7.6.10 simmel secrecy

8/9/2019 7.6.10 Simmel Secrecy

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TheSociolngy fCeorgSimmelTRANSLATED, EDITED, AN D WITH AN INTRODT]CTIONAYKurt H. Wolff

T H E F R E E P R E S SA DIvrsloN or MIcMTLLAN Punr,rsruxc Co.. Inc.New YorkCor,r,rcn Mecnarr,r,rx PuslrsHnnsLondon

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O S C A R L O U I S W O L F FH A N S S C H I E B E L H U T H

K A R I - W O L F S K E H L

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Chapter 7

I(nowled,ge,Truth, arldlralsehood in, Human Relatiorts

oBvIousLY, ALL RELATIONSrvhich pcoplc have to one another ar e based on their knolving.s


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socia l eve l ,may st r ikc on c asan e lnPty orm; yc t i t is an adeict t rre f thc other ind iv idur l ''is in f l t rc 'ncccl iy rca l , l l ract ica l-anclscnt in lct r ta l , re la t ions'-l-[ is last inf ltrcnce is by no ll]eans on e o[ nlerc falsil icatiOn.,.It i s cnt i rc ly !eg i t i rnrte th : r t the t l rcoret ica l concept ion lve havcof a part i. . , i , , , incliviclual shotrld vary with th c stanclpoint frornrvhicir it is forrnccl, a standpoint rvhich is th e rcsult of the over'al l rc la t ion bcnvccn kn


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\i31 0 Knowledge, Truth, Falsehood n Human Relations$ 3. Tru.th., Error, and Social Life

Ou r conduct is based upon ou r knowledge of total reality.Bu t this knorvlcclse is char:rctcrizcclby peculiar l imitat ions an ddistort ions. -fhat "error alone is l ifc, and knorvleclgc, cleatlt"cannot, o[ cottrse,be valid as r Principlc, becausea Personcaughtin continuous error would contint loLrsly act in an incxpcdientfashion, and thus incvitably woulcl perish. And yct, in vicwof ou r accidcntal and defectivc adaptations to our lifc conclit ions,thcre is no cloultt t ltat we Prcscrvc tncl acquire not only sc l nttclttrtrth, l i t t t- ; t lso so much ignorancc ancl crror, as is appropriatcfo r ou r practical activit ies. Wc havc only to think of the greatinsights which transform human life, btrt which fail to makethcir appcarance or go unnoticcd, unlcss the total cultural situa.t ion rcnclers them possible and trsclul. Or we may think, on thcotlrer lrand, of the "Lebensli ip4e" f"vital l ie"] of th e individualwh o is so often in need of dccciving himself in reg:rrd to hi rcapacit ies, even in regard to hi s fcclings, and who cannot dowithout supcrstit ion about gods zrnclmen, in orcler to maintainhis l ife and his potcntialit ies. In the scnse that t l ' rc expcdiencyo[ the cxternal as of the internal l ife sees o it that rv e obtainth e exact amounts of error an d truth which constitutc th e basitof th e conduct reqtrired of us, crror and truth are psychologicallycoorclin:rtc-althotrgh, o[ coursc, only by and large, and with awicle l:rt itudc for variat ions and de[ective adaptations.

$ 4. The lruliuidual es an Obiect of KnowledgeIlgt within the range of objects, rvhich lve may know cor.

rectly or about which lv e ltray llc clcceived, thcre is a sectionrvhcrcin both truth an d dcception ca n attain a cltarac.tcr ha t iino t forrnd anywhcre else.This is th c inner l i fe of th c incl iv idu l lwith rvhorn wc interact. I{c may, intentionally cithcr revcal t ltCtrutlr about hirnsclf to uS ,or dcccivc trs by l i e ancl concc:t ltnenl,No other object of knowledge ca n reveal or hicle itself in th esanle way, becauseno other objcct modif ies it s behavior in vicgof th e fact that it is recognizcd. This moclif ication, of coul$C1


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312 Knouledge, Truth, Falsehood in Human Relationsimpulsivc, intirnate matters-is a selection from that psycholog'ical-real whole whose absolutely exact report (absolutely exactin terms of content and scquence) would drive everybody intoth e insanc asylum-if a paradoxical expression is permissible.In a quatrt itat ive scnse, t is not only fragments of ou r inner lifewhicfu we alonc rcvcal, even to our closest fellowmen. What itmore, these fragmcnts are not a representative selection, butone made from tlre standpoint of reason, value, and relation tOth e listencr and his understanding. Whatever we say' as on g alit gocs bcyond rnere interjection an d minimal communication,is ncver an immediate an d faithful presentation of what reall ' toccurs in us during that part icular t ime of communication, bu tis a transfiormation of this inner reality, teleologically directed,reduced, and recomposed. With an instinct automatically pre'venting us from doing otherwise, we show nobody the co_ursCof our psychic processes n their purely causal reality and-fromthe standpoints of logic, objectivity, and meaningfulness----corn'plctc incoherence and irrationality. Always' we show only aiection o[ them, stylizcd by selection and arrangement. We sirn'ply cannot inragine any interaction or social relation or societywlrich are not based on this teleologically determined non'knowledge of one another. This intrinsic, a priori, and (as itwere) absolute PresuPPosition includes all relative differencclwhich are familiar to us under the concepts of sincere revelationsand mendacious concealtnents.

$ 6. The LieEvery ie, no matterhow objectivc ts topic, engendersyits verynature an error concerninghe lying subiect.The liCconsists n the fact that the liar hides his true idea from the

other. Its specific nature is not exhaustively characterizedbythe fact thai the pcrson lied-to has a false concePtionabout thetopic or object; this the li e strareswith common error. Whatis pecific is that he is kept deceivcdabout the private opinionof. the liar.Truthfulness and lie are o[ the most ar-reachingsignificancefo r relations among men. Sociological structures difter pro'foundly according to the measure of lying which operates n

Th e Li e 31 3them. In the f irst place, in very simple circumstances th e li eis often more harmless n regard to the maintenance of the groupthan under nlore complex condirions. Primit ive man who livesin a small group, who satisfies his needs through his own pro-cluction or through dircct cooperation, who limits his intellec-tual interests to hi s own experienccs or to unil inear tradit ion,surveys and controls the material of his life more easily and com-pletely than does the man of higher cultures. To be sure, th einnumerable errors and supcrstit ions in th e life of primit ivernan are harnrful enough to him, but far less o than ar e corre-sponding ones in advanced epochs, because he practice of hi slife is guidcd in the main by those few facts and circumstanceso[ which his narrorv angle of vision permits hi m to gain directlya correct view. In a richer and larger cultural l i fe, however,cxistence rests on a thousand premises which the single indi-vidual cannot trace and verify to their roots at all, but must takeon faith. Our modern life is based to a much larger extent thanis usually realized upon the faith in the honesty of the other.Iixamples are our economy, which becomes more and more acrcdit economy, or otrr science, in which most scholars mustuse innumerable results of other scientists which they cannot

! , - , r ^ / - L ^ J ^ ^ : ^ : ^ ^ ^ - ^ t - r ' d t ' c i a f fc x a l l t l l l c . v v c lJ | ds c uu l Hr r dv c lL t l c L lD t t ll J l j r l 4 L r J r r r P r LA r ) | r r l r uof conceptions, most o[ which presuPpose the con{idence thatrve wil l no t be betrayed. Under modern condit ions, th e lie,therefore, becomes something much more devastating than itwas earlier, sornething which questions the very foundations ofour li[e. If among ourselves today, the lie were as negligible asin as it rvas among the Greek gods, the Jewish patriarchs, orthe South Seas slanders; and if we were not deterred from itby the utmost severity of the moral law; then the organizationof modern life would be simply impossible; for, modern life isa "credit economy" in a much broader than a strictly econOmicsense.

These historical differences are paralleled by distances ofother dimensions as well. Th e farther removed individuals ar efrom our most intimate personality, the more easily can we cometo terms with their untruthfulness, both in a practical and inan intimate psychological sense-while if the few Personsclosestto us l ie, l i fe becomesunbearable. This is a banality, bu t it must


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314 Knowledge, Truth, Falsehood in Human Relationsbe noted in a sociological light, bccausc it shows that the meas-ures of truthfulncss in d mendacity which ar e comPatible withth e existcncc o[ ccrtain condit ions, constitute a scalc on whichth e rneasuresof intensity of thesecondit ions ca n be read off 'In addit ion to this relative sociological ltermissibil i ty of theli e under prirnit ive circumstances, there is also it s posit iv' !* 'p ed.i n cy !Vlt"." a {irst organ za t on, arranlement' central izationff ,n " gio,rp is at stakc, this organization will take place tlrroughth c su6ordination o[ th e weak under th e physically an d intellec'tually supcrior. Th c lie which maintains itsclf, which is no t.o-n rhrnrrrrlr is rrnf lorrbtefl lv a means o[ aSSerting ntelleCtualJ L L r r ! r . ^ v I "superiority ancl of using it to control and suppress th e less n',. i l ig..tr. it is an intellectual club la w as brutal, bu t on occasiottu, ulipropriate, as physical club law. It may operate as a selectingfactoi to breed intelligence or create leisure for the few forwhom others nlust work; for tfue few wfio need the leisure forproducing higher cultural goods or for giving a leader to th eSro"p foices.*The more easily these aims can be reached byL.ot t whose inciclcntal consequencesare only slightly unde'sirable, th e less is there need fo r lying, an d th e more is thereroorn for l-reipg aware of its ethically obiectionable character.I{ istorically this proccss s by no means completed. Even today,retail traclebclievcs tltat it cannot do without mendacious claimsconcerning ccrtain merchandise, and tlrercforc Practices themwith good conscience. I lut wholesale busincss and retail tradcon a ially large scale, havc overcomc this stage and can affordto proceed with complete sinccrity when offering their goods.Onte th e businc.sspractice of th e small an d middle-sized mer'chant reachcs th e samc perfection, t ltc exagscrations an d out'right falschoods o[ advert ising and praising, for which it is no turually blamcd today, wil l mcct with th e samc cthical condem-nation which alreacly is meted out wherever these falsehoodsar e no longer required by practice. In gcneral, intra-grouP inter'action baseclon truthfulness will bc th c morc appropriate, th emore th e welfare of th e many, rather than of th c few, constitutesthe norm of the gToup. For, those wtro are lied-to, that is , thosewh o ar e harmecl by the lie, wil l always constitute th e majorityover the liars who find thcir advantage in lying. For this reason,

Th e Li e 31 5"cnlightcnnlcnt," which aims at the rcmoval of the untruthsoperating in social l i fe, is entirely democratic in character.I lunran intcraction is normally based on th e fact that th eicleational rvorlds o[ mcn have ccrtain elements in common,that objective intellectual contents constitute th e material whichis transformccl into subjective life by rneans of men's social rela-t ions. The typc, as rvcll as the cssential instrument, of these(.omnlon elctncnts is sharcd language. I lut, on closer exatnina-t ion, it appcars that the basis discusscclhere, by no rneans con-sists only in rvhat both o[ tn'o interacting individuals know, orwith rvhat thcy ar e acquaintcd as thc phycltological content ofonc anotircr. For, it must aiso bc notcci that aii of t iris is it-rter'-woven rvith clerncnts knorvn to only one of th e two. Tlt is l imita-t ion rcvcals signif icancescven nlore basic than those which re -sult from the contrast between th c non-logical and contingentrcality of the iclcational proccssan d th e logical an d telcologicalselcction wc rnakc of it in order to show it to othcrs. Humannature is dualist ic: we feel that each of its expressions lows froma plurality o[ divergent sourccs;we consider each measure of itas grcat or small, according to its cornparison with somethingsmaller or grcater.

This s:lrnc dualisrn also causes sociological relationships tobe determincd in a twofold manner. Concord, harmony, co-cfficacy, which are unquestionably held to be socializing forces,lnust nevcrtheless be interspersed with distance, competit ion,rcpulsion, in order to yield the actual configuration of society.'flre solid, organizational forms which seem to constitute orcre:rtc socicty, must constantly be disturbed, disbalanced,gnawecl-at by individualistic, irregular forces, in order to gainihcir vital rcaction an d developrnent through submission an drcsistance. ntim:rte relations, whosc formal medium is physical:rnd psychological nearness, losc the attractiveness, even thecontent of their intimacy, as soon as the close relationship doesnot also contain, simultaneously an d alternatingly, distancesan dintermissions. Finally, and this is the decisive point: althoughrcciprocal knowledge conditions rclationships positively, after:rl l , i t does no t do this by itself alone. Relationships being whatthey are, they also presuPPosea certain ignorance and a measure9f mutual concealment, even though this measure varies im-

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,: .ilil$lr $f;i " i 'rtfr 1 .16 Knowledge, Truth, Falsehood in Human Relationsmensely, to bc sure. The li e is merely a velY crude and, ulti'mately, often a contradictory form in which this necessity showsitself. However often a lie may destroy a given relationshiP, "slong as the relationship existed, the li e was an integral elernentof ii . The ethically negative value of the lie must not blind usto it s sociologically quile positive significance for the formationof certain .o..r.t. rllations. In regard to the elementary socio'logical fact at issue here-the restriction of the knowledge of theon--e bout the other-it must be remembered that the lie is onlyon e among all possible available means. It is the posit ive and,as it were, iggrelsive technique, whose purpose is more often at-tained by me.e secrecy an d concealment. These more generaland more negative fortns will be discussed in the following Pages.

Chapter 2

Typesof SocialRelationshipthy Degreesof ReciprocalKnoutledgeof TheirParticipantssecretn the sense f a consciously ".::;t"T.lll."t-ent, onemust note the different degrees to which various relationshipslcave the reciprocal knorvledge of the total personalities of theirmembers outside their province.

$ I. InterestGroupsAmong the various groups still involving direct interaction,the most important is the associationbasedon someparticularinterest lZwechaerbandf,more especially that which involvescompletely objective member contributions, determined byrnere membership. The purest form here is monetary contribu-tion. In this case,nteraction, olidarity,and thepursuit of com-rnon purposes do not depend on everybody's psychological

knorvledge f everybodyelse.As a group member, he individualis only the executor of a certain function. Questionsconcerningt.hose ndividual motives which determine this performance,or the sort of total personality n which his conduct s mbedded,:rre completely irrelevant. The associationbasedon some par-ticular interest is the discreetsociological orm par excellence.Its members are psychologicallyanonymous. In order to formthe association, l l they have o know of one another s precisely3r7


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318 Types of Social RelotionshiPsthis fact-that they fortn it . Th e incrcasing oll jectif ication ofou r culture, whosc phenomcna consist rl lore an d nrore of im 'personal clements an d less and lessabsorb the sull jectivc totalityof th " individual (most simply shown by thc contrast betweenhandicraft an d factory work), also involves sociological struc'tures. Thcreforc, groups into n'hich earlier man cntered in hiStotality and individuaiity ancl rvhich, for this reason, required Ircciprocal knowlcdge fa r beyond th e inrmediate , oll icct ive -con'tenf of th e rclationship-t ltcse grotlps ar e nolv bascd exclusivelyon this obicctive content, rvhich is ncatly factorecl out of the. . ' l ' ^ l ^ r a l r t i n nw l I v r L l v r . f L r v r r .

$ 2. Conf;.dence nder More and Less Complex ConditionsThis developrncnt also givcs a Pcctl l iar evolutiotr to an ante'ccdcnt or subscqtlent form o[ knowledge abottt: l httm:rn being,

namely, confidence in him. Confidence, evidently, is one of themost important synthetic forccs wittrin society. As a hypothesitregarcling future behavior, a hypothesis certain enottgh to serveas a basis fo r practical condtlct, confidence is interrnccliate be:,tween knowledge an d ignorance about a nlan. The pcrson who,knows cornplctely need not trust; r.t'hile the person rvho knowfnothing cun, on no rational grounds, afford even confidence,l[ ,pochs, f iclds of interest, an d indivicluals diffcr, characterist ic" '

r l fhcre is, to be sure, also anothcr tyPc of conf idence, Bu t since i t stands outsld0th e categories of knowledge an d ignor:ance, t tot tches the present cl iscussion onlyinot ly has evcr l lcl ievet l in Co d on the bUbof a i ry : ' p roof o f t he ex i s t c t t ce of ( l< l< t , "s i t ' t cc , tt th e cont rary , these proofs ,a f6post-f 'estutr just i l icat ions or intcl lcc(ual rnirrors o[ a conrplctcly i rnnrc


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320 Types of Social Relationshipsknow rvhether he is decent, compatible, and rvhether he has adaring or hesitant temperarnent. lJpon such rcciprocal knorvl-edge rcst no t only the bcginning of the relationship, but alsoit s rvhole development, the daily comrnon actions, and the divi-sion of functions between the partners. Today the secrct o[ thepersonality is sociologically more limited. In view o[ the largeextcnt to which th e interest in the common pursuit is borne bypersonal qualit ics, the personal elemcnt ca n no longer be soautonomous.

$ 3. "Acquaintance"Asicle from interest groups bu t aside, equally, frorn relation-

ships rooted in the total personality, there is the sociologicallyhighly peculiar relation which, in our t imes, among educatedstrata, is dcsignated simply as "acquaintance." Mutual "ac-quaintance" by no means is h.nouleclge of one another; it in-volves no actual insight into the individual nature of the per-sonality. It only means that on e has taken notice o[ the otlrer'sexistence,as t \^ 'ere. t is characterist ic that the idea of acquaint-ance is suggested by th e mere mentioning of one's name, by" intro'Jucing onese![" : "acquaintance" depends upon th eknorvledge of the that of the personality, not of its what. Afterall, by saying that one is acquainted, even well acquainted, witha part icular person, one characterizes quite clearly the lack ofreally int imate relations. Under th e rubric of acquaintance, on eknows of the other only what he is toward thc outside, eitherin th e purcly social-representative sense,or in the senseof thatwhich he sltorvsus . The degree of knowledge covered by "beingwell acquainted with on e anothcr," refcrs not to the otlrcr pe r se lno t to rvhat is cssential in him, intrinsically, btrt only to what issignif icant for that aspect of hirn which is turned toward othcrsand th c rvorld.

$ 4. DrscretionAcquaintance in this social sense is , therefore, the proper

seat of "discretion." For, discretion consists by no means onlyin the respect for the secret of the other, for his specific will to

Discretion 321conceal this or that from us , but in staying away from th eknowleclge of all that the othcr does not expressly eveal to us .It does not re[er to anything part icular which we are not per-mitted to knorv, btrt to a quite general reserve in regard to thetotal per.sonality. Discretion is a special form of the typicalcontrast betrveen th e imperatives, "what is not prohibited isallowed," an d "what is no t allowecl is prohibited." Relationsamong rncn ar e thus dist inguished according to rhe questionof mutual knorvledge-of either "what is not concealed ma yl-le known," or "what is no t revealed must not be known."To act upon the second of these decisions corresponds to thefeeiing (which alst-r -rpcratcs iservhere) har an ideal sphcre liesaround every hunran being. Although differing in size n variousclirections and differing according to the person with whom on eentertains relations, this sphcre cannot be penetrated, unlessth e personality value of the individual is thereby destroyed.A sphere of this sort is placed around man by his "honor."I-anguage very poignantly designatesan insult to one's honor as"coming to o close": th e radius of this sphere marks, as it were,th e distance whose trespassingby another pcrson insults one'shonor.

Another spl'rere of the same form cor!'espon.Js o what iscalled the "significance" of a personality. In regard to the"signif icant" ["great"] nlan, there is an inner comptrlsion whichtells one to keep at a distance and which does no t disappeareven in int irnate relations rvith him. Thc only type for rvhomsuch distance does no t exist is the individual who has no organfor pcrcciving significance. For this reason, the "valet" knowsno such sphere of clistance; for hirn there is no "hero"; bu tt lris is due, not to th e hero, bu t to th e vale . For the same eason,all inrportunity is associatedwith a striking lack of feeling fo rdiffcrcnces in th e signif icance of men. The individual rvho failsto kecp his distance from a great person does not esteem himlr ighly, muctr es s oo highly (a snright supcrficially ppear o b ethe case) but, on the contrary, his importune behavior revealslack of proper respect.Th e painter often emphasizeshe sig-nificance of a figure in a picture that containsmany figuresbyarranging th e others n a considerable istance ro m it. In ananalogous ashion, the sociologicalsimile of significance s the

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322 'fyltcs of Social Relationshipsd istance which keeps thc ind iv idual outs idc a ccrta in sphcrethat is occupicd by thc powcr, wil l, ancl grcatncss ol' a pcrson.Th c same sort of circle which surrounds rnan-:rlt lrough itis valuc-accentuated in a very different scnse-is f i l led out byhi s affairs and by his charactcrist ics. To pcnctratc this circlc bytaking notice, constitutes a violation of hi s personality. .f us t asmatcrial propcrty is , so to spcak, an extcnsion of th c cgo,2 an dan y interferencc rvith our propcrty is, for this reason, clt to bca violation of th e person, there also is an intellcctual private-property, whose violation cffects a lesion of the cgo in it s veryccntcr. I)iscretion is nothing but th e feelins that therc existsa right in resard to t l ie spliere of thc i niincdiate l ife contents.l)iscretion, of course, differs in its extension with different per-sonalit ies, just as the posit ions o[ honor and of property havediffcrent radii with respcct to "close" individuals, and tostrangers an d indil lerent persons. In the case o[ the above-mentioned, rnore properly "social" relations, which arc mostconveniently designated as "acquaintanccs," th e point to whichdiscretion extends is, above all, a very typical boundary: beyondit, perhaps there are not even any jealously guarded sccrets; butconventionally and discreetly, the other individual, neverthe-less,does not tresDass t by questions or other invasions.The question where this boundary lies cannot be answeredin terms of a simple principle; it leads into the finest ramifica-t ions of societal formation. For, in an absolute sense, he rightto intellectual private-property can be affirmed as little as canthe right to matcrial property. We know that, in higher civiliza.tions, material private-property in its essential three dimensions-acquisit ion, insurancc, increase-is never based on th e indi.vidual's ow n forces alonc. It always requires the condit ions an d lforces of the social milieu. From the beginning, therefore, it isl imited by th e right of the whole, whether through taxation orthrough certain checks on acquisit ion. But this right is groundedmore deeply than just in the principle of servicc and counter.service between society and individual: it is grounded in th emuch more elementary principle, that the part must sustain asgreat a restriction upon its autonomous existence and posses.

2 Property is that which obcys the wi l l of th e owner, as, for instance (with fdillerence of degree only), our body which is our first "property."

Discretion 323siveness as t l le maintenance an d the purposcs o[ th c wholerequire

This also applics to the inncr sphcrc of man. In the interestof interaction and social cohcsion, the individual rnzsl knowccrtain thincs al;out th c othcr pcrson. Nnr does the other havethc right to opposc this knowlcclgc frorn a moral standpoint, byrlcmandinu the discretion of thc f irst: he cannot claim the en -t irely undisturbed possessionof hi s orvn being and conscious-ness, incc this cliscrct ion rnight Irarm the interestso[ hi s society.Th e businessrnan rvho contracts long-range obligations withanotller; thc master rvho enrploys a servant (but also the servantircfore entcrins the service); t irc superior who advancesa sub-ordinatc; the housewife who acccpts a new member into he rsocial circle: all thesc must have thc right to learn or infer thoseaspectso[ the other's past an d present, temperament, and moralquality on th e basis of rvhich they can act rationally in regardto him, or reject him. These are very crude instanceso[ the caservhere the duty of discretion-to renounce the knowledge of al lthat the other does not voluntarily show u5-1s66des beforepractical rcquirements. Bu t even in subtler and less unambig-uous forms, in lragmentary beginnings and unexpressednotions,all Of !runran intcrco,-rrse rest-S n t[e fact that e,,,ery];orly nowSsomewhat rnore about th e other than the other voluntarily re-veals to hirn; an d those things l ' reknorvs arc frequently matterswhose knon'ledse the othcr person (were he arvare of it) wouldfind undesirablc.

All this may be considered incliscretion in th e individualsensc: in the social sense, t is a condit ion necessary or theconcrctc dcnsity an d vitality of intcraction. Ncvertheless, it isextrcmely diff icult to trace thc legal l imit of this trespass nt ointellectual private-property. In gencral, man arrogates o him-self the right to know all he ca n find ou t through mere observa-t ion and reflection, rvithout applying externally i l legit imaterncans. As a matter of fact, howcver, indiscretion practiced inthis fashion can be just as violent and rnorally inadmissible aslistening behind closed doors and leering at a stranger's leters.To the man with the psychologically fine ear, people innumer-able times betray their most secret thoughts and qualities, notonly although, but often because, they anxiously try to guard


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824 Types ol SocialRelationshiPsthem. The avid, spying grasp of every inconsiderateword, theboring reflection on what this or that tone o[ voice might Ae"l'how suchand suchutterancesmight be combined, what blush-ing on mentioning a certain name might betray-none o[ thistrinsccnds the limits of external discretion; it is entirely thework of one's own intellect and, for this reason' one's aPPar'ently indisputable righr. And all the more so , since such anabuse of piychological superiority often occursquite involun'tarily: oftin we simply cannot checkou r interPretationof theother, our construction of hi s inner nature. No matter ho Wrnrrrh Fverv der'enr nerson te l ls himsel f that he must not muse. - ^ , / r - - - - - - -on what the other hldes, ha t he must no t exPloit the slipsan dhelplessnessesf the other; knowledge,nevertheless,ccursoftenso iutomatically, and its result confronts us with such strikingsuddenness,hat mere good will has no power over it. Wherethe doubtlessly impermissible can ye t be so inevitable, thcboundary between what is allowed and what is not, is all themore blurred. How far discretion must refrain from touchingeven intellectually "all that is his"; how far, on the other hand,the interests f interaction and the interdePendcnce f the rllTl'bers of society imit this duty-this is a question fo r whosCanswer neither moral tact nor knowledge of objective condi.tions and their requirements alone is sufficient,since both arCneeded.The subtlety and complexity of this question relegateit to th e individual decisionwhich cannot be prejudgedby an ygeneral norm-to a much higher degrce han does he questiotlof private property in the material sense.

$ 5. Iriendship and, LoaeIn this pre-form or complementation of the secret' he pOlnt

is no t th e behaviorof the individual wh o keepsa secret, ut th Cbehavior of another individual: within th e mixture of reClp'rocal knowledgeor ignorance, the accent s more on the daqg-tof knowledge han oi ignorance.We now come to a totally dlf. ,ferent configuration. It is found in those relationships rvhlChrin contrast o the ones discussed, o not center around cle1flycircumscribed interests that must be fixed objectively, if Onlyircumscribed nterests that must be fixed objectively, it OnU rbecause f their "superficiality." Instead, they are built, at lC${';'{

Friendship and Loue 325in their idea, upon the person in it s totality. The principal typeshere are friendship and marriage.To the extent that thc ideal of friendship was received fromantiquity and (peculiarly enough) was devcloped in a romanticspirit , i t aims at an absolute psychological int imacy, an d is ac -companied by th e notion that even material property should becomnron to friends. This entering of th e whole undividcd egointo the relationship may be more plausible in frienclship thanin love fo r th e reason that friendship lacks th e specil ic concen-tration upon on e element which love derives from its sensuous-ness.To be sure, by virtue of the fact that one emane the tota!range of possible reasons for a relation takes the lead, thesercasons attain a certain organization, as a group does throughlcadership. A particularly strong relational factor often blazesthe trail on which the rest follow it, when they would otherwisercmain latent; and undoubtedly, fo r most people, sexual loveopens the doors of the total personality more widely than doesanything else. For not a few, in fact, love is the only form inwhich they can give their ego in its totality, just as to the artistthe form of his art offers the only possibility for revealing hisrvhole inner life. Probably, this observarion can be made espe-cially often of womcn (although the very differently understood"Christian love" is also designed to achieve the same result).Not only because they love do women unreservedly offer thetotal remainder of their being and having; but all of this, so tospeak, is chemically dissolved in love, and overflows to the otherlreing exclusively and entirely in the color, form, and tempera-rnent of love. Yet, where the feeling of love is not sufl icientlycxpansive, and the remaining psychological contents of the rcla-t onship are not suff iciently malleable, the preponderance of thct:rotic bond may suppress,as I have already suggested, rhe orhcr

r ontacts (practical-moral, intellectual), as well as the opening-upof those rcservoirs of the personality that l ie outside the eroticsllhere.Fricndship lacks this vehcmence, bu t also tl ' re requent un-(:vcnness,of this abandon. It may be , therefore, more apt thanlove to connect a whole person with another person in its en -tirety; it may melt reserves more easily than love does-if not;rs stormily, yet on a larger scale and in a more enduring


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326 Types of Social Relationshipsscquence. Yet such complete intimacy becomes probably moreand more diff icult as diffcrentiat ion among men increases.Modcrn man, possibly, ha s oo much to hide to sustain a friend-ship in the ancient scnse.Besides,except for the r earliest years,pcrsonalit ies ar e perhaps too uniquely indivicltralized to allowfull rcciprocity of understanding and receptivity, rvhich always,after all, requires much creative imagination and nruch divina.t ion rvhich is oriented only tolvard the othcr. I t rvould se em that,for all these rcasons, the rn


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328 Types ol Social RelationshiPsmany nature peoplcs,as rvell as antong th e Hindus and Romans.Nobody will deny, of coursc, that even in modcrn li[e, marriageis probably contracted overrvhelmingly from conventional ormiterial ntotives. Ye t no mattcr ho w often it is acttralized, th csociological idea o[ moclern marriage is the collllnonness of al ll i fe-conlents, insofar as they detertnine th e value and fate ofth c personality, immediately or t lrrclugh their effects.No r is thenature of this ideal requiremcnt without results: oft.en enoughit allon,s, or even stimulatcs, an init ially quite impcrfect unionto develop into an ever more comprehensive onc. But, whereaSth e very interminabii ity oi t iris process is t ire ilrstrLii ircnt of th ehappiness an d inner vitality of the relationship, it s reversalusually entails grave disappointtncnts-namely, lvhen abso'lute unity is anticipated firom the bcginning, when ncither de 'mand no r revelation knolvs restraint, not even th e restraintwhich, fo r al l { iner and deeper natures, remains locked in theobscurity o[ the soul even where it seems o pour itself ou t beforeth e other entirely.

During the first stages of the relationship there is a great.temptation, both in marriage altd in marriagc-like free love,r r . r t . - l - L - ^ - l - ^ - t L - . - t - ^ ^ . 1 - ^ - . ^ ^ ^ - - l r l . oto le t oncsert De co l l lPre tcry auuut uc( l r ry Lrrc (rLrrcr ' Lt JLrru Lrr f ,

last reserves of the soul after those of the body, to lose oneself tOth e other without reservation. Yet, in most cases, hi s abandOnprobably threatens th e future of th e relationship seriously. Onlyihor. individuals can give themselves wholly without dangcrwho cannot wholly give themselves, because their wealth con'sists n a continuous development in which every abandon is atonce follolved by ne w treasures.Such individuals havc an inex' rhaustible rcservoir o[ latent psychological possessions, nd hencecan no more reveal and give them alvay at one stroke than atree can give away next year's fruits with those of the seasotl.Bu t other individuals ar e different. With every fl ight of feeling,with every unconditional abandonment, with every revelationof their inner life, they make inroads (a s it were) into thcircapital, because they lack the mainspring o[ ever renewedpsychic affluence which can neither be exhaustively revealcdnor be separated from the ego. In these cases, he spouses haVea god chance of coming to face one another with emPty handfiand th e Dionysian bliss of giving may leave behind it an im .

Marriage 829povcrishment which, unjustly, -bu t no less bitterly fo r that,Lelies n resrrospect ven pastabandonsand their happiness.-We are, aftei all, mad; in such a way that we neednot onlya certain proportion of truth and error as he basisof our lives(as was pfini.a out earlier), but also a certain ProPortion ofilistinctnessand indistinctness n the imageof our life-elements'The other individual must give us not only giftswe may accePt'but the possibility of our giving him-hoPesl idealizations,lridden biauties, aitractions of which not evenhe is conscious'IJut the place rvherewe deposital l this, which we produce,but- - ^ J , . ^ - G ^ - h l - i c t h e i n d i c t i n r r l r n r i z o n n f h i s n e rs o n a l i t v . t h eIr r ( , L t L l L L LV L t 3 3 t t o , ^ o L r r e r - - - - - --interstitial realm, in which faith rePlaces knowledge. But itmust be strongly emphasized that this is, by no means, only amatter of illuiions and optimistic or amorous self-decePtions,but that portions even of tlie persons closest o us must be offeredus in the form of indistinctness and unclarity, in order for theirattractiveness to keep on the same high level.

It is in this way that the majority of people rePlace the attrac-tion values, which the minority possess n the inexhaustibilityo[ their inner iife and growth. The mere fact of absolute knowl-cdge, of a psychological having-exhausted, sobers us uP, evenwiltrout prior.drunkcnness; it Paralyzes the vitality of relationsancl lets their continuation really aPPCar pointless.This is th eclanger of complete and (in more than an cxternal sense)shame-less abandon, io which th e unlimited possibil i t ies of int imaterelations tempt us . These possibil i t ics, in fact, ar e easily feltas a kind of duty-particularly where there exists no absoluteccrtainty of one's own feeling; and the fear of not giving th eother enough leads to giving hirn too much. It is highly prob-able that many malriages founder on this lack of reciprocalcliscrction--discretion both in taking and in giving. They lapseinto a trivial habituation rvithotrt charm, into a matter-of-lactnesswhich has no longcr an y room for surprises.Th e fert i leclcpth of relations susPectsan d honors somcthins cven moreul[ inrate behind every ult imateness revealed; it daily challcngesus to reconqucr even secure possessions.Bu t this dcpth is onlyth e rervard fo r that tendernessand self-discipline rvhich, cven inth e most itrt imate relation that comprises th e total individual,respects his inner private proPerty, and allows the right toquestion to be limited by th e right to secrecy.

h'j


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staf1i

It.iChapter 3

(\JecrectrJTI IE SOCIOT,OGICAL CI IAR.actcr is t ic of a l l these combinat ions is that th e secrcr o[ a g ivcn

: , . . 1 . . : - 1 , . . , : ^ ^ ^ t - - ^ - . - r ^ i - - r r . r r ir r r ( r rvr l rLr


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iii332 Secrery

in order to enhance the personality in the eyes of others-toth e point wherc an individual sometitnes brags about im-moralit ies he has not even committed.

$ 2. The Fascina.tion of SecrecyThe employment o[ secrecy as a sociological technique, as

a form of action without which certain purPoses-since rve ivein a social environment--{an simply not be attained, is under-standable immediatcly. No t quite so evident are the attractionsand values of the secret beyond its significance as a mere means-the peculiar attraction of formally secretive behavior irrespec'tive o[ its momentary content. In the first place, the stronglyemphasized exclusion of all outsiders makes for a correspond'ingly strong fecling of possession.Fo r many individuals, prop'erty does not fully gain its significance with mere orvnership,bu t only with t lte consciousness ha t others mlrst do withoutit . Th e basis for this, evidently, is the impressionabil ity of ourfeelings through di.{Jcrences.Moreover, since the others are ex'cluded from the possession-particularly when it is very valu'

t ! - r - - - - - : . - ^ l c - - - - - ^ l ^ - l ^ - : ^ ^ l l - - - ^ * * - , 1 - . . l - ^ eaole- f , I rc corrvcrsc su8,$c5 ls lLscr l PsyL l lu luB, rLdrry ' l l d l r rcry ' Lrr4Lwhat is denied to many must havespecialvalue.Inner property of the most heterogeneous incls, hus, attainsa characteristic value accent through the form of secrecy, nwhich the contentual significance f rvhat is concealed ecedes,often enough, before the simple fact that others know nothingabout it. Among children, pride and bragging arc often basedon a child's being able to say o the other: "I know somethingthat you don't [nsq7"-and to such a degree, hat this sentenceis uttered as a formal means of boasting and of subordinatingthe others, even where it is made up and actually refers o nosecret. This jealousy of the knowledge about facts hidden toothers, s shown in all contexts, rom the smallest o the largcst.British parliamentary discussionswere secret for a long time;and, as late as under George III, presscommunications aboutthem were prosecuted as crirninal offenses-explicitly, as viola'tions of parliamentary priaileges.The secretgivesone a positionof exception; it operatesas a purely socially determined attrac.tion. It is basically ndependent of the content it guardsbut, of

The Fascinotion of BetraYal 33tcourse, is increasingly cffcctivc in th e measure in which th eexclusive possession s vast an d signif icant'Fo r t5is, a converse notion, "t" iogottt to ttre on e mcntionedab


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334 Secrecysurprises, turns of fate, joy, destr1161i6p-lf only, perhaps, ofself-destruction. Fc.rr hi s reason, th c secret is surrounclecl by rhepossibil i ty an d ternpt:rt ion of bctrayal; an d th e cxternal dangerof bcing discovcrecl is intenvoven with the internal clanger,which is l ikc th c fascin;rt ion o[ an :rbyss, f giving oneself o*"y.TIre sccret puts :r barrier benvecn rnen but, at t lre samc tilre, itcreates.the tcmpting challengc to break through it, by gossiporconfession__2p61hi s challenge accomPanics it s psychology it .a constant ovcrtone. Th c sociological signif icancc of the secret,thercforc, has it.s practical extent, its rrrode of rcalization, onlyin t l rc ind iv idu: r l 's capacir .y r inc l inat ion to kecp it to h irnse l f ,in hi s resisrancc or weakncss in tirc face of tcmlrring berrayal.out o f the cot rn tcrp lay o[ thesc rvo in tcrcsts, n ionccal ing an drevc:rl ing, spring nuanccs an d fates of hurnan interaction ttratperrneate t in it s enr i re y. In the l isht o[ our car l icr st ipu la t ion,evcry human relation is charactcrizecl, among othcr things, byth e anrount of secrecy that is in an d ar.ouncl t. In this rc.specr,therefore, t tre furthcr dcvelopnrent of cvery relation is dlter-mined by th e rario of perscvering an d yielcling energies which

ar e contained in th e relation. Th e fornrcr rest on th e practicalintcrest in secrecvand it s formal attraction. J-lre lattcr ar e basedon the irnpcrssibil i ty of !-'c:.ring rh c rension cntailccl by keepii-rea sccrct an y loneer, an d on a feeling of supcriority. Althclugiithis supcriority l ics in a latent forrn, so ro sp6ak, n sccrccy tself i,for 'ur fcc l i .gs ir is ' r r l lyact rra l izccl n ly a t l r re nromenr of rcve la-t ion or ' [ tcn, a lso, n t l rc lust o[ confcssion, v l r ic l r rnay conta inthis fccline of porvcr it r th c ncgative ancl pcrvcrtc(l fnrin of sclf-h t rrrr i l ia t ion an d contr i t ion.

$ 4. Secrecy and IndiuidualizationAl l t l rcsc cle tncnts which clcterrn inc th c socio loe ica l ro lc oft l tc scct -e t rc o[ an incl iv ic lu : r lnat t rrc; bu t th c nrc: rsrrr .cn rvh ic l rth c rl isl losit ions ancl cotnplications of pcrsonalit ics forrn sccrctsdcpetlcls,at t lte satrtc itne, on t-l lesocial structurc in rvlriclr t f tcirl ivcs : rrc p laccd. TI rc dccis ive point in th is respccr s that th csecrct is a f irst-ratc clernent of incliviclu:rl ization. It is this in atypical clual role: social condit ions o[ strons personal clif fcrcn-t iat ion pcrmit an d rcquirc secrccy in a higtr clcgrec; and, con-

Secrecyan d Indiuidualization 33 5vcrse y, thc sccrct crnbodics ancl intcnsif ics such di{ ferentiat ion.In a stnall anoutrd to shorv thcir dangersin economric action involving forcign rnoneys. They havc le dto a l)rotcctivc rncasure namcly, thc pr.rbliccharacterof f inancialrnanipulations ll y joint-stcrckcompanics an d governments.

This suggcstsa somen'hat more cxact phrasing of t l ' re evolu-t ionary forrntrla tonchccl upon abovc. According to it , it wil l bercr.allcd, the sccret is a f


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nation it preservesan unchanged quantity of secrecy'I lut one can find a somervhatmore precisely detcrmincd con-tent fo r this general schcme. It seemsas f, with grorving culturalexpedien.y, !.n"ral affairs bccame ever more public, an d indi'

336 Secreqone of them, social l i fe se ze suPon anotller, an d in all this alter-

Secrecyan d Indiuidualization 33 7developed, in the midst of metropolitan crowdedness, a tech-nique io r making and keeping private matters secret, such as"u.i i" , could be aitained only by means of spatial isolation.Th e answer to th e question of ho w fa r this dcvelopmentntay bc considered expedient depends on social value axioms'Every clcmocracyholdi publicity to be an intrinsically desirablesituaiion, on th e fundamental premise that everybody shouldknorv th e events and circumstances that concern him, since thisis th e cond.it ion without which he cannot contribute to decisionsabout them; an d every shared knowledge itself contains th e psy-- - L ^ t ^ - : ^ ^ l ^ l - ^ l l o - -a + ^ c h r rp r l r r t i n n I t i s a m O O t O U e S t i O nL l l u r u H r l L d l l L r r 4 r r L r r S ! uv of rs r vs " v L ^ v ^ ' Iwhetlicr thisconclusion is quire valid. If , above al l individualist icinterests, there has grorvn an objective governing structurewhich emboclies cert;in aspects of these interests, the formalautonomy of this structure ma y very well entit le it to functionsecretly, without thereby belying it s "publici ly'_ in the senseof a material consideration o[ the interests of all. Thus, there isno logical connection which would entail the greater aalue otpublility. On the other hand, the general sche.meof culturaldifferentiation is again shown here: what is public becomes evermore public, and wlhat is private becomes ever more-private'Andthis historical development is the expression of a deePer, objec-tive significance whit is essentially public and what, in its con-tent, clncerns all, also becomes ever more public externally, inits sociological form; an d what, in it s inner meaning, is autonomous-the centripetal affairs of the individual-gains an evermore private charlcter even in it s sociological position, an evermore distinct possibility of remaining secret.

I pointed out earlier that the secret also operates as an adorn-ing possession and value of the person-ality.-This fact involvesth! iontradiction that what receaes before the consciousnessofthe others and is hidden from them, is to be emphasized in theirconsciousness; that one should aPPear as a Particularly note-worthy person precisely through what one conceals. But thiscontradiction pioves, not only that the need for sociolqical at -tention may indeed resort to intrinsically contradictory means,but also that those aga;nstwhom the means are actually directedin the given case, sitisfy this need by bearing the cost of thesuperioiity. They do so with a mixture of readiness and dislike;

vidual affairs ever more sccret. In less developed stagcs,as has .alreacly been noted, th c individual an d hi s condit ions cannot, to ,th e sameextent, Protect themselvesagainst being looked into an d ,m e c l c l l c c l r v i t [ r a J u n d e r t l r e n r o d e r n s t y l e o f l i f e , r v h i c l r l r a s p r o .c l u c c c l a n e n t i r e l y n c r v m c a S u r e o f r e s e r v e a n d d i s c r c t i o n , . l P : .' r l - - : - l ^ - - ^ ^ : r i ^ - T - ^ ^ - I : ^ - r i - . o o f r r n n t i a n r . i e c n f t l ' r e n t r l r l i f jCf i l l y f f I d I B r g L l L r c J . ll l c . t l l l L l L r r r r L J ' r u r r L L r v r r l- " " - ' -intcrests were customarily clothed with mystical authority, while, 'under larger and more mature condit ions, thcy attain, throught l rcex tens iono f t l re i rsp l re reo fdom ina t ion , t l r ro t rgh t l reob jec .t ivity of their technique, an d through their distance lrom everyindividual, a certainty an d dignity by means of rvhich they canpermit their activit ies to be public. Th e former secrecyof publiciffuirc, however, shorved its inner inconsistency by at once creat'in g th e countermoventents of betrayal, on th e one hand, 1" d o! ,.rf ior,ug", on th e other. Even as late as in the seventeenth andcighteenth centuries, governments kept anxiously- sile.nt alo-utth i amounts of state debts, the tax situation, an d th e size of th earmy. Ambassadors, therefore, often knerv no better than to sPy,to intercept letters, and to make people who "knelv something"talk, domlstics no t excluded.a In the nineteenth century, how'ever, publicity invadecl the affairs of state to such an extent that,by norv, governments oflicially publish facts rvithout whosesecrecy,prior to the nineteentil centt lry, no regime seemed evenpossible. Polit ics, administration, an d jurisdict ion thus haveiost their secrecyan d inaccessibil i ty in the salnc measure in rvhichth e individual ha s gained the possibil i ty of ever more comPletewithdrawal, and in the same measure in which modern life has

r This countermovement also occtrrs in the opposi te direct ion. I t has been saidabout Engl ish court history that thc real court cabal , the secret whlsperings, thcorganizat tns of intrigue, di d no t occur under despot ism, bu t only once the kinghicl const i t rrt ional counselors, that is, rvhcn th e government was, to this extent, anopenly revealed system. Only then, the king began-and this is supposed-to harC- l ' - " - I ' - - - - - - - - t - -blen not iceable part icularly since Eclrvard I I -to form, against these co'rulers.who isomehow were foisted upon him, an ino{I icial quasi-subterranean circle of advisen, Iwhich in i tsel f , as wel l ai rhrough the ef lorts toenter i t , created a chain of conceal 'ments and conspiracies.


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338 SecrecYbut, in practicc, thcy neverthcless supply the dcsirccl rccogni-t ion. It may thus be appropriate to shorv that, although appar-ently the sociological .b,., t t t" .-polc o[ sccrccy, adornmcnt has,in fact, a socie al iig.tifi.ottcc rvith a structtlre analogotls to thatof secrecy tself. It is t lre natt lrc ancl ft tnction o[ adornment tolead th e eyes of othcrs rlPon lltc adorned. Although, in thissense, t is th c antagonist o[ sccrccy, lot cvcn tltc secrct (i t wil lbe rememberecl) is without th c ftrnction o[ pcrsonal emphasis.An d this, aclornment, too, Cxcrt: iscs,by rnixing superiority tOothers with dcpendence rlPon tltcrn, atrcl thcir eood will withtheir envy. it cioesso in a ntall l lcr rvlrit l i , as a sociological formof interaction, requircs its sPecial nvestigation.

$ 5. Adornrnent6Man's desire to Pleasehis social environment contains tw ocontradictory tcndencies, in whose play an d countcrPlay _i ngcneral, the relations among iirclividuals take thcir course. On

Ih " on " hand, it contains kinclncss,a dcsire o[ th c individual togive th e othcr joy; but on the othcr hand, thcre is the wish fo rihis joy and these "favors" to flow back to ltim, in thc form of.ecofnit ion an d esteem,so that they be attributed to hi s Pcrson-alit /as valucs. Indccd, this second need is so intensil ied thatit rn i l i ta tcs against th e al t ru isrn of rv ish ing to p lease by meansof t lris lrlcasing;, th e incliviclual clesires to clist inguislr himse.lfbefore others, an d to be the


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tion. They operateas the symbols of such a fulguration evenwhere, in actuality, they are only external, where no suggeJtivepower or significanceof the personality flows through them.tfie radiationso[ adornment, the sensuous ttention it provokes,supply the personalitywith such an enlargementor intensifica-tiJti oi it s sphere: he personality,so to speak, s more when it isadorned.Inasmuch as adornment usually is also an object of con-siderable value, it is a synthesisof the individual's having andbeing; it thus transformi *.t" possessionnto the sensuous ndemptatic perceivability of the indiviclual himseii. This is noitrue of oriinuty dresswhich, neither in respectof having norof beirrg, strikes one as an individual particularity; only-.thefancycliss, and aboveall, jewels, which gathcr_the ersonality'svalueand significance f radiation as t in a focal point, allow themere hauin! of the person to become a visible quality oj.itsbeing. And this is sb, not atthough adornment is something.,supirfluous," but preciselybecau.set is .The necessarys much,rroi. closely connicted with the individual; it surrounds hisexistencewith a narrower periphery. The superfluous "flowsr r . r - ^ : - : - o ^ - . - ^ . ^ - ^ i - + - . . , 1 - : ^ t - ^ - o C - - - o - ^ . r o r l f r n r n i f qov er , f , I laL ls r IL l t uwD Lu P L, r r r LJ wr r r L r r 4r L rs ^ r s r r r vorigin but to which it stiil remains tied: around the Precinct of*.i. necessity, t lays a vaster Precinct which, in principle, islimitless. According to it s very idea, the suPerfluouscontainsno measure.The fiee and princely character of our being in -creasesn the measure n which we add suPerfluousnesso ourhaving, sinceno extant structure, such as s laid down by neces-sity, mposesany limiting norrn uPon it .'Thii very accentuation of th e personality, however, isachieved.by means of an impersonal trait. Everything that"adorns" man can be ordered along a scale n terms of its close'ness o the physical bocly.The "closest" adornment is typicalof nature p6oples: tattooing. The opposite extreme is repre'sentedby metil and stone adornments, which are entirely un-individual and can be Put on by everybody.Betrveen hese wostandsdress,which is not so inexchangeableand personal astartooing,but neither so un-individual and separable s ewelry,whoseviry elegance ies in it s impersonality. That this natureof stoneand metal-solidly closedwithin itself, n no way allud'

Adorntnent 34Ling to any inclividuality; hard, unmodifiatrle-is yet forced to,.iu. the person, this ii its subtlest fascination. What is reallyelegant avoids pointing to the specifically individual; it ahvayslayi a more general, stylized, almost abstract sphere around man-which, oi ao,.,rr", prevents no frnesse from connecting thegeneral with the persbnality. That new clothes are particularlyf l.g"n, is due to their being sti l l "st if f" ; they have no t ye t ad -jusierl ro rhe modilications o[ the individual body as -fully astla., clothes have, rvhich have been worn, and are pulled andpinched by the pcculiar movements of their wearcr-thus com-^ ln ta l r , .prr .e l incr h is nart icrr lar i tv- Th is "newness," th is lackl / r L r v ^ / ^ - - - r- -bf modiflcarion by indlviduality, is typical in the highest meas-ure of metal eweiry: it is alwaysnew; in untouchable oolness,it standsabove he singularity and destinyof its wearer' This isnot true of dress.A long-worn Pieceof clothing almostgrows oth e body; it ha s an intimacy that militates against he verynature oi elegance,which is something or the "others," a socialnotion deriving it s value from generalresPect'-.If jewelry tf,us is designed,o enlarge he individual by add-ing something super-individual which goes out to al l and isno"tcdand ap[reciated by all, it must, beyondany effect that it smaterial itsCtl may have,possess tyle.Style s alwayssometiringgeneral. t brings the contents of Pe-rsonalife and activity into^I for* shared 6y *ury and accesiible o many. In the caseofa rvork of art, Ive are the less nterested n its style, fi e greaterthe personal uniquenessand the subjective ii e expressedn it 'For, it is with these that it appeals o the spectator's ersonalcore, oo-of the spectatorwh6, so o speak,s alone n the wholervorld with this work of art. Bu t of rvhatwe call handicraft-rvhichbecause f it s utilitarian PurPose ppcals o a diversityofmen-lve rcquest a more general and typical articulation. weexpect ttot ottly that an inclividuality rvith it s uniquenessbeuoice,l in it , but a broad, historical or socialorientation andtemper, vhich make it possible or handicraft to be incorporatedinto the life-systems f a great many different individuals' It isth e greatestmistake to think that, becauset always unctionsas l; aclornmentof an individual, adornmentmust be an indi-vidtral rvork of art. Quite the contrary: becauset is to servethe individual, it may not itself be of an individual nature-as

Secrecy


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342 Secrecll it t le as th c picce of furniturc on rvhich rv c sit, or t l lc catingutensil which we rnanipulate, rnay bc inclivicltral works of art 'l fhe r'ork o[ ar t .urrrrr, in princiPlc, bc incorporatccl into :rtr-other lite-it is a sel[-sufhcient*uot]1,1.]y co.trast, al l t l tat occu-pies th e larger spherc arouncl th e li[e o[ t ltc individual, t lt t tstI"rr--.f i i?r if i. , "u", widcr concentric sphcres

that lcad Sackro th e indiviclual or originate lrotn him. Th c cssenceof styliza-iio' i, preciscly t6is 4il. t ion .[ inclivicltr:rl oignancy, tSis een-eralization beyoncl th c unit lucness o[ th c personality-rvhich'nevertheless, n it s callacity o[ b:rscor circlc of radiation, carriesor absorbs th c inclivi iuati iy as f in a irroati iy i iowing rivcr' Irorthis rcason, aclornment ha s always instinctivcly bcen shapcd ina relativelY severestYle'Ilesirles it s fo'n"i stylization , thc ntatcriul means o[ it s socialprrrpor. is it s Dril l anci.I ly virtue o[ tSis bril l iance, it s rvearerappears as the center of a circle o[ racliat ion in rvhich evcry close-by person, every seeing cye, s catrght' As th c flasho[ th e prccioussrone seems ro be clirlecieclat tl c otScr-l ike t6 e lightning. ofth e glance th e ey e acl. lrcsseso him-it carries th e s


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344 Secteqoriginally, and often exclusively, efers to adornment. By con' :tra;, the personal ProPerty of the male usually b.eginswith iweapons. tnir r.u.ilt his active and more aggressive ature: lthe ^male enlargeshis personality sphere without waiting fo rthe will of otheis. In thi case f the more passiveemalenature'th is resu l t -a l thoughfo rmaI ly thesameinsp i teo fa l lex te rna ldifferences-dependt -ot. on the others'good r'vill.Every P,top' lerty is u., .*t.rriion of personality; property is that which obeys :oui rvills, that in which our egose*-pt.tt, and externally realize, ', ,themselves. hi s expression ..ttt, iarliest an d mostcompletely,in regard to our body,which thus is our first and most uncondi'tionai possession.n the ad,ornedbody, we possess xore; f wehave the adornedbody at our disposal,we are masters ver more ,and nobler things, o io speak. iis, therefore, deeplysignificant ;that bodily adoinment 6ecomesprivate ProPerty above all: it :expands the ego and enlarges ttte sphere around us which is :filfed with our personality ttd *hi.hlonsists in the pleasureand itheattentionotourenvironment.Thisenvironmentlookswit l tmuch lessattention at the unadorned (and thus as if less"ex' ,panded") individual, an d passesy without including hiT'Tlt ,- r - t t , - f - l - - . : - o - o r r o o l a t l i n it unoamenB r P r r nc lP lc oL aqu l l l l l l c l r L lD ( , l r LL r r r v r L r Lv v s ^ !u .' t 1the fact that, under primitive conditions, the most outstandingpossession f women became hat which, according to it s veryid .u ,e x i s t s o n ly fo ro th e rs ,a n d wh ic h c a n in te n s i f y th e v a lu cand significanceof it s wearer only through the recognition-thatf lows6ack toher f romtheseothers . Inanaes the t ic fo rm,adorn 'ment createsa highly specificsynthesisof the great convergentand divergent fories of the individual and society,namely, thcelevation of ttt" ego through existing fo r others,and the eleva'tion of existing foiothers through the emphasis nd extensiono[ :the ego.This iesthetic form itsilf standsabove he contrastsbe' ':t*".i individual human strivings. They find, in adornmentr ,not only the possibility of undisturbed simultaneousexistenccrbut the possibility of a reciprocal organization that, as anticipa' :tion and pledge of their deeper metaphysicalunity, transcendlthe disharmony of their aPPearance. i

Chapter 4

'Ihe SecretSocietyTHE SECRET IS A SOCIOLOG-

ical deterrnination characterist ic of th e reciprocal relat ions be -tween group elements; or, rather, together with other relationalforms, it constitutes their relationship as a whole. Bu t it mayalso characterize a group in its totality: this applies to the caseof "secret societies." As long as the existence, the activities, andthe possessions f an individual are secret, the general sociologi-cal significance of the secret is isolation, contrast, and egoisticindividualization. The sociological significance o[ the secret isexternal, namely, the relationship between the one who hasthe secret and another who does not. But, as soon as a wholegroup uses secrecy as its form of existence, th significance be-comes internal: the secret determines the reciprocai reiationsamong thos e who share it in common. Yet, sincc even here thereis thc exclusion (with its specific nuances) of the non-initiates,the sociology of the secret society is confronted with the com-plicated problem of ascertaining how intra-group life is determ-ined by the group's secretive behavior toward the outside. I donot preface this discussion by a systematic classification of secretsocieties, which would have only an external, historical interest;even without it, essential categories will emerge by themselves.

$ I. Prolection and, Conf.denceThe first internal relation typical of the secret ociety s thereciprocal confidencea amons its members. It is required toa particularly great extent, because he purposeof secrecy s,above all,protection. Of .al l protective measures,he most adicalis to make oneself nvisible. In this respect, he secretsocietya"Vertraucn," i .e. ,both "conf idencc" and "t rust ." Roth terms ar e used in this

translation, according ,o .onr.*,.-tt.aO,


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348 The Secret SocietYquality, there is in the secret society, as already- nclted, the in -tlrnal- quality of reciprocal confidence among it s members-the very speci{ic trust that thcy are capable of keeping silent.According- to their content, associations rest uPon premises ofvarious kinds of con{idence: conlidence in business abil ity, inreligious conviction, in courage, love, decency, or-in the caseof criminal groups-in the radical break with moral concerns.But as soon as the society becomes secret, it adds to the trust de'termined by it s particular purpose, the formal trust in secrecy.1fhis, evidently, is faith-in-the-person of a sociologically moret . . , t - - - - . ^ - - .L ^ . L ^ - ^ : - ^ ^ ^ ^ " . ; l . l o ^ n f r r n n , naDs t I : t c l u l la laLLc r L r r d r r d r ly ( J l l l s l , D l l t LL \ - v L r / yvr r rv rL Lv . r r r r r v ^ .content may be subject to it . Furthermore (but fo r exceptions),no other kind o[ confidence needssuch uninterruPted subjectiverenewal. For, in the casesof faith in affection, encrgy, morality,intell igence, decency, or tact, it is more likely that there ar ecertain facts which, once fo r all, justify th e faith and its extent'an d which reduce to a minilnum the probabil ity of deceit. Bycontrast, the chance of "talking" rests on momentary impru" Idence, on the tenderness or excitement of a mood, or on thcnuance, perhapsunconscious,of some emphasis.The preserva'tion o[ tire secret s something so unstable; the temptations Of ,betrayal are so manifold; the road from discretion to indiscre't ion is in many cases so continuous, that th e uncondit ionaltrust in discretion involves an incomparable preponderance ofthe subjective actor. lFor this reason, ecret ocieties ffer a very impressive chool' iing in the moral solidarity among men. Their rudimentaryforms begin with any two persons who share a secret; theirdiffusion in al l places nd at all times s mmenseand hashardlyever beenappreciated venquantitatively.For, n the con{idenceof on e nran in anothcr lies as high a moral value as n th e factthat th e trustedpersonshowshimself worthy of it. Perhaps t iteven more free and rneritorious,since he trust we receiuscoll'tains an almost compulsory power, and to betray it requirelthoroughly positive meanness. y contrast,confidence s "given";it cannot be requested n the same manner in which we arcrequested to honor it, once we are its recipients.

Silence 3.19$ 2. Silence

It is nattrral that secret societies shoulcl scek means for pro-rnotine th c secrccy p.sychologically,since it cannot be directlycnforcecl. Above all, there ar e the oath and the drreat of punish-rnent, rvhich nced no discussion. More interesting is a techniquethat is sometimes encountered, namely, the systematic nstruc-t ion of the novice in the art of silence. In view of the above-nrentioned diff icult ies of wholly guarding one's tongue and,part icularly, in view of the easy connection betrveen thought- - - - , 1 - . - - . t - - ^ - : , - : , , r. l I r ( r t t L L c I r t I l L u L l l r t L c x l S L s l I l L I l c I I I O I C I ) I . l I I l r t l V C S L a l i C S ( a I I I O I l Sclri lclrcn and many nature peoples, thinking and speaking ar e:rlmost th e same), t is necessary,above all, to learn how to be.silcnt, before silence regarding an y part icular item may becxpccted.T Thus it is reported of a secret order in the MoluccanIsland of Ceram rhat the young man wh o seeksadmittance, notonly is enjoined to keep silent concerning everything he experi-cnces on entering, bu t also is not permitted for weeks to say aw'ord to anybody, not even to his family. Certainly not merelythe educational factor of thoroughgoing silence operates here;it is in l ine with this psychologica!!y unil if ferentiated stage hat,cluring a period when something part icular must be kept secret,speaking altogether should be prohibited. This is the same radi-calism in which prinrit ive peoples often us e th e death penaltyin caseswhere later a part ial sin is met with a part ial punish-rnent; or in which, if this is their inclination, they pay fo r some-

z If hrrman sociat io:r s condit ioned by the capaci ty to speak, t is shaped by ther: rpac i t y to be s i l ent , a l t hough th i s becomes obvious on ly upon occas ion.Where al l


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350 TIrc Secret SocietYthing molnentarily attractive rvith a wholly disproport ionatepart of their possessions.

In al l this, there is nranifesteda specif ic " lack of skil l" whoseessenceseelns o consist in th e incapabil ity of cngendering th epart icular innervation neecled or a Particular purposive _move'ment: th e clumsy person nlovcs th c wllole artn whcre, fo r hi sf*por., he should move only two fingers,- or t5e wSole bodyi"h" ' . . a precisely art iculatecl movcment of th e ar m would beappropriate. In tire casesquotecl, the preponderance of psycho'iJgi." i asscrciation mmeniely intensil ies th e dangcr of indis'cr l t ion ancl , a t the samc t i tnc, a l lows i ts proh i l ) l t lon to growU.yor. l i ts part icular, teleologically dctcrnrined content and,initead, to cbver th e whole function that inclucles this content'If , on tfie other hand, the secret ordcr of tfie Pythagoreans Pre'scribecl several years'silence fo r th e novices, th e intention, prOb'ably here too, tvent beyond mere education for guarding thesecrets of the order-but not because o[ that "lack o[ skill" but,on the contrary, because the differentiated PurPose itself wafenlargcd in its own direction: the adept had to learn, not only 'iio t.".p silent about particular matteis, bu t to mastcrhimselft . - - : - ^ - ^ , - ^ ^ ^ l G J : - ^ : ^ l i ^ ^ - - t l a Igencra l l y . I ne oroer a l l l l cu aL a rIE)uIUuD lLrr-Lrr i l - rPrrr rL 4rru rr litylizecl purity of life; and, whoever managed to -be silent ovefy"urr, wasulsoable, prcsumably, o resist emptationsother than

Silence 35 1pendence upon personal instruction, and the fact that the exclu-iiu. ,o.r.ce of the teaching was within the secret order_-notdeposited in any objective piece of rvriting-these facts tied.u".y single member with iniomparable closeness o the group,and made him constanrly feel thit, it he were severed from thissubstance, he would lose his own and could never find it againanywhere.

It lras perlraps not been sufhciently noted how muclr, in morernarure cultures, the objectification o[ the spirit promotes thegrowing independ.rr.. of the individual. so long as immediate. ! - - r - , - r . . , ^ - t . : - - ^ - ' l - 1 . ^ . , e r l l e s t a h l i s h m e n t O fl rac l l t . l on ' l l l o l v luua l LcdLrr l r rEr ' arru ' 4v v vsnorrns through persons in auihority, detcrrt]i".- tire individual'sintellectuat life, he is wholly integratecl rvith his surrounding'l iving group. It alone gives hi m tn e P-ossibil i ty.ot1 fulf i l led an d,pi.ii,rit existence; the*direction of it t channels, through whichliis life-c.lntents flow to him, runs only between his social milieuancl [ inrself; and he feels this at every moment. But, once th elabor o[ the spccies capitalizes it s results in the form of writing,in visible works, in eniuring examples, this immediate, organicIIow benveen th e actual S.;tp an d it s individual member isinterrr-rpted. Tl're lifie process of the individual no longer con-tinuousiy binds hinr io the group without comPetition froman y other quarter: it can no w teed on obicctive sourceswhich,r. id no t be personally present.Th e fact that this supply actuallyorginates in proccsses'oi hc social mincl, is relatively irrelevant'These proceisc, ar e not only quite remote, having occurred ing.rr.r"iions rvhich are no longer connectcd rvith the Present feel-in g of t l-re nclividual, althoJgh hi s supply is - he crystall izationo[ actions ll y these l)astgencrations. Above all, however, it is th eobjective fornr cr t hi s iupply, it s separateness ro m subjectivelrcisonality, that opcns a suPer-social otrrce of food to the indi-viclual. I{ is spirit iral content, both in desree an d kind' thusColnes to depend rnttch lnore rlrarkcdly uPon his capacity to:rl lsorb, than upon an y allotted offering. The part icularly close:rssociation rvit lt in t lte sccret society (t o be discussed ater ingreatcr cletail), rvl ' rich ha s it s affective category, so to speak, inrlrecif ic "trt lsL," thtrs suggests hat, rvhere th e secretsociety haS:r s ts core tlte transnrission o[ intellectual contents, it is fi t fo rit to avoid th e rvrit ten fixation of these matters'

Anothcr means for placing discretion uPon an objectrv6basis rvasapplied by the ecret order of the Gallic Druids. ThCcontent of ilieir secretsay, particularly, n spiritual songswhiclt

-that it requircd an cxtraordinary long time, even uP to twenty iyears. Il y rneansof this long period of learning beforc there.Wf,l;

evcry Drtrid had. o memorize. Bu t this wa s so arrangcd-aboVC.all, probably, bccause o[ thc prohibit ion to writc the songsdoWn,i

talkativeness.

anytlring cssential that could have been betrayed, a gradual haribituation to silcnce lvas clcveoped. The fascination of disclosuf$,di d no t assai l he t rnd iscip l ined mind al l at once, as t were; t l t {younf; rnind rvas allowed to adapt itself slowly to resisting' tfiiius.inntion. The rule according o which the songs ould not tr6'writtcn down, however, was more than a mere protective mCafrure against the revelation of the secrets-it is part of much nconrprehensive sociological phenomena. Thc individual's

7.6.10 simmel secrecy

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