DET NORSKE VERITASTM

REPORT NO./DNV REG NO.: 2013-4091 / 17TLT29-5

REV 1, 11.06.2013

APPENDIX B

HAZID

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Report for Skangass AS

Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK

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Table of Contents Page

1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF WORK ...................................................................................... 2

2 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................. 4

3 PARTICIPANTS ................................................................................................................................. 6

4 SUMMARY OF HAZARDS IDENTIFIED ....................................................................................... 6

5 HAZID LOG ....................................................................................................................................... 7

6 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 11

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Conclusion of the review on the 17.05.2013:

After review of the HAZID inputs and conclusion delivered on the 18.05.2012, DNV assessed that no

update is required as the concept design used as basis for the HAZID has not changed in the detail

engineering phase.

1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF WORK

A one day HAZID workshop was carried out in June 2011 for the design at that stage of LNG

bunkering station in Risavika, ref. /1/. As the design has changed considerably since then, an update of

the HAZID was carried out on February 16 2012.

The objective was to identify and assess potential hazards for the LNG bunkering station, with focus

on safety. Risks reducing measures were identified and assessed where possible.

Like the HAZID in 2011, this update focuses only on hazards associated with bunkering of LNG to

ferries on jetty 38. This includes equipment and operations both inside and outside the LNG Base Load

Plant, ref. Figure B - 1 and Figure B - 2, respectively.

For remaining hazards associated with the LNG Base Load Plant, reference is made to the QRA from

2009, ref. /2/.

The HAZID does not take into account the risks due to ship or truck LNG loading to the ferry.

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Figure B - 1 Equipment associated with the bunkering system located inside the plant

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Figure B - 2 Route of the underground pipe and bunkering station on jetty 38

2 METHODOLOGY

HAZID (Hazard Identification) is a systematic review of installations and/or operations in order to

screen potential hazards. The HAZID review on February 16 2012 was run in a workshop with

participants from Skangass, Fjordline and DNV. Each hazard was assigned a likelihood and

consequence category, so that each hazard could be ranked in accordance with a predefined risk

matrix, see Table B - 1. This risk matrix is the same as the one used in HAZID in June 2011.

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Appendix B HAZID

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Table B - 1 Risk matrix

Severi

ty

Consequence Categories Likelihood

Peo

ple

En

viro

n-

men

t

Del

ay /

Do

wn

tim

e

Rep

uta

tio

n

1 2 3 4 5 6

Failure is not

expected

< 10-5

Never heard of in

Industry

10-4 - 10-5

An incident

has occurred

in Industry

10-3 - 10-4

Has been experienced

by most Operators 10-2 - 10-3

Occurs several times

per year per

Operator 10-1 - 10-

2

Occurs several times

per year per

facility >10-1

1 No or superficial injuries

Slight effect on environment, < 1 BBL

< 2 hours

Slight impact; local public awareness but no public concern

L L L M M M

2

Slight injury, a few lost work days

Minor effect Non-compliance. < 5 BBL

< 1 day

Limited impact; local public concern may include media

L L M M M H

3

Major injury, long term absence

Localized effect Spill response required. < 50 BBL

1 - 10 days

Considerable impact; regional public/slight national media attention

L M M M H H

4

Single fatality or permanent disability

Major Effect Significant spill response, 100 BBL

> 60 days

Extensive negative attention in international media

M M H H H H

Risk Definition:

High Actions must be taken to reduce risk to at least the medium level

Medium

Risk reduction measures must be taken if their respective costs are not disproportionately high as compared to their

attained benefits (ALARP principal); actions need to be taken to manage and measure risk.

Low Monitoring actions required to identify whether the risk rises to medium level

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3 PARTICIPANTS

Table B - 2 Participants at the HAZID workshop March 16 2012

Name Company Position / role in HAZID

Camilla Gautestad Skangass Process Manager, Gas & LNG projects

Gunnar Helmen Skangass Key Account Manager, LNG Industry & Marine

sbjrn Folvik Skangass Process engineer, LNG Industry & Regulations

Morten Larsen Fjordline Technical & Nautical Director

Erik Skramstad DNV HAZID facilitator

Jon Magne Ofte DNV QRA Project Manager

Jean-Baptiste Berthomieu DNV Scribe

4 SUMMARY OF HAZARDS IDENTIFIED

The new design of Skangass bunkering system is considered an improvement in terms of safety, as it mitigates or eliminates some of the hazards identified in the HAZID from June 2011: The likelihood of

a leak is reduced by introducing underground, double wall pipeline and by eliminating buffer tanks and

flare.

Since the HAZID in 2011, the number of hazards with criticality High is reduced to one:

1-4 Leaks from the loading arm during bunkering operations, caused by fabrication or material defects; weld defects, leaking seals and swivels. Possible consequences are fires if ignition

sources on and around bunkering ferry (under ro-ro operation) are present; risks to ship

passengers.

The main changes include the lower criticality of the following hazards, due to reduction of likelihood

and/or consequence:

Criticality changed from Medium to Low:

o 1-1 Release of N2 and HC from vents on the ship (ship-side)

o 1-2 Inability of purging N2 from the loading arms

o 1-12 Damage to loading arms with possible release of LNG (New: No crane operations during bunkering operations.)

o 3-1 Loss of LNG supply capacity

o 3-2 Damage to piping system inside the LNG plant

Criticality changed from High to Medium:

o 1-10 Loss of control during filling of ship (New: ESD has been provided; the system will fail in a safe position.)

Other changes since the HAZID in 2011 do not move hazards from one criticality level to the next.

All changes are marked with text in red in the HAZID log in the next chapter.

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5 HAZID LOG

(Text in red has been revised since HAZID June 2011)

ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / CONTROL MEASURES

Cat

ego

ry

Co

nse

qu

ence

Lik

elih

oo

d

Cri

tica

lity COMMENTS

1-0 Loading area loading arm from LNG Base Load Pant to ship 1-1 Release of N2 and HC

from vents on the ship (ship-side)

N2 purging of loading arms into the ship's main header vent system

Fire hazard if ignition sources on and around bunkering ferry (under ro-ro operation) are present

Design of cold vent; minimise purging through better control of the process; design of fire fighting system (foam etc.)

1 3 L This could be a problem when simultaneous passenger and cargo "offloading" are being carried out

1-2 Inability of purging N2 from the loading arms

Pollution of fuel in the ship's fuel tank

Control of the purging process

1 2 L

1-3 Release of N2 and HC from the loading arms (shore-side)

Unintended releases during connection and preparation for the LNG transfer

Minor fire with HC release Demonstration to authorities on this (safe?) design

1 3 L Neighbouring pressure relief valves can be connected to this onshore header vent system. With the current procedure, the release is small, then the consequences will be small as well.

1-4 Leaks from the loading arm during bunkering operations

Fabrication or material defects; weld defects; leaking seals and swivels

Gas dispersion Manual detection possible but not reliable (due to surrounding noise pollution during work)

Gas detectors and immediate / automatic shut-down

2 3 M Consider visual indication of closed connections; hydraulic backup system of the loading arms should be considered

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MANAGING RISK

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5

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Date : 11.06.2013 Page 8 of 11

ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / CONTROL MEASURES

Cat

ego

ry

Co

nse

qu

ence

Lik

elih

oo

d

Cri

tica

lity COMMENTS

1-5 Fires if ignition sources on and around bunkering ferry (under ro-ro operation) are present; risks to ship passengers

Visual detection (continuously operated during ship loading)

Immediate / automatic shut-down; elimination of ignition sources in classified areas; fire-fighting

4 4 H Address radiation level and fire effects on personnel and passengers on the open-bridge and open decks during the bunkering; Consider access control to the open-deck and fire protection on the bridge.

1-6 Embrittlement Spill protection (for the steel on the deck)

3 3 M

1-7 Frost burns PPE mandatory 3 3 M

1-8 Unplanned disconnection of the loading arms, with possible damage to equipment and release of LNG

Excessive ship motions due to failure in engine control system on the ship; failure in mooring; passing ships; weather

Refer to consequences in ID 1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07

Manual detection Berthing control of the ship; weak link/quick release coupling will minimise damages to the loading arm

3 3 M Emergency procedures to be addressed in the overall operation procedures as well as during training etc.

1-9 Overfilling of fuel tank (ship)

Control failure (instrument; operational etc.)

Release of LNG through tank relief valves, and NG through pressure relief valves. Refer to consequences in ID 1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07

Level alarm controls

Operational procedures and tank protection system (level indicators)

4 3 M This is linked to the ship design, it will be designed according to the IMO guidelines (ESD link will be provided)

1-10 Loss of control during filling of ship

Loss of power Abortion of the filling process in an unsafe state

Loss of power / black-out should be easily detected

This has to be addressed in the ESD philosophy (including the back-up of power supply)

2 3 M ESD has been provided; the system will fail in a safe position.

1-11 Damage to loading arms with possible release of LNG

Impacts from trucks and crane arms

Fire hazards (trucks acting as potential ignition sources). Injuries to facility operators and ferry

Manual detection Concrete or other protective barriers and traffic rules (speed limits etc.); no traffic during bunkering operation

4 1 M

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ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / CONTROL MEASURES

Cat

ego

ry

Co

nse

qu

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Lik

elih

oo

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Cri

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1-12 Dropped objects on loading arms from cranes loading the ship

passengers. Refer also to consequences in ID 1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07

Manual detection No crane operations during bunkering operations

3 1 L Crane activities should be carried out at a safe distance from loading manifold (or vice versa)

1-13 Ship collision / impact from other passing vessels

Human error and / or technical failures, leading to loss of navigational control

Structural damage to the ship. Possible damage to the loading arms cannot be disregarded.

Manual detection Port traffic controls 3 2 M Harbour traffic control (especially due to the increased sea traffic opposite to LNG bunkering facility) - Refer to DNV Risk Analysis on Risavika Harbour

1-14 Damage to loading arms when disconnected

Truck traffic; dropped containers; collision impact from other vessels

Material damage to the (normal stainless steel) arm and possible release of LNG (before LNG has evaporated)

Visual observation / inspection

Shut-down valves at both the ship-side and onshore tank-side of the filling line; consider possibility to empty loading arm after disconnection

2 3 M Low probability (and minimal spillage of LNG); Loading arm will contain LNG shortly after loading; safety zone around the loading arm; access is restricted to limited (trained) personnel; protection equipment by personnel present at that area

1-15 Unplanned abortion of fuelling operation

External fire (on ship, building and truck)

Damage to equipment (including escalation); delay

Visual observation Fire detection and fire-fighting; ESD and emergency plans

3 3 M To be addressed as part of the ESD procedures

1-16 Sabotage and terrorist attacks

Covered as part of meeting the international regulation requirements (ISPS)

1-17 Failure of the vacuum-insulated transfer line

Material fabrication defects Shut down and need for repairs

Loss of vacuum (detected in the control room)

Design of culvert, pipe support and draining system of the culvert, ventilation system if culvert is closed

3 3 M

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ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / CONTROL MEASURES

Cat

ego

ry

Co

nse

qu

ence

Lik

elih

oo

d

Cri

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lity COMMENTS

1-18 LNG releases in the culvert

Double barriers failure; digging activities; flooding; Fatigue; improper installation; excessive loads of traffic activities; vibrations; settlement.

Fire and explosion Gas detectors (if flanges are present inside the culvert); otherwise vacuum detectors / monitoring should be adequate

Minimise valves / flange connections inside the culvert

4 1 M Valves / flange connections should preferably be outside the culvert

2.0 LNG Buffer Tank(s) (top and bottom filling inlets) & its filling lines No longer part of the design

3-0 Main LNG plant - 42-TR-101 tank & truck loading bay

3-1 Loss of LNG supply capacity

Loss of fuelling capacity, i.e. breakdown of facility's reliability

Visual Revise the operational manual so as to consider the reliability of the truck and Buffer tank(s) filling

1 3 L

3-2 Damage to piping system inside the LNG plant

Release of LNG in Truck Loading Bay; fire and explosion (due to ignition sources from the trucks)

Process control and gas detectors at the Truck Loading Bay

Ensure that piping system is designed for situation with back-flow in the system

1 3 L Vapour return line to be considered?

3-3 Failure of liquid lines from pump 42-PS-101B

Increased frequency of use The increased use of this pump should be reflected in the QRA

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6 REFERENCES

/1/ Risikovurdering av LNG bunkring av RoPax ferje i Risavika havn, DNV reg. no. 12PABXZ-

21, 26.08.2011

/2/ QRA for Skangass LNG plant, DNV report no. 2009-0068, rev 1, 08.05.2009

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