(5) merton (1937) - sociology of knowledge

8/2/2019 (5) MERTON (1937) - Sociology of Knowledge

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The Sociology of KnowledgeAuthor(s): Robert K. Merton

Reviewed work(s):Source: Isis, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Nov., 1937), pp. 493-503Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/225155 .

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The sociologyof knowledge *)The last two decades have witnessed, especially in Germany and

France, the rise of a new discipline, the sociology of knowledge(Wissenssoziologie), with a rapidly increasing number of studentsand a growing literature (even a "selected bibliography"would include several hundred. titles). Since most of the investi-gations in this field have been concerned with the socio-culturalfactors influencing the development of beliefs and opinion ratherthan of positive knowledge, the termn"Wissen" must be inter-preted very broadly indeed, as referring to social ideas and thoughtgenerally, and not to the physical scien.ces, except where expresslyindicated. Briefly stated, the sociology of knowledge is primarilyconcer.ned with the "dependence of knowledge upon socialposition" (i) and, to an. excessive and fruitless degree, with theepisternological implications of such dependence. In fact, as weshall see, there is a growing tendency to repudiate this latterproblem as it becomes increasingly apparent that the social genesisof thought has no necessary bearing on its validity or falsity.'T'he Seinsverbundenheit of thought is held to be demonstratedwhen it can be shown that in certain realms knowledge does notdevelop according to immanent laws of growth (based on obser--

(*) This brief general survey of the subject is primarily but not exclusivelybased upon the following booksERNST GRONWALD. Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens. Wien-LeipzigWILHELM RAUMOLLER, 1934. Pp. 279 4-viii. RM 7.50.MAX SCHELER (ed.). Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. Miinchen undLeipzig : DUNCKER & HuMBILOT, 1924. PP. 450+vii.ALEXANDER VON SCHELTING. Max Webers WVissenschaftslehre.iibingen: J. C. B.MOHR, 1934. PP. 420+viii. RM I6.KARIL MANNHEIM. Ideology and utopia: an introduction to the sociology of know-ledge. Translated by LOUISWIRTH and EDWARD SHILS. New York: HARCOURT,

BRACE and Company; London : KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., 1936.PP. 3I8+xxxi. $4.00. 15s.(i) ,,Seinsverbundenheit des Wissens", a phrase which is fast becoming aready cliche.

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494 R. K. MERTONvation and logic) but that, at certain junctures, extra-theoreticalfactors of various sorts, usually termed Seinsfaktoren, determinethe appearance, form, and in some instances, even the content andlogical structure of this knowledge. These non-theoretical factorsmay impinge upon thought in several ways: by leading to theperception of the problem, by determining its theoretical for-mulation, by fixing the assumptions and values which to a consi-derable degree affect the choice of materials and problems, andby being involved in the process of verification.These factors manifestly influence thought in certain spheres(e.g. the social sciences and the field of opinion generally) to a fargreater extent than others (e.g., the physical and natural sciences).Hence it is quite understandable that most students of Wissens-soziologie have neglected the analysis of the development of themore firmly established disciplines.It is manifest that the sociology of knowledge is concerned withproblems which have had a long prehistory. So far is this true,that this discipline has already found its first historian, ERNSTGRONWALD. As he properly indicates, some of its dominantconceptions are simply more systematic and more clearly for-mulated restatements of views which found expression in thewritings of FRANCIS BACON (see his discussion of the Idola),to trace them no further back. In this samietradition, marking theintellectual optinlism of the Enlightenment, inasmuch as it assumedthat nman s capable of acquiring valid knowledge concerning allproblems but does not do so merely because of 'disturbing factors',is VOLTAIRE's doctrine of the "priestly lie." From this viewthat man, who can know the truth, is lead to conscious dissimula-tion by his interests (economic, the will to power, etc.), it is nota far cry to the doctrine that ideas are the outcome of profoundinterests which unwittingly tincture and distort every phaseof man's thought. NIETZSCHE tarts out from this basis but addsa new facet: the fact that a judgment is false does not necessarilypreclude its utility. This distinction between truth and utilityfinds further expression in the works of VATHINGER, SOREL,PARETOand G. ADLER.According to GR'UNWALD, the Christian dogma of evil, whichis error in the cognitive sphere, as a necessary element of theinscrutable Divine Plan, is the second principal historical root


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THESOCIOLOGYFKNOWLEDGE 495of the sociology of knowledge. Certaingroups, notably those ofunbelievers, were stricken with blindness by God, so that theirjudgments cannotbe valid. Hence, it is no longer necessary toanalyze their individual judgments in order to ascertain theirfalsity; this is pre-determinedby their group-affiliation. In thehands of HEGEL,his doctrinebecomes secularized,andnecessarilyfallaciousthought, up to a certainpoint, is held to be a reflectionof the absolute Geist, since such thought is nothing but a meansfor the "List der Vernunft"to gain its own ends. This idealistichistoricism guaranteesits own truth by holding that the philo-sopher, HEGELimself, stands in alliance with the world-spirit;he is no longer simply a tool in the hands of the absolute spirit,but is at last able to comprehend it. MARX ubstitutes the"relationsof production"for HEGEL'Sbsolute spirit: the deter-minant of an individual's thought and attitudes is found in hisposition in the productive process. Just as some classes areunavoidablycharacterizedby unavoidably distorted viewpoints(falsches Bewusstsein) hence the motives of thtir membersneed not be impugned - so the class which is the exponentof an immanenthistoricprocess,namelythe proletariat, s assuredthe possibility, if indeed not the certainty, of valid thought.The circularreasoningof these doctrines s apparent. Assumingpremiseswhich involvea radicalhistoricismentailingthe denialofthe possibility of valid thought, they uniformlyseek to vindicatetheir own contentionsby merefiat: by assertingthat the historicalprocess (transcendentally or immanently determined) is suchas to exempt the writer, or the group with which he is affiliated,from error.

In contrast to these views, MAXSCHELERoes not accord anyone social class a monopoly of truth. In an aphoristic fashionwhichdid not permithim to develophis many insights,he suggeststhat the Realfaktorenrace,state, economy)act as selectiveagenciesof ideas, retardingor quickeningtheir diffusion,but not affectingtheir validity or determiningtheir content. This view does notinitially preclude an analysis of the development of the physicaland natural sciences since it is primarily concerned with the studyof non-theoretic factors in so far as they determine the directionof intellectual interest. An extreme historicism, on the otherhand, precisely because it unwarrantablymaintains that the


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496 R. K. MERTONconditioning of thought by socio-cultural factors has a significantbearing on its validity, is compelled to eliminate these sciencesfrom consideration, on pain of being forced into the uncomfortableposition of repudiating the accumulated bulk of scientific know-ledge.

SCHELER suggests that an important social development whichlay behind the upsurge of modern science was the increasingdivision between Church and State in the late Middle Ages, andthe subsequent multiplication of religious sects. This meantan ever greater guarantee of the freedom of science since scientistscould play the many authorities against one another with theresult that authoritarian restrictions on science became ever lessbinding. "Toleration" is not unrelated to a multiplicity ofconflicting sectarian points of view. Moreover, in contrastto the feudal ruling classes which consistently sought controlover men, the new bourgeoisie were primarily concerned withacquiring the capacity and power to reshape things into valuablegoods. This change was equally manifested by a suppressionof the 'magical' techniques of controlling groups and of thetraditional ruling classes and by a new positive estimation of thepossibility of controlling nature.

,,Nicht der technische Bedarf bedingt die neue Wissenschaft, nicht die neueWissenschaft den technischen Fortschritt, sondern im Typus des biirgerlichenneuen Menschentums und seiner neuen Triebstruktur und seinem neuen Ethosist ebensowohl fundiert die ursprungliche Umformung des logischen Kategorial-systems der neuen Wissenschaft als der neue gleich urspriingliche technischeAntrieb auf Naturbeherrschung." (p. Ioo)SCHELER uggests further that parliamentary democracy (orregimes approximating it in structure) has been connected withscience in the liberal era through a number of common presupposi-tions and demands. First among these is the general belief,

embodied in strong sentiments, that free discussion, the dialecticexchange of ideas and theses, would generally lead in scienceas well as in the political arena to truth and the politically correct."Freedom shall lead ye to truth" is sharply opposed to theauthoritarian doctrine: my (2) "truth shall make ye free."

(2) It might be suggested that the relevant implications of the Biblical phrasefirst become fully manifest when read in the setting of the previous verse: "Thensaid JESUS to those Jews which believed on him, If ye continue in my word, then


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THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 497Belief in the "eternal truths of reason" is broken through by therelativism of positivistic science as well as by parliamentarydemocracy. In its place appears the belief in unlimited discussion.as a means of arriving at the true. This, suggests SCHELER,.with its Poincarean doctrine of conventionalism, of pragmatismwhich tests assumptions simply by an appeal to convenience,has as a consequence a Zersplitterung which comes dangerouslyclose to an opportunism of the interests which prevail at anymoment. Hence, it leads - this was written in I923 - in thesphere of knowledge to a demand for an "established truth"and in the political realm to the drive for the abolition of anantiquated parliamentarism, to a readiness for dictatorship,from the right or left.

,,So hat der liberale Szientifismus und der parlamentarischc Demokratismussich eben in diesem gemeinsamen Prinzip langsam fast totgelaufen, um (noch)nur literarisch -nicht politisch- bedeutsamen Verzweiflungsschreien nach,Dczision', Diktatur, Autoritait Platz zu machen." (138)MANNHEIM's recently translated work (3) is primarily concernedwith the examination of human thought as it operates in politicallife "as an instrument of collective action" and not as it is norma-

tively described in textbooks on logic. Upon the assumptionthat it is the will of members of groups to change or to maintainthe realms of society and nature which guides the emergenceof their concepts, problems and modes of thought, MANNHEIMseeks to discriminate and isolate various styles of thinking andto relate them to the groups in which they arise. The fact thatthought is so rooted in a social milieu need not lead to error butmay provide a perspective for observing aspects of a problemwhich would otherwise be overlooked. Contrariwise, a givensocial position so limits one's point of view as to obscure variousfacets of the situation under scrutiny. These conceptions aredeveloped by 1M'ANNIIEINI in connection with his discussion ofthe two basic concepts, ideology and utopia.arc ye my disciples indeed; And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall makeye frec." JOH-IN,viii : 31, 32.

(3) Wc arc indebted to Prof. Louis WIRTH and EIWARD SHILS for a lucidtranslatiorn of a particularly difficult work. This volume combines MANNHEIM'Swidely-heralded Ideologie und Utopie, first published in 1929; his article "Wissens-soziologic", published in the HandwOrterbuchder Soziologie, edited by ALFREDVIERKANDT; and an introduction written especially for the English edition.


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498 R. K. MERTONThe concept "ideology" is an outgrowth of political conflict

in the course of which it appears "that ruling groups can in theirthinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation thatthey are simply no longer able to see certain facts which wouldundermine their sense of domination." (p. 36) As a result,the social judgments of the dominant strata constitute an apologiafor the existing order. Ideologies are of two types: particularand total. The particularist version maintains that the viewsof our opponent are so bound up with his class position that he isunwilling or unable to admit considerations which destroy hisclaims to dominance. Historically, the first step toward thechange of the particularist to the total conception was taken byKANT in his development of a philosophy of consciousness.This held that an infinitely variegated world is transformed intoa unity through the unity of the perceiving subject who evolvesprinciples of organization (categories) for understanding thisworld. The subject is not a concrete individual but "consciousnessin itself," which, viewed by HEGEL in historical perspective assubject to continuous transformation, becomes the Volksgeist.With MARX,the folk-spirit is broken down into consciousnessof classes and unitary perspectives are held to be peculiar of classesrather than of peoples, times, or nations.It is possible to divide the total conception into special andgeneral forms. Special, by interpreting opponents'views as a merefunction of their social position; general, when the analyst subjectsall points of view, including his own, to ideological analysis. "Withthe emergence of the general formulation of the total conceptionof ideology, the simple theory of ideology develops into thesociology of knowledge." (p. 69) This general total conceptionis finally divided into an evaluative, which is concerned with theepistemological bases of ideas, and a non-evaluative type, whichseeks simply to ascertain how certain social relations give rise toparticular interpretations.The second of MANNHEIM'S basic pair of concepts is that ofutopia. Oriented toward an as yet non-existent but concretelyrealizable state of affairs, conceptions which, once they pass overinto action, break up the existing order, are utopian. In contrastto ideologies which are illusory, utopias (as thus defined) aretrue. Manifestly, this involves an ex post facto criterion of truth


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THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 499since it is otherwise impossible to ascertain which ideas will betranslated into actual situations.

Inasmuch as MANNHEIM has severely delimited, if not eliminated,the realm of valid thinking, he is compelled, as were his prede-cessors, to justify his own observations as true and not merelyideological. This he strives to accomplish by indicating thatthere is an "unanchored, relatively classless stratum, the sociallyunattached intelligentsia" (sozialfreischwebende Intelligenz), who*can, by virtue of their detachment, transcend class perspectivesand attain valid thought, which integrates the various partialpoints of view. And, by necessary inference, it is in this stratumthat MANNHEIM finds his place. Once again, the grounds ofvalidity are found not in objective canons of truth but in thecharacteristics of a specifically defined group. And on whatbasis can one establish this premise ?In the course of his invariably stimulating discussion, MANNHEIM-states a number of theorems which might more advisedly be*construed as suggestive hypotheses. It is only in a highly-differentiated society, characterized by high social mobility anddemocratization, that the confrontation of incompatible and mu-tually unintelligible universes of discourse leads to relativism.The sociology of knowledge could itself arise only in such asociety where, with the emergence of new and the destruction-of old basic values, the very foundations on which an oppo-nent's (4) beliefs rest are challenged.

(4) The use of the term "opponent" or "adversary" reflects the political sourceof MANNHEIM'S thought and its general inapplicability to scientific developments.*Thc function of political controversy, in contrast to scientific criticism and dis-cussion, is personal or party aggrandizement at the expense of 'opposing','competing' persons or parties. Hence, the objective of discrediting one's opponentel tout prix. In science, the "opponent", if it be permitted to revert to anthropo-morphism in order to find a parallel, is "ignorance" or the "resistance of natureto the uncovering of its secrets." To be sure, because of social factors which areextraneous to the pursuit of science itself, the same elements of personal aggran-dizement and loyalty to a "school" or faction may intrude themselves into scicntificpursuits. But these are considered to represent unfortunate deviations from thegoverning norm of impersonality; they are not tactical expedients for the specificend in view. In fact, it is the essential function of this norm of impersonality topreclude these emotional involvements of scientists with certain of "their"theories, so as to leave them willing and ready to foresake these theories when newfacts demonstrate their inadequacy. The sentiment basic to science adheres tothe dominating idea of "the search for truth" and the intrusion of other sentiments


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500 R. K. MERTONMANNHEIM propounds the further thesis that "even the

categories in which experiences are subsumed, collected andordered vary according to the social position of the observer."(p. I30) An organically integrated group conceives of history as acontinuous movement toward the realization of its ends; sociallyuprooted and loosely integrated groups espouse an a-historicalintuitionism which stresses the fortuitous and imponderable.The well-adjusted conservative mentality is averse to historicaltheorizing since the social order, which is viewed as "natural",presents no problems. Only the questioning of the status quobv opposing classes leads conservatives to defensive philosophicaland historical reflections concerning themselves and the socialworld. Furthermnore, conservatism tends to view history interms of morphological categories which stress the unique characterof historical configurations, whereas advocates of change adopt ananalytical approach in order to arrive at units which may berecombined, through causality or functional integration, into newwholes. The first view stresses the inherent stability of the socialstructure as it is; the second emphasizes changeability by ab-stracting the component elements of this structure and rearrangingthem anew.In so far as it claims epistemological relevance, MANNHEIM'Sdiscussion has been subjected to a thoroughgoing critique byDr. VON SCHELTING (5), who clarifies many of the controversialissues involved. His leading objections may be brieflysUmmarized. i. The inmputationof ideological thought to one'sopponent is a rhetorical device which as a social phenomenonmay be profitably studied by social science, but it is doubtful(personal vainglory, economic and political status, etc.) is apt to disturb thisumliassed pursuit of truth. Hence, also, the jealous reaction of the scientistwhen loyalties to other institutions, e.g. the State, are demanded of him quascientist, since these, as in the case of PHILIPP LENARD's denunciation of EINSTEIN'S"Jewish physics", interfere with the institutionalized functioning of scientificresearch.(5) We are here concerned only with that section of SCHF.LTING's book, namelypages 73-177, esp. pp. II7-I67, which deal directly with the sociology of knowN-ledge. It may be said in passing that the work as a whole contributes much to ourunderstanding of MAX WE1RR'S methodology and clearly demonstrates its im-portance for present day research in the social sciences. Cf. also SCHELTING'Slengthy review of MANNHEIM'S Ideologie und Utopie in the American SociologicalReview, August 1936.


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THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 501whether we are justified in adopting ideology as a central con-cept. 2. In the total version of the ideology concept, the entirestructure of an individual's thought is involved. H-ence therecan only be ideological thought, and even science, especiallysocial science, becomes bound to social position and is conse-quently invalid. How, then, can MANNHEIM claim validity forhis own thought? Whether MANNHEIM has been led to thisfamiliar relativistic impasse is, however, a moot point which doesnot lend itself to a ready solution. At times, MANNHEIMmaintainsthat the determination of thought by social position is not neces-sarily a source of error, but may often afford an opportunity forinsights which are otherwise not possible. (6) In other contexts,he asserts that such determination destroys the possibility ofvalid thought (7). It seems that these contradictions rest upon atwofold confusion. In the first place stands the tenable thesisof a greater probability of distortion and error when interest andsentiment not only motivate but also pervade the very act ofcognition. This is the familiar personal and social equation.But this is confused with the necessity of significant bias in allsituations involving "vital interestedness." Secondly, the factthat one's interests and consequent definition and limitation of theproblem are related to class affiliation is at times unwarrantablyassumed to imply that judgments within this limited sphere arenecessarily incorrect. These are essentially distinct propositions:the grounds for choice of a problem imply nothing about thestatus of its solution (8).3. SCHELTINGproperly indicates MANNHEIM S serious confu-sion of essentially different spheres. Ethical and aesthetic norms,political and religious beliefs (prejudices and convictions) andscientific judgments are all lumped under the one rubric "Wissen",(I & U, pp. 22, 72, 84) and considerations which are applicableto some of these phenomena are tacitly extended to all. On

(6) See, for example, pp. 42, 72, III, I24, 153, 254.(7) Sce, for example, pp. 6I-62, I75-6, i84.(8) In his essay on ThzeSociology of Knowledge, MANNHIEIM tempers his viewsand grants the possibility of particularized validity to different observers in thesame class position who "on the basis of the identity of their conceptual andcategorial apparatus and through the common universe of discourse therebycreated, arrive at similar results." (p. 270) But MANNE1I3IMdoes not concede thepossibility of objective judgments transcending class position.


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502 R. K. MERTONwhat grounds may one attribute or refuse "validity" to ethicalnorms! 4. MANNHEIM'S multiple criteria of "truth" - an idea'sfulfilment of function, active efficacy, etc. - are non-cognitive,non-theoretical bases for evaluating ideas. Moreover, theypresuppose the very concept of objective validity which theypurport to supplant. 5. If super-particular validity is vouchsafedthe "socially unattached intelligentsia", how does one arrive atthis valid generalization, except by epistemological fiat, andsecondly, how can one objectively establish the fact that a specificindividual is "socially unattached"?

6. MANNHEIM freely grants that the "psychological genesis"of ideas is irrelevant to the problem of their validity. Yet, hemaintains that the "social genesis" of thought involves such rele-vance because it is a "meaningfiul genesis." This is only appa-rently convincing. The argument rests on the confusion of thetheory of the irrelevance of genesis for the meaning of a judgment(which no one denies) with the doctrine of the irrelevance ofgenesis for the validity of a judgment. Only the latter is main-tained by epistemology.

7. Finally, the thesis of historical change in the categories ofthought has not been demonstrated. In the course of suchnominal "demonstrations", comparisons are characteristicallymade, not between the categories involved in the positive thoughtof various peoples, but between these and the categories basicto religious or magical conceptions. This fallacy, which is sharedby both MANNHEIM and SCHELER, is especially conspicuous inthe work of L1UVY-BRUHL,JERUSALEM and their disciples. Incontroverting this thesis, it can be shown a) that in realms otherthan that of positive knowledge, the negation of the principlesof identity and contradiction is prevalent even in our own dayand b) that in primitive groups, in addition to spheres where"pre-logicality" is dominant, there exists a corpus of technicalknowledge which presupposes the canons of logic and verificationbasic to positive thought.Once we leave this general problem of the epistemologicalrelevance of the sociology of knowledge, disagreement gives waylargely to consensus. If this discipline is to bear fruit, if it isto provide insight and understanding of the complex interrelationsof thought and society, it would seem advisable that its investi-


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THE SOCIOLOGYOF KNOWLEDGE 503gations be restricted to problems which lend themselves to testsof fact. In his preface to MANNHEIM'S work, Professor WIRTHdescribes some of these fundamental problems.I. Determination of the shifts in the foci of intellectual interestwhich are associated with changes in the social structure(changes in differentiation, stratification, etc.)

2. Analysis of the mentality of a social stratum, with due regardfor the factors which determine acceptance or rejection ofparticular ideas by certain groups.3. Studies of the social evaluation of types of knowledge andof the factors determining the proportion of social resourcesdevoted to each of these types.4. Studies of the conditions under which new problems anddisciplines, arise and decline.5. Systematic examination of the social organization of intellec-tual life, including norms guiding such activity, sources ofsupport, direction and foci of interests involved in suchorganization.6. Study of the agencies facilitating, impeding and directing thetransmission and diffusion of ideas and knowledge.7. Studies of the intellectual: his social origins, means of socialselection, degree of change or shift in class loyalties, incen-tives for particular pursuits, associated interests.8. Analysis of the social consequences of scientific, and parti-cularly technological, advance.

It is likely that the emphasis upon the metaphysical and episte-mological implications of the sociology of knowledge can be traced,in part, to the fact that the first proponents of this disciplinestemmed largely from philosophical rather than scientific circles.The burden of further research is to turn from this welter ofconflicting opinion to empirical investigations which may establishin adequate detail the uniformities pertaining to the appearance,acceptance and diffusion, or rejection and repression, developmentand consequences of knowledge and ideas.

Harvard University ROBERT K. MERTON

(5) merton (1937) - sociology of knowledge

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