Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196271 October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity,

and in representation of MAGUINDANAO

FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS

ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,

JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN

TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-

SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and

BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,

vs.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its

President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO

BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its

Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO

OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive

Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of

Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the

Philippines,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,

vs.

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of

the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.

in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of

Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in

his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE

ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and

FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of

the House of Representatives, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197221

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,

vs.

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the

Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197280

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING

CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO

LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its

Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO

N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,

HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as

Secretary of the Department of Budget and

Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his

capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197282

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197392

LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197454

JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,

and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES,

INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act

Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the

National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was

enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of

August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three

(3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular

national and local elections. The law as well granted the

President the power to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the

Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor,

and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who

shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until

the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have

qualified and assumed office."

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No.

10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House

Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in

petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after

RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987

Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of

provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing

common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,

economic and social structures, and other relevant

characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and

the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the

Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to

enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely

carry into effect the granted autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each

autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the

regional consultative commission composed of representatives

appointed by the President from a list of nominees from

multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic

structure of government for the region consisting of the

executive department and legislative assembly, both of which

shall be elective and representative of the constituent political

units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts

with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent

with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when

approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units

in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only

provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such

plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987

Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No.

6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was

held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article

X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous

Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting

provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-

tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the

regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60

days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the

Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,

Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An

Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,

as Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law

provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first

defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular

elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday

of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 91401 -

on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections

originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001.

It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later

than August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14,

2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join

ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 93332 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the

ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005,

and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No.

6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a

plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections

should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun

preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of

candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on

June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM

elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and

local elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as

House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the

ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22,

2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with

one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own

version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011.

Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June

7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate

amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA

No. 10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came

through a petition filed with this Court – G.R. No. 1962713 -

assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No.

2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for

non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.

Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed

another petition4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC

stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave

rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its

constitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition5 filed by Rep. Edcel

Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives against

Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary)

and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;

b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition6 filed by Atty.

Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC,

docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and

Preliminary Injunction7 filed by Louis "Barok" Biraogo against

the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,

docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus8 filed by Jacinto Paras

as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive

Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as

G.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding

Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido

Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with

candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for

August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and

Mandamus9 against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.

197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No.

9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights

Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement

filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for

Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011.

On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same

Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the

petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No.

2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,

2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their

respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary

restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153

and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to

continue to perform their functions should these cases not be

decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.

10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have

to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite

requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of

RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is

unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading

requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.

Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of

suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere

to the "elective and representative" character of the executive

and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the

petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to

appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM

officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular

elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue

that the power of appointment also gave the President the power

of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16,

Article X of the Constitution.

The Issues

From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were

recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of

August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization

of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2),

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a

supermajority vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections

constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No.

9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for

amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and

Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the

corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the

creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,

Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the

ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is

constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented

above.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the

constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that

the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of

this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory

Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under

this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,

1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined

by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election

of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of

all Members of the city or municipal councils in the

Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of

Representatives and the local officials first elected under this

Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve

obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year

and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and

Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for

purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to

noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President

under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of

May, 1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress

has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent

towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory

Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,10 which show the

extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately

making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,

sought to attain synchronization of elections.11

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all

elective officials, done among others through the shortening the

terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of

votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections –

whether national or local – to once every three years.12 This

intention finds full support in the discussions during the

Constitutional Commission deliberations.13

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the

provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all

serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold

synchronized national and local elections, starting the second

Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the

synchronization of the national and local elections as a

constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission on

Elections,14 we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987

Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the

House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and

the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same

hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned

Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously

as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise

intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or

occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future

elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of

the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of

Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)

will have to be synchronized with the election for President and

Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from

the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional

Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should

be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a

"local" election based on the wording and structure of the

Constitution.1avvphil

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used

should be understood in the sense that they have in common use

and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms

are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to

them prevails.15 As this Court explained in People v.

Derilo,16 "[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s

document, its language should be understood in the sense that it

may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary

meaning except where technical terms are employed."

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to

something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited

district, often a community or minor political

subdivision.17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions

of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly

representatives obviously fall within this classification, since

they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the

limited region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions

are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident

from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government."

Autonomous regions are established and discussed under

Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to

Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a

form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X

of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the

Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,

municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous

regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter

provided.

Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization

mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional

elections of the ARMM –unmeritorious. We shall refer to

synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this

concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed

in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete

resolution.

II. The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of

RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section

26(2), Article VI of the Constitution18 which provides that before

bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws,

they must pass through three readings on separate days. The

exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the

bill’s immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,19 explained the

effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following

manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement

not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate

days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the

necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section

26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can

become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate

days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed

three days before it is finally approved.

xxx

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the

requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing

and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the

weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the

certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with

the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed

on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on

the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by

the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to

the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the

necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the

ARMM elections with the national and local

elections.20 Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s

certification exempted both the House and the Senate from

having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the

immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public

calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to

our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ

of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section

18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the

delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art.

VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic

rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of

presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with

procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly

considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a

different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of

their legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the

President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.

Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify

our intrusion under our power of judicial review.21

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or

justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial

department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of

the President's certification by both the House of

Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers

and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters

committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the

judicial hand.22

In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold

purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on

separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable

our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to

intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with

respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators

of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that

a measure is in progress through the enactment process.23

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law,

that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure

had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light,

no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to

RA No. 9054

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been

challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3,

Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These

provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution,

this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress

of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the

Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate

voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act

shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the

vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be

held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)

days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153

amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will

show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first

ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular

elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the

date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by

enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously,

these subsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 –

cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did

not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely

filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by

providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the

determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to

legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that

rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA

No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent

elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM

elections,24 leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative

enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,25 RA No. 8176,26 RA No.

8746,27 RA No. 8753,28 and RA No. 901229 were all enacted by

Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these

laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No.

6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.

Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any

plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law

on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be

held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter,

Congress passed RA No. 914030to reset the date of the ARMM

elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the

plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No.

9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA

No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite

held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA

No. 9333,31 which further reset the date of the ARMM regional

elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of

Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent

ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.

Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed

RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the

amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3,

Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for

giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact

amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting

requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.

905432 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the

character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the

Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a

"majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of

the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these

bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold

session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally

sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a

vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the

House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately,

in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3

voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution

requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the

plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws

it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of Davao v.

GSIS33 on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the

unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic

principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the

actions of future legislative body, considering that both

assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do

the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the

attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which

attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its

enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all

subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its

territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the

old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal

constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind

itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when

so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the

acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal

may be exercised at the same session at which the original act

was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it

becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future

legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot

declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures

or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing

statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it

is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the

passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it

significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action

and flexibility.

III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively

enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article

X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an

unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite

requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that

Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the

enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point

of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite

is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for

determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be

included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is

that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the

plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,35 questions

on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may

unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the

Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a

plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The

creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when

approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent

units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With these wordings

as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only

amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act

constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions

– i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution

which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require

ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the

Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the

regional government; (b) the region’s judicial system, i.e., the

special courts with personal, family, and property law

jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative

powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government

under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.36

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the

matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to

provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that

the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are

valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as

a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require

compliance with these requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local

elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide

for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.

On this point, an existing law in fact already exists – RA No.

7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.

7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections

with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA

No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with

the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections

where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is

technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law,

given that regional elections are in reality local elections by

express constitutional recognition.37

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to

reconcile the schedule of the ARMM’s regular elections (which

should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333)

with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed

by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three

options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These

options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to

remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1),

Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the

synchronized elections assume office;38 (2) to hold special

elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire

when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;

or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to

Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the

synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in

choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs,

chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a

completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying

material premises must be fully understood. The first is the

extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the

constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and

the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and

established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and

comprehensive.39 The legislative body possesses plenary power

for all purposes of civil government.40 Any power, deemed to be

legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by

Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it

elsewhere.41 Except as limited by the Constitution, either

expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects

and extends to all matters of general concern or common

interest.42

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either

express or implied. The express limitations are generally

provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and

State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights

(Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative

and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the

autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express

limitations. The implied limitations are found "in the evident

purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical

events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as

a part of organic law."43

The constitutional provisions on autonomy – specifically,

Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution – constitute

express limitations on legislative power as they define

autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting

what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate

on the governance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the

limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of

government – i.e., that the government must have an executive

department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be

elective and representative of the constituent political units;

national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative

powers granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as

expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, "all powers and

functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the

autonomous regions shall be vested in the National

Government."

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve

as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with

legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions.

The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the

Constitution intends – the idea of self-rule or self-government,

in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,

economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under

these provisions are the permeating principles of national

sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as

expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.44 In

other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence,

as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio45 in

the relationship between the national and the regional

governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the

synchronization of national and local elections are recognized

and established constitutional mandates, with one being as

compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all,

the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on

and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy – as the

term suggests – directly carries a narrower regional effect

although its national effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and

limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To

succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then,

its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the

national, congressional and all other local elections (save for

barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the

problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the

intervening period between the expiration of the term of those

elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-

one (21) months away – of those who will win in the

synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this

period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its

established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due

to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not

a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The

Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively

provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the

new46and for the introduction of new concepts.47 As previously

mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections

towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the

Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look

far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that

synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus,

the present problem is with us today.

The creation of local government units also represents instances

when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon

del Sur48 and Dinagat Islands,49 the creating statutes authorized

the President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and

members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these

positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive

officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall

have been elected and qualified.50 A similar authority to appoint

is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-

province to a province.51

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by

necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were

adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in

sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution

and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the

choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to

congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall

serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the

options available to Congress to address the problems brought

about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly

understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide.

The proper understanding of the options as interim measures

assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the

passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the

constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be

faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the

Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the

concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections

necessarily brought with it?

B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were

elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM

during the 2008-2011 term – as an option that Congress could

have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of

the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be

three years and no such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered

and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the

Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.

As this Court put in Osmeña v. COMELEC:52

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of

officers by providing that they shall hold over until their

successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has

in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when

the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall

begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office

beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify

within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act

postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is

limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent

beyond the period as limited by the Constitution." [Emphasis

ours.]

Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the

Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where

the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its

mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should

be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by

amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional

process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches

of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate

except only as the Constitution itself may allow.53 If at all,

Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully

operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it

by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other

hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is

appropriate and called for.54

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been

fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any

implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself

and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this

Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay

at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be

extended by holdover by Congress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively

another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for

Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for

the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term

– is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do

indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that

would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if

acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly,

then all laws would be illusory.55 Congress cannot also create a

new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for

the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by

Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the

constitutional appointment power of the President.56 Hence,

holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally

infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where

the question of holdover was brought before, and given the

imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though

differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,

particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,57 Adap v.

Comelec,58 and Montesclaros v. Comelec,59 where the Court

ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in

a hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang

kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly

provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other

hand, refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the

ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional

Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year

term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot

legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were

originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible,

and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,

Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,60 we have to remember

that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option

where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary

exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.61

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that

it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that

prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this

provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within

the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary

legislative powers; this Court cannot pass

upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of

legislation,62 except where an attendant unconstitutionality or

grave abuse of discretion results.

C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is

for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct

special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa

Bilang (BP) 881.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in

nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following

provisions of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election

of the Senators and the Members of the House of

Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

[Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable

solely to the President and Vice-President, states:

xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular

election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the

second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code

which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election,

appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions

and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may

be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice

President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when

so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a

body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the

power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the

execution of that power.63

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by

postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting

another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections

synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other

local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy

decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not

call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing

the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the

Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections

instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly,

cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative

decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not

without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for

being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave

abuse of discretion.64 But our power rests on very narrow

ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it

is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what

Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative

powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282

urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional

power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress

to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing

and administering all laws and regulations relative to the

conduct of an election.65 Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to

call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a

specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5

and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone

elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and

can only be exercised within, the specific terms and

circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious

cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election

paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous

causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and

honest election should become impossible in any political

subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified

petition by any interested party, and after due notice and

hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal

opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a

date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election

not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but

not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such

postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force

majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous

causes the election in any polling place has not been

held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the

hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting

and during the preparation and the transmission of the election

returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election

results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the

failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the

election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition

by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for

the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended

or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close

to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted

in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the

cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of

the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to

address instances where elections have already been scheduled

to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence,

(b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or

records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of

such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest

election should become impossible in any political subdivision.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous

causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected

events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These

"analogous causes" are further defined by the phrase "of such

nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election

should become impossible."

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations

where elections have already been scheduled but do not take

place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence,

(c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the

election in any polling place has not been held on the

date fixed, or had been suspendedbefore the hour fixed by

law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during

the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or

in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a

failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses

instances where the elections do not occur or had to be

suspended because

of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is

by law – i.e., by congressional policy – and is pursuant to the

constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local

elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be

given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by

Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal

causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure,

cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of

interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended

by the lawmakers.66 Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of

BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has

absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold

special elections.

D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective

officials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to

compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis

likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials

shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the

synchronized elections shall have assumed office.

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the

terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power

to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be

exercised only in the case of barangay officials,67 is specifically

given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such

power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of

twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,68 and extended the

terms of the President and the Vice-President69 in order to

synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same

power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution

cannot be changed by mere statute.70 More particularly, not

even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to

fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or

more, than the constitutionally mandated three years71 as this

tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the

Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials

cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be

shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three

(3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will

happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special

elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is

achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express

provision of the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those

officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on

their term (where the "term" means the time during which the

officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval

after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,

while the "tenure" represents the term during which the

incumbent actually holds the office).72 As with the fixing of the

elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis

to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would

commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their

discretion if they do so.

E. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim

measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President

of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization

period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only

measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however,

should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in

nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of

this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or

qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be

recognized.73 The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,

Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent

of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the

executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel

or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are

vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other

officers of the Government whose appointments are not

otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be

authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the

appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President

alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,

commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the

President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors;

other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and

other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in

this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to

appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress

may by law vest in the President alone.74

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from

RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the

President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the

Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear

constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the

authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the

assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM

executive and legislative officials to be "elective and

representative of the constituent political units." This

requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-

observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs

constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged

constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes

very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a

law that changes the elective and representative character of

ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way

amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets

outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in

fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of

the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of

the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the

functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly

elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and

assumed office." This power is far different from appointing

elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the

assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013

elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the

supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is

that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153,

in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the

interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this

is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was

written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.75 Aside from

its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim

measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization

requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim

measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given

the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought

with it. In more concrete terms and based on the above

considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing

for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional

possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the

elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to

appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure,

and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution

– an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to

make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other

situations or where the power of appointment would extend

beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to

foster a government that is not "democratic and republican." For

then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them

may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of

fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would

frontally breach the "elective and representative" governance

requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited

circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period

is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance – both

under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054

– will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat

what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern

unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with

the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary

measures that synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will

temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community,

the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders, but

this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an

interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been

adopted and used in the creation of local government

units76 and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of

provinces.77 These measures, too, are used in light of the wider

national demand for the synchronization of elections

(considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved). The

adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from

the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the

State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of

the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen

leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of

OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment

process; only the "elective" aspect shall be supplanted by the

appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly

seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by

providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete

terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of

Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 –

viewed in its proper context – is a law that is not violative of the

Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one

that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the

oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No.

10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President

the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus

allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.

This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board

cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the

President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers

of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even

Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can

legislatively undertake with respect to elections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it

was for a very specific and limited purpose – the

synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a

lasting end – the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.

10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are

likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied

to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other

localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections

can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated

by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot

continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of

their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to

conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the

dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not

be forgotten that a period of 21 months – or close to 2 years –

intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective

officials’ terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective

officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our

Mindanao history – past and current – teach us, many

developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire

in the country’s Muslim areas in this span of time in the way

they transpired in the past.78 Thus, it would be reckless to

assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an

acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional

Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily.

To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present

circumstances is an absolute necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint

OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the

Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative.

We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v.

Petilla, etc., et al.:79

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the

Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is

empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public

offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws

deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.

However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local

Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we

see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two

laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The

respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct

appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the

President who has supervision over local governments as

provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to

the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the

President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no

approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of

their right of representation and governance in their own local

government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through

their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent,

etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent,

may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay

in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the

Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.80 (Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice

Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly

vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause

disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the

people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional

government, and in responding to critical developments that

may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President

in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment

power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable

measure to take.

B. Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be

constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to

impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the

ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there

exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional

mandates – synchronization and regional autonomy – such that

it is necessary to choose one over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic

principle in constitutional construction – ut magis valeat quam

pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole,81 and one mandate should not be given importance over

the other except where the primacy of one over the other is

clear.82 We refer to the Court’s declaration in Ang-Angco v.

Castillo, et al.,83 thus:

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in

isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be

interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions

should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give

to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally

entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this

Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that

Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to

transit to synchronized regional elections with the least

disturbance on the interests that must be respected.

Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of

being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or

modify its governing features, except in a very temporary

manner and only as necessitated by the attendant

circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections

should not be synchronized with the national and local elections

in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its

own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of

nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from

convinced of its merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous

regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the

Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The

ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the

larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national

policies set by the national government, save only for those

specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional

autonomous determination. As reflected during the

constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous

regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation

from the central government, but rather an efficient working

relationship between the autonomous region and the central

government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a

separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really

thought of as complete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within

the larger political framework of the nation.84[Emphasis

supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the

above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by

the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that

autonomy shall be "within the framework of this Constitution

and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of

the Republic of the Philippines."

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed

to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary

in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous

regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon

further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision

in order to "make it clear, once and for all, that these are the

limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not

enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national

government[.]"85 Of note is the Court’s pronouncement in

Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre86 which we quote:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national

government has not completely relinquished all its powers over

local governments, including autonomous regions. Only

administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political

subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make

governance more directly responsive and effective at the local

levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the

smaller political units are expected to propel social and

economic growth and development. But to enable the country to

develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally

must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national

goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the

President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be

invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the

synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a

national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy

granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from

having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by

no less than the Constitution.

Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a

constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national and

local elections – when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court

cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this

task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of

wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.87 As judges, we can

only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about

its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.88

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which

Congress should address what is essentially a legislative

problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge

laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the

exclusive prerogative of Congress.89 The petitioners, in asking

this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite

its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture

into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one

of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic

government – the separation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress

acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an

evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a

duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law

as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic

manner by reason of passion and hostility.90

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly

within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it

acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked

reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that

synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be

accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to

perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the

petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we

can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is

presumed valid.91 Congress, thus, has in its favor the

presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party

challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of

rebutting this presumption.92 Any reasonable doubt about the

validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its

constitutionality.93 As this Court declared inGarcia v. Executive

Secretary:94

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional

questions and to presume that the acts of the political

departments are valid in the absence of a clear and

unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.

This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of

powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect

for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the

joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law

has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance

with the fundamental law before it was finally

enacted.95 [Emphasis ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of

constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and

confirm its validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the

consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for

lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We

likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our

Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.