Signs of lifeThe meaning of a word from the semiotic and morphological point of view

Kristijan Krka

Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus in Zagreb, Department of PhilosophyZagreb School of Economics and Management, Department of Marketing

Sciences Po Lille, Department of Political ScienceAddress: Jordanovac 110, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia

E-mail: kristian.krkac@gmail.com

Abstract The paper consists of the following parts in all of which classical differences are criticized, namely, the difference between non-significant and significant (signs) phenomena in the first part, between natural and artificial signs in the second, between non-linguistic and linguistic signs in the third, and finally between words and languages (language-games, discourses, texts, speech-acts, and dialogues) in the fourth part. Criticism of all of these differences from the morphological point of view, that is to say, by offering a creation of a kind of net between mixed types of these allegedly strongly opposed sides which will present a kind of pattern, in some way influences our strong inclination to clearly define the subject matter of the philosophy of language in the manner that the very subject matter itself is internally and externally vague which seems to be fine for all tasks of the discipline itself. In addition such approach gives the philosophy of language certain inter and trans-disciplinary nature which makes it relevant theoretically and practically and internally for other philosophical issues and externally for other sciences. Some consequences of such approach are to be mentioned only passingly, consequences such as quite porous internal differences between different theories of meaning, between different approaches to philosophy of language (say in continental and British-US approaches), and quite porous external differences between philosophy of language and different disciplines in various sciences (for instance in the rest of the philosophy, linguistics, semiotics, psychology, neurology, cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, etc.). Key words: artificial languages, artificial signs, causal theories of meaning, dialogue, discourse, language-games, language, linguistic signs, natural languages, natural signs, non-lingustic signs, non-significant phenomena, philosophy of language, reference, sentence, significant phenomena, signs, speech-acts, text, theories of meaning, words.Abbreviations: PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks of the Foundations of Mathematics, OC = On Certainty, TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

A black cat crossing your path signifies that the animal is going somewhere. (Groucho Marx)

A personal note

If I am allowed let me start with a personal note from my college years. When I was freshman at Jesuit College in Zagreb, Croatia in 1990, studying philosophy there were two courses that I was especially attracted to most of all because some of the philosophers mentioned were still alive and I thought I could listen to their lectures and perhaps talk to them, and the other reason was that the professors of these courses were open for discussion. One course was Analytic philosophy and the other was Contemporary philosophy (both in the sense of 20 th century philosophy). This appeared weird. How it is possible that two different courses cover the same period? Why they are not just one course? Like for instance course Modern philosophy: Empiricism and Rationalism. Very soon I discover that on both sides some huge differences were pointed out at first lectures (for instance: Kierkegaard has nothing in common with Frege).

Since my high school was scientifically oriented I was naturally more attracted to analytic philosophy for the reason that it seemed at least a little bit clearer what were the basic issues, problems, arguments, and standpoints. Some of the philosophers were claiming that they are engaged in scientific philosophy. Well, using the predicate scientific doesnt make the philosophy scientific more then it is. Yet something was bothering me. I saw much dissimilarity clearly because they were emphasized in textbooks of both courses, but also many similarities that were not mentioned at all. Most of these were of course accidental, irrelevant, and simply my mistakes. So, it was clear that my overall direction in philosophy is going to be analytic. However, since the professor of the course was an expert in Wittgenstein I started to read his major works and discovered great

divides not just within Wittgensteins philosophy (a propos the professor argued in favour of continuity of his philosophy), but within analytic philosophy as well (between Vienna Circle and Oxford School, between Wittgenstein and Quine, between Kripke and later Putnam, etc.). It is beside the point to mention divides in Continental philosophy since they were obvious enough.

However, some similarities I saw were correct, but as some argued, clearly irrelevant, and since it was obvious that I will be doing philosophies of some members of Oxford school and Wittgenstein, I thought that it would be useful to get to know Continental philosophy in more detail. At that time The Phenomenology of Perception by Murice Merleau-Ponty seemed to me the most clear of all Continental philosophy that I read and additional reason was that even a hard-core positivist A. J. Ayer in one of his books was not so critical about it. So I did my BA on this topic. Of course I had to read at least some works of other continental philosophers and some introductions to other schools. So I discovered many strange connections, for instance between Kierkegaard and Heidegger, the former being the real founder of existentialism, between Goethe, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein from TLP and PI, between Brentano, Husserl, and Frege, and many others. Of course, these connections can be irrelevant, yet, and at least concerning language and theories of meaning, there were many similarities that seem to be relevant more then accidentally, they seemed to shape some crucial topics on all sides included.

In the same time I continued my studies and I had no time to do many things alongside analytic philosophy, my MA thesis on Moore and Wittgenstein, and afterwards a PhD completely crazy thesis on Wittgensteins pragmatism in OC that is to say was he or was he not a pragmatist of some sort? Afterwards, I had enough time to return to Continental philosophy, and I did, but I discovered that there are philosophers who in one way or another combined all mentioned sides and created something new, interesting, and inspiring such as R. Rorty, J. Habermas, U. Eco, or P. Bruckner. The first two I trust since they are completely aware of the situation (see Rorty 1967:1-41), and very precisely build their standpoints, while the last two I trust since they were excellent novel writers and philosophers in the same time compared to other more famous contemporary philosophers who tried to compare analytic and Continental philosophies like K. O. Apel, E. Tugendhat, A. J. Ayer, P. Riceur, and others. So I came up with the idea to formulate some similarities and connections in more substantive way. Some ways were already exploited more, some less. Analytic philosophy led me among many directions to linguistics, semiotics and cultural anthropology. Semiotic approach seemed to be the most promising one but I didnt have the starting idea. Now I have it and I will try to describe it. It all started with a sign.

Another, perhaps more objective reason, is that the idea that the philosophy of language is the First Philosophy (perhaps after metaphysics and epistemology historically speaking) nowadays would be accepted only by few no matter if many are still engaged in it (Hale and Wright 1999:viii-ix). It will surely continue to develop. One can contribute to its relevance by making it relevant to other classical disciplines which meanwhile become important again in analytic philosophy (such as ontology, epistemology, applied ethics, etc.). Yet, the divide still exists; say more between analytic and Continental ontology and epistemology, and perhaps less between ethics and various issues in applied ethics. Now, one can try to make it relevant to the whole of philosophical field, to change the aspect of looking at it and this is the goal of the present paper.

A note on terminology

A technical note concerning terminology should be supplied here. The central concept is that of a sign but contrary to the common use for its function which is signifying, I prefer signing. I prefer it partly because it is a matter of a joke. Because humans are signing documents and signatures are rarely signs of anything semiotically speaking although they are signs of individual physical persons (that is in case of overlap of Greek words smeon and noma), and especially in cases in which particular human is a significant person, and because it seemed funny to alter the quote form the movie Shining.

However, there are two half-serious reasons. First serious reason is that it is a matter of the word sign and understanding that signifying has its origin in signum but signum means much more (especially if one includes the line from Stoic smeon, Latin signum, and our sign the line of translations that hides many differences in intension and extension of the term, see Eco 1986:14-46), and sometimes something completely different from contemporary meaning of the word sign even in general semiotics not to mention difficulties in applied semiotics concerning with various natural, cultural, artificial, linguistic, and non-linguistic signs in which these differences appear as extremely relevant. Second serious reason is that it is important for the topic of the paper to differ between human intentional and artificial signs like pointing to the right at a crossroads, and unintentional and automatic signs like bodily symptoms for instance. Therefore, one has to choose between signifying (for intentional signs) and signing (for unintentional signs). Since, the topic does not include discussion on names and signatures, yet it includes discussion on primal signs, and since there is no additional reason to follow the common practice except the common practice itself, I chose signing. Signifying sounds more artificial and intentional then signing which in the present context sounds more primal and primordial,

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and since I try to point to primordial pattern of all signs rooted in a group of primordial signs semiotically speaking, signing seemed more convenient. For example, cave paintings of hands from 31,000 years ago like in Chauvet cave in France, one could say that these are closer to signing then to signifying because these hands represent not just signum but symbol and signature as well.

An introductory note

This means something. This is important. [Contemplating the lump shape] (Roy Neary in Close Encounters of the Third Kind)

If one approaches to the core and currently discussed topics in the philosophy of language from the semiotics as the starting point, as it was done for instance by Umberto Eco in his Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Eco 1986), then one can see that there are no significant differences between say different if not radically opposed theories of meaning, (for example between causal and contextual theories), further on between different schools in philosophy of language in analytic philosophy, even between analytic and continental approach, and finally between say philosophical, linguistic, semiotic, cultural anthropological, physical anthropological, psychological and other approaches to the very conception and the whole issue of language. On the other hand, any expert in the field of the philosophy of language can list some traditional and current discussions and standpoints on which the fundamental debates rest, or without which the great deal of these discussions doesnt make sense anymore. In other words, they become completely different discussions.

Another way to say the same thing is to say that some elements of the semiotic approach to the philosophy of language reveal that between mention debates, standpoints, theories, schools, overall approaches to philosophy, and finally different disciplines and sciences there are no fundamental differences and that a kind of unified source, method, goals, scope, and limits of philosophical inquiry can be established. Yet, in the present paper this cannot be done for the field of semiotic in general, but it can and it will be done concerning a list of definitions of some crucial concepts and their differentiations that can lead to mention methodological and other differences between theories, schools, and approaches. The most elegant way to limit the subject matter of the present research and some modest proposals that will be made at the end of the paper is to present it with certain classical differentiation which is called the Porphyrian tree. The analysis and criticism of such way of differentiation is useful, leaving aside historical research, only if it can expose the roots and some issues of the present discussions, and this seems to be the case.

Now, the actual example which will be presented here isnt really present in any particular work, but it tends to embrace as many as possible of similar differentiations made from Porphyry to the end of the 19th century (as shown in Table 1). The topic of the paper is the phenomenon and the concept of a sign.

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Table 1: Classical divisions from signs to words and languages

Only two things will be analysed and criticized in what follows, namely: the descriptions of the phenomena and concepts, especially on the right column of Table 1, and the differentiations or divisions of the phenomena and concepts on all levels. This will hopefully reveal that some current discussions in 20th century philosophies of language are if not seriously meaningless, then at least in some part dangerously misplaced if they claim that other approaches are completely wrong. What follows can be viewed only as a set of examples and objections to some easily accepted and presupposed definitions, and differentiations of some basic concepts.

1. Phenomena: non-significant and significant and not-signifying and signifying something

A little bit of alternation of one of many memorable quotes from the Stanley Kubricks classic psychological horror The Shining could be used as a leitmotif for the present issue in question. So, the alternate quote runs as follows:

I can remember when I was a little boy. My grandmother and I could hold conversations entirely without ever opening our mouths. She called it shining [signing]. And for a long time, I thought it was just the two of us that had the shining [signing] to us. Just like you probably thought you were the only one. But there are other folks, though mostly they don't know it, or don't believe it. How long have you been able to do it? (Dick Hallorann)

The quote, alternated as it is, highlights the topic of place of signing in living our lives as we live them as humans. However, the topic is more closely related to some central issues in classical philosophy of language. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, like in a dozen of other places, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes on the relation of language and life. The quote runs as follows:

Language, I should like to say, relates to a way of living. (RFM 335) Precisely this relation is the topic of the present essay in terms of an introduction to the philosophy of language as part of the wider issue that is a philosophy of human action or even

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more wider in terms of a philosophy of culture. So, the place of speaking in living in case of humans is in fact the prime subject matter here.

The following discussion consists of the next parts in all of which classical differences are criticized, namely, the difference between significant and non-significant phenomena in the first part, between natural and artificial signs in the second, between non-linguistic and linguistic signs in the third, and finally between words and languages (language-games, discourses, texts, speech-acts, and dialogues). Criticism of all of these differences from the morphological point of view, that is to say, creating a kind of net between mixed types of these allegedly strongly opposed sides which will present a kind of pattern, in some way influences our strong inclination to clearly define the subject matter of the philosophy of language in the manner that the subject matter itself is internally and externally vague which seems to be fine for all tasks of the discipline itself. In addition such approach gives the philosophy of language certain inter and trans-disciplinary nature which makes it relevant theoretically and practically and internally for other philosophical issues and externally for other sciences. Some consequences of such approach are to be mentioned only passingly, consequences such as quite porous internal differences between different theories of meaning, between different approaches to philosophy of language (say in continental and British-US philosophy), and quite porous external differences between philosophy of language and different disciplines in various sciences (for instance in philosophy, linguistics, semiotics, cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, etc.).

Compared to the present state of the art in the philosophy of language, expressed in various companions, handbooks, anthologies, and the most important journals, the present approach to the topic could seem to be, if not outdated and nave, then surely out of the mainstream discussions. This is so not because the author belongs to this or that school or prefers particular philosopher of the philosophy of language, or because it is more amicable to, say linguistic, logical, cultural anthropological, biological, or any other grounding of the philosophy of language. On the other hand it need to be said that the philosophies of later L. Wittgenstein and Oxford school of ordinary language are a kind of seeds from which issues discussed here grew.

In my case, the core issue of the philosophy of language, which is the theory of linguistic meaning, during years step by step, was peeled like an artichoke, and finally there was nothing left. Therefore, I needed to take more seriously the method change, and to use the method that was coined by Wittgenstein as looking at similarities and dissimilarities and seeing connections (PI 66), or by P. F. Strawson as the connective analysis, or morphology as I prefer to call it (following Goethe and Spengler at least terminologically speaking). Taking it more seriously, it meant that the whole viewpoint should be changed, and so I started with signs. This does not mean that the one should study semiotics in order to solve the problems of linguistic meaning, yet some elements of semiotic analysis are going to be used as natural background of such research, namely parts of cultural semiotics, but no more or less then some parts of cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, neurology, and psychology as well. The rough ground of the present discussion surely is not interdisciplinary, yet its background of understanding is by all means.

The world consists of phenomena epistemologically speaking. Concerning various principles of their differentiation they can be differed in various ways. On the occasion such as this it seem fairly convenient to make differentiation of all phenomena on the basis of their significance where the word significance is taken in the broadest possible sense. Classical theory of difference suggests that the differentiated whole or the concept should be completely exhausted in divided parts. Therefore, all phenomena are divided into non-significant and significant phenomena. Significant phenomena can be further divided into not-

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signing and signing phenomena. Signing phenomena are signs and opposed to non-signing phenomena they are somehow ordered, arranged, formatted, and interpreted as signs. Signs always consist of signifier which is the sign itself or the form the sign takes, and the

signified or that what it represents or signifies. For instance rainy clouds are signifiers of the rain which they signified. The sign itself is always the whole consisting of signifier and signified and their interdependence or signification (as shown in Diagram 1.2, see Johansen, Larsen 2000).

However, Diagram 1.2 shows the structure of a sign applicable for all signs, while Diagram 1.1 shows the structure of a sign only for linguistic signs. The Diagram 1.1 shows what is commonly called Ogden/Richards Triangle because it was first published in their book The Meaning of Meaning (1923), yet idea of the triangle can be traced to B. Bolzanos work Beitrge zu einer begrndeteren Darstellung der Mathematik (1810). The elements are symbol, reference and referent and relations are: the relation of reference and a symbol can be correct or incorrect, the relation between a reference and a referent can be adequate or inadequate, and the relation between a referent and a symbol can be true or false.

Some further modifications were made by J. R. Searle. He introduces the term direction to fit between world, (writers) thought (intended), and word (encoded), and between word, (readers) thought (extended), and a referent (decoded). However, the Diagram 1.1 will be of use in section on linguistic signs.

Diagram 1.1: Semiotics: sign and its elements for linguistic signs

Diagram 1.2: Semiotics: sign and its elements for all signs

However, is this division of the phenomenon and the concept of significant really comprehensive? Surely there are phenomena that werent, arent and will never bear any significance whatsoever, and on the other hand there are phenomena that if they are phenomena they eo ipso signify something. Nonetheless, there are phenomena that are significant during a period of time in particular cultures.

Say that The Black Spot is historical fact and not a literary device invented by Robert Louis Stevenson in his novel Treasure Island. Therefore, a pirate presented with a black spot is officially pronounced with a verdict of guilt or judgment, and any other pirate

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can kill him on site. Now, one can suppose that pirates and pirate culture existed for a certain period of time in history. Therefore, The Black Spot wasnt a significant phenomenon in this particular semiosis before pirate culture and ended to be such after the end of that culture and practices. This is perhaps an odd example, yet one can list a series of phenomena that were significant only for some time. Of course, historical ancient symbols, which are nowadays out of use for various reasons, will be the most obvious and vivid examples. Yet, there are nice examples from 20th century. At the beginning of car production cars that were running on electricity were majority compared to cars running on gasoline. In the most optimistic interpretation having a car was a status symbol in these days while nowadays to have a car running on electricity and gasoline is a symbol of ecological awareness of their owners and such cars symbolize the significance of environment preservation and protection. Interesting fact is that the popularity of electric cars went down because as electric they were quite limited for greater distances. Such examples show that the division of phenomena into non-significant and significant is useful but only for particular practical purposes and that other different divisions are also possible and that they are not just useful for other practical purposes but also that they are dynamic and contextual in various ways and that as such they are more comprehensive.

2. Signs: natural and artificial

Let us continue with movie quotes as nice leitmotifs for the present discussion. The following is perhaps not the most memorable like for instance Swing away Merrill. Merrill... swing away. but surely is an important one from the movie Signs and it runs as follows:

Caroline: What kind of a machine bends a stalk of corn without breaking it? Graham: It can't be by hand, it's too perfect. (Police Officer Caroline Paski and Reverend Graham Hess)

The phenomenon of sings in corn fields tickles our imagination for at least half of a century, yet it is interesting concerning the present topic since it raises the issue are these signs natural or artificial (human or extraterrestrial isnt the issue at the moment). So, let us turn to sings. There are phenomena that sign. Following the previous, little bit altered movie quote we can call it signing and that is what makes them significant phenomena. On the other hand, there are significant phenomena that are not signing and therefore are not signs. For instance, WW2 historically speaking is a significant phenomenon of the 20th century, yet it is not a sign. Perhaps the whole WW2 can be described with a series of carefully chosen signs, meaning a combination of various quotes, symbols, signals, symptoms, gestures, etc.) One could say, OK, so there are significant phenomena some of which are signing and some which are not, and those which are signing are signs. Well yes if one is looking for a simple administrative categorization for a simple practical purpose. In order not to confuse the reader it should be said that our goal here is in a way pragmatic but not administrative or even bureaucratic. The basic difference between phenomena concerning signing is the following: There are phenomena that are never signing anything, they are simply non-signs, There are phenomena that are always signing something, they are natural signs, they are

signing causally such as symptoms, or mental signs of the mind, and There are phenomena that sign sometimes only to some group, they are conventional

signs. Only second and third groups are significant phenomena. However, the whole sector

of significant phenomena is essentially a dynamic one meaning that it has porous borders and various overlaps (externally) with other sectors which can be called sectors of non-significant phenomena for the present purpose, and it has porous borders (internally) between its subsectors, parts, or aspects. These aspects can change by their very nature, their structure, or

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by some external influence one into another and that is what makes the whole sector dynamic. Particularly, among significant phenomena some signs can die, or be killed in a way and turn into non-signs and be reborn again, and the same goes for non-signs. Some signs can have the same material form but be different concerning what they sign what they signify in different times, places, or cultures. In the Indian religion swastika is the sacred symbol of good luck, while during and after the WW2 it became a symbol of something a totalitarian regime. Varieties of such changes are virtually innumerable. This dynamism of significant phenomena requires from us to observe it as a whole, in all its details, and in its complete structure in precise time and place in order to isolate signs and their morphology.

The underlying idea of the morphology not as a phenomena structure but as phenomena method of observation and comparisons, no matter how radical it may look like, is the following: there is no pure identity and pure difference among groups of phenomena, pairs of phenomena, or between aspects of phenomena. These are only formally (in fact administratively) construed ideal points. What we experience and what we can describe based on our experience are only aspects of similarity or dissimilarity. If this is OK, then any further difference made is the difference not in kind (say subsets for instance) but in level, shade, intensity, some proportion (which implies certain rhythm and tempo change which means certain dynamics of phenomena). The application of this assumption or the example will be supplied in the next part.

To say that signs are significant phenomena that are signing doesnt say much if anything at all. It seems that the core of the phenomenon of a sign (lat. signum) is hidden but this is wrong since it is not. Signs are pointing, intending to, directing to something, giving course, and this seems to be one of their important aspect. They are completely revealed or they completely reveal that what they are sign of. What is in a way hidden is perhaps the way of reading sings. One need to learn to read signs first and foremost by observing and imitating others who understand them and are able to read them. A sign is always signing something else different from itself, even in cases in which a sign seems to point to itself it points from one of its aspects to its other aspect.

However, what about the difference between signs? Administrative differentiation suggests that signs can be differed as natural, artificial, and some strange exceptions (as show in Table 2). Such manner of differentiation can be and is useful, yet we are concerned not with usefulness primarily but with how something is actually used. It can be said that such difference is practical, yet it is not pragmatic.

Table 2: Practical (or useful) differentiation of signs

Now, in the contrast to practical differentiation between signs, the pragmatic differentiation suggests that there is no clear principle of differentiation, and that what seems to be a small amount of exception is in fact vast majority of quite important cases. And such differentiation perhaps is not useful, however it is de facto used, anthropologically speaking. Say that we have a patch of red color as a sign of a danger or a threat. The color red taken in such way presents an essentially (in various ways) mixed (culture-nature) sign. It is a primordial sign of danger (of course in particular context) which is a certain mixture or proportion between natural and cultural aspects of it, yet we are using it as a whole and in the

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same time as a simple sign. Compared to it there are extremes, namely, on one hand there are almost pure natural signs, for instance blood as a danger, threat, or trauma, and on the other hand there are almost pure artificial signs, for example red traffic light as a dander, threat, or caution (as shown in Diagram 2).

Diagram 2: Pragmatic (or de facto used) differentiation of signs

Mixed signs seem to be not more abstract, rather more primitive or primordial then the natural or artificial (cultural, produced) signs. However, mixed signs are only anthropologically primordial since natural ones are surely biologically primordial and artificial ones are culturally primordial. Here the difference between culture and anthropology is that the culture is wider concept (some non-humans surely have culture), while the concept of anthropology is here reserved for human cultures. When it is said that mixed or primordial signs are de facto used, this is not pure experiential remark, rather an axis remark (OC 152), the third kind in Wittgensteins differentiation between grammatical (hinges) and experiential remarks. There are such primordial human signs actualized in various ways in various human cultures, namely signs for various essential differences, say enemy friend, danger security, edible/drinkable poisonous, barrier passage, etc. Some of these are very similar in different culture yet some are quite dissimilar depending on various further elements of development of particular cultures.

Ways of mixtures and their variety in mixed signs is enormous and cannot be elaborated here. Perhaps one of the reasons why one can consider this particular morphological connective analysis (as shown in Diagram 2) as non-intuitive, contrary to administrative one (as shown in Table 1) is the fact that the analysis itself is observed and analyzed by the members of our Western developed and highly differentiated (administrative) cultures in which for practical purposes the majority of signs are strictly differentiated as natural or artificial because of the historical developments of our cultures. Nevertheless, even in our contemporary cultures, in order to fully comprehend and understand the significance of a sign, say the sign of danger, one need to understand its mixture aspects as well as pure aspects and above all their relations of similarities and dissimilarities and finally the whole net and the pattern of a sign.

Another reason is the following. Natural and artificial signs are easily differed. For instance, a big, dark grey, heavy cloud or meteorologically speaking a cumulonimbus signifies rain because such clouds are rainy clouds for one who knows how to read the sign. Natural signs bear a causal relation to their objects, e.g. lightning is a sign of a thunder, and a thunder is a sign of a storm, while conventional signs signify by agreement. Signs point to in weaker sense, while for example symbols point to in stronger sense, like flags or coats of

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arms. The relation between a sign and a phenomenon is called the semiosis which brings us closer to semiotics and philosophy of language which will be to topic in the next part. Therefore, we have the following relations: Semiosis or signing (semiotics, cultural anthropology, biology), Significance or importance (of events, characters, and similar), and Signification or linguistic signing (semantics, philosophy of language).

No matter if the relation between a sign and a phenomenon or semiosis is problematic one; even more problematic is the difference between natural and artificial signs and this issue can help solving the issue of the nature of semiosis. The difference in question seems to be incomplete. Namely, as shown in Diagram 1, the amount and the importance of mixed signs make them far more then simple exceptions not even included in classical division in Table 1. For instance many facial expressions, gestures, bodily movements, and even some exclamations are, with some dissimilarity, universally recognized as signs and they are as such natural and cultural in the same time, i.e. certain mixture. For instance, there are five vital signs which are standard in most medical settings: body temperature, pulse rate or heart rate, respiratory rate, blood pressure, and pain. These signs are by all means natural signs or symptoms of various diseases and disorders. Some of them appear only in certain social, socio-psychological, and mental environments. Therefore, concerning vital signs as signifiers they are natural, but some aspects of what they signify can be cultural. These signs are mixed and in the same time crucial for our health.

In fact all interactions and results of a mixture of culture and nature, in many different ways, results with in such way mixed signs. Since, such signs are of utmost importance for humans, our survival, and different cultural patterns, as we said previously, one can suspect that they are anthropologically primitive, primal, or primordial, while more natural or more artificial signs are secondary or derived as a kind of special cases. For the end of this short and incomplete note on signs it seems necessary to answer to the question why is this important at all for language and linguistic meaning? It is so because it perhaps points to the morphological nature of all levels of signing and so to linguistic meaning as well.

3. Artificial signs: non-linguistic and linguistic

Surely there are purely non-linguistic signs and purely linguistic signs. Obviously linguistic signs, words like for instance, connectives "and" (conjunction), "or" (disjunction), "either...or" (exclusive disjunction), "implies" (implication), "if...then" (implication), "if and only if" (equivalence), "only if" (implication), "just in case" (equivalence), "but" (conjunction), "however" (conjunction) etc. are purely linguistic signs no matter if they can be represented by words or by symbols such as: negation (not) ( or ~), conjunction (and) ( , &, or ), material implication (if...then) ( , or ), biconditional (if and only if) (iff) (bi-implication) ( , , or = ), etc. The only difference here is that the first are linguistic signs of a natural language while the second are signs of the formal language.

Concerning artificial signs the same can be claimed. Namely, there are purely non-linguistic signs apart from what they signify. The problem with artificial signs is that they can be completely conventional meaning that they have no inherent relation to what they signify, for instance the artificial sign (in fact symbol) for biohazard (as shown in Picture 1).

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Picture 1. Symbol for biohazard as completely conventional

Artificial signs vary greatly since they can be icons, symbols, signals, symptoms, and even significances (in terms of values). Some of them are purely non-linguistic, but some are not. Many artificial signs are in fact in one way or another mixtures or intermediate cases between non-linguistic and linguistic signs. For instance traffic sign for STOP is a combination of red octagon with the white rim and white word STOP in the middle (as shown in Picture 2).

Picture 2: Traffic sign for STOP as partly non-conventional

Therefore, many artificial signs are in fact intermediate cases which are quite important. In fact for a series of such signs or isotypes a credit must be given to Otto Neurath, the important member of Vienna Circle. The most obvious linguistic sings are letters, words, expressions, sentences, texts (and/or discourses). This leads us naturally to the next difference, i.e. between words and languages as artificial linguistic signs. They surely deserve a part on their own if we understand them not just as words, sentences, and texts, but as utterances, speech acts, and conversations.

4. Words and languages: on the Continentalanalytic divide and the referentialcontextual divide among analytic theories of meaning

How a word, or a sentence, or even a text can mean something? Why words or even sentences are rarely bearers of linguistic meaning? Because, to some extent their meaning depends on elements which transcend them; sometimes these are linguistically broader elements such as language-games, sometimes non-linguistically different elements such as non-linguistic signs, and sometimes even contexts of facial expressions, gestures, bodily movements, typical bodily actions, and even cultural routines. Of course, the subject matter of our inquiry must be methodologically strict and isolated, yet is there a special reason why one while investigating the meaning of the word table for instance should not take into account not just the elements of the description of the table, but also many different contextual elements which would show not just that such a definition is only a kind of preliminary or starting point and eventually incorrect, but also the place of the word in language and in life. 4.1. The Continentalanalytic divide

The first issue which should be addressed is the Continentalanalytic divide, before the WW2 symbolized by the channel between England and Europe, and after the WW2 the divide was

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bridged, and a kind of communication between opposite sided was made and symbolized by Grand Canyon which is almost completely dried out and can be crossed on foot. The second issue will tackle some principle controversies regarding differences between different theories of meaning.

Let us turn to first issue. The analytic/Continental divide is a product of analytic not of Continental philosophers. However, if this is true then it seems to be auto-referentially inconsistent since this is a historical not a systematic note. Namely, analytic philosopher cannot claim the divide strictly without contradicting it. On the other hand, Continental philosophers rarely claim the divide. There are some difference, yet they seems to be the issue of methodological style and a way of writing, therefore two texts, each of one tradition can be translated one into another (work of R. Rorty, concerning some crucial philosophical concept is an excellent example). In his book The Origins of Analytic Philosophy M. Dummett (1993) claims that analytic philosophy is strictly post-Fregean, that it concerns only philosophy of language, precisely analytic philosophy and its linguistic turn, and that this turn started precisely with 62nd paragraph of Freges Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Later on, the linguistic turn was in many ways confronted with the interpretative turn of hermeneutic philosophy. However, precisely standpoints of Oxford school of ordinary language and later Wittgenstein, functioning as an intermediate standpoint, shows that besides dissimilarities there are many similarities between philosophies of linguistic turn and philosophies of interpretative turn. The concept and the activity of an interpretation show a long list of dissimilarities between Heidegger and early Carnap, while it shows some similarities between later Wittgenstein and Gadamer. Another example would be to compare various interpretation of the concept of an interpretation in analytic philosophy of science and phenomenology and hermeneutics and to compare these comparisons. However, only few philosophers made such comparisons, but it is not odd to do it nowadays in times of post-analytic philosophy (Rorty). Therefore, this obviously not so obvious radical statement about drastic, deep-stated, and unbridgeable divide led to debates within analytic and continental philosophies. Some of starting points and premises of such debates were even factually mistaken; some were more sophisticated nevertheless wrong in their arguments and conclusions.

Many of analytic philosophers disagree with Dummett since they want to include other philosophers which cannot be subsumed under such strict, and some suggest even self-contradictory in so strict standpoint. Some of them differentiate between linguistic turn and analytic philosophy (such as P. M. S. Hacker), some go even further claiming that there are Continental philosophies that are so analytic that they are closer to analytic then to some schools of Continental philosophy (such as D. Fllesdal). However, the Dummetts radical claim opened the relevant discussion which resulted with many reviews, papers, and books perhaps the most interesting of which is the one by H. J. Glock (ed.) The Rise of Analytic Philosophy with highly critical papers by D. Fllesdal, H. Sluga, R. Monk, P. M. S. Hacker, and J. Skorupski (Glock 1997). Some philosopher go even further claiming that philosophers such as Wittgenstein or Rorty, no matter if they started as analytical philosopher ended as surely not analytical but with something new which is a half-way to some Continental schools.

On the other side, concerning language and meaning, there were and are schools of Continental philosophy that were perhaps not by their affiliation to particular school, but by their approach, issues, and solutions much closer to analytic philosophies then to some schools of Continental philosophy. Yet, there were and still there are philosophers that strictly and combatively insist on analyticContinental divide. They emphasize only one aspect, the aspect of dissimilarities, and do not see, or do not want to see a series of important similarities on which many contemporary philosophies are founded.

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In comparing Continental and analytic philosophy there are two obvious sides, namely Continental and analytic. Therefore, many approaches to the issue of their comparison are more or less obviously biased. Both are commonly claiming that there are important differences that cannot be neglected. Often the other side is completely wrong. However, there are exceptions. For one thing there are always minority reports by third minor parties which do not see any relevant differences, therefore, for them they are identically wrong. Another approach sees possible interrelations; namely, how both sides can learn from each other. (Jones 2009:12-5) A special issue here is that there are historical approaches as well. However, these approaches are perhaps lesser biased yet still biased enough simply because the same division appears in study of history (think for instance about differences concerning 20th century history of international relations by Anglo-American school and German school), and consequently in philosophy of history as well.

On the other hand, there are philosopher who belong to both traditions in various ways (simultaneously, sooner-later, part of this-part of that, etc.) by their education or by their own choice. They could be regarded as eclectics (historically speaking perhaps there are some similarities between great systems of say Plato and Aristotle and schools that followed, and great systems of say Heidegger, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, Quine and schools that followed, but this is only an uneducated augury). However, if they come up with something new, then this is a kind of advancement. The same thing can be said in a way that such philosophers do not belong to these traditions at all. Nevertheless, the truth is not in the middle. Simple existence of philosophers who do not belong to main different and opposed schools or do belong to all of them does not prove anything. However, perhaps the study of differences and similarities between these schools and particular philosophers regarding their focal points can show that these are only aspects of the same issue.

Let as go a little deeper into this group of philosophers. As we said, there are philosophers who saw the obvious differences between generally speaking Continental and analytic traditions but they saw similarities too and they tried to discover the pattern. One can be wrong when making exact list of such philosophers yet some of them are obviously enough on it. Is their work sufficient and relevant in order to create a third tradition is cannot be of lesser importance than it really is since it is completely irrelevant are they mutually interrelated or not. Even if they would create such tradition, this would prove nothing, at least nothing of importance concerning the present topic which is problematic more then historically speaking. Some of them could be the following: L. Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright, D. Fllesdal, K. O. Apel, J. Habermas, R. Rorty, and others. Of course, there are militant wings on each side. I personally know many Hegelians and postmodernists who constantly make jokes on analytic philosophers, and for the other side it is enough to see who signed the letter sent to the Times in 1992 to oppose Cambridges proposal to grant and honorary doctorate to J. Derrida (Levy 2003:286). However, on the conceptual level, especially concerning the issue of language and linguistic meaning and on all levels of the approach to the issue of sources, methods, problems, discussions, goals, and of course results certain difference can be traced (as shown in Table 3, see Rorty 1979:357-89, 1982:211-33).

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Table 3: General differences between Continental and analytic approach to language and linguistic meaning issues (a very simplified differentiation)

I would like to continue a small personal intermezzo from the beginning if allowed. As being raised on Wittgensteins philosophy as my starting point, with BA on M. Merleau-Ponty, MA on Moore and Wittgenstein, with PhD on Wittgensteins On Certainty, and as a professor of analytic philosophy and epistemology, personally I am not to much concerned with these discussions, and for that matter not even with minute exegesis of Wittgensteins philosophy since there is the army of Wittgenstein scholars who take care of that issue with the highest quality possible concerning which many other historians doing philosophy of other great philosophers could be jealous with good reasons. Perhaps this is partially the reason why I do not see the whole fuss as an important. I simply recognize differences (much more discussed in literature), and similarities (substantially less discussed), but I always start with investigating both differences and similarities and making a kind of net. I am not a prig believing that I can discover the whole pattern of 20th century philosophy, but sign approach or sign aspect, after years of studying almost all schools of 20th century philosophies down to completely irrelevant philosophers on the grand scale, an undertaking that with some right can be called a complete waste of time, revealed that there must be such pattern. Now, the same thing surely can be done from other starting points, say epistemological, ontological, or ethical, yet the subject matter of meaning and language seems to the most suitable based on previously stated reasons some of which are even historical (Baldwin 2001).

4.2. The syntactic-semantic-pragmatic divides concerning language and referential-contextual divide concerning theories of meaning

Let us continue with the second issue on the previous one as its background or a kind of context because the previous one was so boring. The following historical observations could be of some importance. The differences between Continental and analytic schools were more obvious in the first half of the 20th century then in the second. In the second part of the century they were discussed as the topic of its own and many similarities appeared (think for instance how Heidegger was opposed to Wittgensteins TLP as a kind of new Chinese and how Carnap was opposed to later parts of TLP (and for that matter to some Heideggers expressions), yet Wittgenstein completely understood both Heideggers and Carnaps intentions and goals no matter if he disagreed with them both because he tried to form a different standpoint. If he really tried to do so, then we have at least more then two standpoints. Let us compare these three standpoints in their most simplified forms. These would be the following:

(a) Language is essentially logical language of science (Carnap, at least in his early writings)(b) Language is essentially activity (speaking) actualized in language-games (later Wittgenstein) (c) Language is essentially the house of Being (Heidegger, at least in some of his writings, Being as Sein).For the first thing, these standpoints are not just oversimplified but perhaps incorrect.

Namely, a language is means of communications (this doesnt prove that (b) is correct because of some further arguments). What is a communication? The common conception of communication simply views communication as a means of sending and receiving information. The strengths of this model are simplicity, generality, and quantifiability. The Shannon/Weaver model is based on the following elements (as shown in Table 3.1)

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Table 3.1: The Shannon/Weaver model of communication

Precisely this and similar communicative conceptions of language make the mixed and new standpoints at least equal and relevant to radical programs (as shown in Table 3). Another point with communication deserves emphasis too. Namely, types of communication, at least the basic types lead to the same point. Differences between types of communication from semiotic and morphological point of view are not strict (as shown in Table 3.2). There are always important intermediate cases and this fact speaks for itself (see definitions d, e and f).

Table 3.2: Basic types of communication

However, there are other reasons for possible incorrectness. For instance, formal languages of sciences, especially of logic, mathematics, linguistics, and others are, as it seems, not more artificial then the language of for instance poetry or sci-fi literature. However, in the first case being artificial means syntactically reduced for further practical purposes, while in the second case it means semantically reduced because they want to express something in the particular way and to produce a particular effect on the reader. The second thing is that this divide (a, b, c) really represents oversimplifications since there are huge differences and varieties within (a), (b), and (c). Within (a) there is a variety of standpoints leading from Frege to Quine, Putnam, Kripke, and Davidson; within (b) a variety leading from members of Oxford school of ordinary language, Moore, and Wittgenstein to many contemporary philosophers shearing some elements of their standpoints (such as Putnam, Habermas, and Rorty) or being completely followers of some of them (like Wittgensteinians for instance); and finally within (c) there is the greatest variety in German school from Husserl (perhaps Brentano and Bolzano as well) and Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Gadamer, in French school from Bergson and Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and others. Comparing these philosophers one could say they have nothing in

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common, yet concerning issue of the nature of language there are important similarities and dissimilarities. Therefore, one can research, metaphilosophically speaking, the history of discussion about Continental-analytic divide, and discover the third kind (group b). Another way to define language is to say the following:

(d) Language is the mental faculty that allows humans to undertake linguistic behavior: to learn languages and produce and understand utterances (N. Chomsky, J. Fodor). (e) Language is a formal system of signs governed by grammatical rules to communicate meaning = ideal language (B. Russell, early Wittgenstein, G. Frege and A. Tarski).(f) Language is a system of communication that enables humans to cooperate = ordinary language (G. E. Moore, later Wittgenstein, P. Grice, J. L. Austin, J. R. Searle, and P. F. Strawson), (Rorty 1967/1992:1-41, especially 15-23).

In this context it seems plausible to say something on the nature of the very subject matter of the present paper, namely on linguistic signs. Signs are threefold related to what they signify (as shown in the Table 4).

Table 4: The basic relations between signs and what they signify

The relation between semiotics and semantics was the primary subject matter of theories of meaning or the question how words mean something, or for example, how the English sign dog means a member of the genus Canis? In the context of this relation (as shown in Table 4), some even suggest (P. F. Strawson for instance, Harrison 1979:199-202) that the basic divide of all theories of meaning of words is between:

(g) Referential theories of meaning and(h) Contextual theories of meaning.

Now in the first group there are:(g1) Truth theories of meaning (descriptive),(g2) Verification theories of meaning (descriptive),(g3) Causal theories of meaning (causal),

While in the second group there are:(h1) Speech act theories(h2) Speakers meaning (intention) theories, (h3) Language-game theory and others (all being contextual). It should be noted that there are many other divisions of these theories. Some differ

between only three groups of theories: of communicative intention, truth theories, and causal theories. One can, by comparing simple divisions from analytic and semiotic points of view see the relevant differences (as shown in Table 4.1). For instance, the issue of the nature of metaphor can show the same Continental-analytic divide, the divide in theories of meaning, and finally divide in understanding language.

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Table 4.1: Different divisions of theories of meaning, from analytic and semiotic point of view

However, let us return to simple g-h division. Referential theories of meaning (g1-g3) are characterized by the fact that the meaning must be described in some kind of reference between a word and what it refers to, but is it the idea, any object (even fictive), the real object, or something different. They are characterized by the belief that the basic function of a language is to describe facts. Frege suggested that a word has its meaning only in the context of a sentence. Now, this point reduced the discussion to statements, even to propositions, composed of a subject and predicates in their most basic form, for example The snow is white. The word snow is the subject of the statement and it refers to the snow as a thing (what follows can be various descriptions of snow), and the word white is the predicate and it refers to the whiteness as the property of a thing (what follow can be various descriptions of white). The whole is affirmative meaning that the snow IS white, not, for instance that it is NOT white, and the statement The snow is white refers the fact that the snow is white (here some elements of g1 and g2 theories are obvious. They can be divided into description theories since predicates describe subjects and such descriptions are meanings of the subject, and causal theories since it is possible to trace the causal relation from the thing to the word in question. For such theories for instance exclamations such as The snow is white! have no significance. This is in a way strange since for instance the exclamation Eureka! is the symbol of a scientific discovery which is at least an important part of the scientific process and these theories are claiming that the form of scientific discoveries is a statement form which really is, yet the whole process includes more then just statements but also questions, suggestions, demands, requests, exclamations, etc. This is partly solved with introduction of formal scientific languages but it does not solve the problem of language of scientific process

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and scientific discovery. These issues lead to some far topics in the philosophy of science that cannot be discussed here.

On the other hand, contextual theories of meaning (h1-h3) in various ways are interested in a kind of outside or wider context of language. They essentially hold the descriptive fallacy meaning that it is wrong to presuppose that the basic function of a language is to describe facts (constatives), because a language has many other functions with which it is a part of wider context and with which we humans perform various linguistic, mixed, and essentially non-linguistic acts (performatives). Some of them include speakers intention (h2), some of them (h1) include even some bodily actions, right persons and utterances, which make the use of a sentences, like I christen this ship Osama bin Laden, successful and by that meaningful as well, and finally some of them (h3) take that the meaning of a word or of a sentence (statements, and utterances) is, in majority of cases, its use in a language-game which can be understood as a complete language for a particular practices but which is essentially interrelated to many other language-games (Hale and Wright 1999). The debate between these groups of theories can be formulated as the debate on the nature of statements. So, let us take an example of the pros and cons for statements as the fundamental kind of sentences according to referential theories:Some pros are: statements are about reality and this language-world relation is important, statements transfer information and this is important for human knowledge, if knowledge aspect is a prerequisite for emotional and willing relation to things then

statements are the most important of all sentences. Some cons are: statements are not primary in the course of language learning but expressions of emotions

or needs, statements have no primacy in the course of understanding reality, statements are not the only way of use of indicative sentences since perhaps these just

look like being nice cases for statements because there are other ways of using indicative sentences which does not have anything to do with knowledge, transfer of information, or stating the facts.

Therefore, for one thing, the debate between approximately speaking referential and contextual theories of meaning can be reduced to the debate about the nature and importance of statements, but to the linguistic debate about the primacy of kinds of sentences as well. This seems odd since no matter if this issue can be interesting linguistically speaking, yet it seems that it does not address the basic question how words mean anything?

Another topic is meaning in broad sense, as the meaning of the world we live in. Mentioned theories do not make account for this. However, this is also important from semiotic and psychological points of view (as shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3).

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Table 4.2: Significance as meanings - world meaning theories

Meaning is here understood as significance. They can be interpreted as meaningfulness (as shown in Table 4.2) and as values (as shown in Table 4.3). In the first case (4.2) the basic question is why and how do humans make sense of their existence in the world or how do they make it meaningful? In the second case (4.3) the question is which are our primordial values and is there an order between them? We cannot enter into discussion here but it seemed important to mention in some detail these non-linguistic signs which are sometimes forgotten.

Table 4.3: Significances as values

On the other hand, all kinds of words and sentences have their place in language and any theory of meaning has to take that fact into account. Perhaps another problem is that each theory spontaneously, or simply being understood as a theory, has a natural inclination to include all kinds of words and all kind of sentences, yet they are mostly unsuccessful at least in cases of natural languages. Semiotic approach tries to take into account words and perhaps expressions, sentences,

and utterances as signs and by that the whole discussion is located around the question what is a sign and how it signifies, which seems to be more plausible. It is approach that recognizes variety of signs and tries to find the pattern of all signs.

Another advantage concerns the nature of language because semiotics can take into account a language as a passive phenomenon i.e. as a system of words, sentences, texts,

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and discourses, but as an active phenomenon as well, that is as a system of expressions, utterances and conversations (this difference partially rests on Saussures difference between langue and parole from his classic A Course in General Linguistics, 1916). The statement aspect and the utterance aspect, for example, are equally important from the semiotic point of view.

5. Instead of conclusion: the basic idea

All previously said can be understood as a short overview of some carefully chosen elements of semiotics, philosophy of language and the Continental-analytic dispute as the relevant context of the simple idea that will be suggested in what follows. Let us start from the obvious and gradually move to new as it was professed by Aristotle as the right method.

Human languages have very distinct and useful feature, which is displacement (Stein, Rowe 1996:290-1). It is an ability to speak about events at distant times and places, not just about what is here and now. Displacement enables humans to learn form the past and to plan for the future. Some signs like symbols and icons make that much easier. More to that, the feature of displacement is responsible for imagination and creativity which also contributes to creation of some signs.

Of course, nature is signing, non-living things, plants, and animals. But this signs as all other non-signing phenomena have to be interpreted, and signs have to be interpreted as signs. Among living non-human species signs among animals are the most complicated (say signs of bees, ants, predators, monkeys, etc.). In the most general sense these signs are necessary and sufficient for survival. Among humans there are a lot of even more complicated signs and among them some are more primordial then others. Now, say that Homo Sapiens Sapiens or modern humans have some basic signs that enable them to survive (origin, structure, and uses of such signs may or may not have some connections to Chomskys theory about The Universal Grammar, (Chomsky 1972), in a way that one can hypothesize about the universal signing pattern), for instance signs basic for surviving techniques such as signs for: Eatablenon-eatable Drinkablenon-drinkable Safetydanger Passage obstacle (see Picture 3) Shelteropen space, My groupothers, Opposite sexmy sex, and similar.For the present purpose there is no need to factually know which of these signs were and are primordial, and how much of them were really necessary. However, their structure and actual use can be relevant. First of all they seem to be mixed signs composed of the following aspects: sounds (various exclamations for instance), facial expressions (eyes, mouth, etc.), gestures and other bodily movements (hands, etc.), possibly of artificial signs (say made of stone, wood, bones), etc.

Some basic signs have various aspects. They can be signs in terms of being natural, artificial, non-linguistic, linguistic, expressed in various natural languages, artificial languages, etc. Say they a group of humans while traveling encounter some kind of danger or an obstacle because of which, concerning their point of an arrival, they should move to the right. There is a variety of signs that humans are using (as shown in picture 3).

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Picture 3: Variety of signs for moving right (from natural to linguistic) as a direction of passage

Picture 3 shows not just the variety which is important, but a kind of process and development, yet there is a huge difference between the traffic sign (in the middle) and linguistic sign (on the right). Yet, if one can interpret the traffic sign (in the middle), then the correct expression in English would be precisely the linguistic sign on the right, i.e. right turn only. On the other hand, the process going from the natural sign for going right (left side up), which can be a part of a gesture or even combined with a facial expression, to pictorial symbol (left side middle), and to the artificial sign (left side down) is obvious.

Basic signs could be easily learned (culturally, Stein, Rowe 1996, Kottak 1999), and on various occasions they could be used in one of their aspect for various purposes (for instance hunting or battle gestures are better then sounds, and in some cases silence can be interpreted as a sign too). Now, the point is that really such basic signs are not real but ideal. They are a hypothesis of an essence because we tend to think that if there are so many different signs say for danger (and words as well) there must be something identical to all of them.

On the other hand, the present idea is precisely the opposite one. One should investigate different cultures and their signs for say eatablenon-eatable, drinkablenon-drinkable, etc. in their most developed forms and in small isolated cultures in their most primordial forms. Therefore, the research is in cultural anthropology and social linguistics, and it is morphological. Then, one should observe and compare various actual signs cross-culturally and their analogies and disanalogies, similarities and dissimilarities, and nets of these will slowly appear. Finally, one would see the pattern, for instance signs for danger. One would easily recognize that something is a sign for danger in one culture and in the other no matter how different they actually could be since one would see their place in pattern. Nothing connects hand signal for pointing to the right and traffic sign RIGHT TURN ONLY, yet the series of intermediate cases make connections of similarities.

Now, one can ask what this has to do with the philosophy of language, theories of meaning and differences between various approaches to these issues. The idea of such future research in the philosophy of language is the following. A linguistic meaning, no matter if understood in terms of word (referential and causal

theories), sentence (Frege, Dummett), text, and discourse theories (semiotics), or in terms of speakers-intention, conversational implicatures (Grice), speech-acts (Austin, Searle), dialogues, monologues (literary theories), and language-games (Wittgenstein), always must take into account: that language (and consequently the meaning) is a living process phenomenon of using signs by humans (not only by humans of course) among other living process phenomena, and that as such is essentially manifested in various mixtures (intermediate cases) of natural and cultural aspects of signs, from primordial to highly developed signs still using for communicating important massages, no matter how simple or complex and sophisticated they can be.

Consequently, any interdisciplinary, comparative, holistic, or whatever fancy word one might use research of signs, meaning, and of linguistic meaning as well, must take into

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account their context among other living procedural phenomena especially those anthropologically basic (in natural and cultural sense) on one hand, and their internal nature which is always a mixture of all levels, differences or in short of all aspects of phenomena.

For instance, there can be a pattern for a sign for danger, a pattern which is very delicate combination of nets and of similarities and dissimilarities between various cultures and their characteristics. The whole pattern is the background of the sign for danger in various cultures and environments, background of recognition of various signs (and words, speech-acts, etc.) and their place in system of signs, in a system of particular culture, but how it is actualized is the rough ground from which we must always start our simple observation. There are consequences for philosophies of language too. For great majority of signs, words, expressions, and sentences, even for some dialogues,

their meaning is their use in language-games to which they belong (not their usefulness but their use).

But to understand their use one needs to understand the place of language-games as an activity among other activities of humans, and the place of all of these activities in their lives as a series of very delicate and variously actualized mixtures of nature and culture.

All of theories of meaning in a way emphasize only one or two aspects of the meaning of linguistic artificial signs belonging to significances, and only some of them recognize the position and place of linguistic meaning among significant phenomena, among phenomena crucial for lives of humans. And precisely this should not be forgotten, that words and languages are signs, signs of life in a way. They shouldnt be blamed for this mistake of not applying synthesis as a legitimate philosophical method in terms of surveyable presentations (Wittgensteins term), conceptual mapping (Ryles term), linguistic phenomenology (Austins term), or connective analysis (P. F. Strawsons term). Origins of this mistake are twofold. On one hand, there is, perhaps justified revolt against idealism and some of its obviously unjustified exaggerations, and on the other hand, there is that nave idea that scientific methods can be completely copied in philosophical proceedings. The radical example is Carnaps idea that philosophy is logical analysis of scientific language and therefore philosophy of science only.

Such research, here described and explicated only in a nutshell, should help to understand not just the issue of meaning in philosophy of language, but the place of language in life, helps that the present diversification of sciences, disciplines, schools, and theories concerning meaning doesnt help much. Such approach helps us to understand better not just past and present cultures, but probable changes in the near future. Therefore, the Porphyrian tree as shown in Table 1 should be completely differently observed, even imagined, and consequently represented (as shown in Table 5 and 6).

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Table 5: Proposal of a new aspect on meaning from semiotic point of view: position of basic signs as mixed between more bodily signs, more linguistic signs, pure linguistic, pure non-

linguistic, and the position of theories of meaning in the context of artificial signs.

Table 5 shows the position of theories of meaning between basic mixed signs, pure linguistic and pure non-linguistic signs. Theories of meaning, semiotically speaking: Most directly overlap with basic mixed signs (or they should if they want to be relevant), While less directly overlap with more bodily, yet still mixed signs, and With more linguistic, yet still mixed signs.Via basic mixed signs, their more bodily aspects, and more linguistic aspects theories of meaning are indirectly connected to all kinds of pure linguistic and non-linguistic signs with which they share many interconnections. Consequently, there are many intermediate cases within and between these groups which are not as strictly divided as shown in the Porphyrian tree in Table 1. This representation, with many conceptual and graphical mistakes still seems to point to another way or aspect of meaning in the semiotic context.

Now is the moment at least to mention some ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspect of signing. These are obviously different for signs and for singing. Concerning ontology, signs are wholes while signings are events or actions. Further on, natural signs are events and actions, while signings are mostly actions. Formation of a rainy cloud is an event, while reading this as a sign or rain is an action. Perhaps this stands for symbols too. On the other hand, artificial sign are actions, e.g. symbolizing, hand and facial signs, speaking a natural language, etc. Mixed signs are prototypical actions. A hand sign for right turn, a speech act such as Tom: I take you Jill to be my lawfully wedded wife, or signing that something isnt eatable are obviously enough actions. Therefore, some further ontology of signs is needed.

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Concerning epistemology the basic question is what is knowledge of a sign which comes down to the issue what does it mean to know-how to use a sign? First question is about propositional knowledge, while second is about an ability or technique of using signs. Therefore, what is needed isnt just propositional theory of knowledge but an overview of know-how as well. Finally, concerning ethics there are two groups of issues. Internal issues about the very morality of a signs. Some signs can be regarded as immoral for various reasons, while other can be moral or simply neutral. Some conversational implicatures will do for that matter. External issues are about applied issues of signing, meaning that signing is a part of complex actions which are regarded as moral or immoral. Here again, the very use of a sign determines its morality. There is nothing inherent to a sign which makes it morally right or wrong, or for that matter signing as human action.

Another thing is that the semiotic approach to signs enables us to understand, to have a conceptual background and the context of the idea that there is no strict boarder between modern humans and say apes and monkeys concerning sign use. Research on baboons, indicates that they can use symbol combinations as a means of specifying more then a single symbol can express (Savage-Rumbaugh 1990:615). Of course there are differences, yet they are not sufficient for strict boarders concerning signing and linguistic signing as its aspect. If one operates with a very strict concept of linguistic meaning and language then these similarities simply cannot be counted as relevant, yet they seem to be. In Table 6 there are some possible relations between principally different groups of signs.

Table 6: Proposal of a new aspect on meaning from semiotic point of view: position of artificial signs in the context of human signing, natural non-human signing, etc.

More to that, Table 6 on the other hand shows even wider context of the Table 5 since the later shows only aspects of artificial human signs. Therefore, it seems important at least to mention this wider context of artificial human signs as more or less intentional as similar and dissimilar with human natural and more or less unintentional signing. Even wider context is human signing as similar and dissimilar with non-human signing (divided into non-human

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natural signing, i.e. non-living things, for instance as rainy clouds sign rain, plant signing, and non-human animal signing). Here there are also many differences and similarities. Some plants and animals have signals and signs. Some of these signs are obviously very similar to some human basic mixed signs, some are obviously very dissimilar. Further wider context is the one of significant and non-significant phenomena.

However, the difference between unintentional and intentional signing is interesting one as well. Intuitively, one could say that signing is always intentional. For one thing it seems very outlandish to claim that a rainy cloud has an intention to sign anything. OK, let us turn to humans. Symptoms, like a body temperature for instance, are typical cases of unintentional signs. There are surely some events going on in human bodies in such situations, yet it is highly questionable are they human actions. So, let us take a bit complicated example. Say that there are two bushes say 50 meters one from another, and that a man with a spear is running from one to another after which there is an open space. This signs nothing except if one says that it signs that a man is running from a bush to a bush. But if you are a hunter you can interpret this situation as a sign that he is running from a dangerous animal and that he needs help. If he doesnt know that you can see him or that you are nearby, then he is unintentionally signing. But let us add two elements to this event. Say that while running the man turns toward you and with his thumb points to the bush he runs from. This can be interpreted in a way that he is running from something. Since he has a spear one can reasonably suppose that he is a hunter and that he runs from a dangerous animal because something went wrong. This can be interpreted as a call for help if you are a hunter too. Many interesting intermediate cases can be presented in order to show that the description in Tables 5 and 6 are much more used then description extracted from Table 1 which is useful only for one purpose, that is to say an administrative classification. However, it cannot be done here.

Here we return to the beginning of the paper. Some, in fact many phenomena do not signify anything to anyone regardless of their interpretation. Yet some are significant. And the last interrelatedness between this level of significant phenomena and human significance as an aspect of pure non-linguistic signs (as shown in Table 5) is that something can be significant phenomena for the environment, some species, or some ecological system yet it does not bear significance for humans directly. However, if the protected natural environment is one of the basic human significances, like protections of various sorts, like life, justice, democracy, etc. then it is not just significance in terms of a non-linguistic sign, for instance, that some humans by some actions obviously and unambiguously signify significance of natural environment, but significant phenomenon in terms of a basic sort of phenomena. There are many intermediate cases, and important interrelatedness between these aspects, but there is no time to describe them at the moment.

As promised at the beginning of the paper, it seems that the basic idea is sufficiently described, made clear, criticized, and defended, namely the idea that the semiotic approach to all theories of meaning, to each of them particularly, and to all of them as a whole of solutions to the one common question, how our words mean something, enables approaching in new, interesting way which can reveal many mistakes, and open many new ways of answering this very question. That is to say, our words mean something because they are essentially signs, and by

having the structure of a sign they act like signs. Therefore, semiotic approaches to the question how words mean something makes possible for one to approach and hopefully to answer the question with some completely new insights, and from completely new perspectives and aspects.

Many of other questions are presupposed as answered in a particular way, for instance that the meaning of a word is its use in a language-game as a kind of explicit Wittgensteinian

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approach to the issue, and many are bypassed because they do not belong to the subject matter, limits and the scope of the basic idea and the argument of the present paper, such as many discussions about the correct definition of semiotics, of a sign, of various differences between kinds of signs, between various theories of meaning, about the relation of this approach to linguistics, to cultural and physical anthropology, etc. and these are obvious limitations which need to be asked and if not answered then at least clarified in some further research.

References

Philosophy of language

Austin J. L. 1980 How to do things with words, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Baldwin 2001 Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophy in English since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Green M. S. 2010 Speech Acts, in: OConnor T. and Sandis C. (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 58-67.Grice P. 1991 Studies in the way of words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Hale B. And Wright C. 1999 A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford, Blackwell. Harrison B. 1979 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, London, Macmillan. Lowe E. J. 2010 Action Theory and Ontology, in: OConnor T. and Sandis C. (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 3-10. Platts M. 1997 Ways of Meaning, An Introduction to Philosophy of Language, London, MIT Press.Rorty R. (ed.) 1967/1992 The Linguistic Turn, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Rorty R. 1979 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Rorty R. 1989 Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge, CUP.Rorty R. 1994 Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Speaks J. 2011 Theories of Meaning, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . (Retrieved 4. 8. 2011). Wittgenstein L. 1969 On Certainty, Oxford, Blackwell (OC). 1974 Tractatus Logico-Philosphicus, Routledge, London (TLP) 1978 Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics, Blackwell, Oxford (RFM). 1998 Culture and Value Revised Edition, Oxford Blackwell (CV). 2009 Philosophical Investigations Oxford Blackwell (PI).

Continental-Analytic Divide

Babich B. E. 2003 On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy, C. G. Prado, ed., A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy, Amherst, NY: Prometheus/Humanity Books, pp. 63-103.Cooper D. 1994 Analytic and Continental Philosophy, Proceeding s of the Aristotelian Society, 94:1-18. D'agostini 1997 Analitici e Continentali, Milano, Raffaello Cortina Editore. Dolcini N. 2007 The Analytic/Continental Divide, Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies, No. 16, (August, 2007), pp. 283-302.Dummet M. 1993 Origins of Analytical Philosophy, London, Duckworth.

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Engel P. 1997 La Dispute: Une introduction a la philosophie analytique, Paris, Minuti. Glock H. J. 1997 The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell. Jones K. 2009 Analytic versus Continental Philosophy, Philosophy Now, 11, July/August, 2009, pp. 12-5.Levy N. 2003 Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences, in Metaphilosophy, Vol. 34, No. 3, April 2003, pp. 284-304.

Semiotics and linguistics

Chandler D. 1994 Semiotics for Beginners, URL: http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/semiotic.html, (Retrieved 24. 8. 2011)Chomsky N. 1972 Language and Mind, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Eco U. 1986 Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press.Johansen J. D. and Larsen S. E. 2000 An Intorduction to Semiotics, (in Croatian), Zagreb Croatia Liber.Shannon C. E. 1948 A Mathematical Theory of Communication, The Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 379423, 623656, July, October.

Anthropology

Buck R. and VanLear C. A. (2002) Verbal and Nonverbal Communication: Distinguishing Symbolic, Spontaneous, and Pseudo-Spontaneous Nonverbal Behavior, Journal ofCommunication, September, 2002, pp. 522-541.Kottak C. P. 1999 Mirror for Humanity, Boston, McGraw-Hill College.Savage-Rumbaugh E. S. 1990 Language Acquisition in a Nonhuman Species: Implications for the Innateness Debate, Developmental Psychology, 23Stein, P. L. Rowe B. M. 1996 Physical Anthropology, New York, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

Internet sources for quoted movies and actors quotes

Police officer Caroline Paski, character played by Cherry Jones and Reverend Graham Hess played by Mel Gibson in the movie Signs, 2002, director: M. Night Shyamalan, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0286106 /quotes, Retrieved 25. 8. 2011.Dick Hallorann, character played by Scatman Crothers in the movie The Shining, 1980, director: Stanley Kubrick, http://www.imdb.Com/title/tt0081505/quotes, Retrieved 23. 8. 2011. Groucho Marx, URL: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/g/groucho_marx.html, Retrieved 23. 4. 2011.Roy Neary, character played by Richard Dreyfuss in the movie Close Encounters of the Third Kind, 1977, director: Steven Spielberg, URL: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075860/quotes, Retrieved 23. 4. 2011.

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