8- systems sole constituent, the operation clarifying a central concept of luhmannian

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System's Sole Constituent, the Operation: Clarifying a Central Concept of LuhmannianTheoryAuthor(s): Jean ClamReviewed work(s):Source: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2000), pp. 63-79Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4201182 .Accessed: 17/12/2012 03:10

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ACTA OCIOLOGICA000

System's Sole Constituent, the Operation:

Clarifying a Central Concept of Luhmannian

Theory

Jean Clam

CNRS, Paris, France

ABSTRACTThe autopoietic turn in Luhmann's later theory is not thinkable without the refocusingof systems theory around a new concept of operativity. The article shows the lines ofdevelopment from the earlier theory towards the final prevailing of a purely operativistconception of the system. The movement is one of deconstructing all intuitive

representations of a border-defined, thing-like system. The radical version that emergesleaves the operation as the sole and unique systemic constituent. The article shows thatsuch a strain of thought contracting an extensive transitive structure into a purelyoperative core has major philosophical antecedents: Aristotle's conception of theactuation of life or intellection in a composite being, Fichte's self-position of thetranscendental I, Heidegger's subject and authorless 'Ereignis' constitute very similarfigures of 'operativization'. This sheds light on the most problematic aspect ofLuhmannian theory, namely its reliance on a 'protologic' that does not elaborate, like

similar philosophical endeavours before it, on the fundaments of its own evidence.

Jean Clam, 1796 Av. de Grasse, F-83300 Draguignan, France? Scandinavian Sociological Association 2000

Niklas Luhmann's systemist sociology is, in itsown project, often misunderstood. The optionfor a description of society within a systemstheoretical framework is very often reduced toan all-commanding assertion of the structuringfunction of systems in today's societies. Luh-mannian systemism is conceived frequently asan attempt to apply a general systems approachto social phenomena. The benefits of such an

approach would then have to be assessed interms of a greater accuracy of the sociologicaldescription as well as a greater explanatorypotency. Not taking into consideration the

complete transformation of the original frame-work through Luhmann's fresh modelling of itscentral concepts, such an assessment is doomedto misapprehension.

I will show in the following how and whyLuhmann goes far beyond the current systemsmodel, and in what direction his theory heads. I

shall have to show the intricacy of theconstructions necessitated by the categorialradicalization it undertakes. I begin with an

introductory presentation of the systems prob-lematics in Luhmann's sociology in order tocome to the core

conceptof the whole

theory:that of a 'non-real', purely 'actual' system,containing nothing and made of nothing but

operations.

1. The transformation of systemism

Luhmann's interest in the systems model is

particularly ambiguous. To have a clearer ideaof the status and function of the model withinthe theory, I will set Luhmann's fundamental

options and intuitions into the broader context

of his sociological work. My thesis, whichstresses a statement obvious for any person

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64 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 000 VOLUME 3

acquainted with the work, is that the specificconatus of Luhmann's enterprise is to conceive

complex objects by means of an adequate,equally complex theory capable of accountingfor the emergence of complexity as a specific

mode of reality or givenness of the real.Luhmann had a very firm intuition of an

inescapable and profound break in the repre-sentation of reality, making impossible or

illusory the continuation of heretofore familiar

self-descriptions of thinking, feeling and theoriz-

ing. He held the conviction that the objects to bemodelled in sociology (personal interaction,institutions, groups, organizations, functional

subsystems, society . . .) could not be con-structed in the terms of classical sociology.Unlike Parsons, Luhmann had a vision of the

historiality of categorial settings. His knowledgeof Heidegger enabled his perspective on thetransformations of all-sustaining matrices of

thought as 'ontohistorial' (seinsgeschichtlich)ones. The 'epoqual' comprehensions of beingprecede and determine the modes of action and

experience realizable in a historical social

setting. Luhmann's concerns reflected the

problems of theory-building in the historialterms of philosophical hermeneutics. He was

profoundly conscious of the rupture of the

ontological tradition. From the beginning his

projectis

very clearlyone of a

post-metaphysicaltheory of society.

The reformulation of systems theory initi-

ally seeks to critique and thereby overcome the

sociological concept of action, a concept thatseems to Luhmann both undefendable anddoomed to atrophy. This took place at a timewhen no convincing model was available thatcould compete with it or prevail over it in

descriptive or heuristic terms. Long before a newversion of systems theory was developed,Luhmann saw the categorical nature of actionas making too many massive assumptions of

self-identity, internal consistency and ontologi-cal firmness of the acting subject. The predomi-nance of the action model was for him

intimately associated with the concept of a

privileged, dignified actor. Luhmann's constantand very early rejection of any axiologicalassumption is reminiscent of Heidegger's own

repulsion with all value thinking. The function-alism of the early Luhmann could thus be seenas the expression of his definite disqualificationof all ontologically impregnated ways of think-

ing. His increasingly complex interdisciplinary

arrangements integrating a number of hetero-geneous 'theory pieces' (Theoriest?cke) and his

constant borrowings of incongruous theoretical

perspectives are required and given order bytheir distance from inadequate modes of

thought. Luhmann is the sociologist of our

century with the most acute sense of the post-

ontological (non) structure of communicationconstituting a world where things (res) have no

consistency and where only differences areevents.1 He has, as a theoretician, an acuteconsciousness of the need for non-metaphysicalframeworks for the description and comprehen-sion of 'what is'.

Thus, functionalist systems theory was, forLuhmann, a convenient departure point for amuch more comprehensive theory designed to

grasp the non-identity, the paradoxical andunsummarizable character of reality. The sys-

tems theory of Parsons and the first-ordercybernetics had to be enlarged and transformedto integrate a variety of systemic and non-

systemic approaches capable of enhancing its

complexity and reflexivity, viz. Second-order

cybernetics (von Foerster), paradoxalist differ-ence theories (Spencer Brown, Derrida), emer-

gence medium-form theory (Fritz Heider),horizontalist meaning theory (Husserl), differ-entialist linguistic (Saussure) and communica-tion (Bateson) theories. There thus remains

nothing of the representation of a previouslyavailable

general theorythat could be

appliedto

a special field of research. What should be most

insistently noted is that the system category is

only apparently wider than that of society as itseventual application field. Luhmann's specialintuition, the one which gives his theory its

specific profile and bestows on it a real

autonomy with regard to all other philosophiesand theories that contribute to its construc-tions, is the following: society is a self-containedfield of social communication and the site of all

self-descriptions of human communication:2 itis the place where all meaning is born and canbe equated with a constituting intersubjectivitystripped of its transcendental nature. Since all

partial or global world representations are

communicatively elaborated, society (i.e. social

communication) is the self-engendering reality- like Hegels Geist, once more denuded from

metaphysical assumptions. The condensationsof social communication (in meanings, institu-tions, routines, systems. . . ) are purely circularand have no anchoring in any reality outside.

They are paradoxical because they include astructural reference to an indefinite further

connection and to an unattainable internalconsistency. Society is the paradigm of a system



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System's Sole Constituent, he Operation 65

or an entity that escapes all objectivation and

engulfs the observation itself that posits it as its

objective correlate.Luhmann's vision of sociology as a science

of society transforms it into a sort of vagrant'supertheorie' with a special reference to thebasic category of 'system'. The radical remodel-

ling of the system category enables it to remain a

unifying pattern of the theory. Nevertheless, areformulation of the theory in terms of differ-entiation and mediation as an alternative to

systemist ones is thinkable throughout. What isfundamental, then, is a type of category capableof expressing the measure of reflexivity, circu-

larity and paradox inherent to society as it is

thought by Luhmann. The specific performanceof his sociology is. thus, the identification and

manifestation of social communication as thelast convex, the untranscendable envelope, of all

meaning and all reality.3 Society - that is, the

'Sinnsystem Kommunikation - constitutes the

unfolding of indefinitely self-referential andinconcludable differences as a multi-dimension-

ally articulated system of meaning, overarchingconsciousness. There is no access to the world of

meaning without a socialization of individualconsciousness in the field and flux of an

unending and ungroundable communication.Communication is, thus, a self-engulfing struc-

ture, being the context of itself.Society and system are interdependent

concepts insofar as the motive for the revisionof systems theory was the conception of societyas a circular, self-contextual structure of a veryspecific type: on the other side, the systemstheoretical framework offered a departure pointfor developing a post-ontological theory whichwill very soon exceed it. Moreover, the intuitionof the unbounded status and scope of sociologyis not a late product of the theory itself, but isthere from the beginning: when Luhmanncomes to

sociologyafter

many yearsin admin-

istrative office, he is attracted by the generalityof its perspective, the possibility to advance in

any theoretical direction, free from disciplinarylimitation. Sociology, in his perception, is a fieldwhere 'one can do everything',4 pursuing anyinterest in knowledge. The range of themes isalmost unlimited, and the sociologist can directhis choice towards any mundane object: per-sons, nature, the state, music, intimacy, etc . . .There is a sociology of everything, everythingbeing communicatively constituted throughsocial media and systemic processes.

Luhmann's path from the presentiment ofthe omnicompetence and thematic vagrancy of

sociology to the most sophisticated theoretical

expressions of the self-reference of communica-tion is an interesting one. It shows us how aninterest in the universal theme of sociologytakes body in the project of a general theory of

society and how the generality of this theoryleads to a radical reformulation of the concept of

society as well as of the concept of system, thelatter being designed to be the main categoryreflective of the former. Thus, the project of a

general theory of an enlarged and profoundlyreflexive concept of society induces the radical

recasting of the systemic categories.5 To retraceLuhmann's progression towards a de-ontologi-zation of the system category is thus worth-while.

The initial research in Luhmann's early

work is concentrated on organization theory.Systemist and affinitive approaches were

already developed in this domain, and theyhave been considerably amplified since.6 Luh-mann's main questioning in this seminal phasecentred on the conception of an 'other' ration-

ality. Actually, administrative science and orga-nization theory were soaring in an impressiveeffort to renew their fundaments: the heretofore

unitary conception of the formal organization asa human institution designed for the realizationof definite goals instrumented through complex

informational and procedural means was foun-dering. The sociology of organization was

discovering how almost all formal organiza-tional schemes, tokens and routines weredoubled through informal ones. Therewith,the system constituted by the organizationrevealed itself as much more complex than itsinstituted, unifying, mostly hierarchical design.Particularly, the category of goal and goalattainment was withering away: the difficult

identifiability of final representations, the con-

fusing interdependence and co-variation of

apparent, strategicand

objective goals,the

constant but irregular re-import in the organi-zation system of informal secondary and unin-tended positive ends . . . made necessary such a

complexification of the notion that it became

eventually soundless to work with it further.7New light was also shed on the relations of the

organization with its environments, therebyshowing an incomparably more nuanced

image than that of an internally functional

system unit subjected to environmental con-straints and producing correlative responses.

The conclusion that Luhmann as anorganization theorist drew from these premises



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resulted in a research programme focussed onthe concept of complex, or as he termed it.'systemic rationality'. The programme was to be

implemented in two stages: (1) a critique of the

supposition of an immanent instrumental

rationality of organization presenting the orga-nizational mode of action as a unique tool,defined and unified by its goals and ends, andwhose rationality is univocally inscribed in itstransitive hierarchical architecture; and (2) a

descriptive and conceptual work on a greatnumber of phenomena constituting complexrationality in a variety of complex figures. The

programme went through a series of recon-structions of the complex intelligence sedimen-ted in organizations as well as in every com-municational phenomenon. Actually, every such

phenomenoncombines a

series of mutuallyconditioned devices to a relatively functionaland operative whole that can take variousforms, ranging from quasi-instant social sys-tems of fugitive face-to-face interaction to theheaviest and most enduring formal institutionalventures. This combination is far from being a

product of pre-projecting design and, above all.from being grasped in its consequences. Thus,the descriptive work converges towards the

problem of order, of its origin and evolution.Within the framework of a theory of complexrationality, order appears as emergent, open tovariation and self-sensitive,9 requiring non-linear, intransitive and original theoretical

concepts. At its origin, the research identifies

self-destabilizing paradoxical settings. Aninstance of such settings is the double con-

tingency scheme, which Luhmann takes overfrom Parsons and Shils and develops into a

generative figure of all order10 in collective

meaning systems - that is, social systems.11Systemic rationality is thus a title for the

central intuition of the improbability, fluencyand circularity of order. Order is improbable not

because it calls for human - or divine - design,but because it has to be accounted for as thenon-natural, non-spontaneous - although self-

organizing12 - realization of forms of being thatno design could have predicted and no self-directed process could have produced. The

system-order emerging from non-reproducibleconjunctions of factors and circumstances isfluent, nurtured through fluency.13 It is neverstructured only from within. Order is 'differen-tial' in the sense that it is the unceasingnegotiation of a difference between non-order

and order. The maintenance of the system-orderis an explicit and continuous performance. As

such it is not self-evident. Most fallacious is thusthe spatial representation of the order-unity as aclosed entity containing in itself its order

components and internally quiescent as longas its environment does not exercise any

pressure on its boundaries. Order is rather anactual difference, order/non-order, which isreflected in its first term (order) and whosemaintenance takes the deceptive, metaphoricalform of a (spatial) boundary. In fact, the

boundary is a complex actual relation, aneffectuation or an actuation - I try to translatethe German word: Vollzug - of an asymmetricaldifference and its reflection in one of its terms.

Very soon the problematic of complex orderconcentrates on the de-realization or de-onto-

logization of the spaces, the fluxes and func-

tional activities related to the system. To thinksystems as pure differences becomes the de-

ontologizing programme of Luhmann's systemstheory. All its lines of argument converge in thisdirection.

To sum up, I could say that the new de-

ontologized concepts are an alternative to the

metaphysically grounded theoretical frame-works of action theory. This does not meanthat those frameworks are altogether invalid;they are just outclassed by a new theoretical

design called for by deep transformations in the

projections (Entw?rfe)14 of themeaning

andstructure of the objects of the relevant sciences.To use an analogy I will discuss more thor-

oughly at the end of the article, the projection ofthe unconscious as the primary psychic objectand the proper theme of the science of the

psyche is an alternative to the previous intro-

spectivist and cognitivist projection of such an

object within the psychology of consciousness.The old designs, which are thus superseded, donot lose their whole relevance. They mustnevertheless be brought up to the new level,restructured so as to fit into the new categorialprojections. Coming back to the problematicswithin sociology at the emergence of the post-actionalist systemist model. I can read it asfollows: Action theory is intrinsically ontologi-c?l in its categorial design; it is co-extensive withthe triadic. extensive, transitive operator-opera-tio-operatum structure, which objectifies itsterms as real, self-identical terms: it lives fromthe equally ontological assumptions made onthe nature of the subject-actor as self-consciousbearer of intentions and will, promoter of hisaction through its more or less rational

instrumentation. The invention (in the doublesense of founding and figuring) of a de-



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ontologizing level of intellection15 is equivalentto the breakthrough in the direction of new

categories framing the comprehension of thesocial. These categories enable and demand anabandonment of the assumption that there is an

actor or an action behind social communica-tion. They allow the positing of a specific,autonomous, anonymic, non-aggregative objec-tivity. Such objectivity is no more ontologicallyprojectible. It requires the framework of atransformed systemism, centred on the inher-

ently circular, self-differential entity whichLuhmann continues to call a system. The new

subject-object of sociology - the social - iscommunication as a system. Communication isthe last constituent of the social, behind whichthere are neither actors nor things, but only

operations. These are the sole, variously specifi-able constituents of all communicative systems.

2. Figures of thought

Differential self-actuationI have followed Luhmann on his way from the

reception of systems organization theory to hiselaboration of systemic rationality. I saw thatwhat was to be thought could not be conceived

along the classical ontoiogical schemes of

objectivation.The kinds of

objectsthat

cameto the fore were paradoxical in the sense that

they could not be thought of as identities orunities, bearing extrinsic relations to theirenvironments, but as system-environment du-alities with an asymmetrical anchoring of the

self-position of the duality in the system. Thiswas the abstract frame of systemic rationality,which had to enable us thinking organizationaldevices, active or sedimented intelligence as

ambiguous contributions to the system's stabi-

lity as well as instability. When boundaries are

de-spatialized to become the expression of theself-difference of the system (as system-envir-onment) in the system (as building a self-

identity), the system enshrines in itself its own

negation. It becomes a circular dynamic whose

potentialities flow from the internalization of itsenvironment (non-self) in itself. That is howorder is built from noise; that is why the mainresources for stability and adaptation areinherent instability and variety and why fixed

optimality is suboptimal and diverse suboptim-ality a major asset for evolution.

This access to the problematic of asymme-

trical self-identity of system from Luhmann'sinitial preoccupation with organization theory

is a convenient one and yet, importantly, not the

only one possible. Luhmann's early - and a

fortiori later - work is not restricted to thistheme and contains already a series of more

general as well as different perspectives. Never-

theless, where law or politics, power or valuesare at stake, the systems theoretical approachtransforms the traditional problem positionsthrough discovering the underlying paradoxicalstructures. Thus, the juridical code (lawful/unlawful) can itself be neither lawful norunlawful; the medium of politics, power, lives

communicationally from its non-use; values area sort of complexity 'stoppers', instrumented tocover the self-reference of all orders of meaning.Throughout these examples, the fundamentaltheoretical difficulty is that systems are inher-

ently incomplete and made unstable throughtheir differential structures.

I should, however, insist on the passagefrom ( 1 ) the classical representation of a systemas a unity with an immanent order facing anenvironment which acts on it, thus promotingor inhibiting the unfolding of its order structure;to (2) a differential representation where theorder unit is that of an asymmetrically reflecteddifference order/non-order. The contrast bringsout the features of the end term. Actually, theinvolved relational and theoretical structure in

this term is not unprecedented. It is part of astock of very special, rarely used figures Iencounter in the philosophical tradition fromAristotle to Heidegger. Where such figuresappear, they are regularly associated with a

daring and violent effort to think at a challen-

ging level of originarity and against habits ofintuitive thought. I will discuss two such figuresin unequal detail. The first, which I call the

'originary self-positing self-identity', is the oneat stake here; the second is the one I call the

kNur-Vollzug structure, meaning a structurewhose terms are contracted in a sole self-contained act or effectuation (this figure engulfsthe first one and will be explained in more

detail).My main purpose in this article is to show

how Luhmann's most central theses can be read

instructively by means of such a structural

commentary of the engaged figures of thought.The objects of my attention are then those

figures of thought - I could say logismoi - thatmake possible a radical transformation of the

problem vision. My 'logismological' approachfocuses on the constitution and performance of

such figures and in this sense, it has certainaffinities with Luhmann's theory-building as a



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type of highly reflexive venture. Luhmann paysa lot of attention to the theorization choices andtheir figures themselves. The actually unfoldingtheory becomes thus an object for itself and theresult of a series of construction decisions made

consciously by the theoretician. This leads to a

very high level of reflexive abstraction in

thought and argument. Luhmann's theory of

theory did not, however, thematize the under-

lying figures of its most crucial categorialcontractions. While it is ultimately enlighteningto the problematics of complex theorizing,16 itstill lacks a genuine analysis of most decisive

figures. These figures have, in my eyes, analo-

gues in the specific theory-building of first

philosophy (prot? philosophia or prima philo-sophia)

7 on the ground of the originaryemergence of the first lineaments of being.

Our thesis is, in particular, that the self-difference paradox can be compared with such a

figure of prime philosophy and thus be clarified

through the reminiscence of some of thetranscendental deductions that give expressionto it. I chose Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre' whoseline of progress is most elaborated.18 In Fichte'sdeduction, at the beginning is a 'Thathandlung'(self-performing act),

9 which is the self-positionof the I (the transcendental subject).2 Beforethis self-position, there is nothing worldly21 and

the emergence of the I is that of being, i.e. of aworld. However, the self-position of the Ursub-

jekt is not global-spherical: the I is not a closedhen kai pan, self- and all-containing in the senseof having no other. Fichte's argument is

precisely that the advent of the I in its originaryact is the advent of a difference, of a same and

non-same, of I and not-I (Ich und Nicht-Ich). The

subject is a subject of something which is notitself. Fichte's vision differs, thus, from the

conceptions of the Parmenidian metaphysicsor that of scholastic theological speculation onthe state of

beingante mundi creationem. The

difference I/Not-I is, further, what is reflected inthe I itself and constitutes the most genuine actof the I as I. The I is not a closed and total

sphere. It is embedded in a split (or a scratch,

Ritz). The I is the split whose name is world andwhose act is the reflection of this same splittingdifference.

The scheme of thought here calls for a

distancing from intuitive modes of comprehen-sion, where unities or identities are posited as

separate and closed wholes. I and Not-I cannotbe thought of as two distinct entities standing inan extrinsic relation to each other, whose

product is, a third and distinct new term. Not

only are all terms here a sole differentialstructure and a sole self-actuating Vollzug(effectuation), but also an asymmetrical one.The Not-I can never attain to the determinative

density of the I, because precisely the I is the siteof the reflection of the uneven difference I/Not-I.This asymmetrical moment is best stressed inthe protologic of G. Spencer Brown, whoconceives the unmarked state within the

inaugural distinction as a sort of residual

term, correlative to the marked state of thedistinction. Here also the duality of the self-difference (I/Not-I, marked state/unmarked

state) is reflected in the active density of, so to

speak, the 'positive' term of the distinction - the

indication, in Spencer Brown's terminology.Distinction is thus, in a specific, paradoxicalsense, self-continent, insofar as it needs nothingmore to exist than its moments united in onesole act: effectuation.

As a matter of fact, Luhmann's reliance onBrownian protologic for the presentation and

development of his own theory graduallyescalated to reach a quasi-dominant positionin his later work. As I shall stress later on, this

dependence makes the question about thetheoretical status of Luhmannian assumptionsand proto-sociological theorems most acute. Atwhat level is the body of the most general and

abstract sentences of Luhmann's theory ofsociety to be situated? Is it transcendental a

priori or is it simply a generalization of a set ofcrossed evidences stemming from variousdomains of observation? My thesis is thatLuhmann's major assertions rely on a sort of a

priori ground with no transcendental reference,which is that of the Brownian protologic. Thus,I think that the logical calculus of GeorgeSpencer Brown, published under the title Laws

of Form,22 is most accurately qualified as a

'protologic'. Classical logics included (1) an

encompassing theoryof enunciation (sentence

and discourse) and inference (deduction ofsentences from sentences), like the inaugurallogic of Aristotle; (2) an apriorical deduction or

description of the constituting acts of a pureconsciousness performing the cognitive opera-tions of judgement and reckoning, like thetranscendental logics of Kant and Husserl; (3)a formal or mathematical body of theorems - an

algebra - syntactically inferred from a small setof axioms and symbol definitions, like the logicof the Principia mathematica of R?ssel andWhitehead. In contrast to these logics, particu-larly the last one, Spencer Brown's programmeis an inquiry into the pre-discursive laws



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emerging with the most elementary position of

'something'. These laws must be situated at alevel preceding the level of expression graspedby classical logic. Protologic denotes, thus, inour context, the logic implied in the most

general act of appearance or position of a

something (a form). It reveals Our internal

knowledge of the structure of the world' (Laws ofForm 1969:xiii). The form, as it is understood bySpencer Brown, is prior to anything logic canthematize at its own levels of generality. It is tobe thought of as lying at such a depth of

originality and generality as to be 'beyond the

point of simplicity where language ceases to act

normally' (ibidr.xx). It, then, 'resists expression'(ibid.), whereas logic is something discursiveabout which I can talk and which I can

objectivize.23To be sure, and this is a point I have already

noted, Brownian protologic is not the onlyapproach Luhmann draws upon in order tothink systems as differences and not as res.Luhmann's own method commanded a diversi-fication of the contributions integrated into the

theory, in order to raise its incongruity and curbthe tendency towards massively unifying and

potentially re-ontologizing concepts. Neverthe-

less, Spencer Brown becomes gradually thedominant reference of the late theory, which

develops into an Observation theory' based onthe Brownian concept of difference as a bilateral

concept (zwei-Seiten-Form). This evolution is not

altogether advantageous. Brown's logic is still a

very poorly elucidated theory waiting for a

genuinely appropriating reception. Yet, Luh-mann works with it as if it were not onlycommon knowledge, but as if one had fullygrasped the transformation of the deep ontolo-

gical structure it induces. In his texts, the sameconcise, schematic hint at Spencer Brown'sLaws of Form suffices to justify the most abstract

concepts and the shorthand-like exposed argu-ments. This is the reason why I think that Ishould try to build an analogical space as mucharound Spencer Brown's protologic as Luh-mann's use of it. For this purpose, I turn to the

philosophical tradition as a reservoir of mostinstructive figures of thought. The advantage ofthe philosophical references is that they bringwith them the necessary diachronic and histor-ical depth severely needed for the clarification of

categorial revisions.Fichte's deduction of the asymmetrical self-

difference structure and of its reflexive entan-

glements is instructive because it reminds usthat the main difficulties of theorizing on an

originary-structural level are twofold: (1) tothink from a theoretical site lying before

experience in a transcendental world withouttime and without objective firmness; and (2) tothink in a world of pure actuality without timeand without objective products of activity.Despite the fact that Luhmann's theory doesnot develop on any transcendental ground, its

figures of thought still have many essentialfeatures in common with the apriorical tradi-tion. The theoretical constructs shaped in thistradition as groundwork of all subsequentempirical acting and experiencing have a sortof homological counterpart in an enlargedsystems theory. This is even more the case as

systems theory integrates protological compo-nents and is shaped in such a manner as to

become a sort of universal theory of objects.24 Itis actually inescapable that at a certain level of

originality - which we could call protological,and where we would situate most aprioricaltheories - heterogeneous schemes share in aseries of figures. The instance of Fichte'sdeduction shows how a thought taking placeat the emerging point of things, at an observa-tion site revealing their most universal features,is forced into unintuitive, highly reflexive,contracted paths. One should see that Luh-mann's theory is not just a sociological theory of

a particularly high generality. It should be seenthat such a theory incorporates a very central

protological dimension. Taken seriously, this fact

changes the basis of the theory reception. It isthus hopeless to try to make sense of the theoryof self-referential social systems, above all when

they are conceived of as nothing but operations,while occulting the protological problematic.

Circular actuality (Nur-Volhug)Let us now examine more accurately some

important moments of the figure of thought

elaborating on the self-difference structure. Inthe course of my commentary on Fichte's

deduction, I said that the main pressure bendingthought into counter-intuitive, highly com-

pacted patterns originates from the twofold

necessity of abstracting time and the necessityto reabsorb all intuitively - i.e. extensivelyposited - terms into one or a few ('verbal')actual aspects of a circular process. I now showthat this figure of contraction of extensive termsin actual effectuation (Vollzug) is not specific tothe transcendental tradition, but is also requiredin other philosophical approaches confrontedwith problems of the composite constitution of

specific beings. Concerning Luhmann, the pre-



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sent stage of my discussion will offer aninstructive specification of his general concep-tion of system as a differential non-entity. It willtake the form of a commentary on its mostfundamental, most pregnant statement: 'nur

Kommunikation kann kommunizieren' (onlycommunication can communicate).25

I begin with a presentation of the figure asit is elaborated by Aristotle, in crucial develop-ments of his psychological theory.26 It is thecentral figure of the act theory of the soul,which solves the major problems of the preced-ing doctrines. The theory reacts to the quasi-mythological treatment of psychology by Plato,for whom the soul is a composite being extendedover several heterogeneous domains and whose

unity seemed ever since problematic. It is

topologically dispersed and its heterogeneousparts are thought of as co-existing and often

interacting with each other in a global space.The question for Plato was that of the unitingdomination (h?gemon?n) of one part over theother or all others within this plurality.27Aristotle simplifies the stratificatory scheme ofthe soul into three main parts: a vegetative(growth and decay without motion), an animal

(autonomous motion and sense) and an intel-lectual (knowledge) part. He then resolves the

problem of the unity of the strata in superior

living beings like animals or men in anaudacious and straightforward manner. He

rejects the idea of cumulative stratificatoryendowments and brings to the fore an actual-effectual or Verbal' concept of form, whichtransforms the problem: the soul (psych?) is theform (eidos) of the living body in the sense that itis the act (the realized dynamis, the energeia) of

living, which is its perfection (entelecheia). In thesoul of a human being there are not three

partial souls or three psychic floors interrelated

through the material being they animate. Thereis

onlyone act,

throughwhich the

livinghuman

being lives and realizes his being (tois z?isi to zen

einai, esse viventibus vivere, De anima 415b:14).Each time this act is specified as vegetative(when man sleeps), animal (when he perceives)or intellectual (when he thinks). The life of sucha being is 'effectuated' (actually realized) in onesole act of being, which is here life in its

vegetative, animal or intellectual farm. There isno need to multiply the involved beings.

The act theory dispels all forms of beingwhich are not actual-effectual (Vollzug), i.e. allforms of already given res-like beings. The

theory transforms the comprehension of beingas presence of objects (frozen products of once

enacted being) in their multiplicity, factual

diversity and dispersion into that of an originaryactus essendi. There is a transformation of the

thick-setting of an extensive, transitive multi-moment structure into a circular intransitive,

internally effective, unique-moment structure.The logico-grammatical triadic structure of

operator-operatio-operatum must be counter-

intuitively compacted into a monadic structurewith one last irreducible component, the

operado. A step must be made to cut behindthe current logical and linguistic settings oftriadic ontic evidence and to attain to the

protological founding dimension of the 'sole-

operation' structure. The act theory invokes the

originary ontological ground, out of which a

reality emerges, whose obscured perception

breaks its primal 'collection' (Sammlung) andscatters its vivid core into cooled disjectedmembers.

The problem created by such an analogybetween Aristotle's act theory in its modern

interpretation and Luhmann's operation the-

ory is that of the limits beyond which boththeories are no more comparable. Massive

misinterpretations lurk, should the analogy beloaded with more than it bears. Aristotle's form

actuality is metaphysical in the sense that it isnot a historically or a self-organizationally

emerging operation, but is the actuating of aprimarily actual essence. It is not an arbitrarydistinction, a contingent split on the world'ssurface. The Aristotelian actuality is essential.It is also strictly unitary and self-sufficient. Its

circularity is not differential or paradoxical; it is

spherical and global. No form-act refers toanother form-act or to an environing non-act,the difference to whom is reflected in the form-act itself. However, if these are the restrictionsto be made on my analogy, the analogy itselfremains pertinent as an elucidation of theactual-effectual

figurewhich is decisive in

Luhmann's categorial revision of sociology.While the Fichtean deduction could help us tounderstand the asymmetrical three-step pro-cess (position of system as concomitant withthe position of difference to an unmarkedenvironment and reflection of the differenceas core operation of the system) as a proto-logical untemporal unique circularity; theAristotelian figure gives us a key for under-

standing more than the actual-effectual aspectsof the r?sorption of extensive terms into one

operative structure, already partially enlight-ened by the comparison with Fichte. It is

mainly interesting for the invaluable contribu-



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Systems Sole Constituent, he Operation 71

tion it offers to the understanding of the

couplings between different operation types,that is, different systems.

The relatedness and dependency of thebrain autopoiesis28 to the autopoiesis of con-sciousness, as well as the relatedness of thelatter to the autopoiesis of communication, canbe explained in terms very much analogous toAristotle's act theory. Only communication cancommunicate, meaning that consciousness - aswell as the brain - cannot: this refers to anactual contraction necessary to think the formas act. There is no place for whatever multi-

plicity in the Aristotelian scheme because theentities at stake are not objective (res-like), butactual-effectual (Vollzug). Multiplicity is the co-existence of many different items at a time, in a

space. Prime actuality - or protological pro-cesses - are non-spatial and are untemporal inthe sense that they are not in time as in a pre-existing space. They are, on the contrarythemselves time-generative. There is thus no

place, on the originary ground, for a multiplicityof acts. The actus essendi of a living being is lifeand that of a thinking living being is thinking(noein). There is no stratification, ordering theacts of being, life, vegetation, perception andintellection as a multiplicity in space or time,

arranging their cumulation at the higher levels.

In the action theoretical framework, the mostspecific act is always and alone the actual one.AH others, 'underlying' ones, are there, in it.

They are superseded by its actual specificity sothat their actuation 'is' its own.

Coupling of operative levelsAristotle proposed a detailed theory of the

couplings involved in the actual absorption oflower act dimensions within higher ones, in

particular the famous abstraction theory coup-ling perception and intellection through the

processingof sense data into intellectual

forms.29 It is not possible to expose it here, butwhat is sure is that the analogical setting of boththeories, Aristotle's and Luhmann's, persistsaround their central logismic figures. Thus,Luhmann approaches the problematics of coup-ling as one of a contribution of the autopoiesis ofthe lower systems to the autopoiesis of the

higher ones. This contribution takes the form ofan entry of lower difference reflections in higherones without breaking the unity of the specificactual effectuation. When conscious material

(thoughts - Gedanken)10 enters communication,it does so in the form of that material which

structurally stimulates the asymmetrical differ-

enee reflection that constitutes the communica-tion acts. The conscious actuality entering thecommunicative actuality does not operate like amaterial component entering a material synth-esis. Consciousness is already fully and genu-inely present in communication. Whencommunication is actuated, consciousness andcerebral life are as well. Aristotle had alreadystressed this presupposition relationship of thelower actuality by the higher one.31 In Luh-mannian terms: whereas only communicationcommunicates, there is no communicationwithout consciousness and no consciousnesswithout cerebral life.

The difference between the two visions liesin Luhmann's conception of the absorption ofthe subordinate actuality in the effectuation of

the more specific one in terms of contributionand stimulation. Since the lower actuality doesnot imply the realization of the higher one, since

e.g. consciousness is not already communica-tion, the coming to pass of communication mustbe specifically conditioned. Communication

being autopoietic, the continuous connectionof its operations from one instant to the next,

building more or less coherent sequences, is

purely communicative in nature. That meansthat each level of actuality is completelyautonomous in its sequence-building and

time-consuming operation. The system endureson the basis of self-motion and self-continuation

through the structural connectibility of its parts- each operation demanding the connection of anew one of the same actuality. The lower

actuality systems do not condition the operativecontinuity of the higher ones - these wouldotherwise not be autopoietic; rather they supplythem with the type of actuality they need,which is in turn transformed by them, througha specific reticulation into the higher typeactuality. The 'material' out of which commu-nication is made is conscious

'Erlebnisse,sense

syntheses of the specific kind that I callconsciousness. These syntheses build the basic'material' of communication by entering intothe higher syntheses specific to this higher typeof sense system.

Not all conscious syntheses enter, however,into the higher communicative ones, as thetransformation of conscious experience(thought, in Luhmann's terminology) into

intersubjective communication is not itselfautomatic. Moreover, not all conscious synth-eses are equally appropriate to enter intocommunication - some being structurallyexcluded, like incommunicable, ineffable con-



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scious experiences. The choice of the terms'contributions' and 'stimulations' to describethe relations between a pair of asymmetricallyconditioned levels of actuality reflects this

unequal and selective structure of systemiccoupling. Some conscious operations are morestimulated than others to engage in commu-nication. Once communication is actual, the

theory considers that the conscious materialhas ceased to operate and has acceded to the

higher operative synthesis of communication.The problem of a conscious experience ofcommunication itself during its own operationis not that of a confusion of the two levels of

operation, but that of a simultaneity or double-

stage effectuation (Vollzug) of the two syntheses.The problem is prevented through the multi-

dimensional structure of communication itselfin Luhmannian theory. Through its conceptionof communication as a threefold operationconsisting of information, impartation (Mit-teilung)12 and comprehension (Verstehen), the

theory accounts explicitly for the phenomenonof the continuous 'quant ? soi underwritingcommunication. Thus, the unquestionable phe-nomenon of a current being-for-myself, feelingand judging in myself of the contents ofcommunication, while engaged in communica-tion, is not occulted in the theory. The conscious

sequences accompanying continuously actualcommunication and forming, so to speak, its

background, are respectively among the con-

stituting acts of communication. The unim-

peachable autonomy and self-referentiality ofthe communicative sequences guarantee the

autopoietic character of the communication

system and inhibit any attempt to resolvecommunication into consciousness.

A possible interpretation of Aristotle's act

theory points towards a new logismic horizonthat I will have to explore. It has been

suggestedto conceive of the Aristotelian

actuation of a specific and individual being asa continuous realization of a form in its

adequate matter. The actuation of vegetativelife in a rose is thus an actuation of being-a-rose in adequate matter, throughout eachmoment of its existence; that of a cell, thecontinuous actuation and thereby mainte-nance of the being or form cell in adequatematter throughout all its metabolic processes.The metaphor that bears the whole interpreta-tion is that of a whirlpool maintaining the

stability of the form through the flow of matter.This conception of 'transtemporal stability',within which specific and individual form

actuating is a 'sempiternal wrap or bend

informing the local matter',33 goes beyond theheretofore explored theoretical space. Withsuch a view of the temporal-operative eventcontinuum we enter the domain of the

concrete realization of the prime originaryactuality. We leave the protological level,

reaching what we could call a strictly opera-tional one. Whereas the former described thestate of things at their untemporal, time-

inaugural emergence, the latter correspondsto a consideration of the concrete actual-effectual (Nur-Vollzug) event. In real time, the

compactness of the Nur-Vollzug structure isreflected in a very specific form. One would

expect that, in the protological event of a self-

reflecting difference, the bundling or knotting

of all extensive terms into one circular actualeffectuation must embody in a contraction ofthe operator and the operatum into a time-

consuming self-centred operatio. The empiricalworld is, however, when compared to its

originating matrix, a world of cooled outderivatives. It constitutes a level of constructed

reality opposite to the protological one and

structurally unable to host its circular arche-

types. These must, when the departure is takenfrom the empirical level, always be reinventedin a stark effort of theoretical thought.

The whirlpool metaphor is thus the bestsuited one to conceive of the sole-being and the

circularity of the operation, as well as thederivative, transitory status of its cooled forma-tions. It has, moreover, a not uninteresting,most concrete basis in biological phenomena.Actually, the material components of livingtissues are continuously renewed and replacedwithin relatively constant periods, while the

biological form is altogether maintained. Thus,the metaphor is in a way inescapable or ceasesalmost to be one. It offers a convenienttransition towards

metaphysicallyunsaddled

representations of operative processes. Presup-positions on the status, ideal identity or

supratemporal sameness of the act forms neednot to be made within it. The conception of a

transtemporally stable operatum through the

unceasing, continuous action of a specific,contingent operatio (eventually consumingtime and matter) fits quite well as a de-

ontologization of Aristotelian act theory. Itestablishes the problematic on an empiricaloperative ground and draws on the contingenceand (evolutionary) variability of the form as

opposed to its supposed incorruptible idealsameness. On the whole, this conception



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seems to be very close to Luhmann's view of the

operation as a prime constituent of the systemwith no guarantee of ontological identity and

stability.Through the flow of time, the concretions

of life, consciousness and communication arecooled forms of current continuous operations.These maintain transtemporally identifiable,

functionally in fine advantageous operata. The

stability of the operata (a cell, a thought, a

specific communication such as a friendlyinteraction, a work conflict, a legal procedure)is nothing but the permanence, from instant to

instant, of the actual effectuation of the

corresponding operation. The operata have nosubsistence and no substance outside the

operation. But what then probabilizes coherent,

enduring, system-building operations ratherthan anarchic, non-self-confirming, non-con-

densing, instantly vanishing ones? WithinAristotle's act theory, such a question isirrelevant. The act form is an ontologicallyfirm eidos, ever since, and self-identical under allconditions. Within de-ontologized frameworkslike systems theory, the tendency to condensa-tion must be especially accounted for, Luh-mann's proposal elaborates on the ground ofthe self-organization theory in a protologicaldifferentialist formulation. Thus, each difference

that scratches the surface of the world tends,from its prime event on, to iterate in a way thatbuilds a nucleus for redundancy as well as forvariation. Redundancy is the basic, variation-

enabling process, while variation is the mar-

ginal one. Both are the substance, the content ofthe operative life pulsing in the constituted form

through the time-matter flow. Each operation,from moment to moment, either confirms andcondenses further the form, or inflects its

wrapping movement and prepares the possible(not necessary) emergence of new forms. The

double trajectory of confirmation and variationis an unpredictable one. Predictions of evolutionhave some pertinence after bifurcation hasoccurred, in phases of necessary condensation

through strong redundancy, the post-bifurcativephase being similar to theoretically initial ones.The nearer to the inaugural distinction, themore redundant operating is likely to prevail.The more virginal the ground where thedistinction is drawn, or the more originary thelevel of emergence, the more hasty and intenseare the processes of iteration. This is clear from

protological, form-theoretical premises: thereflection of the difference system-environmentwithin the system is stronger, and enhances the

building of self-identity, when the environmentis not already so differentiated as to imposeinternal complexification of the system throughthe differentiation of diverse roles and functionswithin the latter. These processes are namelyfactors of variation that inflect the actuatedform in a number of directions. The systemicstructure is maintained as long as variationdoes not provoke a switch to a changed form,whose confirmation would require anew a highmeasure of shape- or structure-building redun-

dancy. A major feature of Luhmann's systemsoperativity theory is finally its inversion of thestatus of structure (in all functionalist and

systemic theories) from one of a superordinatedcommanding magnitude, whose stabilityenhancing is the finality of the functional

processes, to one of a flowing process with noreal anchoring in things. Structure reflects justthe temporary redundancy tendencies of opera-tions, with 'enslaving' effects upon certain

operative sequences.34To sum up: a system would be a sort of

transtemporally stable whirlpool, a form main-tained in actuality through a constant bend ofits individual operative components into a

global structure. The complex mechanismsthat link together or mutually indent thesuccessive operations are not deterministic.

They are inherently unstable because they aregrounded on paradoxes. These paradoxes arethe main source of systemic dis-equilibrium aswell as the main resources for complexity-building and actuality-furthering variation.

Pure eventThe last instantiation of the logismic figure of

Nur-Vollzug I would like to present before

closing this commentary on Luhmann's sys-temic operation could help us understand its'evential' aspect. Operation 'happens' as the

asymmetrical reflection of a difference in aform act. The 'products' of this happening are

living beings, conscious contents and social

interchanges. Luhmann's theory tends todeconstruct these cooled objectivities intotheir constituting operations. But as soon aswe leave the real-objective level for the

operative one, we face the problem of the

representability of protological complexes. Oneof the problematic aspects of thinkability of

originary operativity is the 'happening' of pureoperations. What does it mean that an opera-tion happens or comes to pass? Once more theevocation of a philosophical figure is mostinstructive. It is Heidegger's doctrine of



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'Ereignis' (event).35 The idea of 'Ereignis'represents the climax of the fundamental effortof Heidegger to think 'be' (Sein) in its differenceto the 'being' (Seiendes). This effort leads to a

complete 'verbalization' of thought structures

with a concentration on building ways ofaccess to the non-objective, purely actualuniverse of prime reality. The main statementshave the form: Welt weitet. Nichts nichtet,

Ereignis ereignet, ist istet . . . ,36 reminiscent ofthat fundamental structure of pure actualitywhere operator, operatum and operatio arecontracted in a sole intransitive, internallyactual, circular act. Heidegger's novelty isthat pure actuality is thought as ab-solutefinite, with no anchoring in any transcendentnor transcendental nor worldly rarity. Being is

the pure event of itself, the gift of time andbeing, winding in itself like an out-less finite

ring. The pure event is a circular event, a

coming into its own being (Er-eignen). Once

again, the circular structure is a complex onewith a dual movement of giving time and beingto the reciprocal duality of themselves.

Luhmann's protological conception of a

self-sustaining operativity is certainly nearer tothe asymmetrical three-moment movement ofthe Fichtean deduction than to Heidegger'sdual, quasi-mystical movement of a self-giving

being. The interest of the Heideggerian figure is,however, its insistence on the event character ofcircular actuality. Its shaping of the eventmotive is one whose central stakes are the

'saying' of the gratuity of the givenness of the

given. 'Ereignis is irrelative and causeless. Thereis no transcendent nor any other actor whodoes, makes or motivates the event. There is nointernal necessity eliciting it and unfolding itsmovement. Sole-actuality is 'eventual' for Hei-

degger in the sense that its effectuation (Vollzug)has no motive outside of itself. When it comes to

passand endures

throughtime and

being,it is

still inaugurally motiveless, with no relation to

anything outside its pure event. This radicalityof the Heideggerian figure has no correspondentin Luhmann's theory.

Thus, my last analogical presentationdesigned to enrich my commentary on Luh-mann's operational conception has to be muchmore contrastive than the preceding ones.

Operations, the sole systemic constituents,

'happen', occur, in an already existing streamof specifically identical operations. Metabolic

processes, thoughts and communications cometo pass through insertion in such a stream,

connecting themselves to respectively adequate

and specific operations which are at thatmoment effective. This idea is developed byLuhmann along with a well-known theoretical

topic, that of the connection or connectability(Anschluss, Anschlussfahigkeit, Anschliessbarkeit)of current operations in systems. Thus, the pureoperativity of systems, though circular, is not

prime-eventual. Its protological description canshow it in statu nascendi as emerging and

inaugural, and elucidate its structure, momentsand movement. It does not make any assump-tion on its prime event. Operative systems - inLuhmann's sense - appear then as structurallyor immanently unstable: they can never stopoperating, being, as I would say, tilted aheadand ever searching adequate connection to

operate. They are literally 'pro-clivious', bent

forward in a relentless concatenation withsimilar entities. This ever-current connectingis nothing else than the effectuation of the

asymmetrical reflection of the differencebetween the system and its environment withinthe system. This difference can never attain thestatus of an in itself quiescent unity. As anactual difference, it is continuously, unceasinglyin effectuation (in Vollzug). Thus, systemsconsisting in actual operations presupposethemselves. Their operations can never beginout of nothing, but always lack connection to

other operations of the same autopoiesis inorder to happen. Each singular operation is

structurally referential of other operationsimmediately connected to it through a puzzle-like key mesh. The operations sequence isconcatenated through a sort of structuralintrusion of the 'end' of one operation into the

'beginning' of the next.To be sure, the expression of this state of

things in terms of a beginning and end of

operations is not very appropriate, though itreflects the fact that the circular process of the

singular operationrefers

constantlybackwards

from its (protological) end moment to its

beginning one. In a way each operation has a

part of itself pre-posited in an undeterminednext operation, specified through the key fitcharacteristic of the relevant autopoiesis. An

operation of social communication cannot beconnected with an operation of life or ofconsciousness, as none of the moments of the

autopoiesis of life nor of consciousness are ableto fit between the circularly organized momentsof the communication operation, i.e. informa-

tion, impartation and comprehension. Each

operation of a specific autopoiesis hosts in itselfthe reference to a homopoietical operation



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under the form of an entangling intrusion oftheir different moments in the circular processof their effectuation.37

3. The world problem

Although contrasting with such an embedded-ness of the advent of the like in the stream ofever-actuated like, the Heideggerian event con-

cept still has illuminating aspects. It actuallyshows the thought of Nur-Vollzug in a state offull completion. Unfolding its immanent motivesand making explicit its internal horizons, pureoperativity would tend to these extremes of pureeventuality. Acutely elaborating on the proto-logical structures, Luhmann's approach is, for

its part, not blind to the problem of pureeventuality. In its terms, the problem of theevent of circular actuality would be a world

problem, outreaching the scope of a theory of

society - however radical the theory may be inits categorial casting of pure, internal-intransi-

tive, circular operativity. The achieving piece of

Nur-Vollzug thought is the reflection of an aspectof reality which hints towards a horizon that

out-ranges, and in a way engulfs the horizon ofall- and self-engulfing communication.

The world problem of world event is,

however, like everything having sense, a poten-tial object of social communication. It can beindicated, discussed, referred to. Any emergenceof it is socially constructed. In contrast to allother constructions of communication, it is,however, something that directly hits upon the

paradoxical, self-eluding, circular limitations ofsocial communication itself. It unites all the

paradoxity of the latter in one enigma and givesit the name of the sole horizon of all its horizons,that is, the world. Social communication beingthe ultimate envelope of itself cannot cross

beyond itself. However, it does not reflect thisself-limitation as a problem of communicationitself, i.e. as a social problem. Communicationreflects its paradoxical character as a whole inthe form of a (non-social) world problem. Itshows, then, in its most paradox forms like art38or religion, that there still is a problem that isnot its own. A problem that is neither a part of itnor coextensive with it. but definitely largerthan it. It is the problem of a sphere thattranscends communication and should not beconfused with any sphere of the incommunic-able within communication. We have seen thatconscious experience, especially when very inti-mate and intense, is not easily communicable.

Other spheres of meaning do not motivatecommunication adequately. Besides, there is awhole shadow domain of communication whichis structurally incommunicable: a communica-tion can never impart, in its own act, the

impartation quality of this same act.39 A wholestream of non communication is thus co-current to that of communication, buildingthe non attainability of the whole of commu-nication to itself.40 These are the paradoxes of

pure operativity as structurally pro-clivious and

unending. Besides these specific paradoxes,communication hosts, very centrally, another

type of communication that does not reflect

problems of its self-reference, but the fact that

although all-engulfing and self-contextual,communication is not the 'largest' horizon of

being. Communication, thus, contains the mostparadoxical hint towards a 'world', larger thanit is. The extreme of paradox is thus reached in acommunication - which could be, like silence, arenunciation of communication - that shows

beyond itself. World problems are problems ofthe pure eventuality of ever-streaming pureoperativity. They are not those of self-referenceof communication, but those of the self-refer-ence of the givenness of a world for it.41

4. Social communication: a concept forrefounding sociology

Our exploration of Luhmann's version of

systems theory showed it as a radical transfor-mation of the initial model through a new

shaping of its central categories. The main lineof thought commanding this categorial revisioncould be characterized as a programme ofuniversal de-ontologization viewed as historial

necessity. My endeavour was to shed some lighton the ways and motives that led to the final

centring of the whole theory upon the conceptof operation. I have proceeded by establishingsome conjunctions of Luhmann's approachwith philosophical theories, all of which docu-mented efforts to conceive the emergence offundamental structures of meaning at proto-logical levels. The convergence of these theoriestowards a de-realization (Ent-dinglichung - or de-

substantivization) of current ontological cate-

gories was in itself instructive. Thus, mostefforts went in the direction of a counter-intuitive thinking of internal-intransitive, cir-cular, effectual actuality. I brought them underthe logismic title of Nur-Vollzug. WhereasLuhmann's theory stands somewhat alone in



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contemporary sociology and seems thereforeerratic and incomprehensible, my procedureallowed me to situate it in a line of philosophicalthought. The trajectory of the reviewed figuresof sole-operation could lead us, in an altogetherordered way, from the first shapings of thesystem-operation motive within the complexityproblematics to the last of its reflections in theworld problem.

Let us venture a last remark on the

sociological interest of such a theory of socialcommunication. Its primary level reveals itself,once more, as very remote from the traditional

settings of social theory - and not only its

empirical ones. It would thus further the

scepticism of those who feel that its 'entryrights' are prohibitively high. Moreover, while

showing the strong stimulation such a generaltheory receives and exerts on the specifically a

priori theorizing of neighbouring philosophy, myinterpretation could have enhanced the opinionof its marginal sociological fertility. My thesiswould here be that a sound approach toLuhmann's design cannot do without a minimum

of philosophical analysis of its theoretical pre-mises. Such an analysis should deliver acharacterization of the nature and level of theinvolved concepts. We should avoid self-delusionand recognize the basic evidence that the ground

on which Luhmann's theory stands-

and falls-

isprotological. Protologicity, as practised by Luh-mann, is a very new and peculiar, setting for

forging primary categories, conceptual archi-tectures and descriptive frameworks. Whereasclassical sociology could lean on philosophicalgroundwork (Simmel and Weber on neo-Kan tianism, Scheler and Sch?tz on phenomenol-ogy, etc.), Luhmann inaugurates a new type ofrelation between a theory of society and thefoundational or categorial work of philosophy.He rejects any reliance on a global philosophical

position.Instead, he combines a

multiplicityof

theoretical pieces to a conception of highabstraction and logical priority. The protologicalstatus of the whole synthesis is not always clear.Yet, my conviction is that the central pieces ofthe theory are protological, and hence require a

philosophical elucidation. Actually, protologic isa sort of unidentified transcendental logic whichis poorly established and whose contours arestill very ambiguous. I can see no way to

dispense with a philosophical elucidation of itsstatements.

Admittedly, all this being done, the ques-tion remains as to the concrete returns of atheory so costly in terms of conceptual elabora-

tion and so remote from the fields of its

acknowledged objects. My thesis is that themain and most potent acquisition of Luhmann's

theory is the concept of 'social communication'.To make clear what I suggest, I would compare,in strictly epistemological terms, Freud's 'inven-tion' of the Unconscious with Luhmann'sconstruction of 'social communication'.42 Thebasic epistemological feature they share is thatboth concepts embody a sort of coming tothemselves of their respective disciplines.Actually, both social communication and theunconscious are primary object concepts, cir-

cumscribing the proper theme of a specificscience. As the phenomenological thoroughtheorizing of these matters has shown, such

projections of specific objectivities are nothing

less than inductive. They represent fundamental'Entw?rfe' (castings) of primary objects, impul-sing a decisive differentiation of the scientific

discipline at stake and establishing it on a newbasis. They open unsuspected horizons for

theory-building, allowing a much farther-

reaching inspection of their objective domains,as well as a much more rigorous formulation oftheir accounts. They are prior to any set ofobservations or cognitions, and have somethingof a founding performance.

Our suggestion is to consider the Luhman-

nian concept of 'social communication' as aninaugurative performance endowing sociologywith its proper object: the social. In the samemanner, Freud's Unconscious represented anew foundation of psychology on the basis of a

recasting of the psychic. The analogy holds in a

very pertinent manner. The problem of psychol-ogy at the beginning of the 20th century was,from a psychoanalytical point of view, thedominance of I-centred, introspective and cog-nitive thematizations of the psychic. The psychicas an objectivity was featured in a massively

ontologicalmanner,

supposinga firm, self-

identical and individual mental entity. The

concept of the Unconscious anonymized the

psychic entity, transforming it in a bundle of

processes governed by a complex affectual

economy. We can observe in Luhmann's theorya similar aversion from individualistic ontologyand a striking analogy with the anonymizingeffects of the position of an anthropologically de-centred - or de-anthropoiogized - third person,non-mechanical processual object. The limits ofthese similarities between both castings of de-individualized, centre- and nameless primaryobjects, is that the Freudian Unconscious hasbeen often thought of as an objective entity



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existing somewhere - a sort of Atlantis dis-

covered by a good-hearted man who, after a

long search, came across it. From a Luhman-nian point of view, Freud's casting of the psychicwas not thoroughly de-ontologizing. For this

purpose, the Unconscious should have been

thought as a difference and not as an identity.43However, on the whole, we can maintain the

analogy and insist on the autonomizing and

fertilizing effects of the switch, in both psychol-ogy and sociology, to anonymous and auton-omous primary objects who allow theobservation of a level of reality in its own

right. Psychic life is no more an aggregate ofconscious or cognitive mental states than social

interchange is an aggregate of individualactions. The contribution of Niklas Luhmann

to a refoundation of sociology on the basis of aproper primary objectivity not only delivers the

concept of such a specific object, but also a

highly reflexive, epistemological and protologi-cal theory thematizing all central processes of

any de-ontologization project. My purpose herewas to show how the idea of a circular,

internally actual operation constitutes the coreof such a theory.

First version received July 1999Final version accepted September 1999

Notes

1 Luhmann's irst articles bear testimony o this conscious-ness, where the '?berholtsein der ?berlieferten metaphysischenBestimmung der Wahrheit von ontologischen Pr?missen her'(Luhmann 1962:1. 63) is stated as the basis for a profoundtransformation n the dogmatic structure of social beliefs.2 A political project, a juridical dogmatics, he perception for the acting in a market, a scientific heory, a game, a conflict... all are conceived as self-descriptions f social communica-tion, constituting modes of representing the world withincommunication as well as modes of experiencing or

actingrelated to it.3 The text (Derrida), onsciousness (Husserl), anguage or

logic (Saussure, Spencer Brown) are other figures of the sameprotological paradigm.4 A formulation Luhmann uses in biographical nterviews:. . . weil man als Soziologe alles machen kann, ohne auf einen

bestimmten Themenbereich estgelegt zu sein' (1987:141).5 Parsons' ystemism was in many respects oo narrow, ooessentialist or that purpose, acking the main characteristics fthe required heory, namely high reflexivity. For a reconstruc-tion and critique of Parsons' essentialism, ee Clam 1999:142-150).

6 The relevant literature is immense. The theoreticalsophistication has been ever-increasing. Organization heoryand its literature remained a constant source of inspiration orthe later Luhmann - until recently, where the evolutionaryproblematic n the chapter 'Evolution' of Die Gesellschaft er

Gesellschaft Luhmann 1997) was developed partially on thebasis of such literature.

7 The major reference in Luhmann's work is definitelyZweckbegriff nd Systemrationalitdt 1973). Yet Legitimation urchVerfahren 1969), where the rationality of subordinate, micro-final devices like procedures s theorized, s also interesting.

8 See Clam (1997), the first part of which is dedicated oLuhmann's early work. A stimulating discussion of Luhmann'sadministration and organization theory is Dammann et al.(1994).

9 That is. reacting to its own variation.10 As checked disorder.11 It should be noted that the double contingency scheme is

the paradigm of what I would call the 'indefinite generativity ofparadox'. It is the genus, so to speak, of all other reflexiveparadoxes ike, for instance, that of the circular making of lawthrough legal procedures. See on this latter circularity theenlightening work of G. Teubner 1989).12 I make a terminological distinction between sponta-neous and self-organizing order. I understand spontaneousprocesses as reproducible, whereas self-organizing order isemergent, coming but once to pass and self-encaging.13 We could call it the principle of 'das Feste wird . . . aufdas Flie?ende gegr?ndet' (found the solid upon the flowing',Luhmann 1962:190).

14 Using the terms of the phenomenological pistemologyof Husserl and Heidegger.15 One should always insist on the fact that Luhmann'sinvention does not proceed like an abstract, apriorical deduc-tion. It is nurtured through the evidence coming fromconstructivistically econceived ciences (like attribution heoryin psycho-sociology) and is developed along the lines of atheoretical sociology - and not those of an aprioric philosophy.16 Like those of the sequencing (Sequenzierung) f notionsand arguments in circular or reticular topics, or those of thesense and scope of abstraction n general theory (cf. Luhmann1979:170-177).

17 Succeeding Plato's distinction of different levels ofphilosophizing, the top of which is the Platonic dialectic.Aristotle's pr?te' hilosophia s a research on how being revealsitself as being; a research upon the most fundamental, i.e.categorial. ground of our world comprehension.18 The Grundlage ergesamten Wissenschaftslehre f 1794 isthe most detailed exposition of the system. However, theGrundriss des Eigenth?mlichen er Wissenschaftslehre f 1795contains, at its beginning, a very brief and clear presentation ofthe figure I am discussing. We quote from he first edition of theWerke 1834-35. 1845-46).19 The I is understood by Fichte as a 'pure activity' (reineTha'tigkeit) Grundlage ?1. 6). where the actor (das Handelnde)and its product {dieThat) sind eins und dasselbe' 'are one andthe same thing': ?1. 6). The same passage implicitly dentifiesdas Handelnde the actor) and die Handlung the action). This is avery clear token of the underlying Nur-Vollzug tructure hat Idiscuss later.

20 No need to say that our presentation of Fichteandeduction s a most cursory one. The exegesis of the extremelydense principles Grunds?tze) f the deduction fills an extendedliterature. I concentrate, in our interpretation, on the centraland consensually acknowledged igure of thought (logismos). Afew hints at the literature may suffice: P. Rohs (1991), brings aninteresting image to illustrate the activity-based onception ofthe I: like a photon which is nothing when stripped of itsmovement, the I is nothing besides its actual activity (p. 53.Thathandlung eing the identity of Tat activity) and Handlung(product of the activity); Hans-J?rgen M?ller (1980:120ff.)stresses the problems of the sequenciation of circular activityunder the title of 'symbolic narrative' the Thathandlung eing



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explained n the deduction symbolisch rz?hlend') as well as thefact that the Thathandlung f the I is the paradigm of everyposition (setzen); Dieter Henrich (1982) brings into discussionthe later (1801) Fichtean formula an activity whom an eye hasbeen implanted' (p. 75ff.) which would fit very well into ourinterpretation however, he proposes a divergent assessment ofit; Reinhard Lauth (1984:19ff.) analyses very accurately thedoubling of self-reflection/determination nd hetero-determina-tion in one unique act (Vollzug r Selbstvollzug).21 The transcendental philosophy of consciousness is nolonger modelled on the perfect and divine intellectus riginarius,of whom the human intellect represents a derivative form(intellectus erivativus). hus far, the statement that worldlinessbegins with a finite subjectivity does not prejudge he givennessor not givenness of a pre-worldly onsciousness.22 First edition: London (1969); second edition: New York(1972) containing some significant complements.23 A recent discussion of Spencer Brown's ogic with a clearlink to Luhmann's revival of its central stakes is to be found inthe two volumes edited by Dirk Baecker 1993a, b).24 The 'allgemeine Gegenstandstheorie' n the manner ofthe pure Logistik of the beginning does not reach such deeporiginary evels as Spencer Brown's protologic. t doesn't reallypropose a theory of purely actual, paradoxical and circularobjects.25 The context of the statement is the following: AberMenschen k?nnen nicht kommunizieren, nicht einmal ihreGehirne k?nnen kommunizieren, nicht einmal das Bewusstseinkann kommunizieren. Nur die Kommunikation kann kommu-nizieren' (in the chapter entitled 'Wie ist Bewusstsein anKommunikation beteiligt?' Luhmann 199 5b: 37).

26 The main text is De anima (especially Book 11:412a-b,414a). Our interpretation draws on Inciarte (1970), Frede &Patzig (1988) and Liske 1985).27 Plato, Republic 36a, 544e, 580d-e, 588c-e; Timaeus69c-?.

28 Autopoiesis means, in our context, self-producingcircular actuality and activity.29 Cf. Hamelin (1953). I suppose that Aristotle, with histheory of the totalizing unity of the most specific form act,resolved the problem of the coupling between the principle ofintellectual knowledge and that of animation of the body. For adetailed study of the long groping search for that solution, seeNuyens (1948).30 I would like to add, in the wide sense of all consciousexperience (Erlebnisse). However, Luhmann's texts on con-sciousness occult the affective domain of conscious experience.31 With the exception that pure intellects are not onlyconceivable, but really exist with no anchoring in animal orvegetative ife.32 To avoid confusion I translate he second moment of thecommunication (Kommunikation) peration, namely Mitteilung,as 'impartation' - rendered otherwise most naturally intoEnglish 'communication'. 'Impartation' has the advantage ofreplicating with relative idelity he etymological composition ofthe German word - an advantage the word 'utterance' (theadopted rendering n English ranslations of Luhmann) does nothave.

33 Furth (1978, quoted in Liske 1985:256).34 These effects have drawn the attention of the self-

organization theorists. On this point, cf. Schweitzer (1997).Most mpressive xamples of redundancy n initial phases of self-organizing processes are paths (or tracks: Wege).35 The basic text is Zur Sache des Denkens 1969). As forFichte and Aristotle, a thorough penetration of the philosophical

notion requires a much greater textual basis, extending to theentire corpus.36 One can easily figure how embarrassing he translation

of such nominal-verbal doublets is. World worlds, nothingnothings, event events, is ises . . . reflect quite accurately thechallenging violence done to language in the German of theoriginal text.37 Empirically, ll systems are described as being always ina state of operative ongoing'.

38 I mean the figure of art which Luhmann calls 'world art'in distinction rom all

8- systems sole constituent, the operation clarifying a central concept of luhmannian

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