

than a dozen of these officials were prosecuted. However, it should be noted that this was fewer

than the number of peasants arrested and prosecuted for what they were charged as ‘causing public

disorder, countering against public duty-enforcers, and illegally containing other people’ (Abuza

2001a:84, Ân and Thanh 2010:1082-1085).

Over the years, Thái Bình has also placed importance on the supervision and disciplining of

party cells and party members for their wrongdoings. Table 16 below shows different types of

penalty applied to party cells and party members since 1997 till 2013.

Table 16: Penalty application to party members and government officials

Year Reprimand Warning Dismissal Party Expel 1997-1999 577 501 145 221 2000-2005 773 709 109 386 2013 131 35 10 19

(Source: Thái Bình Provincial Party Commission of Inspection) (TUTB 2005c:6, UBKT-TB 1999:2, 2013:3)

Significantly for the purposes of this thesis, the reasons why these party members were punished

include violation of the principle of democratic centralism, lack of responsibility, intentional

infringement that causes serious consequences, violation of life-style principles for party members,

and corruption (TUTB 2005c:6, UBKT-TB 1999:2, 2013:3). Although the number of party

members and government officials subjected to one or another type of penalty was high, there were

surprisingly only five corruption cases, involving eight government officials, prosecuted in 2013

(BNC-TUTB 2013). When An Tiêm villagers were asked about the punishing of local corrupt

officials, they were very disappointed by the results of anti-corruption efforts. The villagers said

that no severe penalty was imposed on corrupt officials, and in most cases it was just ‘dealt

internally’ (xử lý nội bộ), implying that the punishment was unfair (Interview III and IV, Appendix

1). Though only a few corruption cases were tried, it was sufficient to reduce the peasants’

dissatisfaction. Furthermore, to some extent, local cadres now understand that they are not immune

from punishment for their wrong-doings and abuse of power for personal gain as they were in 1997

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Effective control of crime, life safety and security

Thái Bình has experienced a positive level of safety in their daily life since 2000. The aggregate

score for ‘Law and Order’ of Thái Bình, which is based on three indicators: (i) level of safety in

locality, (ii) change in safety over time, and (iii) victims of theft, robbery, break-ins and physical

violence, had a slight increase as shown in PAPI 2011 and 2012. In 2011, for example, the score

was 1.55, a bit lower than the national mean level 1.60 (PAPI 2011:83). However, while the

national mean level remains the same in 2012, Thái Bình’s score increased to nearly 1.70 points

(PAPI 2012:80). Though theft, robbery and particularly break-ins were a big concern in Thái Bình,

there was no physical violence in both 2011 and 2012.

In the first six months of 2013: 809 cases were newly initiated in the courts, involving 1,400

defendants, a decrease of 6.36 percent in comparison with 2012; 766 of these were criminal cases,

involving 1,325 accused persons, and 746 cases with 1,296 defendants have been brought before

courts for trial (BNC-TUTB 2013:5).

Regarding the enforcement of civil penalties, Thái Bình did better in comparison with the

national standards. In 2009, for example, there was a national backlog of 270,925 civil cases in

which more than eighteen trillion VND in penalties were imposed. Whereas, in the 2009-2010

period, Thái Bình had 3,040 (or 90 percent) out of 3,320 civil cases enforced, resulting in a

collection of more than twelve billion VND, which was eighty percent of the target, for the

provincial budget (CTHADS-TB 2009:3-4, 2010:5).

As far as crimes and civic conflicts in Thụy Dân were concerned, Mr B (Interview II, Appendix

1) said that theft and other offences were quite rare, but sometime there were minor disputes

between households or members within a family. He said that quite often mass organizations,

village and commune leaders became conciliators in these disputes to maintain ‘neighbourhood and

kinship’ (Interview II, Appendix 1).

Effective community-based dispute resolution system

The community-based dispute resolution system in Thái Bình is rather diverse. Hương Ước (as

discussed in Chapter Two) has been used as a supplementary to GRD to regain stability in Thái

Bình after 1997 (Thoạn 2004:37).

Mr. A (Interview I, Appendix 1) described the role of Hương Ước in maintaining the concept of

‘neighbourhood’ as follows:

Hương Ước is very important in rural areas. Everything is laid out in Hương Ước, ranging from rituals to family events, for example, funerals or weddings. Party members have to run after many rules: law, party rules and Hương Ước. Even he is a minister or chairman, he must follow Hương Ước (lệ làng) when returning to the village.

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In the event of disputes between family members or among families, often related to inheritance or land encroachment, first of all, they resolve the problems on their own, and if fail, village and commune leaders will reconcile. Court procedures are just the last resort.

Mr B (Interview II, Appendix 1) also stressed the importance of Hương Ước:

When reconciliation fails, the dispute has to be settled by court, neighborhood would then be jeopardized. Hương Ước is meant for the interlacement of kinship relationships. Court settlement only involves high-profile economic or criminal cases.

In 1997, at the height of unrest, ‘village rules’ overrode the law. One reason that villagers rallied to

the protests against corruption was the threat of ostracism. An explicit warning from the protesting

group was given anyone could join the demonstration or complain as they chose , however, those

who chose not to should not in the future ask neighbors for help when their family member died, or

when their house was on fire (Lai 1997a:5). Ancient ‘village democracy’ proved its importance in

the village life, but clearly could also be abused for negative purposes. However, in rural villages

where local cadres abused power and had rendered the state law toothless, it is understandable that

the villagers reverted to their community rules, rather than the state law.

Thái Bình’s provincial government has promulgated two normative documents prescribing the

formulation of Hương Ước (for village in rural areas) and Quy Ước (for residential group in urban

areas)(UBND-TB 2002, Decision No.65-QĐ/TB), and the enhancement of reconciliation in the

province (UBND-TB 2011, Directive No.19/CT-UBND). In 2003, the province had only

approximately 300 Hương Ước and Quy Ước for 3,000 villages and residential groups – that was

ten percent. By 2008, however, 1,668 out of 2,036 villages and residential groups (equivalent to

eighty-two percent) had Hương Ước and Quy Ước; 268 out of 285 communes (equivalent to 94

percent), wards and towns established a steering committee for the development and

implementation of Hương Ước and Quy Ước; more than seventy percent of communes, wards and

towns completed the formulation of Hương Ước and Quy Ước, typical among these included Vũ

Thư, Kiến Xương, Thái Thuỵ districts and Thái Bình city (Hùng 2008a).

In Thái Bình, some community-based institutions involved in dispute resolution include self-

management teams (in both rural and urban areas), grassroots reconciliation teams, and mass

organizations. In the last ten years, self-organized security groups (tổ an ninh tự quản) cooperated

with more than 2,058 reconciliation teams engaging 12,549 members to conduct conciliation

successfully for over 27,000 (equivalent to eighty-eight percent) disputes and conflicts in the

community, contributing to the prevention and constraint of crimes and social evils (Tuyền 2013,

TUTB 2012:5).

In 1997, lawlessness was a driving force of unrest. Political stability in Thái Bình’s rural villages

in the last fifteen years can be partly attributed to the respect of rule of law. Positive results of the

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implementation of three dimension of rule of law as discussed above verify the mutually

reinforcing mechanism between GRD and rule of law.

Social Capital

Civic engagement

Thái Bình scored 6.10 point on PAPI ranking scale, being the second best performer in terms of

public participation at the local level in 2012. Compared with 2011, the province showed a

substantial improvement, an increase of 14.74 percent. Table 17 below shows 2011-2012

comparative results of participation at local level in Thái Bình with four major indicators.

In PAPI 2012 report, Thái Bình topped the score in terms of civic knowledge (1.44) compared

with other provinces. In particular, the proportion of people that knew the phrase ‘people know,

people discuss, people do, and people supervise and monitor’ – a concise expression of GRD – was

also the highest in Thái Bình, or 98.35 percent, while the national highest proportion was 70.72

percent (PAPI 2012:38).

Table 17: 2011-2012 Comparative Results of Participation at Local Level in Thái Bình

Indicators National Mean National PAPI

2012 (95% CI) Provincial Scores

2011 2012 Low High 2011 2012 Civil knowledge 1.11 1.06 1.03 1.09 1.15 1.44 Opportunities for participation 1.88 1.82 1.79 1.85 1.88 1.91 Quality of elections 1.45 1.47 1.44 1.49 1.50 1.65 Voluntary contributions 0.85 0.81 0.79 0.84 0.83 1.10

(Source: PAPI 2011 and 2012)(PAPI 2011:30-39, 2012:34-41) In a field interview, a key co-author of PAPI reports, said:

For the peasants, they do not understand what GRD is. However when being asked, if they knew the motto 'people know, people discuss, people do and people supervise and monitor’ they would definitely answer ‘Yes’ (Interview IV, Appendix 4).

When An Tiêm villagers were asked if they had ever heard of GRD, more than two-third (seventy

percent) answered ‘No’29, yet had heard of the motto many times on public speakers and meetings.

It seems that elections are the most useful way for villagers to gradually gain confidence that

they can replace leaders who fail to meet their expectations. Peasants were relatively engaged in

voting. For example, the turnout of voters in the election of the people's councils at all levels

between 2004 and 2009 in Thái Bình was 98.6 percent (Hoàng 2012a). That ratio was 98.51 percent 29 In a workshop launching PAPI report 2012, Đinh Xuân Thảo, Director of the Institute of Legislative Studies, said that “in many places, the people are not aware of the Ordinance on Grassroots Democracy”. Thảo was quoted in Châu, Hải. 2013. "Nhiều nơi dân không biết Pháp lệnh dân chủ cơ sở" (In many places, the people are not aware of the Ordinance on Grassroots Democracy). Infornet, http://infonet.vn/Thoi-su/Nhieu-noi-dan-khong-biet-Phap-lenh-dan-chu-co-so/92882.info [accessed on 3 July 2013]

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in the general elections for the National Assembly and people's councils at all levels for the 2011-

2016 tenure, with Thái Thụy district where this researcher conducted interviews having the turnout

of 97.49 percent, ranking third in ascending order among eight districts and cities of the province

(UBBC-TB 2011:2-3). An Tiêm villagers told me that they participated in the last elections.

However, they lamented that ‘whoever was elected, he or she had been pre-selected. Though, it is

our right to vote in the elections’ (Interviews XVII and XVIII, Appendix 1).

There are social programmes and campaigns through which citizens can engage in the

community life. Some of these include, for instance: ‘People unite to build a cultural life in the

community’ (Toàn dân đoàn kết xây dựng đời sống văn hóa ở khu dân cư), ‘An advanced

community’ (Khu dân cư tiên tiến), ‘A cultural community’ (Khu dân cư văn hóa), ‘A cultural

family’ (Gia đình văn hóa). These campaigns though emphasize traditional cultural values; they

draw commitment and engagement of citizens in the public life.

Civic organizations

When asked about the role of mass organizations in engaging citizens and in the decision-making,

most An Tiêm villagers said that ‘nothing changes’. The Fatherland Front (VFF) and its member

organizations such as the Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU), Vietnam Farmers’ Union (VFU),

Vietnam Veterans’ Association (VVA), and Hochiminh Communist Youth Union (HCMYU) in

Thái Bình still serve as the CPV’s tools of communication and dissemination of the party-state’s

policies.

In separate field interviews with leaders of these organizations in An Tiêm, they reported that

their organizations played a more active role in overseeing and monitoring public works,

consultation and nomination of candidates in elections at the community level as compared to the

years before 1997-1998, although their tasks were not always easy and supported by local

authorities (Interviews III, VI, VII, and VIII, Appendix 1). Other civic organizations like the

Elderly, and the Study Promotion, were also active in making the voice of their members heard.

The most active civic organizations are People's Inspection Boards (PIBs) and Community

Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs) with members largely elected by the villagers. In Thái

Bình, PIBs have been established in all communes, wards and towns (Hoàng 2012a). Comparing

with other provinces, Thái Bình has the most informed population of both the existence of PIBs

(74.18 percent) as well as CISBs (43.9 percent) (PAPI 2012:56). The data suggests the activism of

these organizations. The more active these organizations are, the more accountable local

governments in Thái Bình will be. Thái Bình’s accountability score was 6.96, standing among the

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top five provinces that saw civic organizations actively holding local authorities accountable (PAPI

2012:51). Thái Bình’s VFF chairman acknowledging the role of these civic organizations in:

Promoting GRD; contributing to the prevention of agencies from infringing law; and reducing corruption and poor performance of local leaders (Hoàng 2012a).

However, he recognised the limits of these organizations, and declined to give opinions on the case

of Quỳnh Lâm Commune’s VFF chairman (Quỳnh Phụ District), who was subject to discipline,

ironically because “he detected many wrong-doings and corrupt acts of the commune leaders” (Tự

2012). This suggests that civic organizations’ active engagement in local governance is not always

welcome.

Trust

Distrust and skepticism gave rise to high tension in state-peasantry relations and cadre-peasant

relations in Thái Bình in 1997 when local cadres could not explain why they had become incredibly

rich so quickly and had a sumptuous life (Lai 1997a). When the tension was intolerable, it ended up

in violent disturbances. After fifteen years, the conversations between this researcher and An Tiêm

villagers embodies a paradox. On the one hand, the villagers are not quite trustful of the quality of

government activities, the quality of democracy, and express dissatisfaction of inequality. Though,

on the other hand, they are still confident in the CPV’s rule and the socialist regime. In an informal

talk on the last day of the first field trip in An Tiêm, an elderly person with a good reputation, who

is also the leader of a mass organization in the village, stated:

Not all local cadres are the same. Some are good and some bad. Some are corrupt, others not. Nevertheless, our regime is good. You are young men, should work and help each other to accomplish your jobs well and to make this regime better (Interview III, Appendix 1).

The elderly man’s statement indicated that the trust in the regime remains high. This is an example

of ‘trust capital’ (Hải 2013f). Indeed, the CPV earned trust of the peasants through two national

liberation wars and economic progress owing to Đổi Mới, enabling the party-state to reinforce its

legitimacy and keep grip on power for decades (Vasavakul 1995). How could peasants have

contributed in cash and in kind to building public facilities without trust? How has Thái Bình

enjoyed polititcal stability without trust? Recalling the root causes of unrest in 1997 (in which

distrust was an attribute to it (Lai 1997a:14), and based on Thái Bình’s progress in the last fifteeen

years; trust is the key to successfully implementing GRD and regaining political and social

stability. Thái Bình’s governance reforms, though still limited and in some instances cosmetic, and

the positive change in local cadres’ behaviour, attitudes – the most two common measures of trust

used by social scientists (Glaeser et al. 2000, Capra, Lanier, and Meer 2008) – and their response to

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the peasants’ request have rejuvenated trust in the state-party, enabling the CPV to keep its grip on

power thus far.

Conclusion

This chapter set out three questions to investigate the implementation of GRD, its impact on the

local party-state apparatus, cadre-peasant relations, and local governance reform, and ultimately on

the CPV’s legitimacy and governability in Thái Bình in the last fifteen years. Using Chapter Four’s

analytic framework, it shows that the answers are positive when independent variables are generally

improved and positively correlated with GRD as shown in the table below.

Positive Correlation Low Inequality Low Corruption Good Governance High adherence to Human Rights High adherence to the Rule of Law High Social Capital

The positive change in independent variables based on both quantitative and qualitative data

analysis reinforces the fact that Thái Bình has enjoyed political stability in the last fifteen years.

However, in-depth interviews found that villagers temporarily accept the current state of life, but

still express dis-satisfaction and scepticism of the CPV’s sincerity in reforms. This means Thái

Bình’s political stability remains fragile, and the CPV’s legitimacy can be put into jeopardy if the

peasants’ trust is not further improved by more substantive local governance reforms and more

effective mass organizations to protect the peasants’ rights and interests.

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6

Hưng Yên

Administrative Map of H ưng Yên Hưng Yên within Vietnam

Introduction

In late April 2012 and during the ensuing months, Hưng Yên province drew massive attention from

foreign media (RFA 2013, Bangkok-Post 2012, BBC 2012a, AP 2012a, AFP 2012) following a

violent protest involving hundreds of peasants opposing land eviction for a housing project known

as Ecopark in three communes of Văn Giang district, namely: Xuân Quan, Cửu Cao and Phụng

Công. The eviction was described by Vietnamese bloggers as the largest in history (Thụy 2013,

Đức 2012b). Thousands of riot police were mobilized and clashed with the peasants. Dozens were

arrested and beaten by the police in custody (BBC 2012a) and a year later, the land eviction dispute

had not been resolved (RFA 2013). When the Hưng Yên government declared the eviction

complete (Ngân 2012a), peasants in Văn Giang, responded with a statement saying that they were

willing to commit ‘suicide’ to keep their land (Minh 2013a).

The case of Văn Giang echoes the decay of the party-state apparatus and the confrontation

resulting from a breakdown in state-peasant relations and cadre-peasant relations in Thái Bình

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fifteen years ago. In Văn Giang district the peasants’ life is poor, and human rights are not

protected, despite Hưng Yên government stating that the implementation of GRD, the socio-

economic situation, and people’s living conditions have been continuously improved; political

stability, public order and security have been maintained and people’s democratic rights are fully

respected (TUHY 2011b, HĐND-VG 2012, 2011, HĐND-HY 2012). However, data from recent

PCI and PAPI reports suggests satisfactory implementation of GRD in Hưng Yên province. The

contradiction between reality in Văn Giang district and Hưng Yên province government’s rhetoric

make Hưng Yên a suitable case for investigating the implementation of GRD in that province.

Focusing on Văn Giang, this chapter seeks to answer three questions:


• How has the implementation of GRD impacted on state-peasant relations, cadre-peasant

relations, and local governance reform?

• How has the implementation of GRD affected the CPV’s legitimacy in Hưng Yên?

In this chapter it will be argued that Hưng Yên appears to have failed to achieve GRD goals in Văn

Giang for four reasons. Firstly, because the independent variables were negatively correlated with

the quality of GRD, it therefore increased tension in state-peasant relations, local cadre-peasant

relations, and ultimately put the CPV’s legitimacy into jeopardy. Secondly, the provincial index

might not necessarily reflect the actual progress of GRD at the grassroots, where its impacts are

measured by the peasants’ satisfaction with local cadres’ performance. Thirdly, the implementation

of GRD is potentially in conflict with other interests of the state-party and the interest groups that

have close links with the elites, and hence implementation relies on the will and competence of

local leaders. Finally, GRD is highly contextual, being effective in one but not in another

commune, even within a province. This suggests that success is not necessarily attributable to

geographic factors, but depends on the leadership and institutions that create a positive environment

for implementation of GRD.

It should be noted that despite its failure on many measures, GRD is still a mechanism

empowering the peasants in Văn Giang to press the local authorities and cadres for responses to

their concerns, (and indeed for local governance reforms if Hưng Yên government seeks stability

mechanisms).

Background

Hưng Yên was established as a province of the Nguyễn dynasty in 1831. In 1968, it was merged

with another province, Hải Dương, into a new province named Hải Hưng. In 1997, it was separated

from Hải Hưng and re-established as it is now. The province has ten districts and cities; 145

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communes and 768 villages (GSO 2012:175, 2010c:426). In this section, this researcher provides

an overview of Hưng Yên development and the Ecopark-Văn Giang project. This lays the ground

for analysis of the implementation of GRD in the next section.

Overview of Hưng Yên

Hưng Yên is located in Vietnam’s northern key economic zone, bordering with Thái Bình, Hải

Dương, Hà Nam, Bắc Ninh and Hà Nội. It has a natural area of 932 square kilometres with the

population of approximately 1.2 million, of which over ten percent live in urban areas and nearly

ninety percent in rural areas (GSO 2010a:4). This is twenty percent higher than the national rate

of 69.5 percent of the population living in rural areas (An 2012b:7). Hưng Yên employs 10.7

percent of its labour force in industry and construction, 78.9 percent in agriculture, forestry and

fisheries as compared with 55.7 percent at national level (Chung 2010:10); the service sectors

account for 10.4 percent. This data shows that Hưng Yên remains an agricultural province.

After ten years of Đổi Mới, Hưng Yên remains one of the poorest provinces in the Red River

delta. In the period 1996-1999, income per capita of Hưng Yên was the lowest in the region in

comparison with neighbouring provinces like Thái Bình, Hải Dương, Bắc Ninh and Hà Nam as

shown in Table 18 below.

Table 18: Average monthly income per capital in 1996-1999 by province (Hưng Yên)

Average monthly income per capital in 1996 and 1999 by province

Unit: Thousand đồng (VND)

1996 1999 1996-1999 (%) Total 226.70 295.00 130.13 Red River Delta 223.30 280.30 125.53 Hà Nội 379.30 454.00 119.69 Hải Phòng 262.81 350.00 133.18 Vĩnh Phúc 180.88 215.70 119.25 Hà Tây 208.66 240.00 115.02 Bắc Ninh 215.05 260.50 121.13 Hải Dương 176.36 225.00 127.58 Hưng Yên 176.36 210.00 119.07 Hà Nam 176.60 212.00 120.05 Nam Định 176.60 221.60 125.48 Thái Bình 215.21 272.00 126.39 Ninh Bình 178.39 229.10 128.43 (Source: General Statistics Office’s Living Standards Surveys 1999)(GSO 1999)

However, it should be noted that the social stratification, which shows the gap between urban and

rural areas, the difference between the highest income group and the lowest income group in Hưng

Yên, is the smallest compared with other provinces. Table 19 below shows the difference in

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average income levels between the forty percent poorest and the twenty percent richest in Hưng

Yên.30

Table 19: Average monthly income of the poorest and the richest in Hưng Yên in 1994

Province The 40% with the

lowest income The 20% with the

highest income Average

Unit: Dong (VND) Hà Nội city 89,000 601,750 224,520 Ho Chí Minh City 234,000 1,053,690 491,390 Cần Thơ City 130,000 527,520 265,580 Đà Nẵng City 88,000 288,410 148,300 Hải Dương Town 111,000 313,190 181,900 Rural areas in Cần Thơ province 86,000 439,840 188,430 Rural areas in Quảng Nam Đà Nẵng 64,000 305,810 135,370 Rural areas in Hải Hưng province 63,000 189,850 100,590

(Source: The sociological survey about social stratification 2004)(IS 1995, cited in Lai 1997b)

Results of the survey suggest that egalitarianism was a precondition for social stability in Hưng Yên

during this period as the income gap between the rich and the poor was not critical, while other

provinces adjacent to Hưng Yên like Thái Bình saw unrest due to inequality. This suggestion is

further supported by a slight variation in the Gini coefficients between rural and urban areas in

Hưng Yên which indicates that inequality was not a big problem in this period, as shown in Table

20 below.

Table 20: Gini coefficients between rural and urban areas in Hưng Yên in 1994

Province Urban Gini coefficient Rural Gini coefficient Hải Hưng 0.249 0.266 Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng 0.291 0.372 Cần Thơ 0.321 0.368


Since its re-establishment in 1997, Hưng Yên government has focussed on industrial development

and is determined to become an industrial province by 2020. The success of this pro-industrial

development policy, is evident in the period from 2002 to 2010, when the monthly income per

capita of Hưng Yên income groups steadily increased as shown in Table 21 below.

30 It should be noted that Hưng Yên at this time was still part of Hải Hưng province. Therefore, the provincial data above should count for Hưng Yên too.

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Table 21: Monthly income per capita by sources of Hưng Yên between 2002 and 2010

Monthly income per capita by sources of income quintile and province/city

At current prices Unit: 1000 VNĐ

Total Q1* Q2 Q3* * Q4 Q5* ** Q5-Q1 comparison

Hưng Yên 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

269.7 121.4 179.9 231.0 312.1 639.8 5.3 429.7 165.3 263.6 355.0 481.0 883.2 5.3 556.0 210.1 325.0 441.5 607.7 1,195.6 5.7 828.3 313.0 510.1 629.1 872.7 1,813.3 5.8

1,199.1 420.2 739.9 1,006.2 1,328.4 2,490.0 5.9

(Source: Results of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2010)(GSO 2010b:263)

The increased income is related to structural changes in the sources of revenue. Table 22 below

shows this.

Table 22: Proportion of monthly income per capita by sources

Proportion of monthly income per capita by sources of income At current prices/ Unit:%

Hưng Yên Total Salary

/wage Agriculture, Forestry

and Fishery Non-Agriculture,

Forestry and Fishery Others

2002 100,0 21,1 36,3 25,9 16,7 2004 100,0 22,6 35,8 22,4 19,3 2006 100,0 28,6 32,0 21,7 17,8 2008 100,0 30,6 28,7 25,9 14,8 2010 100,0 43,5 21,7 23,0 11,8


Change in the proportion of monthly income per capita by source of income recognizes the

transition from agricultural to non-agricultural economic activities. This also reflects Hưng Yên’s

policy toward enhancing industrial revenues in the provincial economic structure. The proportion of

three sectors: agriculture, industry and services saw structural changes as shown in Figure 20

below.

* Quintile 1: the poorest group ** Quintile 3: the moderate group *** Quintile 5: the richest group

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Figure 20: Hưng Yên Economic Structure Transformation

(Source: Hưng Yên Provincial People’s Committee)(UBND-HY 2005a, 1997, TUHY 2011a)

The data suggests that while fifteen years post re-establishment, Hưng Yên province had seen a

decline of more than fifty percent (from sixty percent in 1997 down to twenty-five percent in 2012)

of employment in agricultural production, yet a corresponding and remarkable increase of more

than fifty percent (from fifteen percent in 1997 up to forty-four percent in 2012) in industry and

construction. Hưng Yên government has boasted that out of fourteen planned land plots for

industrial development, five zones are already in operation, including Phố Nối A Industrial Zone

which is regarded as one of the most successful industrial zones in the country (UBND-HY 2012b).

Of the 813 investment projects in the province, there are 633 domestic businesses and 180 overseas

businesses, and it has attracted a total registered capital of 3,590 million USD (TUHY 2011a).

However, this development of Hưng Yên has also seen an increase in social inequalities,

especially between rural and urban areas. Statistics in Table 22 above show that the poorest-to-

richest gap has steadily widened, from 5.3 percent in 2002 to 5.9 percent in 2010. To promote

industrialization and modernization, Hưng Yên government had withdrawn arable land from

peasants for industrial projects and urbanization. As of 2009, the total area of arable land of Hưng

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Yên was 60,101.4 hectares, of which the area of acquired land was 16,434.34 hectares, equivalent

to 27.34 percent, becoming one of the provinces that resumed the largest amount of arable land for

non-agricultural purposes in the country (An 2012b:5). During this process, not all projects were

developed with popular endorsement. The peasant protests against the Ecopark project in Văn

Giang are an example. They not only reflected the tension in state-peasant relations and local cadre-

peasant relations, but also a prototypical example of the failure of GRD.

Văn Giang-Ecopark

Văn Giang is a district located in the northern part of Hưng Yên, ten km from the centre of Hà Nội.

The district has one town and ten communes. In 2004, the income per capita was 5.2 million VND

per year, which came mainly from the agriculture that accounted for almost fifty percent of

economic activities in the district. In 2012, the income per capita had increased to 26.5 million

VND per year, five times of that in 2004, while the proportion of agriculture fell to twenty-six

percent in the economic structure. Figure 21 below shows the economic structure transformation in

Văn Giang between 2004 and 2012.

Figure 21: Văn Giang Economic Structure in 2004 and 2012

(Source: Văn Giang District People’s Council)(HĐND-VG 2004:1, 2012:1)

Commercial activities and services, as is shown in Figure 21, have become the predominant

economic activities in the district and Văn Giang is rated as one of the most attractive locations

attractions for domestic and foreign investors (FEI 2005:127). To attract such investment into the

district, the Văn Giang Urban Commerce and Tourism Project, known as Ecopark Project, was

launched. The project had been endorsed by the Central government, but provoked protests of the

local communities.

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Ecopark Project

In June 2004, Deputy Prime Minister, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, who is now the incumbent Prime

Minister, signed a decision allowing Hưng Yên government to acquire land for Ecopark project

(PM 2004, No.742/QĐ-TTg). The project has different components on a total area of 5,540,712

square metres (approximately 555 hectares), spreading over three districts and twelve communes

and towns, of which in Văn Giang district are six communes including; Xuân Quan, Phụng Công,

Cửu Cao, Long Hưng, Tân Tiến as well as Văn Giang town. As specified in the above-mentioned

decision, 550,006 square metres (approximately fifty-five hectares) would be acquired for road

construction, from Thanh Trì Bridge to Hưng Yên town with a section from Văn Giang to Dân Tiến

commune, Khoái Châu district. The acquired land was mainly used for arable purposes. Ecopark

was and is regarded as an opportunity to contribute to the urbanization strategy of Hưng Yên

province and the entire east area of Hà Nội (Minh 2013b). In the ten years since it was approved,

the first phase of the project has been developed on an area of fifty-four hectares, including sections

of detached villas and semi-detached villas, medium and high standard apartment buildings and

high-rise condominiums, as well as a street of shop front houses. The project has received two

awards in 2012: "The best complex development project in Vietnam" under the grant of Asia–

Pacific Real Estate Awards system, and the Vietnam Green Architecture Award granted by the

Vietnamese Architects Association (Dương 2012). In an interview given to the researcher in

November 2013, a leader of a Hưng Yên’s Party Committee compared the grand luxury and beauty

of the facilities on these fifty-four hectares to Singapore or other cities in the West.

An Image of Ecopark Complex Project

With the road construction component, the investor has completed 12.5 kilometers from Văn Giang

to Dân Tiến commune of Khoái Châu district, and put it into use. Nevertheless, there remain two

kilometers uncompleted due to land disputes. Under the original plan, the disputed land was to be

acquired and handed-over to investors on 30 June 2012. However, of six communes in Văn Giang

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district, peasants in three communes: Xuân Quan, Phụng Công and Cửu Cao did not surrender their

land, arguing that the project was not approved by an authorised institution (BBC 2012c, A 2012,

Hải 2012), and that there was a lack of transparency in the implementation of the project and the

land acquisition process. The inference is collusion between local authorities and interest groups:

together they keep the peasants in the dark about planning and the purpose of the project, so

enabling them to apply unsatisfactory compensation rates. Văn Giang peasants continued to petition

at all levels, from district to provincial and national level and the most pressing issue is

compensation prices (Ngân 2012b, Đức 2012b, Caunhattan 2012).

Unsatisfactory Compensation

Since 2004 - 2006, land compensation prices in Hưng Yên have been applied on the basis of land

classification regulations (UBND-HY 2005b, No.107/2005/QĐ-UBND). Land in Phụng Công,

Xuân Quan, and Cửu Cao were classified as Class 1, which enjoys the highest compensation rate.

However, the actual compensation price paid for the peasants in these communes was 10,000

VND/m2, lower than the regulated figure. Support measures for newly landless peasants were

reportedly provided by the investors, however these were modest. Households that had members

directly involved in farming, and that had over thirty percent of cultivated land acquired, would be

paid for a notional thirty kg of rice/month for three months (i.e. ninety kg/person) based on the

actual local rice prices. Households that had less than thirty percent of cultivated land acquired

would be paid an additional 1,000 VND/m2. The peasants did not accept these supplementary

offers, and the investors had to increase the compensation price.

In 2007, the investors offered an additional payment of 26,075VND/m2 and a bonus of 10,000

VND/m2 for responsive land handover (Ngân 2012b). Hưng Yên government also offered 4,000

VND/m2, which were extracted from the communal infrastructure construction budget, to support

the peasants. In 2008, the investors raised their offer, promising 35,000VND/m2 for households that

voluntarily ceded their land. Overall, by the end of 2008, the compensation price was 135,000

VND/m2 (Ngân 2012b). In 2011, households that agreed to concede their land to the investors were

paid an additional six million VND per sào (360m2). Furthermore, peasants were compensated with

an additional amount of one million VND per sao per year for five, seven, and ten years if they had

fifty percent, seventy percent or one hundred percent of arable land acquired respectively (Ngân

2012b). Meanwhile, land prices in the transaction market around the project area constantly

increased, and in some instances were ten times higher than the actual compensation rate. On the

other hand, the investors sold a flat in the condominium at the price of twenty million VND/m2, and

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forty million VND /m2 for a villa or semi-detached mansion. Vũ Quang Việt (2012) drew up a

comparison of the revenue of Ecopark project as shown in Tables 23 and 24 below.

Table 23: Facts of Ecopark Project

Total land area of the project (hectare) 555 Land area for road construction (hectare) 55 Length of road (kilometre) 14 Assumed housing area (hectare) 250 1 hectare (=m2) 10,000 1 USD (=VND) (at time this Table established) 20,000

Table 24: Revenue, Cost and Profit of Ecopark Project

Compensation

Cost Construction Cost

(250 hectares) Revenue Profit

Highest Compensation Rate (VND/m2)

135,000 6,000,000

Lowest Revenue Rate (VND/m2)

20,000,000

Total (billion VND 743 15,000 50,000 Total (million USD) 37 750 2,500 1,601

According to Việt (2012), the full compensation cost in USD at the highest price paid to the

peasants would theoretically be $106 million, meanwhile the profit of the project would be 1,610

million. However, Viet believes that the peasants actually received only half of the compensation,

and the investors’ actual profit from house sales was much higher. This shows an excessive

inequality, which was thought to be the root cause of peasant complaints and protests against this

project.

Violent Land Eviction

Protests by the peasants in Xuân Quan, Phụng Công and Cửu Cao slowed down the progress of the

project. On 24 April 2012, Hưng Yên government “enforced the land eviction" (Hưng 2012).

(Map shows the communes where the land siege occurred on 24 April 2012)

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Between 1,000 and 4,000 riot police and non-uniformed guards under the direct guidance of the

CPV chief of Hưng Yên and chairman of Hưng Yên People's Committee were mobilized to evict

2,000 peasants who were camped out on an area of seventy hectares to keep their land (Browne

2012, SGTT 2012, RFA 2012a). The peasants prepared rudimentary weapons to combat the public

security forces. Riot police were deployed to surround the area, blocking all entry roads to the

eviction site to prevent outsiders and journalists from entering and providing news coverage (Phi

2012a). At the break of dawn, the police, equipped with guns and shields, backed by bulldozers,

cranes and excavators, moved onto the land occupied by the villagers to pull down and clear the

tents, and forced the villagers from their land. The peasants, who resisted with hoes and shovels,

and threw bricks, stones and petrol bottles at the police. The police used tear gas grenades, pushing

and beating people with batons. The police and non-uniformed security forces even prevented many

peasants from retreating back to the village. Two reporters from the Radio Voice of Vietnam were

caught, beaten and detained by the police for a few hours (Boston 2012, Crispin 2012). Dozens of

peasants were arrested after the eviction (Browne 2012, RFA 2012a, 2012b, Observers 2012,

Reuters 2012).

Vietnamese netizens describe the eviction as a ‘stain in history’ [of the Vietnamese communist

state], a violation of human rights, treading upon the human dignity, despite occurring in a

supposed ‘socialist rule of law state of the people, by the people and for the people’ (Trung 2012b,

Đức 2012b, Trọng 2012, Thụy 2013). Meanwhile, Hưng Yên government explained that the

eviction had been performed on the basis of ‘full apprehension of the guidance from the

Government’ (UBND-HY 2012c). Vice-chairman of Hưng Yên People’s Committee, Nguyễn Khắc

Hào, said:

…When we have had a right plan, verified by its high economic and social benefits, in compliance with the law, it is not for the sake of some protesters that we fail the eviction (Hưng 2012).

To justify the use of force by public security forces, Hào said:

In the case of Văn Giang, there was a tight coupling between the opposing elements at home and abroad. The information was reported live on site, on line to spread propogation, slanders, staged and produced fake video clips to slander, defame the government (Hưng 2012).

Finally, he made an assessment:

We well performed the planned scenario to ensure safety, and no one had been wounded...The arrested people were those who had extremist and impulsive behaviours, combating against the officials in duty (Hưng 2012).

Hưng Yên government announced that the land eviction was successful, ‘supported by majority of

cadres, party members and people in Văn Giang district in general, and Xuân Quan commune in

particular’, and the investors received the land (Ngân 2012a, UBND-HY 2012c). However, in

response Văn Giang peasants expressed defiance and determination to protect their land by all

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means, including keeping dogs for security and self-defence, organizing protests and sending

complaints to central agencies (Quả 2014) and recently declared an inention to ‘self-sacrifice to

keep land’ (Minh 2013a, Điện 2013).

The land eviction in Văn Giang took place while Hưng Yên government was intensifying the

implementation of GRD in the 2011-2015 period (TUHY 2011c). Although Hưng Yên government

claimed to promote ‘the people’s right to be the master’ in the grassroots (Bền 2013), Văn Giang

emerged to be a typical case of the failure of GRD. The peasants’ democratic rights were ignored,

tension in state-peasant relations and local cadre-peasant relations increased because of corruption,

and rural areas were politically unstable. In the next section, using Chapter Four’s analytic

framework, this researcher examines how GRD had been implemented in Hưng Yên and Văn

Giang.


Inequality


In the case of Văn Giang, at the outset it is evident that the dispute was a confrontation between the

local party-state apparatus and poor peasants. A legal document circulated on the Internet shows

that the Ecopark project surprisingly was quickly approved. Within three days of June (28-30),

2004, the project with a total area of 550 hectares was endorsed by a decision of the Prime Minister.

In contrast, one commentator pointed out that it would take months for a citizen to get a certificate

of land use rights for the land where they are living (Trọng 2012). Moreover, from the beginning,

the peasants were not informed about the project, and they only got to know about the decision on

land acquisition after two years (Phi 2012b). In a field interview, Ms. R in Xuân Quan commune

indignantly said about this, and asked rhetorically:

Why did the three levels of governments in Hưng Yên sell our land in 2004, but the peasants were not totally informed? (Interview II, Appendix 3)

In fact, this violated Article 21 of the 1993 Land Law that was in effect at this time, which specified

that land being used by one can be transferred to another only after an acquisition decision has been

issued. The Government Inspectorate (GoIV) required the province:

To focus on raising awareness among the peasants in 3 communes of the project site about the investment policy in order to ensure harmonized benefits of the state, the people and the investor; to undertake necessary measures to meet the peasants’ legitimate demands; and to reach consensus with the peasants in the construction of Văn Giang Commercial – Tourism urban zone… (GoIV 2007).

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However, Hưng Yên government ignored the GoIV’s requirement and still conducted land

acquisition without the peasants’ consent.

The case of Văn Giang reflected power asymmetry in state-peasant relations in Vietnam’s one

party rule, in which local cadres abused power for their own benefits at the expense of the peasants.

Though they are two different cases, Văn Giang is comparable to Thái Bình in nature fifteen years

ago when local cadres ignored the law, disrespected the peasants’ concerns, and violated the

peasants’ democratic rights.

GRD theoretically empowers the peasants in electing the village leader, but the people’s

committee in Văn Giang completely controlled this practice. Ms. R in Xuân Quan said that the

village leaders in her commune were appointed by the people’s committee, not elected by the

villagers (Interview II, Appendix 3). She used the example of herself, saying that even though she

was nominated as the village leader and member of the commune women's union leadership, the

people’s committee did not accept her, simply because she refused to hand over the land to the

project. She concluded:

In our commune, one must sell his or her land to be elected the village leader. The party decides everything (Interview II, Appendix 3).

The ‘super-fast’ approval of the Ecopark project shows that political inequality in Hưng Yên and

Văn Giang was consolidated by the ‘intangible’ support of central government agencies and interest

groups. This is a noticeable new phenomenon in Vietnamese politics: the coupling of effort

between politicians and entrepreneurs at the expense of poor peasants (Lang 2012, Đức 2013b).

Furthermore, political inequality has been deepened when the peasants’ democratic right to elect

and to stand for election of the village leader is rejected even though it is prescribed in GRD, as in

the case of Ms. R provided above.

Economic Inequality

The role of the investor in the Ecopark project is significant. The key investor in the project is Việt

Hưng Joint Stock Urban Development Company (known as Vihajico). Vietnamese netizens spread

rumours that Vihajico’s investment capital was provided by Bản Việt Bank (known as VietCapital

Bank), and the chairperson of the bank’s management board was the daughter of the incumbent

Prime Minister (Quả 2014). The rumours induced her to speak out in a press interview to defend

herself, and she called the bloggers as "reactionaries" (BBC 2012b, Phượng 2012). A senior official

of Hưng Yên provincial party committee said that “there are such rumours, but no evidence”

(Interview VII, Appendix 3). Of course, it is always challenging to obtain facts related to cases like

this in Vietnam’s one-party state, which is ranked by Freedom House and Reporters Without

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Borders in the list of countries without freedom of the press and at the bottom of the list (FH

2012:36, 369, RWB 2013:24). Nevertheless, the ‘super-fast’ approval (within three days) of

Ecopark project located in what is called the ‘golden land’ raised doubts that Vihajico alone could

not do it and behind it there had to be the support of a certain ‘very strong power’.

In September 2012, Phụng Công commune was typical of the rural conditions that prevailed in

Vietnam at that time. It comprised paddy field and houses topped with old tile roofing hidden

behind bamboo bushes (Field observations, 29 September 2012, Appendix 3). In the paddy fields,

the rice acreage had been given over to fruit trees and other cash crops, in order to increase the

peasants’ income. Nonetheless, life remains tough there. According to the Results of the Vietnam

Living Standard Survey 2010, Hưng Yên was one of the three provinces registering the highest rate

of household poverty in the Red River delta region as shown in Table 25 below.

Table 25: Poverty rate by region and province/city (Hưng Yên)

Poverty rate by region and province/city

Unit: %

2004 2006 2008 2010 2010* Whole country 18.1 15.5 13.4 10.7 14.2 Red River Delta region Hà Nội … … 6.6 … 5.3 Vĩnh Phúc … 12.6 11.3 … 10.4 Bắc Ninh … 8.6 7.5 … 7.0 Quảng Ninh … 7.9 6.4 … 8.0 Hải Dương … 12.7 10.1 … 10.8 Hải Phòng … 7.8 6.3 … 6.5 Hưng Yên … 11.5 10.3 … 11.1 Thái Bình … 11.0 9.8 … 10.7 Hà Nam … 12.8 11.6 … 12.0 Nam Định … 12.0 10.6 … 10.0 Ninh Bình … 14.3 13.0 … 12.2

(Source: General Statistics Office’s Results of the Vietnam Living Standard Survey 2010)(GSO 2010b:432)

Though Hưng Yên saw an increase of industry share in the economic structure, its peasants

remained the poorest, and nearly ninety percent of its population lived in rural areas and 78.9

percent of the rural labor force engaged in agriculture. The peasants’ poverty can be attributed to

the lack of arable land, which has been transformed to industrial zones, while they are not

sufficiently provided with skill training to get a job in non-agricultural environments.

The peasants in the conversation with this researcher said that they were and are getting poorer.

They put it like this:

The authorities took away our means of production. Farming is the only livelihood that we live on. They deprive land from us, how can we survive? (Interviews II-VI, Appendix 3)

Economic inequality may not be necessarily influenced by political inequality, though in the case of

Văn Giang the connection seems to be true. Local cadres acting in the name of state power have

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wealth, whereas the voiceless peasants are getting poorer. In Văn Giang, the combination of

economic inequality and political inequality created acute social discontent, increased tension in

local cadre-peasant relations. Without land for farming, Văn Giang peasants cannot enjoy the

‘freedom from want’, which is the human right to have adequate food (Kent 2005), and ‘freedom

from poverty’, which is the human right to have a decent life (Benedek 2012:95-118).


In 2009, Bến Cát district authorities in Bình Dương province, southeast of Vietnam, revoked 642

hectares of rubber tree land of forty households in An Tây Commune for a company to build an

industrial zone. An article by Huy Đức in the Sài Gòn Tiếp thị (SGTT), a liberal-oriented

newspaper, revealed that among these, the elder sister of the incumbent Prime Minister owned 185

hectares and was paid 185 billion VND (or ten million USD at the time) in compensation (Đức

2009, 2012b, Hoàng 2012b). After the article, the editor-in-chief of SGTT was sacked, and Huy

Đức’s contract with the newspaper was not renewed. Apart from the Prime Minister’s elder sister,

forty other landowners in this case are kin to of local cadres (Đức 2009, 2012b, Hoàng 2012b).

The difference between how the acquired land compensation was done in Bến Cát compared to

Văn Giang demonstrates the correlation between opportunity inequality and political inequality.

Relatives of both central and local senior officials in An Tây commune enjoyed an inordinatly high

land compensation price, while Văn Giang peasants’ concerns were ignored. Mrs. D of Phụng Công

commune said:

Our peasants are forced to fight against the land eviction, because we cry for many times, we appealed to the competent authorities and that no one listened. The local government here only protects the interests of investors (Interview V, Appendix 3).

One might ponder what would have happened to the Ecopark Project and Văn Giang peasants if

relatives of the central and local authorities had some hectares of land in the project site?

The case of Văn Giang shows that inequality of all types is serious. Clearly, it is a structural,

rather than a social problem, created by the power asymmetry embedded in the one-party rule. It

also reflects a new phenomenon in Vietnamese politics, ‘rent-seeking’, in the Đổi Mới era, which is

the influence of interest groups on the decision-making, and the coupling of interest between

politicians and capitalists for individual benefits (Appold and Phong 2001, Fforde 2002, Chen

2008, Jandl 2011, Vuving 2013). The suppression of effective GRD in this context is beyond

serious doubt.

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Corruption

Referring to Ecopark project, Vũ Quang Việt (2012) raised a question: ‘Why did both the

government and police mortgage their reputation to secure a minority of capitalists enjoying such a

huge profit from a fourteen-kilometer road construction?’ The answer can be drawn from one of the

key reasons behind the protests and complaints of Văn Giang peasants, which is corruption. Phạm

Đình Trọng put it this way:

In Vietnamese society where corruption is rampant, there is a sort of power business, doing business under the auspice of political power and the state. This means the state apparatus and state power are abused and get involved in business in order to maximize profits. The formula for this sort of business is as follows: limited budget of businessmen plus absolute power of the state equate super-profit (Trọng 2012).

Mrs. R of Xuân Quan commune challenged the clandestine partnership between the local

government and the investor to earn profits at the expense of Văn Giang peasants as follows:

We are toiling on those plots of land. Naturally, we do have certain entitlements to the land. So, why did the government at three levels [province, district and commune] sell our land without letting us know about it? (Interview II, Appendix 3)

She then answered the question herself by accusing the chairman of Xuân Quan commune, Nguyễn

Văn Sáng, of selling the arable land of the peasants. Mrs. R said that everyone in the commune

knew this and called it corruption (Interview II, Appendix 3). According to her, Mr. Sáng sold

public land when he was vice-chairman of the commune. He was disciplined afterward, but was

recently elected as the deputy party-secretary cum chairman of the commune. Mrs. R added that she

and other villagers believed that Sáng was paid ‘kick-backs or commissions’ by the investor for his

enthusiastic endorsement. Furthermore, 150 ‘diplomatic plots of land’ (xuất đất ngoại giao), which

mean gifts, were reserved for senior officials from the Central and local governments in order to get

the project swiftly approved (Caunhattan 2012). Mrs. D of Phụng Công interrupted and said:

When talking about corruption, we strongly believe that it has taken place from the root, which is the lowest level of government. We cannot catch them in action because it is concealed in a sophisticated fashion (Interview V, Appendix 3).

Without evidence, Văn Giang peasants’ allegations remain unproven. However, not only Văn

Giang is facing complaints about corruption linked with land management. Peasants in other

communes of Hưng Yên such as Hồng Nam claimed that the local cadres there (with the

concealment of colleagues in higher levels) had included a pseudo list of agreed peasants in an

application for approval by higher authorities to sell 154 plots of land reserved for resettlement

(Phương 2012b:86).

Indicators related to corruption control in Hưng Yên in two consecutive PAPI reports in 2011

and 2012 reveal that corruption in Hưng Yên remains acute, particularly in the domain of land

management. In 2011, Hưng Yên ranked forty-five out of sixty-three provinces, for corruption. Its

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rank improved slightly, forty-two out of sixty-three, in 2012 though it remained low. Figures 22

and 23 below show the rankings of Hưng Yên from the bottom in 2011 and 2012.

Figure 22: Control of Corruption in H ưng Yên in 2011


As the figures suggest, in 2011, the score for the dimension of limits on public sector corruption,

which includes indicators ‘No bribes for land title’ and ‘Land bribe frequency’, was 1.6.

Nevertheless, only 29.06 percent of Hưng Yên citizens agreed with the former indicator, as a result

the province achieved the lowest percentage of citizen agreement on this issue (PAPI 2011:61-63).

In 2012, the score was even lower than 1.5 as shown in Figure 23 below, meaning that corruption

in the public sector had exacerbated.

Figure 23: Control of Corruption in H ưng Yên in 2012


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Corruption is associated with nepotism, a problem that has been seen as serious in Hưng Yên,

particularly in the land-related issues in the past years. Figures 24 and 25 below show the levels of

nepotism in Hưng Yên in 2012 were even worse than applied in 2011.

Figure 24: Levels of Nepotism in Hưng Yên in 2011

Figure 25: Levels of Nepotism in Hưng Yên in 2012

(Source: PAPI)(PAPI 2011:66, 2012:65)

Against this background, Hưng Yên published positive reports on anti-corruption in the province,

which were entirely at odds with the above PAPI results. A document of Hưng Yên People’s

Committee said that in 2013 the provincial inspectorate received only twenty denunciations

regarding corruption, but failed to ‘discover any manifestations of corruption and bribery’ (UBND-

HY 2013a). This failure highlighted a sceptical question that had been raised by the National

Assembly Chairman, Nguyễn Sinh Hùng: ‘Is there corruption in the anti-corruption forces?’ (Kiên

2013). In a meeting with his voters in early December 2013 in Hà Nội, the CPV Secretary-General

Nguyễn Phú Trọng emphasized a challenge in the fight against corruption. He acknowledged:

Corruption is dangerous and annoying because it has become commonplace. It is now an organized ring, rather than an individual action. We often call it interest group, whose members cooperate with each other (Vũ 2013).

Văn Giang peasants said that the Ecopark project was invested in by a private company (Interviews

II-VI, Appendix 3). As such, according to the current land law, the Hưng Yên government should

have played the role of a mediator, bringing the investor and the peasants together to negotiate a

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compensation price acceptable to both sides. However, instead of doing so, Hưng Yên government

‘joined and shook hands’ with the investor to put pressure on the peasants.

Mr. T of Phụng Công commune, the youngest in the group, angrily asked the interviewer

rhetorically as if he was a representative of the government:

So, how did the government protect the interests of ordinary people? (Interview VI, Appendix 3)

Mrs. R intervened and lamented:

We know that they are corrupt, all the same; hence, they defend interests of the investor, rather than the peasants (Interview II, Appendix 3).

The CPV Secretary-General Nguyễn Phú Trọng said in late 2013 that ‘as long as there remains

power and the state still exists, there is always corruption’ (Vũ 2013). This comment by Mr. Trọng

is especially applicable in Vietnam’s party-state where there are no checks-and-balances to control

the absolute power held by a minority. The CPV’s anti-corruption efforts have fallen short (Hải

2012a). Furthermore, as noted above, Vietnamese politics is influenced and manipulated by interest

groups and investors; citizens’ rights and interests are ignored and unprotected. Nguyễn Quý Đức, a

freelance journalist in Vietnam, commented:

When the state, public officials and the investor meet each other at one point and back up each other for the same interests, the voice of ordinary people in society shall be ignored and become less important than that of the other side (2013b).

The prevalence of corruption both at the provincial and commune levels in Hưng Yên is a telling

indicator that GRD fails to address one of the root causes of political instability in Vietnam’s rural

areas.

Governance


Three dimensions are used to measure accountability: (1) interactions with local authorities, (2)

people’s inspection boards (PIB), and (3) community investment supervision boards (CIBs).

In 2010 and 2011, Hưng Yên was among poor accountability performers according to PAPI

data. In 2010, the aggregate score of accountability of Hưng Yên was 5.0, whereas the national

mean was 6.1 (PAPI 2010:34-35). In 2011, the score was slightly higher (5.2), but still lower than

the national mean (5.50). Additionally, Hưng Yên also saw the sub-dimension “Interactions with

local authorities” at the bottom with a score of 1.38 (PAPI 2011:51-53). The data suggests that

Hưng Yên government gained less social trust in its accountability, especially through its responses

to complaints and denunciations. The people felt that interactions with local authorities did not

make any sense. Figures 26 and 27 below illustrate the scores of accountability and rankings of

Hưng Yên from the bottom in 2010 and 2011.

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Figure 26: Accountability in Hưng Yên in 2010


(Source: 2010 and 2011)(PAPI 2010:35, 2011:51)

In 2012, Hưng Yên’s ranking of accountability further improved, as a result the province was

reclassified as a high-average performer. The province’s overall score of accountability was 5.8,

while the national median and maximum levels were 5.65 and 6.96 respectively. Figure 28 below

shows the score of accountability in Hưng Yên in 2012.


0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

(Source: PAPI 2010 and 2011)(PAPI 2012:52)

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In recent years, Hưng Yên has put in place institutions that aim to hold local government

accountable to the people. By 2005, all communes in Hưng Yên had established PIBs (TUHY

2005:3). Looking at Figures 27-28, there was a stable and relatively high score of almost 2.0 for

each of the other two accountability dimensions, “PIBs” and “CIBs”, in 2011 and 2012 (PAPI

2011:51-53, 2012:52-55). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean all PIBs are effectively

working.

Mr. P of Xuân Quan commune (Interview III, Appendix 3) said that he had heard about the PIB,

but was not aware of what the PIB did. Moreover, Ms. V also from Xuân Quan commune

(Interview IV, Appendix 3) said that after the land eviction no one from the commune people’s

council came to meet evicted households, especially those who were beaten by the riot police, to

share sympathy and inquire about the issue. She then asked: ‘What is the government’s duty to look

after the people?’

It was not surprising that the 2012 work report of Văn Giang district people’s council ignored

the land eviction despite the fact that Vietnamese netizens called it ‘a stain in the history’ [of the

country]31 (Đức 2012b). The report even went further by saying that ‘public security and social

order were basically maintained’ (HĐND-VG 2012:2). A hypothesis is that Văn Giang authorities

assumed that the eviction was undertaken under the provincial government’s direction, hence the

provincial government would be held accountable in this regard. Whatever the explanation might

be, by ignoring the interests and concerns of the peasants, Văn Giang authorities failed to live up to

the CPV’s motto: ‘people know, people discuss, people do, people supervise and check’ (dân biết,

dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra), which is the core of GRD.


Hưng Yên authorities identified complaints and denunciations, especially those involved with a

large number of people, as a threat to social-political instability and disorder in the province. Table

26 below shows the status of complaints and denunciations in Hưng Yên between 2002 and 2013.

Table 26: Status of complaints and denunciations in Hưng Yên 2002-2013

Year Regular acceptance of complaints and denunciations Total number (of) With a large number of people involved

Times People Number (of) Number of delegations

Number of people

Number of cases Comp-

laints Denun- ciation

Others

2002 1256 1424 14 36 1122 18 86 8 2003 1146 1405 16 15 934 23 104 19 2004 2108 2582 39 35 1392 15 94 13

31 Added by this researcher for clarification of what the author meant by ‘history’.

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2005 1454 1754 18 34 1084 26 203 17 2006 1695 1998 24 44 1252 24 300 17 2007 1331 1660 28 33 928 21 239 15 2008 3221 4515 50 75 1101 67 447 32 2009 3024 3837 63 57 1277 69 352 48 2010 2448 3104 141 165 1095 28 444 19 2011 1933 2529 96 186 1159 31 320 21 2013 2314 3074 340 231 809 54 Total 21930 27882 829 911 12153 376 2589+ 209+

(Source: Hưng Yên Provincial People’s Committee)(UBND-HY 2012a, 2013a)

The above statistics on complaints and denunciations suggest that the problem is both critical and

persistent in Hưng Yên. As far as Ecopark project is concerned, 2,130 peasants were involved in

nine delegations to lodge complaints and denunciations to Central government agencies in 2013

alone (UBND-HY 2013b). Recently, hundreds of Văn Giang peasants assembled at the central

Fatherland Front in Hà Nội to meet with its representatives to present their complaints about

Ecopark project (Đức 2013a).

When Hưng Yên government conducted the eviction in Văn Giang, it seemingly wanted to

demonstrate that ‘stability at all costs’ must be maintained (Wolf 2013). There were allegations that

local authorities had chosen to ignore thugs threatening and even breaking into peasants’ private

houses to physically assault and put pressure on them to surrender land to the investor (RFI 2012,

Dân 2013, Quả 2014). In the interview, Mrs. R of Xuân Quan told me that her family had very

often been threatened. Her son was recently beaten and suffered serious injury by thugs on his way

to work. Another man, whose name is Đồng, living in the same commune with her, was attacked by

thugs with knives and narrowly avoided death. Mrs. R added: ‘Regarding security, we peasants

now always live in fear’ (Interview II, Appendix 3).

Absence of violence means ‘freedom from fear’ as proposed by Franklin Roosevelt (1941).

Nevertheless, what was going on in Văn Giang, as described by Mrs. R, demonstrated that the

peasants were not enjoying this freedom. This contradicts the Hưng Yên and Văn Giang

governments’ reports boasting that ‘public security and social order are maintained and guaranteed’

(HĐND-HY 2012:2, HĐND-VG 2012:2).


Hưng Yên appears very similar to Thái Bình in 2012 PCI report, enjoying a mid-high ranking.

Table 27 below presents the PCI results between 2007 and 2012 of Hưng Yên.

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Table 27: Compiled PCI Results of Hưng Yên in 2007-2012

Year Scores Ranks Governance 2007 57.47 26 Mid-high 2008 57.53 20 Mid-high 2009 61.31 24 Mid-high 2010 49.77 61 Relative-low 2011 59.29 33 Mid-high 2012 58.01 28 Mid-high

(Source: PCI 2011-12(VCCI 2011-2012)

The data in Table 27 above suggest that except for 2010, Hưng Yên dedicated great efforts towards

improving its governance, especially in 2012. Figures 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 below further illustrate

the province’s commitment to support private businesses and economic development.

Figure 29: Transparency and access to information




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(Source: PCI 2011-12(VCCI 2011-2012)

Another indicator suggests Hưng Yên’s commitment to policies that permit and promote private

sector development is the PEII. In 2013, Hưng Yên for the second consecutive year stood in the

group of top ten provinces having the best PEII’s (Long 2013). Indeed, in that year, the province

attracted eighty-four projects, of which thirty were foreign-invested and the rest registered by

domestic companies (HĐND-HY 2013:1-2).

Promoting transparency in policy is a strong point of Hưng Yên. Cross-comparison of

transparency indicators of the province in PCI 2012 and PAPI 2012, shows proximal high average

scores. The transparency scores in these two indices of Hưng Yên in 2012 were 5.64 (as shown in

Figure 29 above) and 5.85 (PAPI 2012:44) respectively, and appear impressive. Most public policy

documents and work reports are made available and accessible on Hưng Yên government’s official

website. However, the case of the Ecopark project is different. The project-related documents were

not published.

Government effectiveness and regulatory quality does not only serve the interests of private

businesses, and above all it should be measured by the satisfaction of citizens who are the direct

targets of public services and feel the impact of the quality of policy. There can be many indicators

to gauge the citizens’ satisfaction, one of which is the volume and frequency of complaints and

denunciations in relation to the policy and its implementation. Concerning Hưng Yên’s policy on

the Ecopark project, these indicate failure in two dimensions. Firstly, they articulate the peasants’

discontent. The peasants affected by Ecopark have constantly lodged complaints in the last eight

years. Secondly, the project has been delayed because the peasants did not transfer their land to the


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investor despite the government forcefully evicting the peasants from their land. Moreover,

Ecopark project is a disaster of transparency. Ms. V from Xuân Quan said in a field interview that:

The government at three levels in the province had signed an agreement to sell our land. However, we the peasants toiling on the land and owners of the land were not informed and consulted. We knew nothing about the project (Interview IV, Appendix 3).

Mrs. R of Xuân Quan claimed:

What’s a government when it had sold our land without informing us for two years!? (Interview II, Appendix 3)

She continued by asking:

Can we call it on such grounds a corp of plunderers, robbering citizens’ property?

This is a very complicated issue that is difficult to answer. The 1992 Constitution and land

legislation prescribe that land is ‘owned by the people’ (đất đai thuộc sở hữu toàn dân) but

‘managed by the state’ (do nhà nước quản lý). These vague constitutional and legal provisions were

interpreted by Hưng Yên authorities in a way that serves the interests of the investor, while the two

foundational tenets of GRD, which are ‘people know and people discuss’ (dân biết và dân bàn),

were ignored.

Human Rights

Prima facie peasants in Văn Giang are definitely denied their fundamental human rights. Field

interviews with five peasants in Văn Giang revealed that they had a good understanding that human

rights existed and were relevant whereas the government officials either intentionally denied or

pretended not to be aware of these rights of the people.

As understood by them, the first right of Văn Giang peasants being violated is the right to life.

Mrs D from Phụng Công continuously stressed that land confiscation meant the authority deprived

the right to life of the peasants. In the interview, she said that farming was the only livelihood and

brought a good income for her family before the Ecopark project (Interview V, Appendix 3). But

the project took her arable land away and paid her a few thousand dollars for compensation, which

was not enough to feed the family and to pay for the children to go to school. Mrs. D said:

If the children do not go to school, they will plunge themselves into gambling, drug addiction and robbery (Interview V, Appendix 3).

While Mrs. D stopped speaking for a moment and tried to keep tears from running out of her red-

eyes, Mrs. R in Xuân Quan said:

Our life is always threatened. If families did not hand the land over, thugs would rush into their houses to riot, to slash and to threaten (Interview II, Appendix 3).

Mrs. R then told the story about one man, who was almost dead after being slashed five times by

thugs; and another case when five thugs drove their motorbikes into a household, holding knives

and chased the house owner. They slashed at the house owner’s daughter who narrowly escaped

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without injury. The thugs only ran away when the house owner’s neighbours came in to save their

lives. Mrs. R then compared the peasants’ life like that of fish. She said: ‘We are now like a fish on

board. No one protects us’ (Interview II, Appendix 3).

While the plight of ordinary peasants is evident, some teachers also became the victims of civil

rights violations. Those who failed to persuade their families to receive land compensation were

rebuked as ‘not complete the duty’, or they would be transferred from the school in the project site

to another school in other areas (Caunhattan 2012).

GRD empowers the peasants to nominate and directly elect the village leader. The peasants

define this as the democratic right. Mr. T of Phụng Công explained their understanding of the

democratic right this way:

We nominated our candidates, but the commune authorities rejected. That is violation of the democratic right (Interview VI, Appendix 3).

Mrs R interrupted:

Commune officials told us that the village leader shall be appointed by the party, not elected by the villagers despite the fact we proposed a competition between one party-appointed candidate and one villager-nominated contender. We then demanded a vote of confidence on the selected candidate, but the party committee turned it down (Interview II, Appendix 3).

Mrs D of Phụng Công then asked:

When we cannot nominate and elect our intended candidates, do we still have rights of Vietnamese citizens as provided in the Constitution? (Interview V, Appendix 3)

Though this question warrants further research, put it in the context of GRD, it is clear that GRD

was not observed.

The peasants were asked in the interview that how they understood the concept of democracy.

An informal survey recently indicated that most peasants did not understand what democracy was

(Vũ 2014). Mrs. R of Xuân Quan explained it this way:

Now we have some paddy rice acres. The Party and the State gave it to us, and then if they need to build the roads, including main trunk roads for the country, then they should meet and speak to us that they need the land for road construction. If we the peasants feel it is necessary to do so, and then we are willing to donate our land, rather than to sue. That is democracy. But in this case, it is the robbery of our democratic rights, the robbery of the right to life. We were not invited for discussion, not informed of the project, and our concerns were not heard (Interview II, Appendix 3).

Violations of human rights by Hưng Yên government are also reflected indirectly through the

scores on implementing provincial administrative procedures in PAPI 2011 and 2012 reports. The

aggregate scores for this dimension of Hưng Yên in 2011 and 2012 were 6.85 and 6.75, being the

low average and poor performer respectively (PAPI 2011:68-71, 2012:67-70). These results show

that Hưng Yên had a regressive year-on-year performance assessment (-1.30 percentage

point)(PAPI 2012:70). There were complaints about all the four related sub-dimensions:

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certification procedures, construction permit, land procedures and personal procedures in Hưng Yên

(Tiến 2010, Tienphong 2013, Danviet 2013).

People’s assessment of ‘Treatment with Respect’ and ‘Satisfied with Service’ – two indicators of

commune-level administrative procedures – was a disaster for Văn Giang government. The

peasants who were interviewed said that people and local cadres distrusted each other. The former

considered local cadres as bribe-takers in the project, whereas the latter blamed the peasants as

trouble-makers preventing progress on the project. Mrs. D of Phụng Công said that there were

always three to five local policemen in plain clothes patrolling her neighbourhood, preventing her

from going to Hà Nội to lodge complaints. She added:

We have nothing to beg for from the local authority, so we have never been up there. If we had to go there, the authority would not respond to our demands, unless we accepted the handover of land for the project (Interview V, Appendix 3).

Contrary to complaints by Văn Giang peasants, Hưng Yên obtained relatively high scores of public

services delivery, being a high-average performer in providing public health, education and

infrastructure services. Figure 34 below shows disaggregated scores of the three public services

delivery in Hưng Yên in 2012.

Figure 34: Public Services Delivery in Hưng Yên in 2012

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 (Source: PAPI 2012)(PAPI 2012:80)

The difference between reality in Văn Giang and PAPI 2012 scores of public services delivery in

Hưng Yên is not surprising, because the PAPI is a general index for the provincial level, while Văn

Giang is only one of ten districts in the province. Furthermore, the subject matter in this research is

three communes in Ecopark-Văn Giang project area, where the access to the people has always

been closely watched by government forces. Therefore, PAPI 2012 results cannot fully reflect the

actual state of Văn Giang. This finding proves that the quality of GRD in one commune is not

simply dependent on geographic factors, (meaning whether it be urban or rural), but rather it

depends on other conditions in each particular locality.

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Rule-of-Law


Corrupt local cadres in Văn Giang resist the enforcement of civil rights. Take the case of Xuân

Quan people’s committee chairman, Nguyễn Văn Sáng, as an example in the story told by Mrs. R

who was interviewed (Interview II, Appendix 3). Despite having been disciplined and demoted due

to selling land illegally when he was deputy chairman of the people’s committee, he was elected as

the vice-party secretary of and chairman of the people’s committee. The peasants were angry but

could not do anything. Vietnam’s current party-state power structure allows him to be appointed,

rather than being popularly elected. Mr. Sáng could not only escape from sanctions for his

wrongdoings, but ironically was promoted to a higher position. This is a typical example of the

influence of interest groups on power politics in Vietnam (Được 2009, Phiêu 2011, Phương 2012a).

Regarding the approval of Ecopark project, though the former deputy minister of Natural

Resources and Environment, Đặng Hùng Võ, who previously advised the prime minister to approve

the project, in a later dialogue with Văn Giang peasants in late 2012, admitted that it was ‘wrong’

and ‘illegal’ (Hương 2012, Thắng, Minh, and Hoan 2012), no corrective action has been made yet.

The peasants revealed that while teachers refusing to accept compensation were transferred and

accused of not fulfilling the duty, local cadres who had made mistakes and violated law were ‘still

roaming outlaws’ (Caunhattan 2012).

The case where two journalists from the Radio Voice of Vietnam were arrested and beaten by

police during the land eviction in Văn Giang also caused public anger in society (Điệp and Kiên

2013, Dũng and Thuận 2012). There were submissions for inquiries about the case (Lang 2012:3),

yet the police officer who beat the journalists with the baton, was not subjected to criminal charges

and only forced to apologize and pay compensation for the cost of medical treatment (Thịnh 2013,

Lan 2012).

The legal sanctions seem to bypass government officials in Hưng Yên, especially the elites.

While getting low scores in two consecutive years on corruption control as reflected in PAPI

reports in 2011 and 2012, Hưng Yên government’s reports say that "there is no case in which

leaders of agencies and organizations that detect corrupt acts are charged " (UBND-HY 2013a:6).

In his 2014 New Year message, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng emphasized the

intrinsic link between democracy and rule of law, considering them as ‘twins’ (cặp song sinh)

(Dũng 2014a). That local cadres and security forces in Hưng Yên were exempted from sanctions

for their misconducts and ignored the peasants’ democratic rights. This not only shows social

injustice, favouritism and power asymmetry, but it is also the basis of the argument that Mr. Dũng’s

message is merely rhetorical, at least in the case of Văn Giang.

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Hưng Yên’s effective control of crime, life safety and security can be measured by three indicators:

(i) level of safety in the locality, (ii) change in safety over time, and (iii) victims of theft, robbery,

break-ins and physical violence. In 2011, the province’s aggregate score for these indicators was

1.58, slightly lower than the national mean level 1.60 (PAPI 2011:83). In 2012, the score increased

to a higher level, nearly 1.70, against the national mean (1.60) (PAPI 2012:80). However, an

improved score does not necessarily mean that Văn Giang peasants enjoyed life safety and security.

Crimes such as theft, robbery and break-ins were very common in Hưng Yên in 2011 and 2012.

Although records in PAPI 2011 (2011:93) show that there was no physical violence in Hưng Yên,

the coercive land eviction as well as thugs’, tolerated by local police, assaults on Văn Giang

peasants in 2012 (Dân 2013) was clear evidence that discredited the records. This is further

illustrated by the emergence of new crimes and the number of criminal cases in 2013 (HĐND-HY

2013:2). In the first six months of 2013, for instance, 491 cases involving 1,081 accusers were

initiated and investigated, of which crimes related to drugs and other social evils accounted for

fifty-six percent and thirty-seven percent respectively (Hải 2013). Especially, the ratio of teenagers

engaged in illegal gangs and serious crimes such as murder, rape, robbery with killing and drug

abuse, reached an alarming level in Hưng Yên in 2013, provoking concern and horror in the whole

province (Baohungyen 2013, Phương 2013).

Those peasants that were interviewed had no sense of ‘life safety and security’ (Interviews II-VI,

Appendix 3). They feared that thugs with knives could always attack them. Mrs. D of Phụng Công

described human insecurity in her commune this way:

Security here for us is intricate and a nuisance. Our villages had been peaceful and people were hard working make a living. Since the project came, everything has been turned upside down. Children turned away with their parents; couples were separated or divorced; disputes between neighbours, brothers and sisters. Violence, including murders, could take place any time. It created disturbances in our rural villages. We are so scared (Interview V, Appendix 3).

The prevalence of crimes in Hưng Yên and the disturbances in Văn Giang community life

demonstrate that laws were not respected and implemented effectively. Whilst GRD is not designed

to address crimes or enable the peasants to enjoy ‘freedom from fear’, it does aim to bring stability

in rural villages by reducing the tension between local cadres and the peasants. Given the

disturbances in Văn Giang and prevailing physical violence, an undermining of GRD is evident.


Within ten years, between 1998 and 2008, Hưng Yên established 1,018 reconciliation teams, which

addressed successfully 7,834 disputes (TUHY 2008:5). In 2004, Hưng Yên government issued a

document that aimed at enhancing this community-based dispute resolution system (UBND-HY

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2004). By the end of 2013, the number of reconciliation teams in Hưng Yên had increased to 1,062,

and 1,136 out of 1,553 disputes, equivalent to seventy-three percent, were successfully resolved by

reconciliation (UBND-HY 2013c:12). The data suggests that the community-based disputes

resolution system has been given priority attention by Hưng Yên authorities and performed rather

effectively. However, in the land dispute related to Ecopark project, the system has become

defunct.

When Văn Giang peasants were asked whether local authorities supported them in the

settlement of disputes with the investors, Ms. D from Phụng Công said:

There is no support from local authorities. They at all levels sold the land to the investor, then how could they support us. Mass organizations also did not stand out for mediation and help us negotiate with the investor. The mass organizations are the party’s organs. If the party-state already decided, which-ever agency would dare say any more? (Interview V, Appendix 3)

According to the current legislation, Hưng Yên government should act as a ‘conciliator’ or

‘arbitrator’, similar to the role of Hà Nội authority in the construction of Tràng Tiền Trade and

Office Centre in the middle of the city (Lang 2012:5, Trung 2009)32, to help the investor and Văn

Giang peasants to negotiate the compensation rates. A senior official of Hưng Yên provincial party

committee in an interview wondered: ‘It is not understood why Ecopark Project went that way?!

Hưng Yên has many projects and industrial parks, but none of them were as complicated as this

project’ (Interview VII, Appendix 3). Perhaps, it would be less complicated if Hưng Yên

government did two things: First, act as an ‘arbitrator’ as Hà Nội authority did. Second, respect the

peasants’ democratic rights by organizing public consultations and making the project transparent.

In fact, these are what Văn Giang peasants wanted (Caunhattan 2012), and prescribed by GRD.

Social Capital

Civic engagement

Hưng Yên’s provincial indices marking political activism by public seems to be quite high. In

comparison with 2011, Hưng Yên had a significant improvement in ranking for the ‘Participation at

the Local Levels’ dimension in 2012, moving from a low average to the best performer. The

32 In 2008, Thời Đại Joint Stock Company (T&T) was granted a license to construct Tràng Tiền Trade and Office Centre in the middle of Hà Nội city. The land price of the location where the Centre supposed to be constructed was as expensive as gold at that time. T&T Company had to pay compensation for seventeen households in the project site to be resettled. For years, the Company and residents in the area could not reach consensus on the compensation rates. Consequently, land clearance for the construction was delayed, leading to the intervention of Hà Nội authority in mid-2011. The authority acting as a ‘conciliator’ and ‘arbitrator’ facilitated negotiations between T&T Company and the residents, who finally reached a mutually acceptable compensation rate of five hundred million VND per square metre, the record high land price in the city. See more in: Lang, Nguyễn. 2012. ‘Thấy gì qua vụ cưỡng chế tại Văn Giang - Hưng Yên (What can be learned from the eviction in Văn Giang-Hưng Yên).’ Tạp chí Mặt trận (Journal of the Fatherland Front) (105); Trung, Trần Ngọc. 2009. Mức đền bù kỷ lục tại khu ‘đất vàng’ bị chê (The record compensation price at the ‘golden’ land site rejected low). Đất Việt newspaper.

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province scored approximately 5.85 on PAPI 2012 ranking scale, just slightly lower than the top

0.34 point and an increase of 9.62 percent from 2011 (PAPI 2012:34-37). Table 27 below shows

2011-2012 comparative results of participation at local level in Hưng Yên with the four major

indicators.

Table 28: 2011-2012 Comparative Results of Participation at Local Level in Hưng Yên

Indicators National Mean National PAPI 2012

(95% CI) Provincial Scores

2011 2012 Low High 2011 2012 Civil knowledge 1.11 1.06 1.03 1.09 1.15 1.15 Opportunities for participation 1.88 1.82 1.79 1.85 1.85 1.95 Quality of elections 1.45 1.47 1.44 1.49 1.50 1.70 Voluntary contributions 0.85 0.81 0.79 0.84 0.83 1.05

(Source: PAPI 2011 and 2012)(PAPI 2011:30-39, 2012:34-41) In several communes of Hưng Yên, findings from a sociological survey (Đức and Minh 2008)

demonstrate a significant change since GRD has been implemented. Table 29 below displays the

increase of people’s participation in infrastructure decision-making in four communes in Hưng

Yên: Giai Phạm (Yên Mỹ district), Trần Cao (Phù Cừ district), Đặng Lễ (Ân Thi district), and An

Vĩ (Khoái Châu district) between 1998 and 2005.

Table 29: People’s participation in infrastructure decision-making (A: Informed; B: Informed and discussed, decided and supervised)

Commune/District

Before 1998 1998-2002 2003-2005 Number of Projects Number of Projects Number of Projects

A B A B A B Giai Phạm/Yên Mỹ 3 1 4 3 5 3 Trần Cao/Phù Cừ 3 1 4 2 3 3 Đặng Lễ/Ân Thi 2 2 3 1 2 2 An Vĩ/Khoái Châu 2 2 1 2 3 3 Total 10 6 12 8 16 11

(Source: EADN Working Paper No.35) (Đức and Minh 2008) The data in Table 29 suggests that civic engagement in the decision-making process increased as

shown by the rise in the number of projects in column (B). This change is obviously associated with

improved civic knowledge of GRD. In PAPI 2012 report, the score for civic knowledge in Hưng

Yên is relatively high (1.15) as compared with the national high score (1.09). Nevertheless, this

does not necessarily mean the people fully understand GRD. A survey found that of 300

respondents asked about GRD, only ninety-seven (equivalent to 32.3 percent) ‘Understand fully’,

115 (51.7 percent) ‘Understand a little bit’, and forty-eight (sixteen percent) ‘Do not understand’

(Cường 2010:58). The lack of understanding of GRD makes public participation in local

governance formalistic and less effective. Civic engagement in elections is a relevant example.

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The percentage of people turning out to vote was very high: 98 percent in the elections of the

people's council 1999-2004 (TUHY 2003); 97.7 percent in the election of National Assembly XIII

and people's council 2011-2016 at all levels for (Hoa 2011). However, these numbers do not reflect

the common practice that a voter often casts the ballot for other members of the family (Phương

2012b:85).

High tension in local cadre-peasant relations with respect to Ecopark project led to low civic

engagement in local elections in Văn Giang. This is because the peasants lost their trust in local

cadres, who they called ‘a syndicate of plunderers’ (Interview II, Appendix 3). When the peasants

were asked about the elections of members of commune people’s council and the village leader,

both Mrs. D and Mr. T from Phụng Công shared the same views like this:

We told each other not to participate in the election of the commune people’s council, because whether or not we engage in the election, it would be the same. The party already decided who would sit in the council. Regarding the election of villager leader, there is no such election. Therefore, whoever becomes the village leader appointed by the party, we do not care (Interviews V and VI, Appendix 3).

Engaging in the election of the village leader is the most visible evidence of the peasant’s

democratic right ‘endowed’ by GRD. The conversation with the five Văn Giang peasants

(Interviews II-VI, Appendix 3) imposed an impression that they fully understood and earnestly

wished to be able to implement this right. However, distrust of the party-state apparatus and local

cadres prevented them from joining the election. This explicitly makes GRD merely rhetorical.

Civic organizations

Two mass organizations with the largest membership in Hưng Yên are VWU and VFU. In 2009,

Hưng Yên VWU and VFU had 244,606 and 285,536 members respectively (Cường 2010:47). The

five peasants involved in field interviews were members of VFU, while the three females were also

members of VWU. One of the key mandates of these mass organizations is to represent the voice

and protect the interests of their members.

However, the silence of these civic organizations in relation to Ecopark project was at odds with

their mandates. Within one year of the land eviction taking place in April 2012, it was hard to find

any media articles in which these mass organizations stood up to protect the evicted peasants’

interests. It can be assumed that even if these peasants were not members of VFU, then as an

organization representing the peasantry’s voice, the VFU should have publicly expressed its

opinions on the issue because Ecopark project affected the peasants’ life and agricultural

production. In addition, the VFF as an organization representing the mass populace (NA 1999:

Article 1) would be expected to raise its concern about the eviction and defend the peasants’ right.

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However, contrary to the expectation, the VFF even expressed its support with Hưng Yên

government in evicting the peasants (Hưng 2012).

Peasants were asked whether or not they had been met and/or supported by mass organizations.

The common answer was that these organizations were not concerned about their situation

(Interviews II-VI, Appendix 3). The VWU and VFU even convinced their members to hand over

the land to the project. Mrs. D from Phụng Công said:

These organizations just listen to the government and do not support us. Women like me are never elected to the governing board of the commune VWU (Interview V, Appendix 3).

The disturbances in Thái Bình in 1997 were partly attributable to dysfunctional mass organizations

like VFF, VWU and VFU. In the case of Văn Giang, these organizations should have played the

role as ‘mediators’ to reconcile the interests of the state, the peasants, and the investor.

Nevertheless, they failed to do so. A senior official of Hưng Yên provincial party committee said

that the mass organizations were ‘weak and poorly functioning’ and ‘not responsible for anything’

when problems occurred (Interview VII, Appendix 3). She admitted: ‘These organizations have no

substantive voice and perform in a passive manner. They must seek guidance from the party

committee before carrying out any activities’ (Interview VII, Appendix 3).

Trust

There are many reasons for Văn Giang peasants not to trust local authorities and cadres. The

peasants believed that local cadres were corrupt and collaborated with the investor to plunder their

land; and that local authorities tolerated thugs to threaten them (Interviews I – VI, Appendix 3).

Furthermore, corrupt local cadres were not punished, mass organizations kept silent when their

members’ rights and interests were violated, and members of Hưng Yên National Assembly

delegation avoided meeting with the peasants. When a senior official of Hưng Yên provincial party

committee was asked whether members of Hưng Yên National Assembly delegation had any

contact with the peasants to investigate the problem, she did not give a direct answer to this

question, rather saying this:

The peasants did not lodge their complaints and petitions in a proper way. They went straight forth to authorities in Hà Nội, bypassing relevant authorities in the province (Interview VII, Appendix 3).

It was understandable that she avoided talking about the responsibility of the delegation, but when

the peasants lost their trust in local authorities, it is not surprising if they had to seek protection

from central government agencies.

In a field interview, Mrs. D from Phụng Công on behalf of other peasants shared her thoughts

about their trust in the party-state like this:

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I tell the truth and confirm with you that our trust in the party and the government has been oozed away with exhaustion. Because if the party was for people, it would not let the people to pursue lawsuits like this for 8 lengthy years; it would not let the black gangsters to chase and to beat the people, to destroy what the people produced. I am telling you the truth that we no longer trust anything anymore, cannot trust in anyone anymore. If the party and the government are for the people, how come they let the thugs attack us? We now consider ourselves as "anarchists" and then, there is no leadership level for us anymore (Interview V, Appendix 3).

In a recent exclusive interview given to Vietnam News Agency, the CPV Secretary-General

Nguyễn Phú Trọng stressed people’s trust for its revolutionary success. Thus, for him, the CPV

always needs to ‘take care of and maintain the people's trust in the CPV’s leadership and the state

governance’ (Trọng 2014). However, for Văn Giang peasants, if asked, they would doubt that they

are among those being ‘taken care of’ by the party-state.

High civic engagement, active and independent civic organizations, and trust are the conditions

of high social capital, which is the key to a functioning democracy (Putnam 1993a). However, in

the case of Văn Giang, these conditions are below the level that can make a positive impact on

GRD.

Conclusion

This chapter aims to answer three questions on the implementation of GRD goals in Hưng Yên and

its impact on state-peasant relations, cadre-peasant relations, local governance reform, and

ultimately the CPV’s legitimacy. Outcomes from the analysis of the independent variables indicate

a negative correlation between all the six independent variables and GRD as shown in table below.

This reinforces the researcher’s argument that Hưng Yên failed to achieve GRD goals in Văn

Giang.

Negative correlation High inequality High Corruption Bad Governance Low adherence to Human Rights Low adherence to Rule of Law Low Social Capital

The failure of GRD is illustrated by the fact that tension in state-peasant relations and local cadre-

peasant relations has increased and as a result the CPV’s legitimacy was at risk as the peasants lost

their trust in the party-state. However, although GRD failed to bring stability in the case of Văn

Giang, it is still a mechanism through which the peasants can directly demand respect for their

democratic rights and indirectly press the local authorities and cadres to respond to their concerns.

In turn they might make adjustments in the local governance system in order to deliver stability

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across Hưng Yên. The independent variables recorded also show that the provincial index might not

necessarily reflect the actual progress of GRD at the grassroots. Instead, this should be measured by

the peasants’ satisfaction with local cadres’ performance. The case of Văn Giang also represents a

new phenomenon in Vietnamese politics, which is the influence of interest groups on the decision-

making and the coupling of politicians and entrepreneurs interests, or rent-seeking, to make profits

at the expense of poor peasants. Finally, GRD is highly contextual, being effective in one but not in

another commune, even within a province. This suggests that the success of GRD in one commune

is not necessarily attributable to the geographic factors, (meaning that whether it is an urban or rural

area), but it depends on the leadership and institutions that create the environment for the

implementation of GRD.

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7

Đà Nẵng

Administrative Map of Đà Nẵng Đà Nẵng within Vi ệt Nam

Introduction

Unlike Thái Bình and Hưng Yên, in the last decade, Đà Nẵng has seen political and social stability,

and been widely recognized in Vietnam for many positive measures of progress. These include: the

most dynamic and fastest developing city; the fastest urbanized city; and a great construction site

(Anh 2013, Thanh 2010a). This latter description reflects that with 18,500 hectares of land re-

claimed, involving 100,000 households in both urban and rural areas (TUĐN 2012:8), only

approximately one hundred households were evicted (Dũng 2012b, TUĐN 2012:8). The was

considered the best province in dealing with land clearance and compensation (Thành 2003:9) as it

had no ‘hot spot’ and collective complaints (Cường 2004:40), except the case of Cồn Dầu parish

(Ngữ 2013)33, and was thus a ‘win-win’ model for other cities and provinces to learn from,

33 In 2010, Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Committee took 440 hectares of land away from Cồn Dầu parish and other four residential areas (Tùng Lâm, Lỗ Giáng, Cẩm Chánh and Trung Lương), in Hòa Xuân ward of Cẩm Lệ district, for the construction of a 430-hectare ecological resort. Only households in Cồn Dầu parish, who are mostly Catholic followers, requested to be resettled within the resort site, which is their ancestors’ land, not in another location (even in

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including those having high rate of land grabbing like Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, (Võ 2012, Tú

2013). Whilst petitions and complaints by citizens of wrongdoing by public officials are universal

in Vietnam (Đức 2013b) and more than seventy percent of them are concerned with land issues

(GoV 2012:6, GoIV 2012:1), Đà Nẵng saw only 400 complaints and denunciations between 2003

and 2012 as compared with 9,200 of Đồng Nai, 7,300 of Bắc Ninh, 4,400 of Thanh Hóa, and

12,500 of Sóc Trăng (SCNA 2012). Furthermore, for years, Đà Nẵng has emerged as the “number

one” in the PCI index in governance reforms to attract investments. The above conditions make Đà

Nẵng a unique and suitable case for investigating how GRD has been implemented there.

Like Chapters Five and Six, this chapter also seeks to answer three questions:


• How has the implementation of GRD impacted on the local party-state apparatus, cadre-

peasant relations, and local governance reforms?

• How has the implementation of GRD ultimately reinforced the CPV’s legitimacy and

capacity to govern in Đà Nẵng?

Using Chapter Four’s analytic framework, this chapter will firstly argue that the independent

variables are positively correlated with the implementation of GRD in Đà Nẵng. Secondly, it will

suggest that GRD has contributed to maintaining a respectful relationship between local cadres and

the residents, promoting local governance reforms to make local authorities more responsive and

accountable to the residents, and encouraging more civic engagement in the community life. Most

importantly, it has brought stability and development of the city, increasing trust of the residents in

the party-state, which in turn reinforces the CPV’s legitimacy and grip on power. Thirdly, it will be

shown that Đà Nẵng could have been able to implement GRD successfully because it had an

‘authoritarian, but determined and competent leader’ (Hải 2013c). Building on this, it can be

concluded that good leadership is an important variable that reinforces the legitimacy of Vietnam’s

party-state.

the same district). Đà Nẵng authority did not accept this request. Households in Cồn Dầu parish submitted complaints to agencies of the central government in Hà Nội, had clashes with the local government. Some residents in Cồn Dầu parish were arrested and brought to court for trial. Đà Nẵng and agencies of the central government organized a dozen of dialogues with households in Cồn Dầu parish, though both sides did not reach an agreement on the resettlement plan. The case is now pending on the decision of the Prime Minister. More details about the case of Cồn Dầu parish, see: Ngữ, Vũ Quốc. 2013. "Land ownership in Vietnam and Land Seizure in One-Party State." The law and land grabbing in developing countries, Nantes, France, 23 May 2013; Hùng, Nguyễn. 2010. Vụ gây rối ở Cồn Dầu (Đà Nẵng): Tòa Giám mục Đà Nẵng bày tỏ sự đáng tiếc (The case of public disorder in Cồn Dầu (Đà Nẵng): Đà Nẵng Catholic Church expressed its regret). Sài Gòn Giải phóng; Khá, Hữu. 2011. Xử phúc thẩm vụ án gây rối trật tự tại Cồn Dầu (Trial of appeal related to public disordering in Cồn Dầu). Tuổi trẻ (Youth Newspaper); Khá, Hữu. 2014. Đà Nẵng đối thoại với 12 hộ dân Cồn Dầu (Đà Nẵng organized dialogues with twelve households in Cồn Dầu). Tuổi trẻ (Youth Newspaper); Minh, Gia. 2014. Vụ đất đai Cồn Dầu chờ kết luận của Thủ tướng (The land case in Cồn Dầu pending the decision of the Prime Minister). Radio of Free Asia (RFA).

197

Background

Đà Nẵng is the biggest city in the Centre and the third largest seaport in Việt Nam. It borders Thừa

Thiên-Huế to the north, Quảng Nam to the west and south, and the South China Sea (or East Sea in

Vietnamese) to the east. The city is 764 kilometres from Hanoi to the north, 964 kilometres from

Hồ Chí Minh city to the south, and 108 kilometres from Hue to the north-west.

Between 1975 and 1996, Đà Nẵng was part of Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng province. In 1994, the

province saw a peasant protest on land-related issues (HRW 1997b:8). In 1997, Đà Nẵng was

separated from Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng and became a city under direct control of the central

government. It has a natural area of 1,283.42 square kilometres; of which the urban inner area

accounts for 241.51 square kilometres and the suburban area accounts for 1,041.91 square

kilometres. The city has eight urban and rural districts, including Hoàng Sa (Paracel islands) in

dispute with China, and forty-five wards, eleven communes and 118 villages (GSO 2012:176,

2010c:429). Đà Nẵng has a population of 890.000 persons, of whom ninety percent live in urban

areas and ten percent live in rural areas (GSO 2010a:4). Compared with the national average of

people living in rural areas (69.5 percent), the city’s ratio is roughly fifty percentage points lower

(An 2012b:7). This uneven distribution of population creates a huge pressure on the urban living

space in Đà Nẵng, requiring the city authority to re-plan its urban infrastructure development.

In the first ten years of Đổi Mới, Đà Nẵng had a lower citizen earning level, compared with Hà

Nội and Hồ Chí Minh city (Hùng 2011, Thành 2003:1) as reflected through the average monthly

income per capita at the starting point in 1994 in Table 30 below.

Table 30: The average monthly income per capita in 1994

City <75,000 (%)

75-150 (%)

150-300 (%)

300-600 (%)

>600,000 (%)

Total (%)

Unit: thous. Dong (VND) Hà Nội 12.9 42.2 29.3 8.8 6.8 100 Đà Nẵng 13.0 56.2 26.0 3.4 1.4 100 Hồ Chí Minh 0.4 2.5 35.5 38.0 23.6 100


Having become a city under direct control of the central government in 1997, by average monthly

income per capita, Đà Nẵng soon emerged as the most developed province in the Centre, and

narrowed the income gap with Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (GSO 1999). Within three years,

income per capita in Đà Nẵng increased nearly two fold, from 187,000 VND in 1996 to 317,000

VND in 1999 (GSO 1999). This was owing to the city government’s adjustments of economic

policies, with greater stress on the industry and services. Figure 35 illustrates Đà Nẵng’s

transformation in economic structure during between 1997 and 2008.

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Figure 35: Economic Structure Transformation in Đà Nẵng between 1997 and 2008

(Source: Đà Nẵng Statistics Office 2009, Đà Nẵng Department of Planning and Investment 2001-2008) (SO-ĐN 2009a, DPI-ĐN 2001-2008)

The expansion of industry and services, and the reduction of agriculture in the economic structure

also reflect the pace of urbanization in the city. Agriculture contributed only two percent in the

city’s economy by 2015 as shown in the Figure 36 below.

Figure 36: Targeted Economic Structure of Đà Nẵng by 2015

(Source: Đà Nẵng Municipal Party Committee)(TUĐN 2010b:3)

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During this period, the labor ratio noticeably transformed in rhythm with the change in the city’s

economic struture. Table 31 below shows the change of labor ratio in three economic sectors

between 1997 and 2010.

Table 31: Change of labor ratio in three economic sectors between 1997 and 2010

Eco. Sector 1997 (%) 2008 (%) 2010 (%) Industry-construction 29 43.8 31.1 Services 37.2 38.5 55.3 Agriculture 33 18.6 9.6

(Source: Đà Nẵng Statistics Office 2009, TUĐN 2010)(SO-ĐN 2009a, TUĐN 2010a:1)

Fast urbanization and the decline of labor force engaged in the agriculture generated acute

pressures on infrastructure, public services, job creation and social security in the city.

Between 2001 and 2010, Đà Nẵng registered an average economic growth rate of eleven

percent, an increase of four fold in GDP per capita as compared with that in 2001, and 2.2 times

with 2005, and 1.6 times against the average national economic growth (TUĐN 2001:1, 2010a).

Since 2000, Đà Nẵng has implemented two nationally well-known and unprecedented social

welfare targeted programmes: The ‘5 Không’ (Five ‘Nos’ or Five ‘Zeros’), and the ‘3 Có’ (Three

‘Haves’), focusing on education, housing, social welfare and security, cultural change, and self-

emancipative values (TUĐN 2000, UBND-ĐN 2000). These programs have had remarkable

impact (Dũng 2011:30). For instance, by the end of 2013, Đà Nẵng had no households living

under the national poverty line and in makeshift houses (Thọ 2014), and no beggars and street

people, a visible phenomenon in most other cities, including Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (Thức

2013).

The most impressive success of Đà Nẵng has been in land acquisition, clearance and

compensation – a process vital to realize its modernization goals as well as to ease the pressure

created by urbanization. The city’s approach regarding land for essential use, is that it is acquired

only if eighty percent of the residents agree, and the city government is directly involved in

compensation and resettlement rather than delegating this task to the enterprises (Thành 2003:9, Võ

2012, Thúy 2012:26, Dực 2012:27-29). This model has been effective and has contributed to

reducing the tension in state-society relations, cadre-resident relations, and crucially reinforcing the

party-state’s legitimacy in the community. The city leaders stressed GRD for its success (TUĐN

2012:8). The next section explores how GRD goals have been achieved in this case.

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Inequality


Two issues are examined here: elections at local levels, particularly the election of urban residential

group (tổ dân phố) leader, and the attitude of local cadres in serving the people.

Đà Nẵng is a pioneer in democratic elections within the local party committee. At the city party

congress for the 2010-2015 tenure, under CPV Politburo’s guidance (2008, 2009), the city

experimented with the direct election of the city party chief (Thanh 2010b). Though the election is

more demonstrative, rather than substantive, it is significant because ‘keeping the countenance or

face-saving’ (giữ thể diện) remains sensitive in Vietnam’s political culture, and such practice is

unprecedented (Bình 2013b).

In 2008, Đà Nẵng sought the CPV Politburo’s permission to apply the Western-style

municipality authority model, in which the city leader would be a mayor and directly elected by the

residents (Hảo 2012). It has not yet been allowed to do so for various reasons, including possible

fear that the central government could lose control over the city, particularly if the popularly elected

mayor is a non-party member. In fact, Đà Nẵng has made ‘fence-breaking’ (phá rào) decisions

when it allowed non-party candidates to be elected into local governance bodies after the adoption

of GRD (Hảo 2012). Table 32 below shows increased number of non-party members in the local

elected bodies – Commune People’s Councils (CPC) – and village boards of heads (VBH)

(consisting of village chiefs and deputy-chiefs) in a district in Đà Nẵng between 1998 and 2005.

Table 32: Non-party members elected in CPC and VBH

in Đà Nẵng between 1998 and 2005

Commune District Before 1998 1998-2000 2001-2004 2005 Hòa Xuân Hòa Vang 4 3 6 8 Hòa Tiên Hòa Vang 5 9 10 14

(Source: EADN Working Paper No.35) (Đức and Minh 2008:9)

In Vietnam’s party-state, that a non-member party is elected into a governing body, even as a

village leader, is a rare case. The data in Table 32 shows an increase of non-party members in the

elected bodies, but they occupy a minority and hence have limited influence in the decision-

making. Nevertheless, their participation at least can put a certain pressure on the bodies to be

accountable to their constituents.

In Thạch Thang, the number of non-party members elected in the people’s council fluctuates

over the years, with generally an increasing trend, but never exceeding twenty-five percent. In

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2011, with the central government’s approval (NA 2008, SCNA 2009, PM 2009, MOHA 2009),

Thạch Thang became one of forty-five wards in Đà Nẵng to experiment with the abolishment of

their people’s council (UBND-ĐN 2012a:1). This makes the residential group leaders and mass

organizations more important in supervising local cadres’ performance.

The election of residential group leaders is a test of political equality. In 2012, Đà Nẵng’s was

ranked as a high average performer, from the low average in 2011, in terms of participation at local

levels (PAPI 2011:31, 2012:34). The city achieved an aggregate score of 1.55 for some election-

related indicators in PAPI 2012: ‘Paper ballot was used’, meaning that paper ballot was used to

replace a show of hands; ‘More than one Candidate’; ‘Votes were counted publicly’; and

‘Candidate was suggested’ [by the local party cell]34, meaning that the local party cell made pre-

election suggestion of one candidate (PAPI 2012:36-38). Nevertheless, low scores of paper ballot

usage in residential group elections in 2011 and 2012 (PAPI 2011:36, 2012:39) affect the residents’

trust in expressing their political attitudes.

In a field interview, Mr. H of the Residential Group No.24 said:

There are two or three candidates, who are nominated and ‘hand-picked’ by the party committee without distinction between party members or non-party members. The party committee did not interfere with the elections (Interview IV, Appendix 2).

Mr. H emphasized that norms such as virtues (đạo đức) and prestige (uy tín), which are cultural

values still highly respected in Confucius-influenced society like Vietnam, as well as the education

and capacity of the candidate have a positive influence on the election results. Mr. H said that his

predecessor was not re-elected because he was not close to the residents, had no public presentation

skills, and failed to convey adequate information from the government to the residents and

especially to reflect the residents’ concerns to the government (Interview IV, Appendix 2). As a

result, during his leadership, the residential group was considered as ‘a snake without head’ (rắn

mất đầu). Mr. H said things have changed, and put it this way:

Anyone with a concern comes to see me. I investigate their concerns, bring them to the government’s attention, and then convey replies to them. Hence, the residents are actively participating in the community life (Interview IV, Appendix 2).

A businessman interviewed during field work was dissatisfied with the city government due to its

delayed recognition of his brother as a fallen soldier (liệt sỹ) and taxation. However, when talking

about the residential group leader, he acknowledged:

I do not know about other places, but I reckon that Mr. H is a good, enthusiastic and responsible leader. He is close to everyone (Interview VII, Appendix 2).

Different people have different perceptions of the importance of residential group leaders (in urban

areas) and village leaders (in rural areas), though they are similar in law. In rural areas, due to the 34 […] added by this researcher for clarification.

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social culture of a village-commune, cohesive and interlaced community and kinship ties, the

enhanced status of the family name, and the concept that ‘relatives of a royal mandarin can enjoy

privileges from his post’ (một người làm quan cả họ được nhờ), the election of village leaders

becomes a competition between clans and factions within the village. Rural villagers believe that

the elected village leader improves the social status of their clan, and their family will have more

influence in the affairs of the village. Thus, every clan would be proud to have one of its members

elected village leader. However, in urban areas, the matter is quite the opposite. Nobody wants to

be the residential group leader. There are many reasons to explain this, but the real reason is public

perception of the residential group leader as a person ‘who spends his own money for nothing’ (ăn

cơm nhà vác tù và hàng tổng). Hence, residential group leaders are mostly retired people, who have

time on their hands and relish the prestige in old age, while younger people are busy making

themselves rich. This embodies a paradox. The CPV wants to control the residential group leader,

but the people are turning their backs on their democratic rights. This may not be universally true in

urban areas, but the fact is that the majority of the Vietnamese people nowadays, especially in

urban areas, are more interested in getting rich rather than politics.

Unlike rural areas, the residents in urban areas are in frequent contact with local cadres and

authorities which makes the attitude and behaviours of local cadres very significant. This researcher

spent three days at Thạch Thang ward headquarters observing local cadres’ performance and their

communication with the residents who attended for various reasons. There were some newspaper

articles praising the attitude of Đà Nẵng public officials (Bình 2013b), however ‘seeing is

believing’: this needed to be observed. The researcher was impressed by the behaviour and attitude

of Thạch Thang cadres. They were polite and focused, rather than irksome with a reserved face like

their colleagues elsewhere. It was quite commonplace to hear complaints from the people in the

grassroots that local cadres were ‘indifferent’ (vô cảm), ‘irresponsible’ (vô trách nhiệm),

‘bureaucratic’ (quan liêu), ‘irresponsive’ (làm lơ), ‘demanding’ (hách dịch), and distant from the

people (xa dân) (Anh 2014). The residents at the ward headquarters did not have ‘dreadful’

criticisms of local cadres when they were interviewed in a field observation (FO, 27 July 2012,

Appendix 2).

Đà Nẵng assesses the people’s satisfaction of public service quality on an annual basis. Table 33

below shows the latest results of satisfaction level by people using public services provided by

district governments in Đà Nẵng.

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Table 33: Satisfaction of people using public services by districts in Đà Nẵng in 2012

Districts

Thanh Khê

Ngũ Hành Sơn

Hải Châu

Liên Chiểu

Sơn Trà Cẩm Lệ Hòa Vang

General Satisfaction (%) 96.91 93.51 91.71 91.44 91.05 84.47 83.67 Quality Satisfaction (score)35 3.43 4.49 3.11 3.12 3.00 2.97 2.86

(Source: Đà Nẵng Institute for Social-Economic Development)(DISED 2012)

As compared with other districts, Hải Châu was the mid-high performer. The residents’ reflections

of Thạch Thang ward cadre’s performance and attitude reinforce Hải Châu’s ranking in Table 32

above.

The field work was conducted in Đà Nẵng at a time when the city government had recently

issued a decision requesting its cadres to make ‘written apologies’ if they were not responsive to the

people’s concerns (Dũng 2012a, UBND-ĐN 2012c, Thiên 2012, Châu 2012c). In a field interview,

Mr A (Interview I, Appendix 2) shared his views of this new decision:

We frequently remind our staff of their service attitude to the people. If we had to apologize, it should be considered as a normal practice.

This is a big reform in local cadres’ perception in Việt Nam’s party-state, because they used to only

be accountable to their superiors, not to the citizens (Kerkvliet 2004:1-27). Đà Nẵng leaders asked

their cadres ‘to learn an ashamed culture’ (biết học văn hóa xấu hổ) when they ‘make promises, but

do very little or do nothing’ (Quang 2013). The ‘ashamed culture’ here means local cadres must

feel ashamed when they meet the people if they do not keep their promises. Confucianism honours

those who keep their promises in order to gain credibility (chữ tín), which is also well connected

with virtues (đạo đức) and prestige (uy tín). Mr A said this:

These are not something new. Our Uncle Hồ taught us many years ago that cadres had to be ‘public servants of the people’ (công bộc của dân) not the ‘revolutionary mandarins’ (quan cách mạng) (Interview I, Appendix 2).

Economic Inequality

In this section, Đà Nẵng’s efforts in poverty alleviation, reduction of disparity between urban and

rural areas, and services rendered to the poor are examined.

In 1997, Đà Nẵng had 11,321 poor households, of which 850 suffered from critical hunger (Đào

2012). By monthly income per capita measures, Đà Nẵng had a higher ratio of poor households

than the other three provinces in the Central Coastal and Northern Central region in 1996, but

registered the lowest in 1999 (GSO 1999). Since 2000, with an annual economic growth rate of

eleven percent, (Thanh 2010a, TUĐN 2001, 2010a), Đà Nẵng rolled out two social programs: the

35 Indicators used to measure the satisfaction include: (1) convenience, (2) response ability, (3) service fees, and (4) mechanisms for feedback, comments, complaints, denunciations.

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‘5 Không’ (Five ‘Zeroes’), and the ‘3 Có’ (Three ‘Haves’); and adjusted downwards four times the

city’s poverty line, a shift which is higher than the national standard (Thu 2012:40-45). Table 34

below shows poverty reduction results between 2001 and 2012 in Đà Nẵng. Notably, the poverty

rate for each period is adjusted on the basis of the city’s development level, rather than the national

poverty line.

Table 34: Poverty reduction rate in Đà Nẵng between 2001 and 2012

Year 2001-2005 (based on national

poverty line)

2005-2010 (based on the city’s development level)

2009-2015 (based on the city’s development level)

2001 2004 2005 2008 2009 2011 Poverty rate (%) 6.66 0.35 15.19 0.95 19.26 3.05

(Source: Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Committee)(UBND-ĐN 2005, 2009a, 2012b) Table 35 below presents comparative data of the national and Đà Nẵng’s poverty line.

Table 35: National and Đà Nẵng poverty lines by years

Year

National Đà Nẵng Unit: Thousand VND

Urban Rural Urban Rural 2004 218,000 168,000 Achieved the national line 2005 …. …. 300,000 200,000 2006 260,000 200,000 2008 370,000 290,000 2009 …. …. 500,000 400,000 2010 450,000 360,000 2011-2015 500,000 400,000 800,000 600,000 (Source: Results of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2010, Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Committee)(GSO 2010b:20, UBND-ĐN 2012b)

The data suggests that Đà Nẵng’s poverty line has always been higher than the national one since

2005. As of 2010, Đà Nẵng’s poverty rate is the second lowest among four major cities in Vietnam

as illustrated in Table 36 below (note that a downwards shift in the poverty rate and an upwards

shift in the poverty line metric both have positive inference).

Table 36: Poverty rate in four major cities

Cities 2004 2006 2008 2010 2010*36

Unit: % Whole country 18.1 15.5 13.4 10.7 14.2 Hà Nội … … 6.6 … 5.3 Hải Phòng … 7.8 6.3 … 6.5 Đà Nẵng … 4.0 3.5 … 5.1 Hồ Chí Minh City … 0.5 0.3 … 0.3

(Source: Results of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2010)(GSO 2010b:432-433)

36 Poverty rate in 2010* by the Government’s poverty lines for period 2011-2015 are 400 thousand dongs per capita per month for the rural area and 500 thousand dongs per capita per month for the urban area.

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The gap in terms of income inequality between urban and rural areas in Đà Nẵng could be

attributed to the lack of capital, scarcity of land for production, shortage of production tools and

facilities (UBND-ĐN 2012b:3). Labour ratio involved in the city’s economic sectors also impacts

on the residents’ average income per capita. Table 37 below shows the proportion of monthly

income per capita by sources of income as well as the consequential impact due to the change of

labour ratio in the economic structure.

Table 37: Proportion of monthly income per capita by sources of income in Đà Nẵng

Proportion of monthly income per capita by sources of income At current prices/Unit:%

Đà Nẵng Total Salary

/wage Agriculture, Forestry

and Fishery Non-Agriculture,

Forestry and Fishery Others

2002 100,0 47,8 5,9 30,5 15,8 2004 100,0 43,6 4,7 32,8 18,9 2006 100,0 43,5 3,5 34,6 18,4 2008 100,0 49,0 2,6 25,1 23,3 2010 100,0 58,3 3,3 26,7 11,7

(Source: Results of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2010)(GSO 2010b:254) The data Table 37 indicates that workers in the agricultural sector have a lower income level as

compared with those involved in the non-agricultural sectors. Table 38 below provides a clearer

comparison of income per capita by sources of income quintile in Đà Nẵng 2002-2010.

Table 38: Monthly income per capita by sources of income of Đà Nẵng between 2002 and 2010

Monthly income per capita by sources of income quintile and province/city

At current prices/Unit: thous. Dong( VND)

Total Q1* Q2 Q3* * Q4 Q5* ** Q5-Q1 Comparison

Đà Nẵng 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

462,6 178,7 281,1 373,9 509,7 971,1 5,4 670,2 251,0 397,1 551,8 770,9 1.379,6 5,5 853,0 319,8 515,2 689,9 956,0 1.785,2 5,6

1.366,6 489,8 804,2 1.071,7 1.499,6 2.962,6 6,1 1.897,2 667,1 1.023,8 1.394,1 1.980,8 4.399,5 6,6


Comparing the income inequality between the poorest and the richest in 2010, Đà Nẵng had a

lower level than Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, which were 8.9 and 6.7 respectively (GSO

2010b:263, 270). This fact suggests that firstly, the social security policy has been fairly well

* Quintile 1: the poorest group ** Quintile 3: the moderate group *** Quintile 5: the richest group

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applied; secondly, the benefits from economic growth have been more evenly distributed in Đà

Nẵng as compared with the other two cities.

In Thạch Thang, many poor households enjoyed benefits of the city’s targeted ‘5 Không’ and

‘3 Có’ programmes (Hữu 2012). In 2011, Hải Châu had 837 poor households, making up 1.7

percent of the total households. By the end of 2012, these households were free from poverty

(UBND-ĐN 2012b:15). In October 2013, Đà Nẵng had raised its new poverty line as shown in

Table 35 above. Consequently, Hải Châu had 2,743 poor households, accounting for 5.50 percent

of the district’s total households (UBND-ĐN 2012b:16).

Mr A said in a field interview (Interview I, Appendix 2) that with the city’s new poverty line,

as of October 2013, Thạch Thang ward had roughly one hundred poor households, of which

dozens were single-mother families. He said:

Thạch Thang had neither homeless family, nor poor children had to stop their schooling owing to poverty. This is because, apart from the city’s support, we could mobilize [financial]37 contribution from residents and businesses located in the district through such social campaigns as ‘the intact leaf covers the torn leaf’ (lá lành đùm lá rách)38 (Interview I, Appendix 2).

When being interviewed about how GRD is significant for social campaigns, and raising funds for

the poor, Mrs. L of Residential Group No.23 (Interview V, Appendix 2) said:

Based on the ward’s instructions, we organized residents’ meetings and called for contributions. There was no coercion, no fixed rate; it was completely voluntary. There was no criticism if one did not have any contribution. We kept the residents informed of the total amount collected, and the ward’s reports. We had to do this, because not everyone understood the issue. It is very complicated.

By saying ‘it is very complicated’, Mrs. L meant that the residents very often questioned whether

or not their money was utilized properly or distributed to those in need, or it went into the pocket

of local corrupt cadres. Else where in the country, there were cases in which funds raised in the

‘lá lành đùm lá rách’ campaign for the poor were embezzled by local corrupt cadres (Linh 2006).

Mrs. L did not answer the question directly, but principles of GRD were implicitly mentioned.

Effective economic inequality reduction requires long-term structural reforms, rather than short-

term social campaigns. However, the latter can contribute to it, and GRD has a role to play in this

process.


In 2011, Mr. Nguyễn Xuân Anh, aged thirty-eight, was elected alternate member of the CPV

Central Committee at its eleventh congress and later appointed as vice chairman of the Đà Nẵng

(BBC 2011c). In early 2013, Mr. Nguyễn Bá Cảnh, aged thirty-one, was elected as secretary of Đà

37 […] added by this researcher for clarification 38 This proverb is used to describe financial assistance by ‘the have’ extended to ‘the have not’.

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Nẵng’s Youth Union, a position from which promotion can be easily facilitated in Vietnam’s party-

state (BBC 2013f). The two cases drew public attention in Đà Nẵng because Anh is the son of Mr.

Nguyễn Văn Chi, a former CPV Politburo member and chairman of the Central Inspection

Commission; while Cảnh is the son of Mr. Nguyễn Bá Thanh, the former party chief of Đà Nẵng

and currently the chairman of Central Commission for Internal Affairs, a body in charge of the

CPV’s anti-corruption. In Vietnam’s one-party rule, children of the CPV leaders like Anh and Cảnh

are considered as the ‘red seeds’ (Quân 2011) and supposed to be the country’s leaders in the

future. Conventional wisdom has it that this is opportunity inequality created by political inequality.

The cases of Anh and Cảnh could have created real scepticism about the efforts of Đà Nẵng

government to promote democratization and to reduce opportunity inequality, as it has been

nationally known for its meritocracy and creation of equal opportunities for talented people. Đà

Nẵng, for instance, was a pioneer in allowing junior cadres to evaluate online their senior officials’

performance (Châu 2012b, UBND-ĐN 2012d), and granting scholarships to talented high-school

students pursuing under-graduate or graduate programmes at home or abroad to keep them working

for the city (Dũng 2011). During 2008 and 2013, the city provided 22,886 scholarships for orphan

poor students (HKH-ĐN 2013) to hit the ‘no illiteracy’ target within the ‘5 Không’ programme. Its

leaders articulated openly that ‘there is absolutely no way for using bribery to be promoted. Merit-

based recruitment and promotion counts’ and ‘competent officials shall be given equal opportunity

to be promoted to higher levels’ (Bình 2013b). Đà Nẵng was one of the first provinces that

organized competitions for the recruitment of leaders of government departments, communes and

wards (UBND-ĐN 2012e, Đông 2012b). Of course there is always a gap between rhetoric and

reality, but clearly these initiatives in Đà Nẵng contributed to reducing opportunity inequality.

Corruption

Đà Nẵng has earned a positive reputation for corruption control in the last three PAPI reports,

moving from a poor performer to a high average and the best performer in 2010, 2011 and 2012

respectively (PAPI 2010:41, 2011:57, 2012:57). It ranked the eighth out of thirty in 2012, thirtieth

out of sixty-three in 2011, an increase of 6.75 percent as compared with 2010; and the fourth out of

sixty-three in 2012, increased by 8.67 percent in comparison with 2011. This suggests that anti-

corruption measures in Đà Nẵng had a clear effect. Figures 37, 38, and 39 illustrate Đà Nẵng’s

anti-corruption progress in 2010, 2011 and 2012.

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Figure 37: Corruption in Đà Nẵng in 2010





(Source: PAPI 2012) (PAPI 2012:64)

Scores of three essential indicators measuring corruption: ‘No diversion of public funds’, ‘No

bribes for land title’, and ‘No bribes/kickbacks for/on construction’, of Đà Nẵng in the Figures

above show a trend toward the ‘perfect’ level. This means despite some progress, corruption related

to land remains to some extent in the city.

This reduction in corruption is, however, relative. One independent survey discloses that sixty-

three percent of businesses complain that most land use contracts are awarded to enterprises that

have close contacts with the municipal government; 46.5 percent of enterprises have to pay

unauthorized fees; 48.5 percent of enterprises encounter bureaucratic obstruction or pay bribes for

business registration, land use right registration (DISED 2013:30-35). There is also a complaint that

those who ‘play fair’ – which means paying bribes – with the city authorities will be awarded land

use rights (Phi 2013). This implies a relationship between interest groups and the authorities. A

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closer look at Đà Nẵng’s score of nepotism in PAPI 2011 and 2012 reports show that it is a serious

problem in Đà Nẵng, as illustrated in Figures 40 and 41 below.

Figure 40: Level of nepotism in Đà Nẵng 2011


Figure 41: Level of Nepotism in Đà Nẵng in 2012

(Source: PAPI 2012) (PAPI 2012:65)

The level of nepotism in Đà Nẵng became even worse in 2012 amidst allegations in the

blogosphere accusing Đà Nẵng leaders of corruption and collusion with business syndicates to gain

profits through land acquisition and distribution (Danlambao 2013, TinParis 2013). In early 2013,

the Government Inspectorate published an unprecedented document accusing Đà Nẵng’s ‘wrong

practice’ in land management, denoting its land-related corruption (GoIV 2013). Đà Nẵng rejected

the document as it ‘undermines the city’s revolutionary cause’ (UBND-ĐN 2013). The matter has

been swept under the carpet and almost forgotten, despite the Đà Nẵng chairman being requested

‘to implement the recommendations of the Government Inspectorate’ (GoVO 2012b). This led to

rumors about internal political in-fighting in Vietnamese polity (Diện 2013a, Quanlambao 2013).

Thạch Thang had some construction projects involving land acquisition and clearance. Mr. A

said in a field interview that:

Under the guidance of the city government, we organized several meetings with concerned households, with the residential groups of inform them the city’s policies and the purpose of the projects. Any complaints can be sent through the residential group leaders or directly to us. We then transferred to the city for final decisions. Some

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household were not satisfied with the compensation rates or resettlement plans, but they were a minority. In the meantime, some households even donated their land. We fully observed GRD regulations and the city government’s instructions. If we did not practice GRD, the situation would be more complicated (Interview I, Appendix 2).

In both residential groups No.23 and 24, there were no cases related to land acquisition and

clearance. However, when the residents here were interviewed about land-related corruption, most

believed that it happened (Interviews XII, XV, XVIII, XX, XXI and XXIII, Appendix 2).

The scores of Đà Nẵng’s corruption in PAPI 2011 and 2012 reports reveal that problems remain

entrenched, but in a country where corruption is rampant at every level (Bảo 2014) like ‘scabies

itching, very horrid’ (BBC 2013b, Hoàng 2013, Cầm 2013) and can be ‘felt when touching

anywhere on the body’ (Đức 2013a, Hà 2012), the city’s improvement in corruption control should

be hailed and linked with the implementation of GRD.

Governance


Đà Nẵng’s accountability score is based on three indicators: ‘Interactions with Local Authorities’,

‘People’s Inspection Board’ (PIB), and ‘Community Investment Supervision Board’ (CIB).

Accountability has been comparatively high and increased year-by- year, keeping the city at the

high-average and best performer level. The aggregate accountability scores of Đà Nẵng for 2010,

2011 and 2012 were 5.7, 5.8, and 6.15 respectively as illustrated in Figures 42, 43 and 44 below.

Figure 42: Accountability in Đà Nẵng in 2010 (a short cut from the top)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 (Source:PAPI 2010)(PAPI 2010:35)

Figure 43: Accountability in Đà Nẵng in 2011(a short cut from the next top)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Source:(PAPI 2011)(PAPI 2011:51)

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Figure 44: Accountability in Đà Nẵng in 2012 (a short cut from the next top)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6


In PAPI reports, PIBs and CIBs are two separate institutions, and this applies to all provinces,

except for Đà Nẵng. The city did not establish CIBs and hence transferred its tasks to PIBs, which

now inspect and supervise public infrastructure construction and investment projects (TUĐN

2012:9).

For repair, upgrading and building new roads and alleys in the urban and rural areas as well as

the construction of trenches and drainage sewers, Đà Nẵng’s government stipulated that it would

cover sixty percent to eighty percent of the cost, with the rest coming from the residents’

contributions, between twenty percent and forty percent (Sáng 2005:47). For example, during 2001-

2005, the residents contributed over 150 billion VND or 32.8 percent of 475 billion VND for

investment into the expansion of existing roads and building new roads within the city; VND

27,469 billion or thirty percent of the total investment in constructing a new bridge (Cường

2004:40, Sáng 2005:46). Some households even donated their land worth of ten billion VND for

the construction of a new road (TUĐN 2012:8). In a field interview, Mr. S of Đà Nẵng Department

of Home Affairs described the role of PIBs in the projects like this:

Where the road runs through, PIBs of the concerned residential groups will supervise the construction quality. If they detected any problem, they could either inform the people’s committee or contact directly with the contractors. In short, the role of PIBs is to make sure that the residents’ contribution is used with transparency and effectiveness (Interview XXII, Appendix 2).

Residents in Residential Groups No. 23 and 24 said in field interviews (Interviews XI and XXIII,

Appendix 2) that they contributed very little for road construction in their area, because the city’s

budget sufficiently covered the cost. Nevertheless, leaders of these Groups said that representatives

from each group were still invited to join the PIBs of the Ward to supervise and accredit the

construction quality. The appointment of Construction Company would be done by the ward

authority (Interviews IV and V, Appendix 2).

Apart from PIBs, authorities at different levels in Đà Nẵng very often organized dialogues with

the residents as shown in Table 39 below.

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Table 39: Dialogues between governments and citizens in 2008-2011 in Đà Nẵng

Dialogues between People’s Committees with businesses and citizens 2008 2009 2010 2011 Urban district 195 265 289 284 Rural district 1 3 4 3 Ward 96 136 159 210

(Source: Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Committee)(UBND-ĐN 2012f)

Holding regular dialogues with the residents at different levels is recognized as an outstanding

democratic practice of Đà Nẵng’s government in order to reduce grievances and denunciations of

the residents (Dũng 2012b). In 2011, a social poll revealed that sixty-seven percent of the

respondents appraised the city authorities’ response to ‘expectations of the people’ (CPVCPE and

CPE-ĐN 2011). In 2012, another survey showed that 72.89 percent of the respondents

acknowledged that the city authorities had accepted and responded positively to the residents’

concerns (DoHA-ĐN 2012). The two surveys were conducted by the city’s departments, thus there

might be scepticism of the data quality. However, the data collaborates field interviews with the

residents in Thạch Thang. A couple said:

If we were asked whether we were satisfied with the authorities’ performance, we would say ‘Not yet’. But we thought the local authorities and cadres, including the residential group leader, were responsible. Whatever concerns we raised, we receive feedback either directly or through the residential group leader (Interview XIII, Appendix 2).

The couple was asked to clarify what ‘the authorities’ performance’ meant to them. They said it

was about administrative procedures like application for construction permits (Interview XIII,

Appendix 2).

Đà Nẵng is a rare case in Vietnam that has the question-time sessions of the city’s people's

council televised live, and set up a hotline for voters to directly communicate their concerns and

questions to the sitting council. These aim to increase the accountability of government agencies to

the city voters (Châu 2013b). The residents’ satisfaction regarding service provision by government

agencies in Đà Nẵng increases each year, from 83.1 percent in 2008 to 97.8 percent in 2011

(TUĐN 2012:8).


Like most other provinces in Vietnam, complaints and denunciations of citizens related to land

clearance and compensation are the greatest concern with Đà Nẵng’s stability. Table 40 below

shows the statistics of complaints and denunciations in Đà Nẵng between 2008 and 2011. The data

demonstrates that Đà Nẵng resolved the complaints and denunciations relatively effectivly in the

period 2008-2011.

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Table 40: Complaints and denunciations in Đà Nẵng between 2008 and 2011

Number of complaints and denunciation sent to People’s Committee 2008 2009 2010 2011 Urban district 173 165 197 308 Of which Received 168 157 174 308

Settled 168 157 174 308 Rural district 86 105 110 137 Of which Received 86 105 110 137

Settled 86 105 110 130 Ward 596 582 625 622 Of which Received 540 578 604 603

Settled 540 578 604 582 (Source: Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Committee)(UBND-ĐN 2012f)

In 2013, Đà Nẵng saw five large demonstrations, one of which involved thirty people who travelled

to Hanoi to submit petitions to the central agencies. These emerged because the residents were not

satisfied with the answers of Đà Nẵng government about compensation and resettlement plan after

several dialogues on the land acquisition for construction projects (VPTDTW 2013:5, Cường

2013). Local residents usually appeal to central agencies after the local government fails to respond

to their concerns. The dispute between the city government and the residents in these cases explains

why dimensions of good governance like transparency, accountability, and the rule of law are

needed where the interests of the people and the government do not meet. Đà Nẵng has applied

GRD principles in an attempt to reach a consensus with the residents and to keep stability, but there

was a potential risk of instability when the residents were not satisfied. A lesson that can be drawn

here is stability is necessary but not sufficient for the success of GRD. It is the residents’

satisfaction that matters.

In the period 2000-2009, Đà Nẵng almost had no ‘Murder to rob’ cases (UBND-ĐN 2009b). In

2013, Đà Nẵng was evaluated as one of the safest destinations in Việt Nam (Hạnh 2013). However,

domestic violence is a big concern in Đà Nẵng. There are cases which are notorious throughout the

country for their ferocity (C.H 2013). Figure 45 below shows domestic violence prevalence in Đà

Nẵng between 2001 and 2006.

As the data in Figure 45 indicates, domestic violence constantly increased in the period 2001-

2006. In 2010, Đà Nẵng leaders initiated an unprecedented dialogue with 130 men who often beat

their wives, and encouraged these men to sign a pledge not to repeat domestic violence, and

presented rewards to those who made progress (Sơn 2013).

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Figure 45: Domestic Violence Prevalence in Đà Nẵng

(Source: Đà Nẵng Municipal Women’s Union, People’s Court)

(Lĩnh 2006, WU-ĐN 2006, PC-ĐN 2006)

In a field interview, Mrs. L of Group No.23 (Interview V, Appendix 2) said that five years ago her

group also had many domestic violence cases due to varying reasons, but has not seen any cases in

the past two years thanks to the residential group’s intervention and the local authorities’ education.

This accords with the statement of Mrs. C (Interview III, Appendix 2) that there was a decline in

the number of domestic violence cases in the ward, but it remains a problem in Hải Châu district at

large, especially in rural communes. If domestic violence is counted as a type of general violence

affecting the measurement results of ‘governance’, Đà Nẵng might not be an ‘absence of violence’

high-average performer.


Đà Nẵng has been nationally known for administrative and governance reforms. It has applied the

‘one-stop shop’ scheme (cơ chế ‘một cửa’)(about the "one-stop shop", see: PM 2003) to all public

administrative offices at the ward/commune level since 2004, and the ‘inter-agency one-stop shop’

(một cửa liên thông)(about the inter-agency one-stop shop, see: PM 2007) to all public

administrative offices at the urban/rural district level since 2006 (UBND-ĐN 2012g:6). Between

2005 and 2010, Đà Nẵng was one of the top three PCI scores achievers (VietnamNews 2012).

Table 41 below presents the PCI results between 2005 and 2010 of Đà Nẵng.

Table 41: Compiled PCI Results between 2005 and 2010

Year Scores Ranks Governance 2005 70.67 2 Excellent 2006 75.39 2 Excellent 2007 72.96 2 Excellent 2008 72.18 1 Excellent 2009 75.96 1 Excellent 2010 69.77 1 Excellent

(Source:Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry) (VCCI 2005-2010)

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Đà Nẵng’s scores for effective ‘governance’ have been almost perfect for six consecutive years,

which were illustrated by continued increase of FDI projects in the city. Since 2006, Đà Nẵng has

attracted more than US$ two billion, nearly twice that of the period 1997-2007, and accounting for

fifteen percent of total capital investment in the city over tweny-five years (Đ.H 2013, DPI-ĐN

2007). As of the first quarter of 2013, Đà Nẵng has 246 FDI projects, accounting for one third of

the total 798 projects in the entire region of North Central and Central Coastal Region (Đ.H

2013:10, Trung 2012).

A closer look at Đà Nẵng’s PCI in 2010 we can see the indicators: ‘Transparency and Access to

Information’ and ‘Proactivity of Provincial Leadership’, which constitute ‘good governance’, were

given the maximum scores. Figures 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50 below show five major indicators of Đà

Nẵng’s governance in 2010. Among the five indicators, Đà Nẵng drew a special attention to

transparency. A national survey on transparency in land management in 2010, for example, reveals

that Đà Nẵng was given the highest score (4.74), while other major cities like Hà Nội, Hồ Chí Minh

City, Cần Thơ and Khánh Hòa achieved 3.26, 4.46, 4.00 and 4.14 respectively (Anh et al. 2010:46).

Figure 46: Transparency and a ccess to information


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(Source: PCI 2005-2010, VCCI)

Đà Nẵng has also effectively implemented the transparency principle applicable to matters

requiring public notices as stipulated by GRD, such as; planning of residential zones, road routes,

administrative procedures, fees and community’s contributions (if applicable). Table 42 below

shows the means and the number of relevant documents published between 2008 and 2011 in Đà

Nẵng.




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Table 42: GRD Transparency in Đà Nẵng

Means of Transparency Number of documents by year 2008 2009 2010 2011

Post on bulletin boards at People’s Committee headquarters and central public places

1901

2346

2725

3033

Read on radio and television 2658 2843 3003 3304 Publish in websites and newspapers 307 394 420 521 Send to heads of villages and urban residential groups

3640 3687 4099 4321

(Source: Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Committee)(TUĐN 2012:7)

At the provincial level, Đà Nẵng has made an enormous leap forward in terms of transparency,

from being a low average to a high average performer, ranking thirty-nine and eighteen out of sixty-

three provinces in 2011 and 2012 respectively (PAPI 2011:41-43, 2012:42-44).

In Thạch Thang (Field observations, 11 August 2012, Appendix 2), laws, regulations, policies,

and administrative fees are made available. A dozen sample legible forms, notification of

procedures, types of administrative fees, and regulations for lodging and receiving feedbacks are

displayed in the Public Notice Board. Right in front of the Board was a row of light-green plastic

chairs for the residents in the queue, from where they could read the information on the Board

(Field observations, 11 August 2012, Appendix 2).

In 2011 and 2012, Đà Nẵng’s ranks in PCI were fifth and twelfth due to low scores of 66.98 and

61.71 respectively. The outcomes reflect ‘dissatisfaction of the business community’ with the city’s

economic management, investment and tax payment procedures (Phi 2013). As compared with the

period 2005-2010, the score of ‘Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality’ indicator of Đà

Nẵng declined. Nevertheless, Đà Nẵng remained in higher position than other big cities in the PCI

2011 and 2012. Figures 51 and 52 below show Đà Nẵng’s PCI scores in comparison with other

major cities in 2011 and 2012.

Figure 51: PCI 2011 of Đà Nẵng and other Cities

Figure 52: PCI 2012 of Đà Nẵng and other Cities

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It should be noted that while Đà Nẵng’s PCI 2012 dropped, its two key indicators: ‘Transparency

and Access to Information’ and ‘Proactivity of Provincial Leadership’, were still given the highest

scores of 6.58 and 5.71 respectively (VCCI 2011-2012).

Recently, to enhance access to information, Đà Nẵng has installed more than 400 free WIFI

routers across the city (Đông 2013). In 2012, Đà Nẵng was still recognized as the best public

administration reform performer. Figure 53 below illustrates Đà Nẵng’s PAR score and ranking in

comparison with other provinces in 2012.

Figure 53: Đà Nẵng’s PAR score and ranking in 2012

(Source: Ministry of Home Affairs)(MOHA 2014)

Another indicator measuring Đà Nẵng’s policies aimed at facilitating private sector development is

PEII. In 2013 PEII, Đà Nẵng ranked fifth among the top ten provinces (NCIEC 2013). Broadly

comparing with the WB’s ‘good governance’ index, Đà Nẵng’s ‘Government Effectiveness and

Regulatory Quality’ dimension can be given a high score. However, as noted above, ‘good

governance’ is best measured by satisfaction of the residents, not the private businesses, because

the residents are the end beneficiaries of public services and policies. As indicated above, Đà Nẵng

residents’ satisfaction of the public administrative service quality is relatively high, in contrast with

private businesses’ dissatisfaction that affects Đà Nẵng’s PCI scores of in 2011 and 2012. This

suggests that Đà Nẵng still has improvements to make in terms of public service provision.

Human Rights

In this section, citizens’ rights in the social, economic and cultural fields are examined through

public service provision and local cadres’ attitude. In 2012, Đà Nẵng ranked second out of sixty-

three provinces in respect of service quality and public service delivery, higher than Hà Nội,

ranking forty-first, and Hồ Chí Minh City, ranking twenty-third (PAPI 2012:67-69). Figure 54

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below introduces the scores of four indicators, including (i) certification services; (ii) application

procedures for construction permits; (iii) application procedures for land use rights certificates; and

(iv) application procedures for personal documents, used to measure public administrative services

quality in Đà Nẵng in 2012.

Figure 54: Quality of Public Administrative Procedures (a short cut from the top)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9


Compared with 2011, Đà Nẵng’s public service quality in 2012 slightly increased by 1.88 percent.

This demonstrates that the public service quality of this city has been maintained at a high level

(PAPI 2012:70). It should be noted here that Đà Nẵng’s PAPI 2012 scores were not influenced by

the city’s delayed promulgation of Decision No.4503, which required its local cadres to apologise

to the people if they made mistakes or failed in their appointments (UBND-ĐN 2012c). The scores

for Đà Nẵng’s human rights-related indicators such as ‘Treated with Respect’, ‘Satisfied with

Service’, ‘Deadline Met’ were at maximum levels in 2012 (PAPI 2012:77).

Field work in Đà Nẵng was conducted a month after Decision No.4503 went into effect. Hence,

it was too early to judge its impact on the attitude and behaviour of local cadres. Yet, the way

Thạch Thang staff communicated with respect to the residents indicated that Decision No.4503 was

simply a document that legalizes unwritten rules already adhered to by them (FO, 27 July and 11-

12 August 2012, Appendix 2). Though, this does not necessarily undermine the importance of the

document, because in various instances in Đà Nẵng local cadres are still ‘commanding, bureaucratic

and authoritarian’ (Anh 2011:57, Quyền 2013:37). For years, local cadres’ commandism and

bureaucratism prevented citizens from accessing public services in Vietnam.

The respect of citizens’ human rights can be assessed by the availability, quality and

accessibility to such basic services as health care, education, public facilities, as well as the state’s

responsiveness to the citizens’ basic needs. The city’s two targeted programmes: ‘5 Không’ (5

Zeroes) and ‘3 Có’ (3 Haves), are meant to address the basic human rights, including: the right to

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food (no household suffering from hunger), the right to housing (no tramp in street and have a

shelter), the right to education (no illiterate person), the right to human security (no murder and no

pillage), and the right to work (have a job).

Đà Nẵng completed the targets: ‘No household suffering from hunger’ in 2000, ‘No poor

household’ in 2004, ‘No illiteracy among those aged 6-35’ in 2002 (Dũng 2011). In the period

2005-2010, the city created jobs for 161,486 workmen, or an average of 32,300 workmen per year

(UBND-ĐN 2012h:3); provided gratis 3,029 new houses to the poor (Huệ 2011, DOLISA-ĐN

2011). It has also put into operation a hospital offering free treatment to poor women suffering from

cancer. There is no other such health care institution in Việt Nam. In 2012, Đà Nẵng ranked the first

in quality of public services delivery as shown in Figure 55 below.

Figure 55: Quality of Public Services Delivery (a short cut from the top)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9


Đà Nẵng’s high quality of public administrative services, and best public service delivery, can be

attributed to the city’s continued high economic growth in the past fifteen years, and hence citizens’

human rights in the related fields could have been better respected. Given the intrinsic link between

human rights and democracy, GRD cannot be implemented effectively if Đà Nẵng residents’ basic

rights are not fulfilled.

Rule of Law


About ten years ago, Đà Nẵng experienced an abrupt change in its governance system. The Director

of the Construction Department was disciplined with a warning because he had slack control of his

subordinates, and the Head of the Construction Management Unit was sacked for irresponsibility

and undisciplined actions. Both cases were publicly announced in the city People’s Council

Meeting – an unprecedented practice in the city (Châu 2013c, 2013d). The case was described as a

‘declaration of war’ by the city government to combat the decay of local cadres at various levels

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(TUĐN 2003, 2004). Between 2003 and 2013, hundreds of party members and local cadres were

disciplined in Đà Nẵng. Table 43 below displays the penalties received by party members and

government officials.

In 2013, Đà Nẵng disciplined one residential group leader and dozens of local cadres for

‘unfriendly communication with the people’, ‘nicking the funds generated by people’s

contribution’, and ‘lack of ethics, keeping no good relations with the community in the residential

area’ through a supervision program conducted by Đà Nẵng VFF (FF-ĐN 2014:7).

Table 43: Penalty application to party members and government officials

Types of penalty

2003-2013 Party and Mass Organizations

Governments at all levels

Reprimand 207 62 Warning 167 36 Dismissal 22 9 Party Expel 50 Wage level reduction 5 Not re-appointed 5 Total 571

(Source: Đà Nẵng Municipal Party Committee)(TUĐN 2013:5)

The number of party members and cadres disciplined in Đà Nẵng represents a small fraction of a

general phenomenon in Vietnam. There are wider problems articulated by phrases like ‘the people

coming to public offices with demeanor of a beggar asking for something’ and ‘citizens think that

public servants shall not serve them, so they are reluctant to come to public offices for fear of being

harassed and forced to pay money’ (Hội 2013). In Đà Nẵng, the disclosure of identities of two high-

ranking public officials disciplined in a public meeting ten years ago was not only for the purpose

of deterrence, but also raised the alarm over the decay and declining accountability of party-

members and local cadres (Châu 2013d).

Two retired residents in Thạch Thang were interviewed (Interview VIII, Appendix 2) about the

way party members and local cadres are disciplined. They said:

They [the government] only rose up the baton and slightly beat down. It means that mistakes are announced, but only a slight penalty is applied, except for the serious cases with too much reflection of the people.

These residents’ comments recalled the response by former Deputy Prime Minister Nguyễn Sinh

Hùng, who is now Chairman of the National Assembly, to a similar question in a question-time

session of the National Assembly. He said this:

Mistakes must be fixed. We do ten good jobs there might be one mistake. If we sack them all, who else remain to do the jobs? Say as it is stipulated by laws, but the laws have their own ethics. If we sack whoever makes a mistake, we cannot find and elect enough people to work (Hùng 2010).

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A young business woman, who lives close to Thạch Thang ward headquarters reported that a senior

police officer received a disciplinary warning because he obstructed a city’s decision on land

acquisition and clearance for a road construction. This woman agreed with the discipline and said:

As a senior police officer and a party member, he should have shown a good example to abide to the city’s decision. Nevertheless, he vaingloriously relying on his power did not conform to the decision; rather he challenged the public service executors. The city government went ahead with land clearance at his household and put him under warning discipline (Interview X, Appendix 2).

When asked if the case had been published on local, the young woman said ‘No’, but knew about it

because her parents lived in the same residential group with the police officer. She added: ‘You can

ask any taxi drivers in the city. They all know the case’ (Interview X, Appendix 2).

This observation indicates that the city government was wise to use the case as deterrence

against the land clearance protesters and to attract the residents’ empathy about the fairness

between party members, local cadres and the residents.


Scores of Đà Nẵng’s indicator ‘Law and Order’, which is used to measure the control of crime,

safety and security in local community life, in PAPI reports between 2010 and 2012, have been

constantly high. Table 44 below provides a comparison between the national and Đà Nẵng’s score

of ‘Law and Order’ by years.

Table 44: Score of ‘Law and Order’ sub-dimension of Đà Nẵng by year

National level

(high score) Đà Nẵng

Score

2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.70 1.65 1.70

(Source: PAPI 2010-2012)(PAPI 2010:66, 2011:83, 2012:80)

Three sub-indicators used to measure ‘Law and Order’ include (i) level of safety in the locality, (ii)

change in safety over time, and (iii) victims of theft, robbery, break-ins and physical violence.

Among these, the most significant for Đà Nẵng is the third. The rate of crime in the city is

relatively high, particularly vehicle theft, robbery and break-in. It is however noticeable that there is

no record of ‘physical violence’, except for domestic violence as noted above.

In 2010, Đà Nẵng was among a few cities with prevalent theft (PAPI 2010:70) and in 2011, the

city had the highest rate of victims of all types of crime, excluding ‘physical violence’ crime like

murder (PAPI 2011:92). That the city had high rates of crime and related victims does not mean

that it failed to address crime and to ensure safety and security of the residents. Instead, it can be

attributed to a high rate of immigration into the city, with over 80,000 immigrants arriving between

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2005 and 2010, generating a high pressure in terms of residence space, employment and security

(UBND-ĐN 2011:2). This also brought new criminals. In 2011 alone, Đà Nẵng had 278 accused

offenders, of whom twenty-five percent were new arrivals (HĐND-ĐN 2011). Drug-related crimes

were a big concern and attracted a great deal of attention of the city. During the period 2001-2005,

for instance, there were 245 cases of arrests and trials, involving 705 convicted offenders (DPS-ĐN

2005:7). Đà Nẵng expressed its determination to combat these crimes by gathering drug users in

concentrations for detoxifying programmes which also served to reduce their presence in the

community where they might otherwise fund their habit by pick-pocketing, robbery and even

murder. The city also initiated rewards for informants who detected drug users in the streets and

reported them to the city authority (Dũng 2011). Regarding other offences, in 2013, Đà Nẵng

discovered 461 out of 583 criminal cases, with 840 arrests; eradicated twenty-nine groups of 155

criminal offenders who intended to form gangs and operate like a ‘black society’ (DPS-ĐN

2013:5).

Another problem related to security and social order that Đà Nẵng has dealt with effectively is

motor-racing on the street - a common phenomenon in most major cities of Vietnam, including

Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Đà Nẵng confiscated and auctioned the racing motorbikes to raise

public funds for poor people. Although Đà Nẵng was criticized for this practice, it received popular

support. A woman from the residential group No. 24 in Thạch Thang (Interview XIV, Appendix 2)

said that a member in her family was critically wounded after being hit by a racing motor-cycler,

hence everybody supported the city government's measure to stop the motorcycle racing problem.

She said:

Motor-racing remains, but less frequently than before. We do not have to suffer from grumbling sound of racing motorcycles every night in front of the house. Moreover, it is a life danger for travellers in the street. I personally support the city’s seizure and punishment of motor-racers (Interview XIV, Appendix 2).

Although Đà Nẵng had and expected to see a high rate of crimes for some time to come (DPS-ĐN

2013:11), thanks to its surprisingly effective control, the city has been recognized as one of the

safest destinations in the country, able to keep good public order (Hạnh 2013).


The development and implementation of Hương ước (village convention) was a focus in field

interviews with the residents in Thạch Thang. ‘Hương ước’ is the phrase used in rural areas, while

in the urban areas it is called ‘Quy ước tổ dân phố’ (urban residential group rules). In the case of

Thái Bình, Hương Ước remains influential in the rural village life. Hence, it is important to

investigate whether and how Quy ước tổ dân phố (Quy ước) is meaningful in urban areas with a

modern life style governed by laws rather than by traditional ‘village rules’.

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Mr. H of Group No. 24 (Interview IV, Appendix 2) and Mrs. L of Group No.23 (Interview V,

Appendix 2) in Thạch Thang showed a copy of their groups’ Quy ước. This two-page document,

approved by Thạch Thang people’s committee, has seven articles articulating commitments of the

residents to a civilized life style, including the preservation of public sanitation, prevention of social

evils (drug abuse, thieving, robbery), and living in harmony with neighbours. As far as the role of

Quy ước is concerned, Mrs. L of Group No.23 said:

Quy ước is loose and mainly encourage the voluntary nature self-esteem of the households in their conducts, though they are the basic rule for everyone to follow, to remind each other of keeping an urban civilized life style, and to curb the disputes which may occur in the community (Interview V, Appendix 2).

By the end of 2011, Đà Nẵng had 1,899 out of 2,250 villages and urban residential groups that

formulated Hương ước and Quy ước, of which 1,859 documents were approved by the local

governments (TUĐN 2012:5). Having Quy ước does not necessarily guarantee there will be no

conflicts or disputes occurring in the community. Mr. H of Group No.24 said:

There are quite a few disputes in the community. They are diversified in nature. Some are minor disputes between family members; others are land-related disputes. In those cases, we collaborate with representatives of VFF, VWU or VVA to reconciliate the disputants in order to keep up the empathy of family and good neighbourhood (Interview IV, Appendix 2).

Like rural areas, reconciliation is also stressed in urban areas. By the end of 2012, Đà Nẵng has

established 1,944 reconciliation groups with 7,526 members, who helped solve eighty to eighty-five

percent of disputes and conflicts arising in residential communities (TUĐN 2012:4). Besides these

reconciliation groups, several community-based self-management teams were also established, such

as ‘Mobile female guardian teams’ (Đội dân phòng cơ động nữ), ‘Teams for quick response to

domestic violence’ (Tổ phản ứng nhanh về bạo lực gia đình), which are also engaged in solving

disputes in the community, particularly domestic violence cases (Hòa 2013, Hoàng 2014). In a field

interview, Mr. A (Interview I, Appendix 2) highly appreciated the performance of reconciliation

groups and self-management teams. He said:

These groups and teams, and the implementation of Quy ước tổ dân phố have substantially contributed to maintaining public order, stability and security in our community. Therefore, we direct our forces like the police and mass organizations to support these teams’ operations (Interview I, Appendix 2).

The outcomes in implementing three dimensions: sanctions for misconduct by government officials;

effective control of crime; and community-based dispute resolution system, show laws are relatively

respected in Đà Nẵng. GRD provides basic principles for the respect of rule of law in the city.

Social Capital

High Civic Engagement

Scores for the ‘Participation at local levels’ indicator of Đà Nẵng in PAPI reports were not high. In

2010, the city ranked fifth out of thirty provinces, but in 2011 and 2012 it stood at thirty-fifth and

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twenty-fourth out of sixty-three provinces respectively (PAPI 2010:17, 2011:33, 2012:36).

Although its aggregate score in 2012 increased, as shown in Table 45 below, bringing Đà Nẵng to

the level of “a high average performer” from a lower position in 2011, the city is still not yet among

the top.

Table 45: Participation at Local Level in Đà Nẵng in 2011 and 2012

Indicators National Mean National PAPI 2012

(95% CI) Đà Nẵng’s scores

2011 2012 Low High 2011 2012 Civil knowledge 1.11 1.06 1.03 1.09 1.20 1.20 Opportunities for participation

1.88 1.82 1.79 1.85 1.70 1.85

Quality of elections 1.45 1.47 1.44 1.49 1.45 1.50 Voluntary contributions 0.85 0.81 0.79 0.84 0.80 1.00

(Source: PAPI 2011 and 2012)(PAPI 2011:30-39, 2012:34-41) A closer look at the indicator ‘Opportunities for participation’ in PAPI 2012, among sub-indicators

measuring ‘Opportunities for participation’, Đà Nẵng had a minimum score for the sub-indicator

‘Voted in the last commune People’s Council election’, which is 41.32 percent, showing low

political participation. Meanwhile, during this time, the proportion of voters who participated in the

election of National Assembly (XIII Tenure, the 2011-2016 term) and the city Đà Nẵng People’s

Council (VIII Tenure, the 2011-2016 term) was very high, reaching 99.89 percent (UBBC-ĐN

2011:2), showing high political activism. There are two explanations for this contrast in popular

political activism in Đà Nẵng. First, Đà Nẵng residents are more concerned with higher

management level, because commune level is subordinate and usually has to simply implement the

directions of the upper level. Việt Nam’s political structure means that the elected bodies at the

district, ward/commune levels merely implement decisions made by the higher elected body. From

2009, Đà Nẵng has experimented abolishing people’s councils at ward/commune level. This could

lead to a psychology in the rural population that having a communal people’s council is not

different from having no people’s council at the ward level.

Second, Đà Nẵng’s rapid economic development in the past ten years has improved the material

life of its citizens. The average annual income per capita in 2010 was 2,015 USD, an increase of 5.4

times compared with 2003 and 1.6 times the national average level (TUĐN 2010a:1, UBND-ĐN

2012g:1, Tăng 2014). The city has the highest rate of urban population in the country (SO-ĐN

2009b:75). This allows us to assume that Đà Nẵng residents tend to enjoy a modern life with

adequate physical facilities, and hence they are better aware of democracy. PAPI 2010 report shows

that Đà Nẵng has the highest ratio of people being aware of the concept of GRD, 70.66 percent

(high national score is 34.17 percent), and its principles, 91.12 percent (high national score is 72.26

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percent), in comparison with other provinces (PAPI 2010:18). An enterprise owner in Thạch Thang

was asked: ‘What is democracy?’ He defines it like this:

Democracy is when the people request, the state has to respond, and the people have the right to doing business (Interview VII, Appendix 2).

A middle-aged woman has it that:

Democracy is that the people are the masters; whatever we want we say it, without being bound up or fear (Interview XVI, Appendix 2).

This suggests that there are many different definitions of democracy, though getting the people to

understand and accept democracy depends on the practical circumstances in which they live,

including the local government’s response to their requirements.

Đà Nẵng’s score for indicator ‘Voluntary Contributions’ is not high, as shown in Table 45

above. However, the level of contributions of urban residents is different from that of rural villagers

in Đà Nẵng. The contribution of urban residents in Đà Nẵng is provided to the local government in

realizing the city’s two targeted programs of ‘5 Không’ and ‘3 Có’. For instance, a household in

Hòa Khánh ward of Liên Chiểu district donated 7,027m2 of land, roughly worth of 10.16 billion

VND, for road construction (UBND-ĐN 2012g:7). In 2010, the residents contributed more than

15.32 billion VND to repairing 331 outdated houses and building 247 new houses for the poor;

paying five percent of health-care cost for 788 poor patients; supporting 4,303 poor students to

return to school; and assisting 788 poor households to develop livelihoods (FF-ĐN 2010:3). These

contributions by urban residents in Đà Nẵng demonstrate that it is not just purely humanitarian

work, but also reflect good citizenship. Moreover, it indicates a high engagement of citizens in the

community life, which in turn enhances mutual cooperation and trust among members of the

community.

Civic organizations

Regarding the role of VFF and its relations with the local government, in a field interview, Mr. B

said:

Comparing with the situation in the past, the voice of VFF is now listened. However, our main task is to coordinate with other mass organizations to mobilize the people to implement the programs and campaigns such as ‘All people are united to build a cultural life in the residential area’ or ‘Pro-poor Day’, because these campaigns are associated with the city’s two targeted programmes (Interview II, Appendix 2).

When asked about the role of VFF in the election of local government leaders and residential group

leaders, Mr. B only answered the second question. He avoided answering the first question, because

VFF’s role is not seriously taken into account (Interview II, Appendix 2). In the case of election of

the residential group leader, VFF’s role is to give opinions and recommendations about one or

another candidate, and party committee shall make the final decision.

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Since 2009 and the abolishment of the people's council at the ward/commune level, VFF has had

more to do, including supervision of local cadres’ performance. For instance, in 2013, the city’s

VFF carried out an experimental monitoring programme to evaluate cadres’ performance at

ward/commune and district levels. Mr. B said:

In the coming time, we will be busier and have a lot of work to do as we are rolling out the implementation of this monitoring programme (Interview II, Appendix 2).

Other mass and civic organizations such as VWU, HCMYU, Trade Union, Red Cross, Charity

Society, Ex-Vanguard Youth Association, Association for the Protection of Poor and Unprivileged

Women and Children, organized various social programs. These include, for instance: ‘Assisting

Poor Women’ (Tiếp sức phụ nữ nghèo); ‘Cosy Shelters’ (Mái ấm tình thương); ‘Trade Union’s

Cosy Shelters’ (Mái ấm Công đoàn); ‘Alms House’ (Nhà tình thương); ‘Helping Unprivileged

Friends go to School’ (Giúp bạn vượt khó đến trường); ‘Affection for Comrades in Arms’ (Vì nghĩa

tình đồng đội); ‘Attached apartments for the single women’ (Xây nhà liền kề cho phụ nữ đơn thân);

‘Cosy Shelters for the poor in border areas and islands’ (Mái ấm cho người nghèo nơi biên giới, hải

đảo) (Quang 2011:43, Hải 2011:47). These social campaigns and activism of mass and civic

organizations demonstrate a vibrant associational life in Đà Nẵng, engaging people from different

groups in community life. They also reinforce relations between the state and society, the local

government and civic organizations, and local cadres and the residents.

Trust

In early 2013, most newspapers in Vietnam published the Prime Minister’s conclusion on the

Government Inspectorate (GoIV’s) inquiries on land mis-management by Đà Nẵng leaders, causing

the loss of millions of US dollars (GoIV 2013, GoVO 2012b). This unprecedented development

was expected to shake up politics in Đà Nẵng because it damaged the reputation of city leaders

(BBC 2013c). Convention has it that if an anti-corruption inspectorate produces a conclusion in a

corruption case, in most instances this is conceived as ‘true’. The citizens tend to support such

conclusion and rarely speak to defend the corrupt officials. However, it was different in the case of

Đà Nẵng.

The city government not only rejected the GoIV’s inquiry results, but also accused the latter of

‘imputing a blame in lack of convincing evidence, negatively affecting the revolutionary cause of

the city’ (UBND-ĐN 2013). Surprisingly, the city government’s rejection was supported by its

residents, who expressed their full trust in what the city government did (Thiên 2013). A middle-

aged man from Group No.23 in Thạch Thang (Interview XXIII, Appendix 2) was interviewed

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whether people like him ‘believe the GoIV’s inquiry results as well as the city’s feedback?’ He

expressed scepticism of a political game, and said:

Those are the big guys kicking each other, how could there be such a big story in this small city beyond our sight?! (Interview XXIII, Appendix 2)

No one could have better understood the city government and its leaders than the residents in Đà

Nẵng. The above ‘political scandal’ is a good example of the people’s trust in the local party-state

apparatus and their leadership. This trust has been built on the basis of the city’s development, the

performance of the city’s leadership, and the city’s governance reforms which respond to the

residents’ demands in the past fifteen years. This is what was labelled as ‘trust capital’ (Hải 2013f).

This trust capital accumulated by the Đà Nẵng’s leadership was so large that when the leaders were

criticized by the central government, the residents still believed that their leaders ‘did the right thing

and had good arguments againt the government inspectorate’s reports’ (Thiên 2013).

Leadership

Unlike Chapter Five on Thái Bình and Chapter Six on Hưng Yên, this extra39 section explores the

role of an individual leader given the well-known influence of a particular leader on Đà Nẵng’s

development in the past fifteen years. This becomes one of the explanations for why Đà Nẵng is

different from the other two provinces (in Chapter Eight).

The leader, Mr. Nguyễn Bá Thanh, at that time was chairman of Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s

Committee (1997 - 2002), and then became the secretary of Đà Nẵng Municipal Party Committee

cum chairman of the Đà Nẵng Municipal People’s Council (2002- 2012)40. During this span of

fifteen years, Đà Nẵng emerged from being a Class 2 city to a Class 1 municipality under the direct

control of the central government; from a poor port city into the most ‘worthy liveable’ city in

Vietnam. That is why it is not a surprise when talking about Đà Nẵng, people are reminded of Mr.

Nguyễn Bá Thanh and vice versa (Thuyết 2012).

Đà Nẵng residents had high expectations for Mr. Thanh ten years ago when he carried out a

‘major surgery’ (đại giải phẫu), meaning political reform, on the city administrative system (Châu

2013f). Under Thanh’s leadership, Đà Nẵng made decisions that were ‘unlike anyone’ and deemed

as ‘breaking the fence’ (xé rào), particularly in the field of land issues and infrastructure

development, making the city a ‘prevailing’ model for other provinces to learn from (Sơn 2013, Võ

2012). Thanh was then labelled as ‘Mr. Infrastructure’ (Mis-ter Cơ sở hạ tầng) (Thành 2003:8).

Thanh’s influence on Đà Nẵng’s development is also extended to the growth of a contingent of

39 Emphasis added 40 In late 2012, the CPV Polibureau appointed Mr. Thanh chairman of the CPV’s Internal Affairs Commission, a CPV-designated body to combat corruption.

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well-trained, disciplined and accountable public officials, and ultimately a governance system

responsive to the people’s concerns. In a public meeting with his subordinates, Thanh said:

Comrades, do not turn you into animals in the circus; every time they are fed, they perform. Let’s work first, and if you work well the people would not forget their gratitude to you (Huy 2013).

He appealed to party members and public officials in Đà Nẵng to admit personal responsibility for

their mistakes. According to him, public officials must ‘feel ashamed’ when they failed to keep

their promises to the people. He told them:

If anyone is too tired, just raise the hand up to ask for a retreat. If you cannot do it, you should ask for resign the post. Do not blame the fault to the collective, to the people! The government is responsible for bringing a peaceful life to the people. How come we blame someone here and there for the faults (Quang 2013, Bình 2013b).

For many external commentators, such comments are the lip service often utilized by communist

party leaders to placate their constituents. Nonetheless, Mr. Thanh seems different from other

leaders in Vietnam. He even received compliments from anti-government bloggers. Trương Duy

Nhất, a well-known blogger being detained under Article 258 of the current panel code for harsh

criticism against the CPV leaders, wrote about Mr. Thanh like this:

Mr. Thanh is the one who can say it and can do it. He is really doing it (Trường 2013, BBC 2013d).

A culturally and socially constructed phrase says that Đà Nẵng people are ‘always arguing’,

implying that they love controversy and criticise when they find things wrong (An 2012a, Quốc

2012). They would never accept a leader who ‘can only say it without doing it’. Here is a Đà Nẵng

native’s comment on Mr. Thanh:

We folks are not idiots? We have the hard brain in the skull! Guy Thanh did his job well otherwise we would not have left him at his ease!(Diện 2013a)41

Thanh was praised by deputies of the National Assembly as a leader who ‘is self-confident and

steadfast’ (bản lĩnh), ‘dares to think out of the old way’ (dám nghĩ), ‘dares to speak about the

political taboos’ (dám nói), ‘dares to do it’ (dám làm), ‘dares to take responsibility’ (dám chịu trách

nhiệm), and ‘dares to confront with the reality and challenges’ (dám đương đầu với thực tiễn)(Minh

2012, Bình 2013a). Many people believe that a leader like him is ‘rarely found... and really needed

for Vietnam today’ (GDVN 2013), because he ‘has rare talents in a country choked by bureaucracy.

He gets things done and deserves a lot of credit for Danang's popularity among investors’

(Timberlake 2011). However, Thanh was also described as an ‘authoritarian’ leader (Diện 2013b,

Phương 2011, Timberlake 2011). This is because of his rigid leadership style and the way he dealt

with his opponents (RFA 2009, Văn 2009). Thanh himself also confessed that when he left the city

41 In the correct accent of Quảng Nam people, this speech reads as follows: “Dân toa đao có ngu chi? Có sỏ troong đào nì? Choa Theng mần đẹc chớ không dễ gì tụi toa để yên cho rứa?”

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behind [to take a new job in Hanoi] ‘many Department directors were very happy’ (Khá 2013).

Whether it is praise or a criticism, no one ever denied what Mr. Thanh did for Đà Nẵng:

transforming it from a backward city to the most ‘worthy liveable’ city in Vietnam, promoting

public administrative and governance reforms to deliver public services of high quality, building a

contingent of competent, disciplined and responsive public officials.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to answer three questions on the implementation of GRD goals, its impact

on the local party-state apparatus, cadre-resident relations, and local governance reform, and

ultimately the CPV’s legitimacy and governability in Đà Nẵng. Outcomes from the analysis of the

six independent variables above indicate a positive correlation between these variables and the

implementation of GRD in Đà Nẵng, as shown in table below. This reinforces this thesis’ argument

that GRD has been implemented successfully in Đà Nẵng.

Positive correlation Low Inequality Low Corruption Good Governance High adherence to Human Rights High adherence to Rule of Law High Social Capital

This success is further illustrated by the city’s enduring stability; continued economic development;

improved party-state apparatus, state-society relations, and cadre-resident relations. Above all, the

city is associated with local governance reforms to make local authorities more responsive and

accountable to the residents; encouraging more civic engagement in community life; increasing

trust of the residents in the party-state, which in turn enhances the CPV’s legitimacy and grip on

power. This has been best described by Mr. Nguyễn Bá Thanh, former leader of the city, like this:

‘the people trust what the party says, the people follow when the Fatherland Front and mass

organizations mobilize; and the people support what the government does’, and hence for the party-

state ‘the biggest gain is the people’s heart and trust’ (Thanh 2010a, 2012).

Finally, this chapter is not about the success of GRD solely attributed to contributions rendered

by an individual leader, but Đà Nẵng was able to implement GRD successfully because it had an

‘authoritarian, but determined and competent leader’ (Hải 2013c). The facts show that in Vietnam’s

party-state, the role of an individual leader is important, determining the success or failure of a

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policy made by the Leninist power-sharing and decision-making structure. Thus, it is possible to

add that good leadership is also an important variable that reinforces the legitimacy of Vietnam’s

party-state.

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8

Case Study Analysis: Explaining Variation

The results of the implementation of GRD in the three case studies appear to be different. In Thái

Bình, GRD was rather successful, but remains fragile as the independent variables analyzed and

identified have not substantially changed. In the case of Hưng Yên, the quality of GRD was low

because of its negative correlation with the six independent variables. Đà Nẵng was the most

successful case in achieving GRD goals as the analysis of the independent variables analyzed

illustrated positive outcomes and appeared reasonably durable (that is, they demonstrated some

degree of sustainability beyond the change of specific personnel). This is further illustrated by Đà

Nẵng’s return to the first place in PCI and PAPI 2013 (VCCI. 2013, Châu 2014b).

Explaining variation between cases

Three factors are forwarded as an explanation for the variation illustrated in the case studies under

review. They include: development, leadership, and vibrant civic networks. These factors are inter-

related and equally important for the successful implementation of GRD.

Development

Development in the case of Thái Bình is best summed up by a native who offered the assessment

that ‘not many changes’ have occurred for the last fifteen years since the disturbances in 1997

(Interview XXI, Appendix 1). Though he means change in an economic sense, this phrase carries

with it a myriad of potential connotations. The most recent survey shows that Thái Bình had the

greatest ratio of poorest households in the Red River delta region (GSO 2010b:432). Poverty does

not make a polity undemocratic, but it does make it less democratic (Varshney 2005:388) and

affects the peasants’ participation in Vietnam’s decision-making process in rural areas (Mattner

2004:125). In Thái Bình, a manifestation that demonstrates the peasants’ disengagement from the

process is participation in villagers’ meetings. The majority of those attending village meetings

were almost all retirees and men, who did not raise their concerns because they thought that

decisions had been pre-made by the party committees. Such participation was inactive and passive,

and obviously affected the quality of the implementation, and therefore the effectiveness of, GRD

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mechanisms. Field work interviews and participatory observations led this researcher to conclude

that local leaders stressed stability on the ground of keeping the status quo, rather than promoting

development that would lead to local governance reforms. Furthermore, the instability in 1997

incurred as a result of economic development without efficient political control seemed to still be

haunting both local authorities and the peasants, becoming an intangible obstacle that prevented

Thái Bình from taking bold steps to modernize itself, both in terms of the governance system and

economic infrastructure. Compared with Hưng Yên and Đà Nẵng, Thái Bình’s modernization lags

far behind. In the short-term, it might not cause any social problems, but in the long-run under-

development could give rise to unrest.

In the case of Hưng Yên, economic development reflected a steady increase of monthly income

per capita since 1997 thanks to the province’s strong commitment to modernization and

industrialization. The Ecopark project is an example of Hưng Yên’s attempt to modernize the

province by turning 550 hectares of arable land into an urban zone with modern high-story

buildings like Singapore. Tensions in state-peasant relations, local cadre-peasant relations, and

investor-peasant relations in this project embodied two problems of the provincial officials’

modernization strategy. First, forced construction of modern buildings, or setting up industrial

zones by depriving the peasants’ land and related entitlements, cannot be equated with the concept

of modernization. According to Lipset, modernization will foster a democratic culture, and increase

‘the receptiveness to the types of norms and values that mitigate conflict’ (Wucherpfennig and

Deutsch 2009:1-2). Second, and related to the first, the modernization policy initiated by any

government will be accepted and tolerated by the citizens if it is formulated and implemented in a

democratic fashion (Shcherbak 2012). In the case of Ecopark project, GRD was ignored and the

investor’s benefits, rather than the peasants’, were prioritized. The rent-seekers who gain benefits

from government-granted privileges (Quinn 2006, Sheng and Trang 2008, Vuving 2010, 2013,

Thuy and Dijk 2012, Schubert 2012, Dũng 2013b) and corruption distorted public policy and, of

course, undermined democratic principles, as defined by the Vietnamese government, like public

consultation, accountability and transparency, which are the core of GRD. Development in the case

of Hưng Yên took place at the cost of the democratic rights of the peasants. This contrasts markedly

with Đà Nẵng, the third case-study.

Đà Nẵng’s modernization is obvious, from a poverty-stricken province to the most ‘worthy

liveable’ city in Vietnam in the past fifteen years. Its development is measured by achievements of

the social welfare programmes that aim to: reduce inequality and protect economic, social and

cultural rights of the citizens; by the citizens’ satisfaction of the party-state’s responsiveness; by

governance reforms that emphasize local cadres’ accountability, and the transparency of public

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office performance. Đà Nẵng is not a ‘perfect’ model and still has its own problems, but it is an

aspiration embraced by many people, including those from the capital city, Hanoi (Minh 2014). The

city’s development is indisputably associated with land. But in contrast with Hưng Yên, land-

related decisions by the city’s authorities are accepted by a majority of the residents. Two aspects

analyzed in the thesis were shown to differentiate Đà Nẵng from Hưng Yên. First, the city

government often holds dialogues with affected residents. The key democratic principle that applies

and makes these dialogues meaningful is the majority of resident vote. Majority rule does not

always and necessarily mean democracy in a Western sense, but it works as a control when there is

only a minority struggling for private rather than collective benefits (Lijphart 1977).

Furthermore, majority vote matters when transparency is upheld. Đà Nẵng’s transparency scores

measured by PCI, PAPI, PAR Index and PEII were constantly high. Second, and as a result of the

first, a majority of Đà Nẵng residents tolerate the city’s modernization and urbanization strategies.

This is because, on the one hand, they were engaged in this process through different channels,

including cadre-resident dialogues and live-televised meetings of the municipal people’s council,

and on the other hand, unlike Hưng Yên, the Đà Nẵng government set up a hierarchical and

consistent land administration system, and directly dealt with and supervised land-related issues

and projects at all stages. These mechanisms have reduced the influence of investors, interest

groups and rent-seekers, minimizing the distortion of land policies and corruption – the most

common driver of social unrest in Vietnam’s party-state for the past decades – and had a direct

relationship with the people’s attitude and acceptance of land-related decisions as a whole.

In short, the cases show that there is a correlation between development and the implementation

of GRD. The former is the facilitator of the latter, but can give rise to unrest, causing the loss of

GRD, where related policies are abusively implemented with the influence of the investors, interest

groups and rent-seekers.

Leadership

Leadership in the case of Đà Nẵng is more generally related to a specific individual leader, not a

collective or a party committee as usually perceived and generalized by scholars when probing into

Vietnamese politics (Womack 1992, Yeong 1992, Probert and Young 1995, Abuza 2001b). The

CPV stresses collective leadership as the key to democratic centralism42 (HoChiMinh 2000(d):505).

However, a historical perspective shows that the CPV-led polity at a certain point in time saw

principle of collective leadership undermined by an individual leader, whose decisions were

responsible for (or inspired) important changes at both the national and local levels (Phong and 42 See its definition by the CPV in Chapter Two

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Beresford 1998:61-71). The practice of the concept of leadership was analyzed and found to be

different across the three provinces studied.

In the cases of Thái Bình and Hưng Yên, local politics were apparently subject to collective

leadership, witnessing no break-through changes that could have enhanced the implementation of

GRD. In Thái Bình, collective leadership was not only used as a safety valve in decision-making,

but also as an indication of democracy. Nevertheless, collective leadership in this sense was defined

as ‘no one takes responsibility’ and ‘everybody’s business is nobody’s business’ (lắm sãi không ai

đóng cửa chùa) (Interview I, Appendix 4). Consequently, this did not create ‘momentum for

development’ (Interview I, Appendix 4). Collective leadership in Thái Bình appears to have

maintained political stability in the short term, but it did not stimulate development, affecting the

implementation of GRD in the long term as analyzed above. Similarly, Hưng Yên also emphasized

collective leadership, which was misused as a protective shield for the economic benefits of

investors, interest groups and rent-seekers at the expense of GRD.

Đà Nẵng experienced an entirely different understanding of leadership. By many manifestations,

the city had all established collective leadership institutions in place (such as the people’s council

and the party committees), but the role of an individual leader was widely recognized. The fame of

this leader, Mr. Nguyễn Bá Thanh, is associated with the development and modernization of the

city, and the reverse was also true: criticisms of Thanh’s leadership style undermined his reputation

as a leader who carried out reforms in Đà Nẵng (Hải 2013c). Mr. Thanh proved that in a one-party

rule if a political leader placed more emphasis on collective benefits than private interests, it could

make a difference; and that having a determined, competent, merit-oriented and personal

responsibility-taking leader is better than a faculty in which ‘no one takes responsibility’. It is not

clear how much Thanh’s leadership style has influenced other Vietnamese politicians, but some of

them seem to be following Thanh’s example. One can argue that Thanh represents the collective

leadership and the party leadership of Đà Nẵng. In other words, Thanh is the party and the party is

Thanh. Consequently, he was called a dictator, but an outspoken, charismatic and benevolent one

who ‘did not eat the whole cake of the people’ (không ăn hết phần của dân) (Diện 2013b). More

importantly, Đà Nẵng’s development and modernization under Thanh’s leadership also saw a high

level of civic engagement, a surge in associational life, and increased trust of the public in the local

governments.

In summary, leadership was one of the contrasting factors across the three case studies. The

analysis has demonstrated that a strong individual leader, even a benevolent dictator, seems to be

more efficient than collective leadership, because the former ‘dares to take responsibility’ while the

later ‘no one takes responsibility’. It is clear that the dynamism and competence of political leaders

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is important, especially at the local level where they carry the burden of duties given by both the

party and the central government. In Vietnam’s party-state, all decisions are made top-down and

local leaders are caught in the middle (Minh 2004-109, Lai 1997a:12) with pressures from the

centre on the one hand and from the rice-roots on the other. A political leader like Mr. Thanh of Đà

Nẵng appears to adhere to Hồ Chí Minh’s teachings that: “Whatever is good for the people, we

must try at our best to do it. Whatever is harmful to the people, we must try at our best to avoid

doing it” (HoChiMinh 2000(c):57). By following this doctrine Đà Nẵng leaders could have enjoyed

the confidence of the residents (Thanh 2010a) even in the face of a report criticizing wrong-doings

and implying corruption related to the city leadership’s land administration. The role of leadership,

particularly an individual leader, is defined by the CPV Secretary-General, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, as

‘guiding the mass, initiating and organizing the work, acting as the nucleus of an organization, the

core of a movement. In any field, regardless the revolutionary periods and wherever it may be,

leaders always have a decisive role to play’ (Trọng 2012b). Mr. Thanh of Đà Nẵng appears to

adhere to this leadership model by putting through decisions, increasing transparency and

accountability by initiating and engaging in public dialogues, and promoting governance reforms.

Vibrant Civic Networks

Civic networks, represented by mass organizations like the VFF, VWU, VFU, HCMYU and VFF,

were active in the cases of Thái Bình and Đà Nẵng, but paralysed in the case of Hưng Yên. Factors

that influenced the activism or inactivism of the mass organizations in the three case-studies varied.

In Thái Bình during the disturbances in 1997, civic organizations were paralyzed and criticized for

not speaking out about their members’ concerns. The past fifteen years have seen a reactivation of,

and activism within, these organizations. Furthermore, GRD also provided impetus for

diversification and increased the vibrancy of associational life by enabling more community-based

groups like PIBs and CISBs that could hold the local authorities accountable to the peasants. These

institutions collide with the interests of investors and corrupt local cadres, but are the actual

mechanisms engaging the citizens in local governance affairs.

In the case of Đà Nẵng, the activeness of civic networks was associated with the city’s

dynamism and modernization strategy. Mass organizations represented by the VFF in Đà Nẵng

enjoyed a certain level of authority as a result of the city’s modernization strategy, within which

improvement of the quality of governance and performance of local cadres was a requirement. In

this context, the VFF was mandated to carry out surveillance activities that aimed to punish local

government officials for any misconduct. The associational life in Đà Nẵng was more vibrant than

in Thái Bình, as illustrated by the presence and activities of social campaigns and self-managed

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clubs or groups. In the case of Đà Nẵng, civic networks and modernization strategy have mutually

empowered and supported GRD implementation and their evolution as mechanisms that mediate

between the party-state, non-state actors (e.g. investors) and the citizens.

In the case of Hưng Yên, mass organizations were paralyzed. The situation was almost the same

as that in Thái Bình back in 1997. However, the difference was that in Thái Bình in 1997, there was

less evidence of the influence of the provincial leadership paralyzing the mass organizations.

Ultimately they were punished for lack of responsibility and mis-management of their lower

authorities. In contrast, in Hưng Yên, the influence of the provincial leadership was obvious and

they tolerated their lower authorities’ performance. In other words, the paralysis of civic networks

in this case was controlled from top-down party-state relationships. This also further explained why

the loss of democratic rights of the peasants in Văn Giang communities was systematic, as opposed

to arbitrary.

In short, civic networks were another key factor that made three cases different between one and

another. GRD was functioning well where there was a vibrant associational life, and poorly

implemented where civic organizations were paralyzed either by their inactiveness (as in Thái Bình

in 1997) or systematic control by the local leadership (as in Hưng Yên).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a comparative analysis of the three case studies, in which three factors –

development, leadership, and vibrant civic networks – that made one case stand out from the others,

were elaborated. By comparing three cases on the basis of the three factors, this chapter has

identified knowledge that can apply to the broader GRD exercise in Vietnam. These three case

studies have shown what actually makes GRD a success or failure, or what factors need to be taken

into consideration to achieve GRD goals, given that each province has its own characteristics,

including cultural factors. These factors are independent variables that can make GRD generally

effective across the country, and have important implications for how the Vietnamese party-state

could maintain its legitimacy and stability in the coming years. In this sense, these findings speak to

the literature on the durability of authoritarian and revolutionary regimes (Levitsky and Way 2013).

Specifically, the managing of GRD has the capacity to provide the Vietnamese state with an

ideologically embedded and historically referenced mechanism for managing decision making and

improving relationships with the ‘rice’ and ‘grassroots’. Building on reflections of the case studies

above, the thesis proposes the following causal mechanism between the preconditions and the

functioning as well as subsequent consequences of the existent GRD:

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The independent variables on the left of GRD facilitate successful implementation of GRD and the

appearance of consequences on the right are results once GRD is established and working. The

reversing arrows imply that those consequences can become conditions that undermine or even

cause the loss of GRD if they are not sustained. In a multi-variable system like this, GRD can be

affected by any variable whenever it declines. The diagram is not a complete model of what makes

GRD a success or a failure, but rather it is a way to clarify the political dynamics of GRD within

Vietnam’s one-party rule and the CPV’s responses to the decay of the party-state apparatus. This

includes, but is not limited to, the tension in state-peasantry relations and cadre-peasant relations, as

well as to rejuvenate local political institutions, to improve local governance systems, and to

reinforce its legitimacy and grip on power since Đổi Mới in the late 1980s. The analysis provided in

this chapter does not claim to provide an exhaustive and complete account of the implementation of

GRD across all Vietnamese provinces. Rather, it has provided an account of some of the major

variables that can account for the functioning of GRD in different provincial contexts. It has

identified that factors such as development, leadership and networks of civic organizations, are

significant to the nature and degree to which GRD is implemented. This needs to be disaggregated

from the way in which GRD is slated to function on paper – as defined by regulation and

legislation. In this way, the thesis has contributed to the existing literature, and specifically added to

our knowledge in this field as drawn out in the last chapter of this thesis – the conclusion.

Grassroots Democracy

(GRD)

Independent variables

Development

More autonomous leadership

Additional Consequences

Accountable/transparent governance system

Equality

Political Stability Vibrant civic

organizations

Increased value system (trust)

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CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to answer the questions: What are the variables that support the

implementation of grassroots democracy goals in Vietnam? And, what impacts does the

implementation of grassroots democracy bring on the party-state apparatus, state-peasantry

relations, cadre-peasant relations, and ultimately the Communist Party of Vietnam as the ruling

party, in terms of its legitimacy, governance and political control?

Since 1998, the CPV has applied GRD to regain its declined legitimacy and governability in the

countryside incurred by the decay of the party-state apparatus, the loss of its control over local

institutions, and tension in state-peasantry relations, cadre-peasant relations. This thesis argued that

to implement the top-down GRD policy successfully, it needs other conditions beyond the law. Or

said differently, the promulgation of legal and regulatory mechanisms, and their surface

implementation, is not sufficient alone for GRD goals set by the CPV to be achieved. This

argument is based on the following four scholarly gaps studying Vietnamese GRD. First, existing

studies isolate Vietnamese GRD as a phenomenon from the mainstream literature on

democratization and democracy. Subsequently, these studies cannot explain adequately potential

impacts of GRD on Vietnamese politics in future. Second, there have been no substantial English-

language studies of how the policy of GRD was implemented after the Thái Bình disturbances in

1997. This makes them unable to explain why GRD is not nationally successful. Third, none of the

studies have drawn adequate attention to local conditions and the contribution of social capital to

the implementation of GRD. This makes them unable to explain why Western democratic ideas

cannot work in local democratization given that Vietnam’s one-party state still enjoys legitimacy

thanks to economic progress. Finally, none of the studies have evaluated the actual implications of

the implementation of GRD on the CPV’s legitimacy, survival and governability at the grassroots.

Without seeing these implications, it is hard to understand sufficiently and correctly the intent of

the CPV when it adopted GRD. This is the most important concern of this thesis, because any

reforms that affect the CPV will also have impacts on Vietnamese politics in the future.

Building on these and being informed by three major theories: modernization, human

empowerment and social capital, which provide an understanding of conditions linked broadly with

democracy, this researcher offered a new approach to assessing Vietnamese GRD. The approach is

based on six independent variables which are broadly identified and incorporated into the analytic

framework in Chapter Three to examine the cases of Thái Bình, Hưng Yên and Đà Nẵng. Outcomes

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of the independent variables provide a better understanding of political dynamics of GRD in the

provinces. Three factors – development, leadership, and vibrant civic networks – were identified as

the most crucial and elaborated in Chapter Seven to clarify variation between these cases.

The independent variables employed in three case-studies not only provide an answer to the

questions set out for this research, but also reinforce this researcher’s initial evaluation in Chapter

Two that GRD has created a mutually empowering mechanism for both the party-state and the

peasantry. The CPV thus uses GRD as a mechanism to reduce tensions between the state and the

peasantry, between party members and the peasants, and helps facilitate stability in rural areas,

enabling the CPV to reinforce its legitimacy, to continue its grip on power, and enhance its

resilience. On the other hand, GRD gives power to the peasantry to raise their voices, hold local

authorities accountable, and indirectly promote local governance reforms.

This research has made three major contributions. Firstly, it shows that successful

implementation of GRD does not necessarily weaken the party-state to govern society, but has the

capacity to reduce structural-social tensions. Secondly, it provides a hope that a democratic

transformation of some form in the future - without violence - is possible in Vietnam. Thirdly, and

broadly, it contributes to ongoing debates about the durability of revolutionary regimes (Levitsky

and Way 2013), and the literature on political regime types and political and social change in

Southeast Asia; and also informs debates on the measurement and analysis of Chinese GRD

mechanisms and implementation across divergent provincial contexts in China.

Final Thoughts

The independent variables operationalized in three cases of Thái Bình, Hưng Yên, and Đà Nẵng

illustrate that in Vietnam’s party-state, policies that are developed at the central level might not

always work at the sub-national level, especially at the rice-roots level. The reverse is also true.

Initiatives brought up by the local level may not be accepted or embraced at the outset and take

time to be recognized as a truth (chân lý) by the central government. For instance, the economic

reform policy adopted by the CPV in the late 1980s, known as Đổi Mới, was in fact a continuation

and official recognition of clandestine economic ‘fence-breaking’ (xé rào or phá rào) activities at

the local level, which were initially criticized by the CPV as contrary to its political lines (Phong

and Beresford 1998:69). Another example is the inception of GRD. It emerged under the peasants’

pressure for local governance reform, and was framed on a popularly-invented motto ‘people know,

people discuss, people do, people supervise and monitor’. These two examples highlight two

important phenomena related to the state-society relationship. First, people at the rice-roots would

break top-down policies that were deemed inappropriate, and find ways to circumvent the policies,

241

even come up with their own initiatives to meet their needs. Second, people at the rice-roots level

would stand up when local cadres were corrupt and mistreated them. However, what we have also

learned from the examples was that the people’s ‘fence-breaking’ activities did not go too far in

terms of challenging the party-state’s legitimacy and power. They were willing to compromise with

the state as long as their demands were met. This researcher believes that this is a cultural

characteristic of Vietnamese who tolerate the authorities even if their rights are breached and will

defy only when they have no other choice. This characteristic is best described by a Vietnamese

proverb: ‘The worm will slant only when it can no longer stand for your trampling’ (con giun xéo

mãi cũng quằn). On the other hand, the CPV was willing to respond positively to the people’s

demands as long as its monopoly of power would not be challenged. This is what Kerkvliet (2005,

2010) labeled Vietnam a ‘responsive-repressive state’.

The tradition of ‘fence-breaking’ was continued as we saw in the case of Đà Nẵng during the

reign of Mr. Nguyễn Bá Thanh. Unfortunately, there are few local leaders like Mr. Thanh, whose

policies and their potential liberalizing effects made the central government rein them in (Hải

2013c). Mr. Thanh could do so because he ‘dares to speak and dares to do it’ and ‘dares to take

responsibility for his decisions’. In Vietnam’s one-party rule, though it would be foolhardy for one

to predict the future of the system (London 2013), there are shoots of hope if we look at Vietnam’s

transformation since Đổi Mới and recent political developments in Vietnam.

Firstly, Vietnam’s economy has been growing fast in the last three decades, bringing the

country up to the level of middle-income country. This change is significant if modernization

theory and the linkage between income level and democracy hold. Secondly, the political culture in

Vietnam has become more pluralistic (London 2013). Thirdly, the CPV as the ruling party has

transformed and is cautiously adapted to modernity (Phong and Beresford 1998:88, Hải 2014c).

Fourthly, a broad range of civic organizations and mass organizations which are though affiliated

with the party-state are classified and forming a nascent civil society and are now acting in a more

assertive manner (Hà 2014, Hải 2014c, Phú 2014, Dũng 2014b, Sinh 2014). Fifthly, recent

constitutional revisions have opened a new window of hope that local governments are to be given

more autonomy and possibly allow local residents to directly elect officials. The CPV Politburo has

agreed for Hồ Chí Minh City and Đà Nẵng to carry out this experiment. In this context, successful

implementation of GRD adds a hope to the enterprise that an orderly democratic transformation is

possible in Vietnam.

242

Appendix 1 – Fieldwork interviews in An Tiêm village, Thụy Dân commune, Thái Bình

18 June – 22 July 2012 (30 days)

Code Name Source Location Date I A Middle-aged man, incumbent chairman of Thụy Dân people’s

committee, former secretary of Thụy Dân party committee (1997-2007)

At his house 23 Jun

II B Middle-aged man, incumbent deputy-secretary of Thụy Dân party committee, former vice-chairman of Thụy Dân people’s committee (1997-2007)

At his house 15 Jul

III C Elderly man, chairman of the commune Fatherland Front, former high school principal

At his house 19 Jun

IV D Elderly man, former village leader/peasant At his house 19 Jun V E Middle-aged man, Thụy Dân cadastral officer At his house 22 Jun VI F Elderly woman, head of An Tiêm women’s group At her house 22 Jun VII G Middle-aged man, head of An Tiêm farmers’ group At his house 26 Jun VIII H Middle-aged man, head of An Tiêm veterans’ group At his house 26 Jul IX K Elderly man, village/peasant Village

pagoda 7 Jul

X L Middle-aged woman, villager/peasant Village pagoda

7 Jul

XI M Elderly man, villager/peasant Village pagoda

7 Jul

XII N Elderly man, villager/peasant At his house 11 Jul XIII P Middle-aged man, villager/peasant As his house 11 Jul XIV Q Elderly man, villager/peasant At his house 12 Jul XV R Elderly man, villager/peasant At his house 13 Jul XVI S Elderly man, villager/peasant At his house 13 Jul XVII T Elderly man, villager/peasant At his house 17 Jul XVIII U Elderly man, villager/peasant At his house 17 Jul XIX V Elderly woman, villager/peasant At her house 18 Jul XX Y Elderly woman, villager/peasant At her house 18 Jul XXI K Young man, a native but lives and works in Hanoi At his house 7 Jul;

20 Jul

243

Appendix 2 – Fieldwork interviews in Thạch Thang ward, Hải Châu district, Đà Nẵng

26 July – 25 August 2012 (30 days)

Code

Name Source Location Date

I A Middle-aged man, vice-chairman cum deputy-party secretary of Thach Thang Ward

Ward Headquarters

26 Jul

FO Field observations Ward Headquarters

27 Jul

II B Middle-aged man, chairman of Thach Thang Fatherland Front Ward Headquarters

30 Jul

III C Young woman, chairwoman of Thach Thang Women Union Ward Headquarters

30 Jul

IV H Middle-aged man, leader of Residential Group No.24 Ward Headquarters

31 Jul

V L Elderly woman, deputy-leader of Residential Group No.23 Ward Headquarters

1 Aug

VI F Young woman, cadre of Thach Thang ward, resident of Group No.13 of Hòa Cường Bắc ward

Ward Headquarters

2 Aug

VII G & L Middle-aged husband (business man, running a printing company) and wife (housewife), residents of Group No.24

At their house 27 Jul

VIII H & B Elderly sisters, retired workers, residents of Group No.24 At their house 28 Jul IX K & N Young husband (a construction worker) and wife (a vendor),

residents of Group No.24 At their house 29 Jul

X Y Young business woman, resident of Group No.24 At their house 3 Aug XI M, D, C Middle-aged husband and wife (business persons), and wife’s

sister (a handicraft goods maker), residents of Group No.24 At their house 4 Aug

XII N & T Elderly sisters, residents of Group No.24 At their house 5 Aug XIII P & X Elderly husband and wife, residents of Group No.24 At their house 6 Aug XIV V Middle-aged woman (housewife), resident of Group No.24 At their house 7 Aug XV R & B Middle-aged husband (a primary school teacher) and wife (a

doctor), residents of Group No.24 At their house 8 Aug

XVI U & T Middle-aged husband (a state company employee) and wife (a hairdresser at home), residents of Group No.24

At their house 9 Aug

XVII D & M Young husband and wife (restaurant owners), residents of Group No.24


FO Field observations Ward Headquarters

11Aug

FO Field observations Ward Headquaters

12 Aug

XVIII T & S Middle aged husband and wife (textile factory workers), residents of Group No.24


XIX X & H Middle aged hustband (staff for a NGO) and wife (primary school English teacher), residents of Group No.24


XX B & L Elderly and retired husband and wife, residents of Group No.24 At their house 17 Aug XXI S & H Young husband (a high-school teacher) and wife (a factory

worker), residents of Group No.24 At their house 19 Aug

XXII S Young man, the head of the Division for Policy and General Affairs

Dept of Home Affairs

20 Aug

XXIII P Middle-aged man (a commerical company employee), resident of Group No.23

At his house 16 Aug

244

Appendix 3 – Fieldwork interviews in Văn Giang town, Hưng Yên

29 September 2012

Code Name Source Location Date I A Middle-aged man, jewellery shop owner, central town of Văn

Giang district At Mr A’s house

29 Sept 2012 II R Middle-aged woman, peasant from Xuân Quan commune

III P Middle-aged man, peasant from Xuân Quan commune IV V Middle-aged woman, peasant from Xuân Quan communue V D Middle-aged woman, peasant from Phụng Công commune VI T Middle-aged man, peasant from Phụng Công commune VII H Middle-age woman, senior official of Hưng Yên Provincial

Party Committee Brisbane 10 Nov 2013

VIII Q Young man, secondary school teacher, Văn Giang district Through telephone

15 Jul 2012

Appendix 4 – Fieldwork interviews

in Hanoi, July-November 2012

Code Name Source Location Date I B Elderly man, member of the CPV Central Committee’s

Theory Council At his house 10 Jul

II D Middle-aged man, Vice-Secretary of the National Assembly of Vietnam

At his office 15 Jul

III H Middle-aged woman, member of the inter-agency steering committee for human rights

At her house 15 Sept

IV D Elderly man, a key co-author of PAPI reports At his house 23 Jul

245

Appendix 5 Model of Governance Structure and Local Democracy in Vietnam

Narrative Explanations: 1. Governance Hierarchy: Vietnam has four levels of administrative governance, namely: (1) Central, (2) Provincial/City, (3) District, and (4) Commune/Ward/Township. Governance from the (2) to (4) is considered local governance and subsequently the (4) is the lowest public governance level. Governance structure is organized exactly the same at all levels. The Executive, for instance, is represented by the Government at the Central level or People’s Committees at provincial down to commune level; the same is for the Legislative: National Assembly at the Central or People’s Council for provincial-commune level.

The Executive is accountable to the Legislative. Executive orders go in vertical direction (to the direct lower level), but accountability goes in both vertical (to the direct upper level) and horizontal (to the legislative at the same level) directions.

Village/Resident Group is considered an extended arm of commune governance, but not constitutionally and legally recognized a level of administrative governance. Consequently, state budget is not allocated for village level. This explains the reason why there is reluctance for a person to stand out for election as leader of the village/resident group. People consider it “a job that consumes personal/family time and money for community benefit” (ăn cơm nhà vác tù và hàng tổng).

2. CPV Direction: CPV committees are present at all levels of administrative governance, including the village level, though these bodies are not components of the governance structure. However, in practice, the CPV leads and gives direction to almost every activity because all decision-making posts are given to CPV members. This allows the CPV to ‘lead and manage the society’ in a unified manner from the Central down to even village level. 3. Local democratization: ‘Grassroots’ (cơ sở) as indicated in grassroots democracy legislation is all about the commune/ward/township and village level. Within the scope of this project, local democratization is limited only to the commune/ward/township and village level, not covering the provincial and district level.

1. CENTRAL GOVERNANCE (State President, Government, National Assembly)

2. PROVINCIAL/CITY GOVERNANCE (People’s Committee, People’s Council)

3. DISTRICT GOVERNANCE (People’s Committee, People’s Council)

4. COMMUNE, WARD, TOWNSHIP (People’s Committee, People’s Council)

VILLAGE/URBAN RESIDENT GROUP

INF

LUE

NC

E O

F T

HE

CO

MM

UN

IST

PA

RTY

OF

V

IET

NA

M

Governance Hierarchy CPV Direction

LOC

AL D

EM

OC

RA

CY

LOCAL DEMOCRACY

246

Appendix 6 Consolidated list of legal normative documents

on grassroots democracy

No. Name of Document (Vnamese)

English Issuing Body Date of issuance

1. Chỉ thị số 30-CT/TW về xây dựng và thực hiện Quy chế dân chủ ở cơ sở

Directive No.30-CT/TW on the formulation and implementation of regulations on grassroots democracy

CPV Politbureau 18 Feb 1998

2. Nghị quyết số 17/NQ-TW về Đổi mới và nâng cao chất lượng hoạt động của hệ thống chính trị ở cấp xã, phường và thị trấn

Resolution No.17/NQ-TW on renewing and improving the performance of the political system at commune, ward and township level

CPV Central Committee

18 Mar 2002

3. Chỉ thị số 10-CT/TW về Tiếp tục tăng cường xây dựng và thực hiện Quy chế dân chủ cơ sở

Directive No.10-CT/TW on continued enhancement of the formulation and implementation of regulations on grassroots democracy

CPV Secretariat 28 Mar 2002

4. Nghị quyết số 45-1998/NQ-UBTVQH10 giao Chính phủ khẩn trương ban hành Quy chế dân chủ ở xã, phường và thị trấn

Resolution No.45-1998/NQ-UBTVQH10 on requesting the Government to intensively promulgate regulations on democracy at commune, ward and township level

The Standing Committee of the National Assembly

28 Feb 1998

5. Nghị định số 29/1998/NĐ-CP về ban hành Quy chế thực hiện dân chủ cấp xã

Decree No.29/1998/ND-CP on the promulgation of regulations on commune democracy

The Government 11 May 1998

6. Chỉ thị số 22/1998/CT-TTg về xây dựng và thực hiện Quy chế dân chủ cấp xã

Directive No.22/1998/CT-TTg on the formulation and implementation of regulations on commune democracy

The Prime Minister

15 May 1998

7. Thông tư số 03/1998/TT-TCCB quy định hướng dẫn về việc thực hiện Quy chế dân chủ ở cấp xã

Circular No.03/1998/TT-TCCB providing guidelines for the implementation of regulations on commune democracy

The Government’s Committee for Organization and Personnel Affairs

6 July 1998

8. Nghị định số 79/2003/NĐ-CP ban hành Quy chế thực hiện dân chủ ở xã

Decree No.79/2003/ND-CP on the promulgation of regulations on commune democracy

The Government 7 Jul 2003

9. Pháp lệnh số 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 thực hiện dân chủ ở xã, phường, thị trấn

Ordinance No.34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on the implementation of democracy at commune, ward and township level

Standing Committee of the National Assembly

20 Apr 2007

247

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UBND-ĐN. 2005. Quyết định số 41/2005/QĐ-UB ngày 28/01/2005 ban hành Đề án giảm nghèo trên địa bàn thành phố Đà Nẵng giai đoạn 2005-2010 (Decision No.41/2005/QĐ-UB of 28 January 2005 on the issuance of the Program for poverty reduction in Đà Nẵng city for the 2005-2010 period). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2009a. Quyết định số 09/2009/QĐ-UBND ngày 25/02/2009 phê duyệt Đề án giảm nghèo trên địa bàn thành phố Đà Nẵng giai đoạn 2009-2015 (Decision No.09/2009/QĐ-UBND of 25 February 2009 on approval of the Program for poverty reduction in Đà Nẵng city for the 2009-2015 period). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2009b. Quyết định số 9051/QĐ-UBND ngày 03/12/2009 phê duyệt Đề án thực hiện mục tiêu "Không có tội phạm giết người để cướp tài sản" đến năm 2015 (Decision No.9051/QĐ-UBND of 3 December 2009 on approval of the Program aimed to achieve the goal "No criminal commit murder to rob property" by 2015). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2011. Báo cáo tình hình nhập cư trên địa bàn thành phố Đà Nẵng trong năm 2005-2010 (Report on the immigration in Đà Nẵng city within 5 years 2005-2010). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012a. Dự thảo Báo cáo về tình hình thực hiện thí điểm không tổ chức Hội đồng nhân dân quận, huyện, phường tại thành phố Đà Nẵng (Draft Report on pilot removal of people's councils at district in urban and rural areas, ward level in Đà Nẵng City). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban Nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012b. Quyết định số 10081/QĐ-UBND ngày 05/12/2012 về việc ban hành "Đề án giảm nghèo trên địa bàn thành phố Đà Nẵng giai đoạn 2013-2017" (Decision No.10081/QĐ-UBND of 5 December 2012 on the issuance of the "Program for poverty reduction in Đà Nẵng city for the 2013-2017 period"). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012c. Quyết định số 4503/QĐ-UBND, ngày 08/6/2012 của Ủy ban Nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng, ban hành Quy định về việc tiếp nhận, giải quyết thủ tục hành chính theo cơ chế một cửa, cơ chế một cửa liên thông tại các cơ quan, đơn vị trên địa bàn thành phố Đà Nẵng (Decision No.4503/QĐ-UBND of 8 June 2012 by Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee on the issuance of Regulations on handling one stop-shop administrative procedures at public offices in the city). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012d. Quyết định số 547/QĐ-UBND ngày 04/7/2012 về việc phê duyệt Phương án thí điểm mô hình đánh giá kết quả làm việc của công chức tại thành phố Đà Nẵng (Decision No.547/QĐ-UBND of 4 July 2012 on approval of the pilot program for appraising performance of public officials in Đà Nẵng). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012e. Quyết định số 6221/QĐ-UBND ngày 02/8/2012 ban hành Quy định thi tuyển chức danh cán bộ lãnh đạo và quản lý (Decision No.6221/QĐ-UBND of 02 August 2012 on the issuance of Regulations on holding tests to select and recruit officials for leadership and management positions.). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012f. Thống kê hoạt động tiếp công dân và kết quả giải quyết khiếu nại, tố cáo của người dân (Statistics of dialogues with citizens and results of handling complaints, denuniciations by citizens).

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Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012g. Báo cáo số 132/BC-UBND ngày 16/7/2012 về Đề án "Tăng cường sự lãnh đạo của Đảng đối với công tác vận động quần chúng trong tình hình mới" (Report No.132/BC-UBND of 16 July 2012 on the Program "Enhancing the party leadership in mass mobilization in the new situation). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-ĐN. 2012h. Quyết định số 2644/QĐ-UBND ngày 09/4/2012 về việc phê duyệt Đề án giải quyết việc làm cho người lao động trên địa bàn thành phố Đà Nẵng giai đoạn 2012-2015 (Decision No.2644/QĐ-UBND of 9 April 2012 on approval of the Employment Program for Laborers in Đà Nẵng city for the 2012-2015 period). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee.

UBND-ĐN. 2013. Thông báo số 12/TB-UBND ngày 19/01/2013 về việc phản hồi Thông báo kết luận của Thanh tra Chính phủ về việc chấp hành pháp luật về thanh tra, khiếu nại, tố cáo, phòng chống tham nhũng và một số dự án đầu tư liên quan đến việc quản lý, sử dụng đất tại thành phố Đà Nẵng (Public Notice No.12/TB-UBND of 19 January 2013 responding to the Public Notice of the Government Inspectorate's conclusions on the implementation of law on inspection, handling complaints, denunciations, anti-corruption, and some investment projects related to land use and administration in Đà Nẵng city). Đà Nẵng: Ủy ban nhân dân thành phố Đà Nẵng (UBND-ĐN: Đà Nẵng Municipal People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 1997. Báo cáo tổng kết tình hình kinh tế-xã hội năm 1997, phương hướng và nhiệm vụ năm 1998 (Report on reviewing the socio-economic situation in 1997, directions and tasks in 1998). Hưng Yên: Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Hưng Yên (UBND-HY: Hưng Yên People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2004. Chỉ thị số 17/2004/CT-UB ngày 6/8/2004 về việc tăng cường công tác hòa giải ở cơ sở (Directive No.17/2004/CT-UB of 6 August 2004 on enhancing the reconciliation at the grassroots level). Hưng Yên: UBND-HY (Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2005a. Báo cáo tình hình phát triển kinh tế-xã hội năm 2004, định hướng và nhiệm vụ năm 2005 (Report on socio-economic development ịn 2004 and directions, tasks in 2005). Hưng Yên: Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Hưng Yên (UBND-HY: Hưng Yên People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2005b. Quyết định số 107/2005/QĐ-UBND về giá đất trên địa bàn tỉnh Hưng Yên (Decision No.107/2005/QD-UBND of land prices in Hưng Yên province). Hưng Yên: UBND-HY (Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2012a. Báo cáo số 143/BC-UBND ngày 09/10/2012 về công tác tiếp công dân, giải quyết khiếu nại, tố cáo ở xã, phường, thị trấn giai đoạn 2002-2011 (Report No.143/BC-UBND of 9/10/2012 on public consultation, settlement of complaints, denunciations at commune, ward and township level between 2002-2011). Hưng Yên: Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Hưng Yên (UBND-HY: Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2012b. Những thành tựu nổi bật của Hưng Yên sau 15 tái lập tỉnh (Remarkable achievements of Hưng Yên after 15 years of its re-establishment). Hưng Yên: UBND-HY (Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2012c. Thông báo hoàn thành việc cưỡng chế đất ở Văn Giang (Announcement on the completion of land eviction in Văn Giang). Hưng Yên: UBND-HY (Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2013a. Báo cáo số 215/BC-UBND, ngày 24/12/2013, tổng kết công tác thanh tra, giải quyết khiếu nại, tố cáo và phòng, chống tham nhũng năm 2013 (Report No.215/BC-UBND of 24 December 2013 on reviewing the inspection, settlement of complaints and denunciations, and the fight against corruption in 2013). Hưng Yên: Ủy ban Nhân dân tỉnh Hưng Yên (UBND-HY: Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

UBND-HY. 2013b. Báo cáo số 205/BC-UBND, ngày 18/12/2013, về tình hình, kết quả triển khai thực hiện Nghị quyết số 10-NQ/TU ngày 25/02/2013 của Ban Thường vụ Tỉnh ủy về tập trung khắc phục có hiệu quả tình trạng khiếu nại, tố cáo đông người vượt cấp ở các xã trong vùng Dự án Khu đô thị Thương mại-Du lịch Văn Giang (Report No.205/BC-UBND of 18/12/2013 on the implementation of Resolution No.10-NQ/TU of 25/2/2013 by the Provincial Party Standing Committee on effective settlement of complaints, denunciations to higher levels by a large number of people from the site of Ecopark-Văn Giang project). Hưng Yên: Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Hưng Yên (UBND-HY: Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

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UBND-HY. 2013c. Báo cáo số 188/BC-UBND ngày 27/11/2013 về tình hình thực hiện kế hoạch kinh tế-xã hội năm 2013 và mục tiêu, nhiệm vụ, giải pháp năm 2014 (Report No.188/BC-UBND of 27/11/2013 on the implementation of socio-economic plan in 2013 and goals, tasks and solutions in 2014). Hưng Yên: Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Hưng Yên (UBND-HY: Hưng Yên Provincial People's Committee).

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