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HARRIS CORPORATION’S RESPONSE TO COMMONWEALTH BUREAU OF AUDITS’ REPORT ON HARRIS CORPORATION COMPLIANCE WITH PA-STARNET RADIO SYSTEM CONTRACT

OCTOBER 25, 2017

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................. 1

HARRIS’ RESPONSES TO COMMONWEALTH’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............ 3

HARRIS RESPONSE TO COMMONWEALTH FINDING NO. 1 ................................................................ 3

HARRIS RESPONSE TO COMMONWEALTH FINDING NO. 2 .............................................................. 15








HARRIS RESPONSE TO COMMONWEALTH FINDING NO. 10 ............................................................ 37

HARRIS RESPONSE TO COMMONWEALTH FINDING NO. 11 ............................................................ 38

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................... 40

EXHIBITS ........................................................................................................................................................... 41

APPENDIX


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INTRODUCTION

Harris Corporation (“Harris”) thanks the Commonwealth and the Bureau of Audits for the opportunity to provide this response to the draft Audit Report dated September 26, 2017. Harris requests a meeting with the Bureau of Audits to review the findings in the draft Audit Report and the Harris response to the draft report findings. In particular, Harris would like to review with the Bureau of Audits the errors and incorrect assumptions in the draft Audit Report prior to the public release of the Report.

Initially, Harris Corporation notes that it worked very hard and diligently with dedicated State Radio Network Division team members to maintain all of the equipment used in the operation of the PA-STARNet Statewide Radio Network throughout the 3 1/4 year term of the maintenance contract under review. Harris performed over 14,500 preventive maintenance inspections. Harris responded to emergency calls and provided demand maintenance services to repair equipment and restore radio equipment operation at all hours of the day or night and during all four seasons of the year including freezing Pennsylvania winters.

This audit commenced in October 2015. Harris has worked diligently and cooperatively with the Bureau of Audits for the past two years on the Maintenance Contract review and provided the Bureau with large volumes of data documenting its maintenance activity during the audit period running from July 1, 2012 to September 30, 2015. Most recently, in response to a preliminary draft of the audit findings, Harris provided the Bureau of Audits with substantial, detailed information in July, 2017 pointing out the errors and incorrect assumptions contained in the draft findings. With just a few exceptions, the Commonwealth’s preliminary draft findings were subsequently incorporated into the draft Audit Report dated September 26, 2017 and it appears that most of the data and information provided by Harris was ignored.

Three examples of significant errors in the draft audit report include the following:

In several findings in the draft Audit Report, the Bureau of Audits appears to have ignored that Harrisperformed 95% or more of the required work correctly on a particular preventive maintenanceinspection, and determined, if there were any questions about the remaining work, that payment for theentire inspection should be disallowed. As an example, in one finding, the Bureau deemed that Harris’entire charge for 47 HVAC inspections should be questioned where the maintenance technician, aftercorrectly performing all of the HVAC maintenance inspection tasks, elected not to replace a clean airfilter sitting in the HVAC equipment.

The Bureau of Audits incorrectly deemed that Harris should be responsible for the past and future costsof making modifications and upgrade improvements to the PA-STARNet communication towersnecessary to support increased antenna and equipment loads for new users. The costs of themodifications and upgrades are not Harris’ responsibility because they were not caused by anymaintenance failures or problems by Harris or its subcontractors or anyone else.

The draft Audit Report states that tower corrections are required because defects allegedly wentunreported for years, when in fact: (1) information regarding the defects had previously been provided tothe Commonwealth; (2) the information was stored in the Commonwealth’s computer system; (3) theCommonwealth had assumed responsibility for making the necessary repairs, and (4) the computersystem provided daily reminders of the incomplete repair work to the Commonwealth’s STARNet


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managers. Some of the repair work was not performed by the Commonwealth for years after defects were originally reported and some still has not been performed today.

The above and other errors in the draft Audit Report possibly could have been averted had the Commonwealth and the Bureau of Audits chosen to reciprocate and cooperatively provide Harris with the necessary information reasonably requested by Harris to better understand the draft audit findings. For example, Harris requested but was not provided with the information needed to reasonably understand the calculation of questioned costs contained in the draft Audit Report and the reasons for the tower improvement work. The additional information would have assisted Harris in better analyzing the reasons for the Commonwealth’s errors and incorrect assumptions and allowed Harris to provide the additional information needed by the Bureau of Audits.

Finally, it appears that the Bureau of Audits relied a great deal on the technical information provided by the user agency in preparing its report and chose to ignore much of the technical information provided by Harris Corporation. This failure to critically assess and independently review and evaluate the technical information of both parties may have also led to the errors and incorrect assumptions in the draft Audit Report.

For the reasons stated above, Harris Corporation repeats its request for a meeting with the Bureau of Audits to review and reconcile the findings in the draft Audit Report with the concerns stated in Harris’ response to the draft Audit Report. Such a meeting would provide an opportunity for the parties to explore a mutually agreed upon resolution on revised audit findings prior to the public release of the Audit Report.


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HARRIS’ RESPONSES TO COMMONWEALTH’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

HARRIS RESPONSE TO COMMONWEALTH FINDING NO. 1

A. Harris Substantially Performed All 51 Tower Maintenance Inspections Questioned by theCommonwealth.

In its Finding No. 1, the Commonwealth contends that Harris breached the Maintenance Contract by failing to require one of its subcontractors -- Jacobs Telecommunications, Inc. -- to use inspection forms meeting Contract requirements when conducting 51 tower inspections during the audit period of January 1, 2012 through September 30, 2015. According to the Commonwealth, the forms omitted certain inspection steps required by TIA 222-G standards, and were ambiguous because they failed to require technicians to provide pass/fail grades. The Commonwealth does acknowledge that all 51 inspections were performed and that many inspection steps were actually performed. The Commonwealth nevertheless contends that Harris should refund the entire amount Harris was paid for the 51 tower inspections, which the Commonwealth calculates to be $389,676.79. Harris has requested, and the Commonwealth has declined to provide, an explanation of its methodology resulting in its allocation of $389,676.79 of the maintenance contract value to the 51 tower inspection reports.

The Commonwealth’s contention is fundamentally unsound for many reasons. First, the Maintenance Contract dictates that tower structural inspections be performed in accordance with the current industry standard, TIA 222-G, but it does not prescribe the inspection form to be used. Nor does the Contract condition payment onthe use of a prescribed tower inspection form. Notwithstanding the form used, Harris’ subcontractor performedits tower inspections in substantial compliance with the EIA/TIA 222-G standard. Indeed, the Commonwealthhas failed to correlate any alleged deficiency in the inspection forms used by Jacobs with any significant towermaintenance issues.

Second, the Commonwealth’s reasoning that all tower inspections performed by Jacobs were deficient because certain tower inspection reports did not identify previously reported foundation issues is flawed. As discussed in detail below, Harris’ inspection program did, in fact, result in the timely identification of identifiable foundation issues for resolution. The Pennsylvania State Police and Statewide Radio Network Division (“PSP/SRND”) took ownership of these issues. It was unnecessary to redundantly report the same issue again and again where a Remedy/Service Now ticket was already opened and assigned to PSP/SRND.

Third, the inspection forms were jointly developed with the Commonwealth’s input and approval as early as 2009. This was three years after the effective date of TIA-222-G in 2006. The Commonwealth has been well aware, since even before extension of the Maintenance Contract in 2012, of the inspection form being used by Harris’ subcontractor to conduct tower inspections. Moreover, during the audit period, the form was included verbatim as the second page of each of the 51 tower inspection reports, all of which were submitted to PSP/SRND engineers for review during Contract performance. Until this audit, the Commonwealth never took issue with the form of the tower inspection form submitted as part of the 51 tower reports. Had the Commonwealth requested that Harris use a different form, Harris would have complied.

Fourth, expert review of the inspection steps listed in the tower inspection form and the shelter inspection formused by Harris’ subcontractor with the inspection steps required by TIA 222-G standards shows that the


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required steps were covered in the forms used by Harris’ subcontractor. Included in the covered steps is the requirement to check the condition of the tower base. See Exhibit A attached hereto, which is a spreadsheet showing the correlation of the TIA 222-G inspection steps with the steps on the inspection forms that were used by Harris’ subcontractor.

Fifth, the Commonwealth in Finding No. 1 fails to appreciate that the five-year tower inspections were part of a broader inspection program. Many of the visual inspection steps required by TIA 222-G were performed by Harris’ subcontractors much more frequently than once every five years, which is the frequency required by TIA 222-G. For example, Harris’ subcontractors performed visual inspections of tower foundations as part of their quarterly tower shelter inspections required by the Maintenance Contract. For items that could be visually inspected from the ground, Harris’ quarterly inspections were an integral part of the tower inspection program undertaken by Harris pursuant to the Maintenance Contract. Tower foundation issues were brought to the Commonwealth’s attention far more frequently than every five years.

In legal terms, Harris “substantially performed” the tower inspections, and the Commonwealth itself is breaching the Maintenance Contract by failing and refusing to credit Harris the reasonable value of theinspection steps that Harris’ subcontractor completed. See, e.g., Widmer Eng'g, Inc. v. Dufalla, 837 A.2d 459, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (where an alleged breach of contract claim was deemed “an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract was substantially performed, the contract remains effective” and the contractor was entitled to recover for the work performed less credits for the work which was uncorrected or unperformed). See also li Corp. v. Fox, 348 F. Supp. 629, 644 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same).

Because Harris’ subcontractor substantially performed the questioned 51 inspections, and the Commonwealth accepted that performance without objecting to the inspection form used, Harris disagrees with the Commonwealth’s contention that Harris should refund $389,676.79, or any portion of that sum.

B. Tower Foundation Repair Costs Facing the Commonwealth Were Caused by OriginalConstruction Defects and Years of Inaction by PSP/SRND in Response to Reported MaintenanceProblems.

The Commonwealth’s second major contention in its Finding No. 1 is that Harris’ alleged failure to comply with the Maintenance Contract’s preventive maintenance inspection requirements led to “disrepair at many Commonwealth tower sites.” The Commonwealth’s theory is that Harris and its subcontractors should have detected and reported certain deteriorating foundation conditions at the tower sites to PSP sooner than they did. By not doing so, Harris allegedly has “caused” the Commonwealth to incur $233,000 in repair costs in 2015-2016, $339,000 in projected repair costs in 2017, and undetermined future repair costs. These repair costs fall into three main categories: 1) concrete inspections and repairs, 2) tower leg anchor bolt inspections and repairs, and 3) tower modifications. (CoPA Audit Report, at Exhibit 3). Each of these categories is discussed in further detail in the subsections that follow below.

The Commonwealth’s causation analysis is untenable for a number of reasons. Instead of exercising the independence required by Generally Accepted Government Audit Standards (“GAGAS”), the Commonwealth has simply adopted the PSP’s position that “Early detection would have given SRND (i.e., the PSP Statewide Radio Network Division) the ability to take corrective action on these problems before they reached this critical state of decline.” (Draft Report, at 24). In doing so, the Commonwealth overlooked (or consciously disregarded) the following available information:


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The tower concrete and anchor bolt issues facing the Commonwealth today are the product ofdefects in the original tower design and construction, not Harris’ alleged maintenance failures.

Under the Maintenance Contract, Harris was not responsible to make tower foundation repairs.Rather, it was Harris’ responsibility to report tower foundation issues to the Network OperationsCenter (“NOC”), so that a Remedy/Service Now ticket could be opened.

In the examples cited by the Commonwealth in the Audit Report, Harris (and in some cases PSPitself) did, in fact, identify and report the issue to the NOC.

It was the Commonwealth PSP/SRND’s responsibility to assign the open Remedy/Service Nowtickets to a contractor for repairs. PSP/SRND had total discretion to assign the tickets to Harris, toanother firm, or to PSP/SRND’s own Engineering/Maintenance/Site Development groups forresolution.

Beginning in early 2013, the Commonwealth assigned all open Remedy/Service Now ticketsrelating to tower foundation issues to PSP/SRND Engineering/Site Development for disposition.

In virtually all cases, PSP/SRND deferred taking any corrective action on known towerfoundation issues for two or more years. In many cases, issues identified in 2012-2013, known toPSP/SRND, and assigned to PSP/SRND for resolution, have still not been resolved.

In 2011, PSP entered into a contract with Crown Castle International, Inc. to act as leasing agentto co-locate private carrier cellular equipment on the Commonwealth’s towers. Crown and itscustomers have made modifications to the Commonwealth’s towers, sometimes at their ownexpense, in order to accommodate the additional tower load resulting from mounting the newequipment.

Many of the costs identified on Exhibit 3 to the Audit Report are not repair costs at all, but rathercosts for tower modifications and upgrades required by Crown and its customers.

Many of the costs included on Exhibit 3 were incurred by Crown, or by Crown’s customer, andnot by the Commonwealth. Thus the Commonwealth is seeking breach-of-contract damages forcosts it did not incur.

In short, the Commonwealth in its causation analysis has ignored the available information, has failed to exercise independent auditing judgment, and is facilitating the PSP’s attempts to shift responsibility for its new co-location program costs to Harris, without any rational basis for doing so. Harris disagrees with the Commonwealth’s position that Harris is responsible for any of the $233,000 in repair costs incurred by the Commonwealth 2015-2016, $339,000 in projected repair costs in 2017, and undetermined future repair costs.


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1. Harris Is Not Responsible for the Cost of Tower Foundation Modifications andUpgrades Required for the Commonwealth’s Private Carrier Co-Location Program

Many of the Commonwealth’s STARNet radio system towers were built in the early 2000’s by a contractor, Rohn Industries, that filed for bankruptcy in 2003. Harris was not involved in the original tower construction. Most of the STARNet towers are “self-supporting” units with three tower legs positioned on three concrete foundations. The majority of towers are 180 to 330 feet in height, with transmitters, antennas and related telecommunication equipment mounted on the tower superstructure.

Until 2011, only Commonwealth-owned equipment was mounted on the STARNet towers. In 2011, PSP entered into a contract with Crown Castle International, Inc. (“Crown”) to act as leasing agent to “co-locate” private carrier cellular equipment on the Commonwealth’s towers, in order to generate revenue for the Commonwealth. Co-location of private carrier equipment obviously creates additional load for which the STARNet towers were not originally designed.

In order to determine the suitability of the Commonwealth’s towers to accommodate the additional load, as well as other private carrier requirements, it appears that Crown, Crown’s carrier customers, and/or PSP have undertaken a comprehensive statewide tower inspection and modification program, beginning sometime in 2013. For example, Crown, in collaboration with the Commonwealth, is in the process of inspecting tower foundations and anchors at all 125 STARNet towers that used grout in the original construction design. Inspections have been completed at 52 towers, with the 73 remaining towers to follow after bids have been obtained by Crown. (CoPA Audit Report, at 24). In Exhibit 3 to the Audit Report, there are multiple references to tower inspections and modifications performed by Crown or Crown’s customers. According to the Commonwealth, PSP intends to charge Harris for the costs of this activity. (CoPA Audit Report, at 24).

There is no legal theory under which Harris would have legal responsibility to pay for tower inspections and modifications undertaken in order to upgrade STARNet towers to meet new requirements imposed by Crown.

There is also no legal theory under which Harris would have legal responsibility to pay for costs incurred by Crown, Crown’s customers, or any party other than the Commonwealth (e.g. Adams County) to make modifications of any kind.

Moreover, notwithstanding PSP’s stated intent to charge Harris for the costs of the statewide inspection and modification program, the Commonwealth has repeatedly refused to disclose any inspection reports, RFPs, proposals, contracts, correspondence, or information of any kind that might reveal the nature of the precise modifications and/or repairs being undertaken in collaboration with Crown. The Commonwealth is purposefully withholding facts that, Harris believes, would reveal the fallacy of its contention that Harris should be held responsible for the costs. The withheld information would, at a minimum, reveal: 1) that the tower inspections and modifications are necessary to accommodate new tower loads and other requirements imposed by Crown and its customers before co-location of equipment can proceed; and 2) that any repairs of deteriorating concrete and anchor bolts were the result of defects in the original tower foundation design and construction – not alleged maintenance omissions by Harris and its subcontractors.

Harris respectfully disagrees that it is responsible to pay the Commonwealth for any costs incurred, or to be incurred in the future, by the Commonwealth, Crown, or Crown’s customers for tower inspections and modifications undertaken in order to upgrade STARNet towers.


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2. Corrosion of Tower Anchor Bolts Are the Result of Latent Defects in the OriginalSTARNet Tower Design and Construction, not Alleged Maintenance Failures by Harris.

The Commonwealth’s self-supporting STARNet radio towers are typically supported by three tower legs anchored to concrete foundations by anchor bolts. According to the Commonwealth, there are 125 STARNet towers that have grout encapsulating the anchor bolts.

Each of the three tower legs is a hollow steel tube from eight to twelve inches in diameter that is welded to a baseplate. The baseplate, in turn, is bolted to the concrete foundation diagram by eight to sixteen bolts arranged in a circle. The nuts securing the baseplate to the anchor bolts can be adjusted to level the tower as necessary. Notably, the there is a cut-out in the baseplate to allow any moisture that has condensed in the hollow tower leg to drain out. The photograph below reflects this configuration.

As part of the original construction of the free-standing towers, the Commonwealth’s contractor packed grout in the space between the concrete foundation and the tower base plates. The purpose of installing grout is to: 1) create additional stability by transferring some of the load on the anchor bolts to the concrete foundation; and 2) encapsulate the anchor bolts to protect them from moisture draining from the hollow tower legs onto the surface of the concrete foundation. When the grout is packed into the space between the basepla te and the concrete foundation, construction best practices mandate that the contractor leave “weep holes” in the grout. The weep holes are designed to allow moisture collecting under the tower leg to drain out through the weep holes.

Based on the photographs and narrative provided in the Audit Report, moisture from tower leg condensation has collected in the space between the tower baseplate and the concrete foundation surface at certain towers, coming in contact with the anchor bolts and resulting in severe corrosion. The Commonwealth’s photographs show that the corrosion is most severe on the interior side of the bolts, indicating that the grout was improperly packed so as to leave the bolts partially exposed, rather than completely encapsulated. This clearly was an original construction defect, one that the Commonwealth failed to detect when it accepted the original tower work. Harris had no role in the Commonwealth’s acceptance of the original tower work.


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The improper packing of grout beneath tower lag baseplates was a latent defect. The industry standard for tower foundation inspections (Annex J of TIA 222-G) requires the technician to inspect the anchorage condition as follows:

a) Anchorage condition b) Nuts and/or nut locking device tightc) Grout conditiond) Anchorages and/or anchor rod conditions

The standard, which is incorporated into the Maintenance Contract, does not require the technician to chip away hardened grout to inspect the condition of anchor bolts that are otherwise hidden beneath the base plates. Nor does the standard require the use of special equipment such as a bore-scope camera to be snaked through weep holes in the grout, in order to inspect the hidden anchor bolts. The inspection standard requires a visual inspection of the grout for deterioration, and tightening of the anchor bolt nuts visible above the baseplate, and reporting of observable deficiencies. The Maintenance Contract required no more.

At 123 of the 125 towers with grouted tower legs, the Commonwealth has presented absolutely no evidence that any existing anchor bolt issues could have, or should have been discovered by Harris or its subcontractors in the course of performing foundation inspections using the contractually required inspection protocol. With respect to one of the two remaining sites – JUNI01 -- corroded anchor bolts were detected in March 2016 with the use of a bore scope camera. The Commonwealth contends that Harris “should have” previously detected the corrosion, but fails to explain how an inspection conducted under the TIA 222-G standard – without resort to extraordinary investigation techniques -- could have revealed the condition. Nor is there any evidence of what steps the Commonwealth would have taken to prevent the advancement of the corrosion and to what degree the costs of repairing JUNI05 could have been mitigated, if at all. With respect to the other remaining site --BEAV02 – corroded anchor bolts could only be discovered after all grout was removed. JUNI05 and BEAV02 towers are discussed in further detail below.

Now, two years after the conclusion of the audit period, Crown, in collaboration with the Commonwealth, is in the process of removing the grout to inspect the condition of the anchor bolts at all 125 STARNet towers. The Audit Report states that inspections have been completed at 52 towers, with the 73 remaining towers to follow after bids have been obtained by Crown. (CoPA Audit Report, at 24).

Based on Exhibit 3 to the Audit Report, potential issues with tower anchor bolts account for $146,480.65 of 2015-2016 expenditures, $258,745 of projected 2017 expenditures, and an undetermined amount of future expenses for “repairs” and/or “modifications.” Tower bolt issues constitute the largest single expenditure cited in the Commonwealth’s Audit Report. Despite the magnitude of these proposed charges against Harris, the Commonwealth has refused to provide Harris with any supporting documentation as to the root cause of the anchor bolt issues, the reason for a statewide grout removal program, the extent to which Crown is insisting on design changes, the extent to which costs are incurred for modifications necessary to support increased tower loads, and any other relevant information that might shed light on whether Harris and its subcontractors should have any legal responsibility for the costs.

The Commonwealth in its Audit Report does not even offer an explanation as to why Crown is removing the grout at all 125 grouted towers. The absence of such an explanation, along with the limited information made available to Harris strongly suggests that Crown may have insisted that all grout be removed at all towers in


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order to eliminate unacceptable defects in the design and original construction of the towers. The Commonwealth makes absolutely no showing that alleged maintenance failures by Harris resulted in undetected conditions leading to this decision.

Accordingly, Harris respectfully disagrees that it is responsible to pay the Commonwealth for any costs incurred, or to be incurred in the future, in order to inspect, remediate or modify conditions caused by latent original construction defects such improperly grouted tower anchors bolts.

3. Harris Is Not Responsible for Costs of Repairing Deteriorating Concrete Caused by Original Construction Defects, Ordinary Aging, and Years of Inaction by PSP/SRND in Response to Reported Maintenance Problems.

In Exhibit 3 to the Audit Report, the Commonwealth identified a total of $167,155 in costs allegedly incurred, or to be incurred, to inspect and correct “tower foundation cracks.” These include $48,175 incurred by the Commonwealth in 2015-2016 to conduct inspections, repair concrete and make modifications at ADAM40 and MIFF40; $38,250 incurred by Crown customers (not the Commonwealth) at two tower sites in 2015-2016; and $80,730 in projected 2017 expenditures for concrete inspections, evaluations and repairs at various tower sites. PSP/SRND intends to charge Harris for these repair costs on the theory that Harris and its subcontractors failed to identify the concrete issues during PM inspections, allowing the cracks/deterioration to advance over time, resulting in more expensive repairs.

The Commonwealth’s theory is utterly without factual support. As discussed below, none of these costs of concrete inspection, repair and modification are chargeable to Harris because 1) Harris and its subcontractors did identify and report the concrete issues to PSP/SRND, and 2) PSP/SRND took ownership of the issues, 3) the issues were never assigned to Harris for repair, and 4) PSP/SRND itself delayed substantially (in most cases, for years) in proceeding with any repairs, leading to any increased repair costs.

Under the Maintenance Contract, tower repairs, including tower foundation repairs involving cracked or deteriorating concrete, were to be specially invoiced by Harris; they were not included in the fixed price Harris was paid by the Commonwealth for preventive maintenance. The Commonwealth had the option to direct Harris, or another contractor of its choosing, to perform the repair work. Thus, under the Maintenance Contract, Harris was not responsible to make tower foundation repairs as part of its preventive maintenance duties. Rather, it was Harris’ responsibility to report tower foundation issues to the Network Operations Center (“NOC”), so that a Remedy/Service Now ticket could be opened.

In the examples cited by the Commonwealth in the Audit Report (to which Harris responds in detail below), Harris (and in some cases PSP itself) did, in fact, identify and report the issue to the NOC. In many cases, photographs of cracked, spalled, or otherwise deteriorating concrete were attached to the ticket.

It was the Commonwealth PSP/SRND’s responsibility to assign the open Remedy/Service Now tickets for repairs. PSP/SRND had total discretion to assign the tickets to Harris, to another firm, or to PSP/SRND’s own Engineering, Maintenance, or Site Development groups for resolution. When a ticket for a new tower foundation issue is opened, it is tracked in the Remedy/Service Now system until resolved. A running record of the status of the issue, including the party assigned to evaluate or repair the problem, is maintained by the NOC. Each of the Commonwealth’s representatives with responsibility relating to STARNet System maintenance had


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access to the NOC database and could research the status of any open issue by ticket number. See, e.g.,Remedy Ticket No. 1247556 for MIFF40 opened June 13, 2013 (attached as Exhibit B hereto).

In addition, twice daily, the NOC Operator generated “Shift Reports” from the NOC database that were circulated to all relevant Commonwealth officials. For example, the June 17, 2013 Day Shift Report (attached as Exhibit C hereto) was emailed to Steven Kuller, John Nally, Michael Sudia, Michael Crimbly, and James Wrightstone. The Shift Reports identified all open maintenance issues, and included the ticket number, description of the issue, ticket status (i.e., open or resolved), and the party assigned follow-up responsibility.

Beginning in early 2013, the Commonwealth assigned virtually all open Remedy/Service Now tickets relating to tower foundation issues to PSP/SRND Engineering/Site Development for disposition. In virtually all cases, PSP/SRND deferred taking any corrective action on known tower foundation issues for two or more years. In many cases, issues identified in 2012-2013, known to PSP/SRND, and assigned to PSP/SRND for resolution, have still not been resolved. See, e.g., Exhibit D, attached hereto (shift report dated July 1, 2014 (reporting 12 open foundation concrete issues assigned to PSP/SRND)); Exhibit E, attached hereto (shift report dated September 30, 2015 (reporting 18 open concrete issues assigned to PSP/SRND)).

As the referenced July 1, 2014 Shift Report demonstrates, the concrete issues at the following sites were identified before mid-2014 and assigned to PSP/SRND for resolution: MIFF40, MONR03, PIKE01, BLAI02, CENT04, COLU01, INDI01, LYCO15, LUZE06, PIKE31, SNYD02, WAYN31. (See Exhibit D) As of September 30, 2015, the date the Maintenance Contract expired, none of these concrete issues had been resolved. Moreover, an additional six concrete issues listed in the September 30, 2015 Shift Report also remained unresolved. (See Exhibit E). It appears from the Audit Report that repairs have yet to be made at a number of these sites. That delay, and any advancement of concrete deterioration during that delay, was in no way caused by Harris.

In light of the foregoing, Harris respectfully disagrees that it is responsible to pay the Commonwealth for any alleged costs incurred, or to be incurred in the future, in order to inspect, remediate or modify cracked/deteriorated concrete foundations at any of the STARNet sites identified on Exhibit 3.

C. Harris’ Response to the Commonwealth’s Findings Regarding Seven Specific Tower Siteswith Foundation Issues

MIFF40:

The tower foundation cracks at MIFF40 were identified by Harris and its subcontractors on multiple occasions, including December 4, 2012, June 17, 2013, May 7, 2014, June 26, 2015, and August 14, 2015. As a result, the issue was assigned an Incident Number (1247556) and a Remedy Ticket was opened by the NOC on June 17, 2013. That same month, the issue was highlighted in Harris’ June 2013 OPRS Monthly Report. Thus, the issue was identified in the field, reported to the Commonwealth, and queued up for remedial action within a relatively short period of time.

Under the Maintenance Contract, tower repairs, including tower foundation repairs, were to be specially invoiced by Harris; they were not included in the fixed price Harris was paid by the Commonwealth for preventive maintenance. The Commonwealth had the option to direct Harris, or another contractor of its choosing, to perform the repair work. The NOC log indicates that the remedy ticket for the MIFF40 foundation


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issue was assigned to the Commonwealth on August 1, 2013 and reassigned within the Commonwealth team to another person “for concrete issues” on December 30, 2013. A further entry dated January 14, 2014 states that the Commonwealth will take care of the concrete issue in spring, 2014. The NOC team later emailed the Commonwealth team for an update on remedy ticket actions on July 4, 2014 and July 18, 2014; no response from the Commonwealth team is noted in the NOC log. The next activity reflected in the NOC log is reassignment of the remedy ticket within the Commonwealth team on December 12, 2014. It was not until the fall of 2016, four years after the original incident was reported, that another concrete foundation inspection was conducted at MIFF40 and bids for repair work were solicited.

The Commonwealth’s stated concern is that Harris was contractually obligated to report the exact same issue every time to OPRS every time it was noted, even after the issue was referred to Commonwealth for action and Harris had no further responsibility for repair. This is not consistent with the parties’ course of performance under the Maintenance Contract. Harris did not repeatedly report previously reported items in every monthly OPRS report unless a significant new development was observed. This practice, especially with tower foundations, was acceptable to the Commonwealth which at no time objected to the practice until now. In summary, it is clear that Harris performed its contractual duties in connection with the identification and reporting of the concrete deterioration issue at MIFF40 and that the three-year delay in proceeding with the $15,000 repairs after referral of the issue to the Commonwealth was not caused by Harris’ alleged failure to comply with contractual requirements.

MONT01

As the Commonwealth stated, PSP was aware of, and photographed, significant tower foundation issues at MONT01 as of March 27, 2012. These issues included cracks in the concrete tower pads and deteriorating grout beneath tower-leg leveling plates. The issues were also noted on the Shelter PM report prepared by theHarris subcontractor dated July 17, 2013 for MONT01. That report notes specifically that a ticket was already open “for tower foundation cracks.” It is Harris’ understanding that the Commonwealth took ownership of the concrete/grout deterioration issues affecting MONT01 after PSP documented the problem on March 27, 2012 and included it amongst the tower foundation issues that the Commonwealth elected to manage in 2013. (In 2013, the Commonwealth directed that all tower foundation concrete issues go to the Commonwealth for inspection, evaluation and repair.)

The Commonwealth also noted in its narrative that PSP had learned that the anchor bolts for the tower legs were badly rusted and contracted with a firm to conduct a bolt inspection. Harris respectfully requested additional information about the bolt inspection and, as of the date of this report, has not received that information from the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth’s stated concern is that Harris was contractually obligated to report the exact same issue every time to OPRS every time it was noted, even after the issue was referred to Commonwealth for action and Harris had no further responsibility for repair. As discussed in the MIFF40 response, this is not consistent with the parties’ course of performance under the Maintenance Contract. Harris did not repeatedly report previously reported items in every monthly OPRS report unless a significant new development was observed. This practice, especially with tower foundations, was acceptable to the Commonwealth which at no time objected to the practice until now. In summary, the Commonwealth was aware of the problem that led to the foundation issues at MONT01 and any delay by the Commonwealth in proceeding with repairs was not caused by Harris’ alleged failure to comply with contractual requirements.


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SOME06

The Commonwealth took photographs of a foundation issue (cracked and deteriorating grout under one or more tower leg leveling plates) during a site visit to SOME06 in May 2015. Based on the photographs, the grout deterioration is in an early stage. The Commonwealth’s stated concern is that the deteriorating grout was not identified in a tower inspection performed by the Harris subcontractor on October 8, 2012, nearly three years prior to the Commonwealth discovery. A more probable conclusion is that the grout condition observed on May 28, 2015 did not exist on October 8, 2012, but evolved over the intervening 31 months.

The Commonwealth also commented that the tower foundation issue at SOME06 was not noted in two quarterly PM shelter inspection forms completed after May 28, 2015 while Harris was still performing the Maintenance Contract. This issue is addressed in the Harris response to the Commonwealth’s draft Finding 5.

BEAV02

In September 2014, Harris’ subcontractor Total Comm conducted the required five-year tower inspection of BEAV02 and detected certain maintenance issues. During its September 2014 inspection, Total Comm noted that the grout for the tower bases did not have weep holes. Total Comm recommended that the grout be removed and replaced with weep holes installed. No corrosion of the anchor bolts was evident from Total Comm’s inspection in 2014.

The Commonwealth’s criticism regarding the BEAV02 site is that the Harris subcontractor did not examine the tower base during its tower inspection of BEAV02 five years earlier in 2009. The criticism is erroneous. First, the absence of weep holes in grouting below tower leg base-plates is a design and construction issue, not a maintenance issue. Recently, an alternative construction best practice is to eliminate grout and have the underside of the baseplate open to air. Second, the Harris subcontractor noted that “N/A” was placed in the inspection block in the report “Check Condition of Tower Base and Guy Anchors” because BEAV02 is not a guyed tower. The Harris subcontractor also noted that tower foundations were included as part of the quarterly shelter inspections at the tower sites. Furthermore, to the extent the Commonwealth is suggesting that other issues identified by Total Comm in September 2014 were missed by the Harris subcontractor in its 2009 tower inspection report, there is no basis for such a conclusion. These are ordinary conditions that likely developed in the five years between the tower inspections. Finally, the 2009 inspection is not within the scope of the Commonwealth’s audit of Harris’ billings under the Maintenance Agreement from 2012-2015.

CLIN41

The Commonwealth’s narrative complains that tower foundation issues at CLIN41 weren’t properly addressed by Harris and its subcontractors. However, the timeline of events concerning this site indicates otherwise. In 2009, Harris’ subcontractors made the initial repairs to the tower foundations that were pre-approved by the Commonwealth. (Discussions about the amount of the quote and the work to be performed would have taken place at that time. Furthermore, questioning an invoice for work performed in 2009 is beyond the scope of the Commonwealth’s audit.)

In October 2012, the Commonwealth observed foundation cracks at the site and took photographs. At this point, the Commonwealth took ownership of foundation concrete issues throughout the Commonwealth. Within


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seven months, in May 2013, the Commonwealth hired “an independent engineering firm” to investigate the cracks. The engineering firm reportedly “discovered several structural deficiencies with the foundations” which are original construction issues the Commonwealth does not describe nor has the Commonwealth provided a copy of the engineering firm’s report to Harris as previously requested.

After observing the foundation issues in October 2012 and taking ownership of the concrete foundation issues at CLIN41 and other sites, the Commonwealth opened a Service Now ticket sixteen months later in February 10, 2014, after the tower owner conducted an inspection. It was noted that one of the customers of the tower owner – not PSP – undertook “repairs” to the tower foundation in 2014 that reportedly cost $100,000. It is not stated,nor is it clear, to what extent the 2014 work was foundation “repairs” or, instead, foundation improvements. Thephotographs of the tower foundation pads at CLIN41 taken by Total Comm in November 2015 indicate that the2014 “repairs” conducted by the customer of the tower owner customer were actually in the nature offoundation upgrades to improve and increase the load carrying capacity of the tower. For example, towersupport legs and diagonal members have been reinforced; the main leg has been encased in a horizontal crosssection member, new anchor bolts have been drilled into the existing foundation pads, etc. These improvementsindicate that the tower was structurally upgraded to provide more capacity to support a tower user’s additionalantennas and equipment.

ADAM40

The Commonwealth’s narrative states that the Commonwealth lost confidence in Harris and its subcontractors’ ability to address concrete foundation issues as a result of issues identified by PSP at ADAM40 on March 14, 2013. Photos from the 2013 site visit by PSP show shrinkage cracks in the surface and edges of the concrete foundation along with lateral cracks that may be the result of improper original construction (cold concrete pour). The Commonwealth is contending that the cracks should have been noted during the Harris subcontractor’s tower inspection on September 9, 2010. The Harris subcontractor’s inspection form, however, indicates that the tower base was inspected and there were no findings to be noted.

Two and a half years passed between the Harris subcontractor inspection in September 2010 and the PSP’s findings in March 2013. The site was exposed to two and a half years of weathering and freeze-thaw cycles that unquestionably affected the concrete in the tower foundation. Small cracks would become more prominent over time; it cannot be reasonably suggested that the same conditions that were observed in 2013 existed back in 2010.

When PSP became aware of the foundation cracks in March 2013, the Commonwealth elected to “red flag” new construction at the site while tower foundation issues were being addressed. No remedy ticket was opened by the Commonwealth at the time, nor was Harris or its subcontractor directed to perform additional inspections or proceed with foundation repairs. In other words, the Commonwealth took ownership of the foundation issue just as it did at other tower sites known to have foundation issues in 2013. It is not known what foundation remedial steps, if any, were taken by the Commonwealth between 2013 and 2015.

On January 29, 2015, after another two years passed, the Commonwealth opened Service Now ticket # 489685. The ticket indicates that, on the same date, Crown Castle was accepting bids for foundation modifications. These modifications apparently were required to provide capacity for additional equipment owned by Adams County to be placed on the ADAM40 tower. The modifications were completed in May 2015 after which the new equipment was installed on the tower. Apparently when the modifications were performed, the foundation


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concrete issues were also repaired. In short, it is clear that the timing and scope of the 2015 repairs were driven by a tower upgrade.

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is no basis for any suggestion that Harris or its subcontractors should be responsible for the cost of retaining an independent engineering firm to evaluate and then perform foundation modifications at ADAM40 to remedy original construction issues. As already noted, any such tower repairs were to be specially invoiced to the Commonwealth, if performed by Harris. (Additionally, Harris would not be responsible for the cost of a foundation upgrade.)

Again, it must be noted that this is an audit of Harris’ performance and billing for services in 2012 through 2015; concerns regarding the September 9, 2010 inspection are outside the Commonwealth’s audit scope.

JUNI05

The Commonwealth’s narrative refers to the discovery by Total Comm of rusted anchor bolts securing tower legs to the concrete foundation piers at JUNI05 during a site inspection on March 21, 2016 (which most likely resulted from another original construction issue). Along with the rusted components, the use of a bore-scope camera in 2016 yielded the discovery of mice nests hidden in the space between the baseplates and the concrete piers. (Harris notes that it has not received a copy of the TotalComm report for JUNI05 that Harris previously requested from the Commonwealth.)

The Commonwealth’s concern is that the rusting bolts were not reported in the Harris subcontractor’ July 11, 2012 tower inspection report. There is no reasonable basis for concluding that the mice residence was present and the referenced condition was observable and should have been reported by the Harris subcontractor in 2012, four years prior to the 2016 inspection. A more reasonable conclusion is that the corrosion of the bolts and the mice residence developed in the four years after the Harris subcontractor inspection.

In response to the Commonwealth’s recommendation, Harris is willing to work with the PSP to resolve the costs questioned in Commonwealth Finding No. 1. Harris will continue to evaluate ways in which it can improve its internal controls and is willing to discuss any suggestions the Commonwealth may have.


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As part of its duties under the Maintenance Contract, Harris was required to submit monthly reports to Office of Pennsylvania Radio System (“OPRS”) reflecting the prior month’s performance (“Monthly Reports”). In Finding No. 2, the Commonwealth contends that the Harris Monthly OPRS Monthly Reports were contractually deficient because they failed to properly report Issues/Exceptions by category” and “Actions taken to resolve issues/Exceptions.”

The relevant contractual provision, Rider F, Schedule C, Section 10, states as follows:

Preventative Maintenance reporting will be provided on a monthly basis to OPRS on the area’s listed below. Reports will be made available no later than the 3rd week of each month reflecting the months prior performance.

Tower (defined by tower type) Equipment Shelter CE3000 Emergency Generator DC Plant HVAC Cell on Wheels (COWS) OpenSky Microwave Cell Sites

Included in the report will be the following:

Total site Preventative Maintenance performance by category Total sites completed within interval, 30 days +/- from the last Preventative Maintenance

performed Issues/Exceptions by category Actions taken to resolve issues/exceptions

The Monthly Reports were intended to provide – and did provide -- a high-level summary of all Harris activity during the month, with a focus on numbers of inspections completed to meet schedule goals. To this end, the Monthly Reports included monthly statistics showing inspections completed by inspection type, issues/exceptions by inspection type as reported in the NOC’s Remedy and Service Now systems, status of each reported issue/exception, and issues/exceptions corrected during the month by inspection type. The Monthly Reports also included data and analyses not required by Rider F, Schedule C, Section 10, including PM’s Performed—Contract Year to Date, PM Issues–12-month View, P1 Trouble Ticket Measured Time To Close, Urgent Trouble Ticket Analysis, P1 Trouble Ticket Detailed Response Time, P2 Trouble Ticket Measured Time To Close.

Harris has submitted Monthly Reports to OPRS and its predecessor SRND since at least 2009. During the Audit Period of July 1, 2012 through September 30, 2015, thirty-nine (39) Monthly Reports were submitted to


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the Commonwealth. The Reports were reviewed at monthly meetings attended by Harris and representatives of the Commonwealth’s STARNet Radio System’s Maintenance Group including Mike Sudia (STARNet Maintenance Manager), Robert Dowel, and Jesse Henry.

The scope, content, and form of presentation of information in the Monthly Reports was adjusted a number of times to include data points and data analysis as requested by the Commonwealth. Harris routinely accommodated the Commonwealth’s requests, even if the additional information was not contractually required. Through the parties’ course of dealing, the form of the Monthly Report evolved, with the Commonwealth’s input and approval. In accommodating the Commonwealth’s requests, Harris took on substantial additional work that was not contractually required, without receiving additional compensation.

In Finding No. 2, the Commonwealth notes that Harris did not mention tower foundation cracks found at MIFF40 in 2013 in four Monthly Reports submitted to OPRS in 2014 and 2015. However, Harris had already reported the MIFF40 foundation cracks in its June 2013 Monthly Report, when the issue was first entered into the NOC system as Remedy Ticket #1247031. (CoPA Findings, at 11.) The Commonwealth nevertheless contends that Schedule C requires Harris to mention open maintenance issues month after month in its Monthly Reports until the issue is resolved. To not provide this information, according to the Commonwealth, constituted a breach of contract.

This is incorrect for at least three reasons. First, the express purpose of the Monthly Reports is to reflect the prior month’s performance. Harris substantially complied with this contractual standard by identifying all new maintenance issues entered into the NOC system during the previous month, along with the Remedy or Service Now ticket number, and the status of the issue (open/closed). Harris also provided monthly statistics for issues/exceptions corrected during the month by inspection type.

Second, the parties’ course of dealing demonstrates that the level of detail Harris provided in the Monthly Reports regarding open maintenance issues was acceptable to the Commonwealth. While Harris did not provide a “status” report on each specific maintenance issues in each succeeding month until the issue was resolved, the Commonwealth never requested this level of detail. The Commonwealth received, reviewed, and discussed 39 consecutive Monthly Reports in face-to-face meetings with Harris without taking exception. At none of those meetings did the Commonwealth advise that Harris’ monthly reports were deficient or insufficient in any way.

Third, the Monthly Reports were intended to provide OPRS with a high-level summary of all Harris activity during the month, with a focus on numbers of inspections completed. Harris provided this information to the Commonwealth’s satisfaction. The Monthly Reports were not the vehicle for communicating the details and status of open maintenance issues to the Commonwealth. That was the function of the Network Operations System (NOC) and the Remedy Tickets, Service Now Tickets and associated reports. Each of the Commonwealth’s representatives with responsibility relating to STARNet System maintenance had access to the NOC database and could research the status of any open issue by ticket number. Full computerized access was never more than a few clicks away. Furthermore, twice daily, Harris generated Shift Reports from the NOC database that were circulated to all relevant Commonwealth officials. For example, the June 17, 2013 Day Shift Report was emailed to Steven Kuller, John Nally, Michael Sudia, Michael Crimbly, and James Wrightstone. The Shift Reports identified all open maintenance issues, and included the reported date, urgency, description of the issue, and party assigned to resolve the issue. (See Email from NOC Operator to various CoPA and Harris recipients with attached June 17, 2013 Day Shift Report, attached hereto as Exhibit C).


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In addition to the daily access to the entire NOC database and daily Shift Reports, Harris also provided monthly spreadsheet reports identifying all Demand Maintenance activities completed during the previous month. These spreadsheet reports were also distributed and discussed with the Commonwealth’s representatives charged with oversight of STARNet maintenance.

It is clear that the Commonwealth in making its audit findings did not consider the fact that Harris and the Commonwealth did not rely on the Monthly Reports as the source of current, accurate and complete data concerning the status and resolution of open maintenance issues. They relied instead on the NOC System, the Shift Reports, and the monthly Demand Maintenance reports. The Commonwealth chose to ignore this reality and to make the following statements as to the purported “effect” of Harris’ alleged contractual noncompliance:

Because Harris failed to properly prepare its Monthly Reports in accordance with the terms of the contract, the ability of PSP management to effectively monitor the hundreds of tower sites it is charged with administering is diminished.

When actions taken to resolve issues/exceptions are not tracked within the contractually required Monthly Reports, PSP management cannot understand the breadth, scope, or severity of the problems that the technicians employed by Harris and its subcontractors were encountering.

The Commonwealth in its contract with Harris called for them to prepare a Monthly Report in order to provide a vehicle by which all significant issues/exceptions could be summarized and tracked in one centralized location until they were resolved. (CoPA Findings, at 28)

Each of these statements is plainly wrong. The Commonwealth had the ability to monitor, and did monitor, hundreds of tower sites through the NOC System, the Remedy and Service Now tickets generated by the NOC, and the twice-daily Shift Reports. PSP management were regular users of the NOC system, and received comprehensive open issue/exception information on a daily – rather than a monthly basis. Therefore, PSP management had constant and continuous awareness of the “breadth, scope, and severity” of the maintenance inspections and problems being encountered and addressed. Accordingly, the PSP never asked Harris to change the scope of its Monthly Reports to provide the same information that the PSP already had at its fingertips.

As the Commonwealth recommends, Harris will continue to look for ways to improve its internal controls.


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In Finding No. 3, the Commonwealth contends that Harris failed to change HVAC filters at least annually when conducting 47 semi-annual and annual HVAC PM inspections. The Commonwealth therefore questions the $24,480.81 associated with performing the entirety of each of the 47 HVAC inspections. Although the filters were not changed annually during the HVAC maintenance, the filters did not need to be changed, and there was no contractual requirement to change them at least annually.

The Commonwealth does not argue that the HVAC systems, including the filters were not inspected, but rather argues that the HVAC filters should have been changed even if there was no need to change the filter. The technicians performing the inspections determined that the filter was clean and elected not to change the HVAC filter. The Commonwealth’s own photographs show that the filters were clean, supporting the action taken by the technicians. See Exhibit F attached hereto for examples of the photographs provided by the Commonwealth showing a clean HVAC filter. Harris also notes that the ongoing use of the clean filters would not damage the HVAC equipment or impede the operation of the HVAC equipment.

The Commonwealth attempts to argue Harris and its subcontractors were contractually required to change the air filters annually. However, PA-STARNet Rider F, as revised, Schedule C states that HVAC filters should be changed “[a]s needed or annually.” The Commonwealth, somehow, interprets this to mean that the air filters must be changed at least annually. A standard that required the air filters to be replaced at least annually would have stated “as needed, but at least annually,” not “as need or annually.” It is clear, based on a fair reading of the standard, that air filters could be replaced either as needed or annually. Such a standard, acknowledges that there may not be a need to replace the air filter on an annual basis.

The Commonwealth attempts to disallow the entire charge of approximately $400 for each semi-annual and approximately $700 for each annual HVAC inspection because a technician did not replace an air filter, which was clean and did not need to be replaced and which costs approximately $2.50. Even if required to change the air filters, which Harris argues it was not, the Commonwealth concedes that the inspections were performed. Accordingly, Harris “substantially performed” its obligations under the contract by ensuring that annual or semi-annual inspections of the HVAC filters were completed and that the HVAC filters were changed as needed. Harris is therefore entitled to the reasonable value of the HVAC inspections, less any damages suffered as a result of not changing the filters. See, e.g., Widmer Eng'g, Inc. v. Dufalla, 837 A.2d 459, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (where an alleged breach of contract claim was deemed “an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract was substantially performed, the contract remains effective” and the contractor was entitled to recover for the work performed less credits for the work which was uncorrected or unperformed); see also li Corp. v. Fox, 348 F. Supp. 629, 644 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same); Danville Bridge Co. v. Pomeroy, 15 Pa. 151, 151(1850). The damages arising from not changing the filters during these 47 inspections are less than $120, as the inspected filters were clean and a new filter only costs about $2.50.

The Commonwealth, in Finding No. 3, also states that it should not be responsible for the $8,683.34 associated with the semi-annual and annual HVAC PM inspections of sites that exhibited a dirty HVAC condenser coil allegedly attributable to a lack of thorough cleaning. Harris has reviewed the data for the 16 cases presented by the Commonwealth asserting that the condensing coils were not cleaned properly during their previous scheduled cleaning. Harris concludes, however, that the data supports a more probable conclusion – that the coils were previously cleaned as required and the coils are now dirty and ready to be cleaned again. The photographs presented by the Commonwealth were taken in May, 2016, at least 8 months after the last required


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cleanings were performed. (The Harris maintenance contract ended in September 2015). Assuming the same 12-month cleaning schedule continued, then in at least four cases, the photographs were taken after the nextscheduled cleaning should have been performed by the new maintenance provider selected by theCommonwealth. Given the long time intervals between the last inspection and the photographs, it is reasonableto expect that the condensing coils were ready to be cleaned again. The Commonwealth notes that none of thesites were located “next to” a farm or any other factor that might cause the site to encounter more debris in theair. However, while not “next to,” two sites are in close proximity to a farm and one site is in close proximatelyto a mining operation, which could contribute to the accumulation of debris on the condenser coils.

The Commonwealth states that it interviewed a technician who was asked to perform HVAC inspections and the technician indicated that he cleaned condenser coils with a vacuum cleaner. The Commonwealth, however, has not identified this individual so as to allow Harris to substantiate this allegation. Harris has confirmed with its subcontractor that it used a commercial industrial solvent to clean the condensing coils which is customarypractice.

Just as with the HVAC filter issue above, the Commonwealth questions the entire cost related to these 16 HVAC inspections even though cleaning the condenser coils is only one of many steps performed during said inspections. Even if the condenser coils were not cleaned, Harris still “substantially performed” the HVAC inspection and the Commonwealth would only be entitled to withhold the value of cleaning the coils, not the entire value of the inspection. See, e.g., Widmer Eng'g, Inc., 837 A.2d at 467 (where an alleged breach of contract claim was deemed “an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract was substantially performed, the contract remains effective” and the contractor was entitled to recover for the work performed less credits for the work which was uncorrected or unperformed); see also li Corp., 348 F. Supp. at 644 (same); Danville Bridge Co., 15 Pa. at 151.

Harris has reviewed the Commonwealth’s recommendation and is willing to engage in discussions with the PSP to resolve the costs questioned in Commonwealth Finding No. 3. Harris will continue to evaluate ways in which it can improve its internal controls and is willing to discuss any suggestions the Commonwealth may have.


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In Finding No. 4, the Commonwealth noted that, in November 2015, Harris provided PSP certain Climatech HVAC PM inspection forms relating to HVAC inspections performed in September, 2015. These inspection forms were photocopies, not originals. The Commonwealth’s stated concern is that: (1) the forms were not completed at the time of the inspection and left in the shelters at the site, and (2) the forms were not completed by the technician that performed the HVAC inspection at the site. In addition, the Commonwealth noted that there were ServiceNow ticket numbers located in the bottom left hand corner of each inspection form.

As explained in the letter from Climatech’s Vice President Joseph Saltmar (attached as Exhibit G hereto) the 51 HVAC PM inspections were, in fact, performed by two Climatech technicians, David Reismeyer and Dalton Marnich, across western PA in September 2015. They completed the required inspection forms onsite and left the inspection forms in the shelters. While onsite, they also completed the Climatech service order forms which contain the following information:

1. Location of work.2. Date work was performed.3. Time in and time out.4. Total labor on site.5. Travel time.6. Technician name.7. Work performed.

See Exhibit H attached hereto for examples of the Climatech service order forms. While not identical to the inspection forms, the Climatech service orders indicate which steps from the inspection forms were performed. Climatech used its service order forms to prepare payroll for its technicians.

In addition to leaving the completed inspection forms at the shelters, Climatech was required to provide a copy of the inspection forms to Harris with their billing. In October 2015, only one month after the inspections were performed, Harris contacted Climatech and asked Climatech for a copy of the inspection forms. Shortly thereafter, Climatech submitted the inspection forms. Later, Harris learned that Climatech had not retained a file copy of the inspection forms so Climatech asked Dave Reismeyer to prepare replacement inspection forms based on the information on the service orders and Reismeyer’s professional recollection of the inspection results. Climatech scanned and forwarded these completed pdf inspection forms to Harris. Harris inserted the ServiceNow ticket numbers in the bottom left hand corner of each inspection form in order to complete its record for the completed inspections.

Despite the documentation provided by Harris, the Commonwealth states that it is unable to determine if all of the contractually required inspection steps were completed at each of the 51 locations. Therefore, the Commonwealth questions the entire $36,669.51 in costs associated with all of these 51 HVAC PM inspections. Again, the Commonwealth has declined to provide its calculations and methodologies for allocating $36,669.51 to the 51 HVAC PM inspections. Even if the Commonwealth contends that it is unable to determine all required inspection steps were completed at each of the 51 locations, the Commonwealth cannot withhold payment for the work that was performed. The documentation provided by Harris unquestionably shows that Harris “substantially performed” its obligations under the terms of the contract. Therefore, the proper remedy is to subtract any damages arising from any deficiencies in Harris’ work from the contract price, it is not to


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withhold the entire contracted price. See, e.g., Widmer Eng'g, Inc., 837 A.2d at 467 (where an alleged breach of contract claim is “an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract was substantially performed, the contract remains effective” and the contractor is entitled to recover for the work performed less credits for the work which was uncorrected or unperformed); see also li Corp., 348 F. Supp. at 644 (same); Danville Bridge Co., 15 Pa. at 151. The damages would be minimal, as the HVAC inspections were still performed and the Commonwealth received the benefits of the performance. There were only minor deficiencies in the manner in which the inspections were reported.

As the Commonwealth has recommended, Harris is willing to negotiate with PSP to resolve the questioned costs in this finding. Harris will continue to evaluate ways in which it can improve its internal controls and is willing to discuss any suggestions the Commonwealth may have.


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The Commonwealth’s stated concern in Finding No. 5 is that 76 quarterly shelter inspection reports completed by Harris’ subcontractors at 11 sites, did not again report foundation cracks that had already been identified and brought to the attention of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth contends that these alleged omissions constituted breaches of the Maintenance Contract that “increase [d] the likelihood that the issues could worsen and not be addressed and corrected in a timely manner. The tower sites are now in a state more severe at least in part because Harris and its subcontractors failed to document the deficiencies that existed at these sites.” (CoPA Audit Report at 46)

As the discussion below demonstrates, the Commonwealth’s in Finding No. 5 is erroneous. The evidence is clear and convincing that repeated, redundant references in shelter PM inspection forms to known, reported, pre-existing foundation concrete issues had absolutely nothing to do with the Commonwealth’s failure to timely and appropriately address tower foundation issues. The Commonwealth auditors, who are supposed to be independent and unbiased, have chosen to disregard this information in an effort to facilitate the PSP/SRND’s attempt to shift blame and cost responsibility to Harris for its significant delays In taking the required corrective actions.

The reporting of maintenance issues to the Commonwealth was an obligation of Harris under the Maintenance Contract. In order to discharge that obligation, the Maintenance Contract established a central clearinghouse –the Network Operations Center (NOC) -- for the recordation, assignment and tracking of identified maintenance issues. In each of the eleven examples cited in Finding No. 5, the tower foundation issue was duly identified and entered by the NOC into the Remedy (or ServiceNow) System by the opening of a Remedy or Service Now ticket, in most cases with photographs detailing the issue attached to the ticket.

As an example, Harris’ subcontractor Transcore noted a “minor crack in one tower leg and chipped concrete” on a shelter PM form for INDI01 dated March 21, 2013. The finding was reported to the NOC and the NOC opened Remedy Ticket #1112202, with pictures of the tower cracks attached, on April 4, 2013. That same day, the Remedy Ticket was assigned to Mike Sudia in the PSP/SRND Maintenance Department for further action; Sudia then reassigned the ticket to Ken Stuck in the PSP/SRND Engineering Department in December 2013. By virtue of these assignments, PSP/SRND took on full responsibility for resolving the issue – Harris was not authorized to proceed with any repair or remediation.

Once the Remedy Ticket for INDI01 was opened, the NOC reported its “open” status twice daily in Shift Reports circulated to Commonwealth officials including Steven Kuller, John Nally, Michael Sudia, Michael Crimbly, and James Wrightstone. Thus the Commonwealth received a daily update on the unresolved nature of the foundation problem at INDI01. The Remedy Ticket for foundation cracks remained open throughout the remainder of the audit period – from April 2013 to September 30, 2015, without PSP/SRND taking any corrective action. Harris believes that – to this day – the issue remains unresolved. (Harris cannot confirm this belief because the Commonwealth has refused Harris’ requests for information regarding the steps the Commonwealth has or has not taken since 2013 to resolve various tower foundation issues.)

The Remedy and Service Now systems administered by the NOC were the exclusive, authoritative means by which STARNet maintenance issues were opened, assigned, tracked, and closed. It was not the parties’ practice to open multiple tickets for the exact same maintenance issue. That would have created confusion and unnecessary administrative cost. Regardless, the Commonwealth’s stated concern is that Harris was


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contractually obligated to report the exact same issue every time to the Commonwealth every time it was noted, even after the issue was referred to the Commonwealth for action and Harris was not assigned the repair and had no responsibility for the repair. This is not consistent with the parties’ course of performance under the Maintenance Contract. Harris did not repeatedly report previously reported items in every monthly report provided to the Commonwealth unless a significant new development was observed. This practice, especially with tower foundations, was acceptable to the Commonwealth which at no time objected to the practice until now. In particular, the Commonwealth did not object to Harris’ monthly OPRS report and information packagethat included shelter inspection reports which did not restate issues that had previously been opened. In those reports, Harris reported new issues and new developments on existing issues, as opposed to a cumulative total of all open issues, whether previously reported or not.

In Finding No. 5, the Commonwealth offers no evidence of worsening tower foundation conditions that Harris or its subcontractors failed to bring to the Commonwealth’s attention. On the contrary, the information shows that Harris and its subcontractors had submitted information sufficient to put the Commonwealth fully on notice of the potential severity of the foundation issues and this information was entered into the Remedy (or Service Now) System. The documents further show that, in every case, the Commonwealth assigned the tower foundation issue to a member of the Commonwealth’s own team for resolution. Thereafter Harris was not asked by the Commonwealth to perform the necessary repairs.

In ten of the eleven examples cited in Finding No. 5, the Commonwealth notes that the identified tower foundation problem was not resolved by September 30, 2015. Based on current NOC records, a number of the foundation issues still remain unresolved, including the high priority stress fractures noted in 2014 at LYCO02. The Commonwealth is responsible for these repairs and the delays in making these repairs; the delays do not result from any purported failure by Harris in bringing foundation issues to the Commonwealth’s attention through quarterly shelter inspections or its monthly reports.

There is no basis for the Commonwealth to question the $16,502.72 of Maintenance Contract costs allocated by the Commonwealth to the 76 PM shelter inspections detailed in Finding No. 5 and Exhibit 6 of the Commonwealth’s audit report.

In response to the Commonwealth’s recommendation, Harris notes that it is willing to engage in discussion necessary to resolve the costs questioned by the Commonwealth in this audit finding. Harris continues to evaluate ways in which it can improve its internal controls.


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The Commonwealth claims that Harris failed to comply with the Maintenance Contract by not providing adequate documentation to support the “expertise, training, and certifications” of seven technicians. To support its argument, the Commonwealth cites to Rider F, Revision C, Section 3.9, System-Wide Maintenance Staffing and Organization, which states, “Harris will maintain a service organization of sufficient size and skill set, including the acquisition of the necessary vehicles and equipment to meet the Service Level Agreements listed in Section F3.3.” The contract simply states that Harris must maintain a service organization of sufficient skill set, it does not require Harris to demonstrate its technician’s skill in the manner requested by the Commonwealth. The contract does not mandate that technicians must hold specific certifications or must receive specific training. During the audit, Harris submitted substantial information that the questioned technicians were in fact sufficiently skilled for the work to be performed including, but not limited to, information regarding their on-the-job training and their years of experience. As such, Harris met its contractual obligations, even without submitting the specific certifications or specific training requested by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth’s dismissal of the information Harris provided including the technicians’ work experience and on-the-job training is wholly unwarranted.

Notably, the Commonwealth does not argue that inspections were performed improperly as a result of any lack of qualification or insufficient skill and claims no damages arising from the alleged lack of expertise, training, or certifications.

The Commonwealth first questions the qualifications of three Jacobs technicians and an EMR Power Systems technician to perform generator maintenance work because there was no documentation that the technicians received “generator maintenance training” and there was no documentation that they possessed necessary “generator maintenance experience.” The contract, however, does not require specific generator maintenance training. It requires the service organization as a whole to possess sufficient size and skill set to meet contractual Service Level Agreements.

The three Jacobs technicians have many years of experience in the communications equipment industry including significant on-the-job training working with towers and shelters and the equipment on the towers and in the shelter compounds. Such equipment includes generators. The EMR technician had 19 years of experience in the power generation/generator maintenance industry. A review of the generator inspection checklists confirms that the skills necessary to perform generator inspections can be obtained through on the job training. If expertise was needed beyond that possessed by one of these technicians, OEM technical representatives would have been consulted.

The Commonwealth next questions the qualifications of two Climatech technicians that performed HVAC maintenance because Harris did not provide specific certifications or other supporting documents for the technicians. The contract, however, does not require Harris to maintain or provide certifications or documentary evidence of qualifications. One of the technicians, Dave Reismeyer, is a Lead Journeyman Technician, who has 29 years of experience in the HVAC trade. The other technician, Dalton Marnich, is a Journeyman Technician with 2 years of experience in the HVAC trade. Both technicians are EPA refrigerant certified and have attended Climatech sponsored continuing education training classes. These individual technicians are sufficiently skilled, regardless of the specific training information provided documenting their qualifications.


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Finally, the Commonwealth questions the qualifications of a Total Comm Systems technician that performed microwave radio equipment system maintenance because Harris did not provide specific certifications or other supporting documentation related to his qualifications. Again, the contract does not require Harris to maintain certifications or documents evidencing a technician’s qualifications. A lack of such evidence does not mean that a technician is not skilled. This technician, Dave Wisgirda, has 16 years of experience in the microwave industry. He was trained by Total Comm Systems’ Director of Maintenance, who has achieved a Level 4 Technician Certification and has over 40 years in the industry. This technician’s experience and training demonstrate that he is sufficiently skilled. Not only are the questioned technicians sufficiently skilled, the organization maintained by Harris possessed sufficient skill.

In response to the Commonwealth’s recommendation, Harris notes that it is willing to engage in discussions with the Commonwealth regarding ways in which Harris can address its internal controls to ensure that its contractors are qualified and sufficiently skilled.


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In Finding No. 7, the Commonwealth contends that Harris overbilled the Commonwealth $24,180 for 44 occurrences involving DM remedy tickets for tower side marker light repairs. To perform its calculation, the Commonwealth identified tickets where more than ten labor hours were billed for on-site and travel time combined. The Commonwealth states that it calculated on-site time as reported on the remedy tickets for the repairs, and then calculated travel time in excess of 8 hours per ticket. Any excess hours, per the Commonwealth’s analysis, constituted overbilled hours.

Given that side marker light repairs are tower repairs which required two technicians to perform the work, the Commonwealth is essentially contending that Harris was contractually precluded from billing more than 2 hours of travel time each way to and from the tower requiring the side marker light repair. The Maintenance Contract does not, however, impose such a limitation on invoicing travel time to and from towers for this Demand Maintenance work. Nor does the Maintenance Contract require technicians to separately record travel time and on-site time. In any event, the Commonwealth’s narrative indicates that the Commonwealth was somehow able to separately calculate on-site time from the remedy tickets.

In 2012-2014, Harris relied upon Jacobs, who is based in Murrysville, to provide certified tower-climbing crews to make side marker light repairs. Travel time in excess of two hours each way from Murrysville to remote locations in the Commonwealth is not unusual or unreasonable. Notably, most of the 44 occurrences cited by the Commonwealth involved towers in remote locations of the Commonwealth such as Tioga, Venango, Elk, Wayne, and Cameron Counties.

The Commonwealth contends that Harris and Jacobs should have taken the time to coordinate the repair of side marker lights with other services. However, such coordination was not always feasible given the urgency of performing side marker light repairs. Side marker light repairs must be completed in no more than fourteen days, and Jacobs typically performed the repairs in less than seven days. The Commonwealth’s suggestion that technicians should have coordinated these urgent repairs in remote locations to coincide with routine maintenance in every instance was not possible or feasible.

The Commonwealth also states that Harris should have contracted with and dispatched tower subcontractors in closer proximity to the towers needing side marker light repairs. This argument presumes that all tower subcontractors charge the same rates as Jacobs. This, however, is not the case. Harris considered using tower subcontractors other than Jacobs to perform side light repairs, but elected to use Jacobs because it was the most cost effective option, even considering the Murrysville travel time. This cost savings was passed on to the Commonwealth.

If the Commonwealth had instructed Harris to use tower contractors in closer proximity to the tower sites, notwithstanding a rate structure which would have made it more expensive than using Jacobs, Harris would have instituted this change. Harris never received such an instruction.

The Commonwealth also argues that it was unreasonable for Jacobs’s technicians to travel to their Murrysville, PA office to pick up materials for a repair and instead Harris should have stored the side marker lights in Harris’s regional offices or required Jacobs’s technicians to keep a supply of the light bulbs in their repair trucks. Harris first notes that it is not an advisable practice to store fragile light bulbs in a technician’s repair truck considering the many places the trucks travel to without smooth paved roads. Additionally, the


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Commonwealth’s argument assumes that it less efficient to travel to the Murrysville office than to one of the regional storage location. However, it is Harris’ understanding that the Jacobs technicians who performed the side marker light repairs were stationed near Murrysville, and thus it was more efficient for them to pick up equipment from Murrysville than from a regional storage facility. Furthermore, repairs often involved more than replacing a lightbulb and required Jacobs to obtain additional parts and supplies which may not have been available at a regional storage location.

During Maintenance Contract performance, Harris reviewed Demand Maintenance subcontractor invoices (which reflected labor hours billed by ticket). When more than eight hours were billed to a ticket, Harris’ subcontractors provided Harris with detailed breakdown reports indicating on-site hours versus travel hours. See Exhibit I attached hereto for an example of the detailed breakdown reports. This information was provided to the Commonwealth. Thus, the hours billed per side marker light repair, the location of the tower, the subcontractor performing the repair, and the breakdown of hours were all reviewed by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth had the opportunity to, and in many instances, did question certain charges. Harris would respond by explaining and justifying said charges prior to the Commonwealth paying the invoices.

Using the data in the spreadsheet provided by the Commonwealth detailing the 44 occurrences involving Total repair time in excess of ten hours, and using Google Maps to calculate travel time from Murrysville to and from each tower location, Harris has evaluated the Commonwealth’s overbilling claim. The Harris evaluation used actual travel times (without the arbitrary limits) and also took into consideration the fact that some invoices covered multiple trips required to complete the repair made, and the often poor condition of roads leading to towers in remote mountainous regions at various times and weather conditions during the year. Using the Harris evaluation model, the calculated travel times for the questioned side marker light repairs were all justified except for $780 of Harris’ billing to the Commonwealth. Harris notes that the repairs requiring the most amount of travel time, such as the repairs performed at WAYN33, were exceptional circumstances, requiring significant repairs and multiple trips.

Harris agrees with the Commonwealth’s recommendation and is willing to work with PSP to resolve the questioned costs in this audit finding. Harris looks forward to the mutual exchange of information and frank and open discussion necessary to resolve this issue. Although no longer performing maintenance for the Commonwealth, Harris appreciates and will consider the Commonwealth’s recommendations as to how it can more effectively and efficiently provide future service.


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In Finding No. 8, the Commonwealth contends that Harris’s charges for Demand Maintenance (“DM”) should be questioned because Harris did not require some of its subcontractors to support their invoices to Harris with sufficient supporting information. The concern is based on the Commonwealth’s review of a “sample” of 75 DM tickets and 8 quoted DM services provided by Harris and its subcontractors during the audit period. The Commonwealth is questioning $212,591.68 of the total $361,409.85 Harris charged to the Commonwealth for labor and materials for the 83 items.

As discussed below, the Commonwealth’s contentions are largely without merit. With few exceptions, Harris’ charges for DM services performed by its subcontractors met the Maintenance Contract’s standard because they were “supported by contracts, invoices, vouchers, and other data as appropriate” to support the charges. See Rider A, Section A.27. In Finding No. 8, the Commonwealth has essentially invented its own standard as to what constitutes adequate support for subcontractor invoices, without any contractual support for the new standard. Worse yet, the Commonwealth is imposing its new standard after-the-fact in order to question invoices that the Commonwealth thoroughly reviewed with Harris and accepted on a monthly basis during contract performance.

For example, a major focus of Finding No. 8 is subcontractor time records. The Commonwealth contends that Harris should have required its subcontractors to keep ticket-specific detailed time records outlining to/from travel locations, travel time, and on-site work time for DM service, and to submit such information as a condition for payment of subcontractor invoices. This contention has no contractual basis. Harris was not contractually obligated to obtain timesheets displaying travel time, on-site time, and ticket specific time tracking methodology. Rider A, Section A.27 cannot be reasonably interpreted to impose invoicing requirements that go beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of that provision. Rider A, Section A.27 only requires charges to be supported by contracts, invoices, vouchers, and other data, it says nothing about subcontractors providing time sheets or original material receipts in addition to the subcontractor invoices.

Further, the parties’ course of performance is relevant. During performance of the Maintenance Contract, the Commonwealth and Harris reviewed Harris’ monthly invoices for DM maintenance. The invoices included detailed information regarding subcontractor hours incurred for each remedy ticket opened in a spreadsheet that accompanied Harris’ invoices. The Commonwealth, until this audit, did not object to or reject Harris’ invoices that included subcontractor time charges on the grounds that the Maintenance Contract required the invoices to be accompanied by detailed subcontractor timesheets. Nor did the Commonwealth request to review such timesheets. Moreover, it appears the Commonwealth accepted the invoices provided by some subcontractors as sufficient evidence to support Harris’ charges and yet the Commonwealth will not accept the invoices of other subcontractors unless substantial additional documentation is also provided.

Beyond billing records, there is substantial additional evidence to support the Harris billings for actual hours worked and material costs incurred. Harris completed the required DM services satisfactorily, often in response to emergency call-outs, and the remedy tickets were closed. The Commonwealth’s actions acknowledge that the work was performed and completed. Additionally, in many non-emergency situations and in some emergency situations, Harris provided fixed price quotes for DM work that were approved in advance by Commonwealth personnel.


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Harris has investigated the Commonwealth’s specific audit exceptions regarding time and materials invoicing for DM services in Finding No. 8. Harris offers the following comments:

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris provided support for the labor hours connected to 20 DM ticketsand 3 quoted services in our DM Sample; however, we could not trace the support Harris provided to thespecific DM ticket or quoted service in our sample.”

Harris Response: As the Commonwealth acknowledges, “Harris provided support for the labor hoursconnected to 20 DM tickets and 3 quoted services.” The Commonwealth takes exception with the factthat it was unable to specifically and precisely trace the support to the specific DM ticket or quotedservice. However, the specific and precise tracing of hours to particular remedy tickets or quotedservice was not a contractual requirement. Rider A, Section A.27 does not require this specific andprecise tracing of hours worked to a remedy ticket. By providing support for the labor hours connectedto the 23 items, Harris clearly complied with the requirements of Rider A, Section A.27.

In addition, in some cases, ticket-specific time sheets were kept, but cannot now be located by some ofthe subcontractors years after the fact. In the case of one subcontractor, old time sheet records are nolonger retrievable due to the change in its accounting software. Even where time sheets did not specifythe remedy ticket, hours were recorded by reference to a billing code specific to DM services provided.In such cases, Harris’ subcontractors were able to assign the hours worked to particular remedy ticketsbased on their knowledge of the jobs, date of service, and the identity of the technicians assigned to theparticular remedy tickets. Remedy ticket numbers and hours worked were included in the monthlyspreadsheets Harris submitted to the Commonwealth. These monthly DM report spreadsheets showinghours per assigned ticket were reviewed with the Commonwealth each month, providing opportunity fora “reasonableness” check of hours being billed. Harris provided more than adequate support for thecharges associated with these 20 DM tickets.

Finally, in three other cases, the hours that were billed were identified in a fixed price quote from Harristhat the Commonwealth approved before work proceeded, as was the standard practice for fixed pricequoted services. The Commonwealth does not question that the work was performed, and because theCommonwealth agreed to pay the quoted fixed price regardless if the number of hours worked wasgreater than the quote, there was no need to record the specific hours worked on a particular fixed pricequoted service.

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris provided no support for hours billed in connection to 19 DMtickets contained in our DM sample.”

Harris Response: In some cases, Harris was advised by its subcontractors that time sheets had beenkept, but cannot be located by some of the subcontractors years after the fact. In some instances,including cases involving Southern Power, project work was also preapproved by the Commonwealth.Although Harris may not have provided the Commonwealth with time sheets to support the 19questioned DM tickets, it strongly denies that the Commonwealth has been supplied no support for thework performed and the hours billed. There is considerable evidence that Harris accurately billed thehours worked, including that: (1) Harris reviewed subcontractor quotes and invoices for reasonableness;(2) the DM work was completed; and (3) the Commonwealth approved payment of the Harris invoices


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with knowledge of hours charged per ticket. If the Commonwealth felt the hours charged were unreasonable, it had the opportunity to question the charges at the time the Commonwealth was billed.

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris was unable to provide a breakdown of travel versus on site time for32 DM tickets in our sample.”

Harris Response: Separate recording of on-site versus travel time was not a contractual requirementfor Harris nor was it required to be flowed down to Harris’ subcontractors. Moreover, travel time andon-site time were both allowable charges that were properly billed at the technician hourly rate. Somesubcontractors stated that it was not their policy to track travel and on-site time separately. They wouldjust track total time incurred for the work. Furthermore, the Commonwealth approved Harris’ invoiceswithout requiring a breakdown of on-site time versus travel time.

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris was unable to provide adequate support for the hours billed for 7DM tickets and 1 quoted service in our DM sample. Therefore, we included the costs connected to theunsupported labor hours within our questioned costs.”

Harris Response: The questioned items involve minor differences between the hours set forth ininvoices submitted by Harris to the Commonwealth and the hours set forth in invoices submitted toHarris by its subcontractors or the hours set forth in invoices submitted to Harris’ subcontractors by asecond-tier subcontractor for the same work. In some cases, the difference is a modest administrativecharge (in hours) imposed by Harris’ first-tier subcontractor. In four of the seven cases, as shown inHarris’ prior submission to the Commonwealth auditors, the variance in billed hours is the result ofadministrative errors that either favored or had no impact on the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris was unable to provide the original purchase documents needed toadequately support the materials purchased in connection to 19 DM tickets and 2 quoted services in oursample.”

Harris Response: It was not a contractual requirement that Harris or its subcontractors retain “original”purchase price information for billed materials. Nor does the Maintenance Contract mandate that thisrequirement be flowed down to Harris’ subcontractors. The Maintenance Contract provides that“material . . . will be provided at cost plus 20%.” There can be no dispute that Harris billed incidentalmaterial costs at Harris’ cost plus 20%, as contractually permitted. Furthermore, the contract cannot bereasonably interpreted to require Harris to disallow other subcontractor mark-ups. Even though Harris isnot contractually required to retain original purchase documents, the following otherwise demonstratesthe reasonableness of Harris’ material charges: (1) Harris reviewed subcontractor quotes and invoicesfor reasonableness; (2) the DM work was completed with the invoiced material; and (3) theCommonwealth approved Harris’ invoices with knowledge of the material costs per remedy ticket. Ifthe Commonwealth believed the material costs charged were unreasonable, it had the opportunity toquestion the charges at the time it was billed.

Additionally, in two instances, the materials billed were identified in a fixed price quote from Harris thatthe Commonwealth approved before work proceeded, as was the standard practice for fixed price quotedservices. The Commonwealth does not question that the materials were provided, and because the


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Commonwealth agreed to pay the fixed price quoted price regardless of the original purchase price of the materials, there was no need to retain or provide original purchase documents.

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris was unable to provide any support for materials purchased inconnection to 5 DM tickets in our sample.”

Harris Response: Harris has in fact provided adequate support for the materials purchased inconnection with these 5 DM tickets. These items relate to heaters purchased by Harris’ subcontractor,Bitner Electric, which were installed at certain CE3000 sites. Harris provided the Commonwealth withthe proposal prepared by Bitner Electric to supply the materials and perform the work at these sites. Thematerials charge is clearly listed on this fixed price proposal. As noted above, Harris is not contractuallyrequired to provide documentation supporting the original purchase price. Furthermore, theCommonwealth preapproved this fixed price project in advance and approved Harris’ invoicesassociated with labor and materials supplied on this project.

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris NOC personnel failed to adequately include technician nameswhen completing the Remedy or Service Now tickets. For 35 sample items, Harris personnel failed toinclude the names of all technicians on site to conduct the repair. For 12 DM tickets and 7 quotedservices, Harris personnel failed to include the names of any of the technicians on site to conduct therepair, but the support provided by Harris named the technicians. For 1 DM ticket, Harris personnelfailed to include the name of the technician who conducted the repair in any of its supportingdocumentation.”

Harris Response: The Maintenance Contract does not require Harris to record the names of servicetechnicians. Even so, for 12 of the DM tickets and 7 of the quoted services about which theCommonwealth complains, the Commonwealth notes that that Harris provided adequate support toidentifying the technician(s) on site. Thus, the Commonwealth knows who performed the repair work.For 35 of the items, at least one of the technicians was named, and in only one instance, were notechnicians named. Furthermore, the Commonwealth does not explain how failing to name all of thetechnicians on site adversely impacted Harris’ performance of its contractual obligations. In fact, theCommonwealth received the full benefit of the repair work performed.

In any event, the Commonwealth has been aware of the form and content of the information contained inthe NOC entries for DM tickets at all relevant times. The Commonwealth did not, however, begin torequest that the technician’s first and last name to be recorded until June 2015 (35 months after thecontract term started). Official notice of this additional requirement was not provided until September2016, well after the end of the 39-month term of the Harris maintenance contract.

Commonwealth Exception: “Harris failed to charge the correct hourly billing rate in accordance withthe contract for 19 DM tickets and 2 quoted services in our sample. A portion of these 21 sample itemsinvolved tower day tickets. We learned that charging tower day tickets is a common industry practice.Therefore, we have excluded these tower day items from the questioned costs connected to this contractbilling rate noncompliance issue.”

Harris Response: The Commonwealth has taken issue with the fact that in certain invoices involvingquoted services or special project work, Harris attempted to pass on a cost savings to the


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Commonwealth by marking up the subcontractor’s labor and materials charges by 20%, rather than separately invoicing the Commonwealth for labor hours and material prices in accordance with the unit pricing terms of the Maintenance Contract. By marking up the actual labor costs by 20% and not charging the higher hourly labor rates allowed under the Maintenance Contract, Harris actually under-billed the Commonwealth. Harris analyzed these sample items and re-priced the items using the Maintenance Contract’s allowed hourly labor rates, instead of marking up actual subcontract labor charges by 20%. Harris determined that for the services in question, Harris under-billed the Commonwealth a total of $13,477.28.

Attached as Exhibit J hereto is Harris’ ticket-by-ticket review and response to Commonwealth Finding No. 8. As demonstrated by Exhibit J, the Commonwealth should be questioning no more than $15,406.75, as opposed to the $212,591.68 in the Audit Report.

The Commonwealth also contends in Finding No. 8 that in six instances there were unreasonable markups taken on equipment purchased by Harris in connection with DM services. Here again the Commonwealth has ignored the applicable Maintenance Contract provision and invented a new, previously non-existent standard for evaluating material mark-ups. Using its new standard, the Commonwealth has questioned all markups that, in the aggregate, exceeded 50% over the original purchase price of the materials, allowing for a 20% markup by Harris, a 15% markup by first-tier subcontractors, and a 15% markup by second-tier subcontractors.

The Maintenance Contract sets forth a different standard: Section F-3.8 of Rider F, Revision C provides as follows: “Material and labor for non-routine maintenance activity will be billed at the established hourly rates and material will be invoiced at cost plus 20%, pursuant to the time and material billing provision of Rider C.” Time and materials pricing is addressed in Section 5.3.2 of Revision C. This section limits Harris’ pricing for incidental material purchases not otherwise specifically priced in Rider C as follows: “Cost plus 20% markup.” The word “cost” as used in Sections F 3.8 and Section 5.3.2 is clearly a reference to Harris’ cost. It does not refer to the original purchase price of the material.

Harris complied with the Maintenance Contract’s “cost plus 20%” mark-up limitation. Further, to the extent that Harris’ subcontractor Jacobs purchased materials, Harris required Jacobs to comply with the 15% mark-up limitation in its Master Services Agreement with Harris. In Finding No. 8, the Commonwealth fails to identify any instances in which either Harris or Jacobs exceeded these limitations.

What the Commonwealth is complaining about is mark-ups by Hunter & Lomison (a second-tier subcontractor under Jacobs), Total Comm (a subcontractor with no 15-percent mark-up limitation in its subcontract with Harris), and EMR (another second-tier subcontractor under Jacobs). Nothing in the Maintenance Contract obligates Harris to manage the mark-ups on equipment and/or materials charged by Total Comm or Jacobs’ second-tier subcontractors. The only limitation on Harris – with which Harris complied at all times – was the 20% limit on the cost Harris paid to its subcontractors for materials and equipment. Accordingly, Harris disagrees with the Commonwealth’s finding that $8,705.82 should be questioned for alleged excessive mark-ups.

Harris has performed a total analysis of all charges associated with all Demand Maintenance performed throughout the 39 month contract period. Harris’ analysis has revealed that Harris under-billed the Commonwealth a total of $199,110.62 for DM services. Attached as Exhibit K hereto is Harris’ Summary of DM Under-Billings. These under-charges are a result of hundreds of instances where Harris did not bill for all


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hours worked because its practice was to round down the number of hours worked to the nearest whole number. For example if 51.75 hours were worked, Harris would only bill the Commonwealth for 51.00 hours. There were also numerous instances where Harris charged the Commonwealth using a labor rate less than that permitted by the Maintenance Contract. Instead of charging the Commonwealth separately for labor and material in accordance with the pricing terms of the Maintenance Contract, Harris frequently marked up the subcontractor’s labor and materials charges by 20%, resulting in significant under-billing. To the extent that the Commonwealth disallows any of the charges for DM maintenance in Commonwealth Finding No. 8, Harris should be entitled to a credit of no less than $199,110.62, where Harris under-billed the Commonwealth for DM maintenance.

In response to the Commonwealth’s recommendation, Harris is willing to exchange information and engage in discussions with the PSP to resolve the costs questioned in this audit finding. Harris appreciates the recommendations provided by the Commonwealth and will evaluate ways in which it can improve its internal controls.


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In Finding No. 9, the Commonwealth noted that of the approximately 14,500 inspections completed during the 39-month audit period, Jacobs documented 328 of the inspections (or approximately 2% of the inspections) on“old” annual and semi-annual PM inspection forms that had been updated in the PA-STARNet contract. Eventhough a majority of the contractually required inspection steps were completed using the old forms, theCommonwealth still questions all $259,887.45 in charges associated with these 328 PM inspections.

The Commonwealth acknowledges that these inspections were performed. They simply argue that some of the contractually required inspection steps were not performed because Jacobs utilized the old inspection forms.Harris disputes the Commonwealth’s conclusion that because Jacobs used the old inspection forms that the actual inspections performed were of no value. Most of the contractually required inspection steps were performed. Although the 328 old inspection forms do not contain the exact same language or exact same steps as the revised inspection forms, an analysis comparing the old forms with the new forms shows that a majority, and in some instances all, of the contractually required inspection steps were still performed when using the 328 old annual or semi-annual PM inspection forms. For example, the following comparisons of the steps on the old annual HVAC PM inspection form to the steps on the new HVAC PM inspection form demonstrates that all contractually required steps are covered using the old form.

STEP# New Annual HVAC PM Form

Corresponding Step(s) on Old

Inspection Form STEP# Old Annual HVAC Form1 Verify Shelter Thermostat Temperature is Set to

72 FA4 A1 Verify operation of HVAC system using

thermostat and thermometer2 Verify operation of Lead/lag control. A2 A2 Verify operation of Lead/Lag control3 Verify operation of HVAC system using

thermostat and thermometerA1 A3 Clean system components such as coil surfaces,

fan blades and drain pans4 Check HVAC Air Filters A8, A9 A4 Calibrate all safety controls, temperature and

pressure controls, etc.5 Calibrate all safety controls, temperature and

pressure controls, etc.A4 A5 Align belt drives, drive couplings and fan fins

6 Clean system components such as coil surfaces, fan blades, and drain pans.

A3 A6 Inspect outdoor condenser coil and cabinet air relief for obstruction. Clean with commercial solvent as needed

7 Align belt drives, drive couplings and fan fins (if applicable)

A5 A7 Inspect and lube the directive drive evaporator motor, blower motor and fan forced heater motor

8 Inspect outdoor condenser coil and cabinet air relief for obstruction. Clean with commercial solvent as needed.

A6 A8 Change inter filters

9 Inspect and lubricate the direct drive evaporator motor, blower motor and fan forced heater motor, bearings front and rear with proper oil.

A7 A9 Clean exterior filters

10 Clean exterior filters. A9 A10 Clean condenser coils11 Change interior filters (As needed or annually) A812 Clean condenser coil. A10

KeyA # See corresponding step on old Annual HVAC

inspection form

Harris “substantially performed” under the terms of the contract and is entitled to the contracted price for performance less any damages suffered as a result of Harris’s incomplete performance. See, e.g., Widmer


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Eng'g, Inc., 837 A.2d at 467 (where an alleged breach of contract claim is “an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract was substantially performed, the contract remains effective” and the contractor is entitled to recover for the work performed less credits for the work which was uncorrected or unperformed); see also li Corp., 348 F. Supp. at 644 (same); Danville Bridge Co., 15 Pa. at 151. The Commonwealth has no legal basis to disallow all charges associated with these 328 inspections as it seeks to do here.

The following chart breaks down the 328 inspections questioned by the Commonwealth. By comparing the inspection steps from the old forms used by the Jacobs technicians with the steps from the new forms, Harris calculated the value of the work performed by Jacobs. Even accepting the Commonwealth’s claim that not all of the appropriate steps were completed, the Commonwealth would only be entitled to $63,804.29, not $259,887.45.

Inspection Type

Number of PMs in

Question by CoPA

Questioned CostsApproximate Percentage of

Steps Completed

Total Value of Work Completed per "Old"

Form

GENERATOR-Semi Annual 65 $39,167.23 84% $32,900.47

SHELTER - Semi Annual 63 28,665.04 67% 19,201.35

HVAC - Semi Annual 56 23,972.93 83.3% 19,977.44

CE-3000 - Semi Annual 9 12,757.08 60.2% 7,686.24

GENERATOR- Annual 59 63,057.62 76% 47,923.79

SHELTER - Annual 29 19,626.46 70.5% 13,839.50

HVAC - Annual 29 20,774.25 100% 20,774.25

CE-3000 - Annual 18 51,866.84 65.1% 33,780.12

Total 328 $259,887.45 $196,083.16

With respect to maintaining inspection forms at the shelters, note that during the audit period PM inspection forms were routinely completed and left in the shelters at the radio tower sites. It was Harris’ practice, known to the Commonwealth, was to periodically collect all of the site inspection forms from the tower shelters except for the most recent inspection forms which were left at the sites for reference purposes. By leaving the most recent inspection forms, the next technician would still have access to the results of the previous inspection, alleviating this concern expressed by the Commonwealth. As the Maintenance Contract was concluding in the fall of 2015, Harris was asked to obtain the remaining inspection forms from the sites and to deliver all of the inspection forms to the Commonwealth. Harris gathered the remaining inspection forms from the sites as instructed and delivered them to the Commonwealth. As a result of the Commonwealth’s instruction, after the fall of 2015, the inspection forms were no longer being retained at the tower site shelters. The Commonwealth


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cannot now complain that the inspection forms were no longer retained at the tower shelter sites when the reason they were no longer retained there was a result of its own direction.

Harris has reviewed the Commonwealths recommendation and looks forward to exchanging information and engaging in discussions with the Commonwealth to resolved the costs questioned in the Commonwealth’s Finding No. 9. Harris is willing to discuss the suggestions provided by the Commonwealth regarding monitoring technician performance and documenting inspections.


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In Finding No. 10, the Commonwealth contends that it sampled DCNR Repeater Project expenditures and identified certain discrepancies and overcharges (including training courses). Despite ordering and paying for 4,300 online training courses for Commonwealth personnel, the Commonwealth now contends it should be refunded $59,714.56 for all unused training courses. Harris, however, has no contractual obligation to provide the Commonwealth a refund for any unused training course. Moreover, the billing and payment structure, where the Commonwealth paid for the courses up front rather than as they were used, reflects an intent to pay for the courses regardless of whether they were used. Harris fulfilled its contractual obligations by making the online training courses available to the Commonwealth personnel from July 1, 2011 through July 31, 2014 (37 months). Harris had no obligation to ensure that the Commonwealth used the training courses that Harris made available.

Regarding other DCNR charges, Harris acknowledges that the Commonwealth may have overpaid for certainother materials and services discussed in Finding no. 10 including $1,485.94 due to the reclassification of certain sites, $25,319.02 from pricing errors, $15,770.00 for missing function tone handsets, and $12,612.26 for the lower value of spare parts returned to the Commonwealth at the end of the contract term. The Commonwealth overpaid Harris by a total of $55,187.22, not $114,901.78 as it claims.

As the Commonwealth recommends, Harris will work with the PSP to reconcile these overpayments and is willing to discuss improvements to its internal controls.


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In Finding No. 11, the Commonwealth states that based on its analysis of Remedy and Service Now tickets, Harris failed to conduct 190 (of the 14,500) PM inspections. The Commonwealth notes that it counted a PM inspection as missing entirely if it was completed more than two weeks early or two weeks late. The Commonwealth questions all $277,545.63 related to these missing, early, or late inspections. Harris has requested, but has not yet received, any information relating to how the Commonwealth arrived at the values assigned to the various inspections. Without the requested information, Harris is unable to evaluate the accuracy of the value the Commonwealth has assigned to these inspections, particularly where the values assigned in this finding appear to be higher than in other findings.

Harris has reviewed the 190 preventive maintenance inspection exceptions noted by the Commonwealth. While Harris acknowledges that the preventative maintenance inspection forms for 128 inspections have not yet been provided to the Commonwealth as part of this audit, Harris’ investigation is ongoing, and Harris reserves the right to supplement this response. The other 62 inspections were not missed, but rather, 59 were completed late and 3 were completed early. See Exhibit L attached hereto for a chart summarizing when Harris performed these 62 inspections.

For the 3 inspections completed early, they were performed only seven days early. For the 59 inspections completed late, some were only a few days late and were typically no more than one month late. While the Commonwealth contends that it did not count an inspection as missing when it was completed less than two weeks early or late, many of the early or late inspections were in fact completed within the two-week grace period. It is unclear why the Commonwealth still counted some of the inspections performed within the two-week grace period as missing. The Commonwealth may not withhold the entirety of the payments associated with these early or late inspections. By completing the inspections, even though early or late, Harris “substantially performed” under the terms of the contract. See Exton Drive-In, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 436 Pa. 261 A.2d 319, 325 (Pa. 1969) (where contractor “substantially performed” despite the contractor’s untimely performance). Accordingly, Harris is entitled to the contract price for this performance minus any damages the Commonwealth suffered as a result of the early or late performance. See, e.g., Widmer Eng'g, Inc., 837 A.2d at467 (where an alleged breach of contract claim was “an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract was substantially performed, the contract remains effective” and the contractor is entitled to recover for the work performed less credits for the work which was uncorrected or unperformed); see also li Corp., 348 F. Supp. at 644 (same); Danville Bridge Co., 15 Pa. at 151. It is unlikely that such damages are substantial, particularly where the inspections were performed shortly before or after the required inspection period.

In Finding No. 11, the Commonwealth also notes that it “randomly” tested 130 required Preventive Maintenance inspections for both existence and completeness. The Commonwealth acknowledges that these 130 “random” inspections have been completed, but that in 9 instances, no inspection report was provided to the Commonwealth and in 25 instances, one or more steps on the inspection reports were left blank. The Commonwealth questions the entirety of the $11,428.05 associated with the 9 inspections where the inspection form was missing and the $33,792.18 associated with the 25 inspections where steps on the inspection form were not filled out.

The Commonwealth has previously acknowledged that the 9 inspections with a missing inspection form were completed. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth disputes the entire cost related to these 9 inspections. Because the inspections were in fact completed, Harris “substantially performed” its contractual obligations. The


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Commonwealth’s damages would be limited to the value of the incomplete performance, not all costs associated with the performance. See, Widmer Eng'g, Inc., 837 A.2d at 467; li Corp., 348 F. Supp. at 644; Danville Bridge Co., 15 Pa. at 151. Here, the value of the incomplete performance would be nominal

With respect to the 25 inspection reports noted as being incomplete, Harris has analyzed the reports utilizing a line-item, step by step approach. Harris has determined that only 7% (36 of 510) of the total steps from these inspection reports were not recorded as having been complete. Even accepting the truth of the Commonwealth’s assumption that steps that were not recorded were not performed, Harris still substantially performed and is entitled to the contract price less any damages arising from any incomplete performance. See, Widmer Eng'g, Inc., 837 A.2d at 467; li Corp., 348 F. Supp. at 644; Danville Bridge Co., 15 Pa. at 151. As can be seen from the chart below, the Commonwealth should be questioning no more than $3,789.55, not the claimed $33,792.18.

Inspection Type

No. of Questioned Inspection

ReportsQuestioned

Costs

Questioned Cost per

Inspection Report

No. of Steps per

Report

Pro-rata Cost per

Step

Alleged Missed Steps

Total Cost Associated

with Missed Steps

CE3000

2 $4,410.76

$2,205.38

26

$84.82

6

$508.93

DC Plant

5

10,807.57

2,161.51

8

270.19

9

2,431.70

Cell Site

1

2,912.37

2,912.37

24

121.35

None

None*

Generator

12

12,576.91

1,048.08

25

41.92

15

628.85

HVAC

3

1,914.69

638.23

12

53.19

3

159.56

Shelter

2

1,169.88

584.94

29

20.17

3

60.51

Total Questioned

Costs $33,792.18

Total Value of

Missed Steps

$3,789.55

*The Commonwealth has incorrectly taken an exception with this site. Although there is a site permit that mentions a 4’ x 4’ compound, it is not a “Compound.” Rather, it is a standard cell site installation on a utility pole.

Harris has reviewed the Commonwealth’s recommendation and is willing to work with the Commonwealth to resolve the costs questioned in this audit finding. Harris is willing to discuss ways to improve its internal controls and to effectively monitor contract performance.


OCTOBER 25, 2017

40804148.9 10/25/2017

CONCLUSION

Harris Corporation would again like to thank the Commonwealth and the Bureau of Audits for the opportunity to provide this response to the draft Audit Report. Prior to the public release of the draft Audit Report, Harris requests the opportunity to meet with the Bureau of Audits to candidly review and discuss the findings contained in the draft Audit Report and Harris’ response thereto. Such a meeting would allow the parties to reconcile the Commonwealth’s findings with Harris’ concerns set forth throughout its response. The mutual exchange of information and candid dialogue regarding the Commonwealth’s findings would also help to facilitate productive discussions with the PSP to resolve the costs questioned in the draft Audit Report and would allow Harris to more effectively evaluate the ways in which it could improve its internal controls. Harris looks forward to working with the Bureau of Audits to achieve a mutually acceptable resolution of the audit findings prior to releasing the draft Audit Report to the public.


OCTOBER 25, 2017

41804148.9 10/25/2017

EXHIBITS

Exhibit A – Finding No. 1 – TIA 222 G to Tower Inspection Form Comparison

Exhibit B – Finding No. 1 – Remedy Ticket No. 1247556 for MIFF40

Exhibit C – Finding Nos. 1 & 2 – Email from NOC Operator to various CoPA and Harris recipients with attached 6/17/2013 Day Shift Report

Exhibit D – Finding No. 1 – July 1, 2014 Shift Report

Exhibit E – Finding No. 1 – September 30, 2015 Shift Report

Exhibit F – Finding No. 3 – Photographs Provided by Commonwealth Depicting Clean HVAC Filters

Exhibit G – Finding No. 4 – Letter from Climatech’s Vice President Joseph Saltmar

Exhibit H – Finding No. 4 – Examples of Climatech Service Order Forms

Exhibit I – Finding No. 7 – DM Visit Hour Breakdown – February 2014 Report

Exhibit J – Finding No. 8 – Ticket-by-Ticket Analysis and Response to Questioned Demand Maintenance

Exhibit K – Finding No. 8 – Summary of DM Under-Billing

Exhibit L – Finding No. 11 – Summary 62 Inspections Performed by Harris

Exhibit B

Finding No. 1

Remedy Ticket No. 1247556 for MIFF40

Report Viewer Page 1 of 1

Incident ID: CSD000001247556 Customer Information Location Information First Name: Barrville MENO II Company: EX Radio Sys Unit - OPRS Middle Name: Region: MR-3 Last Name: MIFF40 Site Group: SC-4 Customer Type: Field-Based Employee Site: Job Title: Desk Location: MR-3 Corporate Email:

Status Internet Email: [email protected] Mail Station: SC-4 Status: Closed

Company: EX Radio Sys Unit· OPRS Status Reason: Automated Resolution Reported

Organization: Impact: 2-Significant/Large

Department: Urgency: 2-High

Phone Number: ##If. Priority: High

Cost Center: Weight: 20

Contact Information Company: Organization: Contact First Name: Department: Contact Last Name: Phone Number:

Classification Reported Source: Reported Date: Jun 17, 2013 4:21 PM Incident Type: User Service Restoration Summary: MIFF40 Tower Leg Concrete Repairs Notes: MIFF40 Tower Leg Concrete Repairs

The concrete on the tower legegs needs to be repaired . ,. - Product

. 'llLClillVll 'I 1£.dUVll

Tier 1: Tower Tier 1: Tier 2: Other Tier 2: Tier 3: Non Service Affecting Tier3:

Product Name: ModelNersion: Manufacturer:

Current Assignment Resolution Support Company: EX Radio Sys Unit • OPRS Resolution Category: Support Organization: IT Support Reason: Assigned Group: Site Development and Resolution: Ticket transferred to Service Now.

Maintenance See TT 415677 Assignee: Kenneth R Stuck

As of Dec 12, 2016 10:27 AM Page 1 of 1

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Incident Work Info History


Incident Number CSD000001247556

Submit Date 1/20/201511:37:31 AM

Submitter Rick Witmer

View Access Internal

Notes Ticket transferred to Service Now. See TT415677


Submit Date 7/18/2014 8:59:37 AM

Submitter Nichole Brown


Notes E-mailed Ken for an update on 7/4 and 7/18


Submit Date 1/22/2014 8:07:20 AM

Submitter Dan Sarokon


Notes Ken will take care of the issue in the spring.


Submit Date 12/30/2013 1 :44:56 PM

Submitter msudia


Notes Reassigning to Ken Stuck for concrete issues


Submit Date 9/5/2013 9:59:25 AM

Submitter Nichole Brown


Notes Changing to pending.


Submit Date 8/1/2013 12:14:31 PM



Notes image (3).jpeg attached


Submit Date 8/1/2013 12:14:14 PM

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Notes image (5).jpeg attached

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Submit Date 8/1/2013 12:13:57 PM



Notes image 1.jpeg attached


Submit Date 8/1/2013 12:01 :45 PM



Notes IMG_Ol 13.jpeg attached

Incident CSD000001247556 Number

Submit Date 8/1/2013 12:01 :14 PM



Notes The tower leg foundation has cracks along with surface scaling. Transfering ticket to the State to see if they want repairs made to the foundation. Pictures attached to ticket.


Submit Date 8/1/2013 11 :19:05 AM

Submitter Bob Matangos


Notes Matt from Jacobs is on site.


Submit Date 6/17/2013 4:22:33 PM

Submitter Dan Sarokon


Notes MIFF40 Tower Leg Concrete Repairs

The concrete on the tower legegs needs to be repaired.

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