Turning points in history: the Fall of Constantinople

«Turning points in history: the Fall of Constantinople»

by Michael Angold

Source:Byzantinoslavica ­ Revue internationale des Etudes Byzantines (Byzantinoslavica ­ Revueinternationale des Etudes Byzantines), issue: 1­2 / 2013, pages: 11­30, on www.ceeol.com.

Turning points in history: the Fall of Constantinople1

Michael ANGOLD (Edinburgh)

Strangely enough few historians have seen the crusader conquestof Constantinople in 1204 as a historical turning point, possiblybecause the Latin Empire of Constantinople was such an ephemeralaffair that it is easy to dismiss the whole episode as an historical aber-ration. The fall of the city to the Ottomans in 1453 is another matter.It used to be singled out as the turning point, which traditionallymarked the end of the Middle Ages. However, Sir Steven RUNCIMAN

devoted the preface to his The Fall of Constantinople 1453 to an elegantrebuttal of any such notion.2 Few if any historians continue to subscribeto the idea that a single event or even a complex of events can by them-selves alter the course of history. They know only too well that – toquote RUNCIMAN – ‘the stream of history flows on relentlessly and thereis never a barrier across it.’ They approach the question of historical

1 There is a vast bibliography on both events. For 1204 the key work remainsD. E. QUELLER – T. F. MADDEN, The Fourth Crusade. The Conquest of Constantinople,2nd ed., Philadelphia 1997. See also J. GODFREY, 1204. The Unholy Crusade,Oxford 1980; M. J. ANGOLD, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, Harlow 2003;J. P. PHILLIPS, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, London 2004. For1453 see most recently M. PHILIPPIDES – W. K. HANAK, The Siege and the Fall ofConstantinople in 1453. Historiography, Topography and Military Studies, Farnham2011; M. J. ANGOLD, The Fall of Constatinople to the Ottomans, Harlow 2012.2 S. RUNCIMAN, The Fall of Constantinople 1453, Cambridge 1965, xi-xii. 11

560e anniversaire de la chute de Constantinople (1453)

1150e anniversaire de l’arrivée des missionnaires Constantin (Cyrille) et Méthode en Grande-Moravie (863)

change from a Braudelian angle, where change is understood in termsof long-term trends and cumulative impact.3 You look for ‘triggers’ thatmake change possible or for ‘tipping points’ where cumulative build-upproduces discernible changes. The notion of a turning point, whichpresupposes some chance event changing the course of history, seemscrude by comparison. Perhaps this will explain why historians havegiven such a wary reception to chaos theory and historical contingency,which might appear to support the notion that chance events havemomentous consequences. For guidance on historical turning pointswe still have to turn to Geoffrey BARRACLOUGH’s Turning points in WorldHistory, now more than thirty years old, which singles out the ScientificRevolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the only sig-nificant turning point in world history.4 His argument is a circular one.World history was a consequence of European world domination, whichin its turn was only possible because of the Scientific Revolution. He isnot interested in events as turning points in history, but merely equat-ing a turning point with an historical process rather than an historicalevent. Though this was not his intention it underlines an importantfact: that an event becomes a turning point in history largely because itinitiates or radically alters historical processes, but as the ScientificRevolution demonstrates the latter can rarely be tied down to any sin-gle event.

Why in that case should the two falls of Constantinople be any dif-ferent? The answer lies in the way that Constantinople was at the cen-tre of historical processes by virtue of being itself a turning point, oneof those hubs around which extensive areas of the globe revolve. Whathappened at Constantinople had repercussions that went far beyond itswalls. For much of a period that runs from the early fourth century tothe end of the First World War it was at the heart not so much ofempires, as of systems of imperial hegemony, for the power its rulersexercised was not only political, but rested on strong religious, culturaland economic forces, which transcended any political frontiers. Itmade Constantinople a focus for regions and peoples outwith thedirect political control of its ruler. It gave the latter access to resourcesof manpower and materials, which were rather greater than thoseoffered by the Empire itself. It goes some way to explaining how theOttoman Empire retained its importance into the twentieth centuryand how after the loss of Syria and Egypt to Islam Byzantium was ableto fend off the threat from Islam and become once again a dominantforce. It goes without saying that Constantinople’s place in the world

3 F. BRAUDEL, A History of Civilizations, Harmondsworth 1995, 27-36.4 G. BARRACLOUGH, Turning Points in World History, London 1979.

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ensured that it was a centre of international commerce, much of itdirected towards supplying the City’s everyday needs. Trade wasimportant to Constantinople, but could not by itself sustain any verylarge population. The key factor was the creation and maintenance ofan impressive apparatus of state required for the exercise of power. Itwas all the more substantial for comprising the administrative organsof both Church and State. Not only did they concentrate power inConstantinople, but also its corollary: wealth. It was this combination,which more than anything explains the huge size of the city. The pre-ponderant role of Constantinople was a defining feature of Byzantiumin its medieval heyday, which lasted until the end of the twelfth centu-ry. In many respects Constantinople was the empire.5 It provided theunderlying stability and continuity, which counteracted the superficialvolatility of Byzantine politics. The lack of certainty over the rules ofsuccession often produced coups and counter-coups, which at least inthe short-term left Byzantium in a vulnerable position. But these needto be put into perspective: they performed a function not dissimilarfrom presidential elections and referenda and were only marginallymore disruptive to the day-to-day running of the state, which was in thehands of a corps of functionaries. These not only ensured administra-tive continuity; they were also the guardians of a political system, ofwhich the emperor was very often a prisoner. Their experience allowedthem by a process of adaptation (oikonomia in Byzantine terms) toassimilate or neutralize the tensions inherent in any political system.But, in the same way as all political systems, however solid and endur-ing they seem, it had its moments of vulnerability. It too would find itsnemesis. It came in the shape of the fourth crusade.

I No event illustrates the role of the contingent in history quite sowell as the story of the fourth crusade. It was famously ‘a tale of menenmeshed in the toils of their own miscalculations.’6 When the fourthcrusade hove to under the walls of Constantinople in July 1203, therewas no question of the establishment of any Latin regime atConstantinople. The crusade was there to back the claims to theByzantine throne of Alexios Angelos, a nephew of the reigning emper-or. It was part of a dynastic dispute, into which the crusade was drawn.7

5 P. J. ALEXANDER, The Strength of Empire and Capital as seen through Byzantineeyes, Speculum 37 (1962) 339-357.6 J. GODFREY, 1204. The Unholy Crusade, Oxford 1980, vii.7 See C. M. BRAND, Byzantium confronts the West, 1180-1204, Cambridge, Mass.1968, 117-157; M. ANGOLD, Byzantine Politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade, in: UrbsCapta. The Fourth Crusade and its consequences, ed. A. Laiou (= Réalitésbyzantines, 10), Paris 2005, 55-68.

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Turning points in history: the Fall of Constantinople

There is no doubt that dynastic infighting left Byzantium in a politi-cally fragile state, but these crises punctuate Byzantine history. If thearrival of the fourth crusade in 1203 bears comparison with the eventsof 717, when with Arab backing Leo III was able to secure theByzantine throne,8 their outcomes were quite different. Leo III turnedon his Arab supporters and drove them from the walls ofConstantinople. In 1204 the Byzantines tried to do much the same withthe fourth crusade, but failed. However, the crusader conquest shouldnot necessarily have entailed the breakdown of the Byzantine system,but it did. It was this, as much as anything, that made 1204 an histori-cal turning point. I want to start by examining more closely the dis-mantling of the Byzantine system in the years following 1204, whichonly the conquest of Constantinople made possible.

The main evidence is Constantinople itself.9 Before 1204 the bestestimate is that it was a city of around half a million inhabitants on apar with the great cities of the Islamic world.10 It dwarfed any towns orcities in the Latin West. It was also out of all proportion to the landmassand population of the Empire itself, for its size and wealth did notdepend on the Empire alone, but on a circle of lands beyond its bor-ders. However, the crusader conquest reduced Constantinople’s popu-lation in a matter of decades to a fraction of its former size. Thisrequires an explanation. It was not as if the crusader conquest ofConstantinople bore any resemblance to the Mongol conquest ofBaghdad in 1258, when there was systematic destruction of the coun-tryside and a massacre the inhabitants. The number of Byzantineskilled by the crusaders when they stormed the walls of Constantinople

8 M. ANGOLD, The Byzantine Political Process at Crisis Point, in: The ByzantineWorld, ed. P. Stephenson, Abingdon 2010, 15.9 On Constantinople under Latin rule see D. JACOBY, The Urban Evolution ofLatin Constantinople (1204-1261), in: Byzantine Constantinople: Monuments,Topography and Everyday Life, ed. N. Necipog¢lu (= The Medieval Medi-terranean 33), Leiden 2001, 277-297; V. KIDONOPOULOS, The Urban Physiognomy ofConstantinople from the Latin conquest through the Palaiologan era, in: Byzantium:Faith and Power (1261-1557), New York – New Haven 2006, 98-117.10 There are no accurate figures for the population of Constantinople. Thechronicler of the fourth crusade Geoffrey of Villehardouin mentions in passingthat at the time of the conquest the city had a population of 400,000, whichmodern historians have seized upon. It does not seem to be a conventional num-ber. If nothing else, its approximation to the well documented estimate for thesize of the population of mid-16th-century Istanbul gives it credibility. It is alsothe case that as a member of the commission charged with the partition of theByzantine Empire Geoffrey of Villehardouin had access – if at second hand – toByzantine administrative records.

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was minute. The one precise figure we have is a mere 2,000.11 The cru-saders appear to have obeyed the admonition of their clergy againstunnecessary bloodshed, though they had no qualms about puttingConstantinople to the sack. Could the looting have been on such ascale that it triggered the city’s long-term decline? There is no doubtthat the booty taken by the crusaders was colossal. We have the chron-icler Geoffrey of Villehardouin’s word for it: “to his knowledge, somuch booty had never been gained in any city since the creation of theWorld.” He reckoned that it amounted to at least 450,000 silvermarks.12 It was likely to have been much more than this. The poorknight Robert of Clari grumbled that there were vast quantities of rich-es in the palaces taken over by the leaders of the crusade.13 Theseappear not to have been included in the general booty to be sharedout. Much of the treasure stored in the main imperial palaces of theBlachernai and Boukoleon came from the stripping of church treasuresordered by the new Emperor Alexios Angelos in the autumn of 1203 inorder to pay his debts to the crusaders. If we should absolve the cru-saders of many of the crimes imputed to them, the damage done toConstantinople over the years 1203-1204 was a great deal more thanthat perpetrated by the crusaders themselves. It went way beyond merelooting. The most serious damage was the result of three terriblefires.14 The most devastating occurred on 19-20 August 1203 andburnt out the heart of the city from the Golden Horn to the Marmorashore. As T. F. MADDEN has noted, it utterly dwarfed the so-called GreatFire of London, which in 1666 had roughly the same population asConstantinople in 1204. If the bulk of the damage done toConstantinople was not the crusaders’ direct responsibility, they werecertainly responsible for failing to make good the damage done, whichis indicative that something had gone badly wrong, for it was not asthough these were the only serious fires Constantinople had known. Aswith its successor Istanbul fires were always a hazard in a city, wherethere was so much building in wood. Equally, it was not as though eccle-siastical treasures had not been confiscated before. They were aresource Byzantine emperors had recourse to at times of exceptionaldifficulties. It meant putting wealth into circulation, which was likely to

11 Given by Gunther of Pairis: The Capture of Constantinople. The “HystoriaConstantinopolitana” of Gunther of Pairis, ed. & transl. A. J. Andrea, Philadelphia1997, 107.12 Geoffroy de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, ed. E. Faral, 2nd ed.,Paris 1961, vol. II, §254.13 Robert de Clari, La conquête de Constantinople, ed. P. Noble (= BritishRencesvals Publications 3), Edinburgh 2005, 98-99.

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have had a generally beneficial effect, but in 1204 that beneficial effectwas perhaps more likely to be felt in Italy and the West than it was inByzantium itself. But it remains debatable how this would have con-tributed directly to the impoverishment of Constantinople and itsinhabitants, if only because much of the plunder taken in 1204 servedno useful economic purpose. In other words, if past experience was anyguide, Constantinople should have recovered. It was after all a stillfunctioning city, when the crusaders took it over. It had suffered con-siderable material damage, but little loss of life. Nor was there any gen-eral expulsion of the inhabitants in the aftermath of the conquest,though many of the elite departed voluntarily. On 17 April 1204 thepatriarch and members of his clergy left Constantinople under safe-conduct for the Thracian city of Selymbria. Along with them went manybureaucrats: the historian Niketas Choniates, for example, who tookhis household with him.15 However, some members of the Byzantineelite preferred to stay on, often serving the Latins in an administrativecapacity.16 One example would be the father of the historian GeorgeAkropolites, who enjoyed many favours from the Latins, but by 1233 hewas seeking to escape from Constantinople together with his house-hold, to which end he despatched his son now aged sixteen to the courtof the Nicaean Empire, the most successful of the Byzantine successorstates.17 The inference is that staying on in Latin Constantinople wasbecoming less and less rewarding for members of the Byzantine elite.Not only had Latin rule failed to deliver prosperity, but – a point,which is often missed – it also brought radical social and ethnic changeto Constantinople.

II Its impoverishment under Latin rule emerges from GeorgePachymeres’s description of Constantinople, when the Byzantinesreturned in 1261. Neglect was everywhere. The Latin emperors had leftthe Blachernai palace uninhabitable. The walls were smeared withsmoke and grease as a result of the disgusting eating habits of the Latinemperor’s companions.18 The poverty of the Latin emperors became a

14 T. F. MADDEN, The Fires of the Fourth Crusade in Constantinople, 1203-1204: ADamage Assessment, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 84/85 (1992) 72-93.15 Nicetae Choniatae Historia, ed. J.-L. van Dieten, CFHB, Ser. Berol. 11, Berlin1975, 589-593.16 P. LOCK, The Latin Emperors as heirs to Byzantium, in: New Constantines. TheRhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th centuries, Aldershot 1994,300.17 George Akropolites, The History, transl. R. Macrides (= Oxford Studies inByzantium), Oxford 2007, 189.18 Georges Pachymérès, Relations historiques, ed. A. Failler and transl. V. Laurent,CFHB 24/1, Paris 1984, ii. 31: I, 219.5-9.16

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byword. The last Latin emperor famously stripped the lead off theroofs of the Great Palace to raise cash.19 A Latin patriarch had antici-pated him decades before when in 1222 he removed lead from the roofof St Sophia.20 Actions such as these make it far less of a surprise thatthe Latins failed to make good the damage done by the fires at the timeof the fourth crusade. Pachymeres recognized the pressures that theLatin emperors of Constantinople had been under. They were sur-rounded by hostile powers and the city was under blockade for longperiods. The lack of firewood became so desperate that the Latins dis-mantled old houses for their wood.21 They also engaged in a brisktrade in statuary and architectural features stripped from churches,palaces, and public places. The Pilastri Acritani at Venice came fromthe church of St Polyeuktos, which was broken up under the Latins.22

The porphyry group of tetrarchs united in brotherly love, which nowstands in an angle of St Mark’s at Venice, was originally at thePhiladelpheion in Constantinople.23 Constantinopolitan spolia equallywent to Ayyubid Egypt.24 The impression left is that to survive any-thing of value in Constantinople was simply sold off by the Latins.According to George Pachymeres the Latins were in such constant fearof being deprived of what did not belong to them that they treated it“as something that would not be theirs for long”.25 Or as anotherByzantine historian Nikephoros Gregoras put it: “Once it was theirs,the Latins took no care of the city, but rather set about its completedestruction, as if they had no confidence in their long-term possessionof the city.”26 This seems to be good psychology. But there was anoth-er dimension. The crusaders were not as impressed as once they wereby the products of Byzantine civilization. These were reminiscent of the

19 R. L. WOLFF, Hopf’s so-called “Fragmentum” of Marino Sanudo Torsello, in:Joshua Starr Memorial Volume, New York 1953, 150.20 R. L. WOLFF, Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204-1261,Dumbarton Oaks Papers 8 (1954) 278.21 Nicephorus Gregoras, Byzantina historia, ed. L. Schopen, CSHB, Bonn 1829,81.8-11.22 R. S. NELSON, The History of Legends and the Legends of History: The PilastriAcritani in Venice, in: San Marco, Byzantium, and the Myths of Venice, ed. H.Maguire – R. S. Nelson, Washington, D.C. 2010, 63-90.23 M. HARRISON, A Temple for Byzantium. The Discovery and Excavation of AniciaJuliana’s Palace Church in Istanbul, London 1989, 100, 132, 143; F. BARRY, Disiectamembra: Ranieri Zeno, the Imitation of Constantinople, the Spolia style, and Justice atSan Marco, in: San Marco, Byzantium, and the Myths of Venice, 34-35, 39-41.24 K. CIGGAAR, Byzantine spolia in Egypt. Sultan Malik Al-’Adil and Byzantium’s cul-tural heritage, in: Quarta Crociata. Venezia – Bisanzio – Impero Latino, ed. Gh.Ortalli – G. Ravegnani – P. Schreiner, Venice 2006, II, 663-681.25 Pachymérès, ii. 30: I, 215.4-5.26 Gregoras, I, 88.5-9. 17

Turning points in history: the Fall of Constantinople

Romanesque, which was in the process of being superseded in the westby a Gothic sensibility. Two works of art exemplify the taste of the Latinleadership at Constantinople. The first is the cycle of St Francis dis-covered in the Kalderhane Camii, which became a Franciscan Churchunder the Latins. The cycle is in the Gothic style and close to contem-porary work being carried out at Acre.27 The second work of art is thereliquary made on the orders of the Latin Emperor Henry of Hainaultfor a relic of the true cross, which is now in the Treasury of St Marks,Venice.28 It is in the style of northern French goldsmith’s work of thetime.

This is a reminder that, notwithstanding a massive dispersal ofrelics in the immediate aftermath of the crusader conquest,29 the Latinemperor managed to secure many of the most precious relics kept atConstantinople, including relics of the passion. He could use them asprestigious diplomatic gifts. He could pawn them, if need be. This iswhat happened to the Crown of Thorns, which was used as surety for aloan. When the last Latin Emperor Baldwin II was unable to redeemthem, the French king Louis IX came to his aid, but on the under-standing that the precious relic was now his, which is how the Crown ofThorns came to Paris. The French king created the most glorious reli-quary for it, which in its turn was housed in that most un-Byzantine ofbuildings, the Sainte-Chapelle.30 But, when all is said and done, theincident is one more example of the poverty of the Latin Emperors,who had recourse to stripping Constantinople of anything valuable asthe only means of getting by.

III Their problem was lack of income. They had little or no landedwealth. Tax revenues amounted to very little, while customs duties werenegligible, because Constantinople had ceased to be a major centre oftrade.31 Paradoxically, the Latin conquest destroyed the trading pat-tern, which underpinned Venetian commerce in the twelfth century,when the Venetians took over a significant proportion of the carryingtrade of the Byzantine Empire, the main purpose of which was provi-sioning Constantinople. To explain the collapse of this trading network

27 C. L. STRIKER – Y. DOG¢AN KUBAN, Kalenderhane in Istanbul. The buildings, theirhistory, architecture and decoration, Mainz 1997, 17; D. WEISS, Art and the Crusade inthe Age of Saint Louis, Cambridge 1998, 102-103, 152.28 The Treasury of San Marco, Venice, ed. D. Buckton, Milan 1984, no. 34, 244-251.29 M. BARBER, The Impact of the Fourth Crusade in the West: the Distribution of relicsafter 1204, in: Urbs Capta, 325-334.30 Le trésor de la Sainte-Chapelle, ed. J. Durand – M. P. Lafitte, Paris 2001, 37-41.

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you need look no further than the disintegration of a centralized systemof taxation, which was a major consequence of the Latin conquest. Itmeant that wealth was no longer concentrated in Constantinople. Itforced the Venetians to rebuild their commercial networks, but this wascomplicated by the long struggle with Genoa for control of Crete. It wasnot until 1252 that the Venetians could be completely confident thatCrete was theirs.32 The focus on Crete reflected the creation of a differ-ent trading pattern. The island had the advantage of linking two dif-ferent commercial networks: one that united Italy with the Aegean andConstantinople and another that joined Italy to Egypt and Syria.Already cut off from its hinterland this shift in the pattern of tradethreatened to turn Constantinople into a backwater. It was no longer thecapital of a great power, nor was it a major centre of international trade.Not only did it suffer from the changing focus of Venetian trade; it hadalso to confront the disruption caused by the Mongol invasions acrossthe Steppes from the 1220s. Paradoxically, these eventually worked toConstantinople’s advantage. The establishment of a pax mongolicaopened up new and exciting possibilities. So, from the 1250s you findVenetian fleets33 and individual merchants, such as Marco Polo’s fatherand uncle, reconnoitring the commercial potential of the Black Sea.The way was open for a new chapter of Venetian and for that matterItalian maritime ascendancy but based on very different foundationsfrom those existing before 1204. It was the fate of Latin Constantinopleto preside over the breakdown of one pattern of trade without beingable to take advantage of the new one, which was taking shape. It was arecipe for rapid economic and demographic decline.

Constantinople changed in other ways as well. Paradoxically, itbecame more of a Latin city, even if it is difficult to find any remains ofthe Latin occupation. There are strong reservations, for example,about attributing to the Latin occupation the flying buttresses, whichshore up St Sophia.34 Far more plausible is a Latin origin for its belfry,

31 L. B. ROBBERT, Rialto business men and Constantinople, 1204-61, DumbartonOaks Paper 49 (1995) 43-58 contra D. JACOBY, Venetian Settlers in LatinConstantinople, in: Ðëïýóéïé êár Öôù÷ïr, ed. Ch. Maltezou, Venice 1998, 181-204;D. JACOBY, The Economy of Latin Constantinople, 1204-1261, in: Urbs Capta, 195-214.32 S. BORSARI, Il dominio veneziano a Creta nel XIII secolo, Naples 1963; G. JEHEL,The struggle for hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean: an episode in the relationsbetween Venice and Genoa according to the chronicles of Ogerio Pane (1197-1219),Mediterranean Historical Review 11 (1996) 196-207.33 E.g. the Venetian expedition of 1257 to the port of Mesembria.34 R. J. MAINSTONE, Hagia Sophia: architecture, structure and liturgy of Justinian’sGreat Church, London 1988, 104-105 contra JACOBY, Urban evolution, 286.

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which was still there at the end of the seventeenth century.35 It was aneasy and cheap way of putting a Latin stamp on the building. Not eventhe Venetians who made the imperial monastery of the Pantokratortheir headquarters have left any signs of their occupation.36 However,in good western fashion the Latins built a fortress over the Forum ofConstantine, which was well positioned to control the city. Even if thereturning Byzantines pulled it down,37 it was a sign of the way theshape of the city was changing under Latin rule. Most obviously, therewas a retreat to a core between St Sophia and the Golden Horn, wherethe water supply continued to function adequately.38 Much of theremaining area within the walls was given over to agriculture of onesort or another. It contained thirteen villages, as we learn from theMoroccan traveller Ibn Battuta, who visited the city in the early1330s.39 It had become a suburban region. In this way too Constan-tinople was coming more and more to resemble the port cities of Italy.

The population became more mixed. The Latins held Constan-tinople for approximately three generations, which was time enoughfor radical demographic transformation, proof of which is supplied bythe Gasmoule community of mixed Latin and Greek race, which hadcome into existence under the Latins.40 How different the populace ofConstantinople had become under Latin rule emerges from the mea-sures taken by Alexios Strategopoulos, the Byzantine general, whosecured the city in July 1261. He organized patrols night and day,because he knew he was dealing with a resentful populace. Even if herecognized that it was made up of both Greeks (Romaioi) and Latins,this did not prevent him from labelling the people of Constantinople aforeign race (allotrion genos).41 Romaizontes (roughly translated as semi-

35 Ibidem, 113.36 D. JACOBY, The Venetian Quarter of Constantinople from 1082 to 1261: topo-graphical considerations, in: Novum Millennium. Studies on Byzantine history andculture dedicated to Paul Speck, ed. C. Sode – S. Takács, Aldershot 2001, 160-167.37 Pachymérès, ii, 35; I, 227.4-6.38 On the water supply of Constantinople, see J. CROW, The water supply ofByzantine Constantinople (= Journal of Roman studies monographs, 11), London2008. Cf. V. KIDONOPOULOS, The Urban Physiognomy of Constantinople from the Latinconquest through the Palaiologan era, in: Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261-1557).Perspectives on late Byzantine Art and Culture, ed. S. Brooks, New York – NewHaven 2006, 98-117.39 The Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D. 1325-1354, transl. H. A. R. Gibb (= HakluytSociety, ser.ii. 117), Cambridge 1962, II, 508.40 Pachymérès, iii. 9; I, 253.10-17.41 Pachymérès, ii. 30: I, 215.15-27.42 Pachymérès, ii. 27: I, 201.5.

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Byzantine) was the term used by the returning Byzantines for theGreeks of Constantinople.42 As the Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologosadmitted, the newly recovered Constantinople was a place, where thestreets sounded to “the confused accents of a half-barbarian people.”43

IV Contributing to the changing character of Constantinople werethe Franciscans and Dominicans, who had established themselves thereby the end of the 1220s.44 In the face of their activities the OrthodoxPatriarch Germanos II from exile at Nicaea tried to strengthen theGreek community in their faith. He was alarmed by reports of Bogomilsuccess among the Greeks of Constantinople. What this meant is notvery clear. It is notoriously difficult to separate Bogomilism from pop-ular dissatisfaction with the Church.45 The patriarch may only havebeen admitting that the ecclesiastical organization of the OrthodoxChurch in Constantinople was failing. Such a possibility receives sup-port in this case from his worries about the lack of Orthodox priestsworking in Constantinople. These were conditions exactly suited to thepastoral talents of the Franciscans and Dominicans, who are known tohave had their successes among the Greeks of Constantinople.46 It waspart of a process of assimilation, which extended to the leaders of theGreek community. Proof of this is the existence of a group of Greekarchontes of Constantinople, who in 1261 preferred to accompany thelast Latin emperor into exile.47 They were faced with the distinct pos-sibility that the return of a Byzantine emperor would spell the end oftheir social ascendancy, because it would mean the return too of thecourt aristocracy, who would resume their accustomed position andprivileges. Such fears can only have been confirmed by AlexiosStrategopoulos, who immediately set about assigning mansions tomembers of the Byzantine aristocracy. It was noted at the time thatsuch acts of expropriation were alienating the people of

43 G. DENNIS, Auxentios: Typikon of Michael VIII Palaiologos for the monastery of theArchangel Michael on Mount Auxentios near Chalcedon, in: Byzantine monastic foun-dation documents, ed. J. Thomas – A. C. Hero (= Dumbarton Oaks Studies, 35),Washington, D.C. 2000, III, 1216.44 R. L. WOLFF, The Latin Empire and the Franciscans, Traditio 2 (1944) 213-237.45 M. J. ANGOLD, Church and Society at Byzantium under the Comneni (1081-1261),Cambridge 1995) 468-501.46 Registres des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople (I, fasc. 4), ed. V. Laurent,Paris 1971, nos. 1287, 1291, 1303; J. GILL, An unpublished letter of Germanos, patri-arch of Constantinople, Byzantion 44 (1974) 142-151.47 The Chronicle of Morea, ed. J. J. Schmitt, London 1904, vv. 1331-1332. JohnPhylax, a servant of the Emperor Baldwin II, preferred to throw in his lot with theByzantine forces, but he seems to have been the exception rather than the ruleamong the Greek archontes of Constantinople (Pachymérès, ii. 27: I, 201.5-23).

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Constantinople.48 These grants then received confirmation fromMichael VIII Palaiologos. Otherwise the emperor did little to alter thearrangements pertaining under Latin rule, apart from providing sup-port to the monasteries of Constantinople.49 If anything, he made itimpossible to reverse the changes that had occurred. He turned largeareas within the walls into farms to support the troops he brought in todefend Constantinople. He even supplied them with plough-teams.50

The Italian communities were left undisturbed, as were the Gasmoules.Under Latin rule the latters’ tax contributions were shared between theVenetians and the Latin emperor. This arrangement continued after1261 with the Byzantine emperor taking the share that had previouslyfallen to the Latin emperor.51

If in 1261 the Dominicans of Constantinople fled with the LatinEmperor Baldwin to Negroponte, the Franciscans stayed on. They werenot driven out of Constantinople until the accession of Andronikos IIPalaiologos in 1282.52 Whether they retained possession of theKalenderhane Camii is another matter, but in the person of JohnParastron – a native of Constantinople – they were a formidable pres-ence in Constantinople under Michael VIII Palaiologos.53 His influ-ence with the emperor reflected the latter’s policy of reconciliation withthe various communities of Westerners left over from the Latin Empire.The Union of Churches was as much for their benefit as it was a diplo-matic ploy, which is the way it is usually presented.54 If it had only beena diplomatic ploy, there might have been less resentment by theByzantines. It united a series of groups, which saw their position threat-ened by the Union of Churches: members of the aristocracy, whoobjected among other things to the way the emperor increasinglyplaced Latins in command of the Byzantine forces; local dynasts,

48 Pachymérès, ii. 30: I, 215.14-15.49 Pachymérès, ii. 33: II, 220-222.50 Pachymérès, iii. 9: I, 251.19-26.51 D. JACOBY, Les Vénitiens naturalisés dans l’Empire byzantin: un aspect de l’expan-sion de Venise en Romanie du XIIIe au milieu du XVe siècle, Travaux et mémoires 8(1981) 221-223.52 William Adam, De modo Sarracenos extirpandi, ed. C. Kohler, in: Recueil deshistoriens des croisades. Documents arméniens, vol. II, Paris 1906, 548.53 Pachymérès, v. 11; II, 475-477; D. J. GEANAKOPLOS, Bonaventura, the two men-dicant orders and the Greeks at the Council of Lyons (1274), Studies in ChurchHistory 13 (1976) 198-199.54 E.g. D. J. GEANAKOPLOS, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West 1258-1282.A study in Byzantine-Latin Relations, Cambridge, Mass. 1959; S. RUNCIMAN, TheSicilian Vespers: a history of the Mediterranean World in the later thirteenth century,Cambridge 1958.

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Frankish and Greek, who understood that the Union of Churches wasa cover for an attack on their independence; and provincial monaster-ies, who believed that it put Orthodoxy in peril. There was very littleopposition to the union on the streets of Constantinople, which is notsurprising if the Franciscan John Parastron was as popular as the his-torian Pachymeres suggests.

V The co-operation of Latin and Greek was probably Byzantium’sonly chance of recovering its dominant position, but it was doomed tofailure because of the structural changes that followed 1204. Crucialwas the way that the Latin conquest had emancipated the Byzantineprovinces from Constantinople. The best thing for Byzantium mightwell have been recognition of a fait accompli and the establishment of aLatin dynasty and ruling class, which with time would have becomeByzantine. Instead, there was resistance to the Latin conquest, out ofwhich would emerge a series of successor states. These would changethe face of Byzantium. Though their aim was initially to win backConstantinople from the Latins, their effect was to infuse provincialpower bases with imperial pretensions. In a Byzantine context onlyclaims to imperial authority provided an institutional basis for statebuilding. Before 1204 there was much unrest in the Byzantineprovinces, but with one exception no attempt was made to create analternative system of government. That exception was the rebellion ofPeter and Asen in the Balkans in 1186. They used memories of theBulgarian Empire to lay the foundations of a new state, which becamethe dominant political force in the Balkans during the Latin occupa-tion of Constantinople.55 Out of the ruins of the Byzantine Empire wesee a quite different political system coming into being in the yearsafter 1204. It consisted of a series of petty states, most with imperialpretensions, but united under the umbrella of the Orthodox patriar-chate, which had been restored in 1208 in the city of Nicaea and quick-ly recovered its ecumenical authority.56 This was to remain the reality,even after the recovery of Constantinople in 1261.

The crusader conquest of Constantinople in 1204 therefore had adouble impact: on the one hand, it created the conditions for the dis-mantling of the economic and political structures on which the integri-ty of the Byzantine Empire was founded, leaving it at the mercy of out-side forces; on the other, it left a legacy of distrust, not to say loathing,of the Latins on the part of the Orthodox Church. This was unfortu-

55 J.-C. CHEYNET, Pouvoir et contestations à Byzance (963-1210) (= ByzantinaSorbonensia, 9), Paris 1990, 427-458.56 M. ANGOLD, Church and Society, 530-563.

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nate, when political realism dictated that Michael VIII Palaiologosmake the Latins an essential element in his plans for the restoration ofthe Empire. In retrospect, it becomes clear that he only ever had a slimchance of success. He was not able to reverse the changes that occurredduring the period of exile, whether it was a sense of local identity tak-ing precedence over loyalty to an emperor in Constantinople; whetherit was a more pronounced attachment to Orthodoxy, which undercuthis efforts to integrate Latins into a Byzantine framework. But, most ofall, Michael VIII Palaiologos was unable to reverse the deteriorationsuffered by Constantinople under Latin rule. Why this should havebeen is nowhere made clear. The most likely explanation is a combina-tion of political fragmentation, which meant that tax revenues wereinsufficient to stimulate a sustained recovery, and of changes in thestructure of international trade following on the establishment of a PaxMongolica. These benefited the Italians based in Constantinople (or inthe case of the Genoese at Pera across the Golden Horn). Constan-tinople became their entrepôt. The Byzantine government derivedsome revenues from the flow of trade through its waters, but notenough to make a substantial difference to its financial position. Therole of the Latin occupation of Constantinople was therefore largelydestructive. It allowed the dismantling of the old imperial system,which had sustained medieval Byzantium. A new system only emergedafter the Byzantines returned to Constantinople, but it was the work ofthe Venetians and Genoese. Its basis was commercial rather than polit-ical and religious. It was conditional upon the continuing political frag-mentation of the region, which the Italian republics were determinedto maintain.

The Venetians reckoned that the main danger to their commercialinterests was from a resurgent Byzantine Empire, which will explaintheir opposition to Michael VIII Palaiologos’s efforts to reunite the ter-ritories of the old Byzantine Empire. Key to this was control of theAegean, which in the end eluded the Byzantine emperor because of hisfailure to secure the two key Venetian strong points in the Aegean: thefortress of Negroponte on the island of Euboea and the town of Candiaon the island of Crete.57 The struggle for control of the Aegeanexhausted the Byzantine Empire. On the death of Michael VIIIPalaiologos in 1282 his son and heir Andronikos II disbanded theByzantine navy, leaving the Venetians and the Genoese with command

57 M. J. ANGOLD, Michael Palaiologos and the Aegean, in: Liquid and Multiple.Individuals and Identities in the Thirteenth-Century Aegean, ed. D.Stathakopoulos – G. St. Guillain (= Centre de Recherche d’histoire et civilisa-tion de Byzance, 36), Paris 2012, 27-44.

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of the Aegean. Supremacy at sea thereafter allowed them to underminethe stability of the Byzantine Empire whether by embroiling it in theircommercial rivalry or by meddling in the civil wars, which disfigureByzantine history for much of the fourteenth century.

VI It took time for the Italians to recognize the dangers presented bya new power – the Ottoman Turks, who had established themselves asmasters of Thrace by 1361.58 Unlike other Turkish emirates theOttomans showed relatively little interest in the sea. They relied to alarge extent on the Genoese for naval assistance, which mainly involvedferrying men and materials across the Hellespont from Asia Minor.59

The Ottomans responded by facilitating Italian trading interests. Thatthere was little to be feared from the Ottomans appeared to be con-firmed by the rapid disintegration of Ottoman power following theirdefeat by Tamerlane at the battle of Ankara in 1402.60 This turned outto be only a temporary interlude. Building on the work of his fatherMehmed I (1411-1421) Murad II (1421-1451) re-established Ottomanascendancy in the Balkans, but on a much sounder basis through hiselaboration of the slave institution; by which, I mean, a central admin-istration and standing army composed of slaves of the ruler. The use ofslave administrators and soldiers goes back to the earliest days ofIslam,61 but was given new force by the various Turkic Empires, whichdominated Islam from the eleventh century.62 The Mamluks of Egyptprovide a good example.63 They became a ruling military caste, origi-nally recruited from and continuously supplemented by the slave mar-kets of the Middle East. The Ottomans devised something rather dif-ferent. They took a tribute of children from their subject Christianpopulation, known as the devshirme.64 There is a debate about when it

58 In general, N. NECIPOG¢LU, Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins:Politics and Society in the Late Empire, Cambridge 2009, esp. 119-148.59 K. FLEET, European and Islamic Trade in the early Ottoman state: the merchantsof Genoa and Turkey (= Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization), Cambridge1999.60 D. J. KASTRITSIS, The Sons of Bayezid: Empire building and representation in theOttoman Civil War of 1402-1413 (= Ottoman Empire and its heritage, 38),Leiden 2007.61 See P. CRONE, Slaves on Horses. The evolution of the Islamic polity, Cambridge1980.62 See S. F. DALE, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals,Cambridge 2010, 10-47.63 See D. AYALON, Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt (1250-1517), London 1977;idem, Mamluk Military Society, London 1979.64 C. IMBER, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: the structure of power, Basingstoke2002, 131-136.

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began, but its regularization was undoubtedly the work of Murad II. Itprovided recruits for a standing army known as the janissaries. Butmore important, it also provided slave administrators. Their increasingpower altered the character of the Ottoman state, which had hithertobeen a loose alliance of warlords and old Anatolian families under theaegis of the Ottoman emir.65

VII The growth of the slave institution pointed towards the creation ofan autocracy. The resulting tensions produced a crisis in the mid-1440s, when in 1444 Murad II decided to retire from office in favourof his young son Mehmed II, but the strength and resilience of theOttomans showed itself in the concurrent struggle with Hungary, fromwhich they emerged victorious. It was a major crisis, for which theOttomans blamed Byzantium. They thought that it was the Byzantineemperor, who had incited the Hungarians in co-ordination with theruler of Karaman to invade Ottoman territories in both Europe andAnatolia.66 These suspicions raised the whole question of how much ofa liability the Byzantine Empire had become. Negligible though it wasin military terms it could still be of service to enemies of the Ottomansand could foment internal discord by harbouring dissident Ottomanprinces. The Ottomans had in the past tolerated Constantinople’sindependence because it was useful to them. It provided a convenientplace of exchange with the Italian commercial powers, upon which theydepended for various strategic goods and also for experts to run theireconomy. In other words, they remained dependent upon a commer-cial system created and run by the Italians, but a corollary of this wasrespect for the independence of Constantinople, for it was an impor-tant factor ensuring the efficient functioning of the system, because ofthe way, among other things, it helped to maintain a balance of powerbetween the Venetians and the Genoese. The Ottomans benefitedgreatly from being part of the system, which had facilitated their emer-gence as the dominant force in the Balkans. Breaking with the past wasnot an easy step to take.

Why then should Mehmed II have flouted the received wisdom ofthe Ottoman court and set about conquering Constantinople?67

65 C. KAFADAR, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State,Berkeley – Los Angeles 1995; H. W. LOWRY, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State,Albany 2003.66 See F. BABINGER, Von Amurath zu Amurath. Vor- und Nachspiel der Schlacht beiVarna (1444), Oriens 3 (1950) 229-265; C. IMBER, The Crusade of Varna, 1443-1445, Aldershot 2006.67 See F. BABINGER, Mehmed the Conqueror and his time (= Bollingen Series, 96),

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Strategic thoughts were probably not uppermost in his mind. He wasstill only 21 when he succeeded his father in 1451. Dreams of glorynurtured by reading about the exploits of Alexander the Great weremore to the point, but among members of his inner circle – mostlydrawn from the slave institution – a far more pressing concern wasestablishing the new sultan in power. His brief rule from 1444 to 1446had left an impression of weakness. It was felt that he would be nomatch for his father’s Grand Vezir Çandarli Halil Pasha, the head ofone of the greatest Anatolian families, who was a proponent of the sta-tus quo. The conquest of Constantinople was a gamble, but the stakeswere high. If successful it would consolidate the position of the new sul-tan and his supporters. It would also dent the Grand Vezir’s prestigeand make it that much easier to drive him from power. During the siegeof Constantinople the Grand Vezir was constantly agitating for a settle-ment on terms: something, which Mehmed II refused to contemplate.He is reported as saying, “I will take the city or the city will take medead or alive” when he turned down the offer of terms made in themiddle of the siege by the Byzantine emperor.68 The conquest ofConstantinople was not an easy task. The defenders dealt with the earlyassaults very effectively. The consul of Ancona, who took part in thedefence, reckoned that up to the final assault the defenders had lostonly forty men against 7,000 on the other side.69 These figures cannotbe strictly accurate, but are surely of the right order. The famedOttoman artillery may have shattered sections of the land walls, but insome ways this made things worse for the attackers. It was as difficult –if not more so – to get across the rubble of a collapsed section of thewall as to scale the wall itself.70 When the Ottomans finally broke in itwas through a sally port, which had been left unguarded. At differenttimes Mehmed II came under considerable pressure to raise the siege.By 29 May when the final assault was launched, the Ottoman army hadbeen in place under the walls of Constantinople for almost exactly twomonths. It would have been difficult to keep the whole army togetherfor very much longer. That it stayed together for as long as it did wastestimony to Mehmed II’s willpower. He realized that failure to capture

Princeton 1978; J. FREELY, The Grand Turk. Sultan Mehmet II – the Conqueror ofConstantinople, Master of an Empire and Lord of Two Seas, London 2009.68 Ducae, Michaelis Ducae nepotis, Historia Byzantina, ed. I. Becker, CSHB, Bonn1834, XXXVIII, 18: 276.15-16.69 A. PERTUSI, Testi inediti e poco noti sulla caduta di Costantinopoli (= MondoMedievale: sezione di storia bizantina e slava, 4), Bologna 1983, 4-5.70 K. DE VRIES, Gunpowder Weapons at the Siege of Constantinople, 1453, in: Warand Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th-15th Centuries, ed. Y. Lev, Leiden1997, 343-362.

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Constantinople would leave him beholden to his Grand Vezir and theinterests he represented. One of his first significant political acts aftertaking Constantinople was to have the Grand Vezir executed.71

VIII To conquer Constantinople was to enter into an imperial destiny.One of his entourage records him as saying soon after the conquest‘From henceforth Constantinople will be my capital’,72 but exactly howMehmed II would shape it was a matter of trial and error, whichemerges from the measures he took in the aftermath of his conquest.73

There were two stages. First, he ordered the repair of the walls; the con-struction of a fortress at the Golden Gate and a palace around the oldforum of Theodosios. These works were completed within two years ofthe conquest. He had no intention of abandoning the city to benignneglect. He took steps to bring in settlers and encouraged the Greekinhabitants to stay or to return by re-establishing the patriarchate ofConstantinople, which was done by January 1454.74 These measuresworked well. By the end of his reign Constantinople’s population waspushing on the 100,000 mark, perhaps double what it had been on theeve of the Ottoman conquest.75 At the very least, Constantinople wouldbe another official residence of the sultan along with Edirne in Europeand Bursa in Anatolia. That it would be more than this is evident fromthe decisions taken immediately after the completion of his initial mea-sures. In 1456 he ordered the overhaul of the city’s water supply, whichhad been failing from the late twelfth century.76 Proof of the success ofthis measure was the large number of bath houses built, which were agreat advertisement for the Ottoman way of life.77 In 1458 he beganthe construction of a new palace, the Top Kapi, which became the sul-tan’s permanent residence.78 It was an expression of a new and auto-

71 F. BABINGER, Mehmed the Conqueror, 102; J. FREELY, Grand Turk, 50.72 Tursun Bey, La conquista di Costantinopoli, transl. L. Berardi, Milan 2007, 85.73 On Mehmed II’s reconstruction of Constantinople see Ç. KAFESCIOG¢LU,Constantinopolis / Istanbul: Cultural Encounter, Imperial Vision, and the Constructionof the Ottoman Capital (= Buildings, Landscapes, and Societies, 5), UniversityPark, PA 2009.74 H. I

.NALCIK, The policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek population of Istanbul and

the Byzantine buildings of the city, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 23/24 (1969/1970) 231-249; M.-H. BLANCHET, Georges-Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400-vers 1472): un intel-lectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l’Empire byzantin (= Archives de l’OrientChrétien, 20), Paris 2008, 85-98.75 Ç. KAFESCIOG¢LU, Constantinopolis / Istanbul, 178.76 J. CROW, Water Supply, 22-23, 28, 115, 242.77 Ç. KAFESCIOG¢LU, Constantinopolis / Istanbul, 103-109.78 G. NECIPOG¢LU, Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power: the Topkapi Palace in the fif-

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cratic concept of the sultan’s authority as the inscription over the outergateway made clear. It extols Mehmed II as ‘the Sultan of the Two con-tinents and the Emperor of the Two Seas, the Shadow of God in thisworld and the next, the Favourite of God on the Two horizons…’79 Atthe same time as ordering the construction of a new palace Mehmed IIpulled down the Church of the Holy Apostles to make way for a newmosque complex, which would supplant Aya Sofya as the chief mosqueof the city. This together with the construction of the Top Kapi palacewas a statement of intent that Constantinople was to be an imperialcapital.80

Mehmed II not only put his imperial stamp on Constantinople; healso set about dismantling Italian maritime and commercial suprema-cy. One of the disappointments of the siege was how badly the Ottomanflotilla performed. Mehmed’s spectacular achievement of having shipstransported across land from the Bosphoros to the Golden Horn was asideshow. They were not war galleys, but more like caiques. Their mainvalue was to stretch the defenders a little more and to disrupt commu-nications between Constantinople and the Genoese in Pera. AmongMehmed II’s early actions after the conquest of Constantinople was tobuild a fleet capable of taking on the Italians. The main base was atGallipoli, but he also took over the Genoese arsenal at Pera.81 TheGenoese gave up with scarcely a fight. They retained rights of residenceat Pera against the payment of customs duties. They did nothing tosupport the Gattilusi, a Genoese dynasty, which held a series of islandsin the north-eastern Aegean, of which Mitylene was the most impor-tant. They made no effort to defend Caffa in the Crimea, which wastheir main base in the Black Sea.82 It was different with the Venetians.They took on the Ottomans in a long war lasting from 1463 to 1479,from which they emerged exhausted and badly beaten.83 They losttheir main base in the Aegean of Negroponte on the island of Euboea.By the end of Mehmed II’s reign the Aegean and Black Seas were firm-ly under Ottoman control. The Italians continued to trade at

teenth and sixteenth centuries, New York – Cambridge, Mass. 1991, 4-15; Ç. KAFES-CIOG¢LU, Constantinopolis / Istanbul, 53-66.79 M. NECIPOG¢LU, Architecture, 34-36.80 Ç. KAFESCIOG¢LU, Constantinopolis / Istanbul, 66-92.81 On the Ottoman navy, see C. IMBER, Ottoman Empire, 287-294.82 E. BASSO, Genova e gli Ottomani nel XV secolo: gli “itali Teucri’ e il Gran Sultano,in: L’Europa dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli, Spoleto 2008, 375-409.83 F. BABINGER, Le vicende veneziane nella lotta contra I Turchi durante il secolo XV,in: La civiltà veneziana del Quattrocento, ed. G. Piovene (= Storia della civiltàveneziana, 3), Florence 1957, 51-73.

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Constantinople, but gone forever was their domination of the seas,which they had used to ensure the political fragmentation of theregion. Without the conquest of Constantinople it would have beenvery difficult for the Ottomans to loosen the grip of Italian sea-power,which seems to underline an essential feature of turning points: thatthey make possible what would not otherwise be.

Broadly speaking, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinoplereversed the Crusader conquest by restoring it to its position of impe-rial hegemony. So both 1204 and 1453 emerge as turning points in his-tory, even if they cancelled each other out. It strikes me that 1204 wasthe more dramatic for being unexpected, but beyond that it created anew situation, which previously had only been the remotest of possibil-ities; while 1453 was far from unexpected and simply gave clearer def-inition to a situation, which was already taking shape. Between themthe two falls of Constantinople destroyed Byzantium, but it is not onlythis that makes them turning points in history. It was much more therole the city played in the affairs of the world and the place it occupiedin men’s imagination not only as an imperial capital, but also, in thewords of the Mandeville author, as a repository of “Choses Estranges”.84

84 See I. M. HIGGINS, Writing East: the “Travels” of Sir John Mandeville,Philadephia 1997, 63-91.

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