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Ethnicities

DOI: 10.1177/14696820020020015232002; 2; 79Ethnicities

Catarina Kinnvalland Hindu identity constructions

Nationalism, religion and the search for chosen traumas: Comparing Sikh

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Nationalism,religion and the search forchosen traumas

Comparing Sikh and Hindu ident ity constructions

CATARINA KINNVALL

Lund University,Sweden

ABSTRACT This article proceeds from the argument that various forces ofgloba lizat ion have resulted in increased dislocat ion and uncerta inty for many people

in the world. Religion and nationalism, compared to most other identity construc-

tions, are viewed as particularly relevant organizing principles at a time when

modern society is making increasing demands on individua ls. In comparison to much

constructivist research, however, the art icle d iscusses the diffi culties in understand-

ing religious identity formation and nationhood without taking into consideration

the sociopsychological aspects of cat egory forma tion and the essentializat ion of the

o ther . To clarify t he discussion, an illustra tive study o f religious nationalism in

India is made, with a particular focus on, and comparison of, Sikh and Hindu

religious nationa lism. I show how, in their search for chosen traumas, similar pro-

cesses of categorizing and demonizing the other have been prevalent in both the

Sikh and Hindu cases. However, while Hindus were (and are) successful in fusing

nationalist and religious concerns in their attempts to monopolize both sources of

self a nd ident ity, Sikhs have been less successful in integrat ing the two.

KEYWORDS conflict q identity q Hindu q Sikh q self

INTRODUCTION

In much public debate, group conflict and nationalism continue to be

explained from two diametrically opposed perspectives: primordialism andinstrumentalism. The assertion of difference by social groups is either

viewed as evidence of ancient ha tred between d ifferent groups manifest-

ing itself in the absence of a strong state, or as groups and individuals being

ARTICLE

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but mindless paw ns in various elites struggles for power. D espite the fa ct

that the instrumentalist perspective has been modified in much construc-

tivist work on nationalism, a great deal of this work still lacks a more

comprehensive discussion of how nationalism is related to social andpsychological identity formation. In this sense, many studies give fairly

limited explana tions of the struggle for identity a nd recognition a s manifest

in the world toda y. In part icular, it seems as if there is a common tendency

to underestimate and simplify the extent to which notions of self, identity

and others interact in a rapidly changing world.

Without going into the abundance of literature on globalization and

modernity, this art icle originates from the belief tha t forces of globa lizat ion

in the forms of marketization, privatization, structural adjustment policies

and changing political structures have resulted in a decreased role of thestate. This, in turn, has facilitated rapid change and social transformation

and has, as a consequence, increased dislocat ion and uncertainty fo r many

people in the world. A common reaction to such dislocation is to seek

reaffi rmation of o nes self-identity by dra wing closer to any collective that

is ab le to reduce uncertainty a nd anxiety. D ue to the common tendency to

confla te state and nat ion, nationalism has often been heralded as providing

such certainty and security. The deba te on na tiona lism and the construction

of nationhood is therefore the starting point of this article, although it is

more concerned w ith comprehending the actual intersubjective processes a t

work in explaining identity format ion. It should be viewed a s an at tempt to

understand how nat ionalism and religion, compared to o ther identity con-

structions such as gender, race, language or caste, among others, may be

part icularly relevant o rganizing principles a t a time when modern society is

making increasing demands on individuals. In contrast to much construc-

tivist work, however, this article discusses the difficulties in understanding

religious identity formation and nationhood without giving serious con-

siderat ion to the sociopsychological a spects of ca tegory fo rmation a nd the

essentialization of the other. I t is argued that the way we understand issues

of social identity and group conflict depends on our conceptions of self,

and how such conceptions are related to the subject/other nexus and to

issues of ontological security.

To clarify the discussion, an illustrat ive study o f religious nat iona lism in

India is made, with a particular focus on, and comparison of, Sikh and

H indu nationalism. I show how, in their search for chosen traumas, similar

processes of categorizing a nd demonizing the other have been prevalent

in both the Sikh-Hindu and the Hindu-Muslim case. However, while the

H indus were (and are) successful in fusing nat iona list and religious concerns

in their attempts to monopolize both sources of self and identity, the Sikhshave been less successful in integrating the two . In the ana lysis, I draw on

the discussions of self, identity, religion and nationalism to show how and

why the Sikh-Hindu and the Hindu-Muslim cases differ.1

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NATIONALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OFNATIONHOOD

Litera ture on na tion and na tionalism has experienced an upsurge since the

early 1990s, largely as a response to the perception tha t the scale and inten-

sity o f violent confl ict a ppeared to ha ve increased with the collapse of E uro-

pean communism and the end of the C old War. D escriptions of recent

events involving what in popular media is referred to as ethnic wa rfare and

ethnic cleansing have brought about a multitude of primordialist expla-

nations of ethnicity and nationhood. As noted by Oommen (1997), for

instance, if concepts such as cantonization, decentralization a nd na tional

self-determination all have positive connotations, terms such as balkan-

ization tribalization and communalism are all negative and repressive.

The problem, P ieterse (1997: 365) a rgues, is that:

. . . in the process ethnicity functions as a new imagery and code of ra cism:

civilized people have nat ionalism while others indulge in ethnicity.

R epresenta tions of ethnicity as of funda menta lism in another context are

replete with references to irrat ional crowd beha viour and mass pathology.

Apart from racist biases in discourses on ethnicity, there is also a tendency

to combine primordialism with a modernist perspective. Essential

categories are the traditional ones, those left behind in the language of

modernity. The problem with the terminology of modernity is of course

that it is often based upon an ahistorical and essentializing treatment of

culture as either traditional or modern (see Alam, 1999).

In this vein, modernists such a s Kedo urie, G ellner and Na irn all assumed

that nations were invented, but that, once formed, they constituted real

communities of culture and power. The ontology behind the modernist

project is similar to the more general instrumenta list emphasis on the value

of nat ionality as a n orga nizing construct for collections of individuals who

share common interests and need to mobilize for collective action. I nstru-

mentalist perspectives thus draw attention to the constructed nature of

shared interests, and accentuate how national or other identities may be

mobilized and ma nipula ted by elites (see, for example, B rass, 1991; G urr

and H arff , 1994; Young, 1976).

At the same time, however, both instrumentalist and modernist

approaches have problems in explaining the circumstances in which people

identify with groups for other reasons than those purely instrumental or

economic. E motiona l aspects of belonging, or other needs for identifi cation

and bonding, are often overlooked and so is the desire for mutual recog-nition a nd community building. The tendency to create the other for more

tha n instrumental purposes is a lso disregarded. To be a B rahmin Hindu, for

instance, means something very different from being a D alit H indu, both in

KINNVALL q SIKH AND HINDU IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS



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terms of self-categorization and in terms of how others position you into

categories of B rahmins and D alits.

These problems have led a number of w riters within the fi eld of na tional-

ism and nation building to criticize instrumentalist, often modernist,approaches to nat ionhood. Anthony Smith (1999: 7), for instance, speaks of

the modernist fa ilure to come to grips with cultural identity . . . [which]

renders its explana tion partial a nd one-sided. O thers, such a s Anderson or

Hobsbawn and Ranger, give greater significance to the more constructed

aspects of nationality, ethnicity and even of shared interest. From this

perspective, the nation a nd ethnic group become cultural a rtifacts tha t a re

manifest in a system of collective imaginings and symbolic representation.

Some of these critics side with the mo dernists in their emphasis on prin-

cipal material preconditions for nationalism. For Anderson, for instance,the beginning of the nation is dependent upon media through the rise of

print capitalism. However, unlike G ellner, Anderson is concerned with

exploring the psychological appeal of na tiona lism. The title Imagined Com-munities(Anderson, 1983) refers to the mental processes involved innat ionalism, as members of larger communities can not possibly know each

other and must therefore rely on imagination when relating to the larger

collective, such as the nation. Still, Anderson has been criticized from both

a postcolonial perspective and on ontological grounds. Partha Chatterjee

(1993: 5), for instance, argues that Anderson violates the concept of the

imagined a s he insists on nat ionalisms modular q uality:

If nat ionalisms in the rest of the w orld have to choose their imagined

community from certain modular forms already made available to them by

E urope and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? . . . E ven our

imaginat ions must remain fo rever colonized.

On ontological grounds, Anderson has been criticized for privileging being

over becoming or universalism over particularism (see Neumann, 1999: 177;

U llock, 1996). Eric H obsbaw n and Terence Ranger, in comparison, have

been criticized for doing quite the opposite; for d isregarding any modularquality of the nation at all. In their joint work, The I nvention of Tradition(1993), they study a number of cases in Africa in which national t raditions

have been invented by state-building elites. They demonstrate how the

new states would invent mythical historical accounts of the precolonial

(primordialist) roots of the nation in order to create a unified national

culture. Although many agree with Hobsbawn and Ranger about the

invented character of much national tradition, a number of scholars have

argued tha t the more dubious part of their argument is the implication tha t

demonstra ting invention invalida tes traditions (for example, Calhoun, 1997:34; Oommen, 1997: 38).

Here we can see parallels in the critiques of Hobsbawn and Ranger and

also that of Anderson. If Anderson saw the nation as one of modular

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quality, implying the legacy of some kind o f primordial tra its in the con-

struction process, then H obsbawn and R angers see such primordialism in

longstanding traditions as contrasted with various nat ionalist tra ditions that

are of recent and manipulative creation. In both cases, however, the onto-logical critique wo uld be similar, a s being is privileged over becoming. To

escape this ontological trap we must recognize the socially constructed

aspects of tradition. As Calhoun (1997: 34) has noted, all traditions are

created; none a re truly primordial and a ll such creations a re also potentially

contested and subject to continual explicit or hidden reshaping.

This suggests that constructed cultural attributes provide not only the

symbolic references or resources, but they also provide for the revival of

some aspects of a collective past. They can, in other words, act as a source

of revivalism, fundamenta lism and na tiona l chauvinism (A lam, 1999: 130).Here Anderson and other constructivists are right when they insist that

identity awareness tends to arise during periods of crisis, such as rapid

modernization. I t is at such times that w e fi nd the emot ional (psychological)

processes that emerge within, between and among individuals as they are

confronted by ma crostructural challenges. A s markers of ca tegorical iden-

tities, however, nationalism and na tionhood can not be fully conceptualized

without reference to the broad er issue of identity construction. Hence, it is

not enough to establish that nat ions are imagined if one fa ils to d iscuss hownat ional and other identity forma tions emerge at the nexus of structural

andpsychological processes. The questions one must a sk are, fi rst, wha t ha ppensto notions of self, other and identity in times of rapid structural and social

changes and, second, why is it that certain collective responses (such as

nationalism and religion) seem more likely than others?

TRAUMA,FEAR AND THE EMOTIONAL ASPECTS OFIDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

The self is not a static object, but is part of a larger process of identity con-

struction. This larger process is ultimately intersubjective, implying that

interna lized self-not ions can never be separa ted from self/other represen-

ta tions. These self/other representa tions a re not , how ever, stat ic entities,

but are responsive to new interpersonal relationships (Ogilvie and

Ashmore, 1991: 230). Self and other are, in other words, always related in

identity forma tion, regardless of whether the outcome of this relationship

is positive or negat ive. H ere I am primarily interested in w hy this relat ion-

ship a t t imes becomes expressed in feelings of fea r, hate, violence and evenbigotry.

P aying closer at tention to the construction process of self and other, it is

clear that the essentialization of both individuals and groups remains




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common practice. This is accomplished through the reduction o f identity to

a number of cultural characteristics. My argument is, of course, that such

culturally specific traits are by no means essential to human nature per se.

H owever, as cultural bases they are powerful legitimators of identity sincethey a re constructed, promoted and perceived as essential to human beings

and to the organization of human society. The distinction is that between

processand product (Penrose, 1995: 416). The processof identity andcategory formation may very well be common to all human beings, while

the ways such processes are manifested (the products) are not. The tend-

ency to confuse process and product, however, means that categorical

groups come to be seen as essential in their own rights. In a world where

the development of society has been toward larger and larger networks of

independent people, one does not have to be a modernist to argue tha t indi-viduals constantly have to tune their actions to more and more others.

Within this process, a competition among many possible salient identities

arises, with the at tempt to achieve trump card salience for one categorical

identity rather than another (Calhoun, 1994). This, in turn, encourages a

kind of in-group essentialism, a sacralization of us as compared to them.

As a psychological phenomenon, the essentializat ion of self and others

within these processes has been explained by, among others, Vamik Volkan

(1997) and Julia Kristeva (1982, 1991). B oth these authors bring a psycho-

ana lytic perspective to identity formation in general and to nat ional identity

construction in particular. A psychoanalytic focus adds at least three

importa nt dimensions to the literature on nat ional identity a nd na tionalism.

First, it points to the significant emotional weight that national identity

carries in everyday discourse. Second, it understands national identity as

part of the individuals larger project of establishing moorings (Caputi,

1996). Third, by emphasizing the affective and intersubjective bases of

identity fo rmat ion such as fear and a lienation, a s well as love and pride

it is possible to comprehend na tional and other identity fo rmat ion in terms

of both negative and positive responses. The focus of this article is mainly

on the problema tic aspects of these responses, but it should be stressed tha t

positive aspects may a lso be highlighted f rom a sociopsychological perspec-

tive.

In both Volkans and Kristevas work the emphasis is on the striving for

stable, clearly defi ned boundaries in the format ion of self. Such boundaries

(or ca tegories) spell out our need for cohesion as a means of preventing feel-

ings of fragmenta tion. E ssentializing the other becomes part of the subjec-

tive process of constructing not only a singular, integral identity of the o ther,

but a lso a singular and altogether harmonious identity of the self (C alhoun,

1994). This actual comparison between others a nd us serves to reinforcethe whole notion of primordial identity, regardless of its actual existence.

Vamik Volkan (1997: 279), using o bject-rela tions theory,2 explains such

essentialization as the externalization and projection of our unwanted

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elements onto enemies. In doing this, he suggests the analogy of a large-

scale tent to explore group psychology in a more comprehensive way. H e

invites us to think in terms of learning to wea r from childhood on two

layers of clothing, where the first layer fits snugly (the personal identity),while the second layer is a loo se covering tha t protects the individua l in the

way a parent, close family member, or other caregiver protects one (the

ethnic, emotiona lly bonded large group). B ecause this garment is not form-

fitting, it also shelters other members of the group and thus resembles a

large canvas tent. The introduction of traumatic events is likely to raise

anxiety in the tent a nd may jeopardize the collective sense of self in the tent.

Volkans ana logy of canvas tents is interesting, but it has the problem of

providing a picture of boundedness, of inside-out perceptions, rather than

identity as an open contestable concept. H owever, as a description of howcategories are imagined as essentialized bodies, it is relevant. The main

problem is rather to be fo und in his use of object-relat ions theory w hich, by

viewing the o ther a s an object, implies tha t the enemy other alreadyexistsand isdifferent from the self (see Murer, 1999). This is problematic as ithints at an essentialist view of both self a nd other.

Julia Kristevas treatment of self and others responds to this problem, as

she sees the creation of self as an internal psychological process: the other,

she says, can exist in individuals minds even when they are not physically

present, such as the Jews in Poland despite the fa ct that there are few Jew s

actually living there (Kristeva, cited in Murer, 1999: 2). This phenomenon

is what Kristeva (1991) refers to as the strangers within ourselves. The

importa nt point here is that the enemy other is not only created by the self,

but has previously been part o f the self. It becomes the abject, which differsfrom Volkans object. Abject. It is something rejected from which one does

not pa rt, from w hich one does not protect oneself as from a n object (K ris-

teva, 1982: 4).

What causes abjection is that which disturbs identity, system or order,

such as traumat ic changes. Abject becomes a ma jor ingredient of collective

identity fo rmation when the familiar stranger is suddenly recognized as a

threat . Arguments, demonstra tions, proofs and so on the very logic of the

symbolic must follow and conform to such abjection (K risteva, 1982: 15).

Those traits not wanted in the self are projected onto the other, implying

that the differences are perceivedby the self (not actually existing in anobjective sense, as Volkan argues), and a re as intrapsychically created as the

group other itself (Kristeva, 1991: 184; see also Murer, 1999: 18). Through

systematic debasement when confronting the other, the self is assured of

essential difference. Without such systematic debasement of the other:

whom I reject and w ith whom I identify, I lose my bounda ries, I no longerhave a container, the memory of experiences when I had been abandoned

overwhelm me, I lose my composure. I feel lost , indistinct , hazy

(Kristeva , 1991: 187). D ebasement of the o ther thus captures the essential




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connection between fear and desire. By demonizing the other, the self

becomes sufficiently sacralized. As argued by Murer (1999: 27), once the

other has been so thoroughly reduced to inhumanity, any required act to

mainta in the boundaries of self and other can be justifi ed.Here it must be added that not all others go from object to become a

feared abject other. It is important to note how the categorization of the

construction of the other may entail different value orientations in regard

to different groups.3 The historical forma tion of race, for instance, often

comes into play through the racialization of different groups in different

wa ys especially as these are related to various pat terns of migration a nd

colonizat ion. Asians in B ritain, for instance, have historically been stereo-

typed differently than have African Caribbeans, by being perceived as

second class citizens in comparison to the view of African Caribbeans asthird cla ss citizens (see B arker, 1999: 61).

Those who do not (seem to) subscribe to a common belief system thus

challenge the very founda tion of the group. L ike a besieged city, the move-

ment must strengthen its walls against the enemy without and search for

enemies within. True belief does not permit question and doubt (Robins

and Post, 1997: 945). This is similar to Volkans discussion of projection

and dehumanization. Here the other is often perceived as being dirty.

When, for instance, one group insists that the other has a darker color,

smells bad, o r does dirty deeds, they a re rejecting the other as if they w ere

faeces (Volkan, 1997: 113). The other is viewed with contempt, as a des-

picable and worthless non-human. H ate can thus construct a link between

the present, the future and a recrea ted past. In this sense it serves as a socia l

chain for successive generations, as a particular event or t rauma becomes

mythologized and intertwined with a groups sense of self. A s observed by

Murer (1999: 267), it is this process tha t often leads casua l observers to con-

clude that ethnic conflicts may be timeless.

This is what Volkan refers to as a chosen trauma. A chosen trauma

describes the mental recollection of a calamity that once befell a groups

ancestors, and includes information, fantasized expectations, intense feel-

ings and defenses aga inst unaccepta ble thought . The term chosen does not

refer to a n instrumentally calculated choice. R ather, it refl ects how a large

group unconsciously defines its identity by the transgenerational trans-

mission o f injured selves infused with the memory of the ancestors trauma

(Volkan, 1997: 48). A chosen tra uma is often used to interpret new tra umas.

Thus it relies on previously experienced (real o r imagined) rage and humil-

iation a ssociated w ith victimizat ion in the case of the chosen trauma, which

is validated in a new context. Humans, Volkan (1997: 36) argues, can not

accept change without mo urning wha t is lost.This is simila r to G id denss (1991: 1011) a rgument tha t a marriage

that has come apart tends to be mourned, no matter how unhappy it has

been. C hosen traumas (and their opposites chosen glories which may be

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reactivated to bolster a groups self-esteem; Volkan, 1997: 81) provide the

linking objects for later generations to be rediscovered, reinterpreted and

reused. Memories of a past trauma may lie dormant for generations, only

to be rediscovered a s a collectivity experiences a new o r seconda ry tra umawhich may have little to do w ith the fi rst chosen trauma. The linking cycle

can be found in the repeated usage of the same a bject other, as it a llows the

younger generation to experience the pain and the loss of their elders.

B oth chosen traumas and chosen glories are intimately connected to

images of the nat ion and to religion. In looking for the nation, na tionalism

needs to demonstrate tha t the nat ion it wishes to create has alwa ys existed.

Traumas through which the na tion was lost, such as colonization, are at the

heart of this search. As such they are frequently loaded with affective

images, as for example in Nehrus continued reliance on the metaphor ofsexual aggression and rape in his critique of the violence perpetra ted by the

colonia l masters (see B ose, 1997: 54). This narra tive is often deeply ro oted

in religious discourse, relating the present search for the nation to a glori-

fi ed past prior to colonization. R eligious and cultural rituals and ritualistic

observances of a nniversaries can serve to susta in the trauma a nd feed into

the continued demonization of the o ther, while sacralizing the self.

What Kristeva and Volkan show in their different interpretat ions is how

feelings of ancient ha tred a re constructed and ma intained. These are no t,

as todays mass media often make them out to be, primordial feelings of

hatred or entrenched animosities waiting to break out in a largely chaotic

world. Instead, as Volkans and Kristevas texts show, they are structural

and psychological make-ups tha t manifest themselves in chosen traumas. B y

emphasizing the other as a mental image an intrapsychic abject other

onto which the self projects its (or the groups) unwanted (constructed)

traits, we may escape the tendency to describe conflicts in essentialized

terms. The emphasis on t raumat ic events, shared a nxiety, regression, stress-

ful conditions, disturbances, also brings at tention to the emot ional a spects

of human relatedness as defi ned in structural terms. As such, it points to the

nexus of structura l and psychological processes and the need fo r onto logical

and existential security. In particular it raises the question of what possible

group reactions may arise in response to these phenomena?

NATIONALISM AND RELIGION:THE SEARCH FORIDENTITY AND MEANING

H ere it can be a rgued tha t it may a ctually be easier to construct an identityout o f essentia list or primordia list not ions of nationhood a nd/or religion as

they both allow for categorical abstraction and chosen traumas in a sense

tha t gender, language, caste or ra ce may not do. They may thus respond to




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issues of ontological security and existential anxiety.4 However, under-

standing the compara tive power of religion a nd na tionalism requires at least

three things.5 First, we need to grasp the close links between the histories

of individualism and na tiona lism; second, w e must spell out the rela tionshipbetween nat ionalism a nd religion; and , third, it is necessary to outline the

antagonistic connection between religious and secular nationalism and

modernity.

The most influential idea behind nationalism is the notion of the indi-

vidual self a s a united, self-sufficient a nd self-conta ined entity a universal

self . This self ta kes its point of departure as the historically embodied fo rm

of the Enlightenment, connecting reason, knowledge, progress, freedom

and ethical action into a combined label of progress and modernity.6 The

main structural arrangement that makes this self-moving individual trans-form into a united whole is the rise of the modern state. As this process

occurs, the character of na tionalism becomes transformed into a conforma-

tive cultural ideology that is often oppressive to diversity. As noted by

B hikhu Pa rekh (1995), the modern sta te feels deeply uneasy in the presence

of well-organized rival foci of loyalty, since the abstracted modern state

requires socially abstracted individuals as its necessary counterpart.

Hence, it is not uncommon for institutions to essentialize individuals by

providing them with identities based on historically specific tra its, which are

then claimed to be those of human nature. The fact that these attributes are

called upon to mobilize people into collective action should not lead us to

believe tha t they are a ttributes of a na tion, however, as nat ionhood can not

be defined objectively prior to political processes on either cultural or

social structural grounds (Calhoun, 1997: 132). Rather, nations are in part

made by nationalism and exist only when their members make sense of

themselves through the discursive framework of national identity.

R eligion and nat ionalism are often mixed. D espite this being the case,

the religious element in the study of nationalist movements is often

neglected or dismissed. A ccording to G ertrud H immelfarb (in Thomas,

1999: 32), this has to do with religion being viewed as the opposite of the

Enlightenments principles of rationalism, universalism, secularism and

materialism. However, this is to ignore the experience of nat ionalist mo ve-

ments in many parts of the developing world, especially as a response to

colonia lism. Even more importantly, it a lso ignores the similarities between

the individual self of the Enlightenment tradition as manifest in national-

ism and the bases of religious identity. Thus, in comparison to other dis-

cursive identity constructions, both national and religious identities make

claims to a separa te monolithic and abstract identity.

Like the na tion, religion consists of a discursive often essentia list viewof its realm a s an o rganic whole, as a n individual whose various aspects or

dimensions are integra lly, even inextricably, relat ed. To reta in their insti-

tutionalized identity in some form or other, all religions have to maintain

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themselves, and to d o so they ha ve to ha ve some superior claim to a particu-

lar notion of truth and mode of earthly existence (Alam, 1999: 178). In a

similar sense to how the nation, in the absence of nationalism, may exist

discursively in peoples self-definition while lacking in power, non-institutionalized religion may be a mat ter of persona l faith, piety a nd inner

experience but, once institutiona lised, it becomes interested in mainta ining

its hold on the populace and social institutions.7

Institutionalized religion often concurs with the nation in being terri-

torially defined, as religion in its institutionalized form refers to bounded

entities, such as churches, organizat ions or political part ies (Ha ynes, 1997,

1999: 9).8 In this form, religion like nationalism supplies existential

answers to individuals quests for security by essentia lizing the product and

providing a picture of to ta lity, unity a nd wholeness. B y supplying a con-sistent structure, religion provides order from the chaos and uncertainty in

the world. In doing this, religion and nat ionalism both give an illusion o f a

coherent core self as being the sum of its parts. Such a core self consists of

a number of (constructed) essentialized a ttributes that answers to questions

concerning exi stence itself, the external wor ldand human lif e, the existenceof the other, and what self-identityactually is.9 In providing answers tothese questions, they also institute a notion o f t ruth, implying an automat ic

exclusion o f those who do not adhere to such a truth. This is similar to the

common misconception tha t you can only belong to o ne nation (read state)

at a time, and that such belonging requires a belief in those (constructed)

cultural values upon which the nation is formed.

Here, the close relationship between modernity, on the one hand, and

religious and secular nationalism, on the other, becomes important

especially in postcolonial societies such as India . The question tha t ha s occu-

pied religious and secular na tiona lists in postcolonia l societies has centered

around how the postcolonial sta te should be constituted, whether it should

be secular, democratic, religious, etc. The fact that many postcolonial

societ ies set tled fo r a secula r version o f na tionhood inherit ed from the

colonizers as a w ay to bridge religious (or o ther) tensions, has simultaneously

made the state vulnerable to criticisms of westernization, modernization

and mora l decay. G lobalization, privatizat ion, consumerism and the spread

of w estern ideas and practices have been effective in speeding up such pro-

cesses. In response to such modern developments, religious leaders may ta lk

about moral or ethical decline by pointing to modern societys lack of mora l-

ity, loss of ethical values, increased corruption, and so on, where the only

answer to the current decay is a reinforcement of religious norms.

R eligion and nat ionalism, compared to other identity constructions, thus

involve a shift from the personal level to the metalevel in their desire to gobeyond the feeling of being more a t home in one place than ano ther. They

extend further than the values and traditions of childhood formation, as

they both change the focus from that o f a subset of humanity to that of the




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whole.10 In their more extreme forms, both nat ionalism and religious funda-

mentalism claim to monopolize the sources of self and identity, simul-

taneously. Na tionalism a nd religious fundamentalism ma y thus be the most

salient factors in constructing the external and feared other, as theyprovide answers to existential q uestions of being by supplying essentia lized

notions of cultural at tributes based on totality and truth. In this sense, they

may serve as the most effective common denominator for decreasing onto-

logical insecurity in times of rapid change. The relationship between self

and other is likely to be redefined in this process.

In the fo llowing sections, I w ill look at the consequences of these a rgu-

ments for the case of India. I start by giving a brief outline of religious

nat ionalism in India . I then move on to discussing H indu and Sikh nat ional-

ism and the essentialization of self and other. This discussion involves theextent to which either has been successful in finding and demonizing an

other as a part of redefining a self. From there, I turn to a discussion of

the emotional aspects of hatred, debasement and the search for chosen

traumas as related to aspects of structural change such as modernization and

globalization. I compare the extent to which, and the reasons why, Hindu

nationa lism has been more successful in mobilizing on the basis of religious

nat ionalism tha n has been the case for Sikh nationa lists.

There are ma ny good reasons for choosing these two cases. First, in con-

tra st to other religious communities in India , such as B uddhists, Ja ins and

Christians, the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities have actually made

claims to nationhood. Second, there are some clear differences in socio-

economic realities when comparing the relationship between the H indu and

Sikh community, on the one hand, and between the Hindu and Muslim com-

munity on the other. The fact that the Sikhs are as a group relatively

well off compared with o ther religious and ethnic groups in India, a dds an

interesting dimension to the comparison. Third, it remains important to

ana lyze the reasons as to why Hindu nat ionalism appears to have been more

successful than Sikh nat ionalism in its appeals to na tionhood , as tha t ma y

give us some general insights into identity formation and identity mobiliz-

at ion. The study is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive and, as a

result, focuses more on analysis than on historical depth and empirical

details.

Before proceeding to a brief introduction to the two cases, it should be

noted that despite the earlier critique against the use of universal, mono-

lithic religious categories such as Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims there

are few ways of discussing these communities without having to resort to

these terms. However, a ll these ca tegories obviously reflect a plura lism

both in regards to religious tradition and in regards to the members of thevarious communities.

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SITUATING RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN INDIA

P art of the history of religious nat ionalism in India can be found in the wa y

that secularism came to be the guiding principle of post-independence

India. I ndia adopted secularism and constitutionalized religious rights as a

means of overcoming the religious turmoil that had characterized the pre-

independence period and which had resulted in the partition. However, the

leaders of the independence movement chose a type of secularism that

meant a continuous involvement by the state in religious affairs. Rather

than separa ting church and stat e, which is common in the west, India opted

for the principle of sarva dharma samabhava equal respect for allreligions. This principle ha s required government intervention in religious

af fa irs and support of religious activities, so tha t a ll Indians have an eq ualopportunity to pract ice their religions (see, for example, B hargava, 1996;

Kolodner, 1995).

Leaders of the Ind ian Nat iona l Congress d id not see a contradict ion in

professing an Indian nation that rested on Hindu religious tradit ion, as this

tra dition w as view ed a s tolera nt a nd a s ba sed on indigenous religious

plura lism. This choice of intertwining religion and polit ics was heavily

infl uenced by ind epend ence movement leaders like M ohand as G andhi

w ho employed a discourse tha t often resembled the H indu notion of

dharmic obligat ion. His cont inued reference to Mother India intention-a lly invoked characterist ics o f Hindu religious worship and , despite the

fa ct tha t he w as the most a rdent cha mpion of H indu-Muslim unity, he

o ften to ok a communita ria n view (D e ol, 2000; P a nikka r, 1997: 27).11

G and hi was thus ambiva lent in his ca lls fo r religious tolerance and uni-

versalism, as he often based such universalism on Hindu beliefs and prac-

t ices. I t was this inclusivist H indu to lerance tha t a liena ted the M uslim

League, and was a t the hea rt o f the two na tion theory a rticula ted by M .A .

J innah, which suggested tha t the Muslims and the Hindus were separa te

na t ions. As such it o ffered both Hindus and Muslims a na t iona lity associ-ated with a socioreligious community.12

The idea of Sikhs as a socioreligious community is rather complex,

especially in relation to notions of nationhood. Historically, Sikhism and

Sikh identity (at least the official version) have developed along two

historical axes. The fi rst is spiritual and begins with the founding of the Sikh

faith by G uru Nanak a nd his nine successors. This wa s based on the

founders teachings and the establishment of congregations (Sangat s), such

as G ovindwa l and Amritsar, and by the fi fth G uru, G uru Arjans, compila-

tion of the sacred scripture of the community, the Granth Sahib. B ut it wasnot until the 10th a nd last G uru, G uru G obind Singh (16661708), tha t aconfessional identity was established. He abolished the institution of the

G urus and vested power and responsibility for the protection of the




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community in the K halsa,13 the Sikh brotherhood (see Chadda, 1997: 52;G rewal, 1994: 68; Mahmood , 1996: 14).14

The second a xis of Sikhism was temporal and wa s provided by the found-

ing of the Sikh kingdom in 1801 by Maharajah Ranjit Singh. The Mahara-jah abolished the Mislsystem (a confederacy of 12 warring Sikh kingdoms)and established the fi rst unifi ed territorial state o f the Sikhs. It is the combi-

nat ion of this temporal development and the legacy of G uru G obind Singh

tha t have served as historical legitimators for potential and real confronta -

tions with the Ind ian state. The rule of the orthodox Sikh brotherhood, the

Raj Karegha Khalsa has been interpreted either as a reference to the

spiritual triumph of the religious beliefs as manifest in Sikhism, or in tem-

poral a nd territorial terms as representing the establishment o f a separa te

Sikh state (Chadda, 1997: 523; see also Jeffrey, 1994: 5960).The historical background to Punjab politics also involves the growth of

the Sikh dominated party o f Aka li D al (the army of the fa ithful). The Akali

party emerged in 1921 out of the movement for ousting the mahantswhocontrolled the gurdwaras(places of worship, i.e. Sikh temples), and wereaccused of ha ving aba ndoned the symbols of K halsaidentity. The forma tionof the party thus arose as a result of a growing demand among Sikhs, who

had kept the beard and turban, that gurdwaras should be controlled by

genuine Sikhs, not shaven Hindus. The party wa s also formed as a central

organizat ion in response to the estab lishment of a committee to dra ft new

rules for the ma nagement of the G olden Temple in November 1920. This

committee became the Shiromani G urdwara P arbandhak Committee

(SG PC) (J eff rey, 1994: 646; Singh, 1983).15 D espite the creation of the

SG PC and the A kali D al, the Akalis remained within the Indian C ongress

Partys fold for most of the 1920s and 1930s, and the main focus of com-

munal propaga nda w as not on the Hindu-Sikh cleavage, but on the H indu-

Muslim divide.

HINDU AND SIKH NATIONALISM:THE ESSENTIALIZATIONOF THE SELF

H indu nat ionalism16 experienced a boom in the 1980s and 1990s, culminat-

ing in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) being asked to form a minority

government in 1998. H indu nationa lism was formed a s a reaction a gainst,

and because of fear of, the expansion of two minority faiths: Christianity

and Islam. The main concern was the continuity and hegemony of Hindu

identity.17 The B JP s part y program stresses Hindutvaor Hinduness(although this has been downplayed lat ely). R eligious and nat ional identity

is equa ted in the termino logy o f Hindutva, w hich implies tha t a n I ndia nis a H indu who belongs to the (imagined) nation of H industan. As a

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consequence, it puts other religious communities outside the nation, such

as Sikhs, Christians and Muslims. The essentialization of self is thus inter-

tw ined with the construction of the other.

The po litics of Hindutvawere played out in the destruction of the B abrimosque in Ayodhya in 1992. B y tra nsforming the mosque in Ayodhya into

a symbol of the threa tened ma jority, the explosion o f passionate feelings

and violent actions came to be portrayed as natural and crucial to the self-

respect of the collectivity, as if it were an individual. There is, however,

nothing natural or essential in such constructions and it would indeed be

difficult to specify any Hindu identity from a primordialist point of view.

There is the Hindi language, but not all Hindus speak Hindi. There is a

philosophical tra dition of H induism, but at the same time one can believe

almost anything and still be considered a good Hindu, and there is alsoconsiderab le historical evidence of violent struggle betw een different H indu

religious groups. Finally, it would be difficult from a primordialist perspec-

tive to explain the continuing historical conversion of Hindus to Sikhs,

Muslims, Jains and Christians.

Similarly, any a ttempt to specify S ikh identity from a primordialist view-

point is bound to fa il. There is the P unjabi language, but not a ll Sikhs speak

Punjabi and neither is the P unjabi language limited to Sikhs alone. There is

the philosophical tradition of Sikhism, but it is clearly possible to be a Sikh

without adhering to the Khalsa tradition. Also, as pointed out by Rajinder

Kaur (1992), expressions of the philosophical tenets o f Sikhism which on

many levels overlap with H induism were kept at a low key throughout the

confl ict in the 1980s, and Sikhs have long had an intimate relat ionship with

H indus and have commonly been referred to as the military a rm of H indus.

Finally, as in the case of H induism, it w ould be d ifficult to explain the con-

tinuous historical conversions of Hindus to Sikhism from a primordialist

point of view.18

B oth these cases show the difficulty in establishing either a Hindu or Sikh

collective self without the existence of an other, as the essentialization of self

needs to be co ntra sted w ith tha t of the other tha t w hich self is not. The

acceptance and crea t ion of a self, a s suggested by Kristeva , thus requires

establishing boundaries between self and other, boundaries which serve to

reify the other by moving the self from internal perception to material reality.

For identity conflict to occur , the other needs to become a walking, breath-

ing, living embodiment of everything the self wishes to cast off.

CATEGORIZING THE SELF DEMONIZING THE OTHER

In the case of the Sikhs, there was clearly an a ttempt made in that d irection

in Punjab, following the partition in 1947. With the Hindu-Muslim divide




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no longer availab le for ruling-class H indu politicians, they turned swiftly to

exacerbating the H indu-Sikh divide. Although a ll Punjabis speak P unjab i

as their mother tongue, the Arya Sama jis, the Jan Sanghis and, most of a ll,

the Congress campaigned among Hindus that they should record theirmother to ngue as Hindi in the 1951 census. Correspondingly, the Sikh com-

munalists, including the Akali D al (the regiona l, Sikh-dominated party),

were propagating that Punjabi was the language of Sikhs. The call for a

Punjabi Suba (a Punjabi-speaking state) was, it was argued, necessary for

saving the Sikhs from the slavery of the H indus (quoted in P uri, 1989; see

also D eol, 2000; P uri, 1984). Political a ims and religion were conveniently

intertwined in images of them (the Hindus) as conquerors, and us (the

Sikhs) as defenders of the Punjabi language and Sikh religion. As phrased

by Ma ster Tara Singh, the most prominent leader o f the A kali D al up to1962: Now the circumstances have so a ltered tha t we have been saved f rom

Muslim domination, but we have been absolutely trapped under Hindu

dominat ion. . . . We cannot survive under H indu dominat ion (quoted in

Puri, 1989). However, there are no guarantees that such categorization is

always successful in the face of an individuals many fluctuating identities.

Studying the situation in Punjab after the creation of the Punjabi Suba in

1966, it is clear that the A kali D al did not achieve the degree of political

power it might have expected in a Sikh majority sta te. In their a ttempts to

create a t rump card salience for Sikh identity, the Aka li leadership stressed

the term discrimination against Punjab and against Sikhs by the federal

government, and argued that the creation of a Punjabi Suba had not

resulted in many genuine changes.19 Rather than bringing the Sikhs

together, how ever, such a rguments served only to alienate the minorities as

well as the Sikhs of more moderate persuasion. Particularly the Sikh

Mazhabi minorities (Scheduled castes) could not be won over by the Aka li

D al. Opposition by Mazha bis, who constituted the majority of the landless

laborers, wa s due to the fa ct that the Ma zhabis viewed the Akali D al as

being dominated by the landowning Jat castes.

It is clear, then, that there was little resonance between being a Sikh at

a personal level and actions involving the collective at the national level.

Caste a nd class identities took precedence over the offi cial version o f Sikh

identity. Instead, what we saw during the 1970s was a political power

struggle carried out in the names of the Sikhs and the H indus, but w ith little

success in unifying either. This obviously changed during the 1980s, as I will

show in the next section. However, it still differed from the way Hindu

nationalists have come together in their attempts to construct a common

collective identity.

H indu nationalists have been more successful in making the term H induinto a category by projecting some common myths or themes onto the other,

in this case the Muslims. For instance, Muslims are held responsible for the

part ition of the sacred H indu homeland , because they cla imed in 1947 tha t

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they were a separate nation. In the construction of the Muslim other,

Muslims are always referred to as not truly Indian, as dangerous foreign

elements. The traumat ic experiences of the partition a ffected a nd deepened

feelings of distrust between Hindus and Muslims. Such feelings have beenfurther exacerba ted by the continuing diffi cult relations between India and

P akistan. In many w ays, one can argue that the partition has worked a s a

chosen trauma that is constantly referred to and validated in new contexts

such as riots, the destruction of the Babri mosque, or the recent Kargil

conflict.

All these fa ctors make the M uslims an ea sy ta rget in the perception o f

Hindu nationalists, turning them into a despised and feared other. For

instance, RSS ideologues demonize and essentialize Muslim characteristics

by contrasting them with so called pure Hindu values. Muslim men, theyargue, are responsible for raping and all sorts of orgies. They are consti-

tuted by lust unk e aankhon me lust hai(their eyes are full of lust), tho ughthey seek to cover it up with politeness and charm (in D utta a nd Sarkar,

1994: 88). Here, essentialist notions of cleanliness tend to be invoked

Muslims are regarded as being always dirty. The motherland has been

defiled by the polluting, disruptive, destructive presence of Muslims (in

B acchetta , 2000: 278).

E ssentializing the other in the context of H indus and Muslims can not

be understood, however, without referring to a larger historical context.

P eter van der Veer (1996) argues convincingly tha t the discourse on H indu

spirituality and Hindu tolerance has a specific history. The ideal of

religious tolerance in the west, he says, derives from a n abstraction a nd uni-

versalization o f religion tha t is part o f the western discourse of modernity

and connected to the notion of modern nation states. Religious tolerance

as a positive value is thus related to the marginalization of religious insti-

tutions in Europe, while simultaneously replacing violence between

religious groups with violence between states. This discourse has conse-

quences for Muslim and H indu populat ions incorporated into the modern

world system. B eing the old rivals of the C hristian w est, Muslims are labeled

fanatic and bigoted, while Hindus are seen in a more positive light as

being tolerant.

The construction of tolerance as the essence of Hindu spirituality

should thus be understood as a discourse intended not only to unite

different H indu groups, but also as an a venue of complaint about the intol-

erance of those who do no t w ish to be included, such as the Muslims. H indu

nationalism, by clearly identifying and projecting unwanted characters of

the self onto the other, has in this sense been successful in its attempts to

build majoritarian religious nationalism.20In comparison, it is by no means clear that Sikh nationalism has been

equally successful in moving more tha n a subsection of P unjabi society in a

direction where religion has become the dominant self-identification, at




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least not until the ea rly 1980s. There are a t least two rea sons for this: one is

the fa ct tha t neither Aka li D al nor the C ongress were successful in creating

an other aga inst w hich to launch their divisive politics as the two sought

support from both the Sikh and H indu communities; the second reason hasto do with their failure to build a bridge between personal religious experi-

ences and the more secular goals of the collective. This latter aspect

changed, however, as a result of forces of modernization sweeping the

Punjabi countryside in the ea rly 1980s.

MODERNITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SIKHNATIONALISM

While the political parties were fighting, Punjab society was changing. As a

result of the G reen Revolution,21 there was an increase in wea lth among Ja t

farmers, and their contributions to the SG PC 22 rose enormously. Increased

persona l wea lth also led to a change in lifestyle, particularly growing con-

sumerism, which in turn threatened Sikh religious values of simplicity and

asceticism. The increasing disloca tions and uncerta inties crea ted in peoples

everyday lives, as a result o f stunted growth a nd processes of modernization,

ensured the ava ilability of people in search of simpler explanations and dra-matic action. A vigorous campaign of Amri t prachar(baptism into theKhalsa tra dition) in the villages was hinged on a concern for the decline in

fa ith and vita lity of the Sikh religion (see P uri, 1989; D eol, 2000; Purewa l,

2000). Together w ith improved communication, this opened the way fo r

religious leaders like B hindranwa le who could now spread their militant

messages to the countryside. A growing number of unemployed, often edu-

cated youth also a dded fuel to the fi re.

The Akali D al responded by launching its own holy wa r, dharm yudh(litera lly righteous struggle) in 1982, combining economic demands (such

as for more irrigation water) with religious and political issues of greater

autonomy for the Sikhs within India (see Akbar, 1985; Chauhan, 1994;

D eol, 2000; Jef frey, 1994). B y this time, however, militancy had ta ken on a

dynamic of its own and Bhindranwales goal was now the creation of a

sovereign state of Khalistan. The fact that the militants were met with

repression only gave rise to further conflict throughout 198384. The final

outcome was presidential rule and the a ssault on the G olden Temple,

O peration B luestar and the assassination of Indira G andhi by her Sikh

bodyguards.

It would be hard to overstate the feeling of subordination that charac-terized the Sikh community in the fa ce of the assault on the G olden Temple

complex in 1984. H ardly a Sikh I interviewed23 disagreed on the single most

important issue for them, namely tha t I ndira G andhi and the central

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government had completely disregarded the feelings of Sikhs as they shot

their way through the temple, killing not only Bhindranwale and his fol-

lowers, but also several hundred pilgrims. The a tta ck caused unprecedented

convulsions in the whole Sikh community all over the w orld a nd, a s notedby Pettigrew (1992), people who were formerly quite secular suddenly

started growing their beards and seeking baptism into the K halsa.

Sikhs including moderates hence displayed a rare unanimity in con-

demning the military assault on the G olden Temple. H indus, at the same

time, tended to be equally ardent in defending the necessity o f the a ction.

The polarization was captured by a Punjabi Hindu journalist who stated

that: Punjabs tragedy is that there are no Punjabis any more in Punjab

only Sikhs and H indus (quoted in Wallace, 1990: 459). H ow ever, it was not

the work of the Sikhs alone to construct a perception of a homogeneousSikh community. After the assassination of I ndira G andhi, ant i-Sikh mobs

went on the rampage in many cities, killing anything from 2000 people

(G overnment of I ndia) to 6000 people (Civil Liberties U nion). Many o f

these killings were clearly committed with the full knowledge of the Indian

police (see AIFO D R , 1987).

Still, despite the threat and indignation of Sikhs at this juncture, the

ant icipated reaction in Punjab did not come. The H indu minorities in the

villages of P unjab were not ha rmed a t a ll, and even if tension increased in

major cities like Amritsar a nd P at iala, a ctual att acks on either community

were mostly a politically instigated phenomenon. H owever, the fact that the

Sikhs were presented as a secessionist threat had repercussions within the

Sikh community and within a few years a well-organized separatist move-

ment was underway in Punjab. On 25 July 1986, Khalistani terrorists mas-

sacred every cleanshaven passenger of a bus, thus heightening the existing

tensions. The threat to ordinary Sikhs and H indus now came from two sides;

from communal terrorists on the one ha nd a nd from repressive police forces

on the other.

As every village Sikh seemed to be considered a potential terrorist, it

should come a s no surprise tha t they felt discriminated a gainst by the major-

ity. But the ma jority represented the sta te, not fellow H indu villagers. E ven

in the cities of Punjab, where tension was high at times, Sikh and Hindu

Scheduled caste members seemed to avoid being identified with the conflict

going on between Sikh and Hindu communal leaders. As argued by one

youth: For us the real oppression we f ace is not from the other community.

80 percent of the youth are without jobs. We consider our identity more as

Scheduled castes than as Sikh and H indu (quoted in AI FO D R , 1987). Mar-

ginalized, often unemployed, and educated Sikh youth added to the

problem, however. Since regular educational and occupational oppor-tunities appeared to be inadequate or too limited, they were ripe for

mobilization by an extremist movement. As argued by many of my inter-

view subjects; they [described as misled youth] had a chance to ma ke 5000




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rupees a day through looting or kidnapping, rather than 300 it wa s money,

not religion tha t ma de most of them join the milita nts . . . . The role of police

brutality also played its part, in what Harish Puri (1989) has called the

formation of a siege psychosis. Many Sikhs would sympathize with theterrorists only as a response to the frequent a tta cks, suspicions and arb itrary

arrests by the police.

It is clear tha t fa ctors of injured pride, alienation, fear and feelings of dis-

crimination w ere present a mong the Sikhs in P unjab and elsewhere during

the 1980s. How ever, while a subjective perception of discrimination existed

among the Sikhs of P unjab , there was no clear chosen trauma to rely on for

generating and susta ining xenophobic hostility aga inst the Hindus. The con-

fl ict with M uslim rulers in the 17th a nd 18th centuries set a pa ttern of hos-

tility between Sikhs and Muslims rather than between Sikhs and Hindus.H ence, partition could not a s has been the case in H indu-Muslim anta gon-

ism work a s a source of reference for the Sikhs of Punjab experiencing the

traumatic effects of modernization and party politics. Furthermore, the

notion of Khalistan is by no means a simple and straightforward process

despite extensive discussions about a Sikh homeland (see, for example,

Chauhan, 1994: 4360). Although the D al K halsa was established in

Chandigarh in 1978 on the pledge to a chieve an independent Sikh sta te, the

actua l Khalistan movement wa s launched by D r Jagjit Singh Chauhan (a

former Aka li D al G eneral) from abroa d. This has led observers to a rgue

that the support for Kha listan came from abroa d and that there was no real

founda tion among a majority of the Punjab i Sikhs for an independent Kha l-

istani state (see Akbar, 1985; Jeffrey, 1994). This would imply the lack of

another mythical or real point of reference that could have worked as a

chosen trauma as well as a desire for the return of lost territory. Instead,

nat ionalism a nd religion were used separately and political leaders failed to

link them in a manner that could ha ve served to alleviate feelings of a lien-

at ion and fear a s a result of ra pid socioeconomic changes.

MODERNITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF HINDUNATIONALISM

Hindu nationalism has been more successful in this regard. Although

religion is employed, H indu nat iona lism is more than a religious movement .

In ma ny wa ys, it appears to be a d iverse and fragmented response to social,

economic and political dislocation in India. Initiat ives aimed at privatizat ion

and increased competitiveness have threa tened to remove job security fromthe middle and lower middle classes, at the same time as they have

decreased the governments involvement in the economic sector (Kolod ner,

1995; P athy, 1995). The fa ct tha t the centra l government has shed economic

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responsibility in many sectors of the economy has also undermined its image

as a protector of citizens welfare. It is within this process that the B J P has

been able to play an important role by giving voice to deeply-held griev-

ances, frustration a nd aggression a gainst the sta te and the C ongress party.Here the role of rumors in the course of riots provides an excellent

example of how the B JP has succeeded in creat ing a climate of fear and why

it fi nds a receptive audience. In 199091 in western U tta r P radesh, for

instance, two consecutive rumors had it that the B JP had fo und the corpses

of 14 cows outside its offi ce, followed by rumors that a Muslim had poisoned

a water tank and that 500 armed Muslim men were now heading in the

direction of a H indu locality. Riots ensued, despite the fa ct tha t the police

could fi nd only two corpses and neither animal had been poisoned. Another

rumor, spread during the D ecember 1992 riot in B hopa l, had it tha t Muslimmobs had at ta cked a womens college and raped 80 women and cut off t heir

breasts. The B ajrang D al, the VH Ps youth group, consequently organized

murderous violence aga inst M uslims. Soon a fter the riots, it wa s clear tha t

the w omens college had never been a tta cked (see Arslan and R ajan, 1994:

1589; B asu, 1996: 723).

These rumors are important illustrations of selfother hostility in the

Hindu-Muslim case, as they show two patterns of redefining a chosen

trauma in the light of new traumatic experiences. In both cases the passions

and violence of na tionalism are integral to definitions of personhood. In the

first version we have the cow as mother of the Hindu nation, while in the

second version we have the more general wish for pa triarchal control over

the female body. Women are sacred objects that have to be protected

aga inst outsiders, a protection offered by husbands and ma le relat ives in the

case of the family and by the state at the level of the nation. Here the

management of desire is crucial. Fear is hidden in aggression, desire is

hidden in rejection and both can be masked and obscured from view

through an infla tion of the powers of the other in this case the Muslims.

D ebasement as a defense against this desire can be seen as a para llel to

phobia.24 It is within the logic of religious discourse that the protection of

the cow becomes the symbol of the H indu nation state in opposition to the

Muslims.

Implicit in a ll o f this is a pa thologica l concept ion of the past in rela t ion

to a pa rticula r community. I n times of ra pid cha nges, the community

mobilizes itself through a frenzied appeal to the imagination of society, the

invent ion of historica l f act s. The spread of democra t ic norms and va lues

and constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and expression has

speeded up this process. Not only have such processes provided polit ica l

space to Hindu organiza tions such as Shiv Sena or Sangh Pariva r, whicha re openly anti-democra tic, d ivisive and vio lent , but they have a lso d e-

legit imized previous hierarchical structures in Indian society, such as the

caste structure (for details, see B hargava, 1996; Kolodner, 1995; Pa nikkar,




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100

1997). There a re two basic consequences o f this; (1) o ld ways o f get ting

things done are eliminated, which tends to leave behind only uncerta inty,

and (2) the structures that ident ified the community and bound it together

are a lso being elimina ted , which has a d isintegra tive ef fect . B oth conse-q uences are dislocating and have provided an arena in which H indu

nationalists can thrive. B y carefully manipulating religious symbols and by

offering a vision of stability, certainty and comfort , Hindu nationalists have

been able to channel existential fears and have attracted dedicated

followers.

H indu religious nationa lism has thus worked a s a great source of revival-

ism, fundamentalism and national chauvinism. As argued above, all

religions to maintain their identity and themselves have to make

superior claims to some notion of truth and earthly existence.

Not ha ving a fi xed dogma to defend, the H indu religion evolved a different

mechanism of self-sustenance. It d eveloped a highly elabora te a nd rigid pattern

of living which wa s viewed as specifica lly Hindu. This fea ture of H induism can

be categorized as other-directed to lerance and self-directed intolerance. (Alam,

1999: 178)

As Alam a rgues, this self-directed intolerance has spilled out and gradua lly

become a generalized fea ture of H indu nat ionalism.

The success of religious stories in Indian cinema and television, pa rticu-

larly the broadcasting of the R ama yana a s a serial starting in January 1987,

has also brought religion to millions of H indus in the privacy o f their homes.

In this sense, it greatly increased general awareness of Ayodhya as the

(supposed) birthplace of R ama , which is likely to have a ided the VH Ps goa l

of liberating Ra mas birthplace in the name of the H indu nat ion. The B abri

Mosque came to represent the seconda ry chosen trauma, the oppression o f

the Hindus under the Mughuls. Televised images made this sacred center

all the more real and it became highly charged with affect in the popular

imagination.

Modernity ha s thus been instrumental in more than one respect. On the

one hand, it has a cted as a d islocating force in bringing about psychological

anxiety associat ed with a sense of d isplaced isolat ion and alienation. O n the

other ha nd, it has facilita ted the use and d iscovery of the past, of traditions,

of chosen traumas, involving continuous redefinitions of the self in relation

to the other. Hindu na t iona lism, I would argue, has thus been successful

in fusing religion and na tionalism by bringing them to a level where they,

in combination, have provided answers to existential concerns and onto-

logical insecurity.

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101

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA: COMPARINGHINDU AND SIKH NATIONALISM

B oth the H indu and the Sikh cases suggest that the similarities that b ind

groups and na tions together are partial and a mat ter of degree. For identity

construction to be effective it must unite differences between the group

members which it defi nes. At the same time, it must exaggerate the differ-

ences of the individuals or groups from which it is distinguished. B oth pro-

cesses involve individual identity formation a s well as ca tegory forma tion.

As processes they may occur over time, but the products constructed will

change and can thus never be ta ken as given, essential or natural.

However, the power of religion and nation formation is due to their

ability to disguise process from product. The concept of nation and unity

promotes the belief that human interaction with a particular environment

generates natural entities over time entities referred to as nations and

seen as integral and unproblematic aggregations. The rise of Hindu

nationalism shows the force with which cultural bases have been used to

build a categorical notion of Hindustan that derives power from its ability

to integrate nationalism with a constructed version of the Hindu religion.

Stories of glorious pasts, loss of territory and struggles against repressors

have been fused to account for chosen traumas. The striving for indepen-

dence and the creation of Pakistan have been the most prominent in thisregard. Such traumas have been reinterpreted and redefi ned in novel con-

texts involving the self and the collective other. B y establishing rights for

the majority to rule the sta te and the nat ion, a potentially powerful means

of mobilizat ion is provided which simultaneously gives democrat ic illusion

and emotional satisfaction. As such it may be a particularly potent tool in

times of turbulent changes as it provides answers to existential quests for

ontological security.

From a Sikh perspect ive, it is certa inly true that the Sikhs became more

aware of their minority status due to the intensification of the conflict . Theywere no longer automatically guaranteed entrance into H indu society as the

kind of privileged other that they used to be. Whether the Sikh community

wa s transformed on a religiousba sis if Sikhs became more religiousbecause

of the conflict is less clear. Viewed from a historical perspective, they were

certainly being defined as more fundamentalist by outsiders. How ever, that

appears to be more a description of a minority groups actions(the militants),

than characteristic of the Sikh community. The fact that more Sikhs make an

effo rt t o outward ly manifest their Sikh ident ity may, o f course, have had

repercussions in the religious sphere. Hence, it is possible that religiousaspects o f everyday life may have become persona lized in response to an

increased feeling of Sikhism as being a threatened religion.

Still, the lack of a familiar o ther becoming the despised o ther q uestions




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102

the ba ses on which a redefinition o f self a ctually occurred. If Kristeva is right

that it is only through debasement that the self is reassured of essential

difference, then the fact that Hindus were not thoroughly demonized may

make the claim for heightened religious identity hard to make. Also, it isworth emphasizing that appeals for Khalistan seem to have been only

sporad ically supported. This in itself appears to have deprived Sikh nat ion-

alists of any clear chosen trauma that could have served as a foundation

from which to redefine, reinterpret and reevaluate the ongoing conflict.

Without such a chosen trauma, it is unlikely that a common point of refer-

ence a rallying ground could be found, a s memory and imaginat ion need

a mythical support structure in order to redefine self a nd identity.

Notes

1 The ideas presented in this article are elabora ted in Kinnvall (forthcoming).

2 Object-relations theory is mostly associated with D .W. Winnicot, who proceeds

from the premise tha t huma n beings by nature are object-seeking.

3 Oommen (1994: 1614) differentiates, for instance, between four kinds of

others, ranging from the E qua l Ot hers, the Internal Others, the D eviant

Others a nd the O utside-U nequal O thers.

4 Onto logical security refers to a persons elemental sense of safety in the world

where t rust of other people is like an emotiona l inoculation a gainst existentia l

anxieties: a protection against future threat and dangers which allows the

individual to sustain hope and courage in the face of whatever debilitating

circumsta nces she or he might la ter confront (G iddens, 1991: 389).

5 It should be noted that I ma inly highlight those aspects of religion and national-

ism that fa cilitat e mobilization and ma nipulat ion. Both religion and nat ionalism

can obviously serve as important positive identifiers and are not negative by

definition.

6 As noted by Ja ne Flax (1990), this is obviously a drastic reduction of complex

ideas.

7 See similar a rguments in Ala m (1999), B idwa i et al. (1996) and B eyer (1994).

8 To a rgue that religion has commonalities with the nat ion in being territorially

defined refers to the boundedness inherent in the notion of the nation, not to

the physical t erritory a s such. While the nat ion (in real or imagined form) can

not be conceived without a territorial referent, religion as an idea can and is

often transterritorial.

9 To be ontologically secure and avoid existential anxiety means to G iddens

(1991: 513) tha t we can provide answers to funda mental existentia l questions,

such as those outlined here.

10 See Ca lhoun (1997) and Alam (1999) for a similar a rgument.

11 See Kolodner (1995), who further argues that G andhi attempted to broker a

compromise between secular and religious forces by applying Hindu ethical

norms of satyagraha(the force of truth) and ahimsa(non-violence) to thenationalist movement.

12 This argument has been made and developed by many, see, for example, B idwai

et a l. (1996), B ose (1997), D eol (2000), Kolodner (1995) and Panikkar (1997).

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13 The Khalsa (the pure) wa s a step toward full militarization by a group of Sikhs

willing to sacrifice themselves for the G uru. The new members of the K halsa

were enjoined to wear five articles of faith, defining them as Khalsa Sikhs.

These were: kesh, unshorn hair; kanga, comb; kaccha, breeches; kara, steelwristba nd; and kirpan, sword.

14 There are various explanations to account for the growth of Sikh communalism,

neither of which can be discussed in any great deta il here. However, it is inter-

esting to note the differences in those (primordialists) who attribute the for-

mat ion of a distinct Sikh identity to the B ritish and their insistence on the Sikhs

as a mart ial race (see Fox, 1985) with those (often instrumentalists) who argue

that it had to do with the British divide and rule policy where religious com-

munalism served as a counterweight against Indian nationalism (see Pandey,

1990). Finally, we ha ve those like Ha rjot Obero i (1994) who a rgue from a more

poststructuralist perspective that it was the emerging bourgeoisie that createda new standa rd discourse of modern Sikhism.

15 The SG PC was institutionalized by the B ritish, as they were becoming increas-

ingly afra id of losing the loyal Sikhs.

16 H indu nationalism got a name in 1925 through the R ashtriya Swaya seval Sangh

(R SS), but did not become influentia l until the struggle in 1947. The R SS la ter

developed its political wing, the Jana Sangh (Peoples Society), which in 1977

became part of the Janata Sangh. In 1980, the Janata Sangh evolved into the

B haratiya Janata Pa rty (BJ P), as the political arm of RSS. The B JP has close

ties with Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), a non-governmental organization

formed in 1964 to spread Hindu spiritual values.17 See Christophe Ja ffrelot (1999: 191) who a rgues tha t the fea r in the 1920s was

that H induism would be drowned not only by a C hristianization of I ndia, but

even more quickly by the expansion of I slam.

18 Actually, to establish any monolithic Sikh culture is indeed problematic, as

witnessed by the B ritish at tempts to do so in the lat e 19th century.

19 For a detailed account of state-center relations and the political economy under-

lying these relations, see Purewal (2000).

20 As argued by B ose (1997), majoritarian nationalism is alwa ys defined in oppo-

sition to a vilified other.

21 The introduction of high-yielding seeds and mod ern inputs, launched in Novem-ber 1966. For an overview, see Puri (1984).

22 Shiromani G urdwara P arbandhak Committee (SG PC ). The SG PC was consti-

tuted in D ecember 1920 by A kali D al to mana ge important Sikh temples. The

SG PC is both politically significant and economically powerful.

23 I conducted a large number of interviews in Punjab during 1997, both in cities

and in villages.

24 I feel threatened by the other, therefore, the other threatens me, see Murer

(1999: 21).

References

AI FOD R (All India Federation of O rganisations

79.pdfm nationalism, religion and the search for chosen traumas

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