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policy seemed to imply that the government emerging from the 2010 elec-tion would not be legitimate. At the same time, Assistant Secretary Campbellsaid in his October 21 testimony, we are skeptical that the elections will be

either free or fair. If in fact the election to be held on November 7 is not freeand fair, the U.S. government apparently will be forced to disengage on thegrounds that the new government of Burma is illegitimate.

A second ambiguous aspect was the view of the U.S. role relative to the roleof international organizations, regional organizations, and other countries.Toward the end of his October 21 testimony, Assistant Secretary Campbellsaid, We alone cannot promote change in Burma. . . . We need regionalstates support in pressing for political and economic reform. On balance,

however, the testimony can be read to suggest that the United States holdsthe key to Burmas future and that the proper vision of Burmas future isthe U.S. vision. This view contrasts with the position of Senator Webb, whohas pointed to Vietnam as an example of an alternative path to political andeconomic reform that has been accepted by the United States.

A third ambiguous aspect is what the U.S. government decides to callthis country. All of Burmas ASEAN partners and all of Burmas other Asianneighbors (notably China, India, and Japan) call the country Myanmar. Onlya small number of countries apart from the United States continue to call itBurma to show their support for democratic rule based on the outcome ofthe 1990 election. Continuing to call the country Burma has three disadvan-tages. It implies that regime change remains a goal of U.S. policy. It makesthe U.S. government look toothless because it has failed for so many yearsto persuade others to call the country Burma. And it implies that Myan-mars ASEAN partners and Asian neighbors are insufciently committed todemocracy and human rights because they have accepted the name adoptedby the military regime. As part of the policy of pragmatic engagement, a case

could be made for adopting Burma/Myanmar or Myanmar/Burma inofcial statements, as some other Western countries have done. 25

A fourth ambiguous aspect is the view that Burma represents a threat toU.S. national security. In the notice issued by the White House in May 2010extending U.S. sanctions for another year, President Obama determined thatthe Burmese governments actions and policies pose a continuing unusualand extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of theUnited States. 26 Making this nding is a statutory precondition to imposing

sanctions against Burma.27

To the rest of the world, however, this ndingseems far-fetched.


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Recommendations to the U.S. Government

The October 2009 workshop was designed to bring to Washington the per-

spectives of Asian and other non-American experts on the problem of Myan-mar, not to make recommendations to the U.S. government. Nevertheless,it is possible to extract a short set of recommendations from the papers pre-sented at the workshop and the related discussion. Readers should bear inmind that these are the recommendations of non-American experts whotend to view the problem of Myanmar primarily as a regional problem ratherthan a global problem.

The change in U.S. policy is welcome. It is also timely in light of the

political transition that is expected to follow the election in Myanmar to beheld on November 7, 2010.As the new U.S. policy of pragmatic engagement adapts to develop-

ments inside Myanmar, the U.S. government should keep in mind the com-plexities of the internal conict, including discrimination by stronger ethnicminority groups against weaker ones and latent communal tensions amongMuslim, Chinese, and other residents. It should view Myanmar as having apremodern society bearing vestiges of feudalism. It should understand thatthe social changes required to build strong foundations for democratic gov-ernance will occur slowly, over decades. It should understand the predatorynature of the military regime.

To be effective in advancing Americas fundamental interests inMyanmar, engagement by the United States will have to be comprehensive,encompassing all major elements of the society, and multidimensional. Itshould seek to bring people back into the peace equation.

In 2010 the military regime will not be in a position to engage mean-ingfully with the United States or any other foreign country or international

organization because it will be preoccupied with managing the election andlaunching the new government. Therefore it would be advisable for the U.S.government to monitor developments closely and not launch any initiatives.

During the past year, the United States has clearly demonstrated itsstrong interest in ASEAN. It could do much more to support ASEANsefforts to help Myanmar move toward ASEAN norms of good governanceand economic integration.

Human capital and institutional capacity will be the binding con-

straints on the ability of the new government to govern well. The U.S. gov-ernment, along with other friendly countries, should give the highest priority


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going forward to capacity-building programs and projects, especially forcivil servants.

As soon as politically feasible, the U.S. government should stop oppos-

ing technical assistance activities in Myanmar by international organizationsincluding the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the WorldBank Group, and the Asian Development Bank.

The U.S. government should assume that the next government ofMyanmar will not be in a position to commit to quid pro quos for any relax-ation of U.S. sanctions. The U.S. government should also assume that anyintensication of its sanctions will have no positive effect on the current gov-ernment of Myanmar or the next one.

A useful step in implementing pragmatic engagement could be to movetoward calling the country Myanmar instead of Burma, perhaps beginningwith Burma/Myanmar.

The U.S. government might do more to alleviate poverty and injus-tice in Myanmar by focusing on good governance instead of on free andfair elections. The policy of pragmatic engagement might be more successfulif it were more accepting of the development model followed by Indone-sia, China, and Vietnam, where economic liberalization preceded politicalliberalization.

Notes

1. The ten members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (Laos), Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singa-pore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

2. From the Preamble to the ASEAN Charter (www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf [May 2010]).

3. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Understanding Statelessness:Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities, NTS Alert , no. 1 (February 2010) (www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/alert/NTS-alert-feb-1001.html).

4. At the same time a law was passed that guaranteed freedom of religion. DavidI. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford UniversityPress, 2010), p. 59.

5. Ibid., pp. 9192.6. An important step along the way was the SPDCs announcement in August

2003 of a seven-step Roadmap to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy. The plan or-

dered that (1) the National Convention be reconvened; (2) the process necessary forthe emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system be implemented; (3)


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a new constitution be drafted based on the principles laid down by the National Con-vention; (4) the constitution be adopted through a national referendum; (5) free andfair elections for the legislative bodies be held; (6) the legislative bodies be convened;

and (7) a modern, developed, and democratic nation be built by the state leaders andthe government.7. Often called the Saffron Revolution, the monk-led popular protest was quick-

ly and brutally crushed by the SPDC and therefore does not seem to merit beingcalled a revolution.

8. The International Crisis Group published in May 2010 a superb analysis ofthe election laws: The Myanmar Elections, May 27, 2010 (www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/B105-the-myanmar-elections.aspx).

9. Zaw Oo and Win Min, Assessing Burmas Ceasere Accords, Policy Studies

39 (Southeast Asia) (Washington: East-West Center, 2007), p. 13.10. The granularity and complexity of the reconciliation problem today, at thelevel of one major ethnic minority, has been analyzed by Ashley South. He contrastsrecent developments in Karen communities inside Myanmar with those in the sub-stantial Karen groups in Thailand and beyond. Ashley South, Governance and Le-gitimacy in Karen State, in Ruling Myanmar in Transition, ed. Monique Skidmoreand Trevor Wilson (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010).

11. Confronting the Demons, Irrawaddy , October 17, 2009 (www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=17011).

12. Tin Maung Maung Than, State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Econo-my of Industrialization (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), pp. 29092.13. Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 dealt a major blow to roughly half of the delta rice

bowl. While recovery has been somewhat faster than expected, rice output remainsbelow potential, owing to infrastructure damage compounded by severe policy-related constraints.

14. Sean Turnell, Burmas Economy 2008: Current Situation and Prospects forReform, Burma Economic Watch, May 2008 (www.econ.mq.edu.au/Econ_docs/bew/BurmaEconomy2008.pdf), p. 15.

15. Global Witness, A Disharmonious Trade: China and the Continued Destructionof Burma Northern Frontier Forests (October 2009, London).16. A third factor was the remnants of the Kuomintang army that ed into north-

ern Myanmar as Mao Zedongs communist forces consolidated their control overChina following the defeat of Japan. These remnants supported themselves in largepart by becoming a global supplier of opium. Some were evacuated to Taiwan in the1950s, and in 1961 the Chinese army effectively eliminated the rest.

17. Andrew Selth writes that China has provided light weapons and ammunitionto Myanmar: Burmas Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, Conn.: East-

bridge, 2002), p. 168. Others have claimed that China has provided Myanmar withfacilities to manufacture light weapons.18. Few military analysts believe that the number of active Tatmadaw personnel

exceeds 400,000. Desertion seems to be a problem, and many units are known to be


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well under their formal strength. Total personnel at the end of 2009 may have beenbelow 350,000.

19. The current special rapporteur, since May 2008 and from Argentina, is Toms

Ojea Quintana.20. UN General Assembly Resolution 46-132 on the Situation in Myanmar,December 17, 1991 (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/582/20/IMG/NR058220.pdf?OpenElement).

21. The People Power Revolution in the Philippines in 1986 that deposed Presi-dent Fernando Marcos was an even closer example of the victory of democracy overauthoritarian rule.

22. Donald M. Seekins, Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an AuthoritarianRegime, Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (2005): 43752, 439.

23. Tripartite Core Group, Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (July 2008), p. 52.24. Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, February 18, 2009(www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119424.htm).

25. The U.S. Institute of Peace lists the country on its website as Myanmar/Burma.26. White House press release, May 14, 2010 (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

ofce/message-president-continuation-national-emergency-with-respect-burma).27. The requirement is contained in the Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1997.


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Problems with the Processof Reconciliation

Anyone familiar with Myanmar politics knows that the countrysthree main political forces, the military government, prodemocracy groupsrepresented by the National League for Democracy (NLD), and ethnicminority groups, desperately need to reconcile their differences and nda way to work together for the long-term political stability and economicdevelopment of the country. While ethnic problems have plagued the coun-try since independence in 1948, the political deadlock between the prodemo-cracy groups, especially the NLD, and the countrys ruling junta has existedsince 1988, when the NLD came into being. Although both the governmentand the NLD have noted the importance of political reconciliation, neitherhas initiated a meaningful dialogue with the other. Similarly, while the cease-re agreements between the government and most ethnic insurgent groupsremained intact, many vital issues, such as the use of ethnic languages asofcial languages in minority areas, remain unresolved.

Over the past seven years, the military government has declared repeat-

edly that political changes and national reconciliation would take place onlywithin the framework of its seven-point roadmap. In other words, the juntawould work only with political groups prepared to abide by its rules. In addi-tion, the junta also asked ethnic minority and other political groups to run inthe elections to be held in 2010 and demanded that ethnic ceasere groupsturn themselves into border guard forces under the control of the Tatmadaw.

Needless to say, this is not the kind of political reconciliation process thatprodemocracy and ethnic minority groups want to see. The ghting between

Kokang and government forces in August 2009 and the eighteen-monthextension of the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi earlier in the year show thatthe reconciliation process is still far from reality.


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34 Kyaw Yin Hlaing

In mid-2009 Aung San Suu Kyi offered to work on lifting Western eco-nomic sanctions on the country. Several meetings between Suu Kyi and arepresentative of the government then took place. Regardless of this seem-

ing thaw in relations between the two parties, however, actual reconcilia-tion continued to be elusive. Suu Kyi made it clear that she wanted to workon the lifting of sanctions mainly because sanctions were seriously affect-ing the countrys poor people, not because she wanted to reconcile with thegovernment.

When the election laws issued by the government in March 2010 requiredthe NLD to expel Aung San Suu Kyi before it could reregister with the Elec-tion Commission, the NLD sought to revise the laws by ling a suit against

the junta. When the Supreme Court rejected this legal challenge, the NLDleadership decided to boycott the elections. As it had not reregistered withthe Election Commission by the deadline of May 6, the NLD lost its status asa legal political party. If the election result turns out as the military govern-ment intends, the new government will merely be old wine in a new bottle.Although the new military-dominated government might consider releasingpolitical prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, it is unlikely the new gov-ernment will nd it necessary to reach any political settlement with the NLD.In any event, Suu Kyis current detention order will expire in November2010, and there will be little time between the election and the expiration ofher detention order.

This chapter examines why national reconciliation between the threemain political forces has eluded the country. Regardless of their call for anational reconciliation process, none of the three has seriously worked onthe process itself. All have talked more about what they want than about rec-onciling their differences. Each of the three forces, instead of making com-promises and seeking mutually acceptable solutions, wants to be a winner

in the political game. Thus it seems unlikely that national reconciliation willoccur in the near future. Naturally, in such a situation, the military govern-ment holds de facto power and has more leverage and resources than theother two forces.

Problems between the Government and the NLD

Myanmar has been ruled by military governments since March 1962, when

the Revolutionary Council led by General Ne Win replaced the British-styleparliamentary systemwhich came with independence from the British in1948with a military-dominated one-party system. This party, known as


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Problems with the Process of Reconciliation 35

the Burma Socialist Program Party, ruled the country until 1988, when it wasparalyzed by the student-led nationwide social protest commonly known asthe four eights (August 8, 19888-8-88) democracy uprising. When the

leaders of the movement called for the formation of an interim government,the leaders of the Burma Socialist Program Party government allowed thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces to take control of the country. Themilitary then formed a governing body known as the State Law and OrderRestoration Council (SLORC).

As soon as it took control, SLORC announced that it would hold multi-party elections and asked the public to form parties if they wished to engagein political activities. Owing to a lack of mutual trust, the parties formed by

political activists and the junta were at loggerheads with one another overthe rules governing the activities of political parties and the conduct of theelection. The junta showed little mercy to its challengers. Because it was thebiggest party critical of the military government, the NLD and its membersreceived the harshest treatment from the junta. The NLD leader, Aung SanSuu Kyi, was placed under house arrest for the rst time in August 1989.

The Second House Arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi

The situation was aggravated by the NLDs landslide victory in the May 1990elections. Immediately afterward, the SLORC secretary Major General KhinNyunt reiterated the armys preelection announcement at a press conferencethat the winning party of the election would convene a national conven-tion to draw up a constitution, the constitution would have to be ratied ina referendum, and a second election would have to be held to form a newgovernment. The NLDs caretaker leadership initially accepted these terms. 1 However, many NLD members from local areas were disgruntled with thisdecision, as they wanted the transfer of power to take place immediately. 2

Thus the NLD was quickly split by an internal disagreement. The moreradical proponents attempted to form an alternative parliament but werearrested before they could put their plan into action.

The junta refused to transfer power to the NLD. Many military leadersreportedly thought they could do a better job than an NLD-led governmentof keeping the country together. 3 Some military leaders appeared worriedthat an NLD-led government would try to restructure the Tatmadaw in away contrary to their interests. 4 For example, some appear to have concluded

that an NLD-led government might force senior military ofcers to retire orpromote them to unimportant positions. 5 In short, they believed that trans-ferring power to the NLD would create a threat to personal, institutional,


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and national interests. They talked more about reconsolidation than recon-ciliation, reecting a preference for their own entrenchment. By the end of1990 the military government appeared determined to remain in power for a

long time and did not plan to reconcile with the NLD in the way oppositionleaders wanted it to do.

Prodemocracy groups in Myanmar and democracy advocates in theinternational community, especially in the United States and the EuropeanUnion, pressured the junta to honor the results of the election. The mili-tary government resisted all domestic and international pressures, announc-ing that it would seek to establish a discipline-ourishing democracy in thecountry. Several opposition groups called for the junta to have a genuine

dialogue with the NLD and ethnic minorities. They argued that only througha meaningful tripartite dialogue would the countrys political problems beresolved. The NLD repeatedly called for the government to honor the 1990election results.

While ignoring the NLDs request, the junta made ceasere agreementswith various ethnic insurgent groups. 6 The junta announced that it wouldhold a national convention to discuss political issues with all groups in thecountry and adopt guiding principles for a new constitution. Although the junta opened the National Convention in 1993, it artfully controlled theconvention to produce a constitution that would secure for the military astrategic role in Myanmar politics indenitely. 7 Outnumbered by delegateshandpicked by the military government, representatives of the oppositionparties found most of their proposals rejected. Representatives of ceaseregroups and other ethnic minorities also found it almost impossible to gettheir demands accepted by the junta. 8 Moreover, military leaders publiclyrefused to spell out the exact duration of the convention. Opposition groupsrealized that the junta would do everything within its means to prolong the

drafting of the constitution and enhance its own power relative to othergroups in the process.

When the junta released Aung San Suu Kyi in 1995 after more than ve years of house arrest, many hoped that the junta and Suu Kyi would recon-cile their differences and seek a way to work together. To their dismay, theydiscovered that the junta had not released Suu Kyi to reconcile with her.Rather, the positive results of the economic reforms undertaken in the early1990s had allowed the military leaders to be more condent of their position

and less worried about the opposition. The junta released Aung San SuuKyi from house arrest mainly because it believed that by doing so it couldbetter control the opposition movement. Aung San Suu Kyi tried to reach


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out to the junta by making conciliatory comments about the governmentand requesting military leaders to have a dialogue with her party but failedto convince the military that it was in their interest to do so. Many military

leaders at that time appeared to believe that Aung San Suu Kyi and otherNLD leaders mainly wanted to talk about transferring power, not sharingpower. The military was determined to remain in power and was not pre-pared to have such a dialogue. It was not surprising, therefore, that the mili-tary junta simply ignored her requests.

When the government dismissed the NLDs demand to make the NationalConvention more democratic and transparent, the NLD decided to boycottthe convention. 9 Three years later, in 1998, in response to the juntas latest

crackdown on her deant party, Aung San Suu Kyi stated that economicsanctions are good and necessary for the rapid democratization of Myan-mar. 10 As a result she was placed under house arrest again.

The Third House Arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi

Following news of a secret meeting between senior government ofcials andAung San Suu Kyi under United Nations mediation, the junta released SuuKyi from her second house arrest in May 2002. Despite this seemingly posi-tive development, the national reconciliation dialogue between the junta andthe NLD stalled within a few months. Aung San Suu Kyi was again taken intoprotective custody, together with a large number of NLD members, in thewake of a clash in late May 2003 between supporters of the government andNLD members in Depayin, a small town in central Myanmar. 11 The juntahad taken Aung San Suu Kyi into custody hoping she would help them withtheir nation-building activities. Senior General Than Shwe, the junta chair,apparently treated her like a niece being addressed by her uncle during threeshort meetings. They reportedly never talked about political issues. 12 Than

Shwe did not appear to have a plan for dialogue with the NLD. A local ana-lyst who is close to many senior government ofcials noted that Than Shwewould not have placed her under house arrest again if he had ever thoughtabout having a true dialogue with her organization. 13

In 2004 the junta revived the National Convention, which had been inrecess since 1996, in the context of its newly unveiled seven-step roadmapto democracy. 14 The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) invitedNLD leaders to drop their boycott and rejoin the convention. The NLD at

rst agreed but then changed its mind and said it would take part only if thegenerals rst released from custody all of its detained leaders. 15 The NLD alsoissued a series of statements calling for the government to release all political


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prisoners and to convene the parliament that had been formed by the 1990elections.16 The government publicly rejected these proposals, and the con-vention proceeded without the NLDs participation.

On September 3, 2007, the ruling junta concluded the convention afteradopting detailed principles for the new constitution that would not onlyguarantee the militarys continued role in the countrys politics but also makethe military the most powerful and resource-rich institution in the country.For instance, one of the principles required that the president of the countrybe a person with experience in military affairs. Although most oppositiongroups rejected the principles, the junta refused to revise them and expressedits determination to implement the remaining steps in the roadmap.

However, in the wake of the forceful crackdown on the monk-led protestsin some major cities in September 2007, the government announced thatSenior General Than Shwe would meet Aung San Suu Kyi if the latter stoppedconfronting the government and stopped calling on the international com-munity to impose economic sanctions. 17 The junta even appointed a cabi-net minister to liaise with Aung San Suu Kyi directly. Since then, severalmeetings between Aung San Suu Kyi and representatives of the junta havetaken place, and she has been allowed to meet with certain party members.At the same time, the government has emphasized that it would work withopposition groups only so long as they adhered to its rules. Aung San SuuKyi seemed unwilling to abide by the governments parameters. However, aleading member of the NLD noted privately that our problem is that noneof us, including Ma Suu, knew how to change the minds of the generals. 18

On October 18, 2007, the junta formed a committee to draft the new con-stitution based on the principles adopted by the National Convention. InFebruary 2008 the junta announced that it would hold a referendum for thenew constitution on May 10, 2008, and that new elections would be held in

2010. While the junta was preparing for the referendum, some senior mili-tary ofcers publicly conrmed that Aung San Suu Kyi would not be allowedto run in the 2010 elections. 19

The referendum for the new constitution was held on May 10 in mosttownships in the country and on May 24 in the twenty-four townships thatwere seriously damaged by Cyclone Nargis at the beginning of the month.On May 25 the government announced that the new constitution had beenapproved by 92.4 percent of the voters. By early 2009 many foreign coun-

tries, including some European Union countries, had concluded that thegovernment could not be stopped from implementing its roadmap. Whilethe NLD did not seem to know how to resolve the political impasse, the


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junta seemed prepared to proceed without Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.Editorials in government newspapers at this time indicated that the juntahad written off a role for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in the political

transition. Indeed, the government was apparently looking for a good excuseto extend her house arrest after its scheduled expiration at the end of May.

That excuse emerged when the American John Yettaw swam across InyaLake and entered her residence. Aung San Suu Kyi and her two assistantswere charged with violating the terms of her house arrest, and she was givena three-year jail sentence on August 11, 2009. By Senior General Than Shwesorder, the sentence was immediately commuted to eighteen months of housearrest. The subsequent appeal process could take one to two years. 20 Thus

Aung San Suu Kyi will remain under detention until after the elections in2010 because the junta believes she would jeopardize their plan to institutetheir discipline-ourishing democracy. 21

In late September 2009, in a letter sent to Than Shwe, Aung San Suu Kyioffered to work for the lifting of sanctions. She also asked for permission tomeet with European and U.S. envoys to understand the nature of sanctions.Soon after the letter was sent to Naypyidaw, Minister Aung Kyi met withAung San Suu Kyi. Although the issues discussed in the meeting were notmade public, that Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed to meet with EuropeanUnion and U.S. envoys indicated that there might be a thaw in relationsbetween the government and The Lady, as she is popularly referred to inthe country.

In November 2009 the junta allowed visiting U.S. assistant secretary ofstate Kurt Campbell to meet Aung San Suu Kyi at the government guest-house. In addition, at the request of Assistant Secretary Campbell, the gov-ernment allowed the NLDs Central Executive Committee members to meetwith Aung San Suu Kyi. However, Suu Kyi cancelled the meeting when the

government refused to allow fellow detainee and NLD vice chair U Tin Ooto attend it. 22 But in December 2009 Aung San Suu Kyi decided to meet withthree ailing senior NLD colleagues whom the government had allowed her tosee. At the same time, the government gave no indication that it would allowSuu Kyi to play a role in the government to be formed after the elections in2010. The junta also allowed Assistant Secretary Campbell to meet Aung SanSuu Kyi during a second visit in May 2010, after the NLD had been deregis-tered, but the visit left the impression that the positions of the junta and the

NLD were hardening rather than softening. In short, it is clear that the kindof political dialogue NLD leaders want to have with the generals is not partof the agenda of the military junta.


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Reasons for the Absence of a Dialogue

Why has there been no productive dialogue between the junta and the

National League for Democracy? Myanmar watchers have postulated threedifferent answers: First, Ne Wins control of the junta from behind thescenes made such a dialogue impossible. Second, the military was hostile tothe NLD because the latter had defeated the military-backed National UnityParty in the 1990 election. Third, antireform hard-line ofcers prevailedover proreform soft-line ofcers in the struggle for power within the govern-ment. A thorough examination of political developments in Myanmar in thelast two decades shows the implausibility of these three answers. Scholars

and journalists were attracted to the rst answer mainly because Ne Winplayed a crucial role in the emergence of the SLORC. Although Ne Win didwield much inuence over some leading members of the junta until the mid-1990s, there is no direct or indirect evidence of his being actively involvedin domestic politics afterward. 23 In 2002 the government arrested Ne Winsson-in-law and grandchildren on the charge of high treason. Ne Win andone of his daughters who lived with him were also placed under house arrest.The subsequent conviction of his son-in-law and grandchildren suggeststhat Ne Win was not as powerful as he was often perceived to be. When hedied in December 2002 (at the age of around ninety-one) the governmentallowed only a small number of close family members to attend the funeralceremony. If anything, this suggests that the junta was more interested inlooking after its own interests than appeasing its former commander.

With regard to the second explanation, many observers assumed that theNational Unity Party was backed by the SLORC because Ne Win played a rolein its creation and that it was essentially the Burma Socialist Program Partywith a new name. Although it is true that the junta would have preferred

the National Unity Party to the NLD, it is wrong to simply label the partyas the juntas proxy. Nowhere in the country did the military help NationalUnity Party candidates win the elections. 24 Because more than ninety politi-cal parties contested the elections, the junta probably thought that no partywould win a clear majority. Perhaps the military leaders expected that withthe winning seats spread over the disparate political parties, the oppositionwould not be able to form a government and might instead look to the juntato do so.

Journalists and other Myanmar watchers favored the third answer. Whenthe junta disbanded the entire military intelligence agency in 2004, it detainedmany senior intelligence ofcers, including its chief, Khin Nyunt. Because


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Khin Nyunt was more exible than other senior military ofcers, many for-eign diplomats and journalists considered him to be a liberal, proreformofcer. On Khin Nyunts instructions, his close associates informed foreign

diplomats privately that they understood the need for political reforms andwere willing to do whatever they could to implement them. In fact, however,Khin Nyunt was not dismissed for being liberal. The military council decidedto dismiss Khin Nyunt and the entire intelligence corps mainly because ofthe failure of certain intelligence ofcers to follow Khin Nyunts lead andexercise power discreetly in their individual areas of responsibility. Theseofcers, especially ones in the eld, conducted themselves inappropriatelyand became very unpopular. Moreover, the level of corruption among the

intelligence corps was signicant, especially among members assigned toborder areas.Abuse of power by local intelligence ofcers increased in the early years

of the new millennium. The commanders of intelligence battalions oftenacted as if they were as powerful as regional army commanders. Lower-rank-ing intelligence ofcers did not pay proper respect to higher-ranking armyofcers. When a clash between intelligence and army units occurred in thenortheastern city of Muse on the Chinese border in September 2004, seniorarmy ofcers came to the conclusion that the intelligence corps was gettingout of hand. Senior military ofcers, especially Than Shwe and Maung Aye,were reportedly infuriated by this turn of events. Than Shwe ordered KhinNyunt to take action against the intelligence ofcers responsible for the inci-dent in Muse. Khin Nyunt reportedly refused to do so. In an attempt to pre-serve the authority of military intelligence, he instead had a secret meetingwith his close aides and ordered them to uncover information on the cor-rupt activities of regional commanders, which he planned to submit to ThanShwe at a cabinet meeting. A meeting of a small number of military of-

cers without the permission of higher authorities is considered tantamountto mutiny in the Tatmadaw. A local analyst observed that Than Shwe musthave been angry over Khin Nyunts refusal to take disciplinary action againsthis corrupt subordinates and his attempt to investigate senior army ofcersbecause both actions threatened the unity of the armed forces. 25

In October 2004 the government announced that Khin Nyunt had retiredon grounds of poor health. A few days later, however, in a speech given totop government and military ofcials as well as some local business leaders,

Thura Shwe Mann, the third highestranking ofcial in the SPDC, accusedKhin Nyunt of corruption, insubordination, and attempting to break upthe armed forces. 26 Many of his senior intelligence ofcers were given long


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42 Kyaw Yin Hlaing

prison terms, while Khin Nyunt himself received a forty-year suspended sen-tence. A retired ofcer who was close to Khin Nyunt noted that

even though [Khin Nyunt] was more exible than other senior ofcers,he was not prepared to side with the opposition and turn against hishard-line colleagues. A lot of people thought that Khin Nyunt wantedto release Aung San Suu Kyi to please Western governments. It wasnot true. He was not a big fan of hers. He wanted to release her mainlybecause he thought he could control her. In addition, he also thoughtthat the junta could prolong its rule more effectively by engaging withthe Western governments. 27

Another former government ofcial who had worked closely with KhinNyunt suggested that Khin Nyunt was only liberal to the extent that beingliberal served his interests.

Another problem with the power struggle argument is that the supposedlyproreform group was always weaker than the supposedly hard-line group.The power struggle argument reects a misunderstanding of the powerstructure in the government. A large number of Myanmar watchers and alarge majority of the population once thought that General Khin Nyunt, asleader of the liberal group, was more powerful than the hard-liners, but theaforementioned points indicate otherwise.

Why, then, did the military not want to work with the NLD? Part of theanswer probably lies in the way the junta and the NLD sought to legitimizethemselves. The junta took control of the country by cracking down onthe prodemocracy movement. A natural extension of this strategy was tolegitimize itself through outlawing or delegitimizing prodemocracy groups.Similarly, the NLD tried to legitimize itself by delegitimizing the militarygovernment, which had refused to hand over power. Throughout the 1990s

both groups spent more time and energy attacking each other than seekinga means of cooperation. As a result, mutual trust between the junta and theNLD was absent. Apparently many senior military ofcers worried that afuture government might take vengeance against them, their families, andtheir friends.

In calling for dialogue, both the junta and the prodemocracy groups,including the NLD, did not make clear what they could give in return forwhat they wanted. Both sides mainly emphasized what they wanted to get

from the other side, and both became disappointed when they did not getit. Conceivably, both parties adopted hard-line positions out of frustrationover not getting what they wanted. For prodemocracy groups, the political


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deadlock remained unresolved simply because of the military juntas refusalto honor the results of the election of 1990. For the military junta, the prode-mocracy activists, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, were the biggest mischief

makers in the country. Instead of seeking a way to work with each other, bothsides adopted a zero-sum approach. The recent offer made by Aung San SuuKyi to work for the lifting of sanctions in collaboration with the governmentwas a departure from this pattern. However, sources close to the governmentspeculated that this would not change Than Shwes decision to deny her aleadership role in any government formed after the 2010 elections. 28

In early 2010 the junta asked some serving and retired government of-cials, trusted community leaders, and business people to run in the election

in 2010, representing the governments views. The NLD and other opposi-tion groups, by contrast, were ghting internally over whether to sponsorcandidates in these elections. Many leaders of the NLD were worried that ifthey stopped seeking to have their victory in the 1990 elections recognized,their party might become marginalized. Anticipating that the junta woulddo whatever was necessary to win the 2010 election, they worried that theirparty would lose the special status it had gained by winning the 1990 elec-tion. Many younger NLD members, however, believed that if the electionbecame the only game in town, the only serious option would be to partici-pate in it. Otherwise, their party risked becoming irrelevant.

Problems between the Government and the Ethnic Minorities

Numerous ethnic minorities have engaged in armed struggle against the cen-tral government since the year after the Union of Burma was created in 1948.Consequently, stateethnic minority relations have proved to be far morepoliticized than relations between successive military regimes and other

social groups. Myanmar has 135 ofcially recognized ethnic groups, andmore than 20 of them have fought against the central government through-out the postcolonial period.

Many ethnic minority leaders apparently believed that British rule wasbetter than rule by the Burman ethnic majority and displayed much appre-hension before agreeing at the time of independence to join a union domi-nated by ethnic Burman politicians. Many members of ethnic minoritieswere employed in the colonial administration. As a result, they got a modern

education and developed a strong ethnic identity earlier than the Burmanmajority. After independence, Burman politicians dominated the govern-ment. Many ethnic leaders viewed the Burman leaders as hegemons whom


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44 Kyaw Yin Hlaing

they could not trust. They agreed to join the union only out of respect forGeneral Aung San, who also promised that ethnic minority groups couldleave the union ten years after independence if they still felt that membership

was not beneting their people. The Burman-dominated government beganto have problems with ethnic minority groups immediately after indepen-dence. The result was armed insurrection (for independence or autonomy)by the Karens, Mons, Kachins, Shans, Pa-O, Paluang, and Rakhine in the years of parliamentary rule (194858). The government tried to assert con-trol over the country by launching military operations against the insurgentgroups but failed to crush them.

Another major problem between ethnic minorities and the central gov-

ernment was that the former wanted more political and economic rightsand benets from the union than the latter could provide. A prominentShan leader and the rst president of independent Myanmar, Sao ShweThaik, even declared in parliament that if he had known that education,health services, and the economy in his state would remain poor under theBurman-dominated government, he would not have signed the PanglongAgreement. 29 Furthermore, the practice by the Burman political leaders ofdividing revenue for various ethnic regions according to their share of thetotal population did not endear them to the ethnic minorities. Ethnic minor-ity leaders began to question Aung Sans 1947 rhetorical statement that if aBurman gets one kyat, a Shan will get one kyat as well. For Burman politi-cal leaders, the statement meant that if the government allocated one kyat (Myanmar currency) to each individual Burman, it would also allocate onekyat to each individual belonging to an ethnic minority. However, someminorities interpreted the statement as allocating one kyat to each ethnicminority community for each kyat allocated to the Burman community. 30 Ethnic minority leaders also believed that since the areas they inhabited were

more underdeveloped than areas inhabited by the Burman majority, the cen-tral government should invest more in the development of their areas. Thecentral government, however, lacked the scal capacity to meet the demandsof both the Burman majority and the ethnic minorities.

In 1961 ethnic minority leaders held a meeting to exert collective pressureon the government to establish a more federal state. Political leaders of Shanand Kayah states also threatened to secede from the union, as permitted bythe 1947 constitution, if the government did not comply with their demands.

However, before the minority leaders and the Burman political leaders couldreach an agreement, the military seized control of the country, claiming thatit did so to prevent the disintegration of the union.


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Soon after it came to power, the Burma Socialist Program Party govern-ment attempted to make peace with the ethnic minorities by inviting allarmed insurgent groups to send representatives to Yangon, the Burmese

capital at the time, to negotiate a settlement. However, only one small groupwas able to reach agreement with the government. The government thentried to please the ethnic minorities by promulgating a new constitution thatinstituted a quasi-federal system for a one-party state and granted statehoodto seven predominantly ethnic regions. It also offered high-ranking gov-ernment positions to defected insurgent leaders. Nevertheless, the BurmaSocialist Program Party government failed to meet the expectations of theinsurgent groups, and as a result its attempts to end the civil conict failed

to bear fruit. In addition, because the government functioned more like aunitary than a federal state, minority leaders were not happy with the newconstitution. Still, neither the government nor the ethnic minorities werestrong enough to defeat the other, and ghting continued throughout thesocialist period. 31 To make matters worse, units of the Tatmadaw mistreatedresidents in some minority areas. The situation was compounded by the gov-ernments inability to undertake development projects in minority areas. 32

This impasse persisted even after the SLORC-SPDC government tookcontrol of the country in 1988. The junta initially refused to make peacewith insurgent groups. However, after 1989 the government began negotiat-ing with these groups, and eventually seventeen major groups and severalsmaller ones entered into verbal ceasere agreements with the government. 33 Most of the ceasere groups also attended the government-sponsoredNational Convention; having continually received assistance and economicconcessions and other forms of support from the government, they wereloath to offend it. Most of them criticized the government or expressed theirsupport for Aung San Suu Kyi only privately. A Kachin community leader

commented on the interaction between the ethnic minorities and the gov-ernment thus:

It is very difcult to keep something from the government. Once aKachin Independence Organization [KIO] member wrote a letter toAung San Suu Kyi, stating that the KIO supported her and her party.Many KIO leaders did not know about this letter until General KhinNyunt asked Dr. Tu Ja [a leading KIO gure] to see him in Yangon. At

the meeting, Khin Nyunt passed the letter sent to Aung San Suu Kyi toDr. Tu Ja and asked him what was going on. Of course Dr. Tu Ja had totell General Khin Nyunt that it was the action of one member and the


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46 Kyaw Yin Hlaing

leadership of the KIO was unaware of it: This is the situation we havebeen in. We have to be careful about what we do and what we say. 34

Because they are nancially weak, smaller ceasere groups depend moreon the government, and as a result they make even greater efforts to be ongood terms. A leading member of a small Karen group led by Phado AungSan noted,

The government has been really nice to us since we surrendered. Theygive us everything we need. In return, we remain loyal to it. WhenGeneral Khin Nyunt was red, we felt very bad. He was our originalbenefactor. He really helped us. The new secretary I [of the SPDC] has

also been very nice to us. He personally assured us that nothing wouldchange in the way the government treats us. We will remain loyal tothe government. 35

Nonetheless, many problems between the government and ethnic minor-ity groups remain. Most ethnic groups want the country to be divided intoeight states instead of seven states (nonBurman ethnic majority areas) andseven divisions (areas inhabited by the Burman ethnic majority). They alsowant the constitution to guarantee their cultural rights and control over nat-ural resources in their own territories. Although negotiations between thegovernment and the Karen National Union (the last large insurgent groupthat has yet to formalize a ceasere agreement with the government) havebeen under way for some time, the two sides have not found a way to reacha mutually acceptable agreement. Despite having made ceasere agreementswith the government, the New Mon State Party has been openly critical ofthe SPDC. As punishment for their recalcitrance, members of the New MonState Party were marginalized and given fewer economic concessions than

more compliant groups. For many minority leaders, issues regarding auton-omy, promotion of their own cultural practices, and the right to extractnatural resources linger. They believe that a genuine dialogue is necessaryto resolve these long-standing issues. The military government for its parthas been mainly interested in ensuring that all ceasere groups are enjoyingthe economic concessions granted to them, staying away from the NLD andother prodemocracy groups, and not challenging its authority.

In 2006 some ceasere groups began to express their unhappiness with

the government more forcefully. Although they had initially agreed to giveup their arms once the National Convention had nished its work, a num-ber of groups began to retract their agreements since the government had


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not accommodated most of their demands. Most ceasere groups, however,were too weak and divided to challenge the government. Because of infra-structure projects it has undertaken, the government now has relatively easy

access to areas formerly controlled by insurgent groups. In addition, mostceasere groups now are much less able nancially to rearm themselves, asthey can no longer collect fees from illegal business activity at border check-points. A leader of the Karen National Union, which is still ghting againstthe government, noted that morale is poor among low-ranking members ofceasere groups and that most do not wish to ght the government again. 36 Therefore, the government seems to have concluded that even if most of theceasere groups were to end their agreements, they would not be a serious

security threat.After terminating the National Convention, the government indicated toceasere groups that it wanted them to form political parties and participatein the 2010 elections. In addition, in April 2009 the military announced aplan for all ceasere groups to transform their respective armed units intounits of a national border guard force. 37 Each unit would be limited to 326soldiers, of which 30 must be government soldiers. 38 All border guard unitswould be under the command of the Tatmadaw commander-in-chief andwould receive salaries and benets directly from the Tatmadaw. The Demo-cratic Karen Buddhist Army and the New Democratic ArmyKachin read-ily accepted the governments plan. 39 The Kokang groups rejected it openly.Other ceasere groups were unhappy with the plan and asked the govern-ment to give them some time to consider it. The Kachin IndependenceOrganization, among others, hinted that it might accept the plan if the gov-ernment dropped the part about the inclusion of government soldiers in allborder guard units.

In late August 2009 the government accused Kokang leaders of illegal

arms production and dispatched security forces to enforce the law. Skir-mishes between government forces and armed Kokang forces continued forabout three days. 40 Then the Kokang units ed into China and neighboringareas as government forces took control of the Kokang territory. It appearsthat the government took forceful action against the Kokang as a warning toother ceasere groups that it would not accept negative answers to the bor-der guard plan. In late 2009 the other ceasere groups did not seem to havea clear idea about how to respond to the governments plan. 41 None of them

wanted to give up complete control over their respective armed groups. They just wanted to delay discussion on the border guard force for as long as pos-sible. At the same time, a number of ceasere groups, including the Kachin


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48 Kyaw Yin Hlaing

Independence Organization and some Karen and Mon groups, indicatedthat they might participate in the 2010 elections.

At the beginning of 2010, most ethnic groups were still not certain about

their future. However, they understood that they could not expect mean-ingful dialogue with the military government. Most ceasere groups tried toavoid doing things that would lead to problems with the junta. They also triedto abide by the governments rules as long as they did not lose control overtheir own forces, economic benets, and territory. Most of them believed thatgoing back to the jungle and engaging in armed struggle against the govern-ment was not a good option. Instead, they preferred to delay addressing majorissues until the next government comes into existence. At the same time,

many local communities in ceasere zones were frustrated with the ceaseregroups. They complained that the leaders were more interested in enrichingthemselves than in doing something good for their own people. Most ethnicminority areas are microcosms of the entire country: they are multiethnicareas in which the various ethnic groups living together do not agree withone another and feel that the largest ethnic group is trying to achieve politicaldominance. Reconciliation must take place not only between the governmentand ethnic groups but also between the various ethnic groups.

Conclusion

A genuine national reconciliation process between the three major politicalforces in Myanmar has yet to take place. The military mainly wants to retainpower. The NLD-centered opposition does not have any trust in the govern-ment and wants it to honor the 1990 elections. The ethnic minorities do notthink they will get what they want from the military government and seek toget what they can. What they have managed to get is well short of what they

want for themselves and for their people.For national reconciliation to happen, military leaders must give prior-

ity to solving the countrys political and economic problems rather thanextending military rule, and the opposition groups will need to convince themilitary leaders that unless they engage in a genuine process of national rec-onciliation their rule will not last. One way of convincing them could be anationwide uprising. Although such an uprising cannot be completely ruledout, both political and civil society groups are too weak in 2010 to mount

one that can be sustained. Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi as well as mostopposition leaders would not condone a mass uprising to achieve their goals.


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Consequently, many people have concluded that a genuine nationalreconciliation process is not likely to take place under military rule. Somebelieve that instead of wasting resources and energy calling for national

reconciliation, political groups should seek to become credible oppositionforces that can make the military-led government accountable and transpar-ent by expanding political freedom in the country. They believe that oncedemocracy becomes the only viable alternative, national reconciliation willoccur naturally.

The upcoming election is unlikely to turn Myanmar into a democraticcountry immediately. However, some observers are optimistic and hope thatmore political space will be freed up for opposition groups and civil soci-

ety organizations. Critics of the regime argue that because the military willcontinue to control the new government, the upcoming election will notcontribute to any tangible political changes in the country. At the presentmoment, no one knows for sure how the new government will deal with theopposition. Future political changes will depend on the new boundaries forpolitical space set by the elected government and, in turn, on the ability ofopposition groups and civil society organizations to exploit these politicalopportunities. On a more positive note, if these groups are able to overcomeconstraints they have previously yielded to, the political template may wellbe more uid than most observers have come to expect.

Notes

All cited interviews were conducted by the author. Owing to the sensitive politi-cal situation in Burma, the names of interviewees and specic dates of interviews arenot always given.

1. Interview, October 12, 2003.

2. Interview, July 20, 2004.3. Interview, March 12, 2005.4. Ibid.5. Interview, January 8, 2009.6. Mizzima News Group, Democracy Supporters Call for Tripartite Dialogue in

Myanmar (http://Myanmarlibrary.org/reg.Myanmar/archives/200103/msg00054.html [April 2007]).

7. Interview, March 15, 2003.8. Interviews, 2004, 2006, 2007.

9. Htet Aung Kyaw, Roadmap to Division, Irrawaddy (www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=400 [July 2010]).


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50 Kyaw Yin Hlaing

10. Pilger on Aung San Suu Kyis Standoff, BBC, July 28, 1998 (http://myanmarlibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199807/msg00657.html).

11. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues, South-

east Asian Affairs (2005): 239.12. Interview, April 23, 2007.13. Interview, June 15, 2009.14. The seven steps of the roadmap to democracy are (1) Reconvening of the

National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996. (2) After the successfulholding of the National Convention, step-by-step implementation of the processnecessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system. (3)Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basicprinciples laid down by the National Convention. (4) Adoption of the constitution

through national referendum. (5) Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hlut-taws [legislative bodies] according to the new constitution. (6) Convening of Hlut-taws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution. (7)Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected bythe Hluttaw and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw.Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Myanmar in 2003: Frustration and Despair? Asian Survey44, no.1 (2004): 8792.

15. The National League for Democracy, Statement for National Convention,May 14, 2004 (www.dassk.com/contents.php?id=757).

16. All NLD statements are available at the Online Burma/Myanmar Library(www.burmalibrary.org [July 2010]).17. See Sebastien Berger, Aung San Suu Kyi: Leader Offered Meeting, Telegraph,

October 10, 2007 (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/05/wburma105.xml).

18. Interview with a former youth leader of the NLD, July 2, 2009.19. Democrat Banned from Myanmar Elections, Manila Times , February 21,

2008 (www.manilatimes.net/national/2008/feb/21/yehey/world/20080221wor1.html).20. Interview, September 12, 2009.

21. Ibid.22. Daw San Suu Kyi Did Not Meet NLD Central Executive Committee Mem-bers, The Voice, November 915, 2009, p. 3.

23. Interviews, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007.24. Hlaing, Myanmar in 2004, p. 256.25. Interview with a local analyst, December 20, 2004.26. Thura Shwe Mann, Complete Explanation on the Development in the Coun-

try, in Compilation of Speeches by General Shwe Mann, Lt. General Soe Win, and Lt.General Than Sein (Yangon, Myanmar: News and Periodical Enterprise, 2004), pp.

46.27. Interview, April 29, 2008.28. Interviews, September 12, 2009.


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29. Panglong Agreement, Parliamentary Proceedings (Chamber of Nationalities) 2, no. 1: 821. The Panglong Agreement is an agreement reached between Burmesenationalist leader Aung San and leaders of Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic groups

that outlined how Shan, Kachin, and Chin areas would be integrated into the Unionof Burma.30. Interview, May 4, 2003.31. Martin Smith, Myanmar: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity , updated ed.

(New York: Zed Books, 1999).32. Interviews, 200105.33. Yan Nyein Aye, Endeavours of the Myanmar Armed Forces Government for

National Reconsolidation (Yangon, Myanmar, 1999), p. 5.34. Interview, December 28, 2004.

35. Interview, February 22, 2005.36. Interview, May 4, 2009.37. Wai Moe, Border Guard Force Plan Leads to the End of Ceasere, Irrawaddy,

August 31, 2009 (www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16691).38. Ibid.39. NDAK Ready to Turn into Border Guard Force, Mizzima (www.mizzima.

com/news/inside-burma/2360-ndak-ready-to-turn-into-border-guard-force.html[July 2010]).

40. Moe, Border Guard Force Plan Leads to the End of Ceasere.

41. Interview with an ethnic minority leader, September 12, 2009.


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52

An Inside View of Reconciliation

maung zarni

3

Both historically and in the present, the dening characteristics ofpolitics in Myanmar have been mass poverty in all its dimensions, a mul-tiplicity of conicts, domination of the weak by the strong, and resistancefrom below. 1 Sixty years after her independence from Britain, Myanmar isthe only country in Southeast Asia that remains engulfed in domestic con-icts, both armed and nonviolent. Despite numerous local and externalefforts at mediation and direct political negotiations, neither positive peacenor lasting resolution of conicts is in sight.

First, a word about my personal perspective. I was born in Myanmarand spent the rst twenty-ve years of my life in an extended military fam-ily where a state-centric, Burmese nationalist view prevailed. I have spentthe second half of my life in exile as a dissident and a student of Burmeseaffairs, and my earlier views have necessarily been challenged by my com-plete immersion in Aung San Suu Kyiled opposition politics and rst-handexperience working with ethnic minority resistance groups. My views on

peacemaking in Myanmar have evolved as a result of both intensive pro-fessional training in peace negotiations and rsthand experience in seekingcommon ground with the other side. 2

Patterns and Trends in Peacemaking

Until 1989 the conict in Burma was a three-way affair between the SocialistPartycontrolled Burmese army, the armed Maoists, and a number of indig-

enous ethnic armed resistance groups. Within ninety days of Burmas inde-pendence in 1948, an open struggle for state power between the commu-nists and the socialistswith irreconcilable ideological visions and personal


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An Inside View of Reconciliation 53

rivalriesgave birth to a civil war within the ethnically Burman elite. Thebattle raged on until both the socialist-controlled military regime and theirnemesis, the Communist Party of Burma, collapsedin July 1988 and April

1989, respectively. Armed opposition from most ethnic minorities of politi-cal signicance also began early, hardly paused during the 198890 transi-tion, and continues to this day, despite a patchwork of disparate and fragileceasere deals with the countrys military rulers.

Three distinct historical approaches to peacemaking can be seen between1948, when the civil war rst broke out under a parliamentary government,and 198889, when the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) beganpursuing ceasere deals with various ethnic armed resistance groups. In the

rst, inuential nationalist gures in the elds of culture, literature, andpolitics, all ideologically leaning toward the left, launched a Leftist Unitycampaign in the 1950s to mediate the conict between the Maoists and thesocialists. The objective, which did not come to fruition, was a lasting peacebetween the two most powerful forces in the conict.

In the second approach, many Burmese politicians in U Nus parliamen-tary government sought to establish a temporary ceasere with the Maoistsrather than a lasting peace, to concentrate resources on the military campaignagainst the armed ethnic minorities that were demanding greater autonomyor outright secession. At one point, U Nus government was on the verge oftotal defeat at the hands of the Karen National Defense Organization, whichcontrolled territory reaching the suburbs of the capital city of Rangoon. Thenationalist elites rationale was twofold: keeping the Union of Burma intactwas more important than Burman leadership conicts and ideology; and assoon as the military threats posed by the Karen National Defense Organi-zation were addressed effectively the communists and the socialists couldresume their own intra-ethnic, ideological feud. Lasting peace did not seem

to be an end in and of itself for either the Burman politicians on both sidesor the armed units on both sides.

In the third approach, peace meant only two things for the Tatmadawleaders. One was acceptance by all opposition groups of the militarys pre-rogatives, including the historical entitlementthe self-perceived institu-tional rightof the Tatmadaw to congure the postcolonial state in linewith its uncompromising vision of a unitary polity. The other was accep-tance by all opposition groups of the militarys operational terms of peace. In

short, the military saw peacemaking as enforcement of a set of rules dictatedby a central state (in Myanmar) led by the military and subject to its dictates.Since the Tatmadaw was created almost seventy years ago, its self-image


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54 Maung Zarni

has evolved from servant of the people to guardian of the people. Today inMyanmar, the army is the statereal, not imagined.

Between 198889 and 1994, the military reached separate ceasere agree-

ments with more than seventeen ethnic armed resistance groups of varyingsizes and degrees of political signicance. According to Maung Aung Myo,an army-bred former lecturer at Myanmars inuential National DefenseCollege, the decisive factor behind the regimes decision to seek these agree-ments was its fear of cross-ethnic alliances among the armed opposition inconcert with the popular opposition movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi. 3 To be sure, the new external developments such as the approaching end ofthe cold war and post-Maoist Beijings withdrawal of support for communist

and to a lesser extent ethnic armed rebellions across Southeast Asia turnedout to be an external enabling factor for Myanmars ceaseresor peacesettlements, as the regime labels these disparate agreements. The regimespursuit of ceasere agreements, however, was largely motivated by an instru-mentalist strategic objective, not a genuine desire for a lasting peace, whichwould require addressing long-held grievances (past rights abuses, denial ofbasic rights) and substantive political disputes (different political visions,extreme asymmetry of power, local economic and resource exploitation, andother issues related to ethnic, economic, or political justice). 4

Two Thematic Issues in Peacemaking

Since it was formed in 1942 with the sole support of fascist and militaristJapan, the Tatmadaw has gone through a long process of metamorphosis inits ideological foundations, organizational structure, strategic alliances, andrelations with the countrys civilian population. While it has always beena key player in Myanmars national politics, the military seems to be have

locked itself into a process of regressive evolution. 5 In spite of its noble inten-tions at the beginningto liberate the people from the yoke of British impe-rialist ruleits present-day worldview and mode of operations have cometo be characterized rather accurately as fascist and militarist. This view refersnot just to the Tatmadaws policies, decisions, and behavioral patterns butalso to the actions of troops on the front lines. One report after another fromcredible local and international organizations over the past twenty yearslends credence to allegations of atrocities throughout the country suffered

at the hands of the military. The militarys own view from the barracks isdiametrically opposed to the widely held view from the outside.


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Recently the elderly and controversial local writer and former communistMaung Suu San, also known as Comrade Chan Aye, has described contem-porary Burmese politics as post-ideological. He is correct if the ideological

division is dened along the conventional left versus right split. But thisobservation overlooks the crystallization of an alternative ideology that hastwo components. First, it frames the military as the only time-tested, battle-seasoned, and best-qualied natural ruler of the country. Second, it denesnational security narrowly as regime security and places regime security asthe overarching policy objective governing all other dimensions of nationbuilding. Regime security, in turn, is equated with the personal security ofSenior General Than Shwe and his extended family. These two dening

components, pervading the regimes governing discourse and self-percep-tion, are institutionalized and constantly reinforced.Besides, the Tatmadaws carefully constructed, self-serving view from the

barracks is dominant among the new ofcer corps. At the organizationallevel, this hegemonic view serves as a rare ideological basis for elite cohesionwithin the ofcer corps but not necessarily among privates and other ranks. 6 One reason Tatmadaw ofcers hold closely to this view is clearly that doingso helps compensate for the tremendous reputational loss suffered by themilitary as the direct result of both its categorical failures as nation builderand widespread and ongoing human rights crimes against the citizenry ofall class, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Another rationale is the abortedcoup, chronic splits, quiet mutinies, periodic wholesale purges, and highrates of desertion experienced by the military since it rst assumed power in1958. In the words of Maung Aung Myo, a former lecturer at the NationalDefense College, at present, the Tatmadaw is concerned with the institu-tional unity, operational capability and troop discipline. There appears a lowmorale and high rate of desertion. 7 Whether the militarys internal tensions

and conicts of interests will boil over and result in a serious institutionalsplit, which might create political space for dissidents and ordinary citizens,remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: public welfare as the main con-cern of the Tatmadaw has been replaced with a military-centered, statist per-spective. A local analyst recently observed that the military seems to havestopped referring to itself as being the army of, for, and by the people. 8

Thus the Tatmadaw as the ultimate rulerwhose right to rule at willis cemented in the 2008 constitutionis one of the two major themes

local peacemakers feel they have to work with. Operating within this para-digm, the generals pursue what they consider their historical mission to


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56 Maung Zarni

reconsolidate the power of the centralizing state, which was disrupted by acentury of British colonial rule and six decades of post-independence civilwar. By contrast, local peacemakers tend to frame the objective as reconcili-

ation between the military rulers and the suppressed civilians representedby the National League for Democracy (NLD). From their perspective,civilians have as much right as the military to decide how to mold Myanmarinto a modern nation, and they reject the militarys attempt to constitu-tionalize the political apartheid wherein the military arrogates to itself theconstitutional right to be the national arbiter, occupying the rst tier ofpolitics and society.

The second important theme is ethnic equality, which bears an oppos-

ing set of historical memories. The Tatmadaw has gradually moved awayfrom the two cardinal foundations of Myanmar historiography: that Myan-mar regained its independence through a collective effort by a number ofplayersCommunist cadres, ethnic minority feudal elites, leftist-inspiredmasses, rightist nationalists, and soldiers; and that the founding of post-independence Myanmar was based on a formal agreement among severalmajor ethnic groups of varying sizes to voluntarily form a federated Unionof Burma as politically equal founding partners. 9 These two factors are notirreconcilable in and of themselves. However, the tragic assassination of sev-eral key architects of the union on the eve of the countrys independencemade the task of implementing the new arrangement extremely difcult,especially since the Bama or Myanmar leadership that assumed the reins ofthe newly independent state did not seem to be as committed to the idea andreality of Burma as a voluntary federal association whereby the paramountprinciple of equality among indigenous ethnic groups, including the Bamatribes, was to be enshrined constitutionally in both spirit and letters.

In the gradual evolution of its institutionalized self-image, the Tatmadaw

views the majority Burman ethnic group as rst among equals. This is reec-tive of the ethnic makeup of the military leadershipBurmans and ethnicminorities who share the militarys view on ethnic hegemony. To the gener-als, creating a modern state involves no cultural subjugation, political domi-nation, economic exploitation, or territorial expansion and control by theBurman population over the rest of the population. In its own story line, theTatmadaw is only seeking to restore multiethnic harmony and safeguard theterritorial integrity of Myanmar as it has existed since time immemorial. The

generals insist that forging a nation-state, even in a conict-soaked multi-ethnic country such as Myanmar, involves no cultural, military, or politicalsubjugation, despite glaring evidence to the contrary.


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Proles of Reconcilers

Although natural prejudices do arise from differences in ethnic, class, reli-

gious, and professional backgrounds, they rarely degenerate into violentconict. The all-encompassing conict seen today is constructed by the elite,which exploits each groups distrust and fear of the ethnic Other, rather thanby the grass roots. Although Myanmars elite of all ethnic and class back-grounds have been engaged in this ethnopolitical mobilization, the over-whelming public sentiment is that the generalsand their power base, theTatmadawmust bear the lions share of responsibility for the continuingconicts and their own spectacular failures at nation-building. To be fair,

blame must be shared with the uneducated or uncritically educated domi-nant Myanmar ethnic group, especially the Burmese intelligentsia, whichsubscribes to the myopic Bama- or Burmese-centric nationalism. The ongo-ing conict reects a strong twofold legacy: deeply ingrained and localizedfeudal and paternalistic political cultures, on the one hand, and post-inde-pendence political experience, with autocratic regimes, elite domination, andcontrol of the public realm, on the other. Given the elites near-total controlof both the decisionmaking process and the public sphere, it is no surprisethat its dialogue and reconciliation efforts have made a signicant imprinton society at large. The collective hatred toward the military that has devel-oped during the past half century of military rule, however, transcends allbounds of ethnicity, religion, political ideology, and economic background.Even many local businesspeople, including well-known regime cronies, whohave beneted from their close ties with the regime profess privately theirdeep disdain toward their patrons in generals uniforms. 10

The reconcilers can be divided into two categories: internal and external.The internal reconcilers can be further divided into professional ones and

accidental ones. Professional reconcilers are individuals with some formaltraining in mediation, political negotiation, and conict resolution. Acci-dental reconcilers are those who have had no training but whose social andpolitical position makes them ideally suited to the task of mediation.

Internal reconcilers can also be divided into two categories: those with anonmilitary background and those who are or have been military ofcers.Reconciliation work may be dened as both public and private attemptsto help establish common ground between the ruling military regime and

its political opponents, the long-term objective being harmonious coex-istence among all elite groups, both ethnic and military, and their institu-tions. I focus here on elites because grassroots communities are generally not


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58 Maung Zarni

engaged in communal, racial, ethnic, or religious conicts. With the excep-tion of the violent conicts between the Karens and the Burmans in lowerBurma in the 1940s and occasional outbursts of collective hostilities directed

at the economically dominant and culturally chauvinistic local Chinese, eth-nic communities across the country were not warring against one another.It is usually different ethnic elites who attempt to stoke ethnoprejudices as astrategy for political mobilization in their elite-level power struggle. Never-theless, ethnic tensions and divisions, as well as widespread prejudices, aresignicant issues among Myanmars grassroots communities that deserveserious attention. 11

However, only a few of the local players in the politics of reconciliation

are known to have had any professional training in conict transformation,resolution, or management. Even for these few, their current involvementis accidental and circumstantial rather than a result of their professionalbackground. A cursory look also shows that the local peacemakers comefrom highly diverse backgrounds: senior Buddhist monks, Christian pastors,university professors, medical doctors, former and serving military ofcers,prominent dissidents, businessmen, women, drug warlords, and insurgentleaders. Conspicuously absent are Muslim leaders and civil servants. Muslimleaders are not players presumably because of the negative and widespreadsocial attitudes toward them. Civil servants, by contrast, stay out of peace-making because the military rulers direct them to avoid political activities.

Exploring a Track-Two Approach

Following what is considered a failed attempt by the SPDC in 2003 to physi-cally harm Aung San Suu Kyi and her senior colleagues through a mobambush, I was assigned to lead a small team of dissidents mandated to seek

Western support for strengthening armed resistance by the National Coun-cil of the Union of Burma, an umbrella group of armed resistance and dis-sident organizations, including the Karen National Union (KNU), based atthe Thai-Burmese border. 12 As others before us had done, we hit the wall ofpolicy indifference and overestimated Western solidarity with our strugglefor freedom. Finding no prospect for either arms or nancial support, wedecided to embrace pragmatism and start talking to the military. 13 Similarly,within six months of our quietly signing off on our mission to seek Western

support, the late general Saw Bo Mya decided rather pragmatically to acceptthe ceasere offered to the KNU by General Khin Nyunt, the third rankinggeneral, who, in his capacity as head of the powerful Directorate of Defence


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Services Intelligence (the military intelligence unit), served as the regimestop troubleshooter. The spy chief was increasingly viewed as the only gen-eral in the country whom the outside world could do business with, as

one senior Western diplomat based in Rangoon remarked to me after KhinNyunt was arrested. This is the view also prevalent within the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Domestically, Khin Nyunt, with noinfantry troops under his command, was the weakest of the top three gen-erals, and he was therefore compelled to build his base by adopting what Iwould call a politics of give and take with the regime adversaries such asAung San Suu Kyi and armed resistance groups.

At this time the intelligence camp, whose wings were beginning to be

clipped by the rival hard-line group with their zero-sum understanding ofpolitics, was looking for new strategic alliances with ethnic resistance groups,opposition circles, religious leaders, and academics as well as internationalorganizations and foreign diplomats. Uneasy with the drift into the embraceof Beijing and concerned about the damage the domestic political deadlockwas doing to the countrys economic and political development, the intel-ligence camp became interested in mending fences with Washington, whichit saw as a counterweight to the growing Chinese power in the region. InWashington, a less moralistic, more strategic-minded group of policy ana-lysts, advisers in Congress, and career diplomats saw the growing inuenceof China in Myanmar as part of a larger pattern of Chinese activity with thepotential of undermining U.S. interests around the world. By the autumn of2003, in consultation with my team of fellow dissidents in exile and with theknowledge of the U.S. government, I was in direct communication with theofce of prime minister and intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt.

Building on these divergent concerns, I proposed to Matthew Daley, thendeputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacic affairs at the U.S.

State Department, the idea of organizing a track-two initiative. While track-two diplomacy, most broadly dened, refers to non-governmental, infor-mal, and unofcial contacts and activities between private citizens or groupsof individuals, the term as used in this essay refers to a subset of unofcialactivity which involves professional contacts among elites from adversarialgroups with the purpose of addressing policy problems in efforts to analyze,prevent, manage and ultimately resolve inter-group or inter-state conicts. 14

Daley was himself frustrated with the U.S. governments rigid adherence

to its sanctions as he saw how little impact they were having on the regimesbehavior or policies. So he jumped at the opportunity and in due coursehelped secure the necessary political support from the U.S. government. For


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60 Maung Zarni

without the governments ofcial consent, the communications my dissi-dent colleagues and I were having with Burmese counterintelligence wouldhave been problematic, especially since we had all been granted asylum by

the United States. Moreover, if our Burmese efforts were not classied astrack-two, my travel to Rangoon while holding a United Statesissued refu-gee travel document would have been in violation of U.S. immigration andcitizenship laws.

The moment for my own face-to-face condence-building talk camewhen Senior General Than Shwe overruled a political deal that General KhinNyunt had reportedly secured from Aung San Suu Kyi as early as March2004.15 The NLD issued a public statement saying it was staying away from

the National Convention where the constitutional discussions were takingplace off and on, citing the regimes failure to respond to the NLDs requestthat certain antidemocratic provisions and principles be put on the conven-tions agenda for debate. The news that leadership-level dialogue had hit yetanother dead end compelled our group of dissidents to act, believing thatchannels of communications ought to be maintained at all levels. 16

A brief detour here may be useful. My understanding of the deal was thatAung San Suu Kyi, still under house arrest at the time, would be allowed toaddress the National Convention, thereby helping to legitimize the regime-sponsored seven-step roadmap to democracy. The military would also per-mit the NLD to seek changes at the convention in some of the blatantly anti-democratic provisions of the draft constitution. This was a deal that boththe intelligence camp and the NLD felt could move the country on the pathtoward much-needed reforms. However, feeling increasingly threatened bywhat he viewed as the hidden agenda of his own chief negotiator and intel-ligence chief, Than Shwe feared that Khin Nyunt might make a deal withthe Western-backed opposition movement and eventually betray him. Than

Shwes greatest fear is known to be meeting the fate of his former boss, thelate general Ne Win, who was put under house arrest and denied access tocritical medical care by Than Shwe himself. It is hardly surprising that thedeal was shot down. As a matter of fact, in January 2004 Than Shwe backped-aled on the ceasere agreement that the Khin Nyuntled intelligence camphad reached with the KNU. 17

The track-two initiative undertaken by my colleagues and me needs tobe placed in its proper context. The common ground we felt we had was

our view that Western sanctions were hampering the process of change thatMyanmar desperately needed. We were also of the opinion that if we wereto move away from a military-controlled state then a certain segment of the


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military needed to be working with us. In other words, the weakened intel-ligence camp of potential reformists and the dissidents disillusioned by theempty Western rhetoric of democracy promotion needed each other. The

plan we proposed to General Khin Nyunt was to hold a series of face-to-facecondence-building meetings bringing Khin Nyunts deputies together witha group of pragmatic dissidents in exile.

Peacemaking without a License

On May 30, 2004, I ew from Bangkok to Yangon and met with three ofKhin Nyunts deputies: Brigadier General Than Tun, Colonel Hla Min, and

Colonel Tin Oo.18

Initially, our requests included that we also meet withAung San Suu Kyi, but the intelligence camp refused, saying the politicalclimate was too tense. 19

The news of our one-day meeting, rumored to be backed by the U.S. gov-ernment, set off a strong reaction for four different reasons. First, the NLDparty leadership in Yangon felt seriously threatened by the track-two initia-tive. They were outraged that I had stepped forward as an opposition inter-locutor after Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD had pulled out of negotiationswith the regime because the regime had backtracked on a sealed deal. Inaddition, the NLD feared that if Washington were indeed backing an initia-tive with the regime without consulting with or having the prior blessing ofthe NLD, then the United States might be relaxing its economic and politicalpressure on the regime.

Second, many Myanmar dissidents have a rigid idea of who qualies asa legitimate revolutionary or dissident: unless the individual is either in thearmed resistance or has spent time in jail for antimilitary activities, he orshe is not considered a bona de dissident. Despite my track record as an

effective organizer and campaigner who helped translate the NLDs call forsanctions and economic boycotts into a policy reality (in effect serving asa key campaign spokesperson internationally), I was not viewed as a bonade revolutionary or dissident. That I was the only exile who actually wentto Yangon with the backing of the U.S. government and at the invitation ofPrime Minister Khin Nyunt was too much for them to stomach. 20 Personali-ties are at the heart of Myanmar politics. 21

Third, the intelligence camp itself could not bring all its key in-house

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