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DEVELOPING COUNTRY INTERESTS IN

AGRICULTURAL REFORMS UNDER THE WORLD

TRADE ORGANIZATION

XINSHEN DIAO, TERRY ROE, AND AGAPI SOMWARU

Growth in the number of countries engagedin international trade and the share of worldGDP traded show that the new era of global-ization is far-reaching. This process was stim-ulated by lowering barriers to trade in goods,services, and ideas and caused many, but not

all, countries to benefit, with some doublingtheir per capita income in a period of lessthan ten years (Baldwin and Martin). How-ever, protection of agriculture by countries inthe North is still quite high and remains a con-straint to trade to many countries in the South.Since most developing countries have a dispro-portionate share of their resources in agricul-ture, a more open world agricultural marketshould afford them greater opportunities to in-crease exports and to participate more actively

in the new globalization era. This study focuseson these linkages with emphasis on the cost ofagricultural protection in the North to devel-oping countries.

Global negotiations on agriculture were ini-tiated in March 2000. These negotiations areexpected to press for the continuation of thereforms initiated during the Uruguay Round,namely those relating to market access, domes-tic farm support, and export subsidies. Theretend to be diverse and even divergent interestsin the new round of World Trade Organization

(WTO) negotiations among some countries ofthe South. These differences arise in part fromthe concern that liberalization may lead to arise in food prices with negative consequencesfor net food importing countries.

This concern may not be well founded, how-ever, because the type of agricultural products

This paper was presented at the ASSA winter meetings (Atlanta,GA, January 2002). Papers in these sessions are not subjected to

the journals standard refereeing process.Xinshen Diao is research fellow, International food Policy Re-search Institute; Terry Roe is professor, University of Minnesota;andAgapi Somwaruis senioreconomist, U.S. Department of Agri-

that developing countries tend to export (e.g.,fruits, vegetables, sugar) are not the productsthat dominate commodity exports from coun-tries of the North; yet it is these categoriesof commodities for which the North tends toerect trade barriers. Moreover, the pattern

of world agricultural trade is such that mostcountries in Africa tend to trade with Europewhile many countries of Latin America andAsia tend to trade with the United States. Thebarriers imposed by the United States aredifferent from those of the European Union(EU), and consequently trade reform is likelyto have quite different impacts on countries inAfrica relative to those in Latin America or inAsia. While liberalization may lead to a risein the price of grains, access to the developed

country markets for commodities such asfruits, vegetables, and sugar by countries ofthe South may more than compensate themfor the increase in cost of imported grains.However, the level of compensation is likelyto vary by region in the world.

Thus, identifying and measuring the extentof developing countries gains and losses by re-gion from liberalizing world agricultural mar-kets are important to understanding the na-ture of their interest in trade reform, as well asto facilitate possible policies to minimize the

losses of the adjustment process. For this pur-pose, we first focus on the data pertaining toNorth-South and regional agricultural trade.This analysis suggests how reform in the Northis likely to have differential impacts on devel-oping countries in different regions. Then, wereporttheresults from a globalgeneral equilib-rium model in which developed and develop-ing countries are categorized into various sub-groups. Based on a global database (the GlobalTrade Analysis Project (GTAP) database ver-

sion 5, 2001), we discuss the interests ofdifferent developing country subgroups andquantify the potential impacts of a global agri-

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Diao, Roe, and Somwaru Agricultural Reforms under the WTO 783

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Figure 1. Share of exports to Japan/Korea, United States/Canada, and EU in developing coun-tries total agricultural exports, 1998 (%)

Developing Countries Agricultural ExportMarkets Are in the North

Forty developing country groups are identi-fied in the database. A large country, such asChina or India, is itself a group. Accordingto the 1998 trade database, there are sevenamong these groups, for which agricultural ex-ports accounted for more than 40% of theirtotal exports; ten for which it accounted for 2040%, and eight for which it accounted for 1020%. Most developing countries agriculturalexport markets are in the North. On average,65% of developing countries total agriculturalexports are imported by Northern countries.Figure 1 shows the importance of three ofthe largest markets in the worldJapan andKorea, the United States and Canada, and theEUto the developing countries agriculture.

There are seventeen agricultural and pro-cessedfood commodity groupsin thedatabase.Except for rice, for which a few Asian coun-tries exports account for 70% of world ricetrade, the North, especially the United Statesand Canada, dominates world grain exports.

Exports of non-grain crops, such as vegetablesand fruits, cotton, sugar, and vegetable oil, arelargely the domain of developing countries.

of these commodities, most of which are ex-ported to the North. Hence, the agricultural

exports of most developing countries do notcompete directly with theexports of developedcountries. In this case, if most developed coun-tries eliminated their protection of agriculture,exports of developing countries should rise.

Agriculture is still highly protected in manydeveloped countries, especially in Japan andmembercountriesoftheEUandtheEuropeanFree Trade Association (EFTA). The averagetariff rate, one indicator of agricultural protec-tion, for bulk agricultural commodities is morethan 50% in Japan, more than 23% in the EU,and around 100% for the three members ofthe EFTANorway, Switzerland, and Iceland(U.S. Department of Agriculture, EconomicResearch Service). Figure 2 presents the mar-ket share of developing countries exports intotal agricultural imports of Japan and Korea,the United States and Canada, and the EU.Compared to other developed country groups,developing countries export shares are consis-tently small for most commodity groups in theEU (expect for cotton). The high protection

level provides a partial explanation. For ex-ample, the tariff rate on vegetables and fruitsin the EU market is twice the level as that in

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784 August 2002 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.

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Figure 2. Share of developing countries exports in Japan/Korea, United States/Canada, andEUs total agricultural imports, 1998 (%)

Department of Agriculture, Economic Re-search Service). At the same time, develop-ing countries exports accounted for fewer than30% of EUs imports of vegetables and fruits,but accounted for 45% and 68% in the East

Asian (Japan and Korea), and North Ameri-can markets, respectively.The low share of developing countries agri-

cultural exports in theEU market suggests thatbarriers to trade are the cause. Theory sug-gests that the broad patterns of trade amongNorth countries can be mainly attributed toproduct differentiation, while trade betweenNorth and South can be attributed to dif-ferences in factor composition. Most devel-oped countries are at an almost equivalentstage of development, share a similar compo-sition of factor endowments, and consequentlytrade with each other mainly in differentiatedproducts (see Helpman for detailed analysis oftrading patterns). On the other hand, in con-trast to countries of the North, most devel-oping countries are relatively capital-scarce.Their exports are more likely to embody theservices of labor or other natural endowments,and their imports are more likely to embodycapital from the North. Thus, we should ex-pect to observe more intra-North trade in man-

ufacturing and services, and moreNorth-Southtrade in agriculture. We observe that intra-EU trade accounted for 59% of EU total non-

over EU total agricultural imports is higherthan the ratio in non-agriculture, accountingfor 72% of EU agricultural imports.

Thus agricultural protection policies in theEU appear to block developing countries op-

portunities for entering the EU. The EU is thelargest market in world agriculturaltrade, so itsagricultural policies have important effects ondeveloping countries. If 10% of intra-EU tradein agriculture were replaced by trade with theSouth, then the Souths total agricultural ex-ports would rise by 9%.

Distortions in World Agricultural MarketsAre Mainly Due to a Few Countries

in the North

As measured by the world price effects, wefind, not surprisingly, that policies pursued by asmall number of countries in the North causemost of the distortions in world agriculturalmarkets. Using the Agricultural Market Ac-cess Database (U.S. Department of Agricul-ture, Economic Research Service), togetherwith the GTAP database version 5, our modelresults suggest that eliminating agricultural

tariffs (and tariff equivalents), domestic sup-port, and export subsidies worldwide wouldcause agricultural prices to rise by about 12%.

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to price changes or the adoption and develop-ment of new technologies that increased priceincentives would likely stimulate. The decom-position of the increase in world prices bydevelopeddeveloping country groups showsthat agricultural liberalization in the devel-

oped countries accounts for about 80% of therise in world agricultural prices. Of this 80%,the EU and EFTA account for 50% of worldprice distortions, while Japan and Korea, andthe United States and Canada together ac-count for almost the remaining half.

Three reasons help explain why a small num-berofcountriesintheNorthcontributemosttothe distortionin worldagricultural prices. First,as importers, all of these countries are majorplayers in world agricultural markets. In 1998,Japan and Korea imported 12% of all agricul-

tural goods traded in the world; the UnitedStates and Canada imported another 12%, and42% was imported by EU and EFTA. Second,most of these countries either impose high im-port tariffs on a few agricultural commodities,such as the United States on sugar, or protectmany of their agricultural sectors, as in the caseof Japan and Korea, and the EU and EFTA.Eliminating import tariffs should increase im-port demandwhiledomestic supplywouldcon-tract in these developed countries. Third, most

of the developed countries employ, in vari-ous forms, domestic support policies, some ofwhich encourage increased production. In thecase of the EU and EFTA, exports of majoragricultural goods are also subsidized. Reduc-ing domestic support in these countries shouldfurther decrease farm income, or more pre-cisely, lower the returns to agricultures sector-specific resources such as land, farm structures,machinery, and owner-operator labor. To-gether, these forces should place considerableupward pressures on world agricultural prices.

An Open EU Market Is in the CommonInterest of Most Developing Countries

Since world agricultural markets are domi-nated by a small group of developed coun-tries, agricultural liberalization among thesecountries will create export opportunities fora relatively large number of developing coun-

tries. However, this generalization hides im-portant regional linkages. For many of the de-veloping countries, export markets are actually

historical linkages, and to regional integra-tion arrangements. For developing countrieslocated in Eastern Europe, the Middle East,Africa, and some in South America, the EUis the largest agricultural export market. TheUnited States and Canada are the largest mar-

ket for countries in Central and some in SouthAmerica, as well as for some countries in Asia.Japan and Korea are the largest market forneighboring countries in Asia (figure 1). Thus,for manydevelopingcountries, the benefitsofaliberalized world agricultural market are likelyto be regionally differentiated.

We use the change in developing countriestotal agricultural exports to illustrate this link-age. Figure 3 presents the possible increasein agricultural exports of developing countrygroups after fully liberalizing world agricul-

ture. Overall, the results suggest that amongthe forty developing countries or groups in-cluded in the database (with the exceptionof only five countriesMalaysia, Vietnam,Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe) themajor increase in their agricultural exportsis a result of agricultural liberalization inJapan and Korea, the United States andCanada, and the EU and EFTA. For twenty-seven of thirty-five country groups, 50% ormore of the increase in their agricultural

exports is due to liberalizing EU agricul-ture. For two Asian countries (China andThailand), 50% of their increase in agricul-tural exports is dueto liberalizingJapanese andKorean agriculture. For the case of two LatinAmerican countries (Mexico and Colombia)more than 50% of their increase in agri-cultural exports is due to liberalizing U.S.and Canadian agriculture. These results implythat some countries in the North are far moreimportant to some groups of developing coun-tries than areother Northern countries. In sum,the results suggest that the majority of devel-oping countries share a common interest incalling for a more open EU agricultural mar-ket, while more open Japanese, Korean, andU.S. markets are in the interest of a smallergroup of countries located in Asia and in theWestern Hemisphere.

While Japan and Korea are well known fortheir high agricultural import barriers, a closerlook suggests that liberalization in these twocountries does not generate large export op-

portunities for manydevelopingcountries. Thescale of the Japanese and Korean markets issimply small relative to the U.S. and EUs agri-

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Figure 3. Change in developing countries agricultural exports by destination

such as grain and livestock products, are goodsfor which many developing countries do nothold a decisive comparative advantage. De-veloping countries in total only accounted for15% of world wheat exports (and more thanhalf of that share is taken by Argentina). Even

though Japan and Korea account for about11% of world wheat imports, only 3% of wheatimports by Japan and Korea originate from de-veloping countries. Similarly, Japan and Koreaimport more than 27% of the worlds tradein meat and meat products, and only 17% ofthese imports originate from developing coun-tries. The developing countries largest exportmarket share is in vegetables, fruits, and othercash crops (figure 2), commodities for whichJapan and Koreas tariff barriers are relativelylow. Thus, with the exception of rice, for whichonly a few Asian countries hold a decisive com-parative advantage, gains to the developingcountries from trade liberalization in this re-gion are small. However, we should point outthat trade in vegetable and fruit is also blockedby many non-tariff barriers, such as phytosan-itary barriers, quotas, and voluntary export re-straint agreements. Such barriers do not showup in the database we use for the study. De-veloping country exports may be dispropor-tionately affected by these barriers. If all trade

barriers were represented and were removedin the model, developing countries exports tothe North would increase even more.

crease in total agricultural exports after globalagricultural reforms is quite small. One majorreason for this outcome is that in the databasemany non-grain crops are placed in broad cate-gories (called, e.g., vegetables and fruits, or theaggregate other crops) in which individual

developing countries are often net exportersfor a narrow subgroup of these commodities.World trade for a specific commodity may notrise or even decline if the current trade bar-riers imposed by importing countries on thiscommodity are low. For this reason, some de-veloping countries that specialize in the ex-port of one or a few products in this categorymay not benefit from liberalizing world agri-cultural markets. If trade liberalization causesthese countries terms of trade to deteriorate,it is possible for their exports to decline whileimport costs rise, thus lowering their totalwelfare.

Effects of Reform on Food SecurityAre Mixed

A more open world agricultural market wouldsurely increase export opportunities amongdeveloping countries, but as importers of food

grains and meats, some of these countrieswould more likely experience a rise in foodprices. Many of the net food importing coun-

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share of household budgets. Consequently,high priced food imports caused by agricul-tural liberalization may hinder food security.For these reasons, some developing countrieshave expressed concern that agricultural tradeliberalization may worsen their prospects for

food security.Among the forty developing country groupsincluded in the database, thirty countries arenet grain importers. There are only four devel-oping countries that are net exporters of wheatand other grain products (excluding rice). Formostdeveloping countries, grains and/or meatsaccount for more than 20% of their total agri-cultural imports. While there is no universallyacceptable definition of food security, usingthe cluster method, Diaz-Bonilla et al. identifymore than seventy developing countries that

can be categorized as food insecure. They usedfive indicators to gauge a countrys food secu-rity standing: (1) food production per capita,an indicator of the ability of a country to feeditself, (2) the ratio of total exports to food im-ports, an indicator of the ability of a country tofinance its food imports out of its total exportrevenues, (3) the ratio of the non-agriculturalpopulation to total population, (4) calories percapita, and (5) protein per capita. For foodinsecure countries, either all or most of these

indicators are far below the world averagelevel. Using the Diaz-Bonilla measure, weidentify thirteen food insecure countries inthe GTAP database. Four major indicators

Table 1. Indicator Value Used for Food Security Analysis

CALCAPa PROTCAPb PRODCAPc IMPEXPOTd

(Calories) (Grams) (US$) (%)

India 2,400 57.4 112.5 4.5

Philippines 2,367 56.4 131.3 6.0Vietnam 2,427 56.2 124.0 5.3Bangladesh 2,047 43.9 67.1 19.6Sri Lanka 2,264 50.4 73.0 11.4Peru 2,300 58.0 120.6 16.4Botswana 2,208 70.6 112.7 11.8Malawi 2,034 54.2 67.3 26.3Mozambique 1,727 33.1 49.5 45.5Tanzania 2,013 48.8 91.9 17.9Zambia 1,964 51.3 67.3 5.1Zimbabwe 2,078 50.6 67.0 5.5Uganda 2,206 50.1 118.8 9.6World average 2,739 73.5 194.3

a Calories per capita per day.b Protein consumption per capita per day.

used in Diaz-Bonilla et al. for these coun-tries are displayed in table 1, while the sharesof grain and meat imports in these countriestotal agricultural imports are presented infigure 4.

Grain and meat account for a large por-

tion of imports to food insecure countries.Grain and livestock are also highly protectedin Japan, Korea, and the EU and EFTA, sothat trade in these products faces the high-est level of import barriers in comparison toother agricultural commodities. Consequently,liberalization will likely cause the world pricesof these commodities to rise more than theprices of othercommodities, such as vegetablesand fruits. Our models results show that if allforms of domestic support and border protec-tion in agriculture were removed, world grain

and livestock product prices would rise morethan 10% and 25%, respectively, implying asignificant rise in the cost of imported food formany developing countries.

Using both the data analysis and the re-sults from the model simulations, we calcu-late (1) the ratios of imports over consump-tion for grains, meats, and total agriculturalgoods; (2) the ratios of the value of total ex-ports over the values of imports of grains,meats, and total agricultural goods; and (3) the

change in grain, meat, and agricultural pro-duction for all the forty developing countrygroups in the database. These composite indi-cators show thirty-five countries for which the

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Figure 4. Shares of grain and meat imports in total agricultural imports for selected food in-secure countries in 1998 (%). Model results: The height of bar indicates the change in totalexports

ratios of grain, meat, or total agricultural im-ports over consumption rise after agricultureis fully liberalized worldwide. Hence, most de-veloping countries are likely to become moredependent on international markets for food.

Among these countries, the ratios of the

value of total exports over the values ofgrain, meat, and total agricultural importsindicators that capture the ability of a countryto finance its food or agricultural imports outof total export revenuesdecline post world-wide agricultural liberalization. However, theresultsshowthatmorethan50%ofthesecoun-tries also increase their grain, meat, and totalagricultural production post reform, indicatingthat their ability to feed themselves from do-mestic production actually increases. Changein the first two groups of indicators may in-dicate a negative effect of world agriculturalliberalization on food security, while the lastindicator definitely shows a positive effect.

We select some of the indicators for the thir-teen food insecure countries in the databaseto gain further insights into the food securityissue. The rise in the ratio of grain importsover grain consumption and the decline in theratio of total exports over agricultural importsare modest for most of the thirteen countries(table 2). However, the results show that for

five countries whose grain imports accountedfor more than 10% of grain consumption, theirgrain consumption becomes more dependent

countries are among the poorest countries inthe database. It is, thus, possible that the highimport costs could cause their food insecurityto increase.

Welfare Gains for Developing Countries AreHigher in the Long Run

The earlier analysis ignored the effect of re-form on saving, investment, and the patternof growth in a countrys capital stock. Theanalysis of these effects requires assumptionsregarding households willingness to forgoconsumption and invest, the functioning ofcapital markets and international capital flows,as well as the technological spillovers and im-provement in total factor productivity thatseem to accompany growth in countries trade.This kind of analysis captures the direction ofchange in the long run that seems well withinthe realm of reason.

In addition to the typical growth modelspecification, a growth factor related totrade is also added, although the effectsof this factor are reported separately. Thisfactor is added because numerous stud-ies find an empirically strong and positive

linkage either between a countrys growthrate and its openness to international trade(Easterly and Levine, Frankel and Romer),

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Table 2. Effects on Food Security for Selected Developing Countries

Grain Imports/ Total Exports/Consumption (%) Agr. Imports (%) Change in

GrainBase Liberalization Base Liberalization Production

Base= 100

India 3.07 3.13 13.50 12.76 0.20Philippines 6.91 8.34 12.69 11.40 3.17Vietnam 0.31 0.29 17.09 14.23 8.22Bangladesh 2.17 2.17 4.90 4.40 0.03Sri Lanka 11.74 13.74 8.23 7.05 2.42Peru 20.99 23.14 7.12 6.56 0.08Botswana 49.94 51.42 12.52 12.13 4.17Malawi 0.53 0.51 48.71 48.70 0.07Mozambique 11.97 12.15 4.35 4.14 0.43Tanzania 4.06 4.10 4.71 4.28 1.28Zambia 3.29 3.20 48.32 47.66 0.33Zimbabwe 17.75 17.91 15.19 16.35 0.11Uganda 2.67 3.30 14.55 13.63 0.88

Hoffmaister), or between the improvementin a countrys total factor productivity and re-duction in its barriers to the openness (Parenteand Prescott). In our study, the effect of open-ness on economic growth is modeled by addinga technological spillover variable to a coun-trys total factor productivity function. Thisspillover variable is the share of a countrys

trade over its GDP, that is, virtually the samevariable used in most of the econometric anal-ysis cited above.1 The presumption is that fol-lowing worldwide agricultural trade reforms,trade volumes of developing countries shouldgrow. Growth in trade volume should increasethe rate of learning new skills, and improve or-ganizational methods as more advanced prod-uct and process technologies are often embod-ied in the imports of investment goods fromdeveloped countries. This process should in-crease labor productivity and returns to cap-ital and land, and it should be particularlystrong for developing countries in the processof catching up with technologies already in usein more advanced countries. Thus, this longer-run type of analysis allows for agriculturaltrade reform to yield broader economy-widebenefits.

First, considering only the investment in-centives created by reform (i.e., not takinginto account the trade-technological spillover-growth effects), the short-run intertemporal

welfare effects are found to be modest, with

values almost identical to the static analysis.However, as production and investment ad-

justments take time, the welfare effect be-comes relatively large over time, and the gainis greater for developing countries. While theworldwide measure of welfare gain in the tenthyear doubles the gain accrued in the fifth year,the welfare gain for all developing countries, as

a group, triples. Simply stated, the results sug-gest that the payoff to agricultural trade policyreform takes time, and the increase in bene-fits for developing countries exceeds that fordeveloped countries.

Next, we factor in the trade-technologicalspillover-growth effect of policy reform. Inthis case, the intertemporal welfare gains in-crease significantly. Given the limits the largemodel imposes on computational capacity, weonly include a few selected developing coun-tries in the dynamic model while all other de-veloping countries are aggregated into largegroups. The results suggest that all developingcountry groups are better off after worldwideagricultural reform. Further, as the volumeof trade between developed and developingcountries grows, so do the welfare gains expe-rienced by even the poorest of the developingcountries.

These long-run results may be optimisticfor the case of some countries. Observationsuggests that technological spillovers are un-

even, and there are areas untouched by theglobal changes that have taken place. In partic-ular, countries in South Asia and sub-Saharan

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among the poorest in the world. In the caseof these countries, it is possible for the poorpeople living in remote rural areas to be moremarginalized by the process of trade liberaliza-tion. To spread the benefit of globalization tothem is a major challenge.

References

Baldwin, R., and P. Martin. Two Waves ofGlobalization: Superficial Similarities, Fun-damental Differences. Working Paper 6904,National Bureau of Economic Research,1999.

Coe, D.T., E. Helpman, and A.W. Hoffmais-ter. North-South R&D Spillovers, EconomicJournal107(1997):13449.

Diao, X., and A. Somwaru. A Dynamic Evalua-tion of the Effects of a Free Trade Area ofthe Americas - An Intertemporal, Global Gen-eral Equilibrium Model. J. Econ. Integration16(first quarter, 2001):2147.

Diaz-Bonilla, E., M. Thomas, S. Robinson, andA. Cattaneo. Food Security and Trade Nego-tiations in the World Trade Organization: ACluster Analysis of Country Groups. TMDDiscussion paper no. 59, International FoodPolicy Research Institute, 2000.

Easterly, W., and R. Levine. Its Not Factor Ac-cumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth Mod-els. Paper presented at the World Bank Con-ference entitled What Have We Learned froma Decade of Empirical Research on Growth?Washington DC, 2000.

Frankel, J.A., and D. Romer. Does Trade CauseGrowth? Amer. Econ. Rev. 89(1999):37999.

Helpman, E. The Structure of Foreign Trade.Working Paper 6752, National Bureau of Eco-nomic Research, 1998.

Parente, S.L., and E.C. Prescott. Barriers to Riches.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Re-search Service. Agricultural Policy Reform inthe WTO, the Road Ahead. Agricultural Eco-nomic Report no. 802, ERS/USDA, 2001.

Appendix: Country and Commodity Groupsin the Model

Country Groups

ANZ: Australia and New Zealand; JPK: Japanand Korea; ADC: Other Asian developed coun-tries; USA: United States and Canada; E U: Eu-ropean Union and European Free Trade Associa-tion; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; MYS: Malaysia;PHL: Philippines; THA: Thailand; VNM: Viet-nam; BGD: Bangladesh; IND: India; LKA: Sri

Lanka; XSA: rest of South Asia; MEX: Mex-ico; XCM: Central America and Caribbean; COL:Colombia; PER: Peru; VEN: Venezuela; XAP:rest of Andean Pact; ARG: Argentina; BRA:Brazil; CHL: Chile; URY: Uruguay; XSM: restof South America; HUN: Hungary; POL: Poland;XCE: rest of Central Europe; XSU: former So-viet Union; TUR: Turkey; XME: rest of MiddleEast; MAR: Morocco; XNF: rest of North Africa;BWA: Botswana; XSC: rest of South Africa Cus-tom Union; MWI: Malawi; MOZ: Mozambique;TZA: Tanzania; ZMB: Zambia; ZWE: Zimbabwe;XSF: rest of southern Africa; UGA: Uganda;

XSS: rest of sub-Saharan Africa; XRW: rest ofworld.

Commodity Groups

PDR: rice; WHT: wheat; GRO: other grains;V F: vegetable and fruits; OSD: oilseeds; PFB:plant based fibers; OCR: other crops; CTL: bovinecattle, sheep and goats, horses; OAP: other animalproducts; WOL: wooland silk-worm cocoons; CMT:bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat products; OMT:other meat products; VOL: vegetable oils and fats;

MIL: dairy products; SGR: sugar; OFD: other foodproducts; B T: beverages and tobacco products

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