5052863 offshore safety case training ppt

7/31/2019 5052863 Offshore Safety Case Training Ppt

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Sreejith Offshore Training pack

One Day Offshore Safety Training

Pillai Sreejith


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Introduction

Offshore Safety Case Training

[email protected]


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Major accidents do happen around the world,some of them recent, have caused us to ask if

they can happen to us and they certainly can!

We need to ensure they do not happen to us by:

Re-emphasising our safety management system;

Updating our existing Field safety Case; and

Ensuring you all know about it!!

Why this training?


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What will we learn today?

The difference between occupational/personaland process safety;

What is a major accident; What is and what is in an offshore Safety Case; What are the safety barriers / controls/ systems/

Safety Critical Systems (SCE) that prevent majoraccidents;

The part we all must play in preventing major

accidents; and Test our understanding of what we have learned

through Piper Alpha accident.


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Piper Alpha

1988 Major fire and explosion

167 people died

Caused by PTW failure, PFP flaws and layout issues

Bombay High

2005 MSV collision with platform and major fire

11 People died

Caused by riser damage from MSV impact

Texas City Refinery

2005 petroleum distillate overflowed causing explosion & flash fire

14 People died

Caused by maintenance & process start-up flaws

Major Accidents in Oil & Gas Industries


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Recent Major Accidents in your

offshore Field?

Please include details of major accidents (and near-misses) that occurred in

your installation/s to tell the participants the need for them to be cautious.

Include photographs if you have.


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Major Modifications

List down the major modifications (process /

marine) that occurred in your offshore

installation/s in the past 1 year to tell them

that the risk profile has changed:

Examples:

Flare system modifications

Addition of a hydrocarbon process equipment Change in mooring system

Addition of gas compression facilities


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What is a safety case?

Operators of offshore installations want to besure that their operations are safe and do notexpose their people or their business tounacceptable levels of risk;

Plant modifications, variations on operatingconditions and new ownership mean that the riskpicture is changing; and

Regulators and other stakeholders ask you tojustify the continuing operation of the installationthrough safety cases.


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Corporate HSE Management System

Show your HSEMS through a flow chart or a diagram toexplain how periodic risk assessment/s are done to update

safety case, as part of global sustainability reporting / CSR.


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Offshore Safety Case Update project

Key steps involved:

Offshore site visit (to assess the safety

critical element / barrier performance);

Risk Assessment (using realistic field

inputs such as barrier performance to be

used in QRA event gates in frequency

analysis); and

Safety Case update
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1 day Training Contents

Difference between Occupational /personal and Process &Marine Safety;

What is a major accident?; Major Offshore accident case studies;

Piper Alpha Mumbai High Platform BP Texas Refinery

Potential Major accidents for offshore complex; Offshore Safety Case;

Safety Barriers in the offshore complex / installation; and Safety training assessment.
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Breaks for the day

10.30 am: Tea / Coffee Break

12.30 to 1.30 pm: Lunch break

3.30 pm: Tea / Coffee Break
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Once the safety systems /barriers

fail, there can be major

accidents!!!

Only you can operate and

maintain safety systems withoutflaws.

Key Message

[email protected]


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Session Break


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Occupational /Personal, Marineand Process Hazards

[email protected]


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Learning objectivesTo understand major accidents;

To understand the difference between occupational/personal, marineand process hazards;

To understand the Swiss Cheese accident causation model and BowTie barrier concept;

To learn the importance of barriers in controlling major accidents

and

To appreciate the need to maintain the safety systems in order tocontrol / mitigate major accidents.


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Are these terms too obvious and

more of a commonsense issue?

If so, why are we discussing this?

Discussion trigger: BP Texas findings by Mr. Baker panel.


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Major Accident(UK HSE SC Regulations,2005 )

A Major Accident defined by UK HSE is: A fire, explosion or the release of a dangerous substance

involving death orserious personal injury to persons on theinstallation or engaged in an activity or in connection with it;

An event involving major damage to the structure of theinstallation or plant affixed thereto or any loss in the stability ofthe installation;

The collision of a helicopterwith the installation;

The failure of life support systems for diving operations inconnection with the installation; and

Any other event arising from a work activity involving death orserious personal injury to five or more persons on the installationor engaged in an activity in connection with it.


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Major AccidentsExamples

Deadliest accident so far: 1988 Piper Alpha (167

fatalities);

2nd deadliest: 1980 Alexander L. Kielland

Accommodation rig capsized during a storm(123 fatalities);

3rd deadliest: 1989 Seacrest drillship capsized

during a typhoon (91 fatalities ); and

9th Deadliest: 2005 Mumbai High Platform fire

(22 fatalities).


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Potential Major Accidents in your

Offshore Field Examples please customize

Blowouts Riser & Pipeline releases Process Hydrocarbon Releases Fire & Explosion

Ship Collision Dropped Objects Transportation Accidents Helicopter crash

Projectile/Missile impact Structural damage Turret Failure Cargo Tank explosion


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Occupational Hazards

Personal or Occupational Health and Safety Hazards

Can give rise to incidents or accidents that primarily affectone individual worker for each occurrence

Personnel injury from: Slips, trips and falls;

Electrical shocks;

Adverse effects from high noise/heat/dust/fumes;

Minor cuts / bruises; and

Struck-by objects.

Generally OH are avoided by wearing PPEs &following procedures


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Occupational Accidents

Mainly those accidents that can becontrolled by the use of PPEs

Source courtesy: Internet
http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.wildlandfire.com/pics/other/wear_ppe.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.wildlandfire.com/arc/2003b_feb.htm&h=414&w=300&sz=23&hl=en&start=6&um=1&tbnid=IwD5vH3fyJpu-M:&tbnh=125&tbnw=91&prev=/images%3Fq%3DPPE%26um%3D1%26hl%3Denhttp://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ccohs.ca/images/ppe021.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/safety_haz/landscaping/pesticides.html&h=378&w=319&sz=8&hl=en&start=7&um=1&tbnid=s4X_dbxa0lQj_M:&tbnh=122&tbnw=103&prev=/images%3Fq%3DPPE%26um%3D1%26hl%3Denhttp://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.occupationalhealthsafety.ca/images/Occupational-Health-and-Safety-Act-bg.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.occupationalhealthsafety.ca/&h=282&w=425&sz=166&hl=en&start=19&um=1&tbnid=WhIGvJn2cxW3TM:&tbnh=84&tbnw=126&prev=/images%3Fq%3DOCCUPATIONAL%2BACCIDENTS%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN


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Process Safety & Marine Hazards

Process and Marine Safety Hazards Can give rise to major accidents that can have catastrophic

effects and can result in multiple injuries and fatalities, aswell as substantial economic, property and environmentaldamage

Examples of these are: Fires / Explosions Helicopter crash Dropped objects damaging structure or FPSO hull

Un-ignited gas releases Ship collisions Riser / pipeline ruptures


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Safety Performance OH & PSH

Performance for occupational safety is

measured through (eg.) lost time injuries

(LTI); and

Performance for process safety is

measured process safety equipment

performance, hydrocarbon releases, fires,

etc.


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Process Safety Accident

BP Texas City Refinery Fire and Explosion

(15 killed, 180 injured)


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Marine Accident

Ship collision in Japanese waters causing major damage

(July 27, 2007)


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Loss IcebergSource courtesy: Internet


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Bow-tie Barrier Concept

Events andEvents andCircumstancesCircumstances Harm to people andHarm to people anddamage to assetsdamage to assets

or environmentor environment

HH

AA

ZZ

AA

RRDD

CC

OO

NN

SESE

QQ

UU

EE

NN

CC

ESES

BARRIERS

Major accidentMajor accident

Construction /Engineering activities

Maintenance activities

Operations activitiesSource courtesy: Internet


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Barriers for Potential Major AccidentsTHREATS CONTROL &

PREVENTATIVE BARRIERSMITIGATIVE BARRIERS CONSEQUENCE

MAE

Instrumentation,i.e. TAHH / LALL /

LAHH / PALL /PAHH

Relief System

(PSV)

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System

Miscellaneous /Temporary

Equipment

F & GSystem

F & G

Detectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

Wellhead

Isolation

Blowdown

Valves

ESD ManualPull Stations

HVAC

Manual Wate rFire Fighting

Equipment

Deluge System

Manual Foam

Fire Fighting

Equipment

Blowdown

Valves

ESD Manual

Pull Stations

Firewalls

Firewater

Pumps

Firewater Ring

main

Gaseous

Systems

Emergency

Lighting

Emergency

Power (UPS)

Internal

Communications

& Alarms

External

Communications

Helideck Crash

Equipment

Miscellaneous

Safety

Equipment

Safe Refuge

(Muster Area)

Escape Routes

TEMPSC & Life

rafts

Helicopter

Facilities

Direct to Sea

Equipment

Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency response

CMMS

PTW

PreventativeBlowout(Surface blowouts )

Riser Pipeline Releases

Process Hydrocarbon Releases

Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash

Projectile/missile Impacts

Structural Environmental events

Transportation Accidents

Major Potential Accidents

Turret failure

Cargo tank explosionsIgnition

control

Audits

Inspections

Maintenance


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Do you know where these safety

barriers are in your installation/s?

Fire walls (are they A or H or J type? What

does these alphabets mean?; if there is A

60 fire wall, is this acceptable? Why?) Blast walls (are blast and fire walls same?

How are their locations decided?)

Flame / flash back arrestors ESD push buttons


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Safety BarriersExplanation-Example 1

Ignition Control Hazardous Area Classification Use of Ex type equipment (do you know how they are

designed? Why cant they be designed as vapour / gas

tight?) Flash back arrestors, spark arrestors Static charge discharge control (bonding, when do you

install bonding? Why is this done?) Lightning control (how do you control these hazards?)

Inert gas system for cargo tanks Use of inert gas system to dilute hydrocarbon vapours

at vents


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What are the difference between Passive FireProtection (PFP) & Active Fire Protection (AFP)?

Examples of PFP?

Fire walls In tumescent coatings (ESD valves?)

Heat shields on the escape routes?

Examples of AFP?

Deluge FM 200 Gaseous Fire Fighting system

Fire & Gas Detection system

Safety BarriersExplanation-Example 2


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Fire walls, Blast walls, Heat Shields

Source courtesy: Internet sources

A 60 Firewall

J 45/ H60, 0.3

bar Blast wall

Blast wall in place Heat Shield


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Sreejith Offshore Training packSource courtesy: Internet


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PROCESS

INSTRUMENTATION

IGNITIONCONTROL

BLOWDOW

N&RELIEFSYSTEM

FIRE&

GASDETECTION

EMERG

ENCYSHUTDOWN

ACTIVE

FIREPROTECTION

PASSIVEFIREPROTECTION

Explosion / Fire Swiss Cheese Model

HydroCarbo

n

Releases

EXPLOSION

MaintenanceC

hecks/test

Calibration

LoopChecks

Simulation

Audits

MOC/ECR

HAC

StaticElectric

Audits

Loopchecksf

orBD

Audits/Inspection

CFIsonRelief

Valves

LoopChecks

DetectorCalib

rations

Audits

MOC/ECR

CFTonESDV

LoopChecks

Audits/Inspection

FireDrills

Audits

CFTonFirePumps&Valves

Testingoffoa

mc

oncentrate

MOC

IntegrityInspectionofPFP

firewalls

Audits

MOC

Performance

Indica

tors

(Lea

ding

&lagg

ing

)

Prevention barriers Mitigation barriers


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Discuss

For major accident control, which side of

the bow tie should be strong? Left

(prevention) or the right side (mitigation) ?

Why?Major

Accident

Discussion trigger: Can a gas explosion be effectively mitigated prevented

with water deluge?


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Learning

Major accidents;

Potential major accidents at your offshore

installation;

Difference between personal / occupational,marine and process accidents;

Swiss Cheese & Bow Tie safety concepts; and

Importance of safety barriers in controlling majoraccidents.

[email protected]


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Session Break


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Major Accidents

in

yourOffshore Field

[email protected]

m


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Learning Objectives

To learn about the major accidents that

occurred in your offshore complex to

understand What went wrong?; and

To think about the potential barrier failures

that might exist at offshore installations

which could lead to potential majoraccidents.


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Offshore Complex

Show the field diagram

Show the platforms / FPSOs and theinterconnecting pipelines

Include the major additions / modificationsto highlight to the participants that the

installation has changed over the years


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Platform Accident Details

Show the accident & near-miss trends (bar

chart) and discuss cause breakdown (pie-chart)

A graph that shows no particular trend (upwardor downward) could mean:

The HSE is not under control;

The HSE performance / accident data collection /

analysis is not proper;

No one knows what will be the future HSE

performance is!


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Major Accidents

Identify major accidents, hi-potential incidents, near-misses;

Discuss each of the major cases from the detail reports toexplain: Causes Consequences Risk reduction recommendations Implementation status Any similar accidents occurred?

If there are any photos of these accidents, showthem.


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Causes

Examples Inadequate planning / organization;

Flaws in PTW procedures;

Written job procedure did not anticipate

contributing factors; Failure to follow known job procedure (s);

Inadequate training;

Supervisor failure to identify unsafe condition;

and Failure to communicate.


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Learning

If no concrete action is taken to rectify the cause ofthe incident permanently, it might lead to an accident

next time round History has proven this;

Accidents could happen even with safety barriers inplace;

Personnel play an extremely important role in

promoting safety competency, experience and

knowledge is important; and We need to ensure that the safety barriers are

maintained so as to control / mitigate accidents.

[email protected]


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Session Break


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Potential Major Accident Events

at

YourOffshore Complex

[email protected]

In this presentation, the typical potential majoraccidents for FPSO / platform are included. This willrequire customisation in line with the field QRA results.


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Learning Objectives

To learn about the potential major

accidents that can occur in offshore field

and to understand the consequences;

To be aware of the major risk contributors

at offshore installations; and

To be aware of the risk levels for various

personnel at youroffshore field.

P t ti l M j A id t 1


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Potential Major Accidents 1

Examples

1. Surface Blowout

2. Riser / Pipeline Releases

3. Process HC ReleasesFires / Explosions

4. Ship collisions

5. Dropped Objects

6. Transportation Accidents




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Examples

7. Helicopter crash

8. Projectile / Missile impact

9. Structural damage

10. Turret Failure

11. Cargo Tank Explosion



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Risk Terminology

Individual Risk (IR)

Individual Risk Per Annum is the

frequency with which an individual may be

expected to sustain fatal harm due to

exposure to specific hazards in a year


ALARP Triangle


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ALARP Triangle



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What does risk mean?


Essential data used in


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Essential data used inQuantitative RiskAssessment

(QRA) Manning distribution Transportation details

Heat & Material Balance diagram P&IDs

PFDs

General Arrangement / Layouts Design basis and safety philosophies


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Show the areas considered in the QRA

Explain the manning distribution of various

personnel categories in the areas

Tell them the risks calculated is rather

realistic since we have considered more

facts

Offshore InstallationAreas


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Fires and Explosions

Pool Fire

Jet fire

Vapour Cloud Explosion

Flash Fire

Explain the causes and consequences of each type of firesincluding their impairment potential
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Impairment

Discuss impingement and impairment from

pool and jet fires

Pool fire impingement on steel structures:

10 minutes

Jet fire impingement on steel structures:

5 minutes

Courtesy: CMPT QRA

Guidelines


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Potential Major Accidents

Offshore Field

MAE 1 S f Bl


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Causes:

Failure of choke valve

Failure of XMas tree / DHSV / SCSSV

Presence of ignition sources

Consequences:

Jet Fire

Major asset damage

Multiple fatalities / injuries

MAE 1 Surface Blowout



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Subsea blow out



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Fire Contours

Show the jet, pool fire contours

superimposed on the offshore installation

layout drawing to show them the potential

effects.

MAE 5 Dropped Objects


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Causes:

Failure of lifting equipment (overload /

damaged lifting equipment)

Failure of crane equipment (overload,

etc.)

Lifting without following procedures /

controls

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment,

platform, etc.)


MAE 5 Dropped Objects



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Helicopter, boat, personnel transfers

Risks from transportation


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ANOA FIELD


Risks from transportation

MAE 6 Transportation Accidents


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MAE 6 Transportation Accidents

Causes:

Mechanical failure of boats /

helicopter/ flights

Extraneous weather conditions

Material defects of personal transfer

baskets or associated lifting tackles

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment,

platform, etc.)




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Protection from side & vertical impacts?

Personnel falling from height due to

giddiness, loss of grip, high wind, loss of

balance, etc.

Personnel Basket Transfers

Is there an option?

MAE 7 Helicopter Crash


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MAE 7 Helicopter Crash

Causes:

Failure of helicopter (engine failure

/ extreme weather)

Failure of communication

equipment

Fire / explosion in FPSO / Platform

Pilot error

Consequences:

Fire

Major asset / helicopter damageMultiple fatalities / injuries

There are hardly any known occurrences of Helicopter crashing intoFPSO or platform



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MAE 8 Projectiles / MissilesCauses:

Failure of equipment due tooverpressure

Inadequate design

Missiles / projectiles from gas turbines

and FPSO steam turbines

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment, etc.)




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MAE 9 Structural Events


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Causes:Structural failures due to extreme

weather

Corrosion

Inadequate design

Crane boom collision

Consequences:

Asset damage






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MAE 10 Turret Failure


MAE 11 C T k E l i


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MAE 11 Cargo Tank Explosion

FPSO

Overall Risk for Offshore


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Overall Risk for Offshore

Complex Explain the Individual Risk (IR) for the various personnel categories;

Explain the PLL (Potential Loss Of Life) values for the complex andvarious personnel categories;

Discuss if the IR value is within the ALARP tolerable region;

Explain the major risk contributors for the offshore complex;

Explain what is base case IR, and ALARP IR cases (sensitivitycases); and

Explain what is traffic light system and how is it used to determineRealistic Risk levels?

[email protected]

om


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Traffic lights system and performance


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Traffic lights system and performance

of safety systems

Traffic light system was used to assess

the performance of safety systems;

The performance of safety systems were

determined based on: Critical maintenance test results;

Accidents / incidents;

Maintenance backlogs; and

Offshore audit findings.

How will the TL System used to calculate

impairment / event frequencies in QRA?

Traffic Light Interpretation


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Acceptable

Partially degraded

N

ot

accep

table

Safety Systems Performance

Tolerable


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Earlier risk IR 1

Base case risk IR 2

Risk after Safety System

performanceAssessment IR 3

Potential residual riskafter improvements IR4

L i


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Learning

Individual Risk for all offshore personnel arewithin the acceptable limits;

Understanding potential major accidents for

offshore installations (causes andconsequences);

Understanding the major risk contributors atoffshore field; and

Understanding the personnel risk levels forvarious categories.


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Session Break


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Offshore Safety Cases

[email protected]


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Learning objectives

To understand the objective of Safety Cases;

To understand The UK HSE Offshore

Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005;

To understand the typical SC update triggers;

and

To know the Typical Safety Case contents.

S f t C D fi iti


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Safety Case-Definition

A documented body of evidence thatprovides a convincing and valid argument

that a system is adequately safe for a given

application in a given environment

Safety Case exists for Nuclear, Offshore, Aviation, and Rail industries

Safety Case Origin


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Safety Case Origin(post 1988 Piper Alpha explosion)

UK Offshore Operators, says Cullen, mustadopt this new philosophy on safety,

producing a Safety Case'. This includes

continuous hazard assessment over theplant's lifetime, fault tree analysis, which

looks at all the ways an error could

develop, and takes account of ways that'human factors' contribute to disasters

S f t C E l ti Ti li


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Safety Case Evolution Timeline

Forthwith: Immediate, at once

Lord Cullen recommended that the 4 (FEA, ESSA, EERA,SIGA) be carried out

by the offshore operators immediately before the 1992 safety case regulation

was released.

Wh Off h S f t C ?


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Why Offshore Safety Case?

Operators of offshore installations want to besure that their operations are safe and do notexpose their people or their business tounacceptable levels of risk;

Plant modifications, variations on operatingconditions and new ownership mean that the riskpicture is changing; and

Regulators and other stakeholders ask you tojustify the continuing operation of the installation

through safety cases. Regulatory compliance is essential to your

business

S f t C


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Safety Case

First SC Regulations came into force in1992;

Cullen Forthwith studies:

A Fire Risk Analysis;An assessment of the risk of ingress of smoke

or gas into the accommodation;

A review of the ability of emergency systems

to withstand severe accident conditions; andAn evacuation, escape and rescue analysis.

The UK HSE Offshore Installations


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(Safety Case) Regulations 2005

Key changes introduced by the 2005 Regulations include:

-The requirement for duty holders to send an early design notification,instead of a design safety case, to HSE when establishing a new productioninstallation;-Duty holders are required to carry out a thorough and fundamental reviewof their safety cases at least every five years, or as directed by HSE;

-The present requirement to re-submit safety cases every three years hasbeen removed (inspectors will be checking to see that safety cases arebeing kept up to date through inspection);-New duties require licensees to ensure anyone they appoint as an operatoris capable of fulfilling their legal responsibilities for safety;-Combined operations safety cases have been replaced by notifications,which do not need HSE acceptance; and-The Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees)

Regulations have been amended to extend consultation with safetyrepresentatives to reviewing and revising a safety case, as well as preparingone.

Typical Contents of Safety Case


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Typical Contents of Safety Case

Facility description

HSE Management system

Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)

Summary

Safety Critical elements and Performance

Standards

ALARP Demonstration

Fitness to Operate

Safety Case Update Triggers


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Safety Case Update TriggersExamples
http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.jmqc.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderpictures/untitled.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.jmqc.co.uk/id63.html&h=480&w=504&sz=15&hl=en&start=28&um=1&tbnid=59wcw99kbj5LRM:&tbnh=124&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dsafety%2Btraining%26start%3D21%26ndsp%3D21%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DNhttp://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.jmqc.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderpictures/untitled.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.jmqc.co.uk/id63.html&h=480&w=504&sz=15&hl=en&start=28&um=1&tbnid=59wcw99kbj5LRM:&tbnh=124&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dsafety%2Btraining%26start%3D21%26ndsp%3D21%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DNhttp://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.jmqc.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderpictures/untitled.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.jmqc.co.uk/id63.html&h=480&w=504&sz=15&hl=en&start=28&um=1&tbnid=59wcw99kbj5LRM:&tbnh=124&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dsafety%2Btraining%26start%3D21%26ndsp%3D21%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN


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Session Break


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Safety Barriers and their Role

in Controlling Major accidents

[email protected]

L i bj ti


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Learning objectives

To understand the critical role of safety barriers /safety systems in controlling major accidents using

Bow-Tie diagram;

To understand safety barriers on offshoreinstallations;

To appreciate the need to maintain the barriers

through maintenance system, inspections, etc.; and

To identify and monitor performance of safetybarriers through lead and lag indicators.

Bow Tie Diagram


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Bow Tie Diagram


Barriers for Potential Major Accidents


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Barriers for Potential Major AccidentsTHREATS CONTROL &


MAE

Instrumentation ,i.e. TAHH / LALL /

LAHH / PALL /PAHH

Relief System(PSV)

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System


Equipment

F & GSystem

F & G

Detectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

WellheadIsolation

Blowdown

Valves

ESD Manual

Pull Stations

HVAC

Manual WaterFire Fighting

Equipment

Deluge System

Manual Foam

Fire Fighting

Equipment

Blowdown

Valves

ESD Manual

Pull Stations

Firewalls

Firewater

Pumps

Firewater Ring

main

Gaseous

Systems

Emergency

Lighting

Emergency

Power (UPS)

Internal

Communications

& Alarms

External

Communications

Helideck Crash

Equipment

Miscellaneous

Safety

Equipment

Safe Refuge(Muster Area )

Escape Routes

TEMPSC & Life

rafts

Helicopter

Facilities

Direct to Sea

Equipment

Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency response

CMMS

PTW

PreventativeBlowout (Surface blowouts )



Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash

Projectile /missile Impacts



Ignition

control

Audits

Inspections

UK HSE KP 3 Inspection Results


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p



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Sreejith Offshore Training packSource courtesy: Internet

What is wrong at present in oil &


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gas industry?

Unacceptable level of process safety relateddangerous occurrences especially in relation to

loss of containment incidents;

Major hazard industry measured safetyperformance using LTIs!!

Critical systems deteriorate over time without

warning until they fail catastrophically; and

Audits tend to be too infrequent and workplaceinspections focus on personal safety.

Process Safety


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Process Safety

Management System

An effective process

safety management

system measuresperformance

Key performance indicators must include

appropriate indicators of process safetyperformance


Key Performance Indicators set to identify defects in safety systems


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Permit-to-work

Inspection & Maintenance

Staff Competence

Operational Procedures

System defects

Lagging indicator

Leading indicator

Leading indicator

Lagging indicator

Lagging indicator

Lagging indicator

Leading indicator

Leading indicator

Accident Trajectory


PROCESS HYDROCARBON RELEASES/FIRES/EXPLOSIONS

Examplee

s te


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PROCESSINSTRUMENTATION

IG

NITIONCONTROL

BLOWDOWN&RELIEFSYSTEM

FIRE&GASDETECTION

EMERGENCYSHUTDOWN

ACTI

VEFIREPROTECTION

PASSIV

EFIREPROTECTION

p

HydroCarb

on

Releases

E

XPLOSION

Maintenance

Checks/test

Calibration

LoopChecks

Simulation

Audits

MOC/ECR

HAC

StaticElect

ric

Audits

Loopcheck

sforBD

Audits/Inspection

CFIsonReliefValves

LoopCheck

s

DetectorCalibrations

Audits

MOC/ECR

CFTonESD

V

LoopCheck

s

Audits/Inspection

FireDrills

Audits

CFTonFire

Pumps&Valve

Testingoffoamc

oncentrat

MOC

IntegrityInspectionofPFP

firewalls

Audits

MOC

Performanc

eIndica

tors

(Lea

ding

&lagg

ing

)


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How effective are YOUR safety systems?


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How effective are YOUR safety systems?

Traffic light system was used to assessthe performance of safety systems;

Each of the safety systems were assessed

based on: Critical Maintenance Test (CMT) results;

Accidents / incidents;

Maintenance backlogs; andAudit findings.
http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.thefinalsprint.com/images/2006/05/traffic%2520light.jpg&imgrefurl=http://vdillner-math.blogspot.com/&h=550&w=290&sz=73&hl=en&start=2&um=1&tbnid=RScOZ8Fukg0ZIM:&tbnh=133&tbnw=70&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dtraffic%2Blights%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DNhttp://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.thefinalsprint.com/images/2006/05/traffic%2520light.jpg&imgrefurl=http://vdillner-math.blogspot.com/&h=550&w=290&sz=73&hl=en&start=2&um=1&tbnid=RScOZ8Fukg0ZIM:&tbnh=133&tbnw=70&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dtraffic%2Blights%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN


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Offshore Audit Findings


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Examples

H 60 fire walls penetrated to pass pipesand electrical conduits

Fire water deluge not provided for critical

hydrocarbon systems / valve clusters Flame Detectors obstructed with pipework

Hazardous area Classification

compromised

Ex equipment maintenance flaws

Safety Barrier Performance


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Safety Barrier PerformanceTHREATS CONTROL &


MAE

Instrumentation ,i.e. TAHH / LALL /

LAHH / PALL /PAHH

Relief System(PSV)

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System


Equipment

F & GSystem

F & G

Detectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

WellheadIsolation

Blowdown

Valves

ESD Manual

Pull Stations

HVAC

Manual WaterFire Fighting

Equipment

Deluge System

Manual Foam

Fire Fighting

Equipment

Blowdown

Valves

ESD Manual

Pull Stations

Firewalls

Firewater

Pumps

Firewater Ring

main

Gaseous

Systems

Emergency

Lighting

Emergency

Power (UPS)

Internal

Communications

& Alarms

External

Communications

Helideck Crash

Equipment

Miscellaneous

Safety

Equipment

Safe Refuge(Muster Area )

Escape Routes

TEMPSC & Life

rafts

Helicopter

Facilities

Direct to Sea

Equipment

Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency response

CMMS

PTW

PreventativeBlowout (Surface blowouts )



Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash

Projectile /missile Impacts



Ignition

control

Audits

Inspections


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Learning


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Learning

Concept of Safety barriers in major accidentcontrol; and

Role of offshore personnel in ensuring

integrity of safety barriers by monitoringperformance indicators; and

Performance of safety systems to control

major hazards cannot be monitored usingLTIs which calls for a shift in focus.

Key Message


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Once the safety systems fail,

there can be major accidents!!!Only you can operate & maintain

safety systems without flaws.

y g

5052863 offshore safety case training ppt

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