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that their retreat by sea was cut off, then

they were no longer divided, but resolved

to fight it out.

In the battle, the Aeginetans and the

Athenians did the best of all the Greeks,

and Themistocles best among the com-

manders; nor was ever any fleet more

utterly put to rout than that of the Per-

sians,

among whom Queen Artemisia won

praise unm erited. As for King Xerxe s,

panic seized him when he saw the disaster

to his fleet, and he made haste to flee.

He consented, however, to leave Mar-

donius behind with 300,000 troops in

Thessaly, he being still assured that he

could crush the Greeks.

When the winter and spring were

jassed, Mardonius marched from Thessaly

and again occupied Athens, which the

Athenians had again evacuated, the Spar-

tans having failed to send succour. But

when at length the Lacedaemonians, fear-

ing to lose the Athenian fleet, sent forth

an army, the Persians fell back to Boeo-

tia. So the Greek hosts gathered near

Plataea to the number of 108,000 men,

but the troops of Mardonius were about

350,000. Ye t, by reason of doub tful

auguries, both armies held back, till Mar-

donius resolved to attack, whereof warn-

ing was brought to the Athenians by

Alexander of Macedon.

But when the Spartan Pausanias, the

general of the Greeks, heard of this, he

did what caused no little wonder, for he

proposed that the Athenians instead of

the Lacedaemonians should face the

picked troops of the Persians, as having

fought them at M arathon. But Mar-

donius, seeing them move, moved also.

Then he sent some light horse against

the Greeks by a fountain whence flowed

the arm y s wa ter; which, becoming

choked, it was needful to move to a new

position. The move being at night, most

of the allies withdrew into the town.

But the Spartans and Tegeans and Athe-

nians,

perceiving this, held each their

ground till dawn.

N

ow, in the morning the picked Per-

sian troops fell on the Spartans, and

their Grecian allies attacked the Athe-

nians.

But, Ma rdonius being slain, the

Persians fled to their camp, which was

stormed by the Spartans and Tegeans,

and the Athenians, who also had routed

their foes; and there the barbarians were

slaughtered, so that of 300,000 men not

3,000 were left alive. Bu t Arta ban us,

who, before the battle, had withdrawn

with 40,000 men, escaped hurriedly to

the Hellespont.

And on the same day was fought an-

other fight by sea at Mycale in Ionia,

where also the barbarians were utterly

routed, for the fleet had sailed thither.

And thence the Greeks sailed to Sestos,

attacked and captured the place, and so

went home.

History of the Peloponnesian War

THUCYDIDES

A

T the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. Thucydides began to w rite a

. history of the conflict. His History in eight books gives an account of the hostilities

to 411 B.C., but the war, a twenty-seven years struggle between Athens and Sparta for

the hegemony of the Greek world, did not end until the surrender of Athens to Lysander

in 404. The work is remarkable chiefly for its analysis of the causes that underlay

the events recorded. In this respect Thucydides was the first and remains the greatest

of philosophical historians. His History contains some fine descriptive passages, and

in the substantially authentic summaries of speeches attributed to various prominent

men on both sides, some magnificent declamations.

I—THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

I

HAVE

written the account of the war

between Athens and Sparta, since it

is the greatest and most calamitous

of all wars hith erto to the Greeks. Fo r

the contest with the Medes was decided

in four battles; but this war was pro-

tracted over many years, and wrought

infinite injury and bloodshed.

Of the immediate causes of the war

the first is to be found in the affairs of



Epidamnus, Corcyra and Corinth, of

which Corcyra was a colony. Of the

Greek states, the most were joined to

either the Athenian or the Peloponnesian

league, but Corcyra had joined neither.

But having a quarrel with Corinth about

Epidamnus, she now formed an alliance

with Athens, which enraged the Corin-

thians.

They then helped Potidaea. a Corin-

thian colony but an Athenian tributary,

to revolt from Athe ns. Corin th next ap-

pealed to Sparta, as the head of Hellas,

to intervene ere it should be too late and

check the Athenian aggression, which

threatened to make her the tyrant of all

Greece. At Sparta, the war party pre-

vailed, although Archidamus urged that

sufficient pressure could be brought to

bear without hostilities.

The great prosperity and development

of Athens since the Persian war had filled

other states with fear and jealousy. She

had rebuilt her city walls and refortified

the port of Piraeus after the Persian

occupation; Sparta had virtually allowed

her to take the lead in the subsequent

stages of the war, as having the most

effective nava l force at comm and. Hen ce

she had founded the Delian league of the

maritime states, to hold the seas against

Persia. At first these states provided

fixed contingents of ships and mariners;

but Athens was willing to accept treasure

in substitution, so that she might herself

supply ships and men.

Thus the provision of forces by each

state to act against Persia was changed in

effect into a tribute for the expansion of

the Athenian fleet. Th e continuous de-

velopment of the power of Athens had

been checked only momentarily by her

disastrous Egyptian expedition. He r

nominal allies found themselves actually

her tributary dependencies, and various

attempts to break free from her yoke had

made it only more secure and burden-

some.

Hence the warlike decision of Sparta

was welcomed by others beside Corinth.

But diplomatic demands preceded hos-

tilities. Spa rta and Athens sent to each

other summons for the expulsion of the

curse, that is of all persons connected

with certain families which lay under the

curse of the gods.

In the case of Athens, this amounted

to requiring the banishment of her great-

est citizen and statesm an, Pericles. To

this the Spartans added the demand that

the Athenians should restore the free-

dom of Hellas, and should specifically

remove certain trading disabilities im-

posed on the people of Megara.

At this crisis Pericles laid down the

rules of policy on which Athens ought to

act—rules which required her to decline

absolutely to submit to any form of

dictation from Spa rta. W hen a principle

was at stake, it made no difference

whether the occasion was trivial 01

serious. Athen s could face war with con

fidence. He r available wea lth was fai

greater—a matter of vital importance in

a prolonged struggle. He r counsels were

not divided by the conflicting interests of

allies all claiming to direct military move-

me nts and policy. He r fleet gave her

command of the sea, and enabled her to

strike when and where she chose. If

Peloponnesian invaders ravaged Attica,

still no permanent injury would be done

comparable to that which the Athenians

could inflict upon them . Th e one neces-

sity was to concentrate on the war, and

attempt no extension of dominion while it

was in progress.

War was not yet formally declared

when the Thebans attempted to seize

Plataea, a town of Boeotia, which had

long been closely allied to Athe ns. Th e

attempt failed, and the Thebans were put

to death; but the Plataeans appealed to

Athens for protection against their power-

ful neighbour, and when the Athenian

garrison was sent to them this was treated

as a

casus

P

REPARATIONS

were urged on on both

sides;

Sparta summoned her allies to

muster their contingents on the Isthmus

for the invasion of Attica, nearly all the

mainland states joining the Peloponnesian

league. Th e islanders and the cities in

Asia Minor, on the other hand, were

nearly all either actually subject to Athens

or in alliance with her.

As Pericles advised, the Athenians left

the country open to the ravages of the

invading forces, and themselves retired

within the city. In spite of the resent-

ment of those who saw their property

being laid waste, Pericles maintained his

ascendancy, and persuaded the people to

devote their energies to sending out an

irresistible fleet and to establishing a

great reserve both of ships and treasure,

which were to be an annual charge and



brought into active

use

only

in the

case

of dire emergency. The fleet sailed

round

the

Peloponnese,

and the

ravages

it

was able to inflict, with the alarm it

created, caused

the

withdrawal

of the

f

orces in Attica.

u

In

that winter Pericles delivered

a

great

tuneral oration, or panegyric, in memory

of

the

Athenians

who had so far

fallen

gloriously in defence of their country, in

which he painted the characteristic vir-

tues of the Athenian people in such a

fashion

as to

rouse

to the

highest pitch

the patriotic pride

of his

countrymen,

and their confidence in themselves and in

their future.

II—EARLY SUCCESSES

OF

ATHENS

I

N

the

second year

of the war

Athens

suffered from a fearful visitation of

the plague, which, however, made no way

in

the

Peloponnese.

It

broke

out

also

among

the

reinforcem ents dispatched

to

Pot idaea ; and it required all the skill of

Pericles to reconcile the Athenians to the

continuation of the war, after seeing their

territories over-run

for the

second time

for six weeks. By dint of dwelling on

the supreme importance of their decisive

command

of the sea and on the

vast

financial resources which secured their

staying power, he maintained his ascend-

ancy until his death in the following yea r,

though he had to submit to a fine.

The events which followed

his

death

only confirmed the profundity of his

political judgement, and the accuracy

with which he had gauged the capacities

of

the

s tate.

In

that winter Potidaea

was

orced to capitulate to the Athenians.

In the summer of the third year, the

..acedaemonians called on the Pla taeans

to desert

the

Athenian alliance.

On

their

refusal, Plataea

was

besieged

by the

allied forces of the Peloponnesians. W ith

splendid resolution, the Platae ans defeated

the attempt of the allies to force an

entry till they were able

to

complete

and

withdraw behind a second and more easily

tenable line of defence, when the Pelo-

ponnesians settled down to a regular in-

vestment.

The

same ye ar was m arked

by

the brilliant operations of the Athenian

admiral Phormio near Naupactus.

On the other hand, a Peloponnesian

squadron threatened

the

Piraeu s, caused

some temporary panic and awakened the

Athenians

to the

necessity

of

maintaining

a look-out, but otherw ise effected lit tle .

The year is further noted for the in-

vasion of Macedonia by the Thracian or

Scythian king Sitalces,

who was how-

ever, induced to retire.

In

the

next ye ar, Lesbos revolted

against

the

Athenian supremacy.

As a

result, an Athe nian squa dron blockaded

Mitylene.

The

Lacedaemonians were

well pleased to accept alliance with a sea

power which claimed to have struck

against Athens,

not as

being subject

to

her,

but in

anticipation

of

a t tempted sub-

jugation. The prompt equipment, how-

ever, of another Athenian fleet chilled

the naval enthusiasm of Spar ta .

D

URING

this winter the Pla taeans be-

gan

to

feel

in

straits from shortage

of supplies,

and it was

resolved tha t

a

party of them should break through the

siege lines and escape to Athens, a feat of

arms which

was

brilliantly

and

success-

fully accomplished.

In the next— the fifth—summ er, M ity-

lene capitulated; the fate of the inhabit-

ants was

to be

referred

to

Athens. Here

Cleon had now become the popular leader,

an d he persuaded the Athenians to order

the whole of the adult males to be put to

death.

The

opposition, however,

suc-

ceeded in getting this blood thirsty resolu-

tion rescinded.

The

second dispatch,

racing desperately after the first, did not

succeed

in

overtaking

it but was

just

in

t ime to prevent the order for the massa-

cre from being carried out. Lesbos was

divided among Athenian citizens, who left

the Lesbians

in

occupation

as

before,

but

drew

a

large rental from them .

In

the

same summer

the

remaining

garrison of Plataea surrendered to the

Lacedaemonians, on terms to be decided

by Lacedae mon ian comm issioners. Before

them

the

Plat aean s justified thei r resist-

ance, but the commissioners ignored the

defence and, on the pretext that the only

question

was

whether they

had

suffered

any wrong

at the

hands

of the

Pla taeans,

and that the answer to that was obvious,

pu t the Pla taeans to death and razed the

city

to the

ground.

M

EANWHILE, at Corcyra the popular

an d

the

oligarchical parties,

who

favoured the Athenians and Pelopon-



nesians respectively, had reached the

stage of murderous hostility to each

othe r. The oligarchs capture d the gov-

ernment and were then in turn attacked

by the popular party; and there was

savage faction fighting. An atte mp t was

made by the commander of the Athenian

squadron at Naupactus to act as modera-

tor; the appearance of a Peloponnesian

squadron and a confused sea fight, some-

what in favour of the latter, brought the

popular party to the verge of a com-

prom ise. Bu t the Peloponnesians retired

on the reported approach of a fresh

Athenian fleet, and a democratic reign of

terror followed.

The father slew the son, and the sup-

plicants were torn from the temples and

slain near them . And thus was initiated

the peculiar horror of this war—the

desperate civil strife in one city after

another, oligarchs hoping to triumph by

Lacedaemonian, and democrats by Athe-

nian, support, and either party when

upp ermo st, ruling by terror. It was at

this time also that the Ionian and Dorian

cities of Sicily, headed by Leontini and

Syracuse respectively, went to war with

each other, and an Athenian squadron was

first induced to participate in the strug-

gle.

Among the operations of the next, or

sixth, summer was a campaign which the

Athenian commander Demosthenes con-

ducted in Aetolia—successful at the out-

set, but terminating in disaster, which

made the general afraid to return to

Athe ns. He seized a chance, howeve r, of

recovering his credit by foiling a Lace-

daemonian expedition against Naupactus;

and in other ways he successfully estab-

lished a high military reputation, so that

he was no longer afraid to reappear at

Athens.

Next year, the Athenians dispatched a

larger fleet, with Sicily for its objective.

Demosthenes, however, who had a project

of his own in view, was given an inde-

pendent command. He was thus enabled

to seize and fortify Pylos , a position on

the south-west of Peloponnese, with a

harbour sheltered by the isle of Sphac-

teria. The Spartans, in alarm, withdrew

their invading force from Attica, and

attempted to recover Pylos, landing over

400 of their best men on Spha cteria. Th e

locality now became the scene of a

desperate struggle, which finally resulted

in the Spartans on Sphacteria being com-

pletely isolated.

So seriously did the Lacedaemonians

regard this blow that they invited the

Athenians to make peace virtually on

terms of an equal alliance; but the Athe-

nians were now so confident of a triumph-

ant issue that they refused the terms—

chiefly at the instiga tion of Cleon. Some

supplies, however, were got into Sphac-

teria, owing to the high rewards offered

by the Lacedaemonians for successful

blockade-running.

At this moment, Cleon, the Athenian

demagogue, having rashly declared that

he could easily capture Sphacteria, was

taken at his word and sent to do it. He

had the wit, however, to choose Demos-

thenes for his colleague, and to take pre-

cisely the kind of troops Demosthenes

wanted; with the result that within

twenty days the Spartans found them-

selves with no other alternatives than

annihilation or surrend er. Th eir choice

of the latter was an overwhelming blow

to Lacedaemonian prestige.

Il l—V ICTOR IES OF L CED EMON

T

HE capture of the island of Cythera

in the next summer gave the Athe-

nians a second strong station from which

they could constantly menace the Pelo-

ponnese. On the other hand , in this year

the Sicilians were awakening to the fact

that Athens was not playing a disinter-

ested part on behalf of the Ionian states,

but was dreaming of a Sicilian empire.

At a sort of peace congress, Hermocrates

of Syracuse successfully urged all Sicilians

to compose their quarrels on the basis of

uti possidetis

and thus deprive the

Athenians of any excuse for remaining.

Thus for the time Athenian aspirations

in that quarter were checked.

At Megara this year the dissensions of

the oligarchical and popular factions al-

most resulted in its capture by the

Athenians. The Lacedaemonian Brasidas,

however—who had distinguished himself

at Pylos—effected an entry, so that the

oligarchical and Peloponnesian party be-

came permanently established in power.

The most important operations were

now in two fields. Brasidas made a dash

through Thessaly into Macedonia, in alli-

ance with Perdiccas of Macedon, with



the hope of stirring the cities of Chalci-

(Jice to throw off the Athenian yoke; and

the democrats of Boeotia intrigued with

Athens to assist in a general revolution.

Owing partly to misunderstandings and

partly to treachery, the Boeotian demo-

crats failed to carry out their pro-

gramme, the Athenians were defeated at

Delium, and Delium itself was captured

by the Boeotians.

Meanwhile, Brasidas succeeded in per-

suading Acanthus to revolt, he himself

winning the highest of reputations for

justice and moderation as well as for

m ilitary skill. Late r in the year he sud-

denly turned his forces against the Athe-

nian colony of Amphipolis, which he in-

duced to surrender by offering very

favourable terms before Thucydides, who

was in command at Thasos, arrived to

relieve it.

The further successes of Brasidas dur-

ing this winter made the Athenians ready

Ito treat for peace, and a truce was agreed

upon for twelve m onth s. Brasidas how-

ever continued to render aid to the sub-

ject cities which revolted from Athens—

this being now the ninth year of the war

—but he failed in an attempt to capture

Potidaea.

The period of truce terminating without

any definite peace being arrived at, the

summer of the tenth year is chiefly nota-

ble for the expedition sent under Cleon

to recover Amphipolis, and for a re-

crudescence of the old quarrel in Sicily

between Leo ntini and Syracuse. Before

Amphipolis, the incompetent Cleon was

routed by the skill of Brasidas; but the

victor as well as the vanquished was slain,

though he lived long enough to know of

the victory. Their deaths removed two

of the most zealous opponents of the

peace for which both sides were now

anxious. Hence at the close of the tenth

year peace was concluded.

The Lacedaemonians, however, were al-

most alone in being fully satisfied by the

terms,

and the war was really continued

by an anti-Laconian confederation of the

former Peloponnesian allies, who saw in

the peace a means to the excessive pre-

pond erance of Athen s and Sparta. Argos

was brought into the new confederacy in

the hope of establishing her nominal

equality with Sparta.

For some years from this point the

combinations of the states were constantly

changing, while Athens and Sparta re-

mained generally on terms of friendliness,

the two prominent figures at Athens being

the conservative Nicias and the restless

and ambitious young intriguer Alcibiades.

I

N the fourteenth year there were ac-

tive hostilities between Argos, with

which by this time Athens was in alli-

ance,

and Lacedaemon, issuing in the

great battle of Mantinea, where there

was an Athenian contingent with the

Argives. Th is was notab le especially as

completely restoring the prestige of the

Lacedaemonian arms, their victory being

decisive. Th e result was a new trea ty

between Sparta and Argos, and the dis-

solution of the Argive-Athenian alliance;

but this was once more reversed in the

following year, when the Argive oligarchy

was attacked successfully by the popular

party.

The next year is marked by the high-

handed treatment of the island of Melos

by the Athen ians. Th is was one of the

very few islands, which had not been com-

pelled to submit to Athens, but had en-

deavoured to remain neu tral. Thith er

the Athenians now sent an expedition,

absolutely without excuse, to compel their

submission. Th e Me lians, however, re-

fused and gave the Athenians a good deal

of trouble before they could be subdued,

when the adult male population was put

to death, and the women and children

enslaved.

A

T

this time the Athenians resolved,

. under colour of an appeal for assist-

ance from the Sicilian city of Egesta,

deliberately to set about the establish-

me nt of their empire in Sicily. The

aggressive policy was vehemently advo-

cated by Alcibiades, and opposed by

Nicias. Ne verthe less, he , with Alcibiades

and Lamachus, was appointed to com-

mand the expedition, which was prepared

on a scale of unparalleled magnificence.

It was on the point of starting, when the

whole city was stirred to frenzy by the

midnight mutilation of the sacred images

called Hermae, an act laid at the door of

Alcibiades, along with many other charges

of profane outrages. Of set purpo se,

however, the enemies of Alcibiades re-

fused to bring him to trial. The expedi-

tion sailed. Th e Syracusans were deaf to

the warnings of Hermocrates until the

great fleet had actually arrived at

Rhegium.

I I



Nicias was now anxious to find an

excuse, in the evident falsity of state-

ments made by the Egestans, for the fleet

to content itself with making a demon-

stration and then returning home. The

scheme of Alcibiades, however, was

adopted for gaining over the other Sicil-

ian states in order to crush Syracuse.

But at this moment dispatches arrived

requiring the return of Alcibiades to stand

trial. Athe ns was in a panic over the

Hermae affair, which was supposed to

portent an attempt to re-establish the

despotism which had been ended a hun-

dred years before by the expulsion of the

Pisistratidae. Alcibiades, however, made

his escape, and for years pursued a life

of political intrigue against the Athenian

government.

Nicias and Lamachus, left in joint

command, drew off the Syracusan forces

by a ruse, and were thus enabled to

occupy unchecked a strong position be-

fore Syracuse. Althou gh, however, they

inflicted a defeat on the returned Syrai-

cusan forces, they withdrew into winter

quarters; the Syracusans were roused by

Hermocrates to improve their military

organization; and both sides entered on a

diplomatic contest for winning over the

other states of Sicily.

Alcibiades, now an avowed enemy of

Athens, was received by the Lacedaemon-

ians,

whom he induced to send an able

officer, Gylippus, to Syracuse, and to

establish a military post correspond

ing to that of Pylos on Attic soil at

Decelea.

IV —T H E D IS A S TER O F SY RA CU S E

I

N the spring the A thenians succeeded

in establishing themselves on the

heights called Epipolae, overlooking Syra-

cuse, began raising a wall of circumvalla-

tion, and carried by a surprise the coun-

ter-stockade which the Syracusans were

raising. In one of the skirmishes, while

the building of the wall was in progress,

Lamachus was killed; otherwise matters

went well for the Athenians and ill for

the Syracusans, till Gylippus was allowed

to land at Himera, force his way into

Syracuse, and give new life.

Nicias was guilty of the blunder of

allowing Gylippus to land at Himera to

aid the defence at the moment when it

was on the point of capitulation . A

long contest followed, the Athenians en-

deavouring to complete the investing

lines, the Syracusans to pierce them with

counterw orks. Nicias sent to Athen s for

reinforcements, while the Syracusans

were energetically fitting out a fleet

and appealing for aid in the Pelopon-

nese.

Nicias, in fact, was extremely despond-

ent. He dispatched a pitiable letter

(which Thucydides probably gives ver-

batim from some public record) to the

home authorities. The arrival of Gylip-

pus,

he said, had completely changed the

situation. The Syracusans would soon

be strongly reinforced. His arm y were

obliged to give up their own works of cir-

cumvallation, and had become rather the

besieged than the besiegers. Th eir ships

were leaky, their crews daily diminishing

—some even deserting. Th e expedition

must either be recalled at once or strongly

reinforced . H e himself was suffering

from illness, and begged to be relieved of

his comm and. The Athenians, however,

answered his dispatches by preparing a

great reinforcement under the command

of Demosthenes, without accepting the

resignation of Nicias. Th e Lacedae-

monians, however, also sent some rein-

forcements; at the same time they for-

mally declared war, and carried out the

plan of occupying and fortifying Decelea,

which completely commanded the Athe-

nian territory and was the cause of untold

loss and suffering.

Now, at Syracuse, the besieged took

the offensive both by sea and land, and

were worsted on the water, but captured

some of the Athenian forts commanding

the entry to the besiegers lines—a seri-

ous disaster. By the time that Dem os-

thenes with his reinforcements reached

Sicily nearly the whole island had come

over to the side of Syracuse. Before this,

the Syracusans had again challenged an

engagement by both sea and land, with

results indecisive on the first day but

distinctly in their favour on the second.

At this juncture, Demosthenes arrived

and, seeing the necessity for immediate

action, made a night attack on the

Syracusan lines; but, his men falling into

confusion after a first success, the at-

tempt was disastrously repulsed.

Demosthenes was quick to realize that

the whole situation was hopeless; but



licias lacked nerve to accept the re-

sponsibility of retiring, and also had some

idea that affairs within Syracuse were

favourable. His obstinacy gave Dem os-

thenes and his colleague Eurymedon the

repression that he was guided by secret

information. And now it became the

primary object of Gylippus and the

Syracusans to keep the Athenians from

retiring . An other nava l defeat reduced

the Athenians to despair; they resolved

that they must cut their way out.

T

HE

desperate a ttempt was made, but

by almost hopeless men against an

enem y now full of confidence. To the

excited, almost agonised, watchers on

shore, it seemed for a brief space that

the ships might force a passage; the fight

was a frenzied scuffle; but presently the

terrible truth was realized—the Athenian

ships were being driven ashore . Th e last

hope of escape by sea was gone, for,

though there were still ships enough, the

sailors were too utterly demoralised to

make the attempt.

Hermocrates and Gylippus, sure that

a retreat by land would not be tried, suc-

ceeded by a trick in detaining the Athe-

nians till they had themselves sent out

detachm ents to hold the roads. On the

third day the Athenians began their re-

treat in unspeakable misery, amid the

lamentations of the sick and wounded,

whom they were forced to leave behind.

For three days they struggled on, short

of food and perpetually harassed, cut off

from all com mu nications. On the third

day their passage was barred in a pass,

and they found themselves in a tra p. On

the third night they attempted to break

away by a different route, but the van and

the rear lost touch . Overtaken by the

Syracusans, Demosthenes attempted to

fight a rearguard action, but in vain, and

he was forced to surrender at discretion

with his whole force.

Next day, Nicias with the van was

overtaken and, after a ghastly scene of

confusion and slaughter, the remnants of

the vanguard were forced to surrender

also.

Nicias and Dem osthenes were put

to death; great numbers were seized as

private spoil by their captors, the rest of

the prisoners—more than 7,000—were

confined for weeks under the most noi-

some conditions in the quarries, and

finally the survivors were sold as slaves.

So pitiably ended that once magnificent

enterprise in the nineteenth year of the

war.

The terrific disaster filled every enemy

of Athens with confident expectation of

her imm ediate and utter ruin. Lacedae-

mon anticipated an unqualified supremacy.

At Athens there was a stubborn determi-

nation to prepare for a desperate stand;

but half the islanders were intriguing

for Lacedaemonian or Persian aid in

breaking free, while Alcibiades became ex-

tremely busy.

The first Peloponnesian squadron which

attempted to move was promptly driven

into Piraeus by an Athenian fleet and

blockaded. On the open revolt of some

of the states, the Athenians for the first

time brought into play their reserve fund

and reserve navy—the emergency had

arisen. W hile one after anoth er of the

subject cities revolted, the Athenians

struck hard at Chios, and especially

Miletus, and obtained marked success.

Meanwhile, a revolution in Samos had

expelled the oligarchy and re-established

the democracy, to which the Athenians

accorded freedom, thereby securing a use-

ful ally. In Lesbos also they recovered

their supremacy.

Phrynicus now came into prominence

as a shrewd commander and crafty poli-

tician, while the intricate intrigues of

Alcibiades, whose great object was to re-

cover his position at Athens, created per-

petu al confusion. The se events took

place in the twentieth year of the war,

and to them must be added a Lacedae-

monian treaty with Persia.

All the leading men, however, were en-

gaged in playing fast and loose, each of

them having his personal ambitions in

view. Of this laby rinth of plots and

counter-plots, the startling outcome was

the sudden abrogation of the constitution

at Athens and the capture of the govern-

ment by a committee of five with a coun-

cil of four hundred and a supplementary

assembly of five thousand—in place of

the whole body of citizens as formerly.

The Five and the Four Hundred in effect

were the government, and they established

a reign of terror.

At Athens, the administration thus

formed was effective; but the army and

fleet at Samos repudiated the revolution

and swore loyalty to the democracy,

claiming to be the true representatives

of the Athenian state. Mo reover, they

allied themselves with Alcibiades, expect-



ing through him to receive Persian sup-

port; and, happily for Athens, he suc-

ceeded in restraining the fleet—which was

still more than a match for all adversaries

—from sailing back to Piraeus to subvert

the rule of the Four Hundred.

The more patriotic of the oligarchs saw,

in fact, that the best hopes for the state

lay in the establishment of a limited

democracy; with the result that the ex-

treme oligarchs, who would have joine

i

hands with the enemy, were overthrowr

and the rule of the Five Thousand re

placed that of the Four Hundred, provid

ing Athens with the best administratioi

it had ever known. A great naval vi ctor

was won by the Athenian fleet, under

the command of Thrasybulus, over

slightly larger Peloponnesian fleet a

Cynossema.

Anabasis or The Going Up of

the Ten Thousand

X E N O P H O N

S

OME docum entation is needed in introducing Xen opho n s history of the anabas is,

or up-cou ntry march, of the Greek army . Cyrus the Younger of Persia had as-

sisted the Lacedaemonians against the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war, which ended

in the victory of the former at Aegos Potami, 404

B.C.

This year saw also the death

of C yrus s father an d the succession of his brothe r, Artaxerxes II . Cyrus determined

to m ake a bid for the Persian thro ne, and in 401 set out into Artaxerxes s territo ry

with an army of 10,000 Greek mercenaries. Most of the narrative refers to the cata -

basis, or retreat from Cunaxa to the Euxine.

I—THE GOING UP OF CYRUS AND HIS HOST

C

YRUS, the younger brother of Arta-

xerxes the king, began his prep-

arations for revolt by gradually

gathering and equipping an army on the

pretext of hostile relations between him-

self and another of the western satraps,

Tissaphernes. No tably, he secretly fur-

nished Clearchus, a Lacedaemonian, with

means to equip a Greek force in Thrace;

another like force was ready to move

from Thessaly under Aristippus; while a

Boeotian, Proxenus, and two other friends

were commissioned to collect more mer-

cenaries to aid in the war with Tissa-

phernes.

Next, an excuse for marching up-coun-

try, at the head of all these forces, was

found in the need of suppressing the

Pisidian s. He advanced from Sardis into

Phrygia, where his musters were com-

pleted at Celaenae. A review was held at

Tyriaeum, where the Cilician queen, who

had supplied funds, was badly frightened

by a mock charge of the Greek contin-

gent. W hen the advance had reached

Tarsus, there was almost a mutiny among

the Greeks, who were suspicious of the

inten tions of Cyrus. But the diplomacy

of their chief general, Clearchus, the

Lacedaemonian, and promises of increased

pay, prevailed, though it had long been

obvious that Pisidia was not the objective

of the expedition.

Further reinforcements were received

at Issus, the eastern seaport of Cilicia;

Cyrus then marched through the Syrian

gate into Syria. At Myriandrus two

Greek commanders, probably through

jealousy of Clearchus, deserted. Th e

whole force now struck inland to Thapsa-

cus, on the Euphrates.

At Thapsacus, Cyrus announced his

purpose. Th e Greek soldiers were angry

with their generals for having, as they

supposed, wilfully misled them, but were

mollified by promise of large rewards.

One of the commanders, Menon, won the

approval of Cyrus by being the first to

lead his contingent across the Euphrates

on his own initiativ e. The advance was

now conducted through a painfully sterile

country. In the course of this, the troops

of Clearchus and Menon very nearly

came to blows; the intervention of

Proxenus only made matters worse; and

order was restored by the arrival of

Cyrus, who pointed out that the whole

expedition must be ruined if the Greeks

fell out among themselves.

By this time, Artaxerxes had realised

5. history of the peloponnesian war by thucydides, pp. 7-13

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