8-1 chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 what is network security? 8.2 principles of cryptography 8.3 message...
TRANSCRIPT
8-1
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing e-mail8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.6 Network layer security: IPsec8.7 Securing wireless LANs8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8-2
What is network security?
Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should “understand” message contents sender encrypts message receiver decrypts message
Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other
Message Integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure that any message that is altered (in transit, or afterwards) will be detected
Access control and Availability: services accessible and available to authorized users
8-3
Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy well-known in network security world Bob, Alice want to communicate “securely” Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, insert,
modify messages
securesender
securereceiver
channel data, control messages
data data
Alice Bob
Trudy
8-4
Who might Bob, Alice be?
… well, real-life Bobs and Alices! Web browser/server for electronic
transactions (e.g., on-line purchases) on-line banking client/server DNS servers routers exchanging routing table updates other examples?
8-5
What can a “bad” guy do?
eavesdrop: intercept messages actively insert messages into connection impersonation: can fake (spoof) source
address in packet (or any field in packet) hijacking: “take over” ongoing connection by
removing sender or receiver, inserting itself in its place, or inserting itself in the middle
denial of service: prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)
…
8-6
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing e-mail8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.6 Network layer security: IPsec8.7 Securing wireless LANs8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8-7
The language of cryptography
symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identicalpublic-key crypto: encryption key is public, decryption
key is private (also called asymmetric key crypto)
plaintext plaintextciphertext
KA
encryptionalgorithm
decryption algorithm
Alice’s encryptionkey
Bob’s decryptionkey
KB
8-8
Symmetric key cryptography
symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share (know) the same key
standards: DES, AES, RC4, IDEA, …
plaintextciphertext
KA-B
encryptionalgorithm
decryption algorithm
KA-B
plaintextmessage, m
K (m)A-B
K (m)A-Bm = K ( )
A-B
8-9
Public Key Cryptography
symmetric key crypto requires sender and
receiver to share a secret key
Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)?
public key cryptography radically different
approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
sender, receiver do not share secret key
a public key for encrypting (or verifying)
a private key for decrypting (or signing)
8-10
Public key cryptography
plaintextmessage, m
ciphertextencryptionalgorithm
decryption algorithm
Bob’s public key
plaintextmessageK (m)
B+
K B+
Bob’s privatekey
K B-
m = K (K (m))B+
B-
8-11
Public key encryption algorithms
need K ( ) and K ( ) such thatB B. .
given public key K , it should be impossible to compute private key K
B
B
Requirements:
1
2
RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adleman algorithm
+ -
K (K (m)) = m BB
- +
+
-
8-12
RSA: another important property
The following property will be very useful later:
K (K (m)) = m BB
- +K (K (m))
BB+ -
=
use public key first, followed
by private key
use private key first,
followed by public key
Result is the same!
8-13
Session keys
RSA requires exponentiation which is computationally intensive
e.g., DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA Session key, KS
Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key KS
Once both have KS, they use symmetric key crypto for confidential communication
8-14
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing e-mail8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.6 Network layer security: IPsec8.7 Securing wireless LANs8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8-15
Message Integrity Allows communicating parties to verify
that received messages are authentic. Content of message has not been altered Source of message is who/what you think it
is Message has not been replayed Sequence of messages is maintained
Let’s first consider message digests
8-16
Message Digests
Function H( ) that takes as input an arbitrary length message and outputs a fixed-length string Note that H( ) is a many-
to-1 function H( ) is often called a
“hash function”
Desirable properties of crypto hash function: Easy to calculate Irreversible: Can’t
determine m from H(m) Collision resistant:
computationally difficult to produce m and m’ such that
H(m) = H(m’) Seemingly random
output
large message
m
H: HashFunction
H(m)
8-17
Internet checksum: poor crypto hash function
Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:
produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
is many-to-oneBut for a message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message with same hash value. Simple checksum example:
I O U 10 0 . 99 B O B
49 4F 55 3130 30 2E 3939 42 4F 42
message ASCII format
B2 C1 D2 AC
49 4F 55 3930 30 2E 3139 42 4F 42
message ASCII format
B2 C1 D2 ACdifferent messagesbut identical checksums!
I O U 90 0 . 19 B O B
8-18
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
m
s(shared secret)
(message)
H(.)H(m+s)
publicInternetappend
m H(m+s)
s
compare
m
H(m+s)
H(.)
H(m+s)
(shared secret)
8-19
Crypto hash functions in practice
MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321) computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step
process. arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to
construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x
• recent (2005) attacks on MD5, may not be collision resistant
SHA-1 is also used US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1] 160-bit message digest more robust algorithms such as SHA–224, SHA–256,
SHA–384 and SHA–512
8-20
Digital Signatures objective
Like hand-written signatures sender (Bob) digitally signs document with his
own private key, establishing he is document owner/creator.
verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document
8-21
Digital Signatures
simple digital signature for message m: Bob “signs” m by encrypting with his private
key KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m)--
Dear Alice
Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah blah blah)
Bob
Bob’s message, m
public keyencryptionalgorithm
Bob’s privatekey
K B-
Bob’s message, m, signed
(encrypted) with his private key
K B-(m)
8-22
Digital Signatures (more) suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature KB(m)
Alice verifies m by using Bob’s public key KB to check
KB(KB(m) ) = m.
if verified, whoever signed m must have used Bob’s private key.
+
+
-
-
Alice thus verifies that: Bob signed m. No one else signed m. Bob signed m and not m’.
non-repudiation: Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and
prove that Bob signed m or he let someone else use his private key.
-
8-23
large message
mH: hashfunction H(m)
digitalsignature(encrypt)
Bob’s private
key K B-
+
Bob sends digitally signed message:
Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed message:
KB(H(m))-
encrypted msg digest
KB(H(m))-
encrypted msg digest
large message
m
H: hashfunction
H(m)
digitalsignature(decrypt)
H(m)
Bob’s public
key K B+
equal ?
Digital signature
8-24
Public Key Certification
public key problem: When Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web
site, e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob’s public key, not Trudy’s?
solution: trusted certification authority (CA)
8-25
Certification Authorities
Certification Authority (CA): binds public key to a particular entity, E.
E registers its public key with CA. E provides “proof of identity” to CA. CA creates certificate binding E to its public key. certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by
CA: CA says “This is E’s public key.”
Bob’s public
key K B+
Bob’s identifying informatio
n
digitalsignature(encrypt)
CA private
key K CA-
K B+
certificate for Bob’s public
key, signed by CA
-K CA(K ) B+
8-26
Certification Authorities when Alice wants Bob’s public key:
gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere). apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate,
get Bob’s public key
Bob’s public
key K B+
digitalsignature(decrypt)
CA public
key K CA+
K B+
-K CA(K ) B+
Chain of authorities, root
certificate
8-27
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing e-mail8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.6 Network layer security: IPsec8.7 Securing wireless LANs8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8-28
Authentication: challenge-response
Goal: avoid playback attack
Nonce: number (R) used only once in a lifetime
To prove that Alice is “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key
“I am Alice”
R
K (R)A-B
Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt
nonce, so it must be Alice!
8-29
Authentication using nonce and public key crypto ?
“I am Alice”
RBob computes
K (R)A-
“send me your public key”
K A+
(K (R)) = RA
-K A
+
and knows only Alice could have the private key to encrypt R such
that(K (R)) = RA
-K A
+
8-30
Security holeMan (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses
as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)
I am Alice I am Alice
R
TK (R)
-
Send me your public key
TK
+A
K (R)-
Send me your public key
AK
+
TK (m)+
Tm = K (K (m))+
T-
Trudy gets
sends m to Alice encrypted
with Alice’s public key
AK (m)+
Am = K (K (m))+
A-
R
8-31
Security hole (cont.)
Difficult to detect - Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet later and recall conversation)
problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well public key needs to come from a trustworthy source, such as, a public key certificate
8-32
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.5 Network layer security: IPsec8.6 Securing wireless LANs8.7 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8-33
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.5 Network layer security: IPsec8.6 Securing wireless LANs8.7 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8-34
Secure sockets layer
provides transport layer security to any TCP-based application e.g., between Web browsers, servers for e-commerce
(https) two variants: SSL 3.0, TLS 1.2
security services: server authentication, confidentiality, integrity, client
authentication (optional)
TCP
IP
TCP enhanced with SSL
TCP socket
Application
TCP
IP
TCP API
SSL/TLS
Application
securesocket
8-35
SSL: handshake
Bob (client) establishes TCP connection to Alice (server)
Bob authenticates Alice from her CA signed certificate
Bob creates, encrypts (using Alice’s public key), sends pre-master secret to Alice
(nonces not shown in messages)
SSL hello
certificate
KA+(PMS)
TCP SYN
TCP SYNACK
TCP ACK
decrypt using KA
-
to get PMS
create Pre-mastersecret (PMS)
8-36
SSL: key derivations
Master secret generated from pre-master secret, server and client nonces
Alice, Bob use shared master secret to generate 4 symmetric keys: EB: Bob->Alice data encryption key
EA: Alice->Bob data encryption key
MB: Bob->Alice MAC key
MA: Alice->Bob MAC key
encryption and MAC algorithms negotiable between Bob, Alice
Actually two “finished” messages (encrypted), before transfer of application data, to detect any tampering of handshake messages :
1. client sends a MAC of all handshake messages
2. server sends a MAC of all handshake messages
More detail
8-38
SSL record protocol
SSL record protocol provides transport service to SSL Handshake protocol, application data, and other protocols (e.g., Alert protocol for ending session) Type is for demultiplexing
Application data undergo Fragmentation into blocks Compression ( Optionally ) Computing MAC ( Message Authentication Code )
• using entire record + MAC key + value of sequence counter Encryption
• Type, Version, and Length fields are left in the clear
8-39
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing e-mail8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.6 Network layer security: IPsec8.7 Securing wireless LANs8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-40
What is confidentiality at the network-layer?
Between two network entities: Sending entity encrypts the payloads of
datagrams. Payload could be: TCP segment, UDP segment, ICMP message,
OSPF message, and so on. All data sent from one network entity to
the other would be hidden: Web pages, e-mail, P2P file transfers, TCP
SYN packets, and so on. That is, “blanket coverage”.
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-41
IPheader
IPsecheader
Securepayload
IPhe
ader
IPse
che
ader
Sec
ure
payl
oad
IP
header
IPsec
header
Secure
payload
IPhe
ader
payl
oad
IPheader
payload
headquartersbranch office
salespersonin hotel
PublicInternet
laptop w/ IPsec
Router w/IPv4 and IPsec
Router w/IPv4 and IPsec
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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IPsec services
Origin authentication Data integrity Replay attack prevention Confidentiality
Two protocols providing different service models: authentication header (AH) protocol encapsulation security payload (ESP)
protocol
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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IPsec Transport Mode
IPsec datagrams emitted and received by two end systems.
Protects upper level protocols of these end systems
IPsec IPsec
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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IPsec – tunneling mode (1)
End routers are IPsec aware. Hosts need not be.
IPsec IPsec
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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IPsec – tunneling mode (2)
Also tunneling mode.
IPsecIPsec
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Two protocols
Authentication Header (AH) protocol provides source authentication & data
integrity but not confidentiality 51 in protocol field of IP header
Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP) provides source authentication, data
integrity, and confidentiality 50 in protocol field of IP header
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-47
Four combinations are possible
Transport mode with AH
Transport mode with ESP
Tunnel modewith AH
Tunnel modewith ESP
Most common andmost important
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-48
Security association Before sending data, a logical connection is
established from sending entity to receiving entity, called security association (SA) SAs are unidirectional
Both sending and receiving entities maintain state information for the SA Recall that TCP endpoints also maintain state
information. IP is connectionless; IPsec is connection-
oriented How many SAs in VPN for headquarters,
branch office, and n traveling salesperson?
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-49
193.68.2.23200.168.1.100
172.16.1/24172.16.2/24
SA
InternetHeadquartersBranch Office
R1R2
Example SA from R1 to R2
R1 stores SA state info 32-bit identifier for SA: Security Parameter Index (SPI) the origin interface of the SA (200.168.1.100) destination interface of the SA (193.68.2.23) type of encryption to be used (for example, 3DES with
CBC) encryption key type of integrity check (for example, HMAC with MD5) authentication key
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-50
Security Association Database (SAD)
Endpoint holds state of its SAs in a SAD
With n salespersons, 2 + 2n SAs in R1’s SAD
When sending IPsec datagram, R1 accesses SAD to determine how to process datagram.
When IPsec datagram arrives to R2, R2 examines SPI in IPsec datagram, indexes SAD with SPI, and processes datagram accordingly.
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-51
IPsec datagram – tunnel mode, ESP
193.68.2.23200.168.1.100
172.16.1/24172.16.2/24
SA
InternetHeadquartersBranch Office
R1R2
new IPheader
ESPhdr
originalIP hdr
Original IPdatagram payload
ESPtrl
ESPMAC
encrypted
“enchilada” authenticated
paddingpad
lengthnext
headerSPISeq
#
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-52
Inside the enchilada:
ESP header: SPI, so receiving entity knows what to do Sequence number, to thwart replay attacks
ESP trailer: Padding for block ciphers next header identifies protocol in payload field
Use shared keys to encrypt and create ESP MAC field
new IPheader
ESPhdr
originalIP hdr
Original IPdatagram payload
ESPtrl
ESPMAC
encrypted
“enchilada” authenticated
paddingpad
lengthnext
headerSPISeq
#
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-53
Summary: IPsec services
Suppose Trudy sits somewhere between R1 and R2. She doesn’t know the keys. Will Trudy be able to see contents of
original datagram? How about source, destination IP addresses, transport protocol, application port?
Flip bits without detection? Masquerade as R1 using R1’s IP address? Replay a datagram?
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Athentication methods
PSK (pre-shared key)
PKI (public key infrastructure)pubic/private keys and certificates
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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IKE: Key Management in IPsec In previous examples, we manually
established IPsec SAs in IPsec endpoints:Example SA
SPI: 12345Source IP: 200.168.1.100Dest IP: 193.68.2.23 Protocol: ESPEncryption algorithm: 3DES-cbcHMAC algorithm: MD5Encryption key: 0x7aeaca…HMAC key:0xc0291f…
Such manual keying is impractical for large VPN with, say, hundreds of people.
Instead use IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange)
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-56
Two Phases of IKEPhase I: Establish bi-directional IKE
SA IKE SA is different from IPsec SA, also called ISAKMP security associationEach endpoint has private and public
keysUse Diffie-Hellman algorithm to
establish a shared secret
(Mutual authentication is not done in phase I)
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-57
Diffie-Hellman algorithm Publicly known large prime number p and
number g that is prime root mod p Alice and Bob independently choose private
keys, and , respectively and exchange their public keys public key of Alice is g mod p public key of Bob is g mod p
Shared secret known only to Alice and Bob is g mod p = (g mod p) mod p = (g mod p)
mod p
Note that in phase I, public keys of Alice and Bob have not been authenticated
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-58
Two Phases of IKE (cont.)Phase I: Establish bi-directional IKE
SAPhase II: The endpoints reveal their
identities to each other and mutually authenticate using public key certificates Identities are not revealed to passive
sniffers since messages are sent over encrypted IKE SA channel between the endpoints
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-59
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing e-mail8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.6 Network layer security: IPsec8.7 Securing wireless LANs8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-60
IEEE 802.11 security
first attempt at Wi Fi security: Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Many weaknesses Pre-shared key only for authentication
Most recent standard 802.11i (WPA2)
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-61
WEP weaknesses RC4 stream encryption, based on XOR of
plaintext and key, is subject to “known plaintext attack” Append 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to 40-
bit (or 104-bit) secret to generate key for each frame
There are only 224 unique keys 24-bit IV, one per frame, is transmitted in
plaintext -> reuse occurs quickly other weaknesses, e.g., no message
integrity protection
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-62
802.11i (WPA2)
Provides AES block encryption and message integrity
Allows key distribution in addition to pre-shared key use of an authentication server separate
from access point, in addition to local authentication by access point
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-63
wirednetwork
EAP TLSEAP
EAP over LAN (EAPoL)
IEEE 802.11
RADIUS
UDP/IP
EAP: extensible authentication protocol EAP: end-end client (mobile) to
authentication server protocol EAP sent over separate “links”
mobile-to-AP (EAP over LAN) AP to authentication server (RADIUS over UDP)
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-64
AP: access point AS:Authentication
server
wirednetwork
STA:client station
1 Discovery ofsecurity capabilities
3
STA and AS mutually authenticate, togethergenerate Master Key (MK). AP serves as a relay2
3 STA derivesPairwise Master
Key (PMK)
AS derivessame PMK, sends to AP
4 STA, AP use PMK to derive Temporal Key (TK) used for message
encryption, integrity
802.11i: four phases of operation
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?8.2 Principles of cryptography8.3 Message integrity & end point
authentication8.4 Securing e-mail8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL8.6 Network layer security: IPsec8.7 Securing wireless LANs8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-66
Firewalls
isolates organization’s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others (i.e., access control)
firewall
administerednetwork
publicInternet
firewall
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-67
Three types of firewalls
stateless packet filters
stateful packet filters
application gateways
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Stateless packet filtering
internal network connected to Internet via router firewall
router filters packet-by-packet, decision to forward/drop packet based on: source IP address, destination IP address TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers ICMP message type TCP SYN and ACK bits
Should arriving packet be allowed
in? Departing packet let out?
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-69
Stateless packet filtering: example
example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23. all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and
telnet connections are blocked. example 2: Block inbound TCP segments with
ACK=0. prevents external clients from making TCP
connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside.
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Policy Firewall Setting
No outside Web access. Drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80
No incoming TCP connections, except those for institution’s public Web server only.
Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets except those with destination IP 130.207.244.203, port 80
Prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth.
Drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and router broadcasts.
Prevent your network from being used for a smurf DoS attack.
Drop all ICMP packets going to a “broadcast” address (e.g. 130.207.255.255).
Prevent your network from being tracerouted
Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic
Stateless packet filtering: more examples
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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actionsourceaddress
destaddress
protocolsource
portdestport
flagbit
allow222.22/1
6outside of222.22/16
TCP > 1023 80any
allowoutside
of222.22/1
6
222.22/16TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
allow222.22/1
6outside of222.22/16
UDP > 1023 53 ---
allowoutside
of222.22/1
6
222.22/16UDP 53 > 1023 ----
deny all all all all all all
Access Control Lists ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to
incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-72
Stateful packet filtering stateless packet filter: memoryless
admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established:
actionsource
addressdest
addressprotocol
sourceport
destport
flagbit
allow outside of222.22/16
222.22/16TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
stateful packet filter: track status of every TCP connection track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): can determine
whether incoming, outgoing packets “make sense” timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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actionsourceaddress
destaddress
protosource
portdestport
flagbit
check conxion
allow 222.22/16outside of222.22/16
TCP > 1023 80any
allow outside of222.22/16
222.22/16TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
x
allow 222.22/16outside of222.22/16
UDP > 1023 53 ---
allow outside of222.22/16
222.22/16UDP 53 > 1023 ----
x
deny all all all all all all
Stateful packet filtering
ACL augmented to indicate need to check connection state table before admitting packet
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-74
Application gateways
Make policy decisions based on application or application data
Example: allow select internal users to telnet outside.
common examples: mail server, web cache
host-to-gatewaytelnet session
gateway-to-remote host telnet session
applicationgateway
router and filter
1. Require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.2. For authorized users, gateway sets up telnet
connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. Router filters all telnet connections not originating from gateway.
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Limitations of firewalls and gateways
If multiple app’s need special treatment, each needs its own gateway
client software must know how to contact gateway. e.g., must set IP
address of proxy in Web browser
IP spoofing: router can’t know if data “really” come from claimed source
filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP
tradeoff: degree of communication with outside world, level of security
many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Intrusion detection systems
packet filtering: operates on TCP/IP headers only no correlation check among sessions
IDS: intrusion detection system deep packet inspection: look at packet
contents (e.g., check character strings in packet against database of known viruses, attack strings)
examine correlation among multiple packets to detect
• port scanning• network mapping• DoS attack
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Webserver
FTPserver
DNSserver
applicationgateway
Internet
demilitarized zone
internalnetwork
firewall
IDS sensors
Intrusion detection systems
multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
8-78
Network Security (summary)
Basic techniques…... cryptography (symmetric and public) message integrity end-point authentication
…. used in many different security scenarios secure email secure transport (SSL) IP sec 802.11
Operational Security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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End of Chapter 8
8: Network SecuritySSL (8/09)
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Unused slides
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Chapter 8: Network Security
Chapter goals: understand principles of network security:
cryptography and its many uses beyond “confidentiality”
message integrity authentication
security in practice: security in application, transport, network, link
layers firewalls and intrusion detection systems
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A certificate contains: Serial number (unique to issuer) info about certificate owner, including
algorithm and key value itself (not shown) info about
certificate issuer valid dates digital signature by
issuer
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IPsec datagram
Focus for now on tunnel mode with ESP
new IPheader
ESPhdr
originalIP hdr
Original IPdatagram payload
ESPtrl
ESPMAC
encrypted
“enchilada” authenticated
paddingpad
lengthnext
headerSPISeq
#
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Firewall: objectives
prevent denial of service attacks: SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP
connections, no resources left for “real” connectionsprevent illegal modification/access of internal data.
e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something else
allow only authorized access to inside network (set of authenticated users/hosts)
three types of firewalls: stateless packet filters stateful packet filters application gateways
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IEEE 802.11 security
War-driving: drove around Bay area with laptop and 802.11 card [Shipley 2001] more than 9000 accessible from public
roadways 85% use no encryption/authentication packet-sniffing and various attacks easy
Securing 802.11 encryption, authentication first attempt at Wi Fi security: Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP): has weaknesses recent standard 802.11i (WPA2)
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Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP):
authentication as in protocol ap4.0 host requests authentication from access point access point sends 128 bit nonce host encrypts nonce using shared symmetric
key access point decrypts nonce, authenticates
host no key distribution mechanism authentication: knowing the shared key is enough
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WEP data encryption
Host/AP share 40 bit symmetric key (semi-permanent)
Host appends 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to create 64-bit key—a new IV for each frame
64 bit key used to generate (by RC4) a stream of keys, ki(IV)
ki(IV) used to encrypt ith byte, di, in frame:
ci = di XOR ki(IV)
Each frame contains its IV (in the clear) and encrypted data
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802.11 WEP encryption
IV (per frame)
KS: 40-bit secret
symmetric key k1
IV k2IV k3
IV … kNIV kN+1
IV… kN+1IV
d1 d2 d3 … dN
CRC1 … CRC4
c1 c2 c3 … cN
cN+1 … cN+4
plaintext frame data
plus CRC
key sequence generator ( for given KS, IV)
802.11 header IV
WEP-encrypted data plus CRC
Figure 7.8-new1: 802.11 WEP protocol Sender-side WEP encryption
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Breaking 802.11 WEP encryptionsecurity hole: 24-bit IV, one IV per frame, -> IV’s eventually reused IV transmitted in plaintext -> IV reuse detected attack:
Trudy causes Alice to encrypt known plaintext d1 d2 d3 d4 …
Trudy sees: ci = di XOR ki(IV) Trudy knows ci di, so can compute ki(IV) Trudy knows encrypting key sequence k1(IV), k2(IV),
k3(IV) … Next time IV is used, Trudy can decrypt
plus other weaknesses (e.g., no message integrity protection)
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R1 converts original datagraminto IPsec datagram
Appends to back of original datagram (which includes original header fields) an “ESP trailer” field.
Encrypts result using algorithm & key specified by SA. Appends to front of this encrypted quantity the “ESP
header, creating “enchilada”. Creates authentication MAC over the whole enchilada,
using algorithm and key specified in SA; Appends MAC to back of enchilada, forming payload; Creates brand new IP header, with all the classic IPv4
header fields, which it appends before payload.
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IPsec sequence numbers
For new SA, sender initializes seq. # to 0 Each time datagram is sent on SA:
Sender increments seq # counter Places value in seq # field
Goal: Prevent attacker from sniffing and replaying a packet
• Receipt of duplicate, authenticated IP packets may disrupt service
Method: Destination checks for duplicates But doesn’t keep track of ALL received packets;
instead uses a window
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Security Policy Database (SPD)
Policy: For a given datagram, sending entity needs to know if it should use IPsec.
Needs also to know which SA to use May use: source and destination IP address;
protocol number. Info in SPD indicates “what” to do with
arriving datagram; Info in the SAD indicates “how” to do it.
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IKE: PSK and PKI
Authentication (proof who you are) with either pre-shared secret (PSK) or with PKI (pubic/private keys and certificates).
With PSK, both sides start with secret: then run IKE to authenticate each other and to
generate IPsec SAs (one in each direction), including encryption and authentication keys
With PKI, both sides start with public/private key pair and certificate. run IKE to authenticate each other and obtain
IPsec SAs (one in each direction). Similar with handshake in SSL.
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Symmetric key crypto
DES: Data Encryption Standard U.S. encryption standard [NIST 1993] 64 bit plaintext input, 56-bit symmetric key
cipher-block chaining for sequence of 64-bit data units
• XOR encrypted nth data unit with n+1st data unit; the result is then encrypted
Triple-DES (3DES)• use three keys sequentially -- output of one key
operation as input of next key operation
Other symmetric key systems: RC4, IDEA, …, AES—recent (Nov. 2001) NIST standard to
succeed DES, 128-bit data, 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
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Message integrity & authenticity
Bob receives msg from Alice, wants to ensure:
message originally came from Alice message not changed since sent by Alice
Cryptographic Hash: takes input m, produces fixed length value,
H(m), called message digest e.g., as in Internet checksum
computationally infeasible to find two different messages, x, y such that H(x) = H(y) Equivalently: given x = H(m), cannot find m’ such that
H(m’)=x note: Internet checksum fails this requirement
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IPsec: Security Association
For both AH and ESP, source, destination handshake: create network-layer unidirectional logical
channel called a security association (SA) source and dest share a symmetric key
• Internet Key Exchange protocol (RFC 2409) allows the use of signatures, public keys, or a pre-shared key
Uniquely determined by: security protocol (AH or ESP) source IP address 32-bit connection ID (Security Parameter
Index)
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Authentication Header (AH) Protocol provides source
authentication, data integrity, no confidentiality
AH header inserted between IP header, data field.
IP header protocol field: 51 intermediate routers
process datagrams as usual
AH header includes: connection identifier authentication data: MAC
calculated over original IP datagram, AH header fields and symmetric key (except IP TTL field)
next header field: specifies type of data (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP)
sequence number
IP header data (e.g., TCP, UDP segment)AH header
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ESP Protocol
provides secrecy, host authentication, data integrity.
data, ESP trailer encrypted. next header field is in ESP
trailer.
ESP authentication field is similar to AH authentication field.
Protocol = 50 in IP header.
IP header TCP/UDP segmentESP
headerESP
trailerESP
authent.
encryptedauthenticated
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Many more details
We have decribed the IPsec transport mode for security association between hosts for IPv4
IPsec tunnel model is for security association between routers
IPsec for IPv6
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Symmetric key cryptography
substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another
plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq
Plaintext: bob. i love you. aliceciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc
E.g.:
Q: How hard to break this simple cipher?: brute force (how hard?) other?
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Symmetric key crypto: DES
DES: Data Encryption Standard US encryption standard [NIST 1993] 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input How secure is DES?
DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase (“Strong cryptography makes the world a safer place”) decrypted (brute force) in 4 months
no known “backdoor” decryption approach making DES more secure:
use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum use cipher-block chaining
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Symmetric key crypto: DES
initial permutation 16 identical “rounds” of
function application, each using different 48 bits of key
final permutation
DES operation
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AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
new (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST standard, replacing DES
processes data in 128 bit blocks 128, 192, or 256 bit keys brute force decryption (try each key)
taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES
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Block Cipher
one pass through: one input bit affects eight output bits
64-bit input
T1
8bits
8 bits
8bits
8 bits
8bits
8 bits
8bits
8 bits
8bits
8 bits
8bits
8 bits
8bits
8 bits
8bits
8 bits
64-bit scrambler
64-bit output
loop for n rounds
T2 T3 T4 T6T5T7
T8
multiple passes: each input bit afects all output bits
block ciphers: DES, 3DES, AES
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Cipher Block Chaining cipher block: if input
block repeated, will produce same cipher text:
t=1m(1) = “HTTP/1.1” block
cipherc(1) = “k329aM02”
…
cipher block chaining: XOR ith input block, m(i), with previous block of cipher text, c(i-1) c(0) transmitted to receiver in clear what happens in “HTTP/1.1”
scenario from above? +
m(i)
c(i)
t=17m(17) = “HTTP/1.1” block
cipherc(17) = “k329aM02”
blockcipher
c(i-1)
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RSA: Choosing keys
1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)
3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”).
4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: ed mod z = 1 ).
5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d).
K B+ K B
-
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RSA: Encryption, decryption
0. Given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above
1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute
c = m mod n
e (i.e., remainder when m is divided by n)e
2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute
m = c mod n
d (i.e., remainder when c is divided by n)d
m = (m mod n)
e mod n
dMagichappens!
c
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RSA example:Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.
e=5 (so e, z relatively prime).d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z.
letter m me c = m mod ne
l 12 1524832 17
c m = c mod nd
17 481968572106750915091411825223071697 12
cdletter
l
encrypt:
decrypt:
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RSA: Why is that m = (m mod n)
e mod n
d
(m mod n)
e mod n = m mod n
d ed
Useful number theory result: If p,q prime and n = pq, then:
x mod n = x mod ny y mod (p-1)(q-1)
= m mod n
ed mod (p-1)(q-1)
= m mod n1
= m
(using number theory result above)
(since we chose ed to be divisible by(p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1 )
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SSL: three phases3. Data transfer
H( ).MB
b1b2b3 … bn
d
d H(d)
d H(d)
H( ).EB
TCP byte stream
block n bytes together compute
MAC
encrypt d, MAC, SSL
seq. #
SSL seq. #
d H(d)Type Ver Len
SSL record format
encrypted using EBunencrypted