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Security Policies of European Countries outside the Soviet SphereAuthor(s): Herman Van Der Wusten, Jan Nijman and Rob ThijsseSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 303-319Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423400.

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ISSN 0022-3433 ournal f Peace

Research,

ol.

22,

no.

4,

1985

Security

olicies f

European

ountries

Outside he oviet

phere

HERMAN

VAN

DER

WUSTEN,

JANNIJMAN& ROB

THIJSSE

Department

f

Social

Geography,

niversity

f Amsterdam

Security

olicies

f

states

ave

military

nd

a

diplomatic

spect.

or

he

European

ountriesutside

he

oviet

sphere

basic characteristic

f

their

ecurity

olicies

s the

xtent o

which

hese

re

aligned

o the

American-

European

ecurity

elationship. typology

f

ecurity

olicies

s set

up

based n

military

nd

political

lignment.

There

re

five

ypes:

aithfuls,

arginals,

eutrals, artners,

ortresses.

or he

ast

wo

ypes,

cores ifferon-

siderably.

orvarious easons hese

ypes

lso have

higher

efense urdenshan he

thers,

hich

n

their urn

o

not

differ

ystematically

n

this

ount.

Militarylignment

oes

not

necessarily

oincide

with

olitical

lignment.

To

the

xtent

hat

lignment

s one dimension

f

ecurity

olicy

t

all,

t s

apparently

differentne

from

efense

burden. lthoughhe ypesrequite table vertime,ome volutionccurs: ariationnmilitarylignmentn-

creases,

olitical

lignment

ith he

US

generally

ecreases,

efense urdens

iminish.

ross-unitnd

over-time

differencesrerelated

o

power osition

nd

geography,

ut here lso seems o

be

an

elementf routinizationo

explain

he volution f

the

ystem.

t

s

finally

rgued

hat he

rends

owards

ualitative

hanges

n the

ystem

unfortunately

re

not

necessarily

or

he

better.

1.

Introduction

World War

II

and

its immediate ftermath

brought

he

US and

theUSSR to the

fore s the

most

powerful

ountries

n

the

world.

During

the

early

ostwar

eriod

hey

ecame

pposite

poles in the network f internationalecurity

relations. ome

major

bonesof

contention

e-

tween the two

superpowers

ere

ocated in

Europe.

As

a

consequence,

he

US

and the

USSR became f

prime mportance

o

the ecu-

rity

f

European

ountries.

he fixed

ipolarity

of

Europe

was

epitomized

y

the

partition

f

Germany.

his

distribution

f

power

nd

this

structure

f

security

elations

ere

ovel.

heir

distinctive

attern

as

not

been

ransformed

et.

As

a

consequence,

n

studying

he

problems

f

European ecurityince he ate1940s,wedeal

with situation hat

has maintainedts basic

features,

hich s not o

say

hat

here as

been

no

change

t

all.

In

this

aper

we

want

o trace he volution

f

post-war

ecurity

olicies

f a

number f

Euro-

pean

countries

n

a

comparative

ay

nd

to

go

some

way

owards he

xplanation

f

the esult-

ing rajectories.

uccessive

ositions

n timewill

primarily

e assessed

n terms f the

countries'

alignment

ith

superpower.

his

may

be ex-

pressednpolicyines imilarrcomplementary

to

those

f

the

uperpower.

he

alignment

ith

a

superpower

s

a

basicfeature

f

security

olicy

in

a

bipolar

framework.

n

fact

t

s a

defining

characteristic

f

bipolarity.

uch

frameworks

considered o

be relevanto the

security

f

a

country

n

a

positive

supporters

f

a

deterrence

policy) r n negative aysupportersf nall-

European

ecurity

ystem

ased on

co-opera-

tion).

To

the

xtent

hat

arious

volutionary

aths

and

cross-national

ifferencesnd similarities

t

any

moment

n

time eflect

onformity

ith

r

withdrawal rom

he

rules

of the

dominant

bipolar ecurity

rrangement,

e

hope

to

gain

an

nsight

nto he orces

tabilizing

his

rrange-

ment nd

theforces hat

ndermine

he urrent

system

nd

push

n

thedirectionf alternatives.

Someofthese orcesmaybeconstantver ime

but

have

differentffects

n

different

ountries,

resulting

n

stable

ross-nationalariation

ver

time. thers

may ary

ver ime ut

have

imilar

effects n

all

countries

esulting

n

general

e-

riodic hifts.

f

we can take ome

teps

owards

a

proper

stimate

f

forces hat

have ended

o

stabilize

r

change

he

ystem

o

far,

nd

if

we

can

get

ome sense

f the

directions

f

change

that ave ome

with

he

emporary

osses

f sta-

bility

f the

bipolar

ystem,

here

s

a

better

chance ograsp hepotentialitiesnd theprob-

abilities f

changing

he

present

ecurity

r-

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304

Herman

van der

Wusten,

an

Nijman

& Rob

Thijsse

rangement

nto n alternativene.

The

concept

f

security,

hich

s of central

importance

o this

tudy,

warrants

ome extra

attention.t is a singularlylastic ermwhich

needs

ircumscribing.

t

s

used

for ocial ctors

at

differentevels

f

aggregation.

rivate ndi-

viduals

may

feel

ecure

r nsecure

r

they

may

be

n

more

r

ess ecure

ituation

ccording

o

outside

bservers,

nd

so are

groups

nd

states

and theworld s

a whole.

ecurity

efers

o the

risk

of

involuntary

iminution

f values

pre-

sently

vailable

e.g.

health,

oyalty,

military

manpower,

redit nd

money).

t means hat

social

unit s

not

-

or

does

not

perceive,

r

is

notexpectedobe - threatenedrcoerced y

mostly

xternal

but

see,

for

xample,

oyalty)

forces

o allow

significant

hanges

o

happen

with

espect

o

mportant

alues.

hese xternal

forces

may

be absent

rom he nvironment

r

the social unit

may

be

protected

dequately

against

them.

The

problem

of

making

this

distinction

eaningful

s one ofthe

major

tems

in

thediscussion

n defensive

efense'

e.g.

his

journal's

pecial

ssue,

o.

2,

1984).

The ncreased

ange,

recision,

nd

explosive

(not ospeakofotherwiseamaging) ower f

military echnology

nd

the

salience

of the

threat

f

major weapon

ystems

o others as

directed

he

ecurityolicy

f states

ery

much

towards

he

pacification

f the environment.

Threats

rom he environmentan

be

dimin-

ished

at their ource

by political

o-operation

with

ocial

ctors

nthe

nvironment,

hich

will

hopefully

ead to the

distargeting

nd dismant-

ling

of

threatening

eapon systems

n

due

course.

orthe ime

eing

t s the

management

of

antagonistic

elationsn a non-violent,on-

threatening

ay

hat s at

stake.

owever,

hreats

from he nvironment

ave ften een

met

with

counter-threats

n

order

o

pacify

he environ-

ment. hat s the urrent

olicy

f deterrence.

securityolicy iming

t

defense

as

at

the

evel

of

majorweapon

ystems ardly

eendiscussed

until

ecently.

ome

partial

teps

n thatdirec-

tionwere f course

aken

y

he

deployment

f

ABM

systems. ilitary

efense

gainst

ttacks

at ower evels

f violence as

always

eenfore-

seen. A basic

problem

s to whatextent hese

three

forms f

security

olicy

co-operation,

deterrence,

nd

defense)

o

contaminateach

other

f

combined.

The

concept

f

security

s difficult

o define

andevenmoredifficulto operationalizeor

numberof

reasons.

Actual

probabilities

n-

volved

n risks

may

differ

idely

rom

ercep-

tions

n the

same field.

At

the ndividual

evel

this s well

knownwith

respect

o crime.

he

domain f

security,

.e.

the

values

t

stake,

may

intheir wn

perception

ary

rom ctor o actor.

Factors

ausing

nsecurity ay

be assumed

n

wider r narrowerones

nd n

few

r

n

many

spheres

f ife.

In

this

aper

we will

nly

be concerned

ith

securitys the bsence f nvoluntaryirectn-

terference

ith

entral

eaturesf states

popu-

lation,

erritory,

egime ype)

rom

he

outside

by

military

orceor the actual

or

perceived

threat hereof. his is

a rather arrow

efini-

tion,

ut

t

expresses

n

ourview

he ore f the

concept

t

state

evel.

ecurity olicies

im at

preventing

nd

resisting

nterferencend threats

on a

purely

ational

asis

or

collectively

y

l-

lianceformation

for

general

iscussion,

ee

Buzan

1983).

Securityolicyn his arrowense s the ield

of

diplomats

nd the

military.

ut

t

does not

cover the

whole area of non-violent

oreign

policy

nd the xternal se

of armedforce.

n-

ternational

ommerce nd

aggressive

arfare

waged

for

purposes

f

economic

xploitation,

for

nstance,

nly

touch

ecurity olicy

t the

fringes.

t

is, however,

xtremely

ifficulto

makethis ort

of distinction

ith he data at

hand.

nevitably

e

will

have

o

use

data from

the

general

ield f

foreign

elations

military

and non-military)nd interprethemwith

view

to their

ignificance

or

security

olicy

proper.

For reasons f convenience

e

have imited

this

report

o

the set of

present-day

uropean

states outside

the

sphere

dominated

by

the

USSR.

We

havediscarded

he

ases

of

Iceland,

Luxembourg,

nd Albania

from onsideration.

Wehave ncluded inland

nd

Yugoslavia

n

the

analysis, lthough articularly

he xclusion

f

Finland

rom he oviet

phere

s

regards

ecu-

rity olicy

ropermaybe debated.

How can

one

explain

emporal

hanges

nd


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Security

olicies

f

European

Countries

305

cross-country

ariations

n

security olicies

f

European

countries utside

he Soviet

phere,

primarily

ssessed

n

terms

f

alignment

ith

theUS?

Two

types

f

argument

ave

ften

een

used

to

explain

n

assumed

decrease

f

European

alignment

e.g.

n

Mendl

984,

p.

84

f.;

see

also:

Hanrieder Auton

980,

.

284;

Laqueur

1979,

p.

181;

Kaldor

1978).

First f

all relations re

thought

o have

changed

s a

consequence

f

the

evolution

n

superpower

rmaments iffe-

rentials.

n

thefirst

nstance,

hen he

nuclear

forces f theUS were ble

to

reach he oreof

the

USSR and the

Soviet

Union lacked the

means o respondnkind, heUS confidently

guaranteed uropean security y threatening

the use

of these forces

n

case

of

an

attack

againstEuropeanterritory.

s the USSR

ac-

quired

trategicapacity gainst

he US

itself,

the

US

guarantee

f

European

security

ea-

kened.The

advantages

f

alignment

ith he

US

for

Europeans

diminished

nd

alternative

policies began

to

gain

in

prominence.

n

balance,

ctual

lignment

hould ave

ecreased.

Secondly change

s

thought

o

have oc-

curredntheAmerican-Europeanower iffe-

rential. s

European

conomies

ecoverednd

the

ntegration

f theEC

members' conomies

in

particular

pilled

ver

nto ther

olicy

reas,

individual

ountries

cquired

more

xtended

power

ase and somecollectivector

apability

developed

o resist

American

ominance.

Al-

though

ecurity

olicy

ertainly

as

not

n

area

where

his

appened

o

any

great

xtent

see

e.g.

the

hadowy

xistence

fthe

rgans

f

theWest-

EuropeanUnion)

and the

extent o

which his

occurred enerallysa matter fcontention,t

has been

argued

hatroom

for

deviation rom

total

alignment

radually

ncreased. his also

may

haveresulted

n a

gradually

idening

ap

between

S

security olicy

nd thatof

Euro-

pean

states. o the xtent

hatEC

membership

has been of

special ignificance

n this

espect,

differential

ynamics

f

de-alignment

or

wo

classes

f

European

ountries ouldhave o

be

expected.

We

will

furtheriscuss his

rgument

at the nd of this

ection.

To allow for hecross-countryariationn

alignment,

wofactorst least houldbe

taken

into

account:

geography

nd

power

position.

Although heymay

be

differentiated,

hey ar-

tially

verlap.Geographical ategories

ike ize

enter nto assessmentsf power position s

power

base elements

Goldmann

&

Sj6stedt

1979,

h.

1).

Geography

asically

as

two

aspects:

n in-

ternal

ne

the

ite

uality)

nd an externalne

(the

ituational

uality;

country's osition

n

relation

o other

ountries).

errain

nalysis

f

differentountries emonstrates

mportant

if-

ferences

n

vulnerability

o

conventionalutside

attack

compare .g.

Switzerland

nd

the Ne-

therlandsn this

espect).

his results

n

diffe-

rent robabilitiesor arious ecurityolicy p-

tions.

Furthermore,

ountriesre

variously

it-

uated

with

egard

o

basic xes f

transportation

and

potential

ronts.

his

presumably

ffects

their

considerations

n

the field

of

security

policy

ven

f

hey

now

weapon

ystems

f

uni-

versal

estruction

o be

in

the hands of a few

countries. arious cenarios f

aggravated

on-

flict

t differentevels

f destructiveiolence re

probably

aken

nto

account

n

making

deci-

sions n

security

olicy

a

recent

verviewf

his

fields O'Sullivan& Miller 983).

Powerdifferentials

hanging

ver imewere

thought

o

be

responsible

or

ventual

hanges

in

alignment

f

European

ecurityolicies

with

US

policy

n

this

rea.

t is now lso

hypothes-

ized

that

ross-country

ariation

n

power

osi-

tion

s relevanto

the

differences

n

security

o-

licy

between

uropean

ountries.

n

this on-

nection t shouldbe

remarkedhat ross-coun-

try

differences,

t

least

in

terms

f

available

power

ases,

are almost

ertainly

reater

han

changes ver ime. onsequentlyross-country

variation

n

alignment

ould lso be

expected

o

be

greater

han

emporal

ariation.

The

way

nwhich

ower osition

ffects

ecu-

rity

olicy

n the

narrow ense

n

whichwe de-

fined

t,

s difficult

o

predict,

s

contraryrgu-

ments

may

be

madefrom he

perspective

f

the

other ountries

nd

from

he

perspective

f

the

country

tself.

A

more

powerful ountry

as

moremeans oensure

large ay

n

lliance

oli-

tics and also to follow more

omprehensive

security olicy n general.A largerpool of

means

tends to be used for a wider set of


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

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306

Herman

van

der

Wusten,

an

Nijman

& Rob

Thijsse

options.

From the

perspective

f other

oun-

tries

hings

ook

different.he more

owerful

country

ecomes,

he

more

ensitive or

thers

itspointof view as regards ecuritymatters.

Consequently

more

efforts

will

be made

to

affectts

policy.

In

the ontext f the

lignment

f

European

security

olicies

with

he

US,

this

means

very

generally

hatthere

re

morechances

for

de-

alignment

fmore

owerful

ountrieseen rom

the

perspective

f

theirown

means and

of

weaker

ountries

een

from

he

perspective

f

relevance

o the

uperpower.

n

fact

hosewho

arguegeneral

ealignment

f

European

oun-

tries ver ime asedon a shiftinguropean-US

power

ifferential,

s we

mentioned

bove,

m-

plicitly

ake

tfor

ranted

hat

he

irst

rgument

is the

more olid ne.

This

may

n

fact e true or

part

of

the

range

of

power

differences,

.g.

where

hey

re

rather mall.

Power

ftenwidens he

ange

nd

domain f

external nterests

ountries

ursue

generally.

Consequently,

he

institutionsf

non-violent

foreign

elationsnd of

warfarehat

tates

re-

serve

end o be

extended nd

there s

possibly

alsomore oomfor ecurityoliciesnthenar-

row

ense.

As

external

nterestsremore

widely

defined,

hey

re also more ften

ffected

nd

theres

a

paradoxical

endency

or

more

ower-

ful

countries o

perceive

heir

ecurity

more

frequently

s

jeopardized Deutsch

1978,

p.

101).

There

s

considerableoom

for

erminolo-

gical

disputes

n

the

demarcation

f

security

interests

roper,

s we said

before.

Fig.

1.

US-EuropeanDe) Alignment

ypotheses

over

time:

increase

n

US

strategic

vulnerability

dealignment

decrease n

US-European

power

ifferential

across

ountries:

geographyposition

and

situation,

.g.

with

regard

o

vulnerability)

variations

in

alignment

power osition

In

Fig.

1,

we show some

hypothetical

ela-

tions

concerning

S-European

de)alignment

of

security

olicies.

Inthenext wo ections e et uttodescribe

the

ecurity

olicies

f

European

ountries

ut-

side the

sphere

ominated

y

the USSR as

re-

gards

heir

lignment

ithUS

policies

nd

then

to

assess

the

relationships

ith he factors

e

brought

orward.

2.

Alignment

nd

dealignment

f

ecurity

policies

2.1

Military

lignment

We

ry

o assess

military

lignment

f countries

by onsideringreatiesnd egal greements,he

stationing

f

forces,

he

presence

f

American

nuclear

weapons,

he

contribution

o

NATO's

armedforces

nd the

development

f

military

integration.

American-European

elations

n the

field

f

military

ecurity

re

basedon

a number

f

trea-

ties and

agreements.

hose

countries

hat

re

parties

o the ix

reaties

nd

agreements

onsid-

ered obe themost

mportant

y

bservers,

ave

been

mentionedn

Table

I. As far s

we are

aware,no equally mportantextshavebeen

negotiated

fter

1959. The

legal

base of

the

American-Europeanecurity

elationship

as

been

quite

tablefor

generation,part

from

the

juridical

concomitants f

France's

with-

drawalfrom

he

ntegrated

ilitary

ommand

and SHAPE's

removal rom

rench

oil n

the

sixties.

ecently

he

ssue

f a

new

egal

base

for

the

deployment

f

middle

ange

uclearmissiles

has arisen.1

The UK

and France

are

signatories

f

all

texts.Nonethelesshey avedifferentositions

compared

o

the ther

ountries.he

UK

signed

texts

eviating

rom

he'standard

ormulas

n

such

ways

hatmore

qual

partnership

etween

the

o-signatories

the

US

and

the

UK)

was

sug-

gested.

rance,

lthough

ot

withdrawing

rom

theNorth

tlantic

reaty,

oosened he

esulting

ties

n

1966.

After

ugoslavia

ad

withdrawn

rom

ll the

agreements

t had

signed

n

1959,

none of the

six,

generally

onsidered

r

in their wn

view,

'neutral' ountries ere

party

o more han

two of

these

greements

nd

they

weremore


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

6/18

Security

olicies

f

European

Countries 307

Table

.

Co-signatories

o

Treaties

nd

Agreements

Countries

AUS BEI DEN FIN FRA FRG GRE IRE ITA NET NOR POR SPA SWE SWI TUR UK YUG'

ECA

x x x x

'49

x x x x x x

'53

x x x x

NAT2

x x x

'54 '51

x x x

x '51

'

MDAA3

x x

'55

'47

x x

x '51

'53

'47

'

'51

MSA

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

'53

x x

'51

SOFA

'53 '55

'52 '59 '54 '56 '54 '53

'55

'53 '54 '54

ADA x

x x x

'60

x

x x

2 6 5 0 6 6 6

1

6 6 5 5

4 1

0 6 6 3

x

=

original ignatories

'49

=

other

ignatories

ith ateof

entry

EuropeanCooperation greement1948);NorthAtlantic reaty1949);MutualDefenseAssistance greement1950);

Mutual

ecurity

greement

1952);

Status

f

Forces

Agreement1951-1959);

tomic efense

Agreement

1959).

note 1:

Yugoslavia

withdrew

rom ll

the

greements

t had

signed

n

1959.

note :

France

withdrew

rom

heNATO

integrated ilitary

ommand

n

1966;

Greece

did

the

ame

n the

period

974-1978.

note

3: Greece nd

Turkey

oncluded n earlier

greement,

omparable

o

theMDAA

('Agreement

o

provide

assistance

o

Greece/Turkey').

Sources:

Treaty

eries,

United

Nations,

New York.

likely

o

have

signed

ne

or

nil.

The US

military

resence

s

extremely

on-

centrated

n

the

German

Federal

Republic.

About 80% of US militarymanpower n

Europe

s stationed

ere.Aboutthe ame

pro-

portion

f

nuclear

evices

n

Europe

s

kept

n

that

country,

he

overwhelming ajority

f

these

being

American.

About

half

of

the

new

middle

range

missiles

xclusively

merican

controlled, ill,

ccording

o

current

lans,

be

stationed

n

theFRG.

There s

no

question

hat

West

Germany

s

of

the

utmost

mportance

n

terms ftheWestern efense

pparatus.

his s

also

evident

rom

he

doption

f

the

trategic

principlef forward efense yNATO, imply-

ing

full scale

military

ction

at

the German

border

s soon

as

it s crossed

y

nemy

orces.

The

most

mportant

ommanding

fficer

n

NATO

is

the

invariably

merican

ACEUR,

whereas he

political op

function

as

always

been

in

European

hands

and,

what s

more,

occupied

y

British,

elgian,

utch

nd

Italian

politiciansnly).

ACEUR's

peace

ime

ob

is

to

organize,

rain

nd

equip

military

orces

lloca-

ted o

him o

ensure

hat

hey

re

knit

ogether

into one unifiedforce.The transitionrom

peace

o

war

an,

ccording

othe

reaty,

nly

e

made

after

onsultations

n

the DefencePlan-

ning

ommitteend

the

Military

ommittee.

n

time f

war,

maximal

ntegration

f the

various

forces fNATOcountries ay ccur. ACEUR

would

hen ontroll

ll

and,

ea

and

air

opera-

tions

n

the

area of

Allied

Command

Europe.

'Internal

efence

nd defence f

coastal

waters

remain

he

responsibility

f the

national uth-

orities

oncerned,

ut

he

ACEUR

wouldhave

full

uthority

o

carry

ut

such

perations

s

he

deemed

ecessary

or

he

defence

f

any

part

f

the

rea

under

is

ommand'

Facts

nd

Figures

1981,

p.

106).

There

s,

however,

o

absolute

guarantee

hat onsultations ill

ead

to

consen-

susand maximalntegrationftheforcesfall

member ountries.

s

one

author

put

t suc-

cinctly:

...

n an

emergency,

ACEUR

will

om-

mand,

butthere

s no

guarantee

hat

hemem-

ber

ountries

illfollow'

Calleo

1970,

.

112).

On

the

other

and,

t

houldbe stressedhat

the

agreed uthority

f

the

allied

command

s

unique

under

peacetime

circumstancesnd

apparently

ar

wider

nd

stronger

han

hat f

similar odies

during

WorldWars

and

II

in

wartime.

onick

1982,pp.

6-7),

the

historian

workingtSHAPE, stateshevarious ormulas

under

which ational ommanders

n

the

llied


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

7/18

308 Herman

van der

Wusten,

an

Nijman

& Rob

Thijsse

commands ould

appeal

to their wn

govern-

ments

n

these arlier

ccasions,

ypassing

he

commander-in-chief.he

guidelines

nderwhich

SACEUR operatesnwartimeo not seemto

leave uch

opportunities.

Commitment

f

army

nits

o

NATO

can

be

under two

headings:

armarked

r

assigned.

Assignmentmplies

he

ransferf

operational

control

o NATO

commanders

ven

n

peace-

time,

while earmarked

orces

will be

at the

disposal

f NATO

commanders

n

the vent f

war

only.

Air

forces

re

assigned,

nd theradar

warning

ystem

nd its concomitant

eapon

systems

eployed

n

a

semi-circle

long

he

ast-

West border all overEurope are integrated

to

a

veryhighdegree.

he central

ommands

(SHAPE

and

its

subsidiaries

or

AFNORTH,

AFCENT

and AFSOUTH as well s thosefor

the

Atlantic nd the

Channel,

ACLANT and

CINCHAN)

have n

internationaltaff.

It is

clear

from

he

evidence

hat

he

arge,

more

powerful

ountries

enerally

eep

sub-

stantial

art

f

their

rmies utside he

lliance.

This

applies

n

particular

o

the

US,

Great

Bri-

tain nd France. hese

countriesllocated

not

more han thirdf theirrmies othe lliance.

We

should rememberhat

these

re

the

three

countries

hich

have heir

wn

nuclear

orces,

in

the astresort

nly

o

be activated

or se

by

their

espective

eads

of

government,

f

proce-

dureswork

orrectly.

For the

FRG,

no

army

nits utside

NATO

nornuclear

weapons

re

possible

n account f

treaty bligations.

enmark

nd

Norway

and

Canada

also)

have

only

forces armarked

o

NATO.

The

other ountries

re

more

ully

om-

mitted othe lliancenthis espect.

In

summary,

e have

variation f

military

commitment

o

the

American-European

ecu-

rity

elationship:

1. FRG:

co-signatory

o

all treaties

lus

We-

stern

uropean

Union

member,

y

far he

largest

merican

resence

nd central o the

concept

f forward

efense,military

orces

assigned.

2.

Belgium,

Netherlands,

taly:co-signatories

to all treaties nd agreementslus WEU

members,

ilitary

orces

ssigned.

3.

Greece,

urkey:o-signatories

o all

treaties

and

agreements, ilitary

orces

ssigned.

4.

Denmark,

orway, ortugal,

pain:

did not

sign lltreatiesndagreements,nparticular

not on nuclear

weapons;

when

forces re

allocated,

hey

re

only

armarked.

anada

also

belongs

o

this

ype.

5.

Great

Britain,

rance:have

kept

ome

di-

stance

o


ela-

tionship

y

igning

ifferentexts

nd

with-

drawing

rom

ome

obligations

espectively.

Both

of

them

re,

however,

EU

members,

military

orces

nlypartially

ommitted

o

NATO.

Autonomy

with

regard

o

nuclear

arsenal.

6.

Finland, Sweden, Ireland,

Switzerland,

Austria,

Yugoslavia:

ery

few

treaties

nd

agreements igned,

to

American

military

presence

whatsoever,

o

known

military

commitments

o NATO.

A

furthereduction

rings

s to

the

following

trichotomy:

ypes

,

2,

3:

strong

military

om-

mitmentso

the

American-European

ecurity

relationship;ype

4,

5

more hesitant

n

this

respectrpartiallyligned n various rounds;

type

strongly

ommittedo a neutral

osition

which

learly

mplies

distance o

any

military

alignments

ith heUS.

Mostof these

rrangements

ere

made n

the

forties

nd fifties. s a matter

f

fact,

we

pre-

sume hat

he ommitmentf

national

military

forces o

NATO

has

qualitatively

ncreased

ver

time n

account f technical

evelopments

ike

the

radar

warning

quipment,

he

common

pipeline

etworksor

he

ransport

f

fuel,

he

shared ommunicationystemhatsnowunder

construction,

he

ffortso standardize

eapon

systems

nd to

design

nd

produce

hese

or

number

f national orces t a

time. n

strictly

military

erms

much

rogress

as been

made

o-

wards he

knitting

ogether

fone

unified orce.

Finally

t

hould

e

asked owhat

xtent

hese

military

ommitmentsre

part

of

the field

f

securityolicy roper.

here an

hardly

e

any

doubtthat

Europeangovernments

t the

time

perceived

grave

ecurity

isk hat

they

were

anxious o solve. owhat xtenthiswas he ear

of newGerman

ggression

n

the

onger

un r


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

8/18

Security

olicies

f

European

Countries 309

of

immediate

oviet

pressure robably

aries

from

ountry

o

country,

rom

ear

o

year,

nd

from

arty

o

party.

In somecountriesn internal ed caremay

also have

ontributed.

s far s these

ommit-

ments

were ntended

o

solve these

problems

they

ualify

s

securityolicies

nder

ur defi-

nition,

ven

f

n

the nd these ears urn ut to

be

unjustified.

ar moredifficulto

answer

s

the

question

o whatextent merican nd/or

European

deas

about

an eventual

oll-back

f

the

Soviet

nfluence

n Central

urope

were

n-

strumental

n

the

engagements

he different

governments

ntered.

n whatever

ays

these

could be proposed heywouldnotqualify s

security

olicies

n

our

terms.

The reasons

iven

or hese

military

ommit-

ments

avenot

changed

much

ince

hey

were

first

greed.

As a

consequence

we can continue

to

ook

at them s

part

f

the

ecurityolicies

f

these

countries.

very

different

ay

of

ap-

proaching

his

uestion

would

have

been

o

ask

to

what xtent hese

policies,

whatever e

call

them,

ave

ffected

hefield

f

security.

or

he

classification

f

policies

we have

to

use inten-

tions atherhan onsequencess theordering

principle.

2.2

Political

lignment

Voting

atterns

n theUnitedNations

epresent

the

political lignment

f

European

tateswith

the

US

in this

tudy.

t

is

evident

hat

foreign

policy

onsiderations,

hich re

wider

han on-

cerns ver

ecurity

ssues,

eterminehe

way

n

which

country

ses its influence here.

or

example, ecurity

roblems

f

European

oun-

triesnthe enseof thispaperwouldbe called

East-West

ssues

n

the

UN

context,

lthough

certainly

ot

ll

East-West

ssues hat

urn

p

in

different

nalyses

would

qualify

s such.East-

West ssues over

nly

part

of

UN

business.

Besides,

heUnitedNations

s a

specific olitical

arena with ts own distribution

f

spotlighted

areas

and darker orners.As

a

consequence,

points

f

view

may

e

expressed

ifferently

rom

the

waythey

re

expressed

n

other renas

or

even ther

oints

r view

may

be

taken.Alter-

native ources o notfit urneeds nthis n-

stance ither. or

example,

he COPDAB

file,

vulnerable

s it

s,

has

only

mall

numbers

f

events

n

relevant

airs,

and

data

categories

again

do

not allow a

sharp

focuson

security

issuesproper.

The

collection

f UN

roll alls s a

precious

data

source

s

it enables

nalysts

o follow he

foreign

olicy

rientationsf

member

ountries

over

long

period.

Although

he

ontext

eems

to

be

constant,

his s

not he ase.

The

changing

membership

as causeddefinite

hanges

f

cli-

mate. his

s an

extra

andicap

n

the

following

analysis.

ecause

t

turned ut to be

far

from

easy

o

select esolutionsn

the

asisof umma-

ry

descriptions

s to their elevance or

Euro-

pean security,eusedroll all votes aken nall

resolutions

uring

ll

sessionsfor

the

period

1946-1982. e alculated

meandistance f

US

votes o

all

European

ountries

n

the

nalysis y

cumulating

he differences

yes/no

=

2;

yes/abstain

r blank

=

1;

no/abstainr

blank

=

1;

equal

votes

=

0)

between he

US

and a

European ountry

n eachvote aken ivided

y

the number

f votes.

Resulting igures

ary

between

(maximum

ifferencef

opinion)

and 0

(maximal lignment).

henwe

regrouped

the sessions nto sevenpresumably elevant

periods

of

roughly

equal

duration and

calculated

he

mean f

meansfor ach

pairper

period.

Table

2

gives

he

results or countries

that

were

ounding

embers,

or

ountries

hat

entered

n

the

mid-fifties,

or he RG

which as

only

been

a

member

ince

the

early

eventies,

and for

he

whole et

f

European

ountrieshat

we

consider.

Overall here

s

a

distinct rend owards

n-

creasing

istances etween

he

US

position

nd

the standtheEuropeancountries ave been

taking

n

theUN.

Taking

more arefulook

at

the ubsets

with

imilar ates

f

entrance,

ome

further

efinements

an

be

made.

First f

all

the oldest

members

s a

whole

took a

surprisingly

e-aligned

tand

n

the

UN

in

the

arly

ifties.his

presumably

eflects

he

position

fCold War ssues n the

genda

f he

world

rganization

n

those

years

Russett

967,

p.

67).

After short eversaln thedirectionf

alignment

nthe

years

round

955,

here as

a

trendowardse-alignmentollowedy nother

smallreversalround1972.

Then

the

de-align-


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

9/18

310 Hermanvan

der

Wusten,

an

Nijman

&

Rob

Thijsse

Table I. Mean Distances

ollCall Votes

n

U.N.

General

Assembly

or

Pair

U.S.-country perperiod

A. All

countries

< .25 .26-.40 .41-.55 .56-.70 .71-.85 .86-1.00 1 >1.01

SWE/NET/UK

FRA/TUR YUG/SU

1946-1948

NOR/DEN/

BEL/GRE

TUR/NET

SWE/UK/NOR

YUG

SU

1949-1955

DEN/BEL/FRA

GRE

NET/UK/ITA

EL/SPA/AUSRE/SWE/POR FIN YUG/SU

1956-1962

TUR

GRE/DEN/

NOR/FRA

NET/UK/BEL TA/IRE/AUS SWE/FRA/ SPA/POR YUG/SU

1963-1967

NOR DEN/GRE/

FIN/TUR

BEL

UK/NET/ITA

DEN/NOR/ FIN/GRE/SPA TUR YUG/SU

1968-1972

AUS/IRE/

FRA/SWE/

POR

UK/FRG/BEL

TA/NET/DEN NOR/AUS/ POR/FIN/SPA YUG/SU

1973-1977 FRA

IRE SWE

TUR/GRE

UK/FRG/FRA EL/NET/ITA

DEN/POR/ AUS/SWE/FII\

TUR YUG/SU

1978-1982

NOR/IRE SPA/GRE

I

B.

Co-founding

embers

.N.

1.01

1946-48 7 2 2

1949-55

2

7 1 1

1956-62

3

5

1 2

1963-67

3

1

5

2

1968-72

1

2

4

1

1 2

1973-77

3

2

2

2 2

1978-82

2

2 2 2 1

2

C.

Members

ince1955

1.01

1956-62

1

2 2

1

1963-67 3 1 2

1968-72

1 3

2

1973-77

2 1 3

1978-82

1 2

3

D. Members

ince1972

?

.25 .26-.40 .41-.55 .56-.70 .71-.85 .86-1.00

>1.01

1973-77

1

1978-82 1

Sources:U.N. roll alls 1946-1974Ch. Wrigleynvest.)ssued

s a file

y CPSR,

AnnArbor

Michiganhrough

teinmetz

Archives msterdam.

or

the

plenary

meetings

f the

General

Assembly

fter 974 use

has been made of 'Index

to

proceedings

f

theGeneral

Assembly

975-1982',

nited

Nations,

New York.


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

10/18

Security

olicies

f

European

ountries

11

ment rend ontinued

gain.

Members

ntering

the

UN

in

1955were

lready

ess

aligned

when

theyoined

and havedrifted urther

way

from

theUS ever ince.

The FRG

finally

ntereds a faithful

lly

nd

has

not

changed

ourse.

The most

pectacular

ank rder

hanges

f

individual ountries ccurred

n the

early art

of

the

period.

rom

he ixties

nward herank

order f more nd ess

politicallyligned

oun-

tries

nly hangedmarginally.

n the

arly

art

of the

period

weden

hanged

rom

relatively

very aligned

position

to a

distinctively

e-

aligned osition.

urkey,nitiallyeing

hemost

de-alignedmemberf this etofcountries,e-

came

tronglyligned

s theCold War tarted

n

earnest

n

the

ate

forties

nly

o veer ack

to ts

former

osition

ater

n. The

atter

art

f

this

trajectory

as also made

by

Spain,

a

country

that ntered he UN

only

ater.

rance,

n the

other

hand,

moved

from

de-aligned osition

to a

position

elatively

ear the

US,

paradoxi-

cally starting

his

change

at the time

of the

Gaullist

egime.

his

gain

warns

s

against

he

interpretation

f these

atterns

s

direct eflec-

tions fpositionsnsecurityolicy ropernly.

It is an

indication n

how

much

he

genda

on

theUN

mattered,

s France lso at

this

uncture

solved

ts

ast

mportant

olonial

roblems.

he

same

type

of

change

also occurred

o some

extent

ith

ortugal's

osition

n

the ate even-

ties,

pparently

or imilar

easons.

We are nclined o

think hat ven

f

themain

factor

esponsible

or the overall

attern,

he

changes

n

distances

o the US

voting

ecord,

and

their ank

rder,

as

theUN

context

tself,

attheveryeast here ouldhave eenrepercus-

sions

in the

foreign olicy

spect

of

security

policies.

Even

in

thisextreme ase

the results

would

t

east

o

some xtent

ave o reflect

he

situation

n

this ssue rea

as well.

t couldthen

be thatwe overrate

he ncrease f

theAmeri-

can-European

istance

n

the field f

security

policies

r that

n

this

ield he tart

f the

pro-

cess was ater.

ut

we

deem

t

probable

hat or

a considerable

eriod

here as been a secular

trend owards

ncreasing merican-European

political e-alignmentlso affectinghediplo-

matic

art

f

security

elations.

The

mean score

of all

sessionsfrom1955

onwards

all

countries

xcept

RG had

become

members

y then)

hows he UK

to havebeen

thedearest riendheUS has had ntheUnited

Nations ver hese ecades.

Belgium,taly,

he

Netherlands

nd FRG follow

uit

the

igure

or

this ast

ountry

s somewhat iased

because

f

late

entry),

rance t some moredistance. he

other ountriesre even

more

istant

rom

he

US,

there

eing

o consistentifferenceetween

neutral

ountries

nd the

countries

militarily

committed

o

the


relation.

n

fact

Yugoslavia

s a

distinct utlier

rather ear

the

position

f the

SU.

This

does,

however,otnecessarily ean that t haskept

this istance

y

onsistently

oting

ith he

U.

2.3

7Typology

f

ecurity

olicies

The

diplomatic

nd

military art

of

security

policies

measured

n

terms f

alignment

re wo

dimensions hat

may

or

may

not

go together.

Table II is

a

cross-classificationf these wo

dimensions

ith

ll

five

xistingategories

a-

belled.

n

thecases of the

Faithful,

he

Margi-

nals,

nd the

Neutrals,

he wo imensions ore

or essgo together.ore onsensus ithheUS

on

the

diplomatic

ront

means

more

military

alignment,lthough

t the ower ail

nd of the

diplomatic

onsensus he

systematic

elation

with

military lignment

reaks

down. The

Fortressesnd thePartners

epresent

he everse

combination:

igh

military

lignment

nd low

diplomatic

onsensus nd viceversa.

These differencesre

pretty

onsistent

ver

time.

They

are

apparently

he result f

long-

standing

cross-country

ariations.

Military

alignment, here t occurs, s definitelyot

diminishing.

Military

ntegration

f NATO

countries

nd

particularly

f those

losely

ied

to the

militaryrganization

f NATO

has

pro-

bably

eenon the ncrease.

t

the ametime

n

the

diplomatic phere

he

gap

with heUS has

generally

idened.

t

follows

n

general

erms

that

long

he

military

imensionmost

ligned

countries

ave

becomemore

losely

ied

o the

US

and

intertype

ifferences ithin

Europe

have as a

consequence

ecome

more

outspro-

ken.Along thepoliticaldimension ountries

have s a

general

ule

moved urther

way

from


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

11/18

312

Hermanvan

der

Wusten,

an

Nijman

&

Rob

Thijsse

Table

II.

Military

nd Political

lignment

f

European

ountries o the


elation

Militarylignment

strong weak absent

strong

FAITHFUL PARTNERS

(NET

FRG BEL

ITA)

(UK FRA)

Political

alignment

weak

FORTRESSES MARGINALS

NEUTRALS

(GRE TUR)

(DEN

SPA

NOR

POR)

(SWE

SWI YUG FIN

IRE

AUS)

the

US

while

ntercountry

ifferences

ithin

Europe

have

remained ather table. Overall

agreement s regardsEuropean securitys

boundto

be

a vexed

roblem.

The

defenseburden

of

countries

defense

expenditure

s a

%

of

GNP)

does

not

vary

with

the

general

imension

f

alignment.

he Faith-

ful,

the

Marginals,

nd the

Neutrals o

not

systematically

iffer

n this.The

Partners

nd

the

Fortresses,

owever,

onsistently

how

high

levels. he

Partners,

s we

aw,

ave

distinctive

military

olicy

ver and above their ommit-

ments o a common

ecurityafeguarded y

NATO.TheFortresses,hile eing lignedna

military

ense o a

very

igh egree,

ave t the

same timebeen

arming gainst

ach

other. n

other words

it

seems

hardly

worthwhile

o

explain

the

deviating ositions

f

these

two

types

withdirect

eference

o

their

diverging

scores n the wo

dimensions

f

alignment.

he

defense

urden

pparently

s a

separate

imen-

sion of

security

olicy

while

lso

a

subject

f

other

olicy

reas,

conomic

olicy

n

particu-

lar. The

rank

order

f

countriess

extremely

stable, ut hepercentageshange onsiderably

over

ime,

he

general

rend

eing

ownward.

In

catchwords,hen,

he

general

rend f se-

curity olicies

n

Europe

outside the Soviet

sphere

s more

nternal

ariation

n

military

alignment,

general

ecrease f

political lign-

ment

with

he

US and

decreasing

efense ur-

dens.

3.

Explanations

nd

implications

States

pparently

ave heir

istinctive

ecurity

policy rofilesverongperiods f time.While

thewhole et

of

states olls

lowly

orward

nd

backward

n

some

respects,

owardsmorehete-

rogeneity

n

this actor nd more

homogeneity

on another ne,thepatternfpositions fall

countries

emains

ssentially

imilar

ver

ime.

Some

explanatory

actorshat

may

ccount or

this

lowly

volving attern,

or ts table eatu-

res and

for ts

directionsf

change,

were

ug-

gested

n

the first

ection.

Geographical

itua-

tion

plus

terrain

ondition nd

power

osition

were

hought

o be

relevantor he

ross-country

differences

n

security.

e first onsider

hese

factors. hen we take

ccount f

power

hifts

thought

o

be

responsible

or he

emporal

han-

gesofsecurityolicies.

3.1

Cross-countryifferences

The

map Fig.2)

shows he ive

ypes

f

security

policies

we describedn section .3. The

pattern

is

moreor less

regular

nd

to

a

considerable

extento be

explained

y

he rontline

t

the

nd

of

World

War

I.

The

strong

inks

f

FRG to

the


elation re

deter-

mined

by

its

core

position

t this

front ine

marking

he

maximal

xtensionfthe

nfluence

ofthe wopost-waruperpowers,he raditional

importance

f

Germany,

he ole f

Germany

s

themain

ontendern the

osing

ide

n

the

war

and the

central

osition

f

the rea n connec-

tion

with herest f

Europe.

The

position

f

Belgium

nd theNetherlands

on

theone hand

and of

most

of

the

Northern

and

Southern ountriesn the ther and

may

be

interpreted

y

differencesf

maneuvering

space

of small tates n

connection

ith

rmed

conflict

long

hisGerman order.n her

om-

parativetudy n the ffortsffive mall tates

to

stay

ut

of

WorldWar

I,

Fox

1959, .

184)


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

12/18

Security

olicies

f

uropean

ountries

13

Fig.

.

Typology

f

Security

olicies

IV............

I

Faithful

.. ..............

aj Partners

..................

I

Fortresses

.

.

.................

Marginals

.ii

N

eutrals

. ..

.

.

. . . . .

. ..

. .

.

. .

..

.

i

ti~iiiiii fiifiiiiii

i

. .

.

. .

.

o

.

. . . .

.

.

.

. . . .

.

.

.

. . . . . .

.

.

.

iii: 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1

"

.

.

. .

.

.

.

.

. . . . . .

.

.

. . . . .

.

. . .

.

. ..

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . ..

i.

. . . .

.:

.

.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

.....

ii itiiiiiliiiiili iii~iili r

.

Sc~rk'l:.

.

.

.

.~::

Scale 1:29.000.000

Scale

1:

30.000.000

Scale

1:

31.000.000

Scale

1: 32.000.000

Scale

1:

33.000.000

Scale 1:34.000.000

Scale

1:

35.000.000

Scale

1

36.000.000

Scale 1:37.000.000

Scale 1:38.000.000

Scale 1:39.000.000

Scale 1:40.000.000


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

13/18

314

Herman

van

der

Wusten,

an

Nijman

&

Rob

Thijsse

concluded

hat

tschancesbecame maller

he

nearer

country

as

situated o

the

outes on-

necting

he

warring arties.

Most of the

rans-

portationxesconnectingheUS and crucial

Germany ass Belgium

nd

the

Netherlands.

Total ir ifts

ere otfeasible hen he elevant

agreements

eremade.Evennow

port

facilities

are

hought

o

be

ndispensable.

lthough

ox's

rule s

concerned ith he

connection etween

warringarties,

e

uggest

hat he

outes othe

obvious

front

re

n

this ase essential s

well.

As a

consequence

heFaithfulreon or

near

the

ransportation

xes,

he

Marginals

remore

distant.

t

is

difficult

o

say

to what

xtent his

differenceanbeexplainedy he arious oun-

tries'

erception

f their

ventual

osition

n

an

armedconflict r of

US

pressure

o

facilitate

military

peration.

However

his

may

be,

the

changing

cale of warfare

explosives,

issiles

and the

worldwide

peration

f

navies ncrea-

singly

emphasizing

he

importance

f

the

flanks)

as

apparently

ot

altered he

original

decisions.

InsideNATO some

ountrieshun

he

ure f

geography.

or

France nd Great

Britain,

heir

central osition n thetransportationxeshas

not

been a

sufficienteason for

becoming

faithful

lly,

while he ountriesn theEastern

Mediterranean ave not become

Marginals

despite

heir

eripheral

osition.

t

may

be that

France nd Great

Britain

re too

large

tates o

have

their

ecurity olicies

dictated

by geo-

graphy.

hey

trove

o becomePartners. n the

other

andtheUS was

exceptionallyeeply

n-

volved

n

conflicts ithin heEasternMediter-

ranean

countries

n

the

early

post-war

eriod

even efore heEast-Westipolar tructure,en-

tered

round heGerman

roblem,

ad formed.

These

countries ecameFortresses.

taly's osi-

tion

as a Faithfuls also anomalousfrom his

perspective.

Another

eographicalegularity

n the

map

is a zone of minimal

ommitmento theAmeri-

can-Europeanecurity

elation nd of minimal

diplomatic

onsensus

with

heUS close to the

East-West

artition

ine.

This s the one of the

Neutrals rom inland o

Yugoslavia, nly

nter-

rupted y Germany.reland learly efies his

pattern.

ut rish

eutrality

oesnot esultrom

theEast-Westonflict. his

also

applies

o

the

other

wo neutralsmostto the

West:

witzer-

land and

Sweden.

The final

greement

ver

more r essneutralone at the dgeofRussia's

consolidated

pheremay

to

some extent

ave

been

ffected

y

he xistencef

already

eutral

countries

n

Europe

nd

particularly

f

nearby

Sweden nd Switzerland:

The

larger

henum-

ber of neutrals

the

arger)

he would-be

eu-

tral's hance of

successfully

esisting

he

bel-

ligerents',

ox

(1959,

p. 184)

suggested.Why

should

his

not

also

apply

n

a

cold

war?

Internal

hysical

haracteristicslso

play

a

role in

security

olicies. Norway's

xtremely

long oast inewhichsdifficulto defend eems

to have

eenmaterialo

her

hoice f

NATO

de

Raeymaeker

974,

. 394).

Swiss

neutrality

as

beenmore

enable s

a

result f ts

mountainous

territory.

ugoslavia's apacity

or

elf-defense

has beenfacilitated

y

he

ame

ype

f

physical

environment.n the other

hand,

Yugoslavia

also has a

considerableoastline nd it

made

a

choice

ery

ifferent

rom

orway

n

he

field f

security olicy.Physical

nvironmentas

an

impact lthough

ot

determinantne.

Inconclusion,ountriesn theprincipalxis

of

transportation

owards

hemainfront

end o

be

Faithfuls,

ountriest theflanks

end o be

Marginals,

ountries

ear

heEast-West

order

at

somedistance rom hemainfront

end o be

Neutrals. or the

other

ypes

eviating

rom

general

lignment

imension,

ther

xplanatory

factorsre needed.

Fig.

3.

presents ower

rankings

or

1955,

1965,

nd 1975

based

on

GNP,

military

xpen-

diture,

opulation,

nd

size.

Such ndexes

may

becriticizedor heir hoice f ndicators,ays

of

transformationnd for he

oncept

f

power

they

re meant o

reptesent,

ut

anyhow

hey

give

some

general mpression

f ranks and

orders

f differencesetween ountries.

The

enormous

reponderance

f the US is

clearly

hownnd t s

only

lightly

ffectedver

time.As a

consequence

o be

Partners

n

secu-

rity

an

only

be an

aspired

tatus or he

arger

European

tates

ndividually.

he

FRG

is

a lar-

ger

tate

n

European

erms rom he

beginning

and tstrengthenstsposition ver ime. rance

also becomes

tronger

ut t a slower ate. reat


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

14/18

Security

olicies

f

European

Countries

315

Fig.

3.

Power

Rankings

955, 965,

975

1955

1965

1975

+ 19 + 19

US

US

US

+3

+3

FRG

+2

+2

FRA

UK

FRG

CAN

UK

CAN

UK

CAN

+ 1

FRA

FRA

-

1

FRG

ITA

.

ITA

ITA

0

O

SPA

SPA

SPA.1 TUR TUR - TUR --

YUG

NET

BEL

NET

SWE

YUG

NET SE

YUG

NET

DEN

FIN

GRE AUS

POR

SWI

NOR

FIN

GRE

AUS

POR SWI

.

E

IRE

DEN

jQR:

-E2

rE

DEN FIN GRE NOR POR

2

IRE

-3

-3

The

selectionf

power

ndicatorsas beenbasedon

a reviewrticle

GuyTegenbos,

De

macht er taten: en nventarisatie

vande

alternatieven

ot

kwantificering'

es

Publica

16,

1974,

p. 133-159).

ach of

the

our ariables

NP,

militaryxpendi-

ture, opulation

nd size

Thylor

Jodice

983)

has been ransformednto -scores

values xpressed

s

the istance rom

he

mean

n

tandard

eviationnitswith hemean s

0).

Based

n

considerations

f ssumed elevanceariables

ave

inally

een

weightedifferently.

he

ndex

s

2GNP

+ MILEX +

POP +

0,5

SIZE).


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

15/18

316

Herman

an er

Wusten,

an

Nijman

Rob

Thijsse

Britain's

osition

s

apparently

table

ut t

oses

in

power ompared

othe ther wo.

taly's osi-

tion s the sortof

halfway

ouse

position

e-

tweenarge nd smallwhich thasalways ad n

the

modern

istory

f

Europe.

Other

ifferences

and

changes

re

extremely

mall scale.

There

seems o be some rend owards

more

ower

if-

ferentiation

mong

mall

European

tates.

With

egard

o the

dimensions

f

the

ecurity

policies

resented

n

ection

,

theres an overall

relation

with

efense urdens

n

particular.

s

defense urdens re

expressed

n

relativeerms

there s

no mathematicalelation etween he

two.

arger

tates,

lso

when

weextend his on-

cept oother imensionsfpower,pend elati-

vely

more on

defense.

Olson & Zeckhauser

(1966)

have

provided

n

explanation

n

terms

f

alliance

dynamics.

ut

the

relation eems

to

hold

for

he

neutraltates s well.

Moreover,

e

have

lready

mentionedhat ome

tates,

arti-

cularlyarger

nes,

keep

considerable

art

f

their

rmed orces utside

he

military

lliance.

It

may

nthis onnection

lso

be relevant

o

con-

sider

ugoslavia's

nd Sweden's

ower

ositions

compared

o the ther eutralsnd their fforts

tosecure egional rrangementsnthis ield.n

other

words

we

surmise

connection etween

powerposition,

efense urden

nd

scope

of

military

olicies

which

state

may

want o

have

the

apacity

o follow.

gainst

his

ackground

the

position

f the

FRG

is

an

anomaly

nd t

s

to

be

expected

hat

trains

ut

on

that

ountry

will

ncreasingly

e resented. n

the ther and

a

loosening

f

existing

ies will

immediately

reawakenld

fears

n

the

region.

ut

hen

gain

some

part

fthe

ogic

f

geography

lso

attracts

the country o get insertedn the zone of

Neutrals.

There

s

also a

fairly trong

elation f the

diplomatic

onsensus imension

n

the

ypology

(2.3)

and

power

osition

nd a

slight

onnection

with

militarylignment.

n

general

erms

he

more

powerful

tates f

Europe

viewworld f-

fairs,

nd

probably

he

diplomatic

ine

n

secu-

rity

matters

lso,

from

perspective

imilar o

that f heUS

compared

othe ther

uropeans,

but

they

re not

willing

o

align

heir ountries

mliitarilyo theUS tothe ameextent.2

We

rgued

t the utset hat

lignment ight

be related o

power

position

n

two

differing

ways

epending

n

the

erspective

ne takes.

As

we

find

ower osition

o

be

positively

elatedo

thepolitical art fsecurityolicynparticular,

this

would

ccording

o that

rgument

ave o

be

theresult

f

extra ttentionrom he

US

for

more

owerful

ountries.

3.2

Change

ver

ime

Following

ecent

iterature,

merican-European

de-alignment

as

expected

o

occur

or

worea-

sons:the

development

f US-SU

parity

n

stra-

tegy apacity,

nd

the

narrowing ap

in US-

Europeanpower

potential.

he

first

uestion,

ofcourse,s ifde-alignmentas nfact ccur-

red.

According

o our results

t

has,

but

n

the

political

imension

f

securityolicy

nly.

an

this

be accounted

or

by

the

two

processes

we

mentioned?

The

consequences

f

strategic arity

would

probably

irst

f

ll be felt

nthe

military

imen-

sion of

security

olicy,

because the

fear of

Europe

decoupling

would

primarily

ffect

available

military

ptions

and

thus

military

security

olicy. enerally,

owever,

hishas not

been thecase.On thecontrary,ountriesnce

aligned

militarily

end o

strengthen

heir

onds

via

continuing

nstitutional

rowth

partial

exceptions

re

France

nd

Greece).

This could

contrary

o the nitial

ypothesis

be

nterpreted

s an extra ffort

y

he

European

countries

o

hold

on to

theirnow traditional

militaryecurity olicy

of

alignment

gainst

these dds.

There

ould,

on

the

other

and,

be

a

tendency

or hese

European

ountries,

on-

scious of

the

ncreasing

ulnerability

f

their

doctrine f militaryrotection,o look for

political ay

o

pacify

he

nvironment,

hrough

cooperation.

This

could entail

political

de-

alignment

rom he US.

In

this

way,

trategic

parity

etween he

superpowers

ould havere-

sulted

n

opposite olicy hanges

n

the

wodi-

mensions f

securityolicy.

What his

kind

f

argument

annot

xplain

s

themore r ess on-

tinuous

hange

n

security

olicy tarting

efore

the

moment

n

time

hat

arity

as more r ess

reached

nd was

perceived

n

the

ixties.

De-alignmentould also result romhe es-

sening

f

American-Europeanower

differen-


8/11/2019 423400.pdf

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Security

olicies

f

European

Countries 317

ces,

we

stated.

n

actual

fact, owever,

t

s far

from ertain

hat

any significant

hange

has

happened

n this

regard.

Our

Fig.

3 shows

change nthisdirection,ut the differencesn

power

f the

US

and the

European

ountries

remain

imply

normous.

he

FRG made the

largest eap

ahead followed

y

France.

As we

have

een

these

re,however,

ot

thecountries

that

particularly

howed

de-alignment

ver

time.

In

addition

the

presumed

ncreased

ctor

capability

f

some

European

ountries n ac-

count

f

the C and other

orms

f

cooperation

could

be

taken nto ccount.

However,

recisely

inthefield f security olicy roper here re

hardly ny

igns

hat

uropean

ntegration

as

proceeded

uring

he

eriod

we

covered.

n

con-

clusion

we doubt

whether

he

process

f

politi-

cal

de-alignment

e encountered

an

be ex-

plained y hanging

merican-Europeanower

differentials,

ot

to

speak

of the evolution

f

militaryecurityolicies.

If

the actors

e ndicatedreunsuitabler

n

any

case

not

sufficiently

ersuasive

o account

for

he

evolution

f

security

olicies,

what re

otherpossibleexplanations?n our view the

course f

time tself

as to

play large

ole

n

this.

t

s

now

ittle

ess han

orty

ears

ince he

bipolar system

f

international

ecurity

ela-

tionswas

ntroduced

n

Europe.

n

the

first

n-

stance ountrieswere

ligned

o

the

US to a

maximal

extent

remember

urkey's olitical

trajectory

n

this

period).

But even

hen,

ome

countriesucceeded

n

steering

lear f the wo

poles.

The

early

ostwar

istory

f all

six

Neu-

trals

xcept

witzerlands

full

f ncidents

here

thepull foneorboth uperpowersasmore r

less

clearly,

ometimes

ramatically,

elt.

As

long

as the

system

was

under onstruc-

tion,

maximal

clarity

ad to be

obtained

n

order

o

prevent

lternative

rrangements.

fter

the orientationf the two Germanies

owards

the two

respective

oles

had been

settled,

although

ot

withoutome

unresolved

ontrary

views

remaining international osition

of

GDR,

status f

Berlin),

he

bipolar ystem

tar-

ted to wear

tself

ut.

Tensionswerereduced

(Goldmann 974), venf hroughoutinization

only Galtung

1966,

pp.

157

f.). Superpowers

continued heir

truggle

or

egional egemony

elsewhere.

he

proportion

nd

absolute umber

of cases where

uperpowers'

rmed orces

ere

used hort f wardecreasednEurope calcula-

tedfrom

he

ppendices

n

Blechman

Kaplan

1978 nd

Kaplan

1981).

As the

ipolar

ystem

n

Europe

became

more

taken or

ranted

nd drew

ess

ttention,

ther

security

lements

ecame

more

alient,

most f

them

eeding

n

old controversies

tension

e-

tween Greece and

Turkey,

egionalist

move-

ments). urope

utside he oviet rbit

egan

o

develop

ome

ndependentolitical

rientation

as

room or hiswas

provided

y

ltered

olitical

orientationsfboth uperpowersndwonby

change

n

perspective

f

European

countries

themselves.

long

he

military

imension

hings

developeddifferently

ecause

alignment

ad

been

nstituted

n

NATO

in

this

domain.This

institution

athered

nd

kept

ts own momen-

tum s

time

progressed.

ecent

llustrative

vi-

dence

f

he

different

ays

n

which

he

olitical

and

military

imension

of

security

policy

develop

s

provided y

Spain

joining

NA

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