6.resource exhaustion
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Course 1: Overview of Secure Programming, Section 6Pascal Meunier, Ph.D., M.Sc., CISSPMay 2004; updated August 12, 2004Developed thanks to support and contributions from Symantec Corporation, support from the NSF SFS Capacity Building Program (Award Number 0113725) and the Purdue e-Enterprise CenterCopyright (2004) Purdue Research Foundation. All rights reserved.
Course 1 Learning Plan
Security overview and patching Public vulnerability databases and resources Secure software engineering Security assessment and testing Shell and environment Resource management Trust management
Learning objectives
Be able to identify resources at risk Understand how resources become at risk from
denial-of-service attacks Be able to decide which resources need to be
exposed Understand how to mitigate resource exhaustion
risks
Resource Management: Outline
Motivation Resource identification Resource exhaustion
– CPU exhaustion – Network applications and protocols vulnerabilities– Generous Protocols and Algorithms– Other asymmetric attacks
Memory Management
How Important is Availability?
How important is it to have resources available at some specific times or all the time?
Market for 99.99% availability systems or even "5 nines" (99.999%)– Worth a lot of money for some businesses– Redundant hardware, fault-resistant software
Problem: Infrastructure, hardware, software usually designed for functionality and performance in normal situations, not robustness vs. worst-case scenarios– Malicious people can engineer worst-case scenarios to
come true
Availability Through Software
Monitoring software that relaunches an application whenever it crashes or quits
Redundant software installations on different partitions
Disk images (e.g., Ghost) Virtual machines that reload running images
(VMWare) The above are just mitigating setups that don't fix
the original problem and can still cause interruptions– Perfect software is not possible, but better software is
Denial of Service
The unavailability of a needed resource, most often due to a malicious entity.
Sometimes not the primary goal– Side effect of another attack– Failure to achieve worse results
Perhaps used to evade traceability, law enforcement or accountability– disable logging mechanisms– disable detection and alert systems
submerge human with messages, human may disable the attacked defense mechanism!
Resource Identification
Shared resources are exposed to resource exhaustion attacks– Memory– Hard Drive space– Bandwidth– CPU– Entropy (for random number generation)– Database engines– Servers– Analysts– Wireless Mice, Keyboards– Wireless NICs
Question
Which one of these resources is susceptible to a resource exhaustion attack?
a) Electric power b) Chair c) Trackpad
Resource Exhaustion
May happen whenever there are:– A finite number of resources– A finite rate (e.g., processing)
Hard to defend against some variants– Sometimes a balancing act– Analogy: By staying home, the risk of meeting unpleasant
people is removed, but the cure may be worse than the risk.
How Resource Exhaustion Happens
Spend time processing requests from illegitimate (but possibly legitimate) users
Allow legitimate users to hog resources Improperly free resources no longer needed Sometimes design errors, sometimes
implementation
Resource Exhaustion Enablers
Expensive Tasks– Algorithms– Encryption, Compression and Encoding
e.g., DVDs are expensive to compress
Generous Protocols and Algorithms– Anonymous or unauthenticated allocation of computer
resources– Amplifiers (broadcasts, subscriptions, distributed systems)
Coding errors turned into vulnerabilities– Memory Leaks and other memory management errors
Design errors– Absence of policies, restrictions, access control, partitions
or compartments, backups, failover or redundant systems
Example: Disk
Risk: Disk or partition is unavailable because it is completely filled
Threat: one user can rob all others of disk space (including the use of a partition)
Resource managed by the operating system Enabling factors
– Missing or no quotas specified by OS for users and processes /tmp directory
– fill up the disk (or partition) with temp files
/var directory– use up the disk (or partition) with logs
Question
Identify the correct resource exhaustion enablers:
a) Memory failures
b) Generous protocols and algorithms
c) Expensive hardware
Question
Identify the correct resource exhaustion enablers:
a) Memory failures
b) Generous protocols and algorithms
c) Expensive hardware
CPU Exhaustion Attacks
Uninterruptible tasks Unwise operational order
– Perform a series of complex operations first, before checking the request's validity
Asymmetric attacks– Cost for attacker is much smaller than for defender– Algorithmic complexity attacks
Uninterruptible Tasks
CAN-1999-1285Linux 2.1.132 and earlier allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion) by reading a large buffer from a random device (e.g. /dev/urandom), which cannot be interrupted until the read has completed.
CPU not available until random numbers have all been calculated
Unwise Operational Order
A firewall’s job is to block trafficDon’t perform expensive operations on traffic you’re blocking anyway!
CAN-2002-1203 IBM SecureWay Firewall before 4.2.2 performs extra processing before determining that a packet is invalid and dropping it, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion) via a flood of malformed TCP packets without any flags set.
Asymmetric CPU Attacks
Cryptographic algorithms are typically expensive– Initiate communications so server generates keys, etc...
Don’t know if message is good until decrypted– Send random messages
IPSEC design vulnerability
Algorithmic Complexity Attacks
Exploit worst-case scenario of algorithms– Hash algorithms (Crosby and Wallach 2003)
Data structure pollution Bro IDS (Intrusion Detection System) dropping 70% packets Normally O(N), becomes O(N2) with malicious input
– if N is 1000, cost is 1000 times higher than expected!
– Quicksort: O(N2) instead of O(NlogN)– Python regular expression engine
Exponential blowout with malicious input
– Fix: use algorithms that are not vulnerable "universal hash algorithms" designed to avoid the
vulnerability Please see http://www.cs.rice.edu/~scrosby/hash/
Question
Algorithmic complexity attacks work because:
a) they attack complex algorithms
b) they exploit the worst-case behavior of algorithms
c) there were errors in the implementation of the algorithms
Question
Algorithmic complexity attacks work because:
a) they attack complex algorithms
b) they exploit the worst-case behavior of algorithms
c) there were errors in the implementation of the algorithms
Discussion
How would you prevent or defend against:– Uninterruptible tasks– Unwise operational order– Asymmetric attacks
Discussion Sample Answers
How would you prevent or defend against:– Uninterruptible tasks
Limit CPU slices per user– move part of algorithm out of kernel space
– Unwise operational order Do not invest in something that may be worthless until you
know for sure you have to (may not be initially obvious)
– Asymmetric attacks Limit the rate of the expensive events/origin
Network Application and Protocol Vulnerabilities
Can produce:– Memory exhaustion– Numbered resource (e.g., ports) exhaustion– Bandwidth exhaustion...
Ports and Thread Exhaustion
In TCP/IP, an application uses a ”port”, a positive number less than 65536. Example: port 80 for web servers.
Passive FTP:FTP server reserves a random port (above 1024) for use by a client and waits for the client to connect there.
What if client doesn’t connect ever?
Ports example
CAN-2002-0221
Etype Eserv 2.97 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion) via a large number of PASV commands that consume ports 1024 through 5000, which prevents the server from accepting valid PASV.
Threads Example
Microsoft NT architecture: FTP and Web services on the same computer share a common thread poolExhausting the FTP thread pool will cause failed connection requests for the Web service.
CVE-1999-1148IIS processes passive FTP connection requests by assigning a thread to each port waiting for a client to connect
Sockets
Socket: Data structure to record which application talks to what
Internet sockets (AF_INET):
– Which application reserved which port
– One IP address, one port = one socket you can listen to
– Incoming connections are recorded with additional sockets
– Number of sockets -1 = number of clients
Sockets example
CVE-2001-08306tunnel 0.08 and earlier does not properly close sockets that were initiated by a client, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion) by repeatedly connecting to and disconnecting from the server.
Generous Protocols and Algorithms
A Protocol or Algorithm that allocates resources based on (perhaps initially) anonymous or unauthenticated requests
Can you name one?
TCP/IP Generosity
The TCP/IP protocol allocates memory at the beginning stage of a communication, upon reception of a packet with the “SYN” flag, to keep track of communications (e.g., socket).
Early TCP/IP implementations kept the memory allocated for a very long time...
SYN flood attack:The sending of numerous SYN packets until all the memory available for keeping track of new connections has been consumed.
Generosity in Stateful Protocols
Protocols that maintain state information are necessarily more vulnerable to DoS attacks.– Above a certain treshold, quality of service breaks down
Connectionless protocols show progressive degradation with load
Conversion of stateful into stateless protocols– Not easy in all cases, but can solve SYN flood– Idea: encrypt the state data, and return it to client
No memory usage Increased CPU and bandwidth usage trade-off
– Reference: Aura and Nikander 1997
Amplification
Form of generosity Example: ICMP ping
– Request-response protocol– Unauthenticated– Can send request to a broadcast address
All computers respond!– To who? A spoofed IP address == Smurf attack
Bandwidth can be completely consumed by the response– Overwhelm victim destination computer– Other victims
» hosts on affected networks» networks in between broadcast and destination
Question
Can you name another amplification mechanism used by attackers?
a) Challenge-response mechanism
b) Encryption
c) Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks
Question
Can you name another amplification mechanism used by attackers?
a) Challenge-response mechanism
b) Encryption
c) Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks
In DDoS attacks, amplification is provided by numerous "zombie" (compromised) computers obeying remote commands.
Work-Around for Generosity
Quickly expire transactions (connections, etc...) that block while waiting on input– especially anonymous users
Exercise
Name the vulnerability in this pseudo-code, and explain why it is vulnerable:
1 Wait for client connection2 Validate input3 Create user object4 Match user against potential dates5 Prepare report6 Verify that user paid subscription; if so send back report, if not send bill7 Repeat (i.e. go to line 1)
Exercise
Name the vulnerability in this pseudo-code, and explain why it is vulnerable:
That is an unwise operational ordering. It can result in a resource exhaustion because expensive operations are performed before a request validity check.
Memory Management Problems
Memory leaks (very common)– Memory that is never freed, for every request– CAN-2003-0032
Memory leak in libmcrypt before 2.5.5 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (memory exhaustion)
Double free– CVE-2002-0059
The decompression algorithm in zlib 1.1.3 and earlier, as used in many different utilities and packages, causes inflateEnd to release certain memory more than once (a "double free"), which may allow local and remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a block of malformed compression data.
Memory Management Problems (cont.)
Use of freed memory– CAN-2002-1490
NetBSD 1.4 through 1.6 beta allows local users to cause a denial of service (kernel panic) via a series of calls to the TIOCSCTTY ioctl, which causes an integer overflow in a structure counter and sets the counter to zero, which frees memory that is still in use by other processes.
Freeing wrong memory– CAN-2003-0525
The getCanonicalPath function in Windows NT 4.0 may free memory that it does not own and cause heap corruption, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via requests that cause a long file name to be passed to getCanonicalPath, as demonstrated on the IBM JVM...
Memory Management Problems (cont.)
Information leakage– CAN-2003-0048
PuTTY 0.53b and earlier did not clear logon credentials from memory, including plaintext passwords, which could allow attackers with access to memory to steal the SSH credentials.
– CAN-2003-0047 SSH2 clients for VanDyke (1) SecureCRT 4.0.2 and 3.4.7, (2) SecureFX 2.1.2 and 2.0.4, and (3) Entunnel 1.0.2 and earlier, do not clear logon credentials from memory, including plaintext passwords...
– CAN-2003-0001 Multiple ethernet Network Interface Card (NIC) device drivers do not pad frames with null bytes...
Notes About Information Leakage
Overwrite sensitive memory to prevent leakage Compilers may remove calls to bzero and memset
during optimization– Use SecureZeroMemory in Windows– Use spc_memset from Secure Programming Cookbook
Use memory locking to prevent passwords and keys from being saved to disk (virtual memory, swap space)– mlock– AllocateUserPhysicalPages and VirtualLock
Disable crash dumps (core files)– setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, …)
Memory Management Problems (cont.)
Invalid memory references– CAN-2002-1294
The Microsoft Java implementation, as used in Internet Explorer, can provide HTML object references to applets via Javascript, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash due to illegal memory accesses) ...
– CAN-2002-1289 The Microsoft Java implementation, as used in Internet Explorer, allows remote attackers to read restricted process memory, cause a denial of service (crash), and possibly execute arbitrary code via the getNativeServices function, which creates an instance of the com.ms.awt.peer.INativeServices (INativeServices) class, whose methods do not verify the memory addresses that are passed as parameters.
Memory Management Problems (cont.)
Memory exposures– CAN-2002-1125
FreeBSD port programs that use libkvm for FreeBSD 4.6.2-RELEASE and earlier, including (1) asmon, (2) ascpu, (3) bubblemon, (4) wmmon, and (5) wmnet2, leave open file descriptors for /dev/mem and /dev/kmem, which allows local users to read kernel memory.
– CAN-2002-0973 Integer signedness error in several system calls for FreeBSD 4.6.1 RELEASE-p10 and earlier may allow attackers to access sensitive kernel memory via large negative values to the (1) accept, (2) getsockname, and (3) getpeername system calls, and the (4) vesa FBIO_GETPALETTE ioctl.
Exhausting Memory for Data Structures
Process and other tables Buffer pools File descriptors Sockets Etc...
Human Resource Exhaustion
Typical street scenario:– Some people distract the person guarding assets while
others steal things or otherwise violate policies
Information security: – Create many alerts and warnings so that an analyst or
user is overwhelmed and can't identify the dangerous ones. IDS flooding tools available
– "Stick" (Giovanni 2001)
– Attack against online support and services Chat bots (Gabriolovich and Gontmahker 2003)
– Defense: Reverse Turing Tests» Recognizing distorted letters in an image» Riddles
Discussion
Discuss the similarities between SPAM and human resource exhaustion attacks.
True or False?
Denial of service attacks are all caused by resource exhaustion
All shared resources risk being exhausted
Lower resource cost to the attacker than the defender is indicative of a resource exhaustion vulnerability
Questions?
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Developed thanks to the support of Symantec Corporation
Pascal [email protected]:Jared Robinson, Alan Krassowski, Craig Ozancin, Tim Brown, Wes Higaki, Melissa Dark, Chris Clifton, Gustavo Rodriguez-Rivera