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Main Conflict Groups 7

Focus of the Assessment 13Historical Grievances Against Manila 13Contemporary Grievances Against Manila 15Grievances Against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 16Underdevelopment in Mindanao 17Weak Rule of Law in the Philippines 18Extremist teachings and ideology 19Transnational Linkages 22

Focus of the Assessment 23National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism 23Lead GPH Agencies and Programs in P/CVE 24Research on Violent Extremism in the Philippines 29

Insights from the Assessment 32Religious Education 32Bangsamoro identity 33Traditional values 33Civic engagement and the rule of law 34Interfaith relationships and peacebuilding norms 34

An open letter to fellow Bangsamoro youth on upcoming plebiscites 38

2019

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The violent takeover of Marawi city in 2017 by militants acting in the name of the Islamic State (IS) was a dramatic illustration of the challenge posed by violent extremism in the Philippines. Although less widespread and deadly than in other parts of the world, violent extremism in the country has a history stretching back at least to the armed communist insurgency that began in 1969 and that continues into the present. More

Indonesia. However, a recent dramatic rise in violence in the country, inspired in large part by IS, has prompted both the government and civil society organizations to try to enhance, focus, and better coordinate their work on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE).

The administration of President Rodrigo Duterte has taken a number of steps to tackle the violent extremism problem. Presently, it is in the process of drafting a National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. Most urgently, the plan is expected to address a lack of coordination across government agencies in P/CVE programming, which in the past has often resulted in disjointed responses. In this effort and in its P/CVE work more generally, the Philippine government is supported by a range of international partners, most notably the United Nations Development

There are diverse factors contributing to violent extremism in Mindanao, but these potential sources of recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism may also be seen as possible targets for P/CVE programming. Grievances against Manila abound after decades of conflict and a governance vacuum, and include ongoing concerns about human rights abuses by government forces and the imposition of martial law. However, local government units known as barangays are typically trusted by residents and their leaders are often actively involved in civil engagement, making them a potential source of strength in addressing often-severe underdevelopment and weak government service provision. The recent creation of a new layer of governance, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), could also provide opportunities to address these challenges on a local/regional level.

However, as the Moro conflict winds down into self-governance, there is the risk that

for example out of a sense that Moro leaders have betrayed their cause by accepting autonomy rather than full independence. Work to bring all those connected to the new

prophylactic. In Muslim communities, reinforcing an Islamic identity disconnected from violent extremist versions of the religion is also a key concern. Although a sound Islamic religious education can help provide young people with the intellectual and personal tools to resist violent extremist ideology, Muslim religious leaders in

provide such an education.

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This Country Needs Assessment provides an overview of violent extremism in the Philippines and the efforts to respond to it. Based on primary sources, a review of the

civil society leaders, it outlines the drivers of and responses to violent extremism in the

• Youth are particularly vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism and thus should be prioritized when formulating interventions to address at-risk populations. Moro youth leaders, including those serving in the BARMM, should be engaged as key partners in this area.

• Religious leaders should be supported as valuable allies in addressing the challenge of violent extremism. P/CVE in the Philippines requires highly domain-

as well as in how these arguments interact with local grievances.

• Special attention should be paid to equipping parents, as well as others who have regular access to young people, with the tools needed to prevent radicalization to violent extremism via social media. The rapid penetration of social media platforms has left parents ill-equipped to counter violent extremist ideas targeted at children and youth before such ideas are mobilized into violent action.

• Traditional values, including the principle of kasisiyapa (cooperation and mutual concern) in Maranao culture, should be supported to enhance community resilience against violent extremist ideology.

• Bangsamoro unity, as promoted by the BARMM in order to promote unity of identity and purpose (also known as “Bangsamoro convergence”), should be supported as a means of building an inclusive identity that could help make identifying with violent extremist groups less attractive.

• Violent incident data collection and analysis should be supported and enhanced in order to better identify the local hotspots, drivers, and patterns of violent extremism across the Philippines. These data-gathering activities should be complemented by engagement with local communities, which is key for a granular, nuanced and culturally sensitive understanding of the violent extremism phenomenon.

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AKP Ansharul Khilafa PhilippinesARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim MindanaoASG Abu Sayyaf GroupASG–Basilan Abu Sayyaf Group–BasilanASG–Sulu Abu Sayyaf Group–SuluATC Anti-Terrorism CouncilBARMM Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim MindanaoBIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

CBA-CPLA Cordillera Peoples Liberation Arm–Cordillera Bodong AssociationCPP Communist Party of the PhilippinesDILG Department of the Interior and Local GovernmentFTF Foreign Terrorist Fighter IAG Institute for Autonomy and GovernanceIDPs Internally Displaced PersonsIS Islamic StateLGUs Local Government UnitsMILF Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMNLF Moro National Liberation FrontMOA-AD Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral DomainNAP P/CVE National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent ExtremismNPANSC National Security CouncilPNP Philippine National PolicePNP–SAF Philippine National Police–Special Action ForcePOCs Peace and Order CouncilsRPMP-RPA-ABB

Army–Alex Boncayao BrigadeSVIED Suicide Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device

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based research in the Philippines, consultation of conventional and social media sources, and a review of the relevant literature on violent extremism in the Philippines. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key government and civil society stakeholders, with a particular focus on representatives of local civil society organizations. Interviews took place in the cities of Manila, Marawi, Zamboanga and Cotabato, as well as in the province of Sulu.

The literature reviewed for this assessment includes scholarly research articles, civil society research reports, government policy documents, and civil society organization program documents. Due to restrictions placed on the public citation of program and policy documents, however, this report is not a comprehensive survey of CVE programs and policies in the Philippines. At the time of writing, the Government of the Philippines was in the late stages of preparing a National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP P/CVE). Since the NAP P/CVE remains a work in progress, it is referred to here only in general terms. Nevertheless, this Country Needs Assessment is a representative guide to the problem of violent extremism in the Philippines, responses to the problem, and programming needs that must be met if preventing and countering violent extremism in the Philippines is to be successful.

For the purposes of this assessment, violent extremismpolitical or ideological goals through violent methods that implicitly or explicitly reject mainstream legal and social norms.1 A distinction is made here between violent extremist groups and armed insurgent organizations. Insurgent organizations have relatively stable political and territorial institutions, and may be accepted as parties to a peace process. The scope of this assessment is limited to the consideration of violent extremist groups and related non-state actors or individuals.

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The Republic of the Philippines presents a complex and dynamic conflict environment, marked by an increasingly fragmented array of violent extremist organizations, embedded in two of the longest-running insurgencies in the world. First, the communist

nationalists are engaged in a political and armed struggle to establish a homeland in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, some of the poorest parts of the country and

of law, poor service delivery, and a multiplicity of violent splinter groups, many of which

Figure 1 : Administrative Map of the Philippines Source: Wikimedia Commons.

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are aligned with Islamic State (IS), makes Mindanao the greater of the two challenges.2 Amid this complexity, the campaign by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) for regional autonomy presents both the risk of ongoing conflict and the opportunity to end decades of insurgency.

voted overwhelmingly in favor of a Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). A second vote to further expand BARMM territory, held on February 6, yielded mixed results, with 63 out of 67 barangays (wards) in North Cotabato choosing to join the BARMM. Once established, the BARMM will be the only Muslim-majority region in the Philippines. Municipalities in Lanao del Norte failed to achieve the double majorities

and broader political and cultural autonomy than has been enjoyed in the past. By the same token, the BARMM administration will face daunting governance challenges and the risk of frustrated expectations. For this reason, the autonomous government will be central to efforts to counter violent extremism in the Philippines.

Main Conflict GroupsThere are three main armed insurgent organizations in the Philippines, as well as multiple violent extremist groups and factions, most of which are offshoots of the Moro nationalist movement in Muslim Mindanao.3 The numbers of militants involved in violent extremist

such groups has fluctuated, sometimes rapidly, as militants splinter away from parent organizations to join other violent extremist factions, breakaway groups and ad hoc alliances. Militants often move seamlessly between violent extremism, insurgency and

often referring to themselves by the term Dawla Islamiyya (the Arabic for Islamic State), and seek to use violence in order to impose a severe version of Islamic law under an Islamic state in the southern Philippines, a state envisioned as a part of a prospective caliphate.

The MILF, established in 1977, is the largest armed group in Mindanao, with some 4

to establish a peace corridor for trapped civilians to escape the city.5 Given its broad

2-

omous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” Institute for Autonomy and Governance, Manila, 2017.

3 -yond the bounds of the autonomous region. Muslim Mindanao is a subset of Mindanao as a whole, large parts of which are majority Christian.

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5Peace Process (OPAPP), November, 30, 2017.

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base of support, the MILF is a key partner in any lasting peace in the region. Some of the factions within it, however, contain potentially disruptive elements that have in the past collaborated with violent extremist organizations.6

Founded in 1969, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), is the oldest existing separatist armed group in Mindanao. It was the main partner in peace negotiations with the Philippines government until 1996, when a negotiated agreement established the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It has since become estranged from the peace process and eclipsed by the MILF. With its base in the Sulu Archipelago, in 2013 the MNLF unilaterally declared a “United Federated States of Bangsamoro Republik.” The MNLF is now divided into two main factions. The MNLF–Sema faction supports the peace agreement with Manila, which underpins the creation of the BARMM and is represented on the Bangsamoro Transition Commission under the

MNLF-Misuari is the focus of negotiations to include them in the peace process, in

The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), was

insurgency in the world. Protracted peace talks between the communists and the

the NPA a terrorist organization. The NPA is best known for its practice of extracting a “revolutionary tax” from businesses in areas in which it is strong on the ground, namely Mindanao and northern Luzon.

The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) emerged in 2008 as a splinter from

for the region. Based in Maguindanao, central Mindanao, the BIFF clashed with government forces in the deadly Mamasapano incident that derailed the peace

BIFF. Two of these are taking a wait-and-see approach to the creation of the BARMM and have the potential to be integrated into a negotiated demobilization process. The

following paragraph.

the name Dawla Islamiyah. This faction is suspected of being responsible for the

6for International Policy, 2006.

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which left two dead and threatened to spoil the Bangsamoro Organic Law plebiscite to create BARMM.7

The Maute Group, founded in 2012 by charismatic brothers Abdullah and Omar Maute, was the lead organization in the attack on Marawi City in May 2017. A small, clan-

municipality in Lanao del Sur province. Using its local knowledge of the provincial capital, Marawi, the Maute Group coordinated the large-scale attack on the city, declaring an

8 Both civilians and security service personnel were killed in the attack. The group conducted executions of captured Christians, who made to wear orange clothing, mimicking the style of IS. Videos and photographs of the executions were distributed on IS propaganda channels.9 Remnants of the group remain and refer to themselves as Dawla Islamiyya.

The (ASG), founded in 1989 in a break with the MNLF, is one of the most violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia and has one of the most developed networks with foreign violent extremists. Its agenda to establish an independent Islamic state, however, has been overshadowed by its kidnap-for-ransom operations against Filipino and foreign nationals. Based in the Sulu Archipelago, with factions on the islands

Indonesia border, making it a strategic asset for transnational violent extremists. In 2017, ASG played a central role in the pro-IS coalition that attacked Marawi, during which its leader, Isnilon Hapilon, was killed.

The splintered off from the Moro National Islamic Front in the 1990s. It was previously led by Isnilon Hapilon, who, as self-proclaimed emir of IS East Asia, led the 2017 attack on Marawi City. Hapilon died in the attack, but his faction on Basilan continues to be closely aligned with IS and has reach into mainland

the group, most under the leadership of Basilan-based commander Furuji Indama. This faction is suspected of carrying out the suicide vehicle improvised explosive device

which 10 people died.10 ASG–Basilan is deeply embedded in the community of Basilan and local criminal networks.

The is another MNLF splinter, comprising multiple shifting

Radulan Sahiron, its active leadership is currently in the hands of commander Hatib

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8p. 6.

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Sawadjaan. Its membership shades into petty criminals following personal and economic, rather than ideological, interests. Although based in the remote and under-governed Patikul mountains, ASG–Sulu is integrated into the community in Sulu and connected by kinship and social networks with the local MNLF. The faction is suspected

in which 21 people were killed.

(AKP) is a part of the pro-IS coalition in the Philippines

for the attack on Marawi City in 2017. It is also suspected of carrying out bombings of a night market and an internet café in Sultan Kudarat on August 28 and September 2, 2018, respectively.

was formed in 2012 by Humam Abdul Najib, alias Abu Dar. Most members of this group have been subsumed into Dawla Islamiyya. Recently, Abu Dar has emerged as a candidate for emir (leader) of IS-inspired forces in the Philippines.

, formerly the Rajah Sulaiman Movement, is a loose network

Figure 2 : Overview of Notable ISIS Activity, May 2017–October 2018 Source: SITE Intelligence Group

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of violent extremists aligned to IS. It is embedded in the Balik Islam community of Filipino former Christians who believe that the Philippines was a Muslim country before

general community. The center of Balik Islam activity is in the city of Baguio, on Luzon. Although most Balik Islam members peacefully campaign for an autonomous Muslim homeland, a fringe is disproportionally involved in violent extremism, perhaps due to

Maute Group recruited several Balik Islam members from Luzon, some of whom took part in the Marawi siege in 2017.11 The Movement also collaborated with ASG and

a network based in Luzon, Balik Islam militants, when working in collaboration with southern militants, have the capability to execute violent attacks in the national capital.

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Figure 3 : ARMM Conflict Incidents by Municipality Source: ARMM Transition Portal

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Located in the south of the country, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago are the areas most vulnerable to violent extremism in the Philippines. Weak rule of law and an abundance of weapons are major contributing factors to this vulnerability. Indeed, the southern Philippines is the only location in Southeast Asia in which violent extremists have the ability to control territory. Aided by its remoteness, in mainland Mindanao violent extremists such as the Maute Group have the ability to recruit and train members without coming to the attention of the authorities. In the Sulu Archipelago, ASG members exploit their remote location as cover for recruitment; the group also has a capability to operate in and mobilize resources from Sabah, in Eastern Malaysia.

populous island, Luzon. Violent extremist groups, including IS, recruit from the Muslim communities and enclaves of this Christian-majority island. Violent extremists have

Balik Islam (Christian convert) population. Cavite and other parts of central Luzon are

Manila, especially the areas of Quezon City and Quiapo, is similarly vulnerable. In the past, Balik Islam violent extremists working in collaboration with militants from the south have succeeded in carrying out attacks in Luzon, including in the capital, Manila.

of reliable information on recent violent incidents. Examples of violent incidents with rumored (but unproven) connections to violent extremism abound. For example, in 2016 Sheikh Nur Capariño, an imam from the Balik Islam community in Cavite who was close to military and police authorities and who was a strong critic of IS, was murdered. In 2018, Sheikh Bedejim Abdullah, an imam in Baguio who taught at the military academy, was killed. Both murders remain unsolved, but there are suspicions that both were killed by violent extremists, who would likely regard them as apostates for their work with the authorities.12

the Resorts World Casino in Manila. Although IS quickly claimed the attack, Philippine National Police deny that the gunman was connected to violent extremism. The police

the attacker had also recently been recruited into IS was not thoroughly investigated. Confusion continues to surround the nature of the attack.13 Similarly, a series of bombings in Quiapao, Manila, in 2017 left two dead and many injured. IS claimed responsibility for the attacks, but authorities denied any link to violent extremism.14 Taken together, the incidents on Luzon suggest that there may be under-reporting of violent extremism on the island and in the national capital.

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Focus of the AssessmentAfter decades of insurgency punctuated by faltering peace negotiations and outbreaks of fresh violence, the drivers of recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism in the Philippines are deeply embedded. These have evolved over time, shaped by new technologies, ideas and generations. Like elsewhere in the world, in the Philippines radicalization to violent extremism and recruitment pathways are complex and multi-causal. However, one broad assumption is commonly made by subject-matter

and economic factors. A recent large mixed-methods survey research project on youth radicalization to violent extremism in Mindanao conducted by DAI supports this

The picture of risk and vulnerability to extremism that emerges here is complex. Nonetheless, this research does allow us to deprioritize certain assumed

as community marginalization, the social factors of revenge, and the gun culture

certain young people. More broadly, this research describes radicalization as a deeply social process that is embedded in social relations, in feelings towards

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Historical Grievances Against ManilaHistorical grievances against the national government are long-running background factors that drive violent extremism in the Philippines. The conflict in the southern Philippines is one of the more enduring civil conflicts in the world. According to one

16 The legitimate and perceived grievances of a Muslim minority dominated politically by a Christian majority serve as the master frame for these grievances.

The fact that historical injustices underpin conflict in the Southern Philippines is openly acknowledged by all parties to the conflict, including the Government of the Philippines. This has been especially true under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte,

17 Addressing such injustices will

Reconciliation Commission for the Bangsamoro.18

A primary grievance narrative centers on land dispossession at the hands of Christian

15drivers of extremism,” August 2018, p. 13.

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172017.

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migration of Christians to settle large parts of Mindanao in the post-war period, leaving Muslims dispossessed of their property and marginalized in their home region. Indeed, since 1900, hundreds of thousands of Christians from Visayas and other islands have settled in Mindanao, taking advantage of colonial-era land laws. This set the background for the civil conflict that erupted in the 1970s, with the formation of the MNLF.19

status is a common grievance in Muslim Mindanao. As the ICG notes, “In the 2000

20

Human rights abuses by the military constitute another primary grievance narrative that fuels violent extremism. Although some such grievances are contemporary, generally they relate to the period of martial law under the authoritarian president Ferdinand Marcos (1972–1986). During that period, thousands of MNLF soldiers were killed and tens of thousands of civilians were displaced in Mindanao. Arbitrary detention and torture were common. In recent arguments before the Supreme Court in defense

acknowledged the trauma of the Marcos-era application of the law. “All the petitioners are haunted by the ghost of martial law past. There is no reason for them to feel that way,” he said.21

A secondary narrative of human rights abuses relates to the “all-out war” declared

were displaced from their homes during this period, and the poverty rate in Mindanao increased by 7 percent.22 During the war, the military attacked MILF bases and successfully occupied the central MILF base, Camp Abu Bakar, in Maguindanao. In

reported to have held a traditional pork feast at the camp to celebrate their victory.23

Another primary grievance narrative centers on a sense of repeated “betrayals” by the Philippine government during the protracted peace negotiations. For example, in 2008 a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA–AD) was signed by the MILF and the Arroyo government, but it was later struck down by the Supreme Court after a

government forces, causing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in central Mindanao.24

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There have been at least three main peace agreements between Manila and the insurgents, starting with the 1976 Tripoli accord, none of which have delivered a sustainable peace. There is a strong narrative in Bangsamoro that they have been serially betrayed by Manila, and the problems in the current process have fed that scepticism.25

Contemporary Grievances Against ManilaLegitimate and perceived contemporary grievances against Manila build on historical grievances and contribute to a sense of political and cultural alienation among Muslims in Mindanao today. Issues related to internal displacement due to conflict,

to fester.

A primary grievance narrative is the destruction of Marawi City by the Armed Forces of the Philippines during the 2017 aerial bombardment of the city to defeat IS-inspired violent extremists. Fairly or not, the Armed Forces are widely perceived by people in the region as having pursued too aggressive a strategy and as not having allowed enough

Brussels in September 2018, the Sultan of Marawi, Hamidullah Atar, criticized the Duterte government for the post-Marawi imposition of martial law and the bombing

international humanitarian law as it paved the way for the destruction of our cultural

22 schools.”26

Failure to effectively begin and advance the reconstruction (“rehabilitation”) of Marawi City has only compounded these grievances. Tens of thousands of people, from a high of some 300,000, continue to be displaced by the Marawi siege. Many of them are still living in makeshift camps, where youth are highly vulnerable to violent extremist narratives.27

Estrangement of the MNLF–Misuari faction from the peace process is another grievance, held by that faction in particular, that could drive violent extremism. Nur Misuari, a former governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, was removed for corruption and arrested for rebellion when his troops tried to sabotage an election in Sulu in 2008. Troops loyal to him conducted the Zamboanga siege of 2013, which left some 200 people dead. The faction represents many ethnic Tausugs who see their group as marginalized from the new BARMM by Maguindanons. If the MNLF–Misuari faction remains alienated from the peace process and the BARMM regime, either the group itself or splinter groups could seek to sabotage the peace.

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Human rights abuses by the military, including killings, bombings, and the enforcement of martial law, continue to fuel contemporary anti-Manila grievances in Muslim Mindanao. For example, the killing of seven unarmed youth who were picking fruit in Patikul, Sulu, and were suspected by the Philippine Armed Forces of being members of ASG, fed one grievance narrative in Mindanao. Posts and photographs of the dead youth circulated widely on Facebook, generating animosity and distrust towards the central government.28

declared “all-out war” on the ASG and ordered the military to “crush Abu Sayyaf by whatever means.”29 The military responded with air strikes in dense jungle areas of the Patikul mountains, where ASG commander Hajan Sawadjaan heads a camp. While the strikes targeted the camp, they also caused the displacement of an unknown number of civilians who were forced to flee their homes and live in temporary shelters. According

early February 2,331 people had been displaced by the airstrikes.30

embeddedness in the local community, there is a high risk of civilian exposure to military operations. Military operations that unintentionally impact civilians may have the perverse effect of contributing to local grievances against the national government, which in turn are a driver of violent extremism.

Regionally speaking, or within our own territory, I think one ma-jor grievance is the lack of integrity of those people entrusted with

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of their fellow Maranaos, but still, some of them would not think

Grievances Against the Moro Islamic Liberation FrontAs the MILF transitions to a political party and settles into its role in the government of BARMM, it is increasingly the target of grievances held by alienated youth who are liable to consider them as having betrayed the Moro cause and collaborated with Manila. Indeed, two of the most dangerous violent extremist groups in the Philippines at the time of writing, the Maute Group and BIFF, are both disaffected splinter groups that broke off from the MILF.

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Any sense of setback or betrayal in the peace process could serve as a new grievance that fuels splintering among rebel groups and inspires violent extremism. As academic Francisco Lara observed about the outbreak of all-out war in 2000, it was splintering and the loss of command and control by leader Nur Misuari that prepared the ground for renewed conflict.31 The same could be said today, but instead the risk centers on the MILF and its leader, Haji Murad Ebrahim. As the incoming governor of BARMM with

to any new grievances. Already, young violent extremists, such as those in the Maute Group, cast the aging leadership of the MILF as traitors to the Muslim cause who have

32 Addressing the challenge of so-

in Muslim Mindanao, has therefore been a priority for the Bangsamoro Transition Commission.

With the MILF assuming the leadership of BARMM under a peace deal with the

continue to drive violent extremist offshoots. Such offshoots seek to cast the MILF as, at best, old and irrelevant and, at worst, enemy apostates who have collaborated

Underdevelopment in MindanaoAlthough political and cultural factors, rather than material factors, typically drive extremism in the Philippines, it must be observed that Mindanao is one of the poorest parts of the Philippines and one of the least developed regions in Southeast Asia.33 The attendant weak governance, corruption and poor state service delivery have left Muslims in the Southern Philippines economically marginalized. Some of them, especially young people, are vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremist groups offering better economic prospects. Some violent extremist groups have the cash to pay directly for recruitment; others dangle the prospect of material spoils from attacks. Others still, like IS, sell the vision of an Islamist utopia, combining both these elements.

The area encompassed by ARMM has recorded the highest poverty incidence among

provinces are also ranked among the lowest of all the 77 provinces in the country in the Human Development Index (HDI) in terms of life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income. Nine of the ten provinces with the lowest Human Development Index are in Mindanao, four of them being in the ARMM.34

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future site of the Marawi siege, was the poorest province in the country, with a poverty incidence of 71.9 percent, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority.35

Weak Rule of Law in the Philippines

Philippines. The under-governed spaces of the southern Philippines, such as the remote and impoverished areas of Lanao del Sur, the Patikul mountains of Sulu, and the Liguasan Marsh area in Maguindanao, represent the only areas in Southeast Asia where violent extremist groups are able to control territory.

Rivalry between local clans and elites, some with private armies, generates an ongoing state of conflict across the southern Philippines. This undermines efforts by both the national government and local government units to improve governance standards.

contestations between and among clans, tribes and local elites, rather than insurgency-related conflict, have become the dominant form of violent conflict.”36 Relatedly, illicit markets, part of a “shadow economy” in Mindanao, are a “hidden driver” of conflict and

hostages.37

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Figure 4 :

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Extremist teachings and ideologyMosques and Islamic educational institutions such as madaris (the plural of madrasah,

in the Middle East and who condone violent extremism. Meanwhile, government-trained Ulamainstitutions and aligned with the moderate Islamic culture of Southeast Asia, are marginalized. Weak and impoverished mosques and madaris leads to reliance on foreign funding and foreign-trained preachers. Compounding these problems, the curriculum in such Islamic educational institutions is not standardized and is often of poor quality.

In a recent survey of youth vulnerability to violent extremism, the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) observes that madaris are key sites of recruitment

in their community who drove people to being radicalized. Many respondents explained that they knew recruiters and that these were active in local educational institutions (madaris) and in mosques after the Friday prayers. Even those who were not involved in the violent extremist groups conceded that the recruiters were often charming and persuasive. The recruiters were generally treated with distrust by the community as they had the potential to cause problems however, but there was little discussion of notifying government security agencies of their presence.38

38in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, 2017.

Incidence of Poverty and Disease in the Philippines, showing a concentration on Mindanao

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority, 2013

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State universities have also been noted as a site of recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism. A postgraduate student and tutor at the Mindanao State University in Marawi explained that some of her students had been recruited by the Maute Group, sometimes in return for payments in cash.39 As the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) observed in a recent report on post-Marawi violent extremism, “It is clear that universities and technical institutes need to be a part of prevention efforts.”40

a discursive framework with which to convert grievances into action against perceived enemies. Concepts such as jihad qital (armed jihad), (declaring someone an apostate), and the IS vision of a Caliphate serve as mobilizing ideas that can be attractive to at-risk youth and can contribute to radicalization to violent extremism. The

conflict and corruption, is a powerful mobilizing narrative in violent extremist circles.41

Finally, but crucially, the role of extremist preachers in forming and leading violent extremist cells, employing extremist teachings, and recruiting from Islamic education institutions is one of the most dominant features of contemporary violent extremism in

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Figure 6 : Incidence of conflict in ARMM, 2011–2016 Source: International Alert–Philippines

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the Philippines. A common characteristic shared by the leaders of various IS-inspired violent extremist cells is they all are or were self-styled preachers who used the title ustadz (sing. ustadinclude the leaders of one small cell in in Cotabato, Fakhrudin Dilangalen; the founder

both of the Maute brothers.

ideology and teachings, making younger demographics that spend more time online particularly vulnerable. The largest social media platform in the Philippines is Facebook, with usage driven by arrangements with telecommunications providers that make the platform free to use without purchasing a data plan. A joint study by Rappler and the Asia Foundation of online radicalization to violent extremism found that “extremist messaging in the Philippines is highly localized, and connects with local grievances that often spring from the municipal or provincial level.”42 It is also often articulated in local languages such as Maranao, Maguindanoan and Tausug. These circumstances

identify and remove violent extremist content.43

A faction of the BIFF, for example, maintains a Facebook page on which it broadcasts sermons in Maguindanaon to a limited audience. At time of writing, the page had 381

44 Many personal Facebook pages of youth located in Mindanao openly display memes and messages that support IS or violent extremism in general. Such pages also have a limited audience, but appear to have survived efforts by Facebook and the Philippine government to counter violent extremist content. Although such online material has limited reach and engagement, it may play a role in identifying

algorithm.

While such posts are likely to draw on the national grievance narratives outlined above, they are typically triggered by local incidents that are seen to represent broader themes. The killing of a group of young fruit pickers in Patikul, also mentioned under “Contemporary Grievances” in this report, above, is one such example.

Women and children in general are the most affected by these

sending their kids to madaris and torils

42 -pler-TAF, Executive Summary.

43Media in the Philippines,” 2018.

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a negative impact on the youths’ knowledge and understanding of re-

-donment of modest Islamic wear such as abaya or nikab

Transnational LinkagesIn this highly localized context, and given the factionalized character of Moro politics,

linkages provide the mobilizing ideas, leadership, funding and, sometimes, the operatives that serve to unite and focus violent extremism in the Philippines. The most dramatic case of transnational linkages driving violent extremism is that of the Marawi siege. The attack on the city was made possible by IS sponsorship and funding but, more importantly, by leadership under the IS banner. On the promise of establishing an IS–East Asia wilayah

45 The plan to take Marawi was directly inspired by

46

Transnational linkages in the form of a Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF), the German-

47 and the

in the Philippine context. Given that FTF suicide bombers are also implicated in the

will not only enable but also serve to normalize suicide bombing in the Philippines.

dispersed over mainland Mindanao, Basilan and Sulu.48

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Focus of the Assessment

Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP P/CVE) under the auspices of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), with technical support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

institutions. However, the 2016 election of President Rodrigo Duterte, an insider to the conflict in Mindanao who understands the local grievances, has presented a window of opportunity and the political will to address violent extremism in a more direct way than might previously have been possible. The NAP P/CVE promises to close the coordination gap across agencies and civil society organizations in the P/CVE space, providing a coherent framework for policy and programming at the national, regional and local levels.

The effort to develop the NAP P/CVE follows on from the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, which was held in Manila in September 2017. During that meeting, member-states adopted the Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism, which commits ASEAN member states to counter violent extremism in their territories. The Manila Declaration paved the way for the adoption, on October 31, 2018, of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise

steps member-states should follow in their P/CVE programming.49 Both documents explicitly acknowledge the role of “civil society organizations, private sector and non-government organizations” and encourage multilateral cooperation across ASEAN member-states on the issue.50

Many who are influenced by violent extremism are not really evil people, but just people who wanted change or who misunder-stood the concept of jihad; that violent extremism is not found in

National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent ExtremismThe NAP P/CVE is tasked with developing a whole-of-government approach, engaging both the public and private sectors in programs for the prevention of and disengagement

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from violent extremism. The NAP P/CVE builds on the holistic approach adopted by the Philippine National Security Strategy 2018, with a focus on preventing recruitment to, and addressing the process of radicalization to, violent extremism through a whole-of-government approach.

In developing the NAP P/CVE, the NSC conducted extensive consultation workshops with stakeholders from government, academia, civil society and religious institutions across the Philippines.

Lead GPH Agencies and Programs in P/CVEThe (DILG) plays an important role in P/CVE as the department responsible for the Philippine National Police, Local Government Units (LGUs), and their respective Peace and Order Councils (POCs). The POCs are a government platform for the coordination between LGUs, law enforcement and the community against all forms of criminality, including violent extremism. They operate at the regional, provincial, municipal and city levels. In addition to its LGU and POC funding, DILG has a substantial budget allocation for its ‘National Advocacy for

Through these mechanisms and others, DILG supports training in P/CVE at the barangay (ward) level, drawing on support from the Philippine National Police and other government agencies. DILG offers training modules to relevant local stakeholders. These cover topics such as Strengthening Filipino Values, Cultural Sensitivity in the Filipino Setting, Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism, Vulnerable Sectors in Radicalization and Violent Extremism, Community Anti-Terrorism Awareness, and the Bohol System and Purok System.51

The role of LGUs, whether under the remit of the DILG or the new BARMM, will become increasingly important as the national government proceeds with processes of devolution under the rubrics of autonomy and federalism.

The National Security Councilprincipal advisory body for the coordination of plans and policies relating to national security. The National Security Strategy signed in 2018 by President Duterte, which

Modernize, professionalize and synergize the Philippine Armed Forces and the National Police to be capable of quickly and decisively combating terrorism, insurgency and subversion.

Work with Congress to allocate greater resources to modernize the police, military, and coast guard and to enable troops to confront the challenges of terrorism and insurgency.

Defeat radicalism and prevent recruitment through an effective whole-of-

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government approach and address the processes of radicalization and de-radicalization through information operations and education.

Implement the peace agreement with the MILF with the aim of healing in the Bangsamoro, complete the implementation of remaining commitments under the peace agreement between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF, and work for the immediate conclusion of the peace processes with the CBA-CPLA and the RPMP-RPA-ABB.52

Provide additional security to future and existing infrastructure projects to prevent militant groups from sabotaging and/or interfering with the projects

Address the plight of the indigenous peoples and farmers, especially agrarian

insurgents and terrorists.

Implement peace-promoting and catch-up socioeconomic development in conflict- affected areas and empower communities by increasing their capacity to address conflict and reduce their vulnerabilities.

Strengthen government peace and development institutions and mechanisms to increase their responsiveness to peace, conflict, and security issues.

Ensure government rationalization, coordination, and monitoring of the delivery of socioeconomic programs, and other interventions by donor institutions and government agencies in conflict-affected areas, especially in Mindanao.

In addition to the active force, train and expand the strength of the reservists to at least one percent (1%) of the population pursuant to the Philippine Constitution and the AFP Reservist Act (RA 7077).53

The ATC assumes, under the Human Security Act, responsibility for the “proper and effective implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country.” The ATC is the central policymaking body supervising, coordinating and monitoring matters relating to domestic and international terrorism in the Philippines. The ATC is the lead implementing agency in drafting and adopting the NAP P/CVE.

The (DND) as the governmental department responsible for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is central to formulating counterterrorism policy in the country. The department, however, also is also responsible for programs that have a CVE dimension or complement CVE programming by other agencies. The DND provides oversight, for example, for Task Force Balik Loob, the inter-agency body that centrally coordinates programs to reintegrate former rebels into mainstream society.

The (AFP) has typically been at the front line of counter-terrorism operations. Given the context of insurgency and rebellion in the

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Philippines, the AFP has generally been more involved in such operations than the police. Although it is focused on traditional “kinetic” counterterrorism operations, specializing in the deployment of armed force, its personnel are inevitably involved in programing operations that overlap with or complement P/CVE, typically via programs implemented by the DND.

The Philippine National Policeand developing intelligence on violent extremist networks, given their role as a law enforcement agency not as deeply involved in counterinsurgency operations as the AFP. The Salaam Police Center Program, a Muslim-led community policing program, is the jewel in the crown of its P/CVE programming.

a. Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization Trainings;b. Weekly Radio Program on Salaam Police Awareness and Islamic culture;c. Seminar regarding awareness of Muslim culture and practices for Non-Muslim

PNP personnel;d. Regular Friday sermons and visitation of mosques and madrasas in Metro Manila;e. Weekly visitation to madrasas and mosques;f. Monthly dialogue with Tableigh, Imam Council of the Philippines, and Ulama

Council of the Philippines;g. Quarterly meeting with Muslim elders and Muslim/Christian stakeholders for

peace-building and cooperation;h. Quarterly meeting with Muslim women in connection with the protection of women

and children against violence;i. Weekly visitation to different madrasas to support school-based projects for the

Muslim youths; andj. 54

One local Salaam police chief in Maguindanao said that it was his close connections to the community and to religious leaders that had made him effective in preventing violent extremism in his jurisdiction. As a result, he claimed, there had been no successful IED attacks under his watch.55

police have from the local community is apparent, and should inspire further P/CVE programing to support their community policing and early warning functions.

The (DepEd) has implemented a Madrasah Education

Madrasah (pl. madaris) generally refers to Muslim private schools with core emphasis on Islamic studies and Arabic literacy. It is a privately-operated school which relies on the support of the local community or foreign donors, particularly

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from Islamic or Muslim countries. The madaris are the oldest educational institution in Mindanao and are recognized to be the single most important factor in the preservation of the Islamic faith and culture in the Philippines.56

The department estimates that there are between 600 and 1,000 madaris scattered across Mindanao, most of which are not controlled by the government. These are concentrated in the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Basilan and Maguindanao. The department has developed a Road Map for Upgrading Muslim Basic Education that dovetails with efforts to reform and standardize the sector in the interests of P/CVE.

Development and institutionalization of madrasah education.

Upgrading quality secular basic education in formal elementary and secondary schools serving Muslim students.

Developing and implementing an alternative learning system for Filipino Muslim out-of-school youth.

Developing and implementing appropriate livelihood skills education and training for present-day students of private madaris and out-of-school youth.

Supporting government efforts to provide quality Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) Program for Filipino Muslim preschool children.

Creation of a Special Fund for Assistance to Muslim Educational (FAME) by an Act of Congress.

ARMM adopted the same principles and standardized curriculum; therefore, the onus will be on the newly-created education ministry in BARMM to implement the agenda.

DepEd is also responsible for the Arabic Language and Islamic Values Education program, which seeks to standardize the curriculum of private Islamic teachers and ustadz (preachers).

The

Bureau of Corrections is also responsible for the dangerously congested detainee

Area jail near Manila declared allegiance to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi and IS. Pictures and videos circulated online of the prisoners displaying the IS black flag. 57Overcrowding, protracted delays in the administration of justice, and the mixing of militant inmates are

to violent extremism.

Under the auspices of the (ARMM), the Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) sought to reintegrate returnees from armed groups into local communities by providing them with livelihood assistance. PAVE

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in Maguinandao.58 PAVE is recognized by the National Peace and Order Council and

(CLIP), which aims to a achieve permanent and peaceful closure of all armed conflicts

LGUs and the Philippine National Police.59

Health, Education, Livelihood, Peace and Governance, and Synergy (ARMM–HELPS) and Bangsamoro Regional Inclusive Development with Growth and Equity (ARMM-BRIDGE).

The (OPAPP) is the lead governmental agency tasked with managing the peace processes, both with the

mandate to usher in Bangsamoro autonomy under the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the BARMM process. As P/CVE in the Philippines hinges on the success of the peace process in Muslim Mindanao, OPAPP is one of the key implementing agencies in the national government.

PamayaNAn), a convergence program that targets conflict-affected communities in isolated, hard-to-reach areas.60

Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAPWPS). NAPWPS supports the implementation of national mandates on women and gender equality, as well as on peace and development. It supports the government and civil society in promoting interventions, addressing sexual and gender-based violence in conflict environments,

The UNDPCVE and in delivering several large programs, with local partners, in the P/CVE space. According to its website, the UNDP is focused on supporting inter-faith dialogue and an early warning and response system to prevent violent extremism in the Philippines.61

to Risks of Violent Extremism in the Philippines and is funded by the Government of

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major outputs is a partnership with the Al-Qalam Institute at the University of Ateneo-Davao to provide volunteers and training to madaris, in order to prevent the teaching of violent extremist ideas. The program also supported the development, construction and launch of the Bitiala Center for inter-faith dialogue, meditation, and reflection in Cotabato City.62

The UNDP has partnered with Australian Aid to deliver PRIME-Bangsamoro (Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives for Empowerment in the Bangsamoro). The primary objective of PRIME-Bangsamoro is to assist the MILF and MNLF in the transition to

in Mindanao and the Visayas;

Conduct of research on the role that madaris and religious schools play in Muslim communities, and in the promotion or prevention of violent extremism; and,

Capacity development for Muslim and Christian religious leaders to promote inter-faith dialogue.

In some far and rather remote areas in the provinces and in some torils and madaris

Now that there are technological advancements such as cell phones and

Plan International is the implementing agency for the United States Agency for

on the return and reintegration of IDPs from the Marawi siege; however, it also has a broad remit to strengthen the local community and civil society to prevent the re-

“Contemporary Grievances against Manila,” above), this project is an important part of the overall efforts in Muslim Mindanao to prevent violent extremism.

Research on Violent Extremism in the Philippines Although researching recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism presents a

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great challenge, there are a number of institutions in the Philippines with a track record of effective research projects relevant to P/CVE. Most of these continue to work in the area.

International Alert–Philippines has pioneered the use of violent incident reporting

across the ARMM, International Alert has produced data that highlights the importance of the baseline level of conflict in Mindanao and the illicit economies in which violent extremism thrives. International Alert has emerged as an indispensable program for researchers and policymakers, yet much could be done to expand the capability of the

region to include important sites of violent extremist activity, such as Zamboanga and Davao.

The IAG, which often works closely with International Alert–Philippines, also produces

other research institutes.

The Asia Foundation is a regular producer of high-quality research on P/CVE in the Philippines. At the time of writing, the foundation was in the preparation phase of a

and Recruitment in Mindanao.” Its report on online violent extremist recruitment, in

Figure 7 : ARMM-BRIDGE and ARMM-HELPS priority areas, 2014–2018 Source: ARMM Transition Portal

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collaboration with the media outlet Rappler, represents a partnership model that should inspire further research.63

The IMPL Project is a small specialist research institute that has conducted interesting

For example, IMPL conducted a survey of 3,000 youth in Marawi that shed light on recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism that occurred before the siege.

The IPAC is based in Indonesia but has produced perhaps the most detailed analysis of violent extremist networks in the Philippines. IPAC typically draws on primary source

like.

The working on issues of Islam and democracy, peace and, increasingly, violent extremism. The center partners closely with government institutions. In Manila in 2018 it convened

on Peace and the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia.”64

While a number of universities in the Philippines host researchers who conduct individual projects, the system, with campuses in Marawi, Cotabato, and other locations, is a valuable regional network that is beginning to produce research related to P/CVE. In particular, the Mindanaoa new institution, is at the center of efforts related to preventing conflict, addressing the needs of IDPs, and research on PVE.65

In Manila, the is a center for expertise on Muslim Mindanao and conducts some research related to conflict and violent extremism.66

63Social Media in the Philippines,” unpublished report, 2018.

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Insights from the AssessmentDrawing on semi-structured interviews with key community leaders from across Mindanao, it was possible to identify a number of common resilience factors available at the local level. Although not all informants agreed on what these factors were precisely, there were common threads that can serve as a guide to P/CVE programming. Importantly, the nature of the violent extremism problem differs to a degree from area to area. While Marawi IDPs are coping with recruitment among their displaced and disadvantaged youth, in Sulu the ASG have been recruiting from the children of victims from previous cycles of violence between the military and the militants.

Religious Education

have the training and skills to counter self-styled extremist preachers. Respondents emphasized, however, that opposing these often-charismatic preachers is a challenge and requires a deep understanding of the religious arguments used by violent extremists.

As a religious leader, the greatest contribution to reduce violent extremism would be to understand and make others understand that violent extremism has no place

based on the practices of the Prophet Mohammed and his early followers] and have a deeper understanding from reliable people. Religion is supposed to be used for good and not evil. We need to have even just a very basic understanding of the tafseer and asbub un nuzulof those verses regarding jihad that these extremists are so good at misusing and misinterpreting in order to radicalize people into violent extremism. The thing

because you should not study a verse in isolation without understanding the context in which it was revealed along with other verses related to it. In short, we should arm ourselves and others with the correct Islamic knowledge to counter how the extremists misuse religious knowledge to their favor.67

While madaris are often cast as a part of the problem, these surveys made clear that having too little religious education also leaves youth vulnerable to manipulative teachings. Through the distorted preaching of violent extremists, concepts such as jihad (in its violent form) and jannah (heaven) can become persuasive personal incentives. As a community leader described it, “Violent extremists like the Maute Group twisted Islam and the concept of jihad to kill innocent civilians, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Having little to no knowledge on Islam and jihad makes one vulnerable to their ideology,

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P/CVE programming that helps to provide at-risk communities with the knowledge

could thus be one approach to consider.

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Bangsamoro identityThe work that has been done by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission to develop and enshrine in law an inclusive non-sectarian Bangsamoro identity is a key resiliency that must be further developed and popularized in the interests of reducing conflict in Muslim Mindanao. Pride in and loyalty to a Bangsamoro identity, including a sense of duty to make a success of the newly created BARMM regime, may mitigate conflict across clan, family and factional lines that feed into violent extremism. It is a crucial resiliency to draw on for youth who are looking for meaning and identity that transcends local dynasties and patron–client networks and that offers a hopeful vision.

In the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the legislation to enable the Bangsamoro Autonomous

Those who, at the advent of the Spanish colonization, were considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands, whether of mixed or full blood, shall have the right to identify themselves, their spouses and descendants, as Bangsamoro.69

More must still be done, however, to persuade Tausugs in Sulu to join in this inclusive Moro identity. A majority of that group voted against the establishment of the BARMM, under the pretext of Tausug nationalism. The importance of this project has been recognized by the UNDP in its support for “Moro convergence.”

one young leader acknowledged that intra-Moro divisions still exist. That leader, Amir

youth that was carried by major Philippine media outlets. It is also reproduced in full in the annex to this report.

Traditional valuesTraditional values, socially enforced by families, local elites, clan leaders and political dynasties, are a double-edged sword that can both drive and protect against conflict.

A number of respondents highlighted aspects of local traditional culture that are valuable in countering violent extremism. The principal of kasisiyapa (cooperation and mutual concern) in Maranao culture, for example, was considered a way to prevent families from being divided by radicalization to violent extremism. In this context, parents, and mothers in particular, play a crucial role in protecting their children from outside influences and in maintaining the integrity of the family unit.

Sultan Atar of Marawi was one respondent who mentioned kasisiyapa as an important kasisyapa, or looking out and being concerned for

one another in the community, is the most effective way to prevent violent extremism. One view holds that if everyone were to care enough for their own family members and

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neighbors, they would immediately be able to stop the ideology of violent extremism from spreading and causing disastrous consequences. 70

Civic engagement and the rule of lawThe rule of law and civic engagement/participation at the local barangay (ward) level is another source of community resilience to violent extremism. A number of barangay

in decision-making and discussion with the local authorities. One barangay captain

important to reduce violent extremism. Listening to your constituents and including them or consulting them in making certain decisions can help. Providing a peaceful platform where people can voice out their grievances instead of lashing out violently can also help.”71

In this local administrative context, respondents emphasized the importance of the rule of law, as well as of local government/barangay

who are seen to be neutral and trustworthy develop close community ties that serve as a protection and early warning system against recruitment and radicalization to violent

be a sincere leader, give the community what its due, stop corruption and drugs, strengthen the teaching of true Islam, and monitor the community by means of town hall meetings or barangay assemblies.” 72

Interfaith relationships and peacebuilding norms

the Philippines enjoys a wealth of peacebuilding norms and institutions, facilitated by hard-won interfaith and intercommunal relationships. Although grievances from decades of insurgency are risk factors for further conflict, that history of conflict has also produced relationships and processes that have brought about the current peace agreement. These relationships and processes are multifaceted, strong and flexible resilience factors against violent extremism in the Philippines. Communities across Mindanao are tired of conflict, are acutely aware of the costs of conflict, and are highly personally invested in preventing violent extremism and maintaining the peace.

Relationships and norms that mitigate against violent extremism can be seen at the

commander who led the battle against IS in Marawi, is now the highly respected Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process in charge of OPAPP. Galvez has developed strong personal relationships with the leadership of the MILF, the ARMM government, and the Bangsamoro Transition Commission. In 2018, as chief of staff of the AFP,

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the Mindanao peace process.”73

The same peace norms and relationships can be seen in an organic context at the

two people, including the preacher. In response, Christians and Muslims took turns

mosques during Friday prayers and Muslims guarded churches during Sunday mass.74

violence and extremism, often spontaneously and without fanfare. The relationships and norms that make it possible are a strong foundation on which to build sustainable and effective P/CVE programs.

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Based on a comprehensive overview of violent extremism in the Philippines, and informed by the primary and secondary sources, the following P/CVE programming

There is an urgent need to direct programming towards both in-school and out-of-school youth, due to a stark generational divide between children and their parents. This divide has left parents, as well as community elders more generally, ill-equipped to counter violent extremist ideas where and when and they emerge. Broader programming in this area might address the problem of at-risk youth and the erosion of traditional authority structures as the generational context in which youth recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism occurs in the Philippines. Moro nationalist leaders themselves, the majority of whom support the BARMM, are concerned that their youth are vulnerable to militant Islamist preachers and ideologues who make spurious appeals based on utopian visions of a pure Islamic state under Islamic law. (For an illustration of how one prominent Moro youth leader has reached out to his peers, see the letter by Amir Mawallil in the annex to this assessment.)

There is an urgent need to empower religious leaders and authorities with

violent narratives and doctrines that seek to create personal incentives, such a redemption and heavenly reward, for engaging in violent extremism. Skills

(sayings and practices of the Prophet Mohammed) to counter such narratives. Programming must recognize that empowering credible messengers against violent extremism is a challenge. Many religious teachers are unfamiliar with violent extremist ideology, while those who are familiar because they are closer to phenomenon may risk their credibility being undermined if they become

Families should be supported as integral units that are among the best positioned to monitor and intervene against the diffusion of violent extremist ideas among children. Mothers, grandmothers and other female relatives in particular are in a strategic position to counter recruitment and radicalization of children and youth to violent extremism, given their disproportionate

especially Facebook, has created a barrier to parents monitoring and responding

parents manage social media usage by their children should be a particular focus, given that youth access to digital communications technologies will only increase as internet connectivity increases in the Philippines, and content will become harder to monitor as encryption technology becomes more popular.

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Traditional values, which may vary based on province and ethnic group, should be supported as a protective factor against violent extremist ideology dividing local communities. Programming should take into account the fact that the linguistic and ethnic diversity of the Philippines means that traditional cultural principals, norms and idioms vary across the country. Programs must be tailored to these highly local differences. Programs might seek to assist traditional community leaders in advancing values that protect against violent extremism via digital platforms, in order to better reach at-risk youth audiences.

Bangsamoro unity should be supported, including by working in close collaboration with the BARMM administration, in order to prevent fragmentation within the Moro community being exploited by violent extremists. Some violent extremist splinter groups seek to divide the Bangsamoro community so that it can then be (re)united around a violent ideology similar to that of IS. “Bangsamoro convergence” and unity are indispensable to the success of P/CVE programs in the Philippines.

Finally, there is a need to support a more detailed and comprehensive system of violent incident data collection and analysis. While occurring in a national context, incidents of violent extremism are subject to highly localized factors across the diverse social, ethnic and political landscape of the Philippines.

the capability to identify the differences in local drivers and local conflict dynamics across Mindanao and Luzon so as to better tailor programming at the sub-regional scale. A more comprehensive violent extremism data reporting and collection system would be a major contribution to the coordinated whole-of-government, whole-of-community approach envisioned by the NAP P/CVE.

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An open letter to fellow Bangsamoro youth on upcoming plebiscites1 Dear Bangsamoro youth,

For decades now we have been saying that we are all tired of the conflicts, bloodshed and the cycle of violence that left some of us battered and broken. We have said for so long that the cost in lives lost and families broken by violence is too high.

These conflicts were also part of the reason why some of us do not live in our homeland, Mindanao. Many of our Bangsamoro people have had to flee their communities. We have since become the products of this exodus. We have had to choose between staying in our homes or survival elsewhere because of these conflicts.

Many of us have had to choose dispossession and diaspora in order to stay alive.

There was a time when “Moro” was considered a derogatory word. We are changing that. We believe that the discourse on the Bangsamoro narrative is one that should include the whole nation and all Filipino citizens, not just us Moros. This has evolved out of the ongoing conversation on our narrative among the Moro youth and within our communities.

In the last few years, we have seen a lot of Bangsamoro youths directly and indirectly engaged in this process they call peace negotiations. I say that this a refreshing

as much participation from the youth. I have seen the future of the Bangsamoro step up to the challenge of making peace amid all the conflict.

We are making the choice of peace for our future. We have been working to make this happen, and we are still at work. That choice and all your efforts are worthy of respect, and you have our deep and abiding respect.

To all the youth who are giving their time and efforts, and whose work has brought us

Many of us will walk to our polling precincts on Monday for the plebiscite.

of our work for and dedication to peace in our homeland.

This Bangsamoro we are building is owned by all of us, not just our forefathers. This is our future and it is but right that we be the driving force that makes it happen.

1posted on social media and carried by national media outlets in the Philippines. This version of the text was taken from