[8] wells - russia and the franco-prussian war

8/3/2019 [8] Wells - Russia and the Franco-Prussian War

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n p r e d i c t a

Russia and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71Mike Wells argues that Russian decisions in July 1870 were of major significancfor the history of Europe.

There are some turning points inhistory which never quite get their dueconsideration. A good example is thedecision by Hitler to declare war onthe USA in 1941. Obviously this ismentioned in alt the standard books,but the explanations seem ratherpatchy for an event v^hich changedthe whole war and then had hugeeffects on the postwar period.Another of these neglected turningpoints may be the Russian diplomacy

importance of Russian diplomacy in1870, simply telling us that 'Russiawas preoccupied w ith the neutrality o fAustria and Denmark'.Bismarck's D iplomacy and WarsProfessor Tim Blanning has rightlypointed out the importance of Russiannon-intervention in key periods ofGerman history. Had Russiaintervened during the wars thatBismarck fou gh t against Denmark and

A reception given to the victorious Prussian army on 2V^ September 1866 in Berlin,after victory in war against Austria. Would Bismarck's forces have triumphed againstFrance in 1870-71 if the Russians had not deterred Austria from intervening?at the time of the Franco-PrussianWar. For example, in Pftanze'smagisterial survey of Bismarck andunification (see Further Reading),Russian diplomatic actions in July1870 get a few lines out of 600 pages.W.E. Mosse, while dealing in a

Austria in 1864 and 1866, then theresults m ight have been very d ifferent.As it was, Prussia defeated Austria andestablished the North GermanConfederation in 1867 withoutforeign interference. Neither ofPrussia's powerful neighbours, France

Europe, however, had been radicaaltered, and Napoleon III was anxioto gain compensation and maintaFrance's role as a great power, ableinfluence European affairs. YBismarck gave him little, and tgrowing economic and military powof Prussia presented France withpotential rival. Soon the issue of tHohenzoltern candidature, in whichPrussian Prince was considered aspossible King of Spain, threatenFrance with encirclement and wviewed as provocation by Napoleonand the French pub lic.

The independent South Germstates seemed increasingly hostile Prussia, despite the military allianwhich they had entered into wPrussia after the war with Austria1866. A war to resolve the hostibetween France and Prussia and force South Germany into joining tNorth German Confederation seemhighly likely by 1869.Prussia and th e W ar of 1870What would be the likely dangers Prussia in case of such a war? Modehistorians tend to stress the risPrussia's needle gun was not the wwinning w eapon that it was made oto be; the French chassepot was aeffective. Prussian artillery hdeveioped a lot since 1866, but Franhad effective field artillery and tmitrailleuse, a sort of early machigun. In addition, France's railwawere better than the Austrian railwaof 1866 and were plentiful on tborder area. An invasion by Prustherefore would meet resistance fran army fighting on interior lines communication and, moreover, lik


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The North German Confederation was a recent creation and mightwell collapse should Prussian armies meet with decisive defeat.

Prussian military planning onlyenvisaged a short war; but Europeexpected a long one, and saw Franceas the major military power. Aprolonged struggle might bring inAustria, in search for revenge for thedefeat of 1866. A Prussian defeatmight even bring Denmark to act,taking back the lands lost in 1864.There was undoubtedly hostility toPrussia within Germany, for examplein Hanover. The North GermanConfederation was a recent creationand might well collapse shouldPrussian armies meet with decisivedefeat.

With its vulnerable geographicaland military position, a war was onlypossible for Prussia because of thepossibility that the major powerswou ld n ot intervene on France's side.Thus Russia's role was cruciai,especially if the conflict with Francewas not over quickly. In the event of alonger struggle, Russia wou ld become

a key player. Bismarck, then, had toconsider very carefully the possiblereactions of the major Europeanpowers to a war between the NorthGerman C onfede ration and France.Bismarck's StrategyBismarck relied on long-standingtensions between Britain and Franceto ensure that Britain would notintervene. As for Italy, she owed heracquisition of Venetia to Prussia'svictory over Austria in 1866, and wasready to take advantage of Frenchdistraction to occupy Rome. Russiahad been cultivated by Prussia eversince 1863 w hen Bismarck had agreedto cooperate against Polish rebels. Itshostility to Austria in the Balkansmade cooperation unlikely againstPrussia. However, Russian ruling circleswere divided in their attitude toPrussia and France. There was nocertainty about Russian reactions towar.

Not all the Austrian leaders hadaccepted the defeat of 1866. The viewthat Bismarck's lenient Peace ofPrague had somehow ended thedanger of an Austrian intervention isquestionable. A possible Franco-Austrian alliance was talked of in 1869and 1870. The Emperor Franz Josef ofAustria stated in 1869: 'We considerFrance's cause our own and shallcontribute to the success of Frencharms'. The Austrian minister-presidentBeusst pressed hard to join withFrance. The Archduke Albrecht hadvisited Paris to discuss joint militarypianning and in 1870 General Le Brunvisited Vienna. Had the war gone inFrance's favour, then it is by no meansunlikely that Austria would haveintervened.

Austrian participation was madeconsiderably less likely by Russiandiplomatic decisions. Bismarck, like allGerman leaders after him, wasconcerned with the possibilities of waron two fronts. Russian support forPrussia in July 1871 made this lesslikely. There were, of course, otherfactors working against a Franco-Austrian alliance. First, Austrianmilitary capability had been severelyhit by the defeats of 1859 and 1866.Secondly, the influence of Hungary inthe Dual M onarchy, as represented byAndrassy, join t minister-president, wasagainst further action in Germany.Thirdly, nationalism among German-speakers in the Austrian Empire hadrisen to considerable heights andmilitary intervention on behalf ofFrance would have been met withpolitical op position.

However, all this may have beenmore apparent after the event than itwas in July 1870. In 1868 there hadbeen discussions between the Russiangovernment and Bismarck via thePrussian ambassador to Russia, Reust,about mutual action to prevent whatwas seen as a likely alliance betweenAustria and France. The Russian

liked a formal agreement for Germanmilitary action in support of Russia inthe event of a war against Austria.Realistically, this seemed to Bismarckmore likely and he resisted a formalcom mitm ent. Instead there was simplyan understanding about recognisingmutual interests. Bismarck was wellaware of the possibility of using thisunderstanding in July 1870 .The Meeting at Ems, June 1870Bismarck had gone out of his way tocultivate the Tsar when he had cometo Ems to take the waters in June1870. Wilhelm 1 had met the Tsar aEms, too. Though not naturally pro-German, the Tsar had to ld his mistress.Princess Catherine Dologuruky, thathe had come to see Napoleon HI as 'anadventurer'.

Bismarck was encouraged by thismeeting and by his conversations atEms w ith the Russian foreign minister,Gorchakov, which went on at thesame time, in those important fourdays in June 1870. When Prussia andFrance mobilised on 15 July 1871,following the furore at the famousEms telegram, it was natural forBismarck to make approaches to theRussians and ask if the understandingof 1868 was still current.The Crucial Decision, July 1870It is at this po int tha t there came aboutwhat might be considered one of themost significant developments of 19'**-century diplomacy. The Russiansassured Bismarck on 14 July that theagreement held and that, in the eventof an Austrian mobilisation, 300,000Russian troops would be sent toGalicia, preventing an Austrianinvasion of Germany and allowingBismarck to fight a one-front w ar. As abonus, Russian pressure was appiiedto Denmark, whose king had marrieda Russian princess, to remain neutral.Contemporaries saw this as being ofthe utmost importance. In a French


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The French certainly expected Austrian help andtelegrammed to enquire when it was coming duringthe early stages of the war.

Bismarck orchestrating the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Despite Russian support in 1870, he failed to repay his debt, preferriinstead to secure compromises favourable to Austria-Hungary and Britain.The menacing attitude ofRussia forced Austria tomaintain her neutrality. Thiscarried with it Italy. Russiandiplomacy we ighed in the samemanner on Denmark, linked tothe Romanovs by marriagebetween a Danish Princess andthe Tzarevitch. Russiaprevented the formation of apossible League of N eutrals anddiscouraged the collectiveintervention of Europe. TheAmerican ambassador thoughtthat the officers of the Russianarmy were unanimous in theirdesire fo r a war against Prussia;but the general public thoughtotherwise and there weresubscriptions everywhere forthe benefit of wounded French.

This forgotten contemporaryhistory, written just a few years after

about the Russian military threat anddiscussed it in an important meetingof the A ustrian Crown Council held on18 July. The Russian reply to Bismarckhad been reported by Austrian agentsin Berlin. It may not have been adeciding factor, but it certainlystrengthened Andrassy's argumentsfor neutrality, especially as themeeting heard reports from the warministers about Austrian's militaryunpreparedness; Austrian forces couldnot have dealt with a large-scaleRussian invasion.

C.A. McCartney, in hisstudy of theHabsburg Empire, described thismeeting in Vienna as a major turningpoint. Indeed it was. By declaringneutrality, Austria-Hungary had madea Prussian victory more likely. She hadindicated that she wo uld not be amajor player in German affairs, andsignalled that her future interests

come about in 1879. Though Beusthe Austrian minister-president, tothe French in confidence that in tevent of a French victory, the neutramight well end and Austria wouprobably join with France, the vefact of Austrian neutrality made thFrench victory less likely.As Russian diplomacy hcontributed to these major changesmust be seen as highly significant. fact, Alexander H's position changquite quickly. The Prussian victory Sedan and the capture of Napoleonled the Russian government to seekavoid a complete French defeat order to maintain a balance of powThe way was thus set for a futuFranco-Russian alliance. But as surapid Prussian conquests were nforeseen, it is the diplomacy of 14 Jthat must be seen as most influen tiaIt seemed that Bismarck's wooi


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In the event of an Austrian mobilisation, 300,000 Russian troopswould be sent to Galicia, preventing an Austrian invasion ofGermany and a llow ing Bismarck to fight a one-front war.

his forces in the west, using hisrailways to take advantage of hugeFrench strategic and tactical errors.There was more than just Russianinaction at the key juncture - thethreat of intervention, even if notmade directly to Austria, was theclearest possible indication of Russiansupport at a key time in thedevelopment of a new Germany.The Consequences of RussianPolicyThe effects of Russia's policy werehuge, and not necessanly foreseen byAlexander II and Gorchakov, hisforeign minister. These two focusedon the immediate advantage thatRussia could extract from Prussiansupport and European preoccupationwith more changes in central Europe.They sought to end the restrictionsimposed on Russian warships enteringthe Black Sea and issued a unilateralrejection of those clauses from the1856 Treaty of Paris. Bismarck had letit be known that he would not object.France was preoccupied; Austria wasindifferent. That left only Britain. TheGladstone government, intent onEuropean concert diplomacy and ondomestic changes, would not be likelyto restage the Crimean WarThus, from a mixture of friendshipand support to Prussia and by raisingthe possibility of armed intervention inAustna, Russia had gainedconsiderabie advantage from theevents in the Franco-Prussian War byOctober 1870 and had rejected thehated restrictions which she had hadto accept in 1856, after defeat in theCrimea.The Long-term EffectsYet the promise of 14 July must have

the Biack Sea Clauses of the Treaty ofParis, he made it clear that he wouldhave preferred an internationaiconference. This is a pre-echo of thesituation in 1878. If the Russiansexpected huge gratitude for theirreally quite remarkable offer ofmilitary assistance at a crucial time.

they were to be sadly disappointed atthe Congress of Berlin.In 1878, after a war w ith Turkey onbehalf of the Christians in the Balkanswho had been slaughtered inmassacres in Bulgaria, Russia hoped tocreate an enlarged client state inBulgaria and dominate the region.


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If the Russians expected huge g ratitude for the irreally quite remarkable offer of m ilitaryassistance at a crucial time, they were to be sadlydisappointed at the Congress of Berlin.However, before a general Europeanconference in Berlin, she had toreduce her aims and accept a muchsmaller Bulgaria. German support wasnot forthcoming. Bismarck preferredto mediate and support a compromiseacceptable to Britain and Aus tria.

Though standard histories correctlylink this disappointment with thesubsequent ili-feeling between Russiaand Germany, to the closer linksbetween Germany and Austria andthe build-up to the war, they fail togive due emphasis to Russia'sguarantee of 1870. This unusualcommitment by Russia must havemade the failure of Bismarck to offersupport at the Congress of Berlin allthe more galling to the Russians.

Without this Russian support, theGerman Reich might not have comeinto being, and yet Bismarck, the so-called 'Honest Broker' of 1878,seemed to forget that his state owed ahuge amount to Russian diplomacy ata crucial time in 1870. It would behard to overstate the importance ofthe subsequent rift between Germanyand Russia. It was amajor contributoryfactor to the First World War; itamounted to a huge part of WorldWar II; and itw as still of significance inthe Cold war era. Similarly, the closerlinks between Austria and Germanythat developed after 1879 were ofhuge significance. Thesedevelopments were deeply affected bydecisions taken between 14 and 18July 1870.Had Austria offered greatersupport to France, her subsequent

lack of German support might nothave led her into alliance wit h France.A Neglected Turning PointThe 'Blank Cheque' offer of militarysupport from Germany to Austria in1914 was a key step to wo rld conflictand has received due attention byhistorians. A rather similar, if less wide-ranging, commitment by Russia toGermany in 1870 is more of afootnote to history, but itsconsequences are considerableenough to make it a candidate for afuller study and more consideration bystudents of German Unification andRusso-German relations after 1870.For students o f Bismarck, the issue is afascinating one. On one hand, it was atribute to his concern for Russianrelations that, despite divisions ofopinion among the Russian people,government and court, anundertaking of this sort could beobtained. His analysis of the need toavoid a war on two fronts has beenseen as the vital element in hisdiplomacy; the neglect of the principleafter 1890 has been seen as the key tothe tragedies of the 20** century whe nGermany was 'encircled' by Russia andFrance and felt the need to resolve thedangers this posed by war.

However, the undertaking of 14July 1870 set up obligations as well.There really is 'no such thing as a freelunch' in diplomacy: Bismarck'ssuccess engendered huge problems ofhow to repay the debt to Russia whileavoiding alienating Austria andBritain. From the decision of July came

office. This festering resentmewould probably have led to a FrancRussian alliance even had Bismanot been dismissed by the new KaisWilhelm II, in 1890.Further ReadingErich Eyck, Bismarci< and the GeEmpire (Norton, 1954)George Kennan, The Decline Bismarck's European Order (Princ1979)Edgar Feuchtwanger, Bismar(Routledge, 2002)Lothar Gall, Bismarck, Whfiei/o/uf/onary (HarperCollins, 1986Immanuel Geiss, German ForeiPolicy 1871-1914 {Routledge. 197C.A. McCartney, The HabsbuFmpire, ?790-/9;S(Longm an, 196W.E. Mosse, The Rise and Faii of Crimean System 1855-7] (Macmil1963)O. Pflanze, Bismarck and tDevelopment of Germany (Prince1963)L M . Schneerson, The Franco-PrusWar and Russia {\^oscow, 1976)A.J.R Taylor, Bismarck, Man aStatesman (1958, reprinted Sutton, 2003)Mike Wells, Bismarck {Collins HisMakers, 2003)D.G. Williamson, Bismarck aGermany 1862-1890 {Longman, 1edition)Mike Wells is an experienced level examiner and author of study of Bismarck in tHarperCollins History Make


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[8] wells - russia and the franco-prussian war

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