Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

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Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

La Mada Hotel, Nairobi, 12–13 September 2011

ISS Workshop Report i

Contents

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

The institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Summary of workshop presentations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

WORKSHOP PAPERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Small arms and confl icts in the Great Lakes Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Francis K Wairagu

Natural resources and confl ict in the Great Lakes Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Nyambura Githaiga

Forced displacement and confl ict in the Great Lakes Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Dr Khoti Chilomba Kamanga

Bridging the Great Lakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Implementing the human rights dimension of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Dr Isabell Kempf

The role of regional bodies in promoting sustainable peace in the Great Lakes Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Dr Connie Mumma-Martinon

ANNEXURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Annexure A

Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

Annexure B

List of participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

ISS Workshop Report iii

Acknowledgements

The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), the

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

(ICGLR), and the Confl ict Prevention and Risk Analysis

Division of the Nairobi Offi ce of the Institute for Security

Studies (ISS) would like to thank the following people

and institutions for making this workshop a success:

■ The European Union, the Government of Switzerland

and the United Nations Offi ce of the High Commis-

sioner for Human Rights (UN-OHCHR) for providing

fi nancial support and attending the workshop ■ RECSA: Dr Francis K Sang, Executive Secretary;

Francis K Wairagu, Head of Research and Gender;

Angela Baiya-Wadeyua, Head of Communications and

Public Relations; and Dan Osano, Accountant ■ ICGLR: Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, Executive

Secretary; Nathan Mwesigye Byamukama, Pro-

gramme Offi cer, Cross Cutting Issues; Dr Isabell

Kempf, Regional Human Rights Adviser, UN-OHCHR;

Singo Stephen Mwachofi , Programme Offi cer, Peace

and Security ■ ISS: Roba Sharamo, Acting Director; Andrews Atta

Asamoah, Senior Researcher; Nyambura Githaiga,

Researcher; Samira Yusuf, Programme Assistant;

George Mukabana, Offi ce Administrator ■ Presenters: Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Senior

Researcher, ISS; Nathan Byamukama, Programme

Offi cer, Cross Cutting Issues, ICGLR; Nyambura

Githaiga, Researcher, ISS; Dr Khoti Kamanga,

Director, Centre for the Study of Forced Migration,

University of Dar-es-Salaam; Dr Isabell Kempf,

Regional Human Rights Adviser UN-OHCHR,

ICGLR; Dr Connie Mumma-Martinon, Consultant

Researcher; Dr Frank Muhereza, Senior Research

Fellow, Centre for Basic Research; Singo Mwachofi ,

Programme Offi cer, Peace and Security, ICGLR; and

Francis K Wairagu, Head of Gender and Research,

RECSA

iv Institute for Security Studies

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

(ICGLR) is an inter-governmental organisation of eleven

member states in the African Great Lakes Region,

namely Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic,

the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, the

Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda

and Zambia. Its establishment was based on the rec-

ognition that political instability and confl icts in these

countries have a considerable regional dimension and

thus that the promotion of sustainable peace and devel-

opment would require a concerted joint effort.

Regional Centre on Small Arms

The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) is an inter-

governmental arrangement arising from the Nairobi

Declaration aimed at coordinating the joint efforts by

National Focal Points to prevent, combat and eradicate

stockpiling of and illicit traffi cking in small arms and

light weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region and

Horn of Africa. The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem

of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great

Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was signed on 15

March 2000 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and/

or representatives of the governments of Burundi, the

DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan,

Tanzania and Uganda.

Institute for Security Studies

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is a pan-African

applied policy research institute working in the area

of human security in Africa. It seeks to mainstream

human security perspectives into public policy processes

and to infl uence decision-makers on the continent and

beyond. The objective of the Institute is to add critical

balance and objectivity by providing timely empirical

research and contextual analysis of relevant human se-

curity issues to policymakers, area specialists, advocacy

groups, and the media. The ISS is an established think-

tank with offi ces in Pretoria and Cape Town in South

Africa, Nairobi in Kenya, Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, and

Dakar in Senegal.

The institutions

ISS Workshop Report v

Introduction

The Great Lakes Region has been home to some of

Africa’s most intractable and turbulent confl icts. Over

a 20-year period, this region has experienced, among

others, genocide in Rwanda, civil war in Burundi, and

cross-border confl ict in the DRC, all of which have been

exacerbated by illegal armed groups from within and

outside the region. The regional dimensions of these

confl icts, such as illegal armed groups fi ghting proxy

wars across borders, have contributed to their protracted

nature as the actors and associated issues shift bases.

Continued violent confl ict has resulted in humanitarian

crises, an upsurge of displaced populations and poverty

from loss of livelihoods and security. Signifi cant themes

that have dominated the confl icts in the region include

the illegal exploitation of natural resources, proliferation

of small arms and light weapons (SALW), illegal armed

groups, sexual and gender-based violence, population

displacement, and trans-boundary ethnicities. Despite

various efforts at resolution, the confl icts persist with

profound effects on communities and stability in the

region.

Tackling the unresolved regional dimensions of con-

fl ict is crucial to the region’s progressive development

and for achieving human security for all. Given the chal-

lenges the various past efforts at confl ict resolution have

had to face, as well as the fl uid dynamics of the confl icts,

it is important that the various dynamics that inform

the confl icts are continuously examined so as to be able

to elaborate on and contribute to better informed and

sustainable interventions. The International Conference

on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Regional Centre on

Small Arms (RECSA) and Institute for Security Studies

(ISS) have been variously engaged with different aspects

of the confl icts in the region. To this end the three

institutions organised a regional workshop to deliberate

on and interrogate the changing regional dimensions

of confl ict in the Great Lakes Region and analyse chal-

lenges and prospects for sustainable peace. The Confl ict

Prevention and Risk Analysis Division of the Nairobi

Offi ce of the ISS hosted this workshop on 12 and 13

September 2011 at Hotel La Mada, Nairobi, Kenya.

The regional scope of this particular workshop was

largely limited to issues pertinent to four countries,

namely Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC), and to a lesser extent Tanzania

and Kenya. It brought together approximately 35 key

stakeholders from the respective countries drawn from

government, academia, development partners and civil

society organisations (CSOs). Nine regional thematic

presentations were made on the subjects of key drivers

and triggers of confl icts; small arms and confl icts; an

analysis of illegal armed groups; confl ict and sexual

gender-based violence; natural resources and confl ict;

the role of regional bodies in promoting sustainable

peace; forced displacement and confl ict; the regional

implications of the confl icts on political, social and eco-

nomic development; and the human rights dimension of

the ICGLR.

The workshop concluded with a commitment from

participants to develop national and regional initia-

tives that address root causes of confl ict and violence;

promote inclusive democracy, good governance and

state capacity; enhance justice, human rights and the

rule of law; strengthen regional capacities; and promote

the judicious use of shared natural resources. Following

this workshop, the ISS was charged with coordinating

a partners meeting to articulate a regional roadmap for

sustainable peace in the Great Lakes Region in order to

promote better coordination and coherence of existing

initiatives and address identifi ed challenges and gaps.

vi Institute for Security Studies

Summary of workshop presentations

Nine thematic presentations were made at the work-

shop in the sequence below. The fi ve complete papers

presented follow in the next section.

Key drivers and triggers of confl icts in the Great Lakes RegionAndrews Atta-AsamoahInstitute for Security Studies

This presentation began with the assertion that while

confl icts in the Great Lakes region have achieved vis-

ibility, they have been studied largely from a national

rather than a regional perspective. The drivers and dy-

namics of confl ict in the region have become a regional

security complex and, as such, a regional level of analy-

sis should be applied in order to capture the dynamics

of this aspect of regionalisation. The presenter defi ned

drivers of confl ict as factors underlying or sustaining

confl ict and identifi ed six main drivers on the basis of

their relevant regional dimensions. These include the

trans-national aspect of ethnicity; the politics of exclu-

sion (political, ethnic and generational); state weak-

ness, which creates governance and security vacuums;

the presence of exploitable fungible natural resources

which feature in war fi nancing; greedy actors; and

proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

Looking at the Great Lakes Region as a regional security

complex will be a strategy to target regional drivers

of confl ict while simultaneously mitigating against

national drivers of confl ict.

Small arms and confl icts in the Great Lakes RegionFrancis WairaguRegional Centre on Small Arms

The presentation highlighted how the proliferation of

SALW in the region has increased the violent nature of

confl ict. Owing to their legitimate use by governments,

SALW cannot be prohibited – yet their misuse has

become a burden to the region and demands urgent

multifaceted solutions. The dynamics of proliferation

include supply, demand and misuse, with misuse being

the major element of concern. Regional dimensions of

this particular theme of confl ict are most evident in

the spillover effects of SALW proliferation across state

borders hindering post-confl ict development. Estimates

of the number of illegal SALW in circulation are not

reliable. Tackling the problem of SALW proliferation

is compounded by the fact that misuse of SALW is

symptomatic of other root causes of confl ict such as

poverty, youth unemployment, and political and social

alienation. Thus, whereas SALW are a cause of immedi-

ate concern in Great Lakes confl icts, mitigating their

impact will require that other root causes of confl ict

infl uencing the demand for illegal SALW in the region

be addressed. SALW not only impact on the lethality

of confl ict – their long life span creates a potential for

continued misuse even after a particular confl ict has

been resolved. Regional initiatives to deal with the pro-

liferation of SALW will require cooperation among law

enforcement agencies, comprehensive security sector

reform, and a shift from a focus on SALW to a long-

term engagement with more holistic objectives such as

good governance for stability and peace.

Analysis of illegally armed groups in the Great Lakes RegionSingo Mwachofi International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

This analysis of illegally armed groups categorised the

groups as either rebel movements or militias. Rebel

movements are defi ned as groups based in one or more

foreign countries and who take up arms against a gov-

ernment for political, economic and ideological reasons,

while militias are illegally organised groups operating

in a defi ned territory within a particular state and

pursuing political or economic goals. The prevalence

of illegal armed groups in the Great Lakes Region is in

part due to the history of violent confl ict and subse-

quent proliferation of SALW in the region. Three main

illegal armed groups in the region operate outside their

countries of origin. They are the Forces Démocratiques

de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Liberation Forces

of Rwanda, FDLR) from Rwanda in the eastern DRC; the

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the eastern Central

African Republic, north-western DRC and southern

ISS Workshop Report vii

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

Sudan; and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the

eastern DRC. In addition to the rebel movements, local

militia groups such as the Mai Mai Cheka, Mai Mai

Kifuafua, Mai Mai APCLS, Mai Mai Pareko and Mai Mai

Yakutumba are active in the eastern DRC. These illegal

groups capitalise on the breakdown of rule of law and

survive largely through illegal exploitation of natural

resources, extortion, and raiding of villages. Although

there are various reasons for the formation of these

groups (for instance political rebellion), their illegal

modes of sustenance are characterised by human

rights violations such as rape, abduction, murder,

plunder and pillaging. In addition their presence has

aggravated humanitarian crises in confl ict areas, aug-

mented proliferation of illegal SALW, and exacerbated

the illegal exploitation and traffi cking of people and

natural resources. The regional dynamics of illegal

armed groups in confl icts in the region has negatively

affected regional interstate relations on multiple levels

and therefore concerted regional strategies should be

applied to alleviate the vulnerability of populations and

strengthen interstate cooperation.

Natural resources and confl ict in the Great Lakes RegionNyambura GithaigaInstitute for Security Studies

There are both direct and indirect links between

natural resources and confl ict in the region. Direct

links refer to two or more states which fi ght over the

exploitation of natural resources that are present along

common borders and indirect links to the illegal ex-

ploitation of natural resources which are then used to

fi nance confl icts in the region. Taking precedence has

been the role of revenue-generating, non-renewable,

lootable natural resources in the regionalisation of

insecurity, proliferation of SALW, violent confl ict, and

regional smuggling networks. The regional dynamics

between natural resources and confl icts have created a

security complex owing to contextual challenges such

as the multiplicity of actors and motivating factors;

governance challenges from a weak state presence,

failed regulation enforcement and poor infrastructure;

the state of the mining industry, which is largely

informal and unregulated; and the prevalence of armed

groups in the region as well as their use of natural

resources to fi nance confl ict. As a result, natural

resources that should benefi t the region have been

exploited illegally to fi nance confl ict in the absence of

the rule of law. The regional dimensions of natural re-

sources in confl ict are exemplifi ed by the cross-border

activities of illegally armed groups, regional smuggling

networks, trade in illegally exploited natural resources,

and interstate confl ict over shared natural resources.

Though curbing the links between regional natural re-

sources and confl ict demands a regional solution, there

is a challenge to the will and capacity of the respective

nation states to domesticate and enforce regulations to

address the role of natural resources in these confl icts.

However, there is a growing global awareness of the

negative impact of confl ict which is fi nanced by natural

resources and the ongoing imposition of stringent inter-

national standards on exploitation and trade. Countries

in the region will need to act quickly in order to fore-

stall the adverse effects that implementation of these

standards may have on the natural resource-dependent

economies in the region.

Forced displacement and confl ict in the Great Lakes RegionDr Khoti KamangaCentre for the Study of Forced Migration

The term ‘forced displacement’ best captures the

forms of human mobility that have the greatest impact

on confl ict. These include forcibly displaced asylum

seekers, all cadres of refugees, and internally displaced

persons (IDPs). The term ‘refugee’ is used with refer-

ence to rejected asylum seekers, irregularly settled

persons, naturalised but not integrated individuals,

undocumented persons, returnees, and those being

repatriated. With the impact of regionalisation adding

fresh impetus to forced displacement and migration,

there is a decline in the number of refugees and an in-

crease in irregular migrants due to human traffi cking,

smuggling, and hostile environmental and climatic con-

ditions. The response to these mixed migration fl ows

has been heightened by restrictionism, securitisation

of asylum, and the collapse of asylum and immigration

systems. In the region, the nexus between displace-

ment and confl ict has been a vicious, self-perpetuating

circle with a violent confl ict producing IDPs and refu-

gees. These increase social pressure, thereby creating

internal and regional tensions as grounds for further

confl ict. Displacement accordingly engenders confl ict

directly and indirectly. Underlying the phenomenon of

violent confl ict and forced displacement are localised

challenges of governance, socio-economic equity, geo-

politics, environmental degradation, and climate-cop-

ing strategies. The protracted refugee situation in the

Great Lakes Region should be acknowledged and greater

resources directed towards achieving a greater coher-

ence between policy, law and practice with a balance to

be attained between border control management and

the legitimate protection needs of migrants.

viii Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Bridging the Great Lakes: implementing the human rights dimension of the International Conference on the Great Lakes RegionDr Isabell KempfRegional Human Rights Adviser, UN-OHCHR, ICGLR

Recognising that national confl icts and human rights vio-

lations in the Great Lakes Region have a regional dimen-

sion is closely related to the interconnectedness of people

in the region such that instability in one country affects

its neighbours. Institutions such as the International

Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) serve as

entry points for the promotion and protection of human

rights in the region. The ICGLR Pact on Security, Stability

and Development in the Great Lakes Region addresses

the root causes of violent confl icts in the region through

certain human rights protocols and projects. These

include the fi ght against sexual violence, the rights of

internally displaced and returning populations, the

fi ght against illegal exploitation of natural resources,

a regional centre on good governance, democracy and

human rights (including a human rights observatory),

the prevention of genocide, the fi ght against impunity,

and election monitoring. Challenges exist with regard

to the upholding of human rights because of a lack of or

weakness of independent national human rights institu-

tions and organisations. An issue which needs to be ad-

dressed is whether to pursue peace and reconciliation at

the cost of justice to the victims of violations, in view of

the fact that human rights violations and impunity fuel

insecurity and are likely to lead to a renewal of confl ict.

In the absence of strong and active national independent

human rights institutions, monitoring of human rights

violations on a regional scale becomes problematic.

Efforts on the part of the ICGLR to improve the situa-

tion with regard to human rights in the region include

the facilitating of best practices and strengthening of

regional fora on joint human rights monitoring systems

through workshops and projects, as well as establishing

a Regional Centre for Democracy, Good Governance,

Human Rights and Civic Education for the Great Lakes

Region to enhance confl ict prevention and early warning

based on human rights monitoring.

Confl icts and sexual and gender-based violenceNathan ByamukamaInternational Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The rising occurrence of sexual and gender-based vio-

lence (SGBV) in confl icts within the Great Lakes Region is

of grave concern. The damaging long-term psychosocial

impact of SGBV on affected women, men and children

will have negative implications on their contribution

towards regional growth and development. Although

the defi nition of SGBV includes (attempted) rape, sexual

abuse and exploitation, forced early marriage, domestic

violence, traffi cking and female genital mutilation, this

presentation focused on the two aspects of rape and

sexual violation. A three-pronged approach in combating

SGBV is based on fi ghting impunity, assisting victims and

preventing violence. Most of the focus has been on fi ght-

ing impunity and assisting victims, with little strategic

interventions on preventing SGBV. Research on SGBV in

the region indicates a high incidence of mass rapes of

women, men and children by armed gangs or civilians as

a result of rituals, revenge attacks and ethnic cleansing.

The social stigma associated with SGBV has resulted in a

great number of cases going unreported, particularly in

the case of male victims of SGBV. Also, legal instruments

against SGBV seem to ignore the protection of men. This

has meant that the victims continue in dysfunctional

lives with psychosocial and bodily trauma affecting their

capacity to engage in productive livelihoods. It is widely

believed that SGBV is rampant due to impunity but

prosecution and punishment are only part of the solu-

tion. Attention needs to be paid to preventing SGBV by

seeking to address the root causes of SGBV in the Great

Lakes Region. Within the region, the context of violent

confl ict introduces for some an atypical lifestyle that is

characterised by the use of force to fulfi l needs in the

absence of the rule of law. Instruments of the ICGLR such

as the protocols on SGBV, non-aggression, natural re-

sources and genocide prevention all contribute to dealing

with systemic issues surrounding SGBV to enhance the

prevention of this form of violence.

Regional implications of confl icts on political, social and economic development in the Great Lakes RegionDr Frank MuherezaCentre for Basic Research

The interconnectedness of armed confl icts in the Great

Lakes Region has had an impact on the economic,

political and social spheres of the region. Elements of

interconnectedness in the region include territorial con-

tiguity, trans-boundary resources, and trans-national

ethnicities. Every confl ict in the region is linked to at

least one or several others in terms of causes, actors

or the interests of the actors and purveyors of confl ict.

Regionalisation of armed confl ict is evident in the

transnational operations of armed groups, composition

of fi ghting forces, regionalisation of military agendas,

the fl ow of refugees, and externalisation of internal

confl icts. The direct costs of armed confl ict in the region

ISS Workshop Report ix

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

are felt in reduced domestic capital formation, losses

in cumulative gross domestic product, destruction of

infrastructure, and diversion of state fi nancial capital

from productive use to confl ict-related spending on

military, medical and humanitarian needs. The indirect

economic costs of confl ict include a loss of state revenue

due to illegal exploitation by confl ict entrepreneurs, en-

vironmental and natural resource degradation, reduced

regional trade, the burden of refugee infl ux and dysfunc-

tional service delivery, all of which entrench poverty.

Politically, the regional implications of confl ict have been

felt in the undermining of diplomatic relations, destruc-

tion of state institutions (which in turn contributes to

state fragility), unduly competitive military spending on

self-defence, and the confl uence of intra- and interstate

armed confl ict and trans-boundary human rights viola-

tions. On the social front, regional implications of con-

fl ict have been the impact of sexual and gender-based

violence on women, men and children, the psychosocial

effects of confl ict trauma, population displacement,

and intensifi ed vulnerability through limited access to

social services. Some of the challenges faced by inter-

vention actions to mitigate regional implications are a

lack of internal democracy and political governance of

member countries, confl ict drivers that originate from

outside the Great Lakes Region, a multiplicity of regional

frameworks and political commitment of members

states to these frameworks, as well as contradictions

in Western interventions such as the ‘right to protect’.

Member countries should strive to deepen democratic

reforms and address poverty and other conditions that

have driven populations to resort to violent confl ict.

Regionally, the countries should improve cross-border

cooperation and further economic integration projects

and harmonisation of relevant policy frameworks.

Efforts should be made to increase investment in visible

interdependence and support for bilateral stability for all

countries in the Great Lakes Region.

The role of regional bodies in promoting sustainable peace in the Great Lakes RegionDr Connie Mumma-MartinonConsultant Researcher

Regional bodies that are active in the Great Lakes Region

(specifi cally Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda)

include the International Conference of the Great Lakes

Region (ICLGR), the East African Community (EAC),

the Economic Community of Central African States

(ECCAS), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes

Countries (CEPGL) and the Common Market for Eastern

and Southern Africa (COMESA). Most of these bodies

were initially established to promote economic growth

and regional integration but have now expanded their

mandate to include security issues. The success of these

regional bodies has been challenged by the intractable

and protracted confl icts in the region, a heavy depend-

ence on donor funding, weak institutional capacity,

slow decision-making processes, the multiplicity of

bodies with a lack of strategic harmonisation, a lack of

accountability to civilians most impacted by confl icts,

and a lack of coherence in the understanding of and

approaches to resolving confl icts in the region. National

challenges of member countries also have a bearing on

the effi cacy of these regional organisations with varying

state capacities for implementing the rule of law, the

presence of weak governance structures, and a decline

in public services. There is a need for regional bodies to

implement better-coordinated strategies to deal with

the regional dimensions of Great Lakes confl icts. This

should begin with a more coherent understanding of

the root causes of confl icts in the region and common

approaches for its mitigation. The regional bodies must

enhance their capacity to implement regional protocols

and support member states in domesticating and popu-

larising these frameworks.

Workshop papersSmall arms and confl icts in the Great Lakes Region

Francis K Wairagu

Natural resources and confl ict in the Great Lakes RegionNyambura Githaiga

Forced displacement and confl ict in the Great Lakes RegionDr Khoti Kamanga

Bridging the Great Lakes: implementing the human rights dimension of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Dr Isabell Kempf

The role of regional bodies in promoting sustainable peace in the Great Lakes Region

Dr Connie Mumma-Martinon

ISS Workshop Report 3

Small arms and confl icts in the Great Lakes Region

Francis K WairaguRegional Centre on Small Arms

INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons

(SALW) has a great negative impact on violent confl ict

situations. The illicit trade in SALW occurs in all parts of

the globe, but is concentrated in areas affl icted by armed

confl ict, violence, and organised crime, in other words

where the demand for illicit weapons is often highest.

Arms traffi cking fuels civil wars and regional con-

fl icts; stocks the arsenals of terrorists, drug cartels, and

other armed groups; and contributes to violent crime.1

The traffi cking in and easy availability of SALW fuel

instability and confl ict and pose a threat to sustainable

development in affected countries.

Over the years, the Great Lakes Region of Africa has

suffered enormously from confl ict and armed violence.

The proliferation and misuse of SALW have therefore

placed tremendous burdens on the region and require

urgent multifaceted and multisectoral solutions. The

fact that these weapons have legitimate military, police

and civilian uses related to state security provision and

maintenance of law and order alongside self-protection

renders their prohibition undesirable and unrealistic.

As most illicit arms start their lives as licit stocks

under authorised agents, the current trend in addressing

SALW-related challenges is to control and manage both

licit and illicit SALW rather than eradicate them.

Small Arms Survey research shows that there are at

least 875 million combined civilian, law enforcement,

and military fi rearms in the world. The majority of

global fi rearms – roughly 75 per cent of the known total

– belong to civilian owners.2 The most common fi gures

on gun ownership often are personal estimates by

knowledgeable observers whose impressions are useful,

but may differ dramatically. It is diffi cult to establish

the exact number of illegal weapons in circulation any-

where, and therefore researchers and other bodies are

reluctant to quote any fi gures. The fact that the fi rearms

are held illegally makes it diffi cult to collect reliable data

from those who hold them. It is also worth noting that

these fi gures apply to fi rearms and that estimates of

most other types of SALW remain elusive.

Small arms are involved in the vast majority of direct

confl ict deaths worldwide and, more than ever, civilian

populations – increasingly children – bear the brunt of

armed confl ict. These weapons are not only broadly used

in interstate confl icts, but are also the weapons of choice

in civil wars, for terrorism, organised crime, piracy

and gang warfare.3 The most commonly used weapons

in Africa’s confl icts are Kalashnikov assault rifl es. The

vast majority of these weapons and their ammunition –

perhaps 95 per cent – come from outside Africa.4

The proliferation of small arms in some parts of the

Great Lakes Region dates back to the pre-colonial period

when slave traders and seekers of treasures such as

ivory and minerals exchanged arms for some of these

commodities. The liberation wars against colonialism

brought a new wave of proliferation with the worst

period during the Cold War, when regimes within the

region were pitted against each other and supplied with

weapons by the side they supported. The post-Cold War

period triggered another fl ow as regimes sustained

by the bipolar system collapsed as democratisation

and new governance systems emerged in the region.

Elements of this last phase are still a challenge to

governance and the rule of law in some of the states in

the region.

While SALW proliferation plays a signifi cant role in

the sustenance and severity of confl icts, the confl icts

in the region are driven by a combination of factors,

4 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

including historical disputes over territory and current

disputes over national governance and the distribution

of state resources. The easy availability of weapons

makes it more likely that potential belligerents will

choose violence and not negotiation as the way to

pursue their grievances. The abundance of arms has

contributed to the severity, duration and geographic

scope of recent wars. In this sense, the proliferation

of arms is a signifi cant factor in the dynamics of

contemporary confl ict.5

DEFINITION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND PROLIFERATION DYNAMICS

While international agreement on a defi nition for small

arms and light weapons has proved elusive, there is a

general, working defi nition that can be drawn upon.

Small arms are weapons that are designed for individual

use and include pistols, sub-machine guns, assault rifl es

and light machine guns. Light weapons are designed

to be deployed and used by a crew of two or more and

include grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft and

anti-tank guns and missile launchers, recoilless rifl es

and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre.6 The Nairobi

Protocol, which is a regional instrument for arms control,

defi nes small arms as weapons designed for personal

use, such as light machine guns, sub-machine guns,

including machine pistols, fully automatic rifl es and

assault rifl es, and semi-automatic rifl es. These include

any portable barrelled weapon designed to expel or may

be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile

by the action of an explosive, and any other weapon or

destructive device such as an explosive bomb, incendiary

bomb or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missile,

missile system or mine. Small arms also include ‘ammu-

nition’, meaning the complete round or its components,

including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder,

bullets or projectiles that are used in a small arm or light

weapon plus any components, parts or replacement parts

that are essential to its operation. Light weapons, on the

other hand, are defi ned as portable weapons designed for

use by several persons serving as a crew. They include

heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers,

mortars of less than 100 mm calibre, grenade launch-

ers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns,

shoulder-fi red rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and launch-

ers, and air defence weapons.7 It is notable, however,

that these defi nitions are limited in light of the current

technological advancement where larger weapons can be

operated by a single person or remotely controlled. There

is therefore a need to further interrogate the current

‘working’ defi nitions of SALW.

The dynamics of arms illicit proliferation revolves

around three aspects, namely supply, demand and

misuse. This is a critical departure from the dominant

supply versus demand arms control dichotomy because

the mere presence (supply) of arms and the desire to

possess them (demand) do not in itself pose a problem

– it is when arms are misused in confl icts and criminal

activities that they become an issue. Over-concentration

on the illicit arms trade can be misleading because it

cannot be adequately isolated from other types of trans-

fer such as authorised and diverted sales.8

Small arms do not proliferate by themselves. They

are designed, produced, and procured in response to

demand by governments and/or civilians. They are sold,

re-sold, perhaps stolen, diverted, and maybe legally or

illegally transferred several more times. Ultimately, they

are used and re-used, during and after confl ict. At each

juncture in this complex chain of legal and illicit trans-

fers, people, brokers, insurgents, criminals, government

offi cials, and/or organised groups are active participants

in the process. Regulation and control of these weapons

must proceed from this simple fact.9

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SALW PROLIFERATION IN THE REGION

The use of weapons in human confl icts dates from time

immemorial. The use of SALW within the Great Lakes

Region is the result of advances in war technology.

While fi rst used for hunting elephant and other wild

animals for their trophies and for self-protection by Arab

traders, the fi ght alongside the colonial regimes during

World War I and II introduced arms among the regional

population, albeit in small numbers. The challenge is

that most fi rearms long outlive the confl icts they are in-

troduced for, however. There are, for example, still some

remnants of WWII fi rearms in circulation in the region.

Many factors, both internal and external, have con-

tributed to the run-away culture of violence that is

tearing African States apart. The SALW debate can best

be appreciated if placed at the point of intersection

between the internal governance processes and the

external infl uences that shape them. For example, it is

true to say that the post-cold war phase of globaliza-

tion characterised by the hegemony of the market

and liberal democracy constitutes a major vehicle

of structural violence in the developing world, not

least in Africa. That notwithstanding, the weakening

effect of globalisation on the African State should be

seen as exerting only an exacerbating but subordi-

nate impact on the collapse of internal governance.

Consequently, the spread of weapons and intractable

ISS Workshop Report 5

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

violence across Africa should be contextualised

within the post-colonial state building project.10

A major supply of SALW in the region remains the

stockpiles that were pumped into Africa in the 1970s and

1980s by the former Soviet Union, the US and their allies

to fan proxy interstate wars. These leftover weapons

have found their way through clandestine networks in-

volving rogue arms brokers, private military companies,

shady airline companies and local smugglers to exacer-

bate ongoing confl icts and facilitate the commencement

of new ones in the continent.11 Subsequent instability in

the orphaned regimes contributed to the acquisition of

new supplies as they sought to retain power. The search

for cheap markets to open routes for companies in the

Eastern Bloc has lowered the price of SALW.

The democratisation wave of the 1990s in the con-

tinent affected the Great Lakes Region as well. In most

cases, post-independence regimes held on to power

through manipulation and dictatorial tendencies, trig-

gering internal instability in some of these countries.

This, in turn, has led to SALW proliferation, even today.

As some of these regimes fought for survival they

recruited militias and tribal gangs as political armies.

These were supplied with arms without demanding

any accountability. This even challenged disarmament

processes, because it proved impossible to determine the

number of weapons that should be targeted.

The historical marginalisation of communities

or areas considered peripheral to the state in some

countries has generated insecurity in such areas and

communities. They responded by arming themselves in

order to protect their lives and livelihood. This is best ex-

emplifi ed by the situation in most pastoral communities

and semi-arid areas in the Horn of Africa region and in

some areas within the Great Lakes Region. The presence

of arms within such regions has created a culture of

armament in communities where masculinity is defi ned

by the possession of arms.

The approach to addressing the diverse driving

factors to illicit arming must be broad enough to cater

for the wide variety of prevailing factors and circum-

stances within the region. Political interventions will

work where the driving factors are political in nature

while marginalisation and exclusion have to be ad-

dressed through improved governance and accountabil-

ity to the populations and established institutions.

SMALL ARMS AND CONFLICTS

The Great Lakes Region has endured numerous armed

confl icts over the past decades. The dynamics of the

confl icts has shifted from intrastate confl icts in the past

to internal civil wars in the recent past. These spilled

over into the territories of neighbouring states, thus

taking on a regional dimension.

These confl icts and the corresponding insecurity

have generated a strong demand for SALW: ordinary

civilians have sought arms to protect themselves in the

absence of formal state protection. In situations where

states as well as other groups are players in the confl ict,

all sides distribute weapons to civilians.12

The proliferation of light weapons in Africa poses a

major threat to development. Their low cost, ease of use

and availability may escalate confl icts, undermine peace

agreements, intensify the violence and impact of crime,

impede economic and social development, and hinder

the development of social stability, democracy and good

governance.13 In Africa guns are not just the weapons of

choice, but also weapons of mass destruction.14

The availability and misuse of weapons may have a

range of indirect impacts, many with life-threatening

potential. These include the displacement of civilians;

the militarisation of refugee camps; the erosion of sus-

tainable development; the restriction of access to health

services, education, and food security; land denial; and

contributing to obstructions in humanitarian assistance

as well as to development and health workers.15 A recent

study by Oxfam and other civil society organisations

estimated that besides the obvious human tragedy

related to confl icts, armed confl ict costs Africa around

US$18 billion per year, thus seriously derailing develop-

ment.16 It may be deduced that confl icts are a major

contributor to poverty levels within the affected regions

and countries.

It is the duty of all sovereign states to ensure public

safety and such states should have a vested interest in

providing human security for the development of their

citizens. They have the task of responsibly securing

weapons in the hands of police and armed forces to

ensure that state stockpiles are not accessible to the

wrong people. Moreover, in terms of social contract

theory, they have an obligation to protect citizens and

their property against confl icts or threats. Therefore,

ensuring that privately owned small arms do not enter

the illicit circuit has to be part of the equation for

every government.17

In confl ict situations human lives are wasted as

young people devote their energy to confl icts that

contribute to deaths at all levels of society. In addition to

these largely preventable deaths, hundreds of thousands

of people who survive armed violence are left with inju-

ries, permanent disability, and mental health problems.18

Providing health care to those with injuries depletes the

capacity of communities to meet daily responsibilities

such as food security and education.

6 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

In post-confl ict situations, small arms proliferation

signifi cantly hinders the post-confl ict development

process. Foreign investment may be limited because of

continued violence and a perception of instability. When

large segments of the infrastructure and economy are

destroyed during confl ict, countries rely on the assist-

ance of the international community for reconstruction.

If they do not have confi dence in the security of a com-

munity, investors may be hesitant to provide develop-

ment funds. It may simply be too expensive to guarantee

the security of workers and protect development projects.

Many small arms remain in circulation and in the

hands of former combatants at the end of hostilities.

They are often used in armed criminal violence and

perpetuate instability. Some countries in the region have

seen a rise in armed criminal violence once a confl ict

offi cially ends. The power of the gun easily translates

to individual power and explains the drive to get

things from others violently. Many former combatants

become viable candidates for criminal activities because

they lack mechanisms to address the psychosocial

stress and related depression caused by exposure to

extreme violence.

Long-term social suffering, while less quantifi able,

in equal measure affects the future of confl ict-prone

countries and regions. Families may be torn apart,

children orphaned, and social and economic support

systems disrupted by confl ict and violence. Schools,

universities and skills-training programmes may be

unable to operate because of violence, lack of personnel,

or lack of resources. Such conditions seriously harm

the ability to rebuild and provide the next generation

with opportunities.19

Small arms are cheap, light and easy to handle,

transport and conceal. While an increase in small arms

alone may not create the confl icts in which they are

used, their excessive accumulation and universal avail-

ability tends to aggravate confl icts by increasing not

only the lethality and duration of violence but also the

sense of insecurity which leads to a greater demand for

weapons.20 The fact that small arms are cheap and easily

available makes it easy to acquire them. The tendency of

those with new weapon arsenals to provoke parties that

are considered weak exacerbates violence. People arm

themselves in order to counter threats from perceived

enemies, thus creating a circle of demand and confl ict to

test each other’s capacities and capabilities.

Armed confl ict is the main cause of people fl eeing

their homes and is now the most common cause of

food insecurity as productive land is abandoned and

capable individuals are relocated to unproductive areas

or engagements. For countries in the midst of long-term

confl icts as well as states in crisis or in a post-confl ict

phase and nations otherwise nominally ‘at peace’,

armed violence can aggravate poverty, inhibit access to

social services, and divert energy and resources away

from efforts to improve human development. Countries

plagued by armed violence in situations of crime or

confl ict often perform poorly in terms of the Millennium

Development Goals.21 Addressing small arms prolifera-

tion and the related armed violence is thus addressing

the causal factors of underdevelopment and poverty.

There is broad acceptance that certain socio-economic

conditions increase the likelihood of armed violence and,

therefore, increase demand for weapons. Responding to

these root causes, however, can be a challenge, as core

elements of this agenda – poverty alleviation, youth em-

ployment and social alienation, among other issues – are

elusive development objectives.22

THE IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

While it is diffi cult to separate the impacts of small

arms in confl ict situations from the confl ict itself, it is

possible to identify the legacy of small arms in armed

confl ict. The long life span of arms means they continue

to be available long after the confl ict for which they

were acquired has ended. If they are not collected and

destroyed, they move to new areas of demand in cases

where there are instability or are used for criminal

activities after an armed confl ict is over. Whatever the

circumstances, any misuse of arms creates insecurity

and hinders the complete appreciation of social living.

Where arms are used for criminal activities, they

intensify the lethality of attacks and instil fear in the

population. Governments respond by diverting limited

resources to fi ghting criminal elements at the expense

of other essential social services such as education and

health. Communities respond to the situation by invest-

ing heavily in self-protection services such as private

security and deterrences such as electric fencing and

alarm systems. The end result is a lower quality of life

in affected communities. It has even happened in some

pastoralist communities that government-armed home-

guards turned against their own communities in raiding

or banditry activities.

In situations of armed confl ict, social services or

humanitarian interventions and assistance are often

withdrawn when the lives of service providers are

endangered. This exposes the affected communities to

food insecurity, lack of health services, lack of education

services as institutions close down, and withdrawal

of local capacity as professional people seek alterna-

tive areas of operation. As such capacities take long to

rebuild, this effectively slows down development.

ISS Workshop Report 7

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

The costs of accumulating suffi cient arms and am-

munition to sustain confl icts (especially internal ones

where there is no external support) are great. The ac-

quisition of arms and ammunition for self-preservation

or to sustain the confl ict impoverishes the affected

communities. In areas where rebel groups operate,

the plundering of villages and business enterprises, as

well as medical facilities to cater for the fi ghters in the

forests, reverses any advances made.

As the misuse of small arms leads to loss of lives

and hinders social and economic development, the fi ght

against illicit small arms accumulation is a fi ght against

poverty, under-development, social disintegration, and

poor health. Small arms control therefore goes beyond

the borders of security concerns and encompasses

the whole spectrum of human survival. While it is

acknowledged that states must continue to bear arms

for sovereignty protection and maintenance of law and

order, this has to be accompanied by appropriate stock-

pile management to ensure that government stocks do

not feed the illicit markets.

The secure management of national small arms stock-

piles is instrumental in curbing small arms prolifera-

tion. Poor stockpile security is a prime means through

which arms and ammunition are diverted from the legal

to the illicit markets. Lax security makes theft easy.

Corrupt offi cials may sell or otherwise transfer weapons

under their care to criminal groups or rebel forces.

Stockpile security is especially precarious in states

suffering from violent confl ict or weak governance.23

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON SALW CONTROL

The serious challenge posed by SALW proliferation

has been acknowledged by the introduction of interna-

tional, regional and national instruments to address

related problems.

International level

At international level we have the United Nations

Programme of Action to Combat and Eradicate the

Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its

Aspects (UNPoA). The UNPoA provided guidelines and

recommendations for states aimed at strengthening and

implementing stronger national and regional controls

over SALW. States that committed themselves to the

process were also encouraged to submit annual reports

to the United Nations on progress made in implementing

these controls.24 Under this arrangement the global com-

munity gathers biannually to consider progress in the

control of illicit arms proliferation, related challenges in

implementation and opportunities for cooperation and

assistance to affected states and regions. While globally

accepted and under implementation in most parts of

the world, the instrument is only politically binding.

This means there are no mechanisms of challenging

countries that do not comply with its provisions. This

has not stopped affected countries and regions from

pursuing the aspirations resorting under the arrange-

ment, however.

The African continent has been at the frontline in

seeking solutions to the challenges related to illicit small

arms circulation and accumulation. In preparation for

the UN conference, African Union member states met in

Bamako, Mali, to establish a common position on tack-

ling the problem of illicit SALW proliferation, circulation

and traffi cking. This position later became known as the

Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position

on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Traffi cking

of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Bamako

Declaration calls on member states to strengthen exist-

ing control measures and makes recommendations to

be undertaken at both regional and national levels.25

This African common position was quite infl uential in

guiding discussions at the UN meeting of 2001 that came

up with the UNPoA.

Regional level

At regional level, four instruments have been developed

and institutions established to lead signatory states in

their pursuit of the Bamako aspirations. These include:

■ The Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light

Weapons, Their Ammunition and other Related

Materials (2006). The ECOWAS Convention

evolved from the politically binding 1998 ECOWAS

Moratorium on Light Weapons and entered into

force in November 2010. The implementation of

the convention has been entrusted to the ECOWAS

Commission. ■ The Southern African Development Community

(SADC) Protocol on Control of Firearms, Ammunition

and Other Related Materials (2001). The imple-

mentation of the protocol has been entrusted to

the Southern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation

Organisation (SARPCCO). ■ The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and

Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the

Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004)

(it emerged from the politically binding Nairobi

Declaration of 2000). The implementation of the

8 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

protocol has been entrusted to the Regional Centre

on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of

Africa and Bordering States (RECSA). ■ The Central African Convention for the Control of

Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition,

Parts and Components that can be used for their

Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, known as the

Kinshasa Convention, was signed on 19 November

2010 in Brazzaville. (It is yet to be ratifi ed by the

signatory states.) Implementation has been entrusted

to the secretariat of the Economic Community of

Central African States (ECCAS).

The current major gap in all four regions is to earn the

relevant attention and prioritisation by governments in

resource allocation by clearly linking the urgent need to

prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing

of and traffi cking in fi rearms, ammunition, explosives

and other related materials to the harmful effects they

have on the security of states and the region as a whole.

INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS SALW IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND HORN OF AFRICA

In view of the evident challenges that the Great Lakes

and Horn of Africa regions continue to face, coupled with

commitment to regional instruments and mechanisms to

address SALW, some interventions are worth pointing out.

Most of the countries that subscribe to the Nairobi

Protocol have established national focal points (NFPs).

These are national coordination units or points of

contact mandated to liaise nationally and regionally

with other stakeholders on addressing SALW issues. The

NFP institutions differ in terms of mandate, staffi ng,

budgetary allocation and capacity to infl uence action.

Of major concern is the fact that some NFPs are not

integrated into institutions addressing confl icts and

peacebuilding mechanisms. To enable them to play their

role in addressing illicit proliferation of SALW at national

level, and thereby infl uencing the regional situation, the

above areas need to be addressed.

The United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA)

and the Bamako Declaration call on states to develop na-

tional actions plans (NAPs) to comprehensively address

the challenges posed by SALW in their respective coun-

tries. In response to this call eight countries (Burundi,

Djibouti, the DRC, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and

Tanzania) have developed NAPs. Developing such plans

entails nation-wide mapping studies to thoroughly

understand the small arms situation within the country

concerned. The study reports are then shared and

discussions held with all key stakeholders to determine

the appropriate response to the prevailing situations. A

key factor in the analysis is usually the drivers of small

arms demand or proliferation. Confl icts or situations of

instability are thus addressed in NAPs. A fi ve-year plan

is then drawn up and approved by the national authori-

ties for implementation. Legal regimes play a crucial

role in spawning or averting confl icts. Similarly, the

prevailing legal structures in a country determine the

extent to which SALW proliferation can be controlled. To

address this crucial aspect, Nairobi Protocol signatories

in the region are called upon to bring their legislation

in line with the regional instruments. This far, Rwanda

and Burundi have introduced small arms legislation that

conform with the regional instruments while the DRC,

Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya are at various

stages of the review process.

In post-confl ict settings, the immediate destruction

of surplus weapons and ammunition removes fuel for

new instability. The Great Lakes Region has undertaken

the destruction of more than 200 000 arms with the DRC

taking the lead in the destruction of over 90 000. The

debate whether the collected/surrendered arms should

be destroyed or re-issued for use by regular government

forces is ongoing. The regional position is that they

should be destroyed to convince the public that they

were not collected to reinforce government capacity but

because government is convinced they are unneeded.

Stockpile management and control has emerged as

one of the most acute small arms problems. A major

source of illicit stockpiles is the government legitimate

stocks through theft, losses, distribution by govern-

ments to militia forces, and diversion of government

stockpile by brokers, among other methods. Leaking

government stockpiles are prominent sources of illegal

small arms in circulation. To address this concern and

to enhance traceability, the region is undertaking an

arms marking initiative involving all government-held

stocks and civilian-licensed arms. This has been on the

go for the last two years and the response has been very

encouraging. To back up this process RECSA has devel-

oped stockpile data management software to enhance

record-keeping, accountability, and security of records.

CONCLUSION

The challenges posed by the proliferation and misuse of

small arms are complex and do not lend themselves to

simple solutions. With the failure of traditional security

concepts to take into account the shifting nature of armed

violence and the particular tools of violence, attention is

long overdue. As stated by the legendary Nelson Mandela:

’Safety and security don’t just happen: they are the result

of collective consensus and public investment.’26

ISS Workshop Report 9

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

The reinforcement of the legislative and/or regulatory

regimes for strengthening border controls at national,

regional and multilateral levels is crucial in ensuring

that the fl ow of arms and related material across most

of our regional porous borders is countered. States have

to enhance practical cooperation among institutions

that are responsible for the effective control of borders

with a view to combating not only the illicit trade in

SALW but also related criminal activities. Investing in

security should happen in tandem with other develop-

ments as a way of securing any progress attained or

being pursued in other sectors of society. This may

call for a paradigm shift in security management and

especially the demarcation of various specialised units.

Law enforcement authorities should share and exchange

information regarding the movement across borders of

illicit small arms and other contraband goods. Barriers

to information-sharing – for example among customs,

immigration, police and border guards departments –

should be minimised if not eliminated.

The Nairobi Protocol, in its Article 4 (operational ca-

pacity), emphasises that states parties shall strengthen

subregional cooperation among police, intelligence,

customs and border control offi cials in combating the

illicit circulation and traffi cking in SALW, establish

and improve national databases and communication

systems, and acquire equipment for monitoring and

controlling small arms and light weapons movements

across borders.27

While appreciating the great role played by the

international community / development partners in the

fi ght against the proliferation of SALW, support should

shift from short-term project orientation to long-term

engagement that creates suffi cient ground for local

ownership and involvement through sustained capacities

and institutionalisation.28 Investments in strengthening

border control mechanisms through the development of

laws, regulations, policies and practices, improvement

of infrastructure, supply and upgrading of equipment,

sharing of lessons learned, implementation of confi dence-

building measures among neighbouring countries, and

development of training programmes for personnel would

go a long way in solidifying the gains already made.

Regional governments on their part must invest

in the security of their citizens. Regional organisa-

tions have owned the process of addressing small

arms- related issues without reciprocation from the

governments that set up these regional mechanisms.

The principle of shared responsibility is essential to

improve efforts to prevent and combat the illicit SALW

trade across borders and within countries. More owner-

ship is needed at national level and should be expressed

in the budgetary allocation to NFPs and recruitment

of suffi cient staff to manage a national coordina-

tion responsibility. NFPs should be given reporting

mechanisms to gauge their effectiveness. They should

be legally constituted to align their work with other rel-

evant institutions of the government as avenues of con-

fl ict prevention, confl ict management, and post-confl ict

reconstruction where peacebuilding is on course.

Isolating the fi ght against small arms proliferation

from confl ict resolution, peacebuilding, disarmament,

demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and security

sector reforms (SSR) does not aid the process. There is

a need to look at these as steps within a process that

should be comprehensive and well coordinated. In the

case of confl ict resolution, choices need to be reached on

how belligerents will disarm in a process that does not

weaken any of the parties and thereby embolden one to

attack the other. In peacebuilding processes, the removal

of arms should not be pursued as an end in itself but

as a goal after suffi cient confi dence or accumulation

of peace dividends among the communities or former

warring groups has been achieved. DDR processes, while

targeting former combatants and associated groups,

must also address armed individuals in communities

who do not fall in any of the DDR groups. Eventually SSR

should entail the development and provision of reliable

and people-centred security that create an environment

conducive to individuals entrusting their security con-

cerns to the government security apparatus.

The government of a country not only helps to

shape its economic development but is charged with

providing the public good of security to its people. ‘High

levels of armed violence and illicit SALW proliferation

in both confl ict-affected and non-confl ict societies are

often signs of weak or unaccountable security sector.’29

In view of the close relationship between governance

and confl icts and their capacity to induce the misuse

of small arms and light weapons, governance improve-

ment should be enlisted in the fi ght against small arms

proliferation and misuse. Challenges and problems faced

by most governments are often due to lack of adequate

institutional capacity. This capacity refers to state

strength and how effective it is in the application of the

rule of law, the acceptance of its concept and authority

by all groups within it. The institutional capacity of a

state encompasses more than just the instrumental ma-

chinery to deliver goods and services to its citizens. The

spread, acceptance, reference and effectiveness of the

executive, judiciary, security and development sectors

go a long way in determining the structural stability of

a state and its capability to prevent, manage and resolve

confl ict. Any regime needs consensus, authority, loyalty

and consent for legitimacy and survival. A legitimacy

defi cit may result in violent confl ict.

10 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

When governance fails and confl icts erupt, the abuse

of weapons diverts scarce government resources from

health and education to public security, discourages

investment and economic growth, and deprives the

affected country or region of the skills and talents of

the victims of small arms through deaths or displace-

ments. To avoid confl ict, electoral processes and state

management should be inclusive to address any arising

challenges by peaceful means. Marginalisation should be

comprehensively addressed to ensure no communities

or groups feel more exposed to insecurity than others. In

areas where state security is weak or absent, possession

of a gun can be a matter of survival, either to seize food

and other vital resources or as protection from attack.

In other places the low cost and ready availability of

fi rearms can promote a ‘culture of violence’, where gun

ownership becomes a symbol of power and status, and

gun violence a fi rst resort for the settlement of personal

and political disputes.

NOTES

1 See Small Arms Survey, Illicit traffi cing, http://www.smal-

larmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers/illicit-

traffi cking.html (accessed 2 September 2011).

2 See Small Arms Survey, Stockpiles, http://www.smallarmssur-

vey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles.html (accessed 3

September 2011).

3 United Nations Offi ce for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),

Confl icts of interests: children and guns in zones of instability, Panel

discussion at the United Nations, 15 July 2008, New York,

Occasional Paper 14, February 2009, http://www.un.org/disar-

mament/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/

OP14.pdf (accessed 7 May 2012).

4 IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld, Africa’s missing billions: inter-

national arms fl ows and the cost of confl ict, October 2007, Briefi ng

Paper 107, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/fi les/

africas%20missing%20bils.pdf (accessed 7 May 2012).

5 Jayantha Dhanapala et al (eds), Small arms control: old weapons,

new issues, Aldershot: Ashgate, for the UN Institute of

Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 1999.

6 See http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/faq.html (ac-

cessed 3 September 2011).

7 See Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction

of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the

Horn of Africa and Bordering States, signed on 21 April 2004.

8 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, What’s ‘legal’? What’s ‘illegal’? In Lora

Lumpe (ed), Running guns: the global black market in small arms,

London: Zed Books, 2000.

9 Small Arms Survey 2001, Profi ling the problem, Oxford: University

Press, 2001, 2.

10 Abdel-Fatau Musah, Africa: the political economy of small arms and

confl icts, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/docu-

ments/idep/unpan002406.pdf (accessed 4 September 2011).

11 Ibid.

12 Natalie Pauwels and Marta Martinelli, Addressing the

problem of SALW in the Great Lakes region of Africa: existing

initiatives and options for the EU, United Nations Institute for

Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), background paper prepared

for the project European Action on Small Arms and Light

Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War, http://www.unidir.

org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_16.pdf (accessed 14

August 2011).

13 Virginia Gamba, quoted in Michael Fleshman, Small arms

in Africa: counting the cost of gun violence, Africa Recovery

15(4) December 2001, http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/

vol15no4/154arms.htm (accessed 8 May 2012).

14 Fleshman, Small arms in Africa.

15 Cate Buchanan, Armed violence, weapons availability and human

security: a view of the state of play and options for action, Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue, Helsinki Process, 2004, kms1.isn.ethz.

ch/.../ArmedViolenceWeaponsAvailability.pdf (accessed 31 May

2012).

16 IANSA et al, Africa’s missing billions.

17 UNODA, Confl icts of interests.

18 World Health Organisation, Injury: a leading cause of the global

burden of disease, 2000, http://www.who.int/violence_injury_pre-

vention/publications/other_injury/injury/en/index.html (ac-

cessed 14 August 2011).

19 Rachel Stohl and Doug Tuttle, The challenges of small arms and

light weapons in Africa, Confl icts Trends 1 (2009), 19-26, http://www.

accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2009_1.pdf (accessed 7 May 2012).

20 UN Security Council, Small arms: report of the Secretary-General,

17 April 2008, S/2008/258, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/

docid/48108c982.html (accessed 7 May 2012), 2.

21 Ibid, 3.

22 Buchanan, Armed violence, weapons availability and human security.

23 Small Arms Survey, Stockpile management and security, http://

www.smallarmssurvey.org/regulations-and-controls/control-

measures/pssm.html (accessed 7 May 2011).

24 UN Programme of Action 2001, http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/

poahtml.aspx (accessed 20 May 2012).

25 Bamako Declaration 2001, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/test/images/

fi les/documents/ahrdd/theme10/democracy_bamako_declara-

tion_2000.pdf (accessed 20 May 2012).

26 World Health Organisation, World report on violence and health,

2002, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/9241545615.pdf (ac-

cessed 7 May 2012).

27 See http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/Nairobi%20Protocol.pdf (ac-

cessed 16 August 2011).

28 Maze Kerry, Searching for aid effectiveness in small arms assistance,

New York: UNIDIR, 2010, http://unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf3-

act529.pdf (accessed 7 May 2012).

29 Mike Bourne et al, Implications of illicit proliferation and

misuse of SALW, in Reviewing action on small arms 2006: assessing

the fi rst fi ve years of the UN programme of action, London: IANSA,

Biting The Bullet Project, 2006, 231, http://www.scribd.com/

doc/44276513/74/IMPLICATIONS-OF-ILLICIT-PROLIFERATION-

AND-MISUSE-OF-SALW (accessed 7 May 2012).

ISS Workshop Report 11

Natural resources and confl ict in the Great Lakes Region

Nyambura GithaigaInstitute for Security Studies

INTRODUCTION

The Great Lakes Region of Africa has abundant natural

resources that have been linked to confl ict on both

national and regional levels. Natural resources that

are particularly associated with regional confl icts are

revenue-generating non-renewable1 resources like oil,

diamonds, gold and the mineral ores2 of cassiterite,

coltan and wolframite. While natural resources such as

land have been at the core of intractable confl ict in some

of the countries, the aspect of portability makes natural

resources like mineral ores, diamonds and gold more

prone to illegal exploitation and trade and consequently

a factor in confl ict economy. These portable natural re-

sources are also referred to as lootable resources. Owing

to regional insecurity and cross-border illegal exploita-

tion and trade, the actual natural resource wealth of

countries in the Great Lakes Region cannot be accurately

determined, though it is indisputably signifi cant.

Natural resources and confl ict are linked both

directly and indirectly. Direct links are manifested

in bilateral confl ict between two countries stemming

from the exploitation of shared natural resources while

indirect links are evident from the use of proceeds

from illegal exploitation of natural resources to fi nance

confl ict. An example of a direct link would be the

confl ict about maritime boundaries between Angola

and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the

rightful ownership of an oil deposit that accounts for 30

per cent of Angola’s total oil production. The regional

dimension of natural resources and confl ict has been

well illustrated in the DRC by the presence of foreign

illegal armed groups using lootable natural resources to

generate revenue in order to sustain their confl ict goals

in the region.

One implication of confl ict fi nancing for countries in

the region has been the regionalisation of insecurity and

its consequent negative impact on national and regional

economies. Then again, global economic demands to

meet the growing needs of technology have created a

market for these lootable resources.

Apart from the economic downturn effect created

by insecurity, illegal exploitation and trade, as linked

to confl ict fi nancing, has intensifi ed the proliferation

of small arms and light weapons (SALW), not only in

confl ict zones but also in urban crime. In addition, this

has caused a rise in violence against civilians in confl ict

areas with reports of gross human rights abuses, includ-

ing mass rapes, as well as the militarisation of mining in

the region, to mention but a few. The non-renewability

of these natural resources, which implies increased

scarcity, is an indicator of future confl ict trends, par-

ticularly in the absence of viable economic industry and

infrastructure. The future looks bleak for economies that

are dependent on non-renewable natural resources.

Efforts to mitigate illegal exploitation and trade are

on-going, nationally as well as regionally. Nationally,

countries in the region are testing and implementing

certifi cation programmes to enable effective tracking of

minerals, as well as customs and border agreements to

stem illegal traffi cking of minerals. On a regional level,

governments have pledged to jointly fi ght illegal exploi-

tation of natural resources in the region by implement-

ing a regional certifi cation mechanism establishing a

regional database on mineral fl ows and harmonising na-

tional legislation pertaining to the Protocol Against the

Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources.3 Developments

on the international scene have created challenges for

countries in the region to implement stipulated certifi ca-

tion standards or risk having their minerals branded

12 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

as ‘confl ict minerals’.4 This element of stigma extends

beyond countries directly affected by confl ict, such as

the DRC, to adjoining countries which may be conduits

for illegally exploited natural resources.

This paper seeks to highlight the links between

natural resources and confl ict in the Great Lakes

countries, specifi cally in Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and

Uganda. The term ‘natural resources’ will be used to

refer to lootable minerals such as gold, diamonds and

mineral ores which may be illegally exploited to fi nance

confl ict. An analysis of national and regional initiatives

to curb illegal exploitation and trade relating to confl ict

fi nancing will follow and will focus on the challenges

and prospects of the various initiatives. The paper will

conclude with recommendations on eliminating links

between natural resources and confl ict in the Great

Lakes Region.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

There are multiple causes of confl icts in the Great Lakes

Region. Natural resources have been both the proximate

and root cause of confl ict in the region, depending on

whether the link is indirect or direct. The abundance

of natural resources and their link with confl ict in the

Great Lakes Region have led to descriptions such as the

‘natural resource curse’.

Arguably, both scarcity and abundance perspec-

tives apply. While one country may have an abundance

of, or a perception of abundant natural resources, its

neighbour may have a scarcity or a perception of scarce

natural resources. Confl ict may arise when two or more

countries or confl ict actors perceive an element of

mutual incompatibility in their goal to access or control

natural resources in the region for economic gain. This

confl ict may breed not only unhealthy competition

between states, but also create strained diplomatic rela-

tions and opportunities for confl ict profi teers to advance

their gains from illegal exploitation.

The scarcity/abundance perspective feeds into the

greed versus grievance theory. Developed in reference

to civil war, the debate on greed and grievance is helpful

in conceptualising the link between natural resources

and confl ict. Collier and Hoeffl er discussed greed and

grievance as causes of civil war favouring greed over

grievance as a motivating factor.5 According to the

greed motive, ‘groups engaged in violent confl ict are not

primarily motivated by grievance (i.e. ethnic discrimina-

tion, inequality, historical animosity), but essentially by

economic agendas and therefore greed’.6

The debate on greed is expanded by the argument

of the need to consider a more holistic analysis in

consideration of variables such as a weak state presence

providing opportunity for the presence of armed groups.7

In the Great Lakes Region both greed and grievance have

been causative factors in confl ict. Looking at the confl ict

actors in the DRC, the grievance motive is evident in the

formation of some of the illegally armed groups based in

the eastern DRC. The continued presence of both local

and foreign illegally armed groups is made possible by

a weak state presence in the east. These illegally armed

groups often resort to illegal exploitation of minerals

to sustain the confl ict. In this arena of unregulated

exploitation, the motive of greed then factors in with the

looting of minerals by these groups, as well as by the

army and civilians. In essence, the interplay between

grievance, greed, opportunity and other variables per-

petuates a vicious cycle of confl ict.

A key link between natural resources and confl ict

in the Great Lakes Region is confl ict fi nancing whereby

the gains from natural resources are used to fund and

thereby exacerbate confl icts that may have dissimilar

root causes. However, analysis of the role of natural

resources in confl ict fi nancing should be balanced in

recognition of other variables in the economy of confl ict.

‘While natural resources undoubtedly play a great role

in some confl icts, in others they are of minor impor-

tance or only one of the methods of confl ict fi nancing.’8

Wennmann explains confl ict fi nancing as the efforts of

an organised armed group to fund their confl ict activi-

ties.9 The UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation

of Natural Resources of the DRC established that illegal

exploitation remained one of the main sources of

funding for groups involved in the DRC confl ict and also

of arms traffi cking.10

So while acknowledging the fact that natural resourc-

es do not constitute an exclusive variable in confl ict

fi nancing, the illegal exploitation of natural resources

in the Great Lakes Region remains one of the major

sources of revenue for several confl ict actors. Other

sources of confl ict fi nancing that may take precedence

in the absence of natural resources would include pil-

laging, illegal economic levies, and diaspora remissions.

For civilians, the dire impact of confl ict supersedes the

modalities of confl ict fi nancing, however.

This paper focuses on the regional dimensions of

natural resources and confl ict where lootable natural

resources have been a proximate cause of confl ict,

primarily through confl ict fi nancing. Lootable natural

resources are seldom the root cause of regional con-

fl icts – neither are they an exclusive variable of confl ict

fi nancing. The root causes of confl icts in the region

include governance, inadequate socio-economic provi-

sions, and historical injustices. Weak governance and

administration, poor infrastructure, and a history of

insecurity in the region have allowed illegal exploitation

ISS Workshop Report 13

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

of natural resources to fl ourish. Within this context,

the efforts to mitigate illegal exploitation of natural

resources will be analysed beyond the scope of illegal

exploitation to encompass other critical variables that

affect the links between natural resources and confl ict

in the Great Lakes Region.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT

By sustaining confl ict actors, and thus prolonging

confl icts, the natural resource endowment of the Great

Lakes Region has characterised confl icts in the region.

Arguably, all natural resources can play a role in

confl ict situations. Whether they are legally or illegally

exploited, as in the case of shared natural resources,

is immaterial. For instance, oil deposits have been the

cause of border disputes between Angola and the DRC,

even as both states seek to legally exploit the shared

reserves. However, since natural resources such as

oil and gas require considerable investment to exploit

and are not portable, they are usually a cause of direct

confl ict between the affected states over contested

exploitation. Conversely, lootable resources can be used

to fi nance confl ict that affects countries in the region in

various ways, such as enhanced insecurity through the

presence of illegal armed groups, proliferation of arms,

increased vulnerability of populations, and deteriora-

tion of socio-economic conditions.

Although the current discourse focuses on the

indirect link between natural resources and confl ict,

the future threat of increased direct confl ict over

trans-boundary natural resources deserves mention.

The documented instances of direct confl ict over cross-

border natural resources indicate that this will become

more prominent as shared resources dwindle. Of im-

mediate concern is the impact on civilians of strained

relations between confl icting states. Going back to the

DRC–Angola confl ict, from 2003 to 2009 approximately

158 000 Congolese were expelled from Angola, while in

May 2011, 1 048 of 10 961 Congolese men and women

forcibly expelled were allegedly raped by Angolan se-

curity forces.11 In 2009, 39 000 Angolans were deported

from the DRC.12 Angola claimed that DRC immigrants

contributed to illegal mining and traffi cking. It is

likely that this tension between the two countries

will be infl uenced by their ability to reach a mutually

agreeable solution.13

Despite the current focus on lootable natural

resources, the region must remain attentive to cross-

border confl ict on natural resources, which may

potentially increase regional security. ‘[I]t is becoming

clear that the signifi cant oil and natural gas deposits

located in territories where the DRC shares borders with

Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania (especially in

the Lake Albert, Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika areas)

are causing these locations to fast become potential

fl ashpoints in regional relations.’14

Prevailing contexts in the region

Lootable natural resources have been the currency of

choice for corrupt state offi cials, illegal armed group

activities, and criminal networks in illegal exploitation

and trade. The end-user benefi ciaries range from inter-

national conglomerates to state-owned conglomerates,

regional countries that re-export the looted resources,

and individual criminals.15 Illegal exploitation of natural

resources becomes a regional problem when they are

traffi cked through neighbouring countries as end or

transit destinations and when proceeds from illegally

exploited resources fund foreign illegally armed groups,

thereby exacerbating regional insecurity. Those involved

in regional smuggling networks may be motivated by

a predominantly economic agenda, which is also infl u-

enced by the differing regional export tariffs being an

incentive for evasion of export duties.16

These criminal activities only become a factor in

the link between natural resources and confl ict when

it affects diplomatic relations and escalate retaliatory

impacts on civilians. The different contexts that have

intensifi ed illegal exploitation and trade in natural re-

sources are weak governance, unregulated mining, and

illegal activities of armed groups. While the mitigating

efforts have been directed at the latter two aspects, the

issue of governance is a core concern that should be kept

in perspective while developing initiatives that would

sustainably address the link between natural resources

and confl ict.

The governance challenge

Countries in the region have divergent challenges in

governance and this impacts their capacity to develop

common approaches to managing natural resources and

confl ict in the region. Taking the DRC as an example,

the challenges in governance are illustrated by a weak

state presence in the east, insuffi cient infrastructural

networks, lack of adequate socio-economic development,

and a failure to administratively manage national re-

sources and enforce natural resource management regu-

lations. These challenges in governance create gaps that

have been occupied by illegal armed groups, both local

and foreign, who now thrive on these bountiful reserves.

The unique situation of the DRC then spills over to its

neighbours who are subsequently affected by confl ict

actors operating from the DRC to destabilise the region.

14 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Mining industry disparities

The disparity in the capacities of mining industries in

the region will pose a continual challenge. Revisiting

the DRC, the challenges in the mining industry include

informal and unregulated mining, lack of transpar-

ency in mining contracts, militarisation of the mines,

inadequate infrastructure network, and illegal exploita-

tion and traffi cking of minerals. Unregulated artisanal

mining has made it diffi cult to ascertain state revenue

from mining and has also introduced vulnerability to

illegal exploitation of mineral resources. In addition,

previous governments were alleged to have granted

mining concessions on a whim, thus compromising due

process. Transparency regarding mining contracts is still

obscure. Also, with limited infrastructure, diffi culties

arise in accessing the mines, policing legitimate exploi-

tation and regulating trade. Even where good legislation

to regulate mining exists, it is diffi cult to enforce and the

status quo is maintained.

Over-dependence on mining by populations in

mineral-rich areas becomes a potential source of confl ict

when that livelihood is no longer viable due to depletion

of resources or new regulations. For example, during

the six-month mining ban in three provinces in the

eastern DRC, entire villages were deprived of a source of

livelihood, leading to migration and an alleged increase

in urban crime. Given the regional dimension of illegal

exploitation and traffi cking of natural resources, the

particular challenges faced by the DRC mining industry

will affect neighbouring countries by virtue of proximity.

If one country is vulnerable to illegal exploitation, then it

may affect the vulnerability of neighbouring countries to

illegal traffi cking of natural resources.

Armed groups and confl ict fi nancing

Armed groups sustaining themselves through profi ts

from illegal exploited natural resources have created

a regional insecurity complex. For instance, the Allied

Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group from Uganda

operating in the DRC, has been linked to illegal taxation

of gold and timber and the Democratic Forces for the

Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du

Rwanda, FDLR) has been implicated in trade in minerals,

timber, and charcoal, as well as cannabis production.

Criminal elements within the Congolese Army (Forces

Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC)

have also been implicated in illegal taxation and exploi-

tation, notably during the six-month eastern DRC mining

suspension from March to September 2010.17

The demand in global markets is also a perpetuating

factor. The minerals cassiterite (tin ore) and coltan are

important components of cell phones, computers, and

other electronic devices, and the DRC is a primary global

source.18 This demand accentuates regional smuggling as

a means for individuals and collectives to illegally profi t

from natural resources. Illegally armed groups are re-

ported to control access to mines in remote areas where

they subject civilians to gross human rights abuses and

displacement.19 Apart from the regional aspect of illegal

traffi cking of these minerals to fi nance armed group ac-

tivities and the criminal profi t motive, minerals are also

used in lieu of hard currency for trading to fund confl ict.

This includes the supply of arms.20

In the fi nal report of the United Nations Group of

Experts on the DRC,21 it was concluded that the involve-

ment of the military and armed groups in illegal mineral

trade was by way of taxation, protection, commercial

control and coercive control. Taxation involves levying

illegal taxes on mining activities and unrelated com-

mercial activities in the area. Protection is requested

of military and armed groups to provide security for

mining activities and to prevent looting. For commercial

reasons, the military use illegal revenue to engage in

mineral trade. Military and armed groups gain control

through seizing productive pits and periodically pillag-

ing minerals. The involvement of the military in the

illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources has

compromised their mandate to provide civilian protec-

tion. In reference to these criminal elements in the

army, it was observed that deployment of these criminal

networks is increasingly driven by the desire to control

natural resources.22

Illegally armed groups form a vital component of the

natural resources/confl ict nexus. Their role in regional-

ising insecurity is partly fi nanced by illegal exploitation

and trade in natural resources. This underlines the

importance of adopting a regional perspective with

regard to natural resources and confl ict in the Great

Lakes Region.

The interconnectedness of countries in the region

is seen in regional illegally armed groups and crime

networks, interdependent economies, trans-boundary

nationalities, and shared natural resources. ‘While most

confl icts in the Great Lakes begin within the borders

of countries, the actors within a particular confl ict are

rarely confi ned within state. Indeed confl icts tend to link

diverse actors, interests and issues and these linkages

broaden local, regional and international economies

and political contexts.’23 The regional impact of illegal

exploitation and trade in natural resources, and its link

to confl ict fi nancing, indicates that only a dedicated and

concerted regional approach will effectively deal with

the link between natural resources and confl icts.

As stated earlier, natural resources are not the only

source of confl ict fi nancing for illegally armed groups.

‘The challenge for policy is to deal with organized armed

ISS Workshop Report 15

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

groups that are rational, have multiple sources of fi nanc-

ing, and shift from one to another as a function of their

need. They operated in a structural environment that fa-

cilitates confl ict fi nancing characterized by the persist-

ence of weak states, willing collaborators, shadow econo-

mies, and open economies in developed countries.’24

ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EFFORTS

Eliminating the illegal exploitation of and trade in

natural resources as a contributing factor to regional

confl ict is increasingly on the agenda in the quest for sus-

tainable peace in the region. To be successful, initiatives

against illegal exploitation and trade must comprehen-

sively address existing contexts and proximate causes.

Existing contexts–which to a varying degree are also

root causes–include a growing global demand for natural

resources as well as aspects of poor governance such as

a weak state presence, poor infrastructure, inadequate

or unenforced mining regulations, and ineffective or

inconsistent customs and border controls. Proximate or

trigger causes include predatory or corrupt states, ille-

gally armed groups, rogue army elements, regional crime

networks, and political processes such as elections.

National efforts

An effective regional approach towards managing the

natural resources and confl ict dynamic starts with

sound national initiatives, which can then be harmo-

nised for regional impact. National efforts are primarily

based on implementing internationally accepted stand-

ards of compliance in mining which focus on traceability

and certifi cation. These international standards either

target a specifi c mineral such as cassiterite in the case of

tin or a supply chain traceability mechanism such as the

analytical fi ngerprint.

Two major initiatives that Rwanda is working on are

those developed by the German Federal Geoscience and

Natural Resources Bureau (BGR) and the International

Tin Research Institute (ITRI). Under the BGR, fi ve

Rwandan mining concessions that are major producers

of cassiterite, wolframite and coltan have undergone

compliance audits and are now awaiting audit reports.

In addition, Analytical Fingerprint (AFP) has established

a database in Rwanda which identifi es the origin of

mineral ores down to individual dig site level by defi ning

distinctive geochemical, geochronological, and minera-

logical signatures of specifi c ore production sites.25 ITRI,

a supply chain traceability system, has started tagging

cassiterite in Rwanda. According to the Rwanda Geology

and Mines Authority it is now tagging 80 per cent of

Rwanda’s domestic cassiterite, coltan and wolframite.26

The DRC is working with similar initiatives and

additional ones such as developing the trading centres

concept and the recently enforced six-month mining

ban in the east. The goal of trading centres referred to as

‘centres de négoce’ is to offer a marketplace where trace-

able minerals can be traded securely. This is an initiative

by the Congolese mining administration, the United

Nations Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), the International

Organisation for Migration (IOM), and Partenariat Appui

Gouvernance.27 From September 2010 to March 2011, the

DRC government temporarily suspended mining in

the provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu and Maniema

in order to check confl ict fi nancing. ITRI continues

mineral-tagging projects in DRC while BGR is working

with the DRC government on mapping a database of

artisanal mines.28

The challenge of narrowness of purpose may be af-

fecting the effi cacy of national efforts. There seems to

be a heavy leaning towards tracking and certifi cation to

stem the illegal mining and trade of natural resources.

Considering that inadequate and/or unenforced regula-

tions in the mining industry are a core cause of illegal

mining and trade, it is a good starting point. However,

with such a high incidence of artisanal mining, enforc-

ing these regulations will be diffi cult without the for-

malisation of mining activities. Additionally, regulating

the mining sector should be in tandem with resolving

deeper structural issues of governance and security. The

enforcement of regulations, good as they may be, will be

largely dependent on good governance.

Efforts by the DRC to impose a mining suspension,

albeit only partially successful, demonstrated political

will and may have bolstered state power in those regions

while possibly marginally limiting gains of confl ict

fi nancing. One of the unintended consequences of this

was that ‘they promoted the over-militarisation of the

mining zones and shifted the focus of the problem

rather than resolving it’.29 To prevent the illegal groups

from accessing the mines, there was an increase in

military personnel, some of whom were later implicated

in similar incidences of illegal exploitation and levies.

Vircoulon argues that a failure of existing initiatives

to focus on governance reforms has led to the ‘promo-

tion of coercive solutions without the existence of any

means on coercion’.30 If existing governance structures

have failed to adequately address rule of law issues

in certain parts of the country, then how can they ef-

fectively enforce new mining regulations? Even though

the mining ban was a temporary measure, it was myopic

in conceptualising how the unintended consequence

could further exacerbate illegal exploitation. Short-term

measures should be localised in a more comprehensive

strategy to ensure sustainable gains.

16 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

National efforts in the DRC do not visibly work along-

side efforts to address key agendas of strengthening the

state presence in the east and improving infrastructure.

For example, developing secure trading centres will

promote transparency in a few areas of the mining

sector but again is dependent on good governance to

ensure that the administration adheres to stipulated

procedures. The mining sector in the DRC is largely

artisanal and with a large number of civilians engaged

in this industry there must be a focus on formalisation

of mining as well as increasing alternative livelihood

options. Looking at the mining ban, those who suffered

the impact were civilians who could not legitimately

access the mines, while armed groups continued to

profi t. Civilians should be viewed as stakeholders in

mining and their collaboration will be key to policing

and regulating this sector. At the lifting of the mining

suspension, civilians expressed their commitment to

participate through the Civil Society Engagement Act in

which they pledged to contribute to the domestication of

mineral legislation, conduct civic education on mining

industry regulations, and support the government’s

traceability efforts.31 National efforts to eradicate the

link between natural resources and confl ict must involve

local populations who suffer the negative impact in their

daily struggle to survive poverty and insecurity.

Regional efforts

Natural resources have become a signifi cant variable in

sustaining confl icts in the region. It is therefore impera-

tive for countries in the Great Lakes Region to implement

coordinated and harmonised efforts to counter the

natural resource/confl ict link. ‘Sub-regional diplomatic

regimes have to therefore redefi ne their confl ict man-

agement strategies in terms of a stronger recognition of

natural resources management as a powerful negotia-

tion, mediation and post-confl ict reconstruction vari-

able.’32 On a bilateral level in the region, there has been

notable progress with the customs authorities of DRC,

Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda implementing agreements

to combat cross-border traffi cking.

The main regional initiative is under the International

Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which

falls under the protocol on the fi ght against the illegal

exploitation of natural resources under the pact on secu-

rity, stability and development in the Great Lakes Region.

Six tools of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal

Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) were approved

during the special ICGLR summit on the same. These are

the regional certifi cation mechanism, harmonisation of

national legislations, the establishment of a regional data-

base on mineral fl ows, formalisation, EITI peer learning,

and whistle-blowing. The strengths of the RINR are seen

through their principles of transparency with publicly ac-

cessible databases, primary compliance responsibility on

industry, obligatory third-party audits, and an emphasis

on adapting current systems accordingly.33

The challenges are that the RINR will include the

history and context of the Great Lakes countries, the

implementation capacities of the individual states,

their unique internal struggles, and the political will of

governments. Since the DRC bears the brunt and is at

the epicentre of the natural resource/confl ict complex,

effective implementation of the relevant measures will

depend to a large extent on the DRC’s leadership and

capacity to comply. Strategies need to be comprehensive

in seeking to strengthen the DRC’s internal capacity by

resolving issues such as weak governance, poor infra-

structure and security gaps, alongside efforts to curb

illegal exploitation and mining. Another challenge is the

regional insecurity complex created by the presence of

foreign illegally armed groups operating in the DRC and

a regional smuggling network that thrives in the chaos

of a free-for-all mining sector. The regional benefi ciaries

of illegal exploitation and traffi cking may have the fi -

nancial and administrative advantage of frustrating this

process both on a national and on a regional level.

Then there is the challenge of capacity. If the states

now responsible for implementing RINR are already

facing their respective challenges of governance and

administration in the mining areas, then inadequate

capacity will pose a threat to effective implementation

of RINR. ‘Even if all the Great Lakes countries were

to introduce national regulations on certifi cation and

traceability, they do not have the administrative capac-

ity required to ensure compliance (there have been no

increases in either budget or staffi ng of the provincial

mining departments in North and South Kivu).’34 These

challenges do not take away from the fact that govern-

ments in the Great Lakes Region have demonstrated

commitment to eliminating illegal mining and trade, as

exemplifi ed in the December 2010 Lusaka Declaration of

the ICGLR summit to fi ght illegal exploitation of natural

resources in the region. Further implementation of RINR

in a coordinated and harmonised way will demonstrate

the political will of these states to fi ght the illegal exploi-

tation of natural resources, fi rst on a national and then

on a regional level.

International efforts

Regional efforts also seek to comply with international

due diligence guidelines on illegal exploitation as devel-

oped by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) and the United Nations. However,

ISS Workshop Report 17

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

these guidelines are not obligatory, unlike the US

Dodd-Frank Act, which seeks to compel disclosure from

US-listed companies.

In July 2010, the US passed the Dodd-Frank Act of

which Section 1502 specifi cally addresses confl ict min-

erals from the DRC and requires US companies to dis-

close the origin of coltan, cassiterite, gold, wolframite,

or their derivatives if sourced from the DRC or adjoining

countries. This ushered in fears that this disclosure

requirement to label regional minerals ‘DRC confl ict

free’ would negatively affect the demand for these

minerals from the DRC and the region. While the legis-

lation is laudable in seeking to address the link between

natural resources and confl ict, it stops short of seeking

to mitigate against the unintended consequences of its

implementation. This would include the deterioration of

socio-economic conditions as a result of reduced invest-

ment in the mining industry and diminished offi cial

demand for minerals from the region due to the stigma

of confl ict.

Although the US legislation has not yet come into

force, it has put pressure on countries in the region to

get their house in order regarding mining as initially

the impact would be felt region wide. With the global

demand for these minerals being a catalytic force for

illegal exploitation and trade, the disclosure require-

ments will certainly reduce demand and perhaps give

the region time to implement an effective regional

mining mechanism. Conversely, the dissuading effect

of the new requirements will probably magnify regional

traffi cking of illegal minerals to countries further afi eld

and, most importantly, will have an adverse effect on

the livelihoods of mining communities. International

efforts should complement regional efforts to improve

political, social and economic conditions even as they

seek to avoid complicity in confl ict.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The link between natural resources and confl ict has

been mainly experienced in the illegal exploitation of

lootable natural resources to sustain confl ict activi-

ties. As the global market becomes more aware of the

ethical and moral dimensions of irresponsible demand

and supply chains, the Great Lakes Region will begin to

experience stringent requirements regarding the supply

process. Aware of this reality, the region has made

efforts towards achieving international agreed-upon

standards, but there is a need to do more. Though the

economic motive to reform mining in the Great Lakes

Region resonates among global actors, the link between

natural resources and confl ict must take precedence in

envisioning any sustainable solutions for the region. So

far, the efforts of countries in the Great Lakes Region

have been commendable, but there is still much to do

to effectively counter the role of natural resources in

perpetuating confl ict. Governments in the region need

to build their capacity to effectively implement existing

initiatives such as RINR and current border agreements.

As the ICGLR countries belong to regional economic

blocs such as the East African Community and Southern

African Development Community, these can serve as

natural allies in implementation support. As the nega-

tive effects of confl ict fi nancing cannot be confi ned to

specifi c countries, a collaborative regional approach

would be most effective. The natural resource/confl ict

link is a grave regional concern that should be priori-

tised in regional efforts towards sustainable peace and

development in the region. The recommendations below

may guide such engagement.

Countries in the region

■ Collaborating in security initiatives: Regional insecurity

has had a negative impact on countries in the region

and this should be the basis of collaborating on

matters of security. Efforts to deal with foreign illegal

armed groups will be improved by joint security

initiatives focused on enhancing regional security.

Regional collaboration should also be maintained on

coordinated disarmament and implementation of

border control agreements. ■ Support processes promoting democracy and good govern-

ance: Governments in the region should actively seek

to address issues of democracy and good governance

as being at the root of confl ict in the region. Electoral

processes are an opportunity for countries in the

region to support due process in political transition

and democracy. ■ Prioritising economic development and formalisation of

mining industries: Key to regulating the mining sector

will be formalisation at a national level. This will

be key to the success of certifi cation and tracking

mechanisms. Developing alternative livelihood

opportunities would enhance diversifi cation and

sustainability of local economies. ■ Fast-track domestication of the protocol on illegal exploita-

tion of natural resources: Governments should under-

take intensive civic education to raise awareness

of the local populations as a critical stakeholders

and allies in effectively curbing illegal exploitation

of natural resources. Natural resource manage-

ment should also be mainstreamed into education

systems and training for relevant sectors such as

law enforcement.

18 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Regional bodies

■ Facilitating peer learning: Regional bodies should facilitate

the exchange of learning between their member states

in all aspects of governance, security and natural

resource management. This sharing of good practice

expertise will encourage parity in the various sectors. ■ Capacity-building: Regional bodies should take the lead

in improving individual member states’ capacity to

comply with regional protocols. This will ultimately

improve regional capacity in matters of security,

border control, and natural resource management. ■ Development planning: The region needs to begin plan-

ning for infrastructural development to stimulate

value-added production processes. This will generate

more revenue and create employment.

International actors

■ Supporting implementation of new regulations:

International actors should proactively support

implementation of new regulations against confl ict

fi nancing, from creating awareness to setting up the

necessary infrastructure. ■ Engaging in democracy and development: International

actors should continue to support processes that

will enhance the growth of democracy and socio-

economic development as a way of addressing the

root causes of confl ict.

NOTES

1 Natural resources are usually categorised into renewable and non-

renewable resources. The former refers to resources like forests,

air and water and the latter to resources such as minerals and oil.

Renewable resources can potentially be replenished naturally.

2 These mineral ores are smelted to make metals commonly used

in the electronic industries. The ores are processed as follows:

cassiterite into tin, coltan/columbite-tantalite into tantalum,

and wolframite into tungsten.

3 This protocol is under the Pact on Security, Stability and

Development in the Great Lakes Region adopted by member

states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

4 The term ‘confl ict minerals’ refers to minerals that originate from

regions of armed confl ict and whose sales may perpetuate confl ict.

5 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffl er, Greed and grievance in civil war,

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355, The World

Bank Development Group, 2000.

6 Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (eds), Scarcity and surfeit, the

ecology of Africa’s confl icts, African Centre for Technology Studies

and Institute for Security Studies, 2002, 8.

7 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, Beyond greed and grievance:

policy lessons from studies in the political economy of armed confl ict,

New York: International Peace Academy, 2003.

8 Achim Wennmann, The political economy of confl ict fi nancing:

a comprehensive approach beyond natural resources, Global

Governance 13(3) (2007) 427-444, 427.

9 Ibid.

10 United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of

Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of

Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2003/1027, 2003, 14,

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/567/36/

IMG/N0356736.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 19 May 2012).

11 IRIN, DRC: Angola’s ‘sans papiers’ violently deported in latest

wave of expulsions, 2011, http://www.irinnews.org/report.

aspx?reportid=93004 (accessed 30 August 2011).

12 Ibid.

13 Adrian Craddock, Congolese rape victims pay the price of

Angola–DRC oil dispute, Think Africa Press, 2011, http://thinkaf-

ricapress.com/angola/congolese-rape-victims-pay-price-angola-

drc-oil-dispute (accessed 16 August 2011).

14 Petrus de Kock, The DRC at 50: confronting the challenges of

peace and territorial consolidation, Policy Briefi ng 22, 2010, 3.

15 Bruce Guenther, The Asian drivers and the resource cures in

Sub-Saharan Africa: the potential impacts of rising commodity

prices for confl ict and governance in the DRC, The European

Journal of Development Research 20(2) (2008), 347-363.

16 United Nations Security Council, Interim Report of the Group of

Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2011/345, 2011, 18,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/345

(accessed 19 May 2012).

17 Ibid, 8-15.

18 Chip Pitts, Human exploitation fuels mining trade in DRC:

Apple, Dell look away, 2009, http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com/

amnesty-international/human-exploitation-fuels_b_243939.

html (accessed 30 August 2011).

19 De Kock, The DRC at 50, 2.

20 United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of

Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of

Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2003/1027, 15.

21 United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group

of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/596,

2010, 48-49, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.

asp?symbol=S/2010/596 (accessed 19 May 2012).

22 Ibid, 75.

23 Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Environment and confl ict linkages in the Great

Lakes Region, IELRC Working Paper, 2005-6, 4.

24 Wennmann, The political economy of confl ict fi nancing, 428.

25 Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Mineral

certifi cation: certifi ed trading chains and the Analytical Fingerprint

(AFP), Newsletter 03/2011.

26 United Nations Security Council, Interim Report of the Group of

Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2011/345, 21.

27 Ibid, 20.

28 Blore and Smillie, Taming the resource curse, 15.

29 Thierry Vircoulon, Behind the problem of confl ict minerals

in DR Congo: governance, International Crisis Group, 2011,

ISS Workshop Report 19

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/

dr-congo/behind-the-problem-of-confl ict-minerals-in-dr-congo-

governance.aspx (accessed 19 May 2012).

30 Ibid.

31 Ministère des Mines, Acte d’engagement solennel de la Sociéte

Civile, 2011.

32 Philip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika, Natural resources confl ict manage-

ment processes and strategies in Africa, ISS Paper 216, 2010, 9, http://

www.issafrica.org/uploads/216.pdf (accessed 19 May 2012).

33 Blore and Smillie, Taming the resource curse, 34-35.

34 Vircoulon, Behind the problem of confl ict minerals in the DR

Congo, 3.

20 Institute for Security Studies

Forced displacement and confl ict in the Great Lakes Region

Dr Khoti Chilomba KamangaCentre for the Study of Forced Migration

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘Great Lakes Region’, although used liberally,

does not have a common, shared interpretation. In the

context of the International Conference on the Great

Lakes Region (ICGLR)1 the term denotes eleven African

states, seven of whom, namely Burundi, the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania,

Uganda and Zambia, are perched on the shores of

Africa’s largest lakes: Victoria, Tanganyika, Albert and

Kivu. The remaining four ICGLR member states: Angola,

the Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of

Congo – Brazzaville and Sudan, do not enjoy such prox-

imity to the lakes. In this paper the term ‘Great Lakes

Region’ has a restrictive interpretation and is confi ned to

the ‘core’ Great Lakes states of Burundi, the DRC, Kenya,

Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.2

HUMAN MOBILITY

While refugees continue to dominate the discourse

on forced displacement, a number of other forms of

human mobility demand attention. First and foremost

of these are internally displaced persons (IDPs).3 Table 1

highlights the IDP phenomenon in some countries in the

Great Lakes Region.

Close on the heels of IDPs is a category at the centre

of the highly topical issue of environmental change and

global warming. Displacement has become a coping

strategy in respect of yet another stimulus – marked

disruption in the ecosystem which renders it temporar-

ily or permanently unsuitable to support human life.4

The likely impact of climate change on population

movements has been described by one source as follows:

‘Estimates have suggested that between 25 million to

one billion people could be displaced by climate change

over the next 40 years.’

The third, fi nal category is no less contentious.

Often described as ‘undocumented migrants’, ‘irregular

migrants’ or ‘migrants in an irregular situation’, these

displaced persons represent another manifestation of

contemporary human mobility.5

Given the range of sub-categories of forced displace-

ment in the Great Lakes Region, the present study is con-

fi ned to the two most lasting and visible manifestations

– refugees and internally displaced persons. Statistics

on refugees and IDPs in the region are presented both

as a way of contextualising the ensuing discussion and

providing a backdrop to the search for appropriate and

sustainable responses. Besides revealing the trends of

displacement in the region, the data enable us to de-

termine the magnitude of the problem relative to other

geographical locations on the continent and beyond.

Of all documented cases of forced displacements,

‘protracted refugee situations’ (PRS) are the most

serious. Importantly, data show that the gravity of

the situation in the Great Lakes Region is particularly

acute on account of population size and duration, both

Table 1 Number of internally displaced persons

in the Great Lakes Region, 2010/11

Country Number of IDPs

Burundi 100 000

Democratic Republic of Congo 1 700 000

Kenya 250 000

Uganda 74 000

Total 2 124 000

ISS Workshop Report 21

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

of which far outstrip the thresholds of a PRS. A key

hypothesis of this paper is that there is an intimate link

between forced displacement, on the one hand, and gov-

ernance and armed confl ict on the other. A second hy-

pothesis is on the role (adequacy or otherwise) of policy,

institutional and legal frameworks in the displace-

ment–confl ict nexus. It is concluded that there does exist

a causal link (even if not direct and linear) between the

high incidence of displacement in the region and govern-

ance challenges, as well as the seemingly endless armed

confl icts raging in the region. Inadequacies at policy,

institutional or legal level are an aggravating factor.

In view of this, the study recommends fi rst and

foremost that rather than approaching displacement

as a transitional phenomenon, policymakers should

begin formulating mid- and long-term strategies in ap-

preciation of the lasting nature of the phenomenon. In

broad terms, the ‘migration and development’ paradigm

should be adapted. More specifi cally, mitigation and pos-

sible disruption of the displacement–confl ict link seem

to call for greater focus and resources in the following

areas: entrenchment of an evidence-based culture in

formulating policy interventions; fostering a culture of

broad, purposeful consultations with stakeholders in

policy formulation and implementation; and ensuring a

more robust implementation and enforcement of treaty

obligations pertinent to forced displacement.

NATURE, MAGNITUDE AND TRENDS OF DISPLACEMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

This section attempts to address three intercon-

nected issues, namely the nature, scope, and trends

of displacement. It will seek to capture the various

objective manifestations of human mobility that are of

particular relevance to the incidence of violent confl ict.

In summary, the manifestations of mobility can con-

veniently be grouped into ‘forcible’ and ‘voluntary’, or

‘forced displacement’ and ‘migrants’.

It is within the ‘forced displacement’ cluster that we

fi nd refugees as well as internally displaced persons.

However, existing defi nitions as to who is a ‘refugee’

should not be regarded as comprehensive and exhaus-

tive. Admittedly, the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969

brought a welcome normative development when it

defi ned a refugee in more liberal fashion than the UN

Convention.6 Having said that, it is equally important to

stress that since the adoption of the OAU Convention,

much water has passed under the bridge. The interven-

ing years have witnessed a spectacular increase in the

categories of persons in need of asylum and humanitar-

ian assistance, a matter aggravated by, among other

things, ‘mixed migration fl ows’, ‘refugee warriors’, and

the emergence of the environment as a major deter-

minant of displacement. Given these unprecedented

developments, the adequacy of the OAU Convention as

a regulatory framework becomes questionable. Not only

are existing defi nitions increasingly lagging behind in

capturing the unfolding reality around the notion of

refugees, but new forms of human mobility are emerging

well beyond the purview of present legal precepts.

On the one hand there are various sub-sets of

persons, all of which are in some way or other associated

with the notion of ‘refugees’. Most notable among these

are asylum seekers whose applications remain either

undetermined, or have been unsuccessful, but yet they

remain within the territorial jurisdiction of that particu-

lar state while no solution has been found. Then there

are de facto refugees who are in confl ict with the host

country’s (rigid) residence and documentation require-

ments, thus bringing into question their de jure status.

Refugees infringing these conditions fi nd themselves

in the loosely defi ned category of ‘irregular settlers’, or

undocumented migrants.

The refugee continuum also embraces those refugees

who have opted for voluntary repatriation or resettle-

ment (to a third country) and for whom the process has

not been taken to its fi nal, conclusive stage. Another and

fi nal sub-set are those refugees who have repatriated

and for some reason or other continue to be in genuine

need of both protection and assistance pending full re-

integration. They are the so-called ‘returning persons’.

I draw attention to these categories primarily to un-

derscore the diverse nuances in terms of applicable law,

procedures, as well as institutions (local or otherwise)

with the greatest responsibility for (or institutional

mandate over) the individual or group in question. This

distinction is also relevant to the process of identifying

protection needs along with the possible security impli-

cations for the concerned state(s). Needless to say, in-

ordinate delay in determining the status of applications

for asylum is a source of considerable stress, unrest,

generalised violence, and fatalities for those in detention

centres. Two other categories with a direct impact on

stability and security are what are loosely referred to

as ‘environmental migrants’ and the so-called ’warrior

refugees’, the latter associated with the much broader

problem of militarisation of refugee camps.

One cannot ignore the phenomenon of internally

displaced persons in the Great Lakes Region. There

is largely consensus that IDPs should be recognised

as one of the newly emerging challenges to scholars,

practitioners and policymakers alike.7 Within a short

period of time – as captured by Table 1, and in contrast

to Table 2 – IDPs have overtaken refugees as the largest

22 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

g in

s

of

Table 3 Global refugee statistics by geographical region

Number of refugees originating from the region

Number of refugees migrating to other regions

Number of refugees who returned to region of origin

Asia 6 393 200 97 584 5 620 502

Africa 2 805 165 149 480 2 300 062

Europe 528 245 4 319 1 628 086

Latin America and Caribbean 462 808 70 367 437

Various 202 550 25 0

North America 2 467 0 444 895

Oceania 2 105 0 35 558

Source Data extrapolated from UNHCR and US Committee for Refugees and Migrants websites.

and fastest growing constituency among the forcibly

displaced. Indeed, a perusal of global databases and

analysis of trends in forced displacement, confi rms a

decline in refugee populations against dramatic leaps in

the numbers of IDPs.8 In addition, and what is particu-

larly pertinent to this paper, internal displacement has

invariably been linked with particularly grave confl icts,

be it in the Great Lakes Region, Asia or Latin America.9

Policymakers engaged with the issue of mobility and

security need also bear in mind two other phenomena

that are gaining prominence in the region, namely

human smuggling and traffi cking.

While it cannot be claimed that the above constitutes

an exhaustive list of the manifestations of human

mobility of consequence to security, it is fair to say that

the list does capture the most signifi cant and highly

visible groups.

Leaving behind the dual issues of nature and magni-

tude of displacement in the sub-region, we now turn to

those trends in displacement with the greatest relevance

to the displacement–security nexus. That forced dis-

placement and migration have deep, pervasive roots is

not readily acknowledged – neither is the implication

for human mobility of regional economic systems, a key

component of which is the free movement of production

factors. In other words, human mobility is not only in-

separable from the history of the region but is a defi ning

characteristic of the present and foreseeable future.10

Second, and as has been captured in Tables 1 and 2,

there is the confl icting trajectory between refugees on

the one hand and the remaining categories of forcibly

displaced persons and migrants on the other.

A third notable development is the incidence of

‘mixed migration fl ows’ whose perplexing humanitarian

and security challenges are associated with the fact that

a huge and, typically, spontaneous cross-border infl ux

combines persons governed by different and sometimes

confl icting policies, laws and institutions. A classical

illustration was the phenomenal infl ux from Rwanda

in the wake of the 1994 civil war and genocide. At one

point, nearly 250 000 persons were reportedly cross-

ing the border with Tanzania every 24 hours, putting

unprecedented pressure on border management, disease

control, provision of relief assistance, water and land.11

It soon emerged that along with genuine asylum seekers

were heavily armed ex-FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaise)

Table 2 Country statistics on refugees in the Great Lakes Region, 2010

OriginNumber of refugees

from country of origin

Number of refugees hosted by ‘country of

origin’

Number of refugees who returned to country of origin

Number of refugees per 1 000 of population

Burundi 84 004 29 365 4 766 3,50

Democratic Republic of Congo 476 693 166 336 16 631 2,52

Kenya 8 602 402 905 325 9,95

Rwanda 114 836 55 398 10 906 5,21

Tanzania 1 144 109 286 0 2,44

Uganda 6 441 135 801 59 4,06

Total 691 780 899 091 32 687

Source Extracted from http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jun/15/refugee-statistics-unhcr# (accessed 30 August 2011).

ISS Workshop Report 23

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

Interahamwe and militia, some of whom were responsi-

ble for such serious crimes against international law as

genocide and crimes against humanity.12

Each of the six countries of the Great Lakes Region

under discussion is a signifi cant country of asylum

and save for Tanzania, a notable country of origin as

well (see Table 2). In this, the region is not exceptional,

since a similar scenario exists in other regions of the

continent such as the Greater Horn. What sets the Great

Lakes Region apart, however, is the gravity of the situ-

ation (over 25 000 persons exiled for an uninterrupted

period of more than 12 years) prompting scholars and

practitioners to label it a ‘protracted refugee situa-

tion’ (PRS).13 Relevant to this paper is the high linkage

between PRS and the incidence of violent confl ict.

Two other facts are worth mentioning: the location of

refugee camps (in terms of distance from international

frontiers) and the policy responses to the incidence of

displacement and migration. Often, and understand-

ably, refugee camps are pitched in close proximity to

the common border with the refugee’s country of origin

despite the (ambivalent) prescription of the OAU Refugee

Convention that camps be located ‘at a reasonable

distance from the frontier of [the refugees’] country of

origin’. In reality refugees are often settled in a remote,

resource challenged area characterised by a weak or

nominal presence of central government but inhabited

by communities straddling a highly porous international

frontier. Such a camp profi le is a recipe for tension and

suspicion in relations between host and origin countries.

The presence of warrior refugees and militarisation of

the camps add to the strained relationship between the

refugees and local communities.

As for an overall assessment of host country re-

sponses, it is fair to say that apart from a handful of

‘maverick’ approaches, most policy interventions lean

towards the predominant global trend, which is towards

restrictionism and away from what Rutinwa and others

have termed the ‘golden age of asylum’, as exemplifi ed in

Tanzania’s erstwhile egalitarian ‘open door policy’.14

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT

This study is premised on the existence of a causal

link between displacement and confl ict, but also on

the presumption that the adequacy, or otherwise, of

the regulatory framework governing displacement is

a key variable in the equation. There is one further

hypothesis. A sound regulatory framework is likely to

prove important in checking excesses associated with

displacement and in so doing, preclude, or mitigate,

the incidence of confl ict where it erupts. Conversely, an

effective and effi cacious confl ict transformation and

post-confl ict reconstruction system is highly dependent

upon the relevant regulatory framework. It is against

this background that in the section attention is given to

policy directives, laws, and institutions at the core of the

regulatory framework pertinent to displacement.

Of particular concern is the extent to which the

framework conforms to existing international normative

standards and practices, most notably the adequacy

with which effect is given to voluntarily assumed treaty

obligations and, in particular, ratifi cation, domestication

and the adoption of other treaty implementation meas-

ures. Another area of concern is the level of coherence

between the various components of the framework, that

is, law, policy and practice. A fairly high number of trea-

ties have been signed by member states in the region. An

entirely different matter is ratifi cation status, domestica-

tion, and other follow-up implementation measures.

If tardiness in treaty compliance was confi ned to

generally applicable global treaties such as the UN

Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951, there

would have been no reason to raise alarm. Ratifi cation

status, domestication and follow-up administrative and

judicial measures are a cause for concern, however,

even in respect of homegrown sub-regional treaties

such as the Nairobi Pact of 2006 and two of its most

relevant protocols.15

It needs to be stressed that the ‘Great Lakes Process’

holds the greatest potential in meaningfully addressing

the seemingly ceaseless conundrum of displacement

and confl ict in the region.16 Although the process traces

its legislative origins to the UN Security Council and the

African Union, it is a homegrown initiative and is dis-

tinct for its holistic, integrated approach in confronting

the governance, stability and development challenges in

the region.

DYNAMICS OF THE DISPLACEMENT–CONFLICT NEXUS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

This section, with the aid of Chart 1, attempts to capture

the dual phenomenon of displacement and confl ict. The

initial discussion will be followed by an examination of

events of the mid-1990s in Rwanda.

At the very top of the chart is a block representing an

existing situation of ‘violent confl ict’ (the most extreme

case of which is either ‘intrastate’ or ‘interstate war’).

The term ‘confl ict’ adopts the defi nition articulated in

the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, more specifi cally,

by the Additional Protocols of 1977 and case law of the

UN ad hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

and for Rwanda (ICTR). A distinction is made between

24 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

international and non-international armed confl icts. For

their part, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 defi ne the

former as ‘all cases of declared war or of any armed con-

fl ict’ or, ‘occupation … even if the said occupation meets

with no resistance’.17 Article 1 of Additional Protocol

II, on its part, defi nes a non-international confl ict (in

popular parlance, civil wars) as an armed confrontation

taking place within the territorial confi nes of a state

and pitting government forces against ‘dissident armed

forces or other organized armed groups’. It needs to be

stressed that the Great Lakes Region has the dubious

record of experiencing both categories of armed confl ict.

In the Jean Paul Akayesu case, for example, the court

characterised the confrontation in Rwanda at the time

of the genocide as amounting to a ‘non-international

armed confl ict’.18 International armed confl icts are

equally not unfamiliar to the Great Lakes Region and

have even given rise to international litigation.19

The threat of violent confl ict to human security

leaves no other option than fl ight, which in turn takes

two major forms – internal displacement for IDPs, and

cross-border infl ux resulting in asylum seekers and refu-

gees, as depicted by the two blocks to the right. The next

block, ‘Internal tension’, underscores the deterioration

in stability and tranquility generated by the presence of

IDPs and refugees.

Where no effort is made to contain and localise these

tensions, or such efforts prove fruitless, an escalation of

tension occurs with a spill-over into a neighbouring state

or into several contiguous states, thus ‘regionalising’

what originally was a local, intrastate confl ict. Once this

happens, there is a high possibility of a fresh wave of

displacement (IDPs and refugees alike) in the newly af-

fected countries, a development likely to exacerbate the

original confl ict and in that way, complete the vicious

cycle of displacement and violence.

1994 DISPLACEMENT IN RWANDA AND REGIONALISATION OF CONFLICT

The Great Lakes Region confi rms the widely held view

that displacement and confl ict are intimately connected

in that confl ict is often among the major ‘triggers’ of

forced displacement, and PRS in particular, while the

latter is, concurrently, a signifi cant source of instability

and war. A classical illustration of this toxic symbiotic

relationship between displacement and confl ict can be

found in the situation in the Great Lakes Region follow-

ing the exodus out of Rwanda in 1994. The genocide,

coupled with the civil war, left many Rwandese with no

other option but fl ight, internally and across borders. In

addition to the internally displaced, nearly 2,5 million

people sought refuge in the neighbouring countries of

Burundi, the then Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda.

The regional security implications of the phenomenal

scale of displacement became apparent in a relatively

short time in the form of refugee warriors, militarisation

of refugee camps, arms traffi cking, expropriation of

humanitarian resources by armed groups, breakdown

of law and order, truncated capacity of governmental

authorities (of the country of asylum) to assert authority

in the refugee camps, and openly heightened vulner-

ability of host countries, particularly Tanzania. In this

way what should have been an ‘innocent’ population

Chart 1 Displacement–confl ict nexus

ISS Workshop Report 25

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

displacement rapidly turned toxic, threatening to

destabilise the entire sub-region. For example, refugee

camps in Zaire at the time were known to accommodate

persons masterminding and overseeing the Rwandese

genocide, that is, genocidaires. With contemptuous bold-

ness Rwandese militia replicated the political structures

of home country communes within refugee camps

in Tanzania and Zaire.20 To compound the problem,

Interahamwe and ex-government armed forces (FAR)

began to recruit, rearm and train. Milner asserts that

the ‘direct security concerns faced by Tanzania relate

to allegations that Burundian armed elements were

based in and around the [refugee] camps, and the belief

that the presence of refugees facilitated the fl ow of

small arms’.21

According to one analysis, the Hutu militias created

such insecurity that, in 1996, the Rwandan Patriotic Front

(RPF)-led government in Rwanda repeatedly demanded

that the Congolese government dismantle the refugee

camps or face an armed intervention by the Rwandan

Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing of the RPF.22

Indeed, part of the rationale for RPA support for the anti-

Mobutu Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation

of Congo-Zaire (ADLF) led by Laurent Desire Kabila was

to eliminate the potential military threat posed by Hutu

militia in the refugee camps, who were perceived as

a serious security threat by Kigali.23 Put simply, what

initially was an intrastate issue not only led to multiple

cross-border infl uxes from Rwanda into contiguous coun-

tries of the sub-region, but as Chart 1 attempts to show,

the entire Great Lakes Region experienced instability and

insecurity which could be directly traced to (intrastate)

confl ict and displacement within Rwanda.

Acknowledging the causal link between displacement

and confl ict should not be taken to suggest that all situ-

ations of displacement – including a protracted refugee

situation – inevitably lead to violent confl ict. Conversely,

wherever there is violent confl ict, massive population

displacement is the inescapable outcome. Practitioners

and scholars have identifi ed a number of ingredients

or the preconditions for the causal link to unfold, as

did happen in the case of Rwandese displacement. It is

however fair to stress that the singular most threatening

prerequisite seems to be the existence of a PRS.

PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS

It has been shown that of all situations of human

forcible displacement, protracted refugee situations

would seem to be the more severe and with far-reaching

consequences, including (intra- and interstate) confl ict

and instability. The International Conference of the

Great Lakes Conference (ICGLR) makes it very clear that,

often enough, confl ict and instability impair economic

development and entrench poverty. In other words,

fi nding a sustainable solution to PRS is fundamental

to securing lasting peace, stability and development.

However, fi nding an acceptable and meaningful solution

to displacement is easier said than done.

For example, considerable literature exists on the

three traditional ‘durable solutions’ to the refugee

problem: repatriation, resettlement and local integra-

tion. Experts have often shown the severe constraints

characterising each of the three, despite unanimity

about the comparative suitability of repatriation. Given

the peculiarity of PRS, strategies in addressing the

scourge requires one to ‘think out of the box’ and, as a

minimum, bring strategic innovation to the understand-

ing and application of the three traditional durable

solutions. For this reason I fi nd the approach taken by

the ‘Great Lakes Process’, given its holistic, inclusive

and proactive sweep, as being the most promising in

combating the triggers along with drivers of instability

and confl ict.

As Milner and Loescher warn,24 a distinction should

be drawn between PRS and related emergency situa-

tions. Second, it is worth exploring the possible mutual

reinforcement of the three durable solutions, coupled

with other novel options. Indeed, there is near unanim-

ity that relocation to a third country (in other words

resettlement) is of limited use and effi cacy. The total

number of those able to enjoy this durable solution,

as a proportion of those in need, is a mere drop in the

ocean25 and can therefore not be regarded as contribut-

ing signifi cantly in alleviating the PRS-related burdens of

the respective country of asylum. This should not come

as a surprise given the fact that resettlement is an en-

tirely discretionary matter for the state wishing to have

refugees relocate to its territory on permanent terms of

residence. Local integration (entailing naturalisation),

like resettlement, is a solution that is among the least

popular for policymakers and as a result offers of local

integration are so rare that countries of asylum such as

Tanzania stand out.26

In a variety of policy documents, voluntary return of

refugees to the country of origin is often touted as pref-

erable among the traditional solutions.27 And yet, as the

Tanzanian experience has dramatically shown, this is

not always the case. Of the 218 000 Barundi refugees in

the so-called Old Settlements of the Tabora and Rukwa

regions of south-central Tanzania, only 20 per cent opted

to return to their home country, as opposed to 80 per

cent who expressed a clear preference for assimilation

and acquisition of Tanzanian citizenship.

26 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Table 4 Nationality of refugee population in Tanzania and duration of exile (December 2006)

Nationality Population Duration of exile (years)

Burundi 353 000 35,0

Democratic Republic of Congo 128 000 10,0

Total 481 000 22,5

Sources: Compiled from the World Refugee Survey 2007 and the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook of the same period.

Otherwise, refugee movements, and migration in

general, are increasingly being viewed in a more enlight-

ened manner, giving rise to the ‘migration and develop-

ment’ discourse.28

The migration and development discourse is relevant

to the displacement–confl ict nexus (which is the primary

concern of this paper) in a number of ways. First and

foremost is the fact that refugees are considered to be an

integral component of international migration. Second,

a key strategy within migration and development is

emphasis on the enhancement of the human rights

regime within national boundaries as a tool in address-

ing poverty, poor governance, and confl ict, all of which

are known triggers of displacement and migration.29 A

related and pertinent tenet is the insistence that migra-

tion should be the result of choice rather than necessity.

According to the Global Commission on International

Migration (GCIM), ‘women, men and children should be

able to realize their potential, meet their needs, exercise

their rights and fulfi ll their aspirations in their countries

of origin’.30

TANZANIA AND THE SEARCH FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS TO A PROTRACTED REFUGEE SOLUTION

If one was tasked with fi nding a classical illustration of

PRS within the Great Lakes Region, the search would

include, if not end, with Tanzania. Let us bear in mind

that scholars and practitioners insist we have a ‘major

PRS’ whenever 25 000 refugees have been in exile for

more than fi ve years with no immediate prospect of a

durable solution.31 Curiously, even the term PRS barely

captures the gravity of the situation in Tanzania. This

is evident from Table 4, which shows that at the end

of December 2006 there were 481 000 refugees from

Burundi and the DRC in Tanzania, with an average

duration of exile of 22,5 years.32 As a country of asylum

and PRS par excellence, Tanzania’s quest for a ‘durable

solution’ to its refugee population should be a matter

of heightened interest for scholars, policymakers, and

indeed, refugees themselves.

Constraints of time and space require that the author

confi ne himself to a search for durable solutions and

refrain from considering previous initiatives. It needs to

be recalled that, in 1983, Tanzania’s president, Mwalimu

Julius Nyerere, became the second ever African (after

Botswana’s Sir Seretse Khama) to receive the Nansen

Award, the most prestigious honour conferred by

UNHCR, for extraordinary and dedicated service to the

refugee cause. In 2008, Tanzania once again came into

the international limelight. According to the Head of

Delegation of the European Commission, Tanzanian

authorities have taken a unique and unprecedented act

of generosity and humanity on account of the offer of

naturalisation to Barundi refugees.33

The ongoing initiative was articulated for the fi rst

time in 2007 with the signing of a tripartite agreement

between the governments of Tanzania and Burundi, and

UNHCR. The troika launched TANCOSS, or the Tanzania

Comprehensive Solution Strategy. It is instructive that

TANCOSS, in its bid ‘to bring a dignifi ed end’ to one of

the world’s most conspicuous PRS, ignored ‘resettlement’

all together. The Barundi refugees who had fl ed their

home country in 1972 – now numbering 218 000, of

whom 82 per cent were born in Tanzania – were offered

a two-pronged ‘durable solution’ instead: voluntary repa-

triation, on the one hand, and local integration, entailing

naturalization, on the other.

Having brought the repatriation exercise to an end

and completed the naturalisation phase, TANCOSS had

been brought to its conclusion and the stage was set

for the dispersal of the refugees from the ‘refugee set-

tlements’ and re-integration into local communities in

various destinations within the country.

It is for this purpose that the National Strategy

for Community Integration Programme (NaSCIP) was

adopted in early 2010. Its objective is the ‘relocation

and effective local integration of the newly naturalised

Tanzanians’ (NNTs).34 NaSCIP assigns the lead role to

the Prime Minister’s Offi ce – Regional Administration

and Local Government (PMO-RALG), popularly known

by the Kiswahili acronym TAMISEMI, with support

from UNHCR. A pertinent section of NaSCIP sets out the

guiding principles of the integration programme, which

may conveniently be grouped into three broad clusters:

those of general applicability, those that are relatively

specifi c, and transitory matters.

ISS Workshop Report 27

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

Five other matters in this innovative policy document

deserve attention. NaSCIP acknowledges and implicitly

promotes the possibility of naturalised persons sponta-

neously and independently relocating to destinations of

individual choice within the country, but, importantly,

without seeking fi nancial assistance from TAMISEMI.

However, in the estimation of the Tanzanian govern-

ment and UNHCR, this category will be the smallest

compared to those who will require assistance to relo-

cate and integrate. Partly because of the sheer size of the

latter group (comprising about 35 000 households) and

the logistical (and several other dimensions, including

security) implications, spontaneous relocation was found

to be not a sensible and practical option.

Instead, NNTs will be required to relocate to one of

16 specifi ed districts of Mainland Tanzania. A second

major issue is the ‘operational support’ required to

implement NaSCIP and which revolves around four sub-

clusters: individual handouts to NNTs; land acquisition;

support for destination local communities (otherwise,

the ‘community-based support’); and mass mobilisation

campaigns. A third cluster is the sensitive issue of re-

source mobilisation. In 2010, it was estimated that rolling

out NaSCIP will come with a price tag of nearly US$144

million staggered over the period 2010-2014. Fourthly,

policymakers took cognisance of the fact that, in 2015,

Tanzania will be holding its fi fth general elections since

the advent of plural politics35 and it is therefore unwise to

allow a politically loaded issue such as mass naturalisa-

tion and relocation of refugees to coincide with a period

of national economic, social and political tension.

CONCLUSION

The Great Lakes Region continues to be a major global

fl ashpoint regarding both displacement and migration.

Even with the successful roll-out of NaSCIP, Tanzania

will still have over 20 000 refugees with no durable

solution within easy reach. The issue of refugees and

in particular that of protracted refugee situations (PRS)

in the Great Lakes Region is therefore real and likely to

linger on in the foreseeable future. Policymakers and

other regional players would therefore be well advised

to bear in mind this stark reality and embrace the

necessity of both short-term and long-term counter-

strategies. Second, policymakers, humanitarian agencies

and other actors need to be mindful of peculiarities of

population displacement in the region. On the one hand

there is the problem of ‘refugee warriors’ and the related

issue of militarisation of refugee camps, internal and

regional stability and security. On the other hand are the

legitimate human rights and protection needs of asylum

seekers and other categories of migrants that are coming

under increasing threat of ‘restrictionism’ and the ‘secu-

ritisation’ of asylum.

Third is the related problem of ‘mixed migration

fl ows’ in which embedded within genuine asylum

seekers are all manner of irregular migrants, including

the smuggled and traffi cked, and the resultant complica-

tions for authorities responsible for border control and

management, as well as refugee status determination.

Fourth, there is the prevailing institutional,

policy and normative framework governing refugees.

Complications arise from the weakness of individual

states to fully comply with voluntarily assumed treaty

obligations, for example under the UN Convention

on the Status of Refugees, 1951, and the AU Refugee

Convention, 1969, or even the East African Community

Treaty, 1999, or the Great Lakes Nairobi Pact, 2006. While

signature and ratifi cation status is laudable, treaty

domestication and adoption of the required administra-

tive and judicial implementations measures are far

more important.

Fifth, and related to the above, is the need to harmo-

nise laws and policies, as required by the treaty for the

establishment of the East African Community (EAC) of

1999. There are intrastate discrepancies with regard to

policy and legal frameworks and practices pertaining to

refugees. Either an offi cial policy document on refugees

is absent altogether (Kenya, Uganda), or existing law

and practice do not fully refl ect the policy document

(Tanzania). In other cases one encounters multiplicity

and duplicity not only in refugee-related institutions, but

also in laws (Burundi).

Sixth, institutional capacity – especially among gov-

ernment authorities – lags far behind the magnitude and

complexities of the refugee problem. Empowering those

with responsibility for refugee status determination and

border control and management with requisite special-

ised knowledge and skills requires far more resources

than are currently available.

Finally, support for teaching, research, and outreach

will not only create an enlightened public mind but will

go a long way towards building harmonious relation-

ships between the displaced and their host communi-

ties. Another major dividend, especially from teaching

and research and publication, is the adoption of policy

decisions grounded in evidence-based, rigorous scholarly

interrogation.

NOTES

1 For details and an overview of the ICGLR visit http://www.icglr.org.

2 Henri Médard and Shane Doyle (eds), in Slavery in the Great Lakes

Region of East Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2007, give a persua-

sive explanation of the term ‘Great Lakes Region’.

28 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

3 Details can be found on the website of the Internal

Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) at http://www.internal-

displacement.org (accessed 2 December 2011).

4 Norwegian Refugee Council, Future fl oods of refugees: a comment

on climate change, confl ict and forced migration, 2008, citing E

El-Hinnawi, Environmental refugees, New York: United Nations

Environment Program (UNEP), 1995, http://www.nrc.no/arch/_

img/9268480.pdf (accessed 17 May 2012). Increasing reference is

being made to ‘environmental migrants’ and ‘environmentally

displaced persons’.

5 According to the IOM, the term ‘illegal migrant’, which is widely

used by drafters of national legislation governing immigration

and residence, carries a criminal connotation and seen as

denying migrants’ humanity: see Glossary on migration, 2nd ed,

Geneva: IOM, 2011, 54, http://joomla.corteidh.or.cr:8080/joomla/

images/stories/Observaciones/11/Anexo%205.pdf (accessed 17

May 2012).

6 In contrast with Article I (2) of the OAU Convention, Article 1 of

the 1951 Convention defi nes a ‘refugee’ in terms of an individual

rather than a group member and is particularly individualistic.

In addition, the 1951 Convention confi nes itself to a ‘well

founded fear of persecution’ as the only legitimate grounds for

claiming asylum.

7 At the UN, the focal point is the Special Rapporteur on the

Human Rights of IDPs, an offi ce established in 1992. Among the

world’s leading institutions dedicated to the study of internal

displacement is the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

in Geneva (http://www.internal-displacement.org) and the

Brookings Institution (http://www.brookings.edu) operating

from Washington DC.

8 In particular, see World Refugee Surveys of the US Committee

on Refugees and Migrants and the Global Overviews of Trends

published by the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring

Centre.

9 The confl ict–displacement nexus has been the subject of two

international conferences organised by the Bonn International

Centre for Conversion (BICC). See for example its publication

Migration and displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa: the security–migra-

tion nexus, 2008, edited by Clara Fischer and Ruth Vollmer,

http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/briefs/brief39/

brief39.pdf (accessed 18 May 2012).

10 See for example K Kamanga, The changing manifestations of

forced migration: Africa in denial of its migrant history? Refugee

Insights, Newsletter of the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, (12 &

13), July–December 2007.

11 For details see Sadako Ogata, The turbulent decade: confronting the

refugee crises of the 1990s, New York: Norton, 2005, 172-275.

12 Besides Ogata no other book captures this gruesome reality as

vividly as that by a former UNAMIR commander, the Canadian

Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, Shake hands with the devil: the

failure of humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House, 2003.

13 Recent works on this phenomenon include James Milner and Gil

Loescher, Responding to protracted refugee situations: lessons from

a decade of discussion, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, Forced

Migration Policy Briefi ng 6, January 2011, http://www.rsc.ox.ac.

uk/events/launch-policy-briefi ng-6/RSCPB6-RespondingToProtra

ctedRefugeeSituations.pdf (accessed 17 May 2012).

14 B Rutinwa, The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies

in Africa, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No

5, Geneva: UNHCR, May 1999, 4. See also Sreeram Chaulia,

The politics of refugee hosting in Tanzania: from open door to

unsustainability, insecurity and receding receptivity, Journal of

Refugee Studies 16(2) (2003), 147–166.

15 Appended to the 2006 ICGLR Pact on Security, Stability and

Development are ten protocols including the Protocol on the

Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and

the Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons, which

are the most important protocols in the context of this paper.

Importantly, only a handful of the eleven member states of the

ICGLR have ratifi ed and domesticated these two protocols.

16 Details of the ‘Great Lakes Process’ can be found at http://www.

icglr.org.

17 Article 2, common to all four Geneva Conventions, 1949. This

must be read in conjunction with Article 1 of Additional Protocol

I of 1977 which considerably widens the range of international

armed confl icts.

18 The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, para-

graph 621.

19 In particular, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory

of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), ICJ Reports, 2005 and ICC, Prosecutor

v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07.

20 Ogata, The turbulent decade, 179, for instance, describes in moving

detail how a crowd of 5 000 camp-based refugees in Tanzania

rioted over the arrest of former bourgmaster and suspected

genocidaire Jean-Baptiste Gatete at the Benaco refugee camp in

northwestern Tanzania.

21 James Milner, Refugees: the state and the politics of asylum in Africa,

Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 128.

22 For details see John F Clarke (ed), The African stakes of the Congo

war, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003, passim, but especially

in Chapter 8, by Timothy Longman, The complex reasons for

Rwanda’s engagement in Congo, 129-144.

23 Ibid.

24 Milner and Loescher, Responding to protracted refugee situations, 15,

16.

25 While conceding that resettlement has the potential for not

only serving as a durable solution, vital protection tool, and an

international responsibility-sharing mechanism, the UNHCR

Statistical Yearbook for 2007 makes the sobering observation

that only a paltry 1 per cent of the world’s refugees directly

benefi ted from resettlement.

26 A subsequent section will discuss at length an ongoing initia-

tive known best by the acronym NaSCIP, that is, the National

Strategy for Community Integration Programme.

27 The Tanzania National Refugee Policy of September 2003 is il-

lustrative and so too are countless UNHCR policy directives and

studies.

28 Among leading fora championing this cause is the UN General

Assembly High Level Dialogue on International Migration and

Development (HLD), the Global Commission on International

Migration (GCIM), and the Global Forum on Migration and

Development (GFMD). In respect of Africa, two initiatives are

worth pointing out. These are the African Union Strategic

ISS Workshop Report 29

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

Framework for a Policy on Migration, 2001, and the IOM’s

Migration and Development in Africa (MIDA) strategy.

29 Global Migration Group, Mainstreaming migration into development

planning: a handbook for policy-makers and practitioners, Geneva:

IOM, 2010, 11.

30 Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an

interconnected world: new directions for action, Report of the GCIM,

2005, 4.

31 Milner and Loescher, Responding to protracted refugee situations, citing

UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusion on protracted refugee

situations, 22 December 2009, No 109 (LXI), 2009, 3, http://www.

unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b30afd92.html (accessed 18 May 2012).

32 Data have been gleaned from the World Refugee Survey 2007

and the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook for the same period. The

benchmark 2006 has been taken since at that stage, as opposed

to the subsequent year, no elaborate durable solution had yet

been found for neither of the two groups of refugees.

33 In terms of a 2008 agreement the EU would support the UNHCR

in rolling out the naturalisation process of Barundi refugees

through a grant of €2,5 million.

34 In working meetings of TAMISEMI, the term NNTs was subse-

quently replaced with ‘relocating Tanzanians’ as a means of

escaping the ambiguity and possible stigma that was likely to

accompany the term ‘newly naturalised’ Tanzanians, which

suggested on that there exist ‘classes’ of citizens.

35 Multipartyism, as the phenomenon is widely known, was for-

mally ushered in with the enactment of the Political Parties Act

in 1992 and politically following the general elections of 1995

and the emergence of an ‘offi cial opposition’ to the ruling party

within Parliament.

30 Institute for Security Studies

Bridging the Great LakesImplementing the human rights dimension of the

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Dr Isabell Kempf1

Regional Human Rights Adviser, UN-OHCHR, ICGLR

HOW THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION STARTED

The idea to organise an International Conference on the

Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) originated in response to re-

gional crises in the 1990s, particularly the 1994 genocide

in Rwanda. United Nations Security Council Resolution

1097, adopted unanimously on 18 February 1997, was

one of the motivators of this project asking for the set-

tlement of the confl ict in the region through political

dialogue and the convening of an international confer-

ence on peace and security in the Great Lakes region. In

a similar way, the Special Envoy of the European Union

on numerous occasions expressed the need to fi nd a

regional approach to the multiple crises in the region.

Our model is the Conference for Security and

Cooperation in Europe, which made a fundamental

contribution to the consolidation of peace and

stability on the Old Continent. The aim is to crate

the basis for a new partnership between the coun-

tries of the region and between these countries

and the rest of the international community.2

At the end of the 1990s, the idea was to have the three

belligerents, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),

Uganda and Rwanda, sign a peace agreement. However,

they refused to meet, which led to the idea of an inter-

national conference which included all the actors in the

sub-region involved in the war, under the auspices of the

UN and the African Union.

The preparatory process for the International

Conference on the Great Lakes Region started with the

fi rst National Coordinators’ meeting of the original

six core countries (Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda,

Tanzania and Uganda) in Nairobi in June 2003. It was at

these meetings that the objectives, calendar, structure

and principal themes of the conference were agreed

upon. At the fi rst meeting the core countries, among

other things:

■ Agreed on the principle of convening the

International Conference for the Great Lakes Region ■ Insisted on ownership of the conference by the region

and on the need to host all the meetings within the

sub-region ■ Concurred that the preparatory process could be

started immediately but that the conference itself

should take place once the Arusha and Lusaka peace

processes had reached a mature stage (that is, the

Inter-Congolese Dialogue had been completed, the

transitional government in DRC was in place, and an

all-inclusive ceasefi re had been reached in Burundi)3

In 2004 fi ve additional countries were incorporated

into the group of core countries, namely Angola, the

Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo,

Sudan and Zambia. In 2004, in addition to the National

Coordinators’ meetings, there was also a meeting of

women in Kigali, youth in Kampala, and civil society in

Arusha, as well as the fi rst meeting of foreign affairs

ministers in preparation for the fi rst Summit of Head

of States and Government in Dar-es-Salaam, where

the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security,

Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region

was signed by the eleven presidents of the core countries

in November 2006. This expression of the political will

of the region to work together was tested only a few

days later when a security crisis between Rwanda and

ISS Workshop Report 31

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

the DRC emerged. It was thanks to the good offi ce of the

chair of the conference (Tanzania) that the crisis was

resolved peacefully.

After the fi rst summit in Tanzania, the ICGLR started

the elaboration of the Peace, Stability and Development

Pact based on an agreed structure, participation and in-

ternational partnership, which will be explained below.

The participatory process of the elaboration of the Peace

Pact took place in 2005, whereas the signature of the

Peace Pact was postponed until December 2006 to allow

for the results of the elections in the Republic of Congo

which took place in July 2006.4 The pact created its

own secretariat of the ICGLR, which has been based in

Bujumbura since 2007, as well as a follow-up mechanism

at the political level that will be explained below.

PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW

Peacebuilding theories in the 1990s built on the experi-

ences of trying to build a culture of peace in areas of

armed confl ict in internal wars, such as the one in

the former Yugoslavia. Fetherston calls these counter-

hegemonic or post-hegemonic peacebuilding projects

and the idea is to move from a neutral outsider approach

towards a partnership with local actors.5 The involve-

ment of local actors is seen as a condition for achieving

stable peace through the use of the peacemaking poten-

tial of the communities themselves.

This approach is especially important in a confl ict

area such as the Great Lakes Region, where many

communities have cross-border ties which are often

stronger than national ties. The involvement of differ-

ent societal actors in a framework for peacebuilding

from below includes the private sector; the planning

ministry and farmers cooperatives; military actors such

as demobilised soldiers, military and police offi cers;

political leaders such as grassroots leaders, parliamen-

tarians and ministers; as well as social leaders such as

representatives of youth and women’s groups, the media,

and religious authorities. The structure of the confer-

ence allowed for the inclusion of all these actors in the

national delegations and for their local wisdom and ex-

perience to be taken into account. One example of such a

project is the establishment of a regional media council

as part of the Peace Pact, which would contribute to the

promotion of a peace culture and prevent phenomena

such as the hate media which greatly contributed to the

genocide in Rwanda.

The architecture of the conference also took into

account the global and regional forces that impact on

the communities and the region by allowing neighbour-

ing countries to participate as co-opted members of

the conference, as well as integrating international

actors with a strong interest in the region into its Group

of Friends.

A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH

The participatory approach of the process includes a

wide range of actors. The eleven core countries (Angola,

Burundi, CAR, DRC, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda,

Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) include those

that were most affected by confl icts in the Great Lakes

Region. These countries participate in all meetings,

present their positions, and take all relevant decisions.

They are also the signatories of the declaration and the

Peace Pact. Each of the core countries has a national

coordinator and a national preparatory committee,

which was converted into the National Coordination

Mechanism during the implementation phase of

the pact.

The National Coordinator is the head of the National

Coordination Mechanism and is also the liaison person

between the secretariat of the ICGLR and the national

authorities on all maters relating to the conference.

His/her role is to follow up on the implementation of

decisions relating to the conference at the national level,

which is why the National Coordinator is usually at the

level of an ambassador. Regular meetings of the national

coordinators during the conference process are an im-

portant way to discuss and take decisions in a collegial

and consultative manner.

The National Coordination Mechanism has to

elaborate a national work plan for the implementation

of the pact, assist in articulating national positions and

contributions and carry out activities for the effective

participation of each country in the conference. They

are composed of technical staff from the different

ministries relevant to the four themes of the confer-

ence, as well as representatives from civil society and

youth and women’s groups. Some later also included

representatives from the private sector. The mechanism

also has to make the conference process known inside

the country and share its results with different sectors

of the population. The core countries are responsible

for fi nancing their own committees but did also receive

some fi nancial support from the Group of Friends during

the negotations.

The fact that the number of core countries was

increased to eleven refl ects the spillover effect of

confl ict in the region. An example of the interrelation-

ship between the different confl icts in the region is the

seizure of power by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in

1994 after the genocide in that country. When the RPF

crossed the border into Zaire (now the DRC) to persecute

the Hutu militia responsible for the genocide – and who

32 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

were hosted by Mobutu Sese Seko – this led to Mobutu’s

eventual deposition as the military support for Laurent-

Désiré Kabila from within and outside the country

(Rwanda and Uganda) grew. This in turn allowed José

Eduardo dos Santos in Angola to weaken his opponent

Jonas Savimbi of UNITA (the União para a Independência

Total de Angola, Union for the Total Independence of

Angola) who had previously been supported by Mobutu

and eventually helped Kabila to drive his former allies,

namely the Rwandese and Ugandan soldiers, out of

Zaire. This close interaction and changing alliances

make it essential for all these actors to have an equal

place at the negotiation table.

The co-opted members of the conference are the

neighbouring countries of the core countries who are

invited to all the regional preparatory meetings, as well

as to the summits. They are able to participate in all the

plenary and closed-door sessions but not in the decision-

making process. The co-opted countries follow the Peace

Pact negotiation process closely in order to assure that

their interests are taken into account. One example is

that of Egypt, which applied for the status of co-opted

member because the sources of its main water supply,

the Nile, are in the Great Lakes Region.

The Group of Friends was a group of countries that

supported the conference process fi nancially, diplomati-

cally, technically and politically. They were given the

special status of partners with the right to participate

in all the plenary sessions, preparatory meetings and

summits, as well as the closed-door sessions when

invited by the core members. Since December 2003 the

ICGLR process was accompanied by a Group of Friends

of the Great Lakes Region made up of 28 countries

and ten international organisations and specialised

agencies. The group was co-chaired by Canada and the

Netherlands. After the signing of the pact in 2006 the

Group of Friends dispersed and one of the challenges

that the secretariat of the ICGLR now faces is how to

reunite the Group of Friends and encourage them to

continue supporting the region as a collective and in a

coordinated manner.

The conference considers existing subregional

organisations to be essential partners in the process in

order to avoid duplication and build on existing initia-

tives. The role of the subregional organisations consists

of contributing to existing activities and helping with

the elaboration of programmes and projects. They also

play an important role in the implementation of the

Peace Pact.

Observer status can be requested formally by a state,

a national, regional or international organisation, or a

non-governmental organisation (NGO). The core coun-

tries review the applications based on a list of criteria

and then decide whether to accept or reject the applica-

tion. Observers are allowed to participate in the regional

preparatory committees and participate in the summits

and attend all plenary sessions but not the closed-door

sessions. Observers are allowed to distribute their

documents and have access to the general information

of the conference, but not to the working documents.

Observers include inter-parliamentary organisations

such as the Association of European Parliamentarians

for Africa, the Amani Forum, and other NGOs and inter-

national organisations.

During the preparatory phase, representatives

from leading UN departments and agencies for the

four themes of the conference functioned as facilita-

tors and resource persons during all meetings and

technically coordinated the programmes and projects

of the Peace Pact. Other UN agencies were invited to

assure the integration of cross-cutting issues into the

conference process and the Peace Pact itself. The agen-

cies that played active roles and who are still stable

partners of the secretariat are the UN Offi ce of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN Women

for gender issues, and UNEP for the environment.

During the conference process there was active coop-

eration between the agencies working on cross-cutting

issues, which is not only refl ected in the systematic inte-

gration of human rights and gender issues into the Peace

Pact, but also in the participation of the relevant actors

such as women, youths, NGOs and national human

rights observatories. The implementation of the human

rights dimension is now supported by a Regional Human

Rights Advisor from UN-OHCHR who is working within

the ICGLR secretariat.

INNOVATIVE ARCHITECTURE OF THE ICGLR

The architecture of the conference combines in a very

innovative way the technical, the political and the

decision-making levels, all of which are important for

the creation of a regional peace pact. It was important to

involve the technical experts from the different minis-

tries and civil society in order to assess what was avail-

able already, what had worked in one or more countries

of the region and where the gaps were. Also, the techni-

cal discussions in the Technical Thematic Task Forces

have shown that it is often easier for technical experts to

work together, as they have a similar way of identifying

problems and of working together in a harmonious way

to solve them.

One example of this is the politically sensitive sug-

gestion that was brought up by technical experts in the

Good Governance and Democracy Task Force, namely

ISS Workshop Report 33

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

the need to create a regional observatory to monitor

the human rights situation. Although human rights

monitoring is usually a mandate that is very diffi cult to

get from a governmental forum, the technical people

put forward strong arguments, such as the need for

early warning, for cooperation between national human

rights institutions and to combat impunity and increase

protection on the ground. These reasons created a strong

lobby from the technical experts and civil society for the

establishment of a regional monitoring body.

Similarly, the Regional Preparatory Committee

included civil society actors and thus ensured meaning-

ful participation and representation, which provided

important legitimacy to the conference process. All four

groups, the women, youth, civil society and the private

sector, had their own meetings within the conference

process in which they elaborated their own strategies

and recommendations. They were accordingly able to in-

tegrate these into the projects and protocols of the con-

ference through the Regional Preparatory Committee.

It is thanks to this structure that the pact contains a

regional forum each for women, youth, civil society and

parliamentarians, as a way for them to continue to work

together to address common concerns. A protocol and

project against sexual violence and a project to foster

youth employment are only two examples of how the

structure of the negotiations allowed for the successful

lobbing by civil society actors.

The decision-making organ of the conference, the

Regional Interministerial Meeting, is an important

forum for the discussion of politically sensitive issues,

such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources

or the property rights of returning populations. The

main idea of adding a decision-making body at foreign

minister level was to assure that decisions were taken

on sensitive issues and it was interesting to see that the

group was often more progressive than the individual

members. This means that topics which were too sensi-

tive on the political agenda of a single country, such as

the property rights of returnees, could be tackled in a

regional context, because there was enough peer pres-

sure to do so. With regard to returnees it is important

Source: http://www.icglr.org (accessed 30 May 2012).

Diagram 1 The regional follow-up mechanism

34 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

to observe that the interests of those concerned often

coincided with those of the former host countries of the

refugees, which helped to constitute a pressure group

for their demands. The Interministerial Meeting takes

important decisions about what topics should remain on

the agenda and how to solve contentious issues, and has

thus created through its collective decision making an

atmosphere of trust and collegiality which has a number

of immediate benefi ts for the region. One of the most im-

portant is the joint military action between Rwanda and

the DRC against the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du

Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda,

FDLR) and between Uganda and the DRC with respect to

the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), based on the protocol

on non-aggression and mutual defence in the Great

Lakes Region.

The Regional Interministerial Committee is also part

of the follow-up mechanism, together with the Troika, as

illustrated in Diagram 1.

In 2008, the Troika was composed of the former,

present and future chairpersons of the ICGLR, namely

Kenya, Zambia and Uganda. Kenya’s being part of the

Troika during the post-election violence in that country

was a factor which hindered the Troika from being fully

effective in its confl ict prevention and crisis manage-

ment role. This experience should help to redefi ne the

role of the Troika in the future.

HOLISTIC NATURE OF THE PACT

The main programmes of the pact are set out in Diagram 2.

In addition, the conference addresses gender, the

environment, human rights, HIV/AIDS and human set-

tlements as cross-cutting issues.

The above shows that the pact is not a tradi-

tional peace pact, but rather a regional cooperation

programme similar to the Helsinki Final Act of the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE), which was signed in 1975. The Organisation for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as the CSCE

is now known, is a cooperative security organisation

with no means of enforcing its decisions. Its institutional

fl exibility and political nature enable it to react swiftly

and pragmatically in crisis situations.

Nowadays, the OSCE fulfi ls four functions: fi rst, it

promotes shared values such as democracy, human

rights and the rule of law. Second, the OSCE is a perma-

nent forum for dialogue on matters relating to security

in Europe. It can initiate a debate, receive clarifi cations

from states, and stimulate joint responses. This process

contributes to transparency and itself represents a con-

fi dence and security-building measure. Third, the OSCE

is a forum for arms control and disarmament. The con-

fi dence and security-building measures contained in the

Vienna Document of 1994 were in fact negotiated under

the auspices of the OSCE, which is also monitoring the

implementation of the document’s provisions. Fourth,

the OSCE is equipped with the means to intervene in

regions of confl ict. The High Commissioner on National

Minorities and the OSCE’s preventive diplomacy mis-

sions are examples of early warning, confl ict prevention

and crisis management.

The International Conference on the Great Lakes

Region has similar objectives. The fi rst is to create a col-

lective space for sustainable peace and security, political

and social stability, shared growth and development and

cooperation through the implementation of the Pact. The

Pact is based on the insight that peace and development

are closely linked, as stressed by authors such as Johan

Galtung6 and Kofi Annan7 in his UN reform programme.

The idea behind this thinking is that confl ict is often

related to the control over and access to resources and

that sharing the access to and benefi ts of resources

through common development projects and trade create

an incentive for collaboration across borders.

HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION OF THE PACT

In human rights terms, countries in the region face

similar issues and challenges with regard to their

national protection systems. These include weak institu-

tional capacity in the administration of justice and more

generally in public service provision; sexual violence, the Source http://www.icglr.org (accessed 30 May 2012).

Peac

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Dem

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Econ

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dev

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re

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tegr

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Hum

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PR

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PROTOCOLS

PR

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Regional Programmes of Action

Pact of Security, Stability and DevelopmentDar-es-Salaam Declaration

Diagram 2

ISS Workshop Report 35

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

protection of internally displaced persons and returning

populations; the illegal exploitation of natural resources;

widespread poverty and social inequality; and a lack of

transitional justice mechanisms and widespread im-

punity. Impunity refl ects the absence of the rule of law

and a functioning judicial system as well as inadequate

civil control over the security forces in some countries in

the region.8

At the same time, human rights violations may not be

a result but a long-standing structural cause of confl ict.

The experience of the Great Lakes Region has shown that

the denial of the group right to self-determination, or the

denial of human rights to certain groups in society, may

be a root cause of confl ict. Another structural human

rights concern in the region is the lack of recognition of

the cultural identity and mode of production of pastoral-

ists, which has led to repeated confl icts in zones where

pastoralists live and which are often neglected by the

government, such as the northern border of Kenya with

Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia where drought, the absence

of government services and cattle rustling remain major

problems. The exclusion of large parts of the population

from development and decision making and the result-

ing poverty constitute major human rights violations in

nearly all countries of the region, and the right to mean-

ingful participation in political affairs has been one of the

root causes of the civil war in Sudan.

Peace researchers have pointed out that the viola-

tions of human rights are more likely to be linked to

internal confl ict than to inter-state confl ict.9 In the case

of the Great Lakes Region, however, where cultural

identities are bound together across borders, abuses of

group rights can rapidly lead to inter-state confl ict. The

example of the Banyamulenge in the eastern DRC shows

that the neglect of their identity and citizens rights have

made them look for allies among their own cultural and

ethnic group, the Tutsi in Rwanda.

Similarly, Kenyan pastoralists who are of Somali

ethnic origin have often been discriminated against, for

example by providing them with special identifi cation

cards. There have also been massacres (such as the

Wajir massacre) in the region which were never inves-

tigated and still today the pastoralists are often treated

like potential terrorists by the state authorities.10

The universality and moral character of human rights

often make it diffi cult to use a rights-based approach for

negotiations or arbitrations, as compromising on human

rights is diffi cult from a legal and moral point of view.

Victims have a right to justice and reparation, which is

not negotiable, yet in confl ict situations it is important to

reconcile interests and needs and be aware of the often

unequal distribution of power between parties. On the

other hand, if human rights violations are one of the root

causes of the confl ict, then these have to be dealt with

to achieve a long-lasting solution. A good illustration of

this is the dilemma between amnesty laws and the fi ght

against impunity. If there is a post-confl ict transition

which does not address impunity and justice in response

to massive human rights violations for the sake of short-

term stability and consensus, the prevailing injustice

will eventually lead to acts of revenge, an unstable social

environment and an eventual resurrection of the confl ict.

Recent peace agreements between the government

of the DRC and former armed groups, for example,

grant total amnesty to the members of the former

rebel groups, many of whom were incorporated into the

military or police without a vetting process, which would

have served to prevent war criminals from entering the

security forces. The recent mutiny and defection of parts

of the integrated former CNDP rebel groups from the

Congolese army has led to a resurgence of rebel activi-

ties in the eastern DRC leading to renewed human rights

violations and displacement of the population.

PROGRAMME ON GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY

The programme of action of the Great Lakes Pact relating

to the promotion of good governance and democracy

aims at creating a region characterised by entrenched

values, principles and norms on democracy, good gov-

ernance and observance of human rights.

The programme is structured into three sub-pro-

grammes, which are currently implemented as follows:

■ Sub-programme 1, concerning the promotion of

the Rule of Law, The Fight against Crimes against

Humanity, and Human Rights, out of which two

projects have developed: ■ A Regional Centre for Democracy, Good

Governance, Human Rights and Civic Education in

Lusaka ■ The Regional Initiative for the Prevention of War

Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, the Crime of

Genocide, and for the Fight against Impunity ■ Sub-programme 2, entitled Consolidation of

Democratisation Processes, which has established

the following regional fora: ■ The Regional Forum for Parliamentarians ■ The Regional Forum for Women ■ The Regional Youth Forum ■ The Regional Forum for Civil Society

■ Sub-programme 3 concerning the ‘Rational

Management of Resources’ has established the

Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of

Natural Resources

36 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Table 1 Functions of the Regional Centre for Democracy, Good Governance, Human Rights and Civic Education

Strategies Purpose

1 Capacity-building

■ To strengthen national institutions, civil society organisations, private sectors and other actors for an active and effective national and local engagement in the promotion of democracy, good governance, human rights and civic education

■ To train trainers of national institutions and fora on regional and international instruments and human rights■ To develop appropriate training tools for civic education (manuals, guides, curricula)

2 Research and analysis

■ To marry scientifi c and applied research in the search for solutions to the problems of the Great Lakes Region■ To undertake and promote policy- and action-oriented research and analysis on issues of concern to the

Great Lakes Region■ To deepen research on marginalisation and exclusion as the genesis of confl icts in the Great Lakes Region■ To deepen research on indigenous and traditional approaches, practices and methods of confl ict resolution

and peacebuilding■ To establish best practices in all the thematic areas covered by the centre

3 Fostering synergy and networking

■ To facilitate the formation of state–civil society dialogue networks through the different fora created by the Pact

■ To facilitate the establishment of a regional approach to research and joint problem-solving in the Great Lakes Region

■ To establish collaboration strategies among national institutions and networks in the region

4 Lobbying and advocacy

■ To provide a space for civil society and other stakeholders in the region to advocate for, inter alia:■ State compliance with regional and international instruments■ Policy transformation (for example through the development and application of a regional gender policy)■ The respect for and application of the rule of law and human rights

5 Monitoring and reporting

■ To promote and monitor compliance with regional and international instruments, ICGLR instruments, protocols and decisions

■ To monitor the integration and implementation of cross-cutting issues into the ICGLR’s programmes and activities. These include human rights, gender, environment, youth and HIV/AIDS

■ To establish and facilitate the regional observatories on gender and human rights linked to an early warning system

6 Data collection and dissemination

■ To set up a database on networks of different actors dealing with the themes of the centre■ To develop and operationalise an interactive website for the centre■ To facilitate the translation and dissemination of regional and international instruments into local languages to

facilitate their access to and understanding by the citizens of the Great Lakes Region

7 Establishment and operation of an early warning system for the Great Lakes Region

■ To provide analytical reports on situations that merit attention for pre-emptive and joint action by the member states

REGIONAL CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIC EDUCATION

The Pact for Security, Stability and Development in the

Great Lakes Region was signed by its eleven member

states in 2006 and entered into force in June 2008. It

provides an important legal and political framework

for the promotion of common policies and strategies to

entrench the values of good governance and the rule of

law and rebuild a peaceful and prosperous region.

The mission of the Regional Centre for Democracy,

Good Governance, Human Rights and Civic Education

established under the Programme for Good Governance

and Democracy of the pact is to strengthen the institu-

tional capacities in these areas through research, train-

ing, monitoring and reporting and to facilitate dialogue

and consultation among the different social and political

actors in the region.

The centre will host a regional human rights observa-

tory and a number of fora linked to networks of national

institutions, observatories and civil society in the member

states of the ICGLR. The centre has also added value to

the ICGLR Secretariat’s confl ict management efforts to

develop an early warning system through the provision

of analytical reports on situations that merit attention for

pre-emptive and joint action by the member states. The

functions of the regional centre are listed in Table 1.

REGIONAL OBSERVATORY ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Despite international and regional efforts to promote

good governance, democracy and human rights in

the Great Lakes Region, there is a lack of coordination

of actors. In addition, country monitoring mandates

for human rights in the Human Rights Council have

been dramatically reduced (with only the UN Special

Rapporteur on Sudan being still in place in the region).

ISS Workshop Report 37

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

The regional observatory will have a monitoring

mandate and be linked to a network of national human

rights institutions and observatories in the member

states of the ICGLR, which will also add value to the

ICGLR secretariat’s confl ict management efforts by the

development of its early warning system. The ICGLR

secretariat requires a reliable mechanism for obtaining

credible and quick information on issues of strategic

importance and on cross-border issues.

One option would be to have an independent expert

on confl ict prevention and early warning from and for

the Great Lakes Region who could undertake fact fi nding

on the ground and bring urgent situations to the atten-

tion of the political structure of the conference. This

would strengthen its capacity for preventive diplomacy.

An independent expert would be a cost-effective way

of undertaking human rights monitoring and confl ict

prevention at the regional level and for elaboration of

pertinent recommendations through dialogue with

national authorities and civil society.

The regional centre is the fi rst project to be fi nanced

by the member states of the ICGLR through the Special

Fund for Reconstruction and Development, showing

their commitment to the promotion and protection of

human rights and good governance in the region. This

commitment constitutes a clear encouragement for

other partners, including the UN-OHCHR and other UN

and regional organisations, to contribute to the success-

ful running of the centre.

ICGLR AS AN ENTRY POINT FOR PROMOTING AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REGION

The Pact constitutes an opportunity to encourage

member states to ratify existing international and

regional instruments and to domesticate and implement

its protocols on human rights issues. This should be a

priority for the region. The Pact constitutes a unique

legal framework on for example the rights of internally

displaced populations or to combat the illegal exploita-

tion of resources.

The following are examples of activities carried out

in 2010 and 2011 by the ICLGR in close partnership with

UN-OHCHR.

Human rights training

The ICGLR and OHCHR provided a joint training exercise

on human rights and confl ict prevention for the ICGLR

Regional Youth Forum as well as representatives of the

eleven member states and staff of the ICGLR in Tanzania

in May 2010. Together with the National Coordination

Mechanism and Youth Forum in Rwanda, the OHCHR

also organised human rights training for youth to

prevent election violence prior to the presidential elec-

tions in 2010. It also contributed to a sensitisation cam-

paign for young people in Burundi during the election

process. Further human rights training and briefi ngs

were provided to ICGLR election observers in Sudan,

Burundi and Tanzania. A joint ICGLR–OHCHR workshop

on elections and human rights was organised together

with the UN Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in

Yaoundé in July 2010 to train heads of electoral manage-

ment bodies and in March 2011 for election observers.

Domestication of ICGLR protocols

Funding and technical advice was provided by the

Regional Human Rights Adviser to Uganda and the CAR

for domestication workshops on ICGLR protocols in 2010.

Two workshops were organised together with OHCHR

fi eld presences and ICGLR staff who helped member

states to incorporate and use regional and international

human rights instruments and dimensions for the elabo-

ration of new policies and laws.

The ICGLR, through it Regional Human Rights

Advisor and Sexual Violence Expert, participated in the

elaboration of a national law for the combat against

sexual violence in Burundi. This will domesticate the

regional protocol on the combat against sexual violence.

OHCHR is providing fi nancial and technical assistance

for the domestication of this protocol in the CAR and for

treatment centres for victims.

UN-ICGLR partnerships

UN country teams from Burundi, the CAR, the DRC

and Rwanda were able to develop their capacity to

integrate human rights into their analysis, plans and

programmes, involving also national partners (includ-

ing government and civil society representatives) in

a joint workshop with ICGLR National Coordination

Mechanisms. National workshops took place between

the UN Country Team and ICGLR in Rwanda in May

2010, in the CAR in July 2010 together with the Special

Rapporteur on the Rights of Internally Displaced

Populations, and in the DRC in August 2010 on ESCR and

natural resources together with MONUSCO. Joint pro-

grammes were carried out with the UNCTs in Burundi,

DRC and Rwanda and the National Coordination

Mechanisms of the ICGLR in these countries to elaborate

elements for a sub-regional human rights strategy to be

implemented jointly in 2011. The main topics of this joint

strategy are human rights and the fi ght against illegal

exploitation of natural resources, prevention of genocide

38 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

and the fi ght against impunity, elections and human

rights and a Regional Human Rights Observatory.

The Republic of Congo elaborated and adopted

the fi rst specifi c law in Africa on the rights of indig-

enous peoples in close cooperation with the National

Coordination Mechanism, OHCHR and the International

Labour Organisation.

The OHCHR supported the ICGLR in setting up its

Regional Committee on the Prevention of Genocide,

which was approved by the Heads of State Summit in

Lusaka on 15 December 2010. This committee is based

on a regional protocol on the prevention of genocide

which provides a unique legal and political framework

for the prevention of genocide. The OHCHR and the

ICGLR Secretariat assisted the committee with the

constitution and elaboration of its internal procedures

and work plan in September 2010 and provided training

to its members together with the Offi ce of the Special

Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of

Genocide and the ICGLR Uganda Offi ce. The setting up of

this committee and the elaboration of its work plan is an

innovation as it makes the Great Lakes Region the fi rst

region in the world to work collectively on the preven-

tion of genocide. ICLGR and OHCHR also helped to set up

National Committees in Kenya, the Republic of Congo

and Tanzania.

Illegal exploitation of natural resources and economic, social and cultural rights

Human rights violations related to the illegal exploita-

tion of natural resources are one of the root causes of

confl ict in the Great Lakes Region and especially in the

DRC. Despite its natural wealth, the majority of the

DRC’s population live in poverty and do not enjoy any

benefi ts from natural resources, which is a structural

human rights problem linked to insecurity and violence

around mining sites in the eastern DRC. A regional

initiative was subsequently developed by the ICGLR for

the certifi cation of natural resources to ensure that they

do not come from confl ict areas and fuel further human

rights violations. This regional initiative will include a

whistle blowing system by means of which the popula-

tion and civil society can denounce cases of the illegal

exploitation of natural resources and contribute to the

proposed traceability and transparency of the process.

At a special summit held in Lusaka on 15 December

2010, the Heads of State of the ICGLR adopted this

regional initiative in the Lusaka Declaration, committing

themselves to its implementation.

The OHCHR and ICGLR jointly organised a workshop

on exploitation of natural resources and economic, social

and cultural rights in preparation for the summit and will

continue to support this process. Emphasis will be on the

training of civil society actors and journalists who have

an important role to play in denouncing illegal exploita-

tion and trade in minerals and related human rights

abuses, including child labour, forced labour and sexual

violence. In May 2012, civil society actors set up a regional

network to work with the ICLGR to combat the illegal

exploitation of natural resources in the Great Lakes.

Preventing election violence in Burundi

The ICGLR, with the support of the OHCHR, kept watch

over the fi ve-month long electoral process in Burundi

through the monitoring of human rights and by con-

tributing to sensitisation programmes and providing

human rights training to the observers of the ICGLR.

Based on the information provided by the OHCHR and

in order to address escalating violence and confl ict after

the withdrawal of the opposition, the Great Lakes Region

sent a high-level mission to Burundi to discuss the situ-

ation with both the government and the opposition. This

confl ict prevention activity helped to diminish tension

and prevented an escalation of the violence.

CHALLENGES AND RISKS

The challenges to the promotion and protection of

human rights in the Great Lakes Region are manifold.

One of them is the false opposition of justice and peace.

Peace research has shown that internal confl icts which

are not followed by a justice process are highly likely to

re-emerge within fi ve years after the confl ict comes to

an end. Transitional justice processes need political par-

ticipation by and commitment from all political actors

and are vital for bringing lasting peace to the region.

Another challenge is the lack or weakness of inde-

pendent national human rights institutions and human

rights organisations in the region. Consequently, capac-

ity and institution building as well as regional coopera-

tion among human rights actors are vital for the success

of the Peace Pact. Moreover, existing human rights

actors, such as parliaments, national human rights in-

stitutions and civil society organisations, can play a vital

role in the monitoring and implementation of the pact.

Elections in the region and their impact on the

human rights and security situation in should not be

neglected. The example of the post-election violence in

Kenya has shown that root causes of political and ethnic

confl ict, such as land rights and political participation,

which have not yet been addressed, can fuel political vi-

olence. The ICGLR has a protocol on democracy and good

governance and an election observation mandate which

has great potential for the training and strengthening

ISS Workshop Report 39

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

of civil society, the judiciary and governmental actors

in their role of assuring fair and transparent, as well as

peaceful, elections. The ICGLR works with other actors

who have a mandate and the capacity to monitor elec-

tions, such as the African Union, COMESA (the Common

Market four Southern and Eastern Africa), ECCAS (the

Economic Community of Central African States) and the

European Union to support fair and peaceful elections.

Elaborating a common strategy to solve the problem

of the negative forces in the region, including a human

rights perspective, is an imminent and urgent challenge

for the region. At the recent meeting of Ministers of

Defence from the region held in Kigali in September 2011,

the need to jointly address the question of the FDLR and

LRA was underlined and there was a call for a meeting

of all concerned countries on this issue. The challenge is

how to stop the operations of these groups in the region,

without creating further human rights violations and

avoiding negative impacts on the civilian population,

while bringing those who have committed genocide, war

crimes and crimes against humanity to justice.

While this last issue is probably one of the most

urgent ones, there is a need to look at the longer-term

structures of society as well, to ensure that the region

will create social, political and economic opportunities

for all sections of its society and build bridges across

borders for those parts of its populations who have

strong historical and family ties.

NOTES

1 Isabell Kempf is the former ICGLR-UN-OHCHR Regional Human

Rights Adviser for the Great Lakes Region. The views expressed

in this paper are those of the author and do not represent those

of the organisation.

2 Aldo Ajello, Cavalier de la paix: quelle politique européenne commune

pour I’Afrique? Brussels: GRIP, 2000, 105.

3 See Report on the fi rst meeting of national coordinators of the

International Conference for the Great Lakes Region, Nairobi,

23–24 June 2003, 2–3, http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profi les/

greatlakes/1stNCmeeting_report.pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

4 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Pact

on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes

Region (Nairobi Peace Pact), signed in Nairobi, Kenya,on 15

and 16 December 2006, http://www.internal-displacement.

org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/60ECE277A8EDA2DDC12

572FB002BBDA7/$fi le/Great%20Lakes%20pact_en.pdf (accessed

21 May 2012).

5 A B Fetherston, Transformative peacebuilding: peace studies in

Croatia, Paper presented at the International Studies Association

Annual Convention, Minneapolis, March 1998.

6 Johan Galtung, Peace by peaceful means: peace and confl ict, develop-

ment and civilisation, London: Sage, 1996.

7 Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform,

Report to the United Nations, A/51/950, 1997.

8 See Jérôme Ollandet, La Conférence International sur la Région

des Grands Lacs: quels enjeux? Le Regard Diplomatique: revue

congolaise d’études et de pratiques diplomatiques, Congo-Brazzaville:

La Savane, 2009, for a description of the multiple crises which

are at the origin of the ICGLR.

9 See Pearson Nherere and Kumi Ansah-Koi, Human rights

and confl ict resolution, In G Lindgren, P Wallensteen and K

Nordquist (eds), Issues in Third World confl ict resolution, Uppsala:

Department of Peace and Confl ict Research, Uppsala University,

1990, 3-42.

10 See the UN, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People on his Mission

to Kenya, UN: A/HRC/4/32/Add.3, 2007.

40 Institute for Security Studies

Role of regional bodies1 in promoting sustainable peace

in the Great Lakes RegionDr Connie Mumma-Martinon

Consultant Researcher

INTRODUCTION

Confl ict constitutes a major threat to the development

of Africa in terms of loss of human life, destruction of

property, displacement of people (sometimes across

international borders) and the diversion and misalloca-

tion of resources meant for promoting sustainable de-

velopment to arms purchases and funding of expensive

peacekeeping support operations.2

As a region, the Great Lakes has not been spared. It

has been affected by border attacks by armed groups

and communities straddling the borders; smuggling;

motor vehicle thefts; drug traffi cking; fl ow of small

arms; landmines; and in recent times, threats of terror

networks.3 The areas along its borders make it ideal for

these activities to fl ourish because natural obstacles

in the terrain, such as forests and deserts, hinder

accessibility.

There is recognition that in order for development

to take place in the Great Lakes Region, peace has to be

sustained. African regional and sub-regional organisa-

tions are increasingly called upon to lead international

efforts (alone or jointly) to provide security and confl ict

management in Africa.4

Africa’s regional bodies have made substantial strides

in assuming primary responsibility to curb insecurity

problems and to promote and maintain peace in the

region.5 The role of these bodies is enshrined in both the

Charter of the United Nations and the African Union’s

Constitutive Act.

This paper seeks to examine the role of the

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

(ICGLR), the East African Community (EAC), the

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

and the Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs

(Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries,

CEPGL) in promoting peace in the Great Lakes Region.

Towards this end, the following questions will be

answered:

■ How have the regional bodies been involved in pro-

moting peace in the region? ■ Which are the key policies and strategies imple-

mented towards peace? ■ How effective have these been in promoting regional

peace? ■ What challenges, gaps and prospects have been

identifi ed regarding the role of regional bodies in

promoting peace?

UNDERSTANDING SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Peace in Africa is better understood within the global

context. Peace is a universal concept: every society

desires it and none can exist without it.6 John Galtung

defi nes peace as ‘the absence of violence’.7 This kind of

peace is technically referred to as negative peace since it

is silent on how to contend with social and personal vio-

lence arising from unjust, repressive and oppressive na-

tional and international political and social structures.8

Positive peace, on the other hand, considers preven-

tion of violence and addresses structural violence that

might be embedded within the society. The advocates

of ‘positive peace’9 thus posit that sustainable peace re-

quires the egalitarian distribution of resources and fi ght-

ing against anything that compromises basic human

existence and survival.10 The challenge of globalisation

has brought into the spotlight three important values

within which peace objectives are now pursued around

ISS Workshop Report 41

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

the world, namely respect for human life and dignity,11

universal responsibility12 and global cooperation.13

The discussion in this paper will take into considera-

tion the defi nition of positive peace.

CONTEXT IN WHICH REGIONAL BODIES PROMOTE PEACE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

The regional bodies operate in an environment that can

be best characterised as the deadliest confl ict region

since World War II. The confl icts in this region are com-

plicated, multi-layered and involve a multitude of actors

with diverse interests. This suggests that the different

regional bodies might have confl icting interests and

interpretations of the crises that have caused so much

death and despair in this part of Africa. While initially

some of the regional bodies under study were meant to

provide opportunities for establishing sustainable eco-

nomic growth, expansion into the security domain has

become one of their most important features.

REGIONAL BODIES

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The ICGLR held its fi rst international conference

meeting from 6 to 10 September 2004 in Bujumbura,

Burundi, but it was offi cially launched in June 2003. The

secretariat of the ICGLR came into existence in May

2007 and became fully operational in 2008. The Dar-

es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy

and Development in the Great Lakes Region (the Peace

Pact) was adopted and signed in Dar-es-Salaam on 20

November 2004 and ICGLR heads of state declared their

‘collective determination to transform the Great Lakes

Region into a space of sustainable peace and security for

States and peoples ...’.14 This was followed by the signing

of the Nairobi Peace Pact on 15 December 2006, which

provides a legal framework governing relations between

the member states (article 4).15 The ICGLR comprises

eleven countries.16

East African Community

The Permanent Tripartite Commission (PTC) for East

African Cooperation was fi rst formed in 1967 as the

EAC but collapsed in 1977 as a result of political differ-

ences. Following the dissolution of the organisation,

three former member states, namely Kenya, Uganda

and Tanzania, negotiated a Mediation Agreement for

the Division of Assets and Liabilities, which they signed

in 1984. One of the provisions of the mediation agree-

ment was that the three states would explore areas of

future cooperation.

Considering the need to consolidate regional coopera-

tion, the East African heads of state, at their second

summit in Arusha on 29 April 1997, directed the PTC to

start the process of upgrading the agreement establish-

ing the PTC for East African Cooperation to a treaty.

The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC was

signed in Arusha on 30 November 1999. It entered into

force on 7 July 2000 and the EAC was inaugurated in

January 2001.

Economic Community of Central African States

ECCAS comprises states of the former Customs and

Economic Union of Central Africa (Union Douanière et

Économique de l’Afrique Centrale, UDEAC), created in

1966, and the member states of the CEPGL that was

established in 1976 by the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC), Burundi, Rwanda and São Tomé et Principe.

Angola remained an observer at ECCAS until 1999, when

it became a full member. ECCAS began functioning in

1985 but remained ineffective throughout the 1990s.

In 1999 the community signed a protocol of relations

with the African Economic Community (AEC). Four

treaties guide its functioning, namely the Treaty estab-

lishing ECCAS; the Protocol Establishing the Network

of Parliamentarians of ECCAS (REPAC); the Mutual

Assistance Pact between Member States of ECCAS; and

the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual

Security Pact in Central Africa (COPAX).

ECCAS’s main objective is to achieve collective au-

tonomy, raise the standards of living for its populations

and maintain economic stability through harmonious

cooperation. Its priority areas of cooperation include de-

veloping capacities to maintain peace, security and sta-

bility in the region. It has the following technical organs:

■ The Central African Early Warning System (MARAC),

which collects and analyses data for the early detec-

tion and prevention of crises. ■ The Defence and Security Commission (CDS), which

is the meeting of chiefs of staff of national armies

and commanders-in-chief of police and gendarmerie

forces from the different member states. Its role is

to plan, organise and provide advice to the decision-

making bodies of the community in order to initiate

military operations if needed. ■ The Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC),

which is a non-permanent force. It consists of

military contingents from member states, whose

42 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

purposes are to accomplish missions of peace, secu-

rity and humanitarian relief.

ECCAS was designated a pillar of the AEC, but because

of the inactivity of ECCAS since 1992, formal contact

between the two organisations was only established in

October 1999.17

Economic Community of Great Lakes

The CEPGL was created by the Agreement of Gisenyi

(Rwanda) on 20 September 1976 with the purpose of

promoting regional economic cooperation and integra-

tion. It comprises Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda and has

its headquarters in Gitega, Burundi. Its main objectives

are ensuring the safety of member states, favouring the

creation and development of activities of public interest,

promoting the trade and traffi c of persons and their

possessions and establishing cooperation in all domains

of the political, economic and social life. The CEPGL

also has control over several institutions.18 The CEPGL

Sub-committee on Defence and Security comprises the

chiefs/heads of defence forces, police, national security,

immigration services, and military and police intel-

ligence from all the member states.

KEY POLICIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE DIFFERENT REGIONAL BODIES

It is important to note that since their establishment, the

regional bodies in different ways and at different levels

have made major strides towards promoting peace in the

Great Lakes Region, either collaboratively or individually.

This section highlights some of the collaborative efforts

among them and ways in which many of these efforts

are similar and geared towards achieving the same

objectives. It further highlights how each regional body

can enhance their collaborative efforts to become more

effective and take comparative advantage of each other.

COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS TOWARDS PROMOTING PEACE BY THE DIFFERENT REGIONAL BODIES

Signing memorandums of understanding with other regional bodies

On 25 October 2010 the ICGLR, through its executive sec-

retary (Ambassador Liberata Mulamula), and the African

Union Commission (AUC), through its chairperson (Dr

Jean Ping), signed a Memorandum of Understanding

(MoU) at the AUC headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The MoU defi nes the modalities of cooperation between

the two bodies in areas of mutual support for peace and

stability in the Great Lakes Region. According to the

MoU, the two parties will reinforce the capacity of the

Great Lakes Region to anticipate, prevent, manage and

resolve confl icts and support and encourage initiatives

aimed at transforming the region.

Joint operations against rebels and armed non-state groups

The impact of the activities of armed non-state groups

(ANSGs) is felt far beyond the borders of the states

within which they originate. The regional trends associ-

ated with ANSGs include humanitarian crises, human

rights violations and the use of violence as a tool for con-

fl ict resolution. ANSGs have regionalised human insecu-

rity and pose serious challenges to regional mechanisms

for preventing, managing and resolving confl icts.19

Each ANSG activity elicits various international

responses, the most common being the facilitation of

negotiations with governments against which they are

fi ghting and those that support them.

The ICGLR has played an important role in addressing

this problem by calling on member states ‘to abstain

from sending or supporting armed opposition forces or

armed groups or insurgents onto the territory of other

Member States, or from tolerating the presence on their

territories of armed groups or insurgents engaged in

armed confl icts or involved in acts of violence or subver-

sion against the Government of another State’ (Article

5(1)(b) of the Peace Pact).

To promote peace among the warring parties in the

Abyei region of Sudan, the ICGLR on 23 March 2011

called upon the concerned parties to refrain from mili-

tary actions which had devastating consequences for the

civilian population and threatened peace and security in

the region. It further urged the parties to renew efforts

aimed at reaching an agreement on the future status of

Abyei in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

and relevant protocols. It also called upon the parties

and the UN Mission in Sudan to protect the civilian

population and ensure that security and calm were

restored in the region.

In January 2011 the countries of the CEPGL also

agreed to ‘intensify joint operations’ against the rebels

and ten other armed groups located in the eastern DRC.

This led to the improved relations between Rwanda

and the DRC, with the DRC inviting Rwandan troops

to help track down rebels from the Forces Démocratiques

de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the

Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR), some of whom have been

implicated in the genocide.

ISS Workshop Report 43

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

Interstate cooperation

Attempts at interstate cooperation by the ICGLR

have generated several initiatives. These include the

East African Protocol on Free Movement of People;

the Lusaka Ceasefi re Agreement in the DRC, which

called for cessation of hostilities, disengagement and

disarmament of non-signatory forces, initiation of

Inter-Congolese Dialogues and the Pretoria Accord,

that which called for the withdrawal of foreign forces

from the DRC. Other initiatives include cross-border

pursuits granted to Uganda by Sudan and the Rwandan

request that the DRC permit it to put troops under

the command of DRC commanders. However, these

successes are limited, due to a lack of trust among the

member states.20

Joint training exercise

Although its priority is economic cooperation, the EAC

also believes it can play a role in enhancing regional

stability. In 1998 as a demonstration of the new spirit

of cooperation, 1 500 soldiers from Kenya, Uganda and

Tanzania took part in a joint training exercise in the

desert terrain of northern Kenya. The one-month exer-

cise, code-named ‘Natural Fire’, was undertaken with

the assistance of the US Army.

In January 2000 ECCAS also hosted a regional peace-

keeping exercise called ‘Gabon 2000’ with the objective

of increasing the capacity of ECCAS states in the fi eld of

peacekeeping and confl ict prevention and management.

This exercise represented a direct application of the

French concept of RECAMP (reinforcement of African

peacekeeping capacities).

Management of natural resources

The Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin

The EAC developed a protocol for the development of

Lake Victoria, known as the Protocol for Sustainable

Development of Lake Victoria Basin, which informs

interstate cooperation in areas of water resources,

fi sheries, agricultural and land use practices, irrigation,

wetlands, wildlife and the environment in general.21 This

protocol incorporates many of the UN substantive and

procedural rules, such as the principle of equitable uti-

lisation and states’ duty to protect aquatic ecosystems.22

The protocol also established the Lake Victoria Basin

Commission, which is currently located in Kisumu on

the shores of Lake Victoria.

Although there are high levels of cooperation among

member states of the EAC, as well as involvement and

commitment of various governments to implement the

protocol, the implementation has been very slow due to

a multiplicity of initiatives that threaten the commit-

ment of the different stakeholders.

Lake Kivu and River Rusizi Water Resources Integrated Management Framework

Lake Kivu and the Rusizi River contribute a great deal

towards the generation of hydroelectric power in the

region. The framework was adopted in August 2011 and

aims to protect and manage the water resources and

promote other aspects related to water, hydroelectric

power generation, fi shing, navigation, watershed man-

agement, irrigation and water supply, all to pre-empt

possible confl icts among users.

Cooperation on security matters

Cooperation continued to be fostered among the police

forces of partner states by means of the meetings of the

EAC Police Chiefs. Decisions were reached to harmonise

police rankings and establish a police liaison offi ce

within the structure of the proposed Directorate of

Peace and Security, in addition to the already existing

bilateral partnerships among the region’s security agen-

cies. The secretariat also held joint training programmes

and joint operations, promoted social interaction and

the collective use of scientifi c crime management assets

to enhance the fi ght against crimes in the region, and

enhanced border surveillance.

Through the meeting of directors of criminal inves-

tigation departments and registrars of motor vehicles,

the law enforcement agencies of the partner states

continue to work together to stem cross-border criminal

activities. These include motor vehicle theft, smuggling

and drug and human traffi cking. The agencies enhance

cooperation with regard to the exchange of crime intel-

ligence, restitution of stolen property and extradition of

crime suspects.

INDIVIDUAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES BY REGIONAL BODIES

Key policies and strategies of the ICGLR

Since its establishment, the ICGLR has made major

strides towards promoting peace in the region and

creating conditions for security, stability and sustainable

development between the member states, as proposed

in Article 2(c) of the Peace Pact. This section highlights

some of the main policies and strategies which have

been implemented by the ICGLR.

44 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Support of the Burundi peace process

In June 2006, the Government of Burundi and the

Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu – Forces National de

Libération (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People –

National Forces of Liberation, Palipehutu–FNL), signed

the Dar-es-Salaam Statement of Political Principles.23

Until the end of 2008, the peace process between

these two parties was characterised by mistrust, thus

preventing various resolutions from being implement-

ed.24 At the Summit of Heads of State and Government

of the Great Lakes Region held on 4 December 2009 in

Pretoria, South Africa, Palipehutu–FNL recommitted

itself to the peace process. A declaration was issued in

which Palipehutu–FNL stated that it realised that its

name was an impediment to its registration as a politi-

cal party and the government of Burundi declared that

it was committed to facilitating the political integration

of Palipehutu–FNL by offering it 33 positions in the

government. However, despite Palipehutu–FNL’s change

of name, issues like its integration into the government

remain a major challenge.

In January 2009 the Bujumbura Declaration was

issued by the special envoys for the Great Lakes in order

to facilitate the peace process. The declaration outlined

various action points, among them a disarmament, de-

mobilisation and integration (DDR)25 process, the release

of political and war prisoners, and the registration of the

FNL as a political party.

Effectiveness of the DDR process

The DDR of ex-combatants was slow and only really

began when the Dutch government agreed to offer as-

sistance for building a camp infrastructure and a base

at Tenga on the northern outskirts of Bujumbura. By

January 2006, a total of 19 739 ex-combatants and former

ex-soldiers had been demobilised (16 242 adult males,

482 adult females and 3 015 children).26

The DDR process took two forms: DDR for child sol-

diers and DDR for ex-combatants. Despite challenges such

as a lack of resources, the strategy was rolled out speedily

and was quite effective because of the approach taken

(where both parties were consulted and a special task

team appointed to move the process forward). Various

stakeholders, including the World Bank, the Bureau Intégré

des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated

Offi ce in Burundi, BINUB) and the facilitating team, col-

laborated on the implementation of the process. On 10

August 2009 the government of Burundi announced an

offi cial end to the DDR programme, stating that 16 948

FNL members had been demobilised.27

The DDR of children proceeded at a fast pace since

the UN Children’s Fund and the National Programme on

Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration worked

hard to compile lists of child soldiers from among the

ranks of the Burundian Army and the Gardiens de la Paix

(Guardians of the Peace).28

States are further expected ‘to co-operate at all

levels with a view of disarming and dismantling exist-

ing armed rebel groups and to promote the joint and

participatory management of state and human security

on their common borders’ (Article 5(1)(c) of the Peace

Pact). It has been through this pact that Rwandan

and Ugandan forces have launched Operation Amani,

Operation Kimia and Operation Lightning Thunder to

demobilise rebel groups such as the FDLR and Lord’s

Resistance Army (LRA) in the DRC.

The Rwandan and Ugandan forces also aim to end

state-sponsored rebel activities. Although this strategy

has had mixed results in terms of for example ending

the sponsorship of LRA activities in Uganda by the

Bashir government, it has signifi cantly reduced govern-

ment support of some rebel groups operating in neigh-

bouring countries.29

The creation of a border security zoning system

The main objective of this initiative is to improve border

security in the region by creating twelve zones, namely:

1. Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC

2. Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania

3. Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia

4. Sudan, Uganda and the DRC

5. Sudan, the CAR and the DRC

6. The Republic of Congo, the DRC and the CAR

7. The DRC, Republic of Congo and Angola

8. The DRC, Zambia and Angola

9. Tanzania, the DRC, Burundi and Zambia

10. The DRC, Burundi and Rwanda

11. Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda

12. Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi

Key policies and strategies of the EAC

Peace and security strategy

The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African

Community30 and the development strategies empha-

sises regional defence, peace and security in the agreed

areas of regional cooperation. The quest for regional

peace and security in East Africa is safeguarded in terms

of Article 5(3)(f) of the treaty, which states that ‘peace,

security and stability … and good neighbourliness’ in the

region shall be among the fundamental objectives of the

community. Towards achieving this goal, EAC member

states have come up with various strategies.

Article 124 of the treaty elaborates on the coopera-

tion in regional peace and security matters. The partner

ISS Workshop Report 45

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

states have an MoU for cooperation in defence matters

and measures are being taken to address the issues of

defence, peace and security to ensure the maintenance

of peace and stability in the region.

An MoU on Cooperation in Defence Matters was

signed in April 1998 and revised in 2001. At an EAC

summit on the security situation in the DRC that took

place in Nairobi on 18 October 1998, the member states

agreed to support the efforts of the Southern African

Development Community (SADC), which were already

under way in consultation with the UN and Organisation

of African Unity.

The EAC established a Sectoral Committee on

Cooperation in Defence, as well as an Inter-State

Security Committee. During 2003 these committees held

meetings, among other things, to exchange information

on the implementation of a national action plan in line

with the Nairobi Declaration on SALW; to draft modali-

ties for a common refugee registration mechanism;

and to establish a Defence Experts’ Working Group on

Operations and Training to discuss joint exercises on

peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism and military

level participation in disaster response.31

In its broader vision, the EAC embraces the eventual

establishment of a political federation of members

(Article 123(1) of the treaty) and a common defence pact

(Article 125), with the ultimate objective of strengthen-

ing the EAC model for regional peace and security.

Drafting a confl ict early warning and response mechanism

Other activities undertaken include the development of

a draft confl ict early warning and response mechanism

(EWRM) and the commencement of work on a regional

confl ict prevention, management and resolution frame-

work. The EAC is also fi nalising plans to launch a strategy

for preventing confl icts and strife in the region. The idea

for an EWRM came about after extensive familiarisation

visits to the headquarters of Economic Community of

West African States, Inter-Governmental Authority for

Development (IGAD) and the AU, which operate various

types and levels of EWRMs. The rationale is to incorpo-

rate best practices and propose a more effective func-

tioning for the EAC. Addressing an opening session at a

workshop in 2009 in Kampala, the EAC Deputy Secretary

General (Political Federation), Beatrice Kiraso, described

the mechanism as an important pillar of confl ict and

crisis prevention and as a means of entrenching regional

peace, security, stability and development.

Cattle rustling programmes

The nature of pastoralist confl ict in the Eastern

Africa region is varied. It manifests itself in various

ways, including as confl ict between pastoralists and

commercial farmers and mobile herders and settled

cultivators; pastoralists and conservationists; and

pastoralists and proxies of the state.32 EAC member

states are members of the Mifugo Project, which is

a joint initiative between the Eastern African Police

Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) and the

Institute for Security Studies. It is based on the Protocol

on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle

Rustling in Eastern Africa.

EAPCCO has eleven members33 and of the fi ve active

members, three are from the EAC (Kenya, Uganda, and

Tanzania). The effectiveness of this project lies in the

fact that apart from the member states, it works with

other relevant parties, including provincial and local

authorities, local pastoralists, governance groups, civil

society organisations and other players in affected pas-

toralist areas in Eastern Africa.

Key policies and strategies of ECCAS

Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa

On 9 September 1994 the member states of ECCAS

adopted a pact of non-aggression at the end of the fi fth

meeting of the UN Consultative Committee on Security

in Central Africa, held in Yaoundé, Cameroon.34 At a

meeting of the UN’s Standing Advisory Committee on

Security Questions in Central Africa, which took place

in Yaoundé on 25 and 26 February 1999, member states

decided to create an organisation for the promotion,

maintenance and consolidation of peace and security

in Central Africa, namely the Council for Peace and

Security in Central Africa (COPAX).

In 2002, during the tenth ordinary session of Heads

of State and Government in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea,

the Protocol on the Establishment of a Network of

Parliamentarians of Central Africa and the standing

orders of the Council for Peace and Security in Central

Africa, which included the Defence and Security

Commission, Multinational Force of Central Africa and

the Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa, were

adopted.

ECCAS, in collaboration with the Arab Maghreb

Union and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States,

mooted the idea of creating an intervention force to help

settle the border disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia.35

ECCAS has been in existence for some time now.

However, it still faces major challenges, as well as an

ongoing battle with fi nancial diffi culties as a result

of the non-payment of membership fees. The war in

the DRC was particularly divisive, too, as Rwanda and

Angola fought on opposing sides.

46 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Key policies and strategies of the CEPGL

Protocol on Defence and Security

On 21 January 2011, the Ministers of Defence of Rwanda,

the DRC and Burundi adopted a binding protocol

on mutual regional defence and security. This was

done under the auspices of the Defence and Security

Committee of the CEPGL.

Cooperation agreement with members of the UN Development Fund for Women

On 19 November 2009 the CEPGL signed a cooperation

agreement with the UN Development Fund for Women

(UNIFEM) in Kigali, Rwanda. This agreement affi rmed

their commitment in responding to confl ict-related

challenges, poverty, migration, internal displacement,

violence and human traffi cking. Both UNIFEM and the

CEPGL aim to work with and mobilise key partners at

regional, national and local levels to promote gender

equality, peace and security in the region.36

CHALLENGES, GAPS AND PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL BODIES IN PROMOTING PEACE

Promoting sustainable peace by regional bodies is char-

acterised by a signifi cant number of challenges. First,

the confl icts in the Great Lakes Region, just like any

other part of Africa, are intractable and protracted. Most

peace agreements do not last and most countries have

experienced a relapse into violence.37

Regional bodies cannot work in isolation, yet many

external players they work with tend to engage in peace-

promoting activities without fi nding out the root causes

of confl icts or involving the grassroots level in their pro-

posed solutions. The designers and the implementers are

not accountable to the communities who bear the brunt

of the confl icts. Most of the programmes geared towards

peace activities depend largely on donor funding, which

is never sustainable. This is the case with ECCAS, whose

major challenge is a lack of resources and overreliance

on external support (especially France, which funds its

Peace Facility and the building of military capabilities

of Central African states in terms of logistics, fi nance

and training).38 This is coupled with the fact that there is

weak harmonisation with the AU and weak managerial

capacity at the Department of Peace and Security. The

decision-making procedures of the COPAX are slow and

many offi cers have inadequate skills, especially at the

strategic planning level, all of which hinder the develop-

ment of an integrated regional peacekeeping force.39

A bigger challenge has been the fact that the

work of regional bodies has been hampered by weak

institutional capacity in some states, which limits

frontier security cooperation. This is the case with the

borders of the ICGLR countries where armed, regional,

destabilising and negative forces exist. This leads to

mutual suspicion and low levels of trust among the dif-

ferent countries, as well as a multiplicity of structures

and externally driven initiatives. Security issues assume

different forms in different parts of the Great Lakes

Region, thus providing challenges for the development

of region-wide borders and security management

structures. The sad reality is that most confl icts in the

region are usually internationalised, in that a confl ict

which starts in one country may have negative effects

on other countries in the region. The main challenge is

to make individual countries understand that a common

approach is needed as soon as a confl ict starts.

Furthermore, the multiplicity of regional organisa-

tions with the same agenda leads to a lack of harmonisa-

tion of activities and a lack of collaboration.40 None of

the regional bodies include the countries of the greater

Great Lakes Region or have as their specifi c or sole focus

peace and security. Whether directly or indirectly,

peace issues form part of the agendas of all the regional

bodies. Evidently, there are overlapping agendas with

an obvious duplication of efforts and initiatives. This

leads to problems of coherence and coordination that the

regional bodies must confront if they are to succeed in

promoting peace in the region.

Existing national coordinating mechanisms to a large

extent affect the work of regional bodies, especially in

cases where there is an absence of the rule of law, poor

governance structures and a decline in public services.

This is exacerbated by corruption in governments, a

characteristic of post-confl ict countries. A case in point

is the DRC.

The major gap within the regional bodies largely lies

in the fact that whenever there is a confl ict or crisis in

one state, the other states are reluctant to intervene,

yet there are so many possibilities for intervention as a

regional block to bring peace within or among warring

countries. Unfortunately this has not happened. A case

in point is the Somalia crisis, where despite the interven-

tion of Uganda and Burundi, other countries have been

making commitments to intervene, but done so reluc-

tantly or have not followed through on their commit-

ment. There is a lot of potential for the different regional

bodies in their comparative advantage in different areas.

LESSONS LEARNT

A great deal has been done by regional bodies and other

organisations to promote peace in the Great Lakes

Region. However, for sustainable peace to be achieved,

ISS Workshop Report 47

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

more needs to be done by all stakeholders. Some con-

crete steps that can be taken to achieve this goal are

outlined below.

■ Find the root causes to the confl icts: There is a tendency

for states to concentrate on controlling and prevent-

ing confl icts. In order to promote sustainable peace,

however, regional bodies must fi nd the root causes

of confl icts, especially when it comes to controlling

SALW. Critical questions must be asked as to what

socio-economic and political factors give rise the

proliferation of SALW. A multifaceted strategy is

required by the regional bodies to address the legal,

social, economic and political aspects of the prolif-

eration of weapons. ■ Cooperate, collaborate and be tolerant: As Ali Mazrui

puts it, ‘whites fi ght with blacks over resources,

while blacks fi ght with whites over identities’.41 The

regional bodies, through their individual countries,

must cooperate and collaborate with each other. At

the individual level, Africans must learn to tolerate

one another. One important step towards creating

stability on the African continent is to cultivate that

very elusive trait, tolerance. Tolerance is the ability to

accept differences.42

■ Involve all stakeholders (especially women) in peacebuilding

initiatives: Women deal with people at grassroots level

and must therefore be empowered to make deci-

sions in all aspects of peace, especially on security

issues. This means that women must be given power

within the legislative processes and in the executive

branches of government, and should be enlisted in

the armed forces in increasing numbers.43 In Africa,

traditional roles still hinder women’s participation

in high positions of decision-making processes. By

giving women seats in parliaments, they are given

the chance to be part of and infl uence some of the

issues surrounding the sustainability of peace in

the region. A case in point is Ambassador Liberata

Mulamula, the executive secretary of the ICGLR. ■ Identify the availability and location of water and pasture in

different seasons: Most of the confl icts like cattle rus-

tling are the manifestation of a bigger problem in the

region, because the confl icts over access to natural

resources also affect other institutions like national

game parks as well as the management of game

parks, forest reserves, police patrol posts, private

ranches and military bases. Therefore, regional

bodies must work closely with the communities

and individual governments and consider the avail-

ability and location of water and pasture in both the

dry and wet seasons. Governments that operate in

areas neighbouring on pastoral societies should also

consider investing in water resource development

and the construction of dams and reservoirs to retain

runoff water during rainy seasons and to exploit

groundwater resources.44

■ Make use of existing traditional structures: Many regional

bodies, organisations and institutions have tended

to marginalise, if not totally ignore, the traditional

strategies of confl ict management. If sustainable

peace is to be attained, the regional bodies must

factor in some of the useful traditional resolution

mechanisms and work hand in hand with the African

traditional leaders, to make use of the traditional

values which promoted sustainable peace within

the African societies. Here the traditional elders and

chiefs would be very helpful since they deal with

such confl icts on a daily basis. The international

community’s role in providing sustained support

for the initiatives being promoted by Africans,

who are grounded in the developmental needs of

everyday existence faced by millions of Africans,

therefore remains a critical and inescapable factor for

success.45

■ Develop standardised guidelines: The regional bodies

might consider developing a standardised template to

guide national governments to ensure that relevant

information on activities towards the promotion of

sustainable peace in the region is provided. This will

assist the regional bodies as well as the individual

countries with the identifi cation of areas where more

efforts are needed.

CONCLUSION

Various issues have been highlighted in this paper about

the role of regional bodies in promoting peace in the

Great Lakes Region, including the motivations for creat-

ing the regional bodies, the basis for promoting peace

in the region and specifi c issues that must be taken into

consideration if peace is to be promoted successfully.

It is imperative, therefore, for these three areas to be

critically analysed and examined in order to fi nd out

why, despite the abundant number of regional bodies

working in peace activities, confl icts keep recurring and

impacting negatively on the countries within the Great

Lakes Region.

NOTES

1 The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR),

the Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic

Community of the Great Lakes Countries, CEPGL), the East

African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of

Central African States (ECCAS).

48 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

2 Albert O Isaac, Understanding peace in Africa, in David J Francis

(ed), Peace and confl ict in Africa, London/New York: Zed Books,

2008, 31.

3 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR),

Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes

Region (ICGLR Nairobi Peace Pact), signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on

15 and 16 December 2006, http://www.internal-displacement.

org/.../Great%20Lakes%20pact_en.pdf (accessed 20 May 2012).

4 A Schabel, Operationalizing confl ict prevention: opportunities

and challenges for regional and sub regional organizations, in

S J Lodge (ed), Sharing best practices on confl ict prevention: the UN,

regional and sub regional organisations, national and local actors, New

York: International Peace Academy, 2002.

5 E Berman and K Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and

culpabilities, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament

Research, 2000.

6 Isaac, Understanding peace in Africa, 33.

7 John Galtung, A structural theory of aggression, Journal of Peace

Research 1(2) (1964) 59–119.

8 E E Uwazie, Social relations and peacekeeping among the Igbo,

in I W Zartman (Ed), Traditional cures for modern confl icts, Boulder,

Colo/London: Lynne Rienner, 2000, 28.

9 J Burton, Confl ict: resolution and prevention, New York: St Martin’s

Press, 1999.

10 Isaac, Understanding peace in Africa, 34.

11 I M Harris, The goals of peace education, Peace Review 2(2) (1990)

4–7.

12 B Reardon, Comprehensive peace education: educating for global

responsibility, New York: Teachers College Press, 1988.

13 Dietrich Fisher, A global peace service, Peace Review 8(4) (1996)

563–568.

14 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Dar-

es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and

Development in the Great Lakes Region, adopted at the First

Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Dar-es-

Salaam, Tanzania, on 19–20 November 2004, article 14, http://

reliefweb.int/node/411133/pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

15 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Pact on

Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region

(Nairobi Peace Pact), adopted in Nairobi, Kenya, on 15 and 16

December 2006, http://www.internal-displacement.org/.../

Great%20Lakes%20pact_en.pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

16 The countries are Angola, Burundi, the Central African

Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda,

Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

17 ECCAS signed the Protocol on Relations between the AEC and

the Regional Economic Communities in October 1999.

18 The CEPGL controls the following institutions: the Bank of

Development of the States of the Great Lakes (BDEGL), based in

the DRC town of Goma, the Comité Permanent Inter-Compagnies

(COPIC), the Institute of the Agronomic Researches and

Zootechniques (IRAZ), the Economic Community of the Great

Lakes Countries Organisation for Energy (EGL), and the Research

Centre for the Development of the Mining Resources in Central

Africa (CRDRMAC). The community collapsed in 1998 when

fi ghting broke out between Rwanda and the DRC.

19 Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (eds), Militias, rebels

and Islamist militants: human insecurity and state crises in Africa,

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010, 36.

20 C Kimutai, Personal interview during a Workshop on the

Viability of Preventive Diplomacy in the Eastern African Region,

15 October 2010, International Peace Training Centre.

21 Protocol for Sustainable Development for Lake Victoria Basin,

adopted by the EAC at Arusha, Tanzania, on 29 November 2003,

http://www.iwlearn.net/publications/II/lakevictoria_2005.pdf

(accessed 28 August 2011).

22 Debay Tadesse Woldemichael, Climate change and transboundary

water resource confl ict in Africa, Workshop report, Mombasa,

Kenya, 29–30 September 2009, 34.

23 The agreement dealt with political issues such as the estab-

lishment of a commission to rewrite the history of Burundi,

provisional immunity for Palipehutu–FNL members, the move-

ment’s transformation into a political party and the modalities

regarding the transformation and modernisation of Burundi’s

defence and security forces.

24 Jamila El Abdellaoui, Another crossroad for Burundi: from FNL to

peaceful elections in 2010, ISS Situation Report, 19 November 2009.

25 Bujumbura Declaration, http://www.iss.co.za/cdburundipeacea-

greements/No%2014%20Bujumbura%20Decleration.pdf (ac-

cessed 21 May 2012). See also, United Nations Security Council,

Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated

Offi ce in Burundi (S/2009/270), http://www.securitycouncilreport.

org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/

Burundi%20S%202009%20270.pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

26 Ibid, 85.

27 Henri Boshoff, Waldemar Vrey and George Rautenbach, The

Burundi peace process: from civil war to conditional peace, ISS

Monograph 171, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010,

129.

28 Ibid.

29 Okumu and Ikelegbe, Militias, rebels and Islamist militants, 455.

30 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community,

as amended on 14 December 2006 and 20 August 2007, adopted

at Arusha, Tanzania, on 30 November 1999, http://www.

kituochakatiba.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_

view&gid=23&Itemid=36 (accessed 21 May 2011).

31 African Union, Regional Economic Committees, East African

Community, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/eac.htm

(accessed 21 May 2012).

32 Augusta Muchai, Stakeholders meeting: Mifugo Project workshop

report, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008, 5.

33 The EAPCCO members are Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,

Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and

Uganda.

34 The adoption of this pact was arrived at after a fi ve-day-long

meeting and discussions between military experts and the

Ministers of Defence of Cameroon, the Central African Republic,

DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé et Principe.

35 Alfred Nhema and Tiyambe Paul Zeleza (eds), The roots of African

confl icts, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008, 17.

36 Barbara Albrecht, a programme analyst at the UNIFEM Central

Africa Sub-Regional Offi ce (barbara.albrecht@unifem.org),

ISS Workshop Report 49

Compiled by Nyambura Githaiga

and Donnah Kamashazi, a national programme specialist

at the UNIFEM Central Africa Sub-Regional Offi ce (donnah.

kamashazi@unifem.org).

37 David J Francis (ed), Peace and confl ict in Africa, London/New York:

Zed Books, 2008, 125.

38 Cilliers, The African Standby Force, 15.

39 Ibid.

40 Examples of regional bodies whose activities are duplicated

include the EAC, IGAD, SADC, COMESA as well as Communauté

Economique des Etats de L’Afrique Centrale (Economic Community

of Central African States, CEEAC), the CEPGL and the

Communauté Economique et Monétaire de L’Afrique Centrale

(Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa,

CEMAC).

41 Ali A Mazrui, Confl icts in Africa: an overview, in, Nhema and

Zeleza, The roots of African confl icts, 38.

42 Susan Mendus (ed), Justifying toleration: conceptual and historical

perspectives, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press,

1988, 41.

43 Mazrui, Confl icts in Africa, 43.

44 Donald Anthony Mwiturubani, The real cause of cattle raids in

Africa, The African.org 5, February/March 2010, 31.

45 Nana K Poku, Context of security in Africa, in David J Francis (ed),

Peace and confl ict in Africa, London/New York: Zed Books, 2008.

AnnexuresAnnexure A: Programme

Annexure B: List of participants

ISS Workshop Report 53

Annexure A

Programme

Sunday 11 September 2011

Arrivals

07:00-09:00 Dinner

Monday 12 September 2011

Session 1Chair: Mr Francis Wairagu

08:00 – 08:30 Registration

08:30 – 09:30Opening remarks and introductionsRECSA, Dr Francis SangISS, Mr Roba SharamoICGLR, Mr Nathan Byamukama

09:30 – 10:30Key drivers and triggers of confl ict in the Great Lakes RegionPresenter: Mr Andrews Atta Asamoah

10:30 – 11:00 Health break

Session 2Chair: Michel Kassa

11:00 – 12:00The impact of small arms on confl icts in the Great Lakes RegionPresenter: Mr Francis Wairagu

12:00 – 13:00Analysis of illegal armed groups in the Great Lakes RegionPresenter: Mr Singo Mwachofi

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

Session 3Chair: Mr Wilson Karamaga

14:00 – 15:00Links between illegal exploitation of natural resources and confl ictPresenter: Ms Nyambura Githaiga

15:00 – 16:00The status of refugees and resettlement in the Great Lakes RegionPresenter: Dr Khoti Kamanga

16:00 – 16:30 Wrap-up of day 1

18:30 – 21:30 Bush dinner

54 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Tuesday 13 September 2011

Session 4Chair: Jean Bosco Habyarimana

08:30 – 09:30Confl ict and sexual and gender-based violence in the Great Lakes RegionPresenter: Mr Nathan Byamukama, ICGLR

09:30 –10:30Human rights, peace and security, ICGLR and the Great LakesPresenter: Dr Isabell Kempf

10:30 – 11:00 Health break

Session 5Chair: Mr Blaise Muhire

11:00 – 12:00Regional implications of confl ict in the Great Lakes RegionPresenter: Mr Frank Muhereza

12:00 – 13:00The Role of Regional Bodies in Promoting Sustainable Peace in the Great Lakes RegionPresenter: Dr Connie Mumma-Martinon

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

Session 6Facilitator: Mr Andrews Atta-Asamoah

14:00 – 15:00Towards a regional strategy for sustainable peace in the Great Lakes RegionGroup session

15:00 – 16:00Towards a regional strategy for sustainable peace in the Great Lakes RegionPlenary session

16:00 – 16:30 Closing remarks

ISS Workshop Report 55

Annexure B

List of participants

Title/Name Organisation Designation Contact Details

Rachel Acheson Interpeace, Nairobi Programme Offi cer, Great Lakes E-mail: acheson@interpeace.org

Andrews Atta-Asamoah ISS Nairobi Offi ce Senior ResearcherE-mail: aasamoah@issafrica.orgTel: +254202667198

Véronique Barindogo Centre Ubuntu, BurundiTrauma and Reconciliation Offi cer

E-mail: bariverita@yahoo.frTel: +25779625254

Benoit Bihamiriza East African Community Confl ict Early Warning ExpertE-mail: bbihamiriza@eachq.orgTel: +255 788 299 106

Déo BuumaAction pour la Paix et la Concorde, Bukavu, DRC

Executive SecretaryE-mail: deobuuma@yahoo.frTel: +243 997622339

Nathan Byamukama ICGLR, BurundiProgramme Offi cer, Cross Cutting Issues

E-mail: nathan.byamukama@icglr.orgTel: +2577940779

Jean-Marie Gasana Independent ConsultantE-mail: jeanmgas@gmail.comTel: +25779923187

Nyambura Githaiga ISS Nairobi Offi ce ResearcherEmail: ngithaiga@issafrica.orgTel: +254202667198

Jean-Bosco HabyarimanaCentre for Confl ict Management,National University of Rwanda

Deputy DirectorE-mail: jhabyarimana@nur.ac.rwTel: +250788452280

Oliver HoehneSwiss Cooperation in Kigali,Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Political Adviser, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Bujumbura

E-mail: oliver.hoehne@eda.admin.ch

Dr Khoti KamangaCentre for Forced Migration,University of Dar-es-Salaam

LecturerE-mail: kkamanga@uccmail.co.tzTel: +255715314478

Wilson Karamaga National University of Rwanda ResearcherE-mail: wilska04@yahoo.co.ukTel: +250788531512

Michel KassaInitiative pour un Leadership Cohésif, Kinshasa, DRC

Executive DirectorE-mail: mnkassa@gmail.comTel: +257810158789

Dr Isabell Kempf,UN-OHCHRICGLR, Burundi

Regional Human Rights Adviser E-mail: isabell.kempf@icglr.org

Dr M J Kimani Consultant ResearcherE-mail: kimanimj1@gmail.comTel: +254202667198

Thomas Kimaru Africa Policy Institute Senior ResearcherE-mail: tkimaru@africapi.orgTel: +254718680038

56 Institute for Security Studies

Regional dimensions of confl ict in the Great Lakes

Title/Name Organisation Designation Contact Details

Paddy Siyanga-Knudsen EU Delegation, TanzaniaProgramme Offi cer, Economics, Governance and Regional Integration

Email: paddy.knudsen-siyanga@ec.europa.euTel: 255782444850

Lukas Probst LopezSwiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Programme Offi cer for the Great Lakes Region

E-mail: lukas.probstlopez@eda.admin.chTel: +41794638625

Dr Connie Mumma-Martinon Consultant ResearcherE-mail: connie_martinon@yahoo.co.ukTel: +254736076447

Willy MugenziRwanda Governance Advisory Council

Senior Communication SpecialistEmail: mugenziw@gmail.comTel: +250788357289

Frank MuherezaCentre for Basic Research,Kampala, Uganda

Senior Research FellowE-mail: fmuhereza@hotmail.comTel: +256752422841

Blaise MuhireInternational AlertDRC-Great Lakes Programme

Project Offi cerE-mail: bmuhire@international-alert.orgTel: +243810104794

Singo Mwachofi ICGLR, BurundiProgramme Offi cer, Peace and Security

E-mail: mwachofi .singo@icglr.orgTel: +25779430790

Leo Näscher ICGLR, BurundiTechnical Advisor, Sexual and Gender Based Violence

E-mail: leo.naesher@icglr.orgTel: +25779672739

Leonidas Ndayizeye Centre Ubuntu, Burundi Research CoordinatorE-mail: leondayizeye@yahoo.frTel: +25779978229

Bonaventure Nikoyandoye Peace House, Burundi Executive SecretaryE-mail: nikobona@yahoo.frTel: +25779937537

Dr Adams Oloo University of Nairobi Lecturer, Political ScienceE-mail: adams_oloo@yahoo.comTel: 254720988233

Roba Sharamo ISS Nairobi Offi ce Acting DirectorE-mail: rsharamo@issafrica.orgTel: +254202667198

George Shitandi ISS Nairobi Offi ce Administrative AssistantE-mail: gshitandi@issafrica.orgTel: +254202667198

Johan Svensson Interpeace, Nairobi Regional Director E-mail: Svensson@interpeace.org

Assumani ThéodoreInstitut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu, DRC

LecturerE-mail: assumanitheo@yahoo.frTel: +243997766913

Angela Baiya-Wadeyua RECSA , KenyaHead of Communications and Public Relations

E-mail: awadeyua@recsa.orgTel: +254203877456

Francis K Wairagu RECSA, Kenya Head of Research and GenderE-mail: wairagu@recsasec.orgTel: +254203876203

Siri Walt Swiss Embassy, Nairobi Deputy Head of MissionE-mail: siri.walt@eda.admin.chTel: +254202228735