424 fpolitical theory volume 18 issue 2 1990 [doi 10.2307%2f191346] stephen macedo -- the politics...

7/26/2019 424 fPolitical Theory Volume 18 Issue 2 1990 [Doi 10.2307%2F191346] Stephen Macedo -- The Politics of Justificat

1/26

The Politics of JustificationAuthor(s): Stephen MacedoSource: Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 280-304Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191346.

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2/26

THE

POLITICS

OF

JUSTIFICATION

STEPHENMACEDO

Harvard

University

THE

PRACTICE OF

POLITICALJUSTIFICATION

s

not

just

for

philosophers,and t does not

simply

lie

behind

as

we

may

hope)

our

political

arrangements.Commitments o reasongiving andreasondemandingnform

some

of our most valuable

political

practices.

Judicial

review,

most

obvi-

ously,

helps

ensure that

legislative

and executive acts are

reasonable

in

constitutional

erms:

In

court it is not the

fact

of

power

but the

display

of

reasonsand evidence that

counts. Not

only

the

courts,

but also

Congress

and

the

executive

branch

sometimes

(and

quite

properly)

onscientiously

ustify

their

actions

n

constitutional erms.

Constitution

side,

muchthat akes

place

in

and

around

egislatures,

elections,

and

other

political

fora can be under-

stoodas effortstojustify particular olicies andprograms.1

Liberals

demand,

as

Jeremy

Waldron

puts it, that the

social order

should

in

principle

be

capable

of

explaining

itself at the

tribunal

of

each

person's

understanding. 2

Liberal,

democratic

politics

is not only

about

individual

rightsand

limited

govemment,

it is

also about

ustification,but

not

about

any

kind of

justification

at

all. Liberal

political

ustification,

even

in

its ideal

form,

shouldbe

understood

politically

this

article

considers

why

and how.

Liberalcontractualistsypicallyseekjustifications hatarewidelyaccept-

able to

reasonable

people with

a broad

range of

moral,

philosophical,and

religious

commitments.3

he aim is

reasonable

greement:

o be

both

reason-

able

and

agreeable

n

a

widely

pluralistic

ociety.4The

appropriate

means is

a

processof

reasoning hat

s

publicly

accessible,

but

genuinely

ustificatory.

AUTHOR'S

NOTE: Thanks

to

William

Galston,

Randy

Krozsner,

Charles

Larmore,

Percy

Lehning,

HarveyC.

Mansfield,

Jr.,John

Rawls,

Judith

N. Shklar,

Mark

Tushnet, nd

Leif

Wenar,

for comments on previous drafts. The article was improved by discussions in the Harvard

Government

DepartmentPolitical

Theory

Colloquium,and

at a

symposium t

the

Instituteor

Humane

Studies.

A generous

grant

romthe

Smith

Richardson

Foundation

providedthe time

to

workon

thispiece.

POLITICAL

HEORY,ol.18

No. 2,

May1990

280-304

?

1990

Sage

Publications, nc.

280

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3/26

Macedo POLITICSOF

JUSTIFICATION

281

The

danger s

that reasonswill

be

deployed that ease

people

into

the

liberal

settlementby

masking

the

true nature

of

liberalism

as

a

regime.

In

the quest

for consensus amidst

diversity,

iberals have

a

tendency

to

minimize the

broad and

deep implicationsof liberal

politics.

Reticence

in

spelling out

the

controversial implications

of liberalism could

lead

to

a

conspiracyof

silence and the

embracement

f a

liberal

false

consciousness.

Beginning

from the desire

to

respectreasonable

persons,publicjustification

could

become

liberal

hoodwinking,

and

political

iberalismcould

come

to

reston a

noble

fib.

Liberal

public

ustification

annot

avoid

controversy:

t

engages

and

seeks

to shape

our

deepest and

most

personal values.

Liberals,

I

argue,

should

acknowledge their

partisanship

and the practical

impossibility of

perfect

convergence on

common

principles

of

justice.

A

workable

conception

of

public

justification

must

acknowledge

the

importance

of a

principled

mod-

eration

as a

core

liberal

virtue,

one

that allows

us

reasonably

o

aspire

to

public

justificationwhile

accepting

the infirmitiesof

the human

condition.

LIBERAL

UBLIC

JUSTIFICATION

The

commitment o

public

justification

reflects a desire to

regardcertain

kinds of

reasons

as

authoritativen

politics:moral

reasons

hatcan be

openly

presented

to others,

critically

defended, and

widely

shared by

reasonable

people. The

reasonsmust be

moral:

good reasons

for

others as well

as for

oneself,

not

self- or

narrowly

nterested.

They mustbe

general reasons,

ones

we areprepared o extend to relevantlysimilarcases. The reasonsmust be

public

in

the

sense of

being widely

and

openly

accessible;

appeals to inner

conviction

or

faith, special

insight,secret

nformation, r

very difficult

forms

of

reasoningare

ruledout.

Public

ustificationmust,

finally,

be critical in

that

objections

have been

soughtout

and

reasonable

altematives

confrontedor

anticipated.5

At its most

basic

level, public

justification

has dual

aims:

It seeks

reflec-

tive

justification good

reasons),but

it also

seeks

reasonsthatcan

be

widely

seen

to be

good

by

persons such as

they

are.

These dual

aims

are pursued

together o

that,

politically

speaking

at

least, there s no

independent

tandard

against

which

a

political

theorycan

be

judged.6

Participants

im

at a system

of

principles hatall

can see

to be

reasonable

not one

that

some will

regard

as

true).

Public

justification does

not

work down

from

a

prior, purely

philosophical

standard:

Political

philosophy

must

be concerned,

as

moral

philosophy

neednot be,

with

practicalpolitical

possibilities. 7



4/26

282

POLITICAL

THEORY

MAY

1990

The dual aims of

justification

are

consonant

with the

principled

commit-

ments

of

a

liberaldemocratic

ociety: By

pursuing

both

together,

we

respect

not

only the

goodness

of

good

reasons,

but

also the freedomand

equality

of

citizens whose

capacity

for reason is limited and

who

espouse

widely

divergent

comprehensive

views.8

Indeed,

the

goodness

of

good

reasons,for

a political

heory,

becomes

entirely

a function of

their

capacity

to

gain

widespread

agreement among

reasonable

people

moved

by

a

desire for

reasonable

agreement.9As

ThomasNagel puts it,

we should

not impose

arrangements,

nstitutions,

or

requirements

n

other

people on

grounds hat

hey

could

reasonably eject(where

reasonableness

s

not

simply

a

function

of

the

independent

ightness

or

wrongness

of the

arrangements

n

question,

but

genuinely

dependson the

point

of view

of the

individual

n

question

to

some

extent).'0

Why public

ustification?We

acknowledge,

irst

of

all,

the

permanent

act

of

diversity:

Reasonable

people

disagree

not

only

about

preferences

and

interests,

but also widely

and

deeply about

moral,

philosophical,religious,

and

other

views.

Second,

while

acknowledging

diversity,

we

respect

as

free

andequalmoral

beings

all

those

who pass

certain

hreshold

ests of reason-

ableness:We

respect hose

whose

disagreementwith us does not

impugn

heir

reasonableness.

We try to

distinguish,

finally,

between

intractable

philo-

sophical

and

religious issues and

other

problemsthat

are

both more

urgent

(at

least from

a liberal

perspective)and

easier

to

grapplewith.'2We

urgently

need

agreementon

certain

practical

problems:

securing basic

liberties

and

establishing

air principles

of

distribution.'3

here are,

says

Rawls, reason-

able and

generally

acceptableanswers

or only a

few

questionsof

political

justice; political

wisdom

consists

in

identifying hose

few,

and

among

them

the

most

urgent.

4

Public

justification

embodies a

complex form

of

respect for

persons:It

respects

both our capacity

for a

shared

reasonableness,

ut also

what Rawls

calls the

burdens

of

reason. '5

eople

disagreefor a

variety of

reasonsthat

do not

impugn their

reasonablenessor

undermine heir claim

to

respect.

Public justification

offers,

therefore,a

way of

acceptingthe

infirmities

of

reasonablecitizens and of respectingthem, blemishesand all. Moralargu-

ments are,

after all,

complex and the

relevant

evidence is often

difficult to

assess

and

weigh

appropriately.

he conceptsof

political

moralityare

inher-

ently abstract

and

vague.

Our judgments

are

inevitably

somewhat

subjec-

tive-shaped, that

s, by a

totalityof

personal

experiencesthat are

boundto

differ

from

one person to

another.

Moral values

are

diverse,

and different

ones

often

weigh

in

on

both

sides of moral

issues.

Particular

political

institutions

and

policies cannot

embody

all

values: We must

make

hard



5/26

Macedo

POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION

283

choices and be

selective.16

Moral evaluation is a

complex

and

difficult

business,

so

convergence

on common

political

principles

is bound to

be

arduous;

t is

only

reasonable o

accept

the fact

of

reasonable

disagreement.

Public

justification

plays

a

representative

ole:

mediating,

n

effect,

be-

tween

philosophyand

the

citizenry

(representing hilosophy

to citizens and

citizens to

philosophy). 7

he

public conception

avoids

excessively subtle

andcomplex

forms

of

reasoning,preferring rguments

hatnot

only

aresound

but

such

that

they

can be

publicly

seen to be

sound. '8

Public

justification

respects the

constraints

of

simplicity and availability

of

information,

moderating he aims of

philosophyso as to ensure

the wide

accessibility

of

the relevant forms of

reasoning

and evidence: These

should be not

too

difficult

and

(if

possible)

not

too deeply at odds

with

firmly

held and not

unreasonable iews. 9With its

significantly public

standard

of

reasonable-

ness, the political conception

fosters trustand

promotescooperation.20

nd

it expressesthe

need to perform

ertainurgent asks

without

waiting

to

settle

deep

and

intractable

disputes.2'

Public

justification embodies the philosophical

impetus toward

critical

reflection in a qualified form.These qualificationsmay strike us at first as

odd,

and

indeed as inconsistent with

certain

liberal institutions.Judicial

review

elevates

the political authority f courts,

authority hat

lows from

the

capacity

to

recognize good reasons and

make

good arguments.And so,

Michael

Walzer charges that

Judicialreview is the

crucial institutional

device

through

which

the

philosophicalconquest

of

politics

takes

effect. 22

Taking

eriously he public

natureof liberal ustification oftens

the supposed

antidemocratic endency of

judicial review,

and allows us to see that the

authority fjudgesis notautomaticna liberaldemocratic ociety: They gain

authorityby

disceming

interpretationsf the fundamentalaw

whose reason-

ableness

can be

widely

seen.23

This

public

conception of justification

construesthe ends

and means of

justification

n

a

way

that

accords

with

ourbroader ommitment

o respecting

the

freedom and

equality of

persons. Having

done so, it honestly acknowl-

edges the

substantive

qualificationsbuilt into the idea of a

public moral

justification

namely,

hat t

does not aim to identifywhat are

simply the best

reasons, where best is a function of only the quality of the reasons as

reasons

eaving

aside the constraints f wide

accessibility).24

Given

a

polity

with a

widespread capacity

for

reasonableness

and a

general

commitment to

liberal

principles, it seems

to

me

right to say that

the

best

political

ustificationswill be public in

the manner

described.25 nd

yet,

the

concessions that

public

justification

makes to accessibility should

not be

confused

with

other,more political and

problematic

oncessions that



6/26

284

POLITICAL

THEORY

MAY

1990

some

liberals

might

be

disposed

to

make

in

the face

of

disagreement

and

controversy.

POLITICIZING

USTIFICATION?

To

smooth the

way for

a

practical

political settlement

a

convergence

of

reasonable

people

on

common

principles

of

justice

liberals

too often

min-

imize

the

broad

and

deep

ramifications

of

liberalism. The

question

is,

Rawlssays, what s theleast thatmustbe asserted;and f itmustbe asserted,

what is its

least

controversial

orm? 26

his liberal

reticence,

I

shall

suggest,

grows

out of

a

desire

for

widespread

agreement,but also

flirts

with

a kind

of

liberal false

consciousness.

Liberals

should,

I

shall

argue,

be

candid about

their

partisanships,

open

in their

arguments,

and

explicit

on

the need

for

principled

moderation.

By

avoiding claims o

universal

ruth,

r

claims

about he

essential

nature

and

identity of

persons,

Rawls

asserts, the

political

conception

of liberal

justification

extends the

principleof

toleration o

the ultimate

questions

of

philosophy

itself.27

Justice

as

fairness

deliberately

stays

on

the

surface ;

political

justification

seeks

only to

identify the kernel of

overlapping

consensus

likely

to be

affirmed

by

each of

the

opposing

comprehensive

moral

doctrines n

a

reasonably

ust

society.28

The

liberalismof

overlapping

consensus

avoids close

links with

com-

prehensive

moral

deals:

dealsthat

nclude

conceptions f

what is

of

value

in

human

life,

ideals

of

personal

virtue

and

character,

and

the like,

that

are to inform

much

of

our

nonpolitical

conduct

(in the limit

of

our life as a

whole). 29

As

Charles

Larmoreputs

it,

we do

better

to

recognize

that lib-

eralism s

not a

philosophyof

man, but a

philosophy

of

politics. 30

nd

so,

we

adopt

a

conception

of the

person

framed as part

of,

and

restricted

o,

an

explicitly

political

conceptionof

justice....

[Plersons

can

accept

this

conception

of

themselvesas

citizens

and

use it

when

discussing

questions

of

political ustice

withoutbeing

committed

in

other

parts

of

their ife to

comprehensive

moral

dealsoften

associatedwith

liberalism,

forexample,theidealsof autonomyandindividuality.31

It is

true

enough

that,

given

the

differences

amongthe

religious

and

moral

perspectives

adopted

n

a

liberal

society,

citizens

will

have

different

reasons

for

supporting he

liberal

settlement.

And

yet,

while

we

seek

reasons

hat

are

widely

accessible and

acceptable,we

must

acknowledge he

broad

and

deep

implications

of

basic

liberal

principles

and

institutions.32

iberal

political



7/26

Macedo

POLITICSOF

JUSTIFICATION

285

principles do not stay on

the

surface,

and their

consequences

cannot

be

confined

to a certain

sphere

of our lives.

Let

us examine how

the

various

thrustsof theminimization trategy ail.

TheBreadthand Weightof LiberalPolitical

Principles

The phrase overlapping

consensus might be taken

to underdescribe

what iberalism tands

or.Politics

is

the final recourse

or

people

who cannot

agree. People who

disagree

about

religious

beliefs

or other

commitments

mustregard ommonpoliticalprinciplesasregulativeof all their nteractions

with others. Liberalism

requires,

herefore,not merely

an

overlapping

con-

sensus but a consensus that

practically

overridesall

competing

values.33

The idea of an overlapping

onsensus does correctly

suggest

that

specif-

ically political

values need not do all the work of

supporting

he liberal

settlement or

everyone

or even

most

people.34

he

comprehensive

moral

and

religious views of

liberal citizens

may provide a

variety of values and

interests

hat

support,without forming a partof, the

sharedpolitical frame-

work: religiousconvictionsthatprizefree and openargumentn a pluralistic

environment,for

example, or atheistic man-centered

doctrines

that

prize

human

fulfillment

n

this life. Shared iberalvalues need

not themselves be

strongenough

to overrideall

competing

ones so

long

as the

weight,

as

it

were,

of liberal

and

supporting or proliberal)values

is

enough

to

outweigh

all

competing (or

antiliberal)

values and interests.

The

success and

stability

of

liberal politics depends, therefore,on

people's private

beliefs and commit-

ments

becoming

importantly iberalized becoming, that

s, congruentwith

andsupportiveof liberalpolitics.

Liberalism

provides

wide bounds

within which

people are free to settle

on

their own

religious beliefs,

aesthetic values, and so

on. And yet,

basic

liberal

principles of

respect or persons and theirrights,

for example)

wash

across

the whole

of

our

lives,

not

determining

all our

choices

but

limiting,

structuring,

nd

conditioning

our

lives as a whole.

Illiberal orms of

private

associationare

strictly

ruled

out, and manyother nterestsand

commitments

are

bound to be

discouragedby the

free, open,

pluralistic,progressive,and

(arguably) ommercialisticnatureof a liberalsociety.

Liberals

do

not,

moreover, ust sit

and hope that

personal beliefs will

become

liberalized.

In

John Locke's

Letter

ConcerningToleration, or

example,

the liberal

flag was planted

deep within the bounds of

people's

comprehensive alues.

Although

Locke denies that he

careof men's souls

is committed o civil

authority nd

emphasizes he distinctionbetween

public

and

privaterealms,

he

must appeal,nevertheless, o a

certainkind of

private



8/26

286

POLITICAL

THEORY

MAY

1990

character:

o all Men thathave Souls

largeenough

to

prefer

he true

Interest

of the Publick

before

that

of

a

Party.

Considerthe repertoireof arguments or tolerationsupplied by Locke:

Thatsalvation

depends

on

an

inner

aiththatcannot

be

coerced,

a

distinction

between

the essential

and he nonessential

n

Christian

octrine,

he

suspicion

that

intolerance s a mere cloak for

power,

a

social

compact argument or

political

legitimacy,

and the claim that

oppression

not

liberty

eads

to

vio-

lence andrebellion.

Significantly,

Locke

crosses the

public/private

oundary

in

arguing

or

toleration,

nd

n

this

way directly

engages

and

shapes

he

most

deeply personal

concerns.

Although

such

a

strategy

may

seem

dangerous,

t

is unavoidable.

People's privatecommitments n a liberal

society

do

not

become

liberal

accidentally.

A

liberal

polity

takes

care,

in

shaping

educational

nstitutions

and

in

other ways

(such

as

promotingcommerce),

to

encourage

ts

citizens

to

adopt

a

range

of

commitments hat

support

he

liberal

political

settlement.

What

s distinctiveabouta liberal

society

is

not that

t

wholly

lacks a

tutelary

apparatus,

ut that this

apparatus

peratesgently

and

often

indirectly.35

t

is

easy for us to take the

success

of

liberalismfor

granted,

but

only

because

liberal

nstitutionshave been at work for so long.

The

Depth of

Liberal

Principles

The

notion of anoverlapping

consensus might

also suggest that

political

norms

somehow

stay on the surface,giving rise to

no deep claims

aboutthe

kind of

persons iberalism

akes us to be. Consider

Rawls's remark:

We can, as it were, enter...[the

original] position any

time simply by

reasoning for

principlesof

justice in accordancewith the enumerated

estrictions.When in

this way

we simulate

being in this position,our

reasoningno morecommitsus to a

metaphysical

doctrineaboutthe nature

of the self thanour playing a game

like monopoly

commits us

to

thinking hatwe are

landlords

ngaged in a desperate

ivalry,winner take all.36

Liberal

ustice

requiresus to be a certainsort of

personall the time.37

We do

not

play

at

being just now and

then, as we occasionallyplay

Monopoly.

No

doubt, we can often

distinguishthe public

and private

identities of

liberal

citizens:Politically

speaking,Saul of Tarsus

ettingout for

Damascus

is the

Paul who

arrivesthere.38

Likewise as

citizens,

we might support he

difference

principle (accepting

only those

inequalities that work

to the

advantage

of the

least

well-off)

while eschewing

it in our private affairs.

Nevertheless,

liberalism

presupposesthe widespreadexistence of

certain

deep character

raits.39



9/26

Macedo POLITICSOF

JUSTIFICATION 287

Liberalism

elevates

impartial tandards

of respect

for all

persons

and

in

doing so

implies

that

people should be

capable

of

reflectively

distancing

themselves

from the

whole range of their

particular

ommitments

friend-

ships,

family ties,

business

associations-although

not on all of them

all

at

once)

for the

sake

of

interposing

mpersonal

tandards

fjustice

and

honoring

the

equal

rights

of others.It

cannotbe right o

say,

as

Rawls

does,

that iberal

citizens may, regard t is

simply

unthinkable o view themselves

apart

rom

certain

religious,

philosophical,

and moralconvictions.

0

Of

course,

critical

self-reflection s not

required

f our

personal

commit-

ments are

already

iberal

but

what guarantees hat?

The

reflective

capaci-

ties of

liberal citizens, alertto

possible conflicts between

personalcommit-

ments and

liberal rights,

should be a

central

mechanism or

preserving

and

advancing

he

cause of

justice

in

a well-ordered

ociety.

The

Dynamics of

LiberalPrinciples

There s

yet

a

thirdway

in

which

it

sometimes

seems that iberalsminimize

the reachof liberalvalues:byoveremphasizing heextent o whichliberalism

settles

basic

moral issues once

and for all. And so Rawls:

a

liberal

conceptionmeets the

urgentpolitical

requirement

o fix, once and for all,

the

contentof

basic rightsand

iberties,

and to assignthem

special priority.

Doing this

takes

those

guarantees

off the

political

agenda....41

The extent to which

liberal

values

constituteus as persons

becomes

clearer

when we considerthe dynamicqualitiesof liberalpublicjustification.

Many

basic

liberal

guaranteesnow

seem pretty

irmly

settled

in

America

(the evil

of

slavery,women's

suffrage,

he right o criticize the

govemment),

and these

might

be takenas

a

hardcore of rights

whose

fixity contributes o

public

trust

and political

stability.It

cannot be claimed,

however,

that

our

Constitution

or any

other)

managed

o

fix, once

and

for

all,

the

content

of

basic

rights and liberties.

The

contours of every one of

our most basic

liberties

remains a

matterof

lively

disagreement

and whole

categories of

rights (of homosexuals,for example)remain argelyunacknowledged.The

Constitution

did

not

so much

settle

as frame an

ongoing

debate about

the

bounds

between

individual

ibertyand government

power.

Public

justification

should be a

never-ending

commitment.It

would be

sheer

hubris o think

hatwe

have, or ever

will have,

the whole political

truth.

We are

always learningand

confronting

new circumstances;

we will

always

have

progress

to make.

Moreover, we

could

have no confidence

in

our



10/26

288

POLITICAL

THEORY MAY

1990

reasonsfor

committingourselves to what we

understand

ustice

to

be

unless

we keep

debating

t and remain

open

to new and better

nterpretations

f

it.

We

cannothonorour statusas

reasonable

beings

unless

we remain

open

to

a

critical

dialogue

aboutthe

justifiability

of our

deepest political

conceptions,

whatever

they

may be.

Liberalism

establishes,

or

good

reason,

a

process

of

public

debate

about

itself

among other

things. Liberalsneed dissenters rom liberalism

because,

as

Mill

observed,

He

who knows

only

his

own side of the

case,

knows

little

of that. 42Not

surprisingly,

hen, closing public

debate

on basic

political

issues is

incompatiblewith our

deepest

ideals

and our

practice

of

respecting

even subversive

speech (while

drawing

a

sharp

line between

speech

and

action).43

I

do not mean to

say

that the

question

of

slavery,

for

example,

should

be

reopened.

But

the fact

thatrace

remainson our

agenda

meansthat he liberal

understanding

f this basic

issue remainsvivid and has a chance

to

grow

and

deepen.

And

because

public

justification

s

dynamic

and

open,

we can

hope

that iberal

values

will

be

tested,refined,andextendedever more

pervasively

throughoutsociety. All this means, as well, that while certain liberal

guarantees

may become

stable, the overall

patternof

rights

s

likely

to be

in

constant

motion.

Public

justification

s not a

means

only but also an

end

in

itself:

being

a

self-critical

reasongiver s the best

way of

being

a

liberal and a

good

way

(liberalsmust

suppose)of

livinga life.

The

reflective,

self-critical

capacities

we

associatewith public

justificationmust,

therefore,

be

regarded sperma-

nent

and

ever-developing

characteristics

f

liberal

citizens at their

best.

The

Method

of

Avoidance

For the

sake of

facilitating

he public

acceptance

of basic

liberal princi-

ples,

liberals

sometimes

limit the reach

and

consequencesof

liberal

princi-

ples in the

ways

we have seen.

I

have

argued, in effect,

that

liberalism

constitutes

a

regime:

Liberalprinciples

andgoals

shapeour

ives

pervasively,

deeply, and

relentlessly.

To

a

great

extent, the modes

of

limitation hat we

have

examined

so far

are

more

apparent

han

real instances

of

reticencerather han

a real

refusal

to

acknowledge

the full

implicationsof

liberalism.Rawls

finally

admits hat

liberalism

hapes

the lives of

liberal

citizens broadly

and

deeply, nfluencing

people'sdeepest

aspirations. 45 e

insists only

that

iberalism s not

fully

comprehensive

meaning that

the regime

does not

prescribe everything

about

the

lives of its

citizens)

and says that

its

broadinfluences

simply



11/26

Macedo POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION

289

cannotbe avoided

on

any

view of political justice. 46Rawls defends the

pervasiveand nonneutral onsequencesof liberal ustice by arguing hat its

aim is to be fair to

moral

persons

(as

liberalism

understands

hem),

not to

all

conceptions

of the

good

or all

ways

of

life.47

But deep at the heart of Rawls's understanding

f

justification

lies

the

methodof avoidance, a directstrategy

o avoid

assessing

the truthor

falsity

of

deeply

held

personalviews,

such

as

religious

beliefs or other

aspects

of

people's comprehensive

moralviews:

nor need we say thatpoliticalvalues are intrinsicallymore importanthanother values

and that's

why

the other

values are overridden.

ndeed,saying

that

is

the kind

of

thing

we hope to avoid, and achieving

an

overlapping

onsensusenables us to avoid it.48

Does it

really? Can public justification

avoid making

ultimatejudgments

aboutwhich

religious beliefs,

for

example,

are

justified?

What does

a

liberal

say

about

a

range

of

religious

beliefs that

include

ecumenicalCatholicism,

undamentalist rotestantism,

nd

sects that

require

holy war againstnonbelievers?There are, says Rawls, noresourceswithin

the

political view to judge those

conflicting conceptions.They

are equally

permissible provided they respect

the limits imposed by the principles of

political justice. 49

Underline

provided :

All

religions compatible

with

liberalism will be respected;those not compatible

will

be opposed.50

The

liberal

must

in

this way imply

that religious convictions incompatible

with

liberalismare unsupportable.

In

making the personalchoice

about whetherto support iberal politics,

one wouldweigh liberalandproliberal alues against he strongestcompet-

ing package,as one sees it. (Is the

freedomto debate,choose, and live one's

own

way really

more

mportant

hanstruggling o establisha commonculture

that

supports piety and other-worldlinessand punishes blasphemers?

Is

peaceful pluralismreally more important hanthe ideal of ChristianUnity?)

To

vindicate

its overridingstatus,

a liberal political moralitywill have to

speak directlyto illiberalcomprehensivepersonal deals, arguing hat

these

are false or

less important hancompeting iberalvalues, or that they

can be

mendedand made compatiblewith liberalism.

The reticent liberal may still

try to avoid issues of truth and ultimate

importanceby excluding fromthe political space, as it were, the comparison

between

the

political conception

and conflicting comprehensiveviews:

Of

course,

citizens

must decide

for

themselves

whether, n light of theircomprehensive

views, and taking into account the

great political values realized by the political



12/26

290 POLITICALTHEORY MAY 1990

conception, they can endorsethatconception

with its

idea

of

society

as a fair

system

of

social cooperation.5'

But can political theory simply be silent

at the crucial

moment

of

deciding

on

the meritsof liberalism?52

Rawls's conception of justification

employs

a

remarkabledivision of

labor.The citizen mustdecide for himself, n light of

his own

comprehen-

sive scheme of values, whether

o

acceptthe political

construction.

The

issue

of

acceptance

s not

within

the

verge

of

political

ustification

for

Rawls,

because acceptance

raises

questions

of ultimate

importance necessarily

situatedwithin the

Apace

of comprehensiveviews, a space that remains

personal

and

publicly opaque

even after

political

theory

has done its work.

Liberalpolitical values must occupy, as

I

have

argued,

much of the same

space

as

personal comprehensive deals, religious

and otherwise.

And

so,

unable to

confine political values to

an autonomous

phere,

Rawls

attempts

to restrict

the scope

of

political justification by

dividing

the

process

of

justification

n

two. First,

here s

the stage

of

construction,

n

which we leave

aside the controversial lements of our

comprehensive

personalperspective

because we

recognize

that

reasonablepeople

with

whom we

wish

to form

a

political association reject them.53The stage of construction

s a search for

reasonable agreement. Only after construction s

complete

do we enter a

second

stage

in which

the

question

of

acceptance

comes

to the fore. At this

second

stage, our controversial eligious and other

personal

convictions

are

reengaged:Can I, as a devout Catholic, really

live with the kinds of ques-

tioning

attitudesandbeliefs

likely to be promotedby

a liberal

framework?54

The problem s thatsegmenting he processof

justificationonly gives the

appearance

of

avoiding

a direct

conflict between

political and personal

values. The conflict is not avoidedbut merely

shiftedoff the political agenda

(and, presumably, ut of political fora) by

bracketing he question

of

theory

acceptance,making t private,and leaving it aside

until the public construc-

tion is

complete. The broaderand deeper

mplicationsof liberalismremain,

however, mattersof public concern that citizens

are bound to raise. Public

justification

should have

something o say abouthow

the interface

between

political and personalvalues is negotiated.Managing hat interface s, in a

sense, the crucialpolitical ssue: an issue we cannot

help addressing n public

fora,

an

issue that in some of its aspectsat least) we

should address n public

fora.

A

more realistic model of justificationwould

allow, in effect, that par-

ticipants' personal moral convictions are

engaged as each feature of the

political

view is

constructed.Theory constructionproperly nvolves not a

rigid segmentationof public and private spaces

of value, but a process of



13/26

Macedo

POLITICS

OF JUSTIFICATION

291

negotiationbetween shared

public

values and each

person's

set of

compre-

hensive and personal

values. None of us can

entirely

leave behind

the

baggage

of

our personalconvictions

when

thinking

about

political

morality.

At

each stage of the

argument,

we

would seek

principles

hatwe can live

with

in

our public and broader

personal

capacities,

as

beings

at

once

public

and

private.

And here

again, despite his

attempt

o

limit the

space

of

political values,

Rawls

reluctantlyadmitsthat a defenderof liberalismcannot avoid

steering

into

the shoals of religious

controversy

and other matters

of

deep

disagree-

ment and

cannot,crucially,avoid

engaging

and

publicly relyingupon

impor-

tant

featuresof a

comprehensive

et of

moral

values:

in

affirminga political

conception of justice we

may

eventually

have

to

assert

at least

certain

aspects

of our own

comprehensive

by

no means

necessarily

fully comprehen-

sive) religious

or

philosophical

doctrine.This

happens

whenever someone

insists,

for

example,

that

certain

questions

are

so

fundamental hat to

ensure their

being rightly

settled

ustifies

civil strife . . .

[T]hesalvation

of

a whole

people, may

be said to

depend

on

it.

At

this

point

we have no

alternative ut

to

deny

this,

and

to

assert

he

kind of

thing

we had hopedto avoid.55

The

participants

n

theory

constructionhave

recourse o their

comprehensive

views as they

go along.

And so, for example,

liberals

must deny

that the

concern for

salvation

requires

anything

ncompatible

with

equal

liberty

of

conscience. 56

Public

justification s a

process of constructive

negotiation n which

the

moves are

partly

determined

by what we tegard

as reasonable

assertionsand

compromises rom within our comprehensiveview, and not only from a

public perspective.

We

do

not

put

off

comparing he

political construction

with our

personalview until

the construction s

complete.

We do not

really

keep personal

and public spaces of

value

separate.Each of us

carries our

comprehensivemoralviews with

us

in

politics,drawingon

the

resources hey

provide, and

displaying

these resourcesto

others. Our

deepest convictions

and

commitmentsare at risk in

political

controversies,and they are

shaped

by

the

confrontation

with

both

political norms

and the deep

convictions of

otherpeople. Enoughmustbe said to adjudicateat least the most serious

conflicts between

sharedpolitical

principlesand

widely held

comprehensive

views.

The political

construction

nevitably

occupies much of the same

space as

people's personal

comprehensive

values. Political

theory

cannot, hen, avoid

advancing

claims

sufficient to tame

or override

the illiberal

componentsof

comprehensivepersonal

value

schemes. The success of

liberal

public justi-



14/26

292

POLITICALTHEORY

MAY

1990

fication does not

require

he

common

embrace

of one

comprehensivemoral

doctrine,butneitherdoes it allowtheseparation f publicandprivatespaces

of

value.

JUSTIFICATION

ERSUS

LOYAL

Y?

There could be

a

substantiveand

very political reason

for

wanting

to

segment

the

process

of

justification

n

the

way

that

Rawls,

at times at

least,

suggests.

The

stability

of a liberal

regime requires

hat the

personal

moral

and

religious

views

of

many people

will

(when

illiberal)

be mended

to

support

the liberal settlement.

Ideally,

this transition

will

take

place

via

candid, open

public arguments.This

is

important

n

part

because

the

transi-

tional

stage does not break

sharply

with normal

practice:

Public

ustification

is,

as

I

have argued, he

way liberalsshould live.

Public

justification s not

the only means of

getting

people to be liberals.

Some people will become liberalwithoutparticipatingn or being directly

influenced

by anythinglike a

public

argument.

Indeed, one

might

even

suppose

that

some

people

are

more

likely

to be liberals

f

they

are not

pro-

voked to

reflection

by

a

public moral

argument.There

might,

n

other

words,

be a

trade-offbetween

candid

public

argument nd liberalsocialization.

Many

people's

comprehensive

moral

views are, Rawls

asserts, rather

loosely formulatedand

only

partially

hought hrough.57

ome who

go along

with

liberalismonly as a

modus

vivendior

who might oppose it

altogether

will often fail to be fully conscious of the relationbetween liberalpolitical

principles

and their

broader personal

values.

As a

consequence, liberal

principles

are

more

likely

to win

an

initialallegiance

that is

independentof our

comprehensive

views

and prior to conflict

with them.

Thus when conflicts do

arise, the

political

conception has a better

chance of

sustaining tself and

shapingthose views to

accord

with

its

requirements.We do not

say, of

course, thatthe stronger

he initial

allegiance

the

better;but it

is

desirable,

politically speaking,that

it be strong

enough to make an

overlapping onsensus

stable.58

People

may go

along without

understanding

nd

eventuallydevelop liberal

convictions

out

of

habitrather han

from

anything ike a reasoned

argument:

many

if

not

most

citizens come to affirm

their

common politicalconception

without

seeing any

particularonnection,

one way or

the other,

between t and heirother

views.59



15/26

Macedo

POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION

293

Unconscious

socialization,

the

result of living in an open,

pluralistic

environment,

can contribute o

a liberal settlement

(admittedly,

a

nonideal

settlement).' As a practicalmatter, ne mightpinone's hopesonunreflective

acceptance,especially

if

one were disposed

to see

self-criticalreflectionand

open justification as politically disruptive

and largely beside the point

of

liberalpolitics. And

Rawls, in his reticentmoments,

sometimesseems to

be

deploying

an

exoteric

ersion of liberalism,one

thatsacrifices full

disclo-

sure to avoid confrontation nd contention

and smooth

the

way

to

a

liberal

settlement.6'

Widespread,unreflective heory acceptance

might be jeopardizedby

the

open and candiddefense

of liberalismas a regime.

Sacrificingphilosophical

candor and

open argument

o smooth the transition o

liberal

peace might

well be justified if there

really is a tensionbetween

candorand allegiance,

and the need

for

allegiance

to liberalismreally is more urgent

han the

need

for full

disclosure

and

open publicjustification.

Under

some

circumstances,

in other words, public

justificationmay be a luxury,and promoting iberal

false

consciousness

a moral

mperative.

Mustliberals,to generateallegiance,exercise caution

n

spelling

out

and

defending

the full

implications

of liberalism?Should philosophical types

keep theirbig mouths

shut?

LIBERAL

USTIFICATION: UBLIC

AND CANDID

Compromising

n the full

disclosure

of what liberalism tands

or entails

high costs. First of all, while public justificationis a form of respect for

persons, failing

to be

candid is

a

form

of

disrespect.

The

search for widely

accessible

reasons is motivatedby a desire

to

respect

the limits of reason-

ableness of common citizens. The embraceof

liberal false consciousness

is

moved not

by respect

but by fear of conflict and despairat the incapacity or

reasonableness.

Many practicalproblems

cannot be settled without confronting

he

deep

and

divisive

implications

of

a liberal public morality.

Constitutional ases

involvingthe FirstAmendment's ree exercise of religion clause is (depend-

ing

on

how you

look at it) a minefield or a gold mine of hard and deeply

revealingquestionsat

the tense interfaceof religion and politics.62Even so,

one could

try

to

paper

over and avoid

problemsby paying lip

service to

the

public/private

istinctionand a

simplistic

dea

of liberal

neutrality,deas that

have

a

certainamount

of

currencyandthatdo, even

when sincerelydeployed,

obfuscatewhat

is at stake

in

practicalpolitical

issues.63



16/26

294

POLMCAL THEORY

MAY

1990

Thereare otherbenefitsof

public ustification

hat

a lack

of

candor

would

threaten:Althougha publicconceptionof justification,by avoidingoverly

complex

and esoteric

arguments

osters

trust,any

lack of

candor,

should

it

become

publicly

known,

would undermine hat rust.And

although

avoiding

problems

might seem

justified as a

temporary

measure,

critical reflection

might be hard

o

revive,

especially

under

conditions

of real

popular

consen-

sus, and after

philosophical

and

popular

culture

have

diverged.

Besides the

costs

of

theoretical

reticence,

there are

positive

benefits

of

stirringup

a little conflict.

My

sense is that

Mill

was

right

in

thinking

that

someintemalopposition o a society'spoliticalmorality s a goodthing.(As

Yogi

Berra put

it;

If

the world

were

perfect,

it

wouldn't

be. )

Liberals

n

particular re

apt

to

forget

what it

is

they

stand

for. Liberal heorists end

to

systematically

minimizewhat

liberalism

ntails

(as

we have

seen).

One

must

be

troubled

by

the

slow and

limp response

of Western

ntellectuals

to the

Ayatollah'scall for

Salman

Rushdie's

death.

Confronting

anatics

and

grap-

pling

with divisiveness

remindsus of

what we

stand

for

as

liberals,

and

that

we

live

in

a

world

in

which liberal

values are

neither

uncontroversial

nor

foregoneconclusions.

Timidity and

a too

ready

willingness

to

compromise

can be as

danger-

ous as

intransigence

and

dogmatism.

It is

not

obvious

to me that

divisive-

ness is

now a

greater

dangerthan

timidity.

Draining

iberalism

of its self-

consciousnessand

partisanship

elps

cultivatean

allegiancethat s

blind

and

bland.

We

should

pick our

fights

carefully

but

preserve

our

ability to

recognize

and

fight the

good

fight.

As

things

stand,

Americans

are

not

especially

reflective

about

what

our

regime

stands or. A

certain

boldness in

thedefense of liberalismmaynowbe a publicservice.

Of

course,

domestic

peace and

tranquility

nd the

many

political

goods

that

have

nothing o do with

being

self-critical,

reason-giving

iberal

citizens

all

might counsel in

favor

of

papering

over divisive

questions.

And let

me

add

one

additional

onsideration

n

favor

of

reticence:

Liberalism s an

export

commodity

andnot

only

a

good for

domestic

consumption.64

hereare

places

in

the

world

where liberal

values are

decidedly

on

the

defensive. To

encour-

age

the

exportof

liberalism,

we

mightwant

to

keep

the price

downby

playing

along withthosewho wouldminimizewhat it standsfor.

My

own

disposition

would

be to adopt

the

public

conceptionof

justifica-

tion

and to

deploy

it

candidly.

We should

seek,

in other

words,

justifications

that

are

not

only

reasonable

but

that

can be

widely

seen to

be

reasonable.

Once

justification

has

gone

public,

a

good

deal has

been

conceded

to

pluralism

and

the

burdens

of

reason.

We should

be

extremely

reluctant o

go

further

and

avoid

articulating

what

appearto be

inescapablebut

possibly



17/26


295

divisive implications

of

liberalism.65

o do so would

be to strikeat the

heart

of

the

liberal

aspiration

o

public

justificationby driving

a

wedge

between

critical reflectionand political practice.

FOR

A

PRINCIPLEDLIBERALMODERATION

Lest my defense

of

open ustifications

openly arrived

at

should

appear

naive, let me introduce

a

final

consideration.Public justification

accepts,

even

invites, open

moral

disagreement

on a wide

range

of

political

contro-

versies. And yet we know thatbecause

even the most conscientiousarguers

often start

from

markedlydifferent

positions, consensus

can

be

difficult

to

achieve.

On

certain

especially

difficult ssues,

liberal

public ustification

has

room for a kind of moderation.

The aim of liberalpublic ustification

s to

respectdiversity

while

forging

a

framework

f common moral

principles

hatall

can

understand,

ccept,

and

openly

affirmbeforeone another.The aim is

a

transparent, emystified

ocial

order,one capable,as Waldronputs it, ofexplaining tself atthe tribunalof

each

person'sunderstanding.

nd so, Rawls'spoliticalconception

of

justice

aims at a

publicly recognized

point of

view

from which all citizens

can

examine before

one

anotherwhether

or not

their

political

and social

institu-

tions

are ust. 66 chieving

a

commonmoral ramework

llows us to express

our common reasonableness

publicly;

it allows

us,

in

effect,

to

mutually

recognize

one another

as equally

reasonablemoralbeings.

The only way that we can achieve a public moral framework

while

accepting the deep and permanent act of diversityis by puttingaside not

only the personal nterestsandreligiousbeliefs, but also the manyphilosoph-

ical andmoral

convictions that

reasonable ellow citizens

will

disagree

with.

Participantsmust share

an

overriding

desire to affirmprinciples hat

are not

simplyjustified (or true)

n

any sense,

but ratherare capableof being

widely

seen to

be justified (or reasonable).The goal of a public moralframework

s

a noble

one,

but

just

how

adamantly

hould we pursue t?

We

do not, Rawls insists, strike

balancesamongthe differentcomprehen-

sive moraldoctrines religiousand philosophical) hatexist in society:To do

so would be to abandon he

hope

of appearing efore one anotheras free and

equal,

or

fully

autonomous,

itizens.67

We

must abstract

away

from

or

leave

behind

grounds

hatwe

cannotshare

with reasonable ellow citizens.

We seek

a common

ground

of

publicly

reasonable consensus; we do not accept,

moderate,

and

balance enduringand ineliminabledifferences of belief

and

perspective.



18/26

296

POLITICAL

THEORY MAY

1990

It is

unrealistic to

hope

for

perfect

convergence

on

a

common

moral

standpoint:

Thatwould

require

a

very

strong

and

sustaineddesire

for

public

moral

agreement.

Given the

range

of

nonpolitical

nterests hat

people

quite

properly

have

in

a

liberal

society,

it

would be hard o

imagine

thatthe

desire

for

public

moralconsensus

could

be

sufficiently

strong

or

sustained

o

make

convergence a

realistic

possibility.

The

kind of common moral

standpoint

represented

y the veil of

ignorance

and the

original

position

may

be

ideals

to

be

aspired

or,

but,

practically

peaking,

we cannot

hope

really

to

converge

on

a

common

understanding

f

basic

political

principles.68

eople

will

be

moved to

peek, as it

were, out

frombehind theveil of ignorancenotonly by

self-interest

or

impatience,

but

also

by

the

variety

of moral

beliefs

excluded

by the drive for

principles

hat

all

reasonable

people

can

accept.

Moderation

s

a virtue that

comes to the

fore when

we

acknowledge

that

afterpublic

reasonableness

as done

its work

(or

as muchwork as

reasonable

people

are

prepared

o

allow it

to

do), our

perspectives

will

inevitably

remain

plural

and

divergent.

Moderation

llows us to

accept

the

fact thata

large

and

diverse

group

of

reasonable

people can never

really

stand within

the

same

moral framework.69Even the best possible liberal settlement will have

something

of

the

character f

a

composite of

irreduciblydissimilar

parts.

It

would

be

nice

to think

that all of

us

-rich and

poor;

libertarian

nd

socialist;

Catholic,

Jew,

Amish,

and

Jehovah's

Witness

could

stand

before

one

another

imply

in

our

moral

capacity.

And,

indeed,

we

should

aspire

to

do

so.

But

at the end

of

the

political

day

we

must

simply

accept

the

fact

of

reasonable

disagreement

nda

reasonable

divergenceof

moral

perspective.70

At

that

point,

the most

reasonable

hing

may well

be to

moderate

our

claims

mutually n the face of thereasonableclaims of others,to balance,andsplit

at

least

some of

our

differences.

Respect

s

called

for

in

the

face of

persons

whom

we

regard

as

reasonable.

Even when

we

cannot

really

respect

a

particular

iew

(antisemitism,

acism,

and other

views

based on

sheer

prejudice),

we

may still

tolerate its

expres-

sion,

partly

because

it

is

being

expressed

by a

person:We

wish

to

respect

hat

person

as a

being

capable

of

reasonand

we

wish to

respect

peech

(the

vehicle

of

reason)

as

such.

And

so we

tolerate

the

antisemiteby

allowing him

to

expresshisviews, but we concede no ground o him,we do notcompromise

with

him,

we do

not

approach

him

with

moderation.

Moderation

oes

beyond

toleration.

Thereare,

or

example,

many

reason-

able

arguments

on

both

sides

of the

abortion

debate.

The

abortion

question

is

so

vexing,

in a

sense,

precisely

because there

are

weighty

reasonson

both

sides, and it

is

easy to

see

how

reasonable

people

can

come

down

on

either

side.

On

policy

issues

such as

abortion,

which

seems, as

things

stand, o

come



19/26


297

down to a fairly close

call between two

well-reasonedsets of

arguments,

he

best

thing

for reasonable

people

to do

might

be to

acknowledge

he

difficulty

of the argumentand the burdensof reason,to respecttheiropponentsandto

compromise

with

them,

to find some

middle

ground

hat

gives

something

to

each side while the argument

oes forward.7'

he

right

kindof middle

ground

on

abortionwould

acknowledge

both the

great weight

due to the

judgment

of the motherandthe

fact that his choice concerns

he

continuance f another

life. It would, perhaps,honor a

woman's choice

up

to

a

certain

point

in

the

pregnancy and also countenancea variety of

measures that would

not

be

permittedwere abortion

imply

a

matter

of an individual's

right

to choose:

measures o ensure at least that the choice is reflectiveand informed.72

Moderation s a liberal virtuejustified by the difficulty

of

occupying

a

common

moralstandpoint,

r of exercising

ourcommon

capacity

or reason-

ableness

in

the

same

way. Taking

moderation

seriously

would lead

us to

qualify

Dworkin's nsistence hat he party

with the

strongest

ase on balance

(no matter how close a call)

has a right to win. The best solution may

sometimes

be

to give

something

o

each side. Moderation

n

the face of

very

strongcompeting

cases

offers a

way

of

honoring

not

simply

the best case but

also the case that is

very strong.

There

is an

argument

o be

developed

here

for

judicial prudence

and statesmanship,not (I hope) for pragmatismor a

blanket

deferenceto legislatures.73

To acceptmoderation s to admit hata mutually ransparent

oliticalorder

is unrealistic.Explicitly embracing

he value of moderation

means that we

representcitizens

in

public justification

with some measureof

their differ-

ences and

disagreements some measureof partialityof perspective)

ntact.

It is a way of coming directly to gripswith the residual and realistically

ineliminablemoraldiversity hat

on my analysis) eads to Rawls's reticence.

I

am not, I should emphasize, arguing that we should

celebrate our

inability o abstract way from

some of our differences;we should

acknowl-

edge

but

not idealize our incapacity o achieve a common moral

perspective.

We should, rather, accept this

limitation as an infirmity of

the human

condition and adoptan attitude hat allows us to deal with it constructively.

CONCLUSION

Even

where citizens share a desire to establish and support

political

institutions that can be commonly

affirmed as reasonable, fully public

justificationson controversial

ssues (ones that all reasonablepeople really

do

accept)

will

often be

impossible

o come by

-

we mustreconcileourselves



20/26

298

POLITICAL

THEORY MAY

1990

to that.

Although it

may

fail

to

achieve a

construction

hat

all

reasonable

people can

agree

upon, public

reflection can

help

us narrowthe

gaps and

negotiate

thetensions

among

public and personal

values.74

Because it

respects

reasonable

persons

and

the limits of

reason

as

located

in

persons,

public

justification s

distinctly

liberal

and

democratic,

ubstan-

tive

and

partisan.Where

iberals

see

respect

or free and

equal

persons,

some

religious

people

aregoing

to see

secularhumanism

nd the

hegemony

of

a

way of

thinking hat

owes a lot to

science and

the

enlightenment

but

that

is

deeply at

odds with

some

forms of

religion.75This cannot be

avoided.

Liberalsoffer

true

believers, like

everyone else,

a

sphere

of

privacy

and

the

opportunity

o

continue

arguing.The liberal

must,

in

the

end,

defend

his

partisanship

nd

not

evade it.

If

liberalism s

justified,

that must

be,

in

part

at

least,

because of the

superiorityof

justificationsbased on

widely accept-

able

reasons

and

public

arguments, ndbecause reasonable

people

really

are

worthy of liberal

respect.

The

public conception

of

justification

may seem to embrace he

concerns

of

those

postmodernist

hilosophers

who

deny

the

availability

of

objective

standards f truth, tandardswhose justificationdoes notdependon thesocial

practices of

particular

ocieties.76But

while

acknowledging the practical

limits

of

reason,

public

justification does

not

embrace

conventionalismor

localism. Reason

establishes he

contoursand

substanceof

moderation: t is

reasonable o

want to

live

in

accordancenot only

with

reasonableprinciples

but also

with

principles that all

can

see to be

reasonable.

We have

good

reasons for

tempering

our

expectations

about the

public

efficacy of

reason,

not for

abandoning ur

aspiration

o

govern

ourselves

reasonably.

Public justification is a core liberal goal, one that informs practical

aspirations nd

political

nstitutions like

judicial

review) that

iberalscan

be

proud

of.

But public

justification

s not our

only

political

goal. We

want the

freedom

to live

our own

lives,

and so a

release

from

political

argument.

We

want

peace, and

more

thanthat,

we

want

comity or

concord.

Comity

is a

political good

that

is not

quite the same as

moral

consensus,

as

Richard

Hofstadter

describes:

Comityexists in societyto thedegreethatthoseenlisted n its contendingnterestshave

a

basic

minimal

regard

for

each

other....

The basic

humanityof

the opposition

is not

forgotten;

ivility is not

abandoned;he

sense thata

community ife must

be

carriedon

after

the

acerbic ssues of

the

moment

havebeen

fought

over andwon is

seldom

far out

77

of

mind....

And

in the

first

Federalist,

Publius

urged

moderation

as a

means to

comity

even

more

forcefully:



21/26

Macedo POLITICSOF

JUSTIFICATION 299

So numerous ndeed andso powerful

are

the

causes which serve

to

give

a

false bias to

judgment,thatwe, upon manyoccasions, see wise and good men on the

wrong

as well

as on therightside of questionsof the firstmagnitude o society.Thiscircumstance, f

duly

attended o, would furnisha lesson of moderation o those who

are ever so much

persuaded

f their

being

in

the right

n

any controversy.

Comity,

or

concord, requires

a

gift

for conciliation and a

willingness to

compromise.

There

may, of course, be

grounds or various forms of moderation for a

prudentmoderation, or example,

in the face of rancorous

disagreement nd

imminentviolence). We do well, however, to makeroom for a principled

moderationat the most basic

level, in our understanding f publicjustifica-

tion. To

do so

allows us to define

and defend a form of moderationwhose

justificationgrows out

of

the commitment

o reasonableness

tself, and so to

extend

moderationon

grounds

hat hold out the promise

of drawingpeople

into the

process of public reason.

Principledmoderationdrawssupport, hen,

from the

hope of an ever-more-reasonable olitical order.

NOTES

1. I will

refer to the

United

States as an

exampleof

a liberalsociety

because it is familiar

and in

manyways

liberal.

I

do not

mean

to identify iberalismwith

American

politics,

although

certain

nstitutions

specially

suited to

liberalreason

giving

are

well

developed

n

America.

For

a more extended

treatmentof liberalism n

general

and as

manifested

n

American

national

institutions, ee my

Liberal

VirtuesOxford:

Oxford

University

Press,1990).

2. JeremyWaldron, Theoretical oundations f Liberalism, hilosophical

Quarterly,

7

(1987

424 fpolitical theory volume 18 issue 2 1990 [doi 10.2307%2f191346] stephen macedo -- the politics...

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