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G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIRE, MARIA LUISA !ALA"IOS,A#$%&%'(ra(r%), petitioner-appellee,vs.MAR"ELLE *. +*A. *E RAMIRE, ET AL., oo'%(or', JORGE a&# ROERTO RAMIRE,legatees, oppositors- appellants.

AA* SANTOS, J.:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose EugenioRamirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow arcelle !emoron de Ramirez"his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez" and his companion #anda de #robles$i.

The tas$ is not trouble-free because the widow arcelle is a %rench who lives in &aris, while thecompanion #anda is an 'ustrian who lives in (pain. oreover, the testator provided forsubstitutions.

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a %ilipino national, died in (pain on !ecember )), )*+, with only hiswidow as compulsory heir. is will was admitted to probate by the ourt of %irst /nstance ofanila, 0ranch 1, on July 23, )*+4. aria 5uisa &alacios was appointed administratri6 of theestate. /n due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:

/78E7T'R/9

na se6ta parte ;)<+= proindiviso de un te

rreno, con sus me>oras y edificaciones, situadoen

la Escolta, anila............................................................. &4??,???.??

na se6ta parte ;)<+= proindiviso de dos

parcelas de terreno situadas en 'ntipolo, Rizal................... [email protected]

uatrocientos noventa y uno ;*)= acciones

de la Bentral 'zucarera de la arlota a &)3.??

por accion ................................................................................@,A3.??

!iez mil ochocientos seize ;)?,@?+= acciones

de la Bentral 5uzon illing o.B, disuelta y en

liCuidacion a &?.)4 por accion ..............................................),+2?.*?

uenta de 'horros en el &hilippine Trust

o.............................................................................................. 2,A4?.3A

T9T'5..............................................................&4)2,*3+.*3

E79(:

!euda al 0anco de las /slas %ilipinas, garan-

tizada con prenda de las acciones de 5a arlota ......... & 4,???,??

8'59R 5/D/!9...........................................&4?3,*3+.*3

The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

'.En nuda propiedad, a !. Roberto y !. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menorde edad, residentes en anila, /.%., calle B'lright, 7o. )@)@, alate, hi>os su sobrino !. Jose a. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de susrespectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgarreciprocal entre ambos.

El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de lafinca (anta ruz 0uilding, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatariosnombrados, en atencion a Cue dicha propiedad fue creacion del Cueridopadre del otorgante y por ser aCuellos continuadores del apellido Ramire

0.F en usufructo a saber:

a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, !a.arcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en /E &E9, calle del General Gallieni 7oAA, (eine %rancia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de !a.#anda de #robles$i, de &alma de allorca, (on Rapina 'venida de losReyes )A,

b.F en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombr!a. #anda de 7robles$i con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:

En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de !. Juan&ablo Jan$ows$i, de (on Rapina &alma de allorca" y encuanto a la mitrestante, a favor de su sobrino, !. orace 8. Ramirez, (an 5uis 0uilding,%lorida (t. Ermita, anila, /.%.

' pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadaslas usufiructuarias nombradas con>untamente con los nudo propietarios,podran en cualCuier memento vender a tercero los bienes ob>eto delegadsin intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.

9n June 2A, )*++, the administratri6 submitted a pro>ect of partition as follows: the property othe deceased is to be divided into two parts. 9ne part shall go to the widow Ben pleno dominiosatisfaction of her legitime" the other part or Hfree portionH shall go to Jorge and Roberto RamHen nuda propriedad.H %urthermore, one third ;)<A= of the free portion is charged with the widousufruct and the remaining two-thirds ;2<A= with a usufruct in favor of #anda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the pro>ect of partition on the grounds: ;a= that the provisions forvulgar substitution in favor of #anda de #robles$i with respect to the widowBs usufruct and infavor of Juan &ablo Jan$ows$i and oracio 8. Ramirez, with respect to #andaBs usufruct are

invalid because the first heirs arcelle and #anda= survived the testator" ;b= that the provisiofor fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to thesecond heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in 'rticle @+A of the ivil ode"that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the &hilippines in favor of #anda #robles$i,who is an alien, violates (ection 4, 'rticle /// of the &hilippine onstitution" and that ;d= theproposed partition of the testatorBs interest in the (anta ruz ;Escolta= 0uilding between thewidow arcelle and the appellants, violates the testatorBs e6press win to give this property tothem 7onetheless, the lower court approved the pro>ect of partition in its order dated ay A,)*+3. /t is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this ourt.

). The widowBs legitime.

The appellantBs do not Cuestion the legality of giving arcelle one-half of the estate in fullownership. They admit that the testatorBs dispositions impaired his widowBs legitime. /ndeed,under 'rt. *?? of the ivil ode H/f the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall bentitled to one-half of the hereditary estate.H 'nd since arcelle alone survived the deceasedshe is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,condition or substitution of any $ind whatsoever. ;'rt. *?, par. 2, ivil ode.=

/t is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants Cuestion and >ustifiably sappears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of arcelle because the testamen

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provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for arcellewho is entitled to one-half of the estate Hen pleno dominioH as her legitime and which is morethan what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. Togive arcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testatorBs intention for as statedabove his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor #anda.

2. The substitutions.

/t may be useful to recall that H(ubstitution is the appoint- >udgment of another heir so that hemay enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.H ;'rt. @43, ivil ode.

'nd that there are several $inds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief orcompendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary ;'rt. @4@, ivil ode.= 'ccording to Tolentino,H'lthough the ode enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes ofsubstitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary . The others are merely variations of thesetwo.H ;))) ivil ode, p. )@4 I)*3A.=

The simple or vulgar is that provided in 'rt. @4* of the ivil ode which reads:

'RT. @4*. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute theheir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, orshould not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.

' simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers,shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless thetestator has otherwise provided.

The fideicommissary substitution is described in the ivil ode as follows:

'RT. @+A. ' fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary orfirst heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmitto a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shallta$e effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree fromthe heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or firstheir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.

/t will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies ofRoberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de susrespectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.

The appellants do not Cuestion the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellantsCuestion the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de !a. #anda de #robles$iH inconnection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow arcelle owever, thisCuestion has become moot because as #e have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to anyusufruct.

The appellants also Cuestion the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with #andaBsusufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan &ablo Jan$ows$i and orace v. Ramirez.

They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because #anda survived thetestator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. 0ut dying before thetestator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity toaccept the inheritance as provided in 'rt. @4* of the ivil ode, supra. ence, the vulgarsubstitution is valid.

's regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claimthat it is void for the following reasons:

;a= The substitutes ;Juan &ablo Jan$ows$i and orace 8. Ramirez= are not related to #anda,the heir originally instituted. 'rt. @+A of the ivil ode validates a fideicommissary substitutionHprovided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.H

#hat is meant by Hone degreeH from the first heir is e6plained by Tolentino as follows:

(caevola aura, and Traviesas construe HdegreeH as designation,substitution, or transmission. The (upreme ourt of (pain has decidedlyadopted this construction. %rom this point of view, there can be only onetranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the heir. anresa, orell and (anchez Roman, however, construe the wordHdegreeH as generation, and the present ode has obviously followed thisinterpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond onedegree Hfrom the heir originally instituted.H The ode thus clearly indicatethat the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the fiheir.

%rom this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child orparent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generatior degree from the fiduciary ;Op. cit., pp. )*A-)*.=

;b= There is no absolute duty imposed on #anda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes asreCuired by 'rts. @+4 and @+3 of the ivil ode. /n fact, the appellee admits Hthat the testatorcontradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the propertie

sub>ect of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the na$edowners.H ;0rief, p. 2+.=

A. The usufruct of #anda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of #anda is vbecause it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acCuisition of lands by aliens.

The )*A4 onstitution which is controlling provides as follows:

(E. 4. (ave in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lashall be transferred or assigned e6cept to individuals, corporations, orassociations Cualified to acCuire or hold lands of the public domain in the&hilippines. ;'rt. 1///.=

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to #anda on the ground that theonstitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession#e are of the opinion that the onstitutional provision which enables aliens to acCuire privatelands does not e6tend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for nauand meaningless. 'ny alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a&hilippine landowner in e6change for a devise of a piece of land.

This opinion notwithstanding, #e uphold the usufruct in favor of #anda because a usufruct,

albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title tland in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the onstitution.

/7 8/E# 9% TE %9REG9/7G, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordereddistributed as follows:

9ne-half ;)<2= thereof to his widow as her legitime"

9ne-half ;)<2= thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in na$edownership and the usufruct to #anda de #robles$i with a simple substitution in favor of Juan&ablo Jan$ows$i and orace 8. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. 7o special pronouncemenas to costs.

(9 9R!ERE!.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino J., took no part.

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G.R. No'. L-278/ a&# L-2789 Mar0 29, 197

!3ILI!!INE "OMMER"IAL AN* IN*USTRIAL AN4, A#$%&%'(ra(or o (e Te'(a(e E'(a(eo "ar6e' Ne(o& 3o#e' S. !ro0. No. 172 o (e "our( o F%r'( I&'(a&0e o I6o%6o:,petitioner,vs.T3E 3ONORALE +ENI"IO ES"OLIN, !re'%#%& Ju#e o (e "our( o F%r'( I&'(a&0e oI6o%6o, ra&0 II, a&# A+ELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

G.R. No'. L-279; < L-279;7 Mar0 29, 197

TESTATE ESTATE OF T3E LATE LINNIE JANE 3O*GES S. !ro0. No. 1;/7:. TESTATEESTATE OF T3E LATE "3ARLES NE=TON 3O*GES S. !ro0. No. 172:. !3ILI!!INE"OMMER"IAL AN* IN*USTRIAL AN4, administrator-appellant,vs.LORENO "ARLES, JOSE !ALI"O, ALFRE*O "ATE*RAL, SAL+A*OR GUMAN,EL"ESAR "AUSING, FLORENIA ARRI*O, !URIFI"A"ION "ORONA*O, GRA"IANOLU"ERO, ARITEO T3OMAS JAMIR, MEL>UIA*ES ATISANAN, !E!ITO I?ULORES,

ES!ERI*ION !ARTISALA, =INIFRE*O ES!A*A, ROSARIO ALINGASA, A*ELFA!REMA?LON, SANTIAGO !A"AONSIS, a&# A+ELINA A. MAGNO, (e 6a'( a'A#$%&%'(ra(r%) %& S. !ro0. No. 1;/7, ae66ee', =ESTERN INSTITUTE OF TE"3NOLOG?,IN"., movant-appellee.

an Juan, Africa, !on"ales and an A#ustin for $hilippine Commercial and %ndustrial Bank.

&an#lapus 'a Office, Antonio 'a Office and i"al . *uimpo for pri+ate respondents andappellees A+elina A. &a#no, etc., et al.

ARRE*O, J.: p

Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary in>unction" certiorari to Hdeclare all acts of therespondent court in the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3 of the ourt of %irst /nstance of /loilo= subseCuent to the order of !ecember ), )*43 as null and void for havingbeen issued without >urisdictionH" prohibition to en>oin the respondent court from allowing,tolerating, sanctioning, or abe tting private respondent 'velina '. agno to perform or do anyacts of administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and from e6ercising anyauthority or power as Regular 'dministratri6 of above-named Testate Estate, by entertainingmanifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to en>oin saidcourt from allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or ta$e part in any manner in the

administration of the Testate Estate of harles 7ewton odges ;(p. &roc. 7o. )+32 of the samecourt and branch=" with prayer for preliminary in>unction, which was issued by this ourt on

'ugust @, )*+3 upon a bond of &4,???" the petition being particularly directed against the ordersof the respondent court of 9ctober )2, )*++ denying petitionerBs motion of 'pril 22, )*++ and itsorder of July )@, )*+3 denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.

Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three ;AA=appeals from different orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioningthe acts of administration of the respondent agno on behalf of the testate Estate of rs.odges.

-E AC

9n ay 2A, )*43, 5innie Jane odges died in /loilo ity leaving a will e6ecuted on 7ovember22, )*42 pertinently providing as follows:

%/R(T: / direct that all my >ust debts and funeral e6penses be first paid outof my estate.

(E97!: / give, devise and beCueath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my

beloved husband, harles 7ewton odges, to have and to hold unto himmy said husband, during his natural lifetime.

T/R!: / desire, direct and provide that my husband, harles 7ewtonodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and en>oy said estaduring his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to ma$e any changesthe physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which hmay thin$ best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as hmay thin$ best" to e6ecute conveyances with or without general or speciawarranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any propewhich he may deem proper to dispose of" to lease any of the real propertfor oil, gas and<or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall passthe absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property he may elect to sell. 'll rents, emoluments and income from said estateshall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of theprincipal of said estate as he may need or desire. /t is provided herein,however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improve

property now owned by us located at, in or near the ity of 5ubboc$, Te6abut he shall have the full right to lease, manage and en>oy the same durinhis lifetime, above provided. e shall have the right to subdivide any farmland and sell lots therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.

%9RT: 't the death of my said husband, harles 7ewton odges, / gdevise and beCueath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be eCually divideamong my brothers and sisters, share and share ali$e, namely:

Esta igdon, Emma owell, 5eonard igdon, Roy igdon, (addie RascoEra Roman and 7imroy igdon.

%/%T: /n case of the death of any o f my brothers and<or sisters named iitem %ourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, harles 7ewtonodges, then it is my will and beCuest that the heirs of such deceasedbrother or sister shall ta$e >ointly the share which would have gone to sucbrother or sister had she or he survived.

(/1T: / nominate and appoint my said husband, harles 7ewton odgeto be e6ecutor of this, my last will and testament, and direct that no bond other security be reCuired of him as such e6ecutor.

(E8E7T: /t is my will and beCuest that no action be had in the probatecourt, in the administration of my estate, other than that necessary to proand record this will and to return an inventory and appraisement of myestate and list of claims. ;&p. 2-, &etition.=

This will was subseCuently probated in aforementioned (pecial &roceedings 7o. )A?3 ofrespondent court on June 2@, )*43, with the widower harles 7ewton odges being appointeas E6ecutor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.

&reviously, on ay 23, )*43, the said widower ;hereafter to be referred to as odges= had beappointed (pecial 'dministrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follo

/!E0 E12$AE &O%O0 O A''O3 O A/-O%4E $E%%O0EO CO0%0/E -E B/%0E %0 3-%C- -E 3A E0!A!ED A0D $EO& AC 3-%C- -E -AD BEE0 DO%0! 3-%'E DECEAED3A '%5%0!

ome petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to on. ourt, most respectfully states:

). That 5innie Jane odges died leaving her last will and testament, acopy of which is attached to the petition for probate of the same.

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2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner harles 7ewtonodges is directed to have the right to manage, control use and en>oy theestate of deceased 5innie Jane odges, in the same way, a provision wasplaced in paragraph two, the following: H/ give, devise and beCueath all ofthe rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to my beloved husband,harles 7ewton odges, to have and ;to= hold unto him, my said husband,during his natural lifetime.H

A. That during the lifetime of 5innie Jane odges, herein petitioner wasengaged in the business of buying and selling personal and real properties,and do such acts which petitioner may thin$ best.

. That deceased 5innie Jane odges died leaving no descendants orascendants, e6cept brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as e6ecutorsurviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.

4. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze thebusiness of petitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase and

sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also in all thesetransactions.

#ERE%9RE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner . 7. odges;harles 7ewton odges= be allowed or authorized to continue the businessin which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doingwhile deceased 5innie Jane odges was living.

ity of /loilo, ay 23, )*43. ;'nne6 H!H, &etition.=

which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:

/t appearing in the urgent e62parte motion filed by petitioner . 7. odges,that the business in which said petitioner and the deceased were engagedwill be paralyzed, unless and until the E6ecutor is named and appointed bythe ourt, the said petitioner is allowed or authorized to continue thebusiness in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had beendoing while the deceased was living.

(9 9R!ERE!.

ity of /loilo ay 23, )*43. ;'nne6 HEH, &etition.=

nder date of !ecember )), )*43, odges filed as such E6ecutor another motion thus:

9T/97 T9 '&&R98E '55 ('5E(, 978EF'7E(, 5E'(E(,9RTG'GE( T'T TE E1ET9R '! '!E %RTER '7!(0(EDE7T TR'7('T/97( #/ TE E1ET9R 'F !9 /7

'9R!'7E #/T TE 5'(T #/( 9% TE !EE'(E! 5/77/EJ'7E 9!GE(.

omes the E6ecutor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersignedattorney, to the on. ourt, most respectfully states:

). That according to the last will and testament of the deceased 5innieJane odges, the e6ecutor as the surviving spouse and legatee named inthe will of the deceased" has the right to dispose of all the properties left bythe deceased, portion of which is Cuoted as follows:

(econd: / give, devise and beCueath all of the rest, residue and remainderof my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to mybeloved husband, harles 7ewton odges, to have and to hold unto him,my said husband, during his natural lifetime.

Third: / desire, direct and provide that my husband, harles 7ewtonodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and en>oy said estaduring his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to ma$e any changesthe physical properties of said estate, 7y sale or any part thereof which hmay thin$ best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as hmay thin$ best" to e6ecute con+eyances with or without general or speciawarranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any propewhich he may deem proper to dispose of" to lease any of the real propertfor oil, gas and<or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall passthe absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property he may elect to sell. 'll rents, emoluments and income from said estateshall 7elon# to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of theprincipal of said estate as he may need or desire. ...

2. That herein E6ecutor, is not only part owner of the properties left ascon>ugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the decease5innie Jane odges. That during the lifetime of herein E6ecutor, as 5ega

has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the&hilippines. That inasmuch as .7. odges was and is engaged in the band sell of real and personal properties, even before the death of 5innieJane odges, a motion to authorize said .7. odges was filed in ourt,allow him to continue in the business of buy and sell, which motion wasfavorably granted by the onorable ourt.

A. That since the death of 5innie Jane odges, r. .7. odges hadbeen buying and selling real and personal properties, in accordance withthe wishes of the late 5innie Jane odges.

. That the Register of !eeds for /loilo, had reCuired of late the hereinE6ecutor to have all the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made him, approved by the on. ourt.

4. That it is respectfully reCuested, all the sales, conveyances leases amortgages e6ecuted by the E6ecutor, be approved by the on. ourt. ansubseCuent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances wthe wishes of the late 5innie Jane odges, and within the scope of theterms of the last will and testament, also be approved"

+. That the E6ecutor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts,and the properties conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the

amounts received.

#ERE%9RE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales,conveyances, leases, and mortgages e6ecuted by the E6ecutor, beapproved by the on. ourt, and also the subseCuent sales, conveyanceleases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes of the deceasedcontained in her last will and testament, be with authorization and approvof the on. ourt.

ity of /loilo, !ecember )), )*+3.

;'nne6 HGH, &etition.=

which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on !ecember ), )*43 as follows

O D E

's prayed for by 'ttorney Gellada, counsel for the E6ecutor for the reasostated in his motion dated !ecember )), )*43, which the ourt considerswell ta$en all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of allproperties left by the deceased 5innie Jane odges e6ecuted by theE6ecutor harles 7. odges are hereby '&&R98E!. The said E6ecutor

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further authorized to e6ecute subseCuent sales, conveyances, leases andmortgages of the properties left by the said deceased 5innie Jane odgesin consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of thelatter.

(o ordered.

/loilo ity. !ecember ), )*43.

;'nne6 HH, &etition.=

9n 'pril ), )*4*, in submitting his first statement of account as E6ecutor for approval, odgesalleged:

&ursuant to the provisions of the Rules of ourt, herein e6ecutor of thedeceased, renders the following account of his administration covering theperiod from January ), )*4@ to !ecember A), )*4@, which account may befound in detail in the individual income ta6 return filed for the estate ofdeceased 5innie Jane odges, to wit:

That a certified public accountant has e6amined the statement of net worthof the estate of 5innie Jane odges, the assets and liabilities, as well as theincome and e6penses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integralpart of this statement of account as 'nne6 H'H.

/7 8/E# 9% TE %9REG9/7G, it is most respectfully prayed that, thestatement of net worth of the estate of 5innie Jane odges, the assets andliabilities, income and e6penses as shown in the individual income ta6 returnfor the estate of the deceased and mar$ed as 'nne6 H'H, be approved bythe onorable ourt, as substantial compliance with the reCuirements of theRules of ourt.

That no person interested in the &hilippines of the time and place ofe6amining the herein accounts be given notice, as herein e6ecutor is theonly devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will andtestament already probated by the onorable court.

ity of /loilo 'pril ), )*4*.

;'nne6 H/H, &etition.=

The respondent court approved this statement of account on 'pril 2), )*4* in its order worded

thus:

pon petition of 'tty. Gellada, in representation of the E6ecutor, thestatement of net worth of the estate of 5innie Jane odges, assets andliabilities, income and e6penses as shown in the individual income ta6 returnfor the estate of the deceased and mar$ed as 'nne6 H'H is approved.

(9 9R!ERE!.

ity of /loilo 'pril 2), )*4*.

;'nne6 HJH, &etition.=

is accounts for the periods January ), )*4* to !ecember A), )*4* and January ), )*+? to!ecember A), )*+? were submitted li$ewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatismutandis to those of 'pril ), )*4*, Cuoted above" and the respective orders approving thesame, dated July A?, )*+? and ay 2, )*+), were substantially identical to the above-Cuotedorder of 'pril 2), )*4*. /n connection with the statements of account >ust mentioned, thefollowing assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee agno in her brief do notappear from all indications discernible in the record to be disputable:

nder date of 'pril ), )*4*, .7. odges filed his first H'ccount by theE6ecutorH of the estate of 5innie Jane odges. /n the H(tatement of7etworth of r. .7. odges and the Estate of 5innie Jane odgesH as o!ecember A), )*4@ anne6ed thereto, .7. odges reported that thecombined con>ugal estate earned a net income of &A2@,?2.+2, dividedevenly between him and the estate of 5innie Jane odges. &ursuant to the filed an Hindividual income ta6 returnH for calendar year )*4@ on theestate of 5innie Jane odges reporting, under oath, the said estate ashaving earned income of &)+,2?).A), e6actly one-half of the net incomehis combined personal assets and that of the estate of 5innie Jane odg;p. *), 'ppelleeBs 0rief.=

666 666 666

nder date of July 2), )*+?, .7. odges filed his second H'nnual(tatement of 'ccount by the E6ecutorH of the estate of 5innie Jane odge/n the H(tatement of 7etworth of r. .7. odges and the Estate of 5inniJane odgesH as of !ecember A), )*4* anne6ed thereto, .7. odges

reported that the combined con>ugal estate earned a net income of&23?,+2A.A2, divided evenly between him and the estate of 5innie Janeodges. &ursuant to this, he filed an Hindividual income ta6 returnH forcalendar year )*4* on the estate of 5innie Jane odges reporting, underoath, the said estate as having earned income of &)A4,A)).++, e6actly onhalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of theestate of 5innie Jane odges. ;pp. *)-*2. 'ppelleeBs 0rief.=

666 666 666

nder date of 'pril 2?, )*+), .7. odges filed his third H'nnual (tatemeof 'ccount by the E6ecutor for the Fear )*+?H of the estate of 5innie Janeodges. /n the H(tatement of 7et #orth of r. .7. odges and the Estaof 5innie Jane odgesH as of !ecember A), )*+? anne6ed thereto, .7.odges reported that the combined con>ugal estate earned a net income&A),@43.*, divided evenly between him and the estate of 5innie Janeodges. &ursuant to this, he filed an Hindividual income ta6 returnH forcalendar year )*+? on the estate of 5innie Jane odges reporting, underoath, the said estate as having earned income of &)43,2@.*3, e6actly ohalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of theestate of 5innie Jane odges. ;&p. *2-*A, 'ppelleeBs 0rief.=

5i$ewise the following:

/n the petition for probate that he ;odges= filed, he listed the sevenbrothers and sisters of 5innie Jane as her HheirsH ;see p. 2, Green R9'=.The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted of the heirs, Roy igdon ;see p. ), Green R9'=. /mmediately, .7. odfiled a verified motion to have Roy igdonBs name included as an heir,stating that he wanted to straighten the records Hin order the heirs ofdeceased Roy igdon may not thin$ or believe they were omitted, and ththey were really and are interested in the estate of deceased 5innie Janeodges. .

's an e6ecutor, he was bound to file ta6 returns for the estate he wasadministering under 'merican law. e did file such as estate ta6 return on

'ugust @, )*4@. /n (chedule HH of such return, he answered HFesH to thCuestion as to whether he was contemplating Hrenouncing the willH. 9n thCuestion as to what property interests passed to him as the survivingspouse, he answered:

H7one, e6cept for purposes of administering the Estapaying debts, ta6es and other legal charges. /t is the

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intention of the surviving husband of deceased todistribute the remaining property and interests of thedeceased in their ommunity estate to the deviseesand legatees named in the will when the debts,liabilities, ta6es and e6penses of administration arefinally determined and paid.H

'gain, on 'ugust *, )*+2, barely four months before his death, he e6ecutedan HaffidavitH wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in (cheduleHH of his estate ta6 returns as to his having renounced what was given himby his wifeBs will. 1

's appointed e6ecutor, .7. odges filed an H/nventoryH dated ay )2,)*4@. e listed all the assets of his con>ugal partnership with 5innie Janeodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated e6pressly that herestate which has come into his possession as e6ecutor was Hone-half of allthe itemsH listed in said balance sheet. ;&p. @*-*?, 'ppelleeBs 0rief.=

&arenthetically, it may be stated, at this >uncture, that #e are ta$ing pains to Cuote wholly or atleast, e6tensively from some of the pleadings and orders whenever #e feel that it is necessaryto do so for a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important and decisive issues raisedby the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.

The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned(pecial &roceedings 7o. )A?3 until !ecember 2+, )*+2, when on account of the death ofodges the day before, the same lawyer, 'tty. 5eon &. Gellada, who had been previously actingas counsel for odges in his capacity as E6ecutor of his wifeBs estate, and as such had filed theaforeCuoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:

RGE7T E12$AE 9T/97 %9R TE '&&9/7TE7T 9% '(&E/'5 '!/7/(TR'TR/1

9E( the undersigned attorney for the E6ecutor in the above-entitledproceedings, to the onorable ourt, most respectfully states:

). That in accordance with the 5ast #ill and Testament of 5innie Janeodges ;deceased=, her husband, harles 7ewton odges was to act asE6ecutor, and in fact, in an order issued by this on. ourt dated June 2@,)*43, the said harles 7ewton odges was appointed E6ecutor and hadperformed the duties as such.

2. That last !ecember 22, )*+2, the said harles 7ewton odges wasstric$en ill, and brought to the /loilo ission ospital for treatment, butunfortunately, he died on !ecember 24, )*+2, as shown by a copy of thedeath certificate hereto attached and mar$ed as 'nne6 H'H.

A. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of5innie Jane odges, whatever real and personal properties that may remainat the death of her husband harles 7ewton odges, the said propertiesshall be eCually divided among their heirs. That there are real and personalproperties left by harles 7ewton odges, which need to be administeredand ta$en care of.

. That the estate of deceased 5innie Jane odges, as well as that ofharles 7ewton odges, have not as yet been determined or ascertained,and there is necessity for the appointment of a general administrator toliCuidate and distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and legatees ofboth spouses. That in accordance with the provisions of (ection 2 of Rule34 of the Rules of ourt, the con>ugal partnership of 5innie Jane odgesand harles 7ewton odges shall be liCuidated in the testate proceedingsof the wife.

4. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal $nowledge of thee6istence of the last will and testament of harles 7ewton odges, withsimilar provisions as that contained in the last will and testament of 5innieJane odges. owever, said last will and testament of harles 7ewtonodges is $ept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will bepresented in due time before this honorable ourt.

+. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an 'dministratri6 be appointed for the estate of 5innie Jane odges and a(pecial 'dministratri6 for the estate of harles 7ewton odges, to perforthe duties reCuired by law, to administer, collect, and ta$e charge of thegoods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses, harles 7ewtodges and 5innie Jane odges, as provided for in (ection ) and 2, Rul@) of the Rules of ourt.

3. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administrationbecause the last will and testament of deceased, harles 7ewton odgeis still $ept in his safe or vault, and in the meantime, unless an administra

;and,= at the same time, a (pecial 'dministratri6 is appointed, the estate both spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.

@. That the most trusted employee of both spouses 5innie Jane odges a.7. odges, who had been employed for around thirty ;A?= years, in theperson of iss 'velina agno, ;should= be appointed 'dministratri6 of thestate of 5innie Jane odges and at the same time (pecial 'dministratri6the estate of harles 7ewton odges. That the said iss 'velina agnoof legal age, a resident of the &hilippines, the most fit, competent,trustworthy and well-Cualified person to serve the duties of 'dministratri6and (pecial 'dministratri6 and is willing to act as such.

*. That iss 'velina agno is also willing to file bond in such sum which on. ourt believes reasonable.

#ERE%9RE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayedthat, iss '8E5/7' '. 'G79 be immediately appointed 'dministratri6 the estate of 5innie Jane odges and as (pecial 'dministratri6 of the estof harles 7ewton odges, with powers and duties provided for by law.That the onorable ourt fi6 the reasonable bond of &),???.?? to be fileby 'velina '. agno.

;'nne6 H9H, &etition.=

which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .

%or the reasons alleged in the rgent E62parte otion filed by counsel fothe E6ecutor dated !ecember 24, )*+2, which the ourt finds meritoriouiss '8E5/7' '. 'G79, is hereby appointed 'dministratri6 of the estaof 5innie Jane odges and as (pecial 'dministratri6 of the estate of har7ewton odges, in the latter case, because the last will of said harles7ewton odges is still $ept in his vault or iron safe and that the real andpersonal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to wastunless a (pecial 'dministratri6 is appointed.

iss 'velina '. agno is reCuired to file bond in the sum of %/8ET9('7! &E(9( ;&4,???.??=, and after having done so, let letters of

'dministration be issued to her.H ;'nne6 H&H, &etition.=

9n !ecember 2*, )*+2, however, upon urgent e62parte petition ofrespondent agno herself, thru 'tty. Gellada, arold, R. !avies, Harepresentative of the heirs of deceased harles 7ewton odges ;who haarrived from the nited (tates of 'merica to help in the administration of estate of said deceasedH was appointed as o-(pecial 'dministrator of th

8/12/2019 863 to 914


estate of odges, ;pp. 2*-AA, Fellow - Record on 'ppeal= only to bereplaced as such co-special administrator on January 22, )*+A by Joeodges, who, according to the motion of the same attorney, is Hthe nephewof the deceased ;who had= arrived from the nited (tates with instructionsfrom the other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estateof harles 7ewton odges in the &hilippines, ;&p. 3-4?, id.=

eanwhile, under date of January *, )*+A, the same 'tty. Gellada filed in (pecial &roceedings)+32 a petition for the probate of the will of odges, 2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters ofadministration to the same Joe odges, albeit the motion was followed on %ebruary 22, )*+A bya separate one as$ing that 'tty. %ernando irasol be appointed as his co-administrator. 9n thesame date this latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding order of probate andletters of administration to Joe odges and 'tty. irasol, as prayed for.

't this >uncture, again, it may also be e6plained that >ust as, in her will, rs. odges beCueathedher whole estate to her husband Hto have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during hisnatural lifetimeH, she, at the same time or in li$e manner, provided that Hat the death of my saidhusband / give devise and beCueath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both

real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be eCually divided among my brothers andsisters, share and share ali$e H. 'ccordingly, it became incumbent upon odges, as e6ecutorof his wifeBs will, to duly liCuidate the con>ugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, inorder that upon the eventuality of his death, Hthe rest, residue and remainderH thereof could bedetermined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. 'nd itwas precisely because no such liCuidation was done, furthermore, there is the issue of whetherthe distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the &hilippines or those of Te6as,of which (tate she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, odges made officialand sworn statements or manifestations indicating that as far as he was concerned no Hpropertyinterests passed to him as surviving spouse He6cept for purposes of administering the estate,paying debts, ta6es and other legal chargesH and it was the intention of the surviving husband ofthe deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in theirommunity Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities,ta6es and e6penses of administration are finally determined and paidH, that the incidents andcontroversies now before s for resolution arose. 's may be observed, the situation that ensuedupon the death of odges became rather unusual and so, Cuite understandably, the lowercourtBs actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in consistency and seeminglylac$ proper orientation.

Thus, #e cannot discern clearly from the record before s the precise perspective from whichthe trial court proceeded in issuing its Cuestioned orders. 'nd, regretably, none of the lengthy

briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.To begin with, #e gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in theappealed cases, one with green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sortof modus operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under which the respectiveadministrators of the two estates were supposed to act con>ointly, but since no copy of the saidagreement can be found in the record before s, #e have no way of $nowing when e6actly suchagreement was entered into and under what specific terms. 'nd while reference is made to saidmodus operandi in the order of (eptember )), )*+, on pages 2?4-2?+ of the Green Record on

'ppeal, reading thus:

The present incident is to hear the side of administratri6, iss 'velina '.agno, in answer to the charges contained in the motion filed by 'tty. esar Tirol on (eptember A, )*+. /n answer to the said charges, iss 'velina '.agno, through her counsel, 'tty. Rizal Duimpo, filed a writtenmanifestation.

'fter reading the manifestation here of 'tty. Duimpo, for and in behalf of theadministratri6, iss 'velina '. agno, the ourt finds that everything thathappened before (eptember A, )*+, which was resolved on (eptember @,)*+, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a misunderstanding

between the representative of the &hilippine ommercial and /ndustrial0an$ and iss agno and in order to restore the harmonious relationsbetween the parties, the ourt ordered the parties to remain in status quas to their modus operandi before (eptember ), )*+, until after the oucan have a meeting with all the parties and their counsels on 9ctober A, formerly agreed upon between counsels, 'ttys. 9zaeta, Gibbs and 9zae

'ttys. Tirol and Tirol and 'tty. Rizal Duimpo.

/n the meantime, the prayers o f 'tty. Duimpo as stated in his manifestatioshall not be resolved by this ourt until 9ctober A, )*+.

(9 9R!ERE!.

there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, e6cept that againreference thereto was made in the appealed order of 9ctober 23, )*+4, on pages 2*2-2*4 of Green Record on 'ppeal, as follows:

9n record is an urgent motion to allow &/0 to open all doors and loc$s

the odges 9ffice at 2?+-2?@ Guanco (treet, /loilo ity, to ta$e immediatand e6clusive possession thereof and to place its own loc$s and $eys forsecurity purposes of the &/0 dated 9ctober 23, )*+4 thru 'tty. esar T/t is alleged in said urgent motion that 'dministratri6 agno of the testateestate of 5innie Jane odges refused to open the odges 9ffice at 2?+-2Guanco (treet, /loilo ity where &/0 holds office and therefore &/0 issuffering great moral damage and pre>udice as a result of said act. /t isprayed that an order be issued authorizing it ;&/0= to open all doors andloc$s in the said office, to ta$e immediate and e6clusive possession thereand place thereon its own loc$s and $eys for security purposes" instructinthe cler$ of court or any available deputy to witness and supervise theopening of all doors and loc$s and ta$ing possession of the &/0.

' written opposition has been filed by 'dministratri6 agno of even date;9ct. 23= thru counsel Rizal Duimpo stating therein that she was compellto close the office for the reason that the &/0 failed to comply with theorder of this ourt signed by Judge 'nacleto /. 0ellosillo dated (eptembe)), )*+ to the effect that both estates should remain in status quo to themodus operandi as of (eptember ), )*+.

To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt thoperation of the office of both estates, the ourt aside from the reasonsstated in the urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments of

'tty. esar Tirol for the &/0 and 'tty. Rizal Duimpo for 'dministrati6agno.

'fter due consideration, the ourt hereby orders agno to open all doorsand loc$s in the odges 9ffice at 2?+-2?@ Guanco (treet, /loilo ity in thepresence of the &/0 or its duly authorized representative and deputy cleof court 'lbis of this branch not later than 3:A? tomorrow morning 9ctobe2@, )*+4 in order that the office of said estates could operate for busines

&ursuant to the order of this ourt thru Judge 0ellosillo dated (eptembe)), )*+, it is hereby ordered:

;a= That all cash collections should be deposited in the >oint account of thestates of 5innie Jane odges and estates of .7. odges"

;b= That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the accounof either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then deposited in

>oint account of the estate of 5innie Jane odges and the estate of .7.odges"

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;c= That the &/0 should countersign the chec$ in the amount of &24? infavor of 'dministratri6 'velina '. agno as her compensation asadministratri6 of the 5innie Jane odges estate chargeable to the testateestate of 5innie Jane odges only"

;d= That 'dministratri6 agno is hereby directed to allow the &/0 toinspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in herpossession in the same manner that 'dministrator &/0 is also directed toallow 'dministratri6 agno to inspect whatever records, documents andpapers it may have in its possession"

;e= That the accountant of the estate of 5innie Jane odges shall haveaccess to all records of the transactions of both estates for the protection ofthe estate of 5innie Jane odges" and in li$e manner the accountant or anyauthorized representative of the estate of .7. odges shall have access tothe records of transactions of the 5innie Jane odges estate for theprotection of the estate of .7. odges.

9nce the estatesB office shall have been opened by 'dministratri6 agno inthe presence of the &/0 or its duly authorized representative and deputycler$ 'lbis or his duly authorized representative, both estates or any of theestates should not close it without previous consent and authority from thiscourt.

(9 9R!ERE!.

's may be noted, in this order, the respondent court reCuired that all collections from theproperties in the name of odges should be deposited in a >oint account of the two estates,which indicates that seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no longer operative, but againthere is nothing to show when this situation started.

5i$ewise, in paragraph A of the petitionerBs motion of (eptember ), )*+, on pages )@@-2?) ofthe Green Record on 'ppeal, ;also found on pp. @A-*) of the Fellow Record on 'ppeal= it isalleged that:

A. 9n January 2, )*+ virtually all of the heirs of .7. odges, Joe odgesand %ernando &. irasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of.7. odges, 'velina '. agno acting as the administratri6 of the estate of5innie Jane odges and essrs. #illiam 0rown and 'rdell Foung acting forall of the igdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estateof 5innie Jane odges and various legal counsel representing the

aforementioned parties entered into an amicable agreement, which wasapproved by this onorable ourt, wherein the parties thereto agreed thatcertain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claimsagainst the two estates and that the assets ;to the e6tent they e6isted= ofboth estates would be administered >ointly by the &/0 as administrator ofthe estate of .7. odges and 'velina '. agno as administratri6 of theestate of 5innie Jane odges, sub>ect, however, to the aforesaid 9ctober 4,)*+A otion, namely, the &/0Bs claim to e6clusive possession andownership of one hundred percent ;)??K= ;or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent ;34K= of all assets owned by .7. odges or 5innie Janeodges situated in the &hilippines. 9n %ebruary ), )*+ ;pp. *A-*A4, %/Rec., (.&. 7o. )+32= this onorable ourt amended its order of January 2,)*+ but in no way changed its recognition of the afore-described basicdemand by the &/0 as administrator of the estate of .7. odges to onehundred percent ;)??K= of the assets claimed by both estates.

but no copy of the mentioned agreement of >oint administration of the two estates e6ists in therecord, and so, #e are not informed as to what e6actly are the terms of the same which couldbe relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.

9n the other hand, the appealed order of 7ovember A, )*+4, on pages A)A-A2? of the GreenRecord on 'ppeal, authorized payment by respondent agno of, inter alia, her own fees asadministratri6, the attorneyBs fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows:

'dministratri6 agno thru 'ttys. Raul (. anglapus and Rizal. R. Duimpfiled a anifestation and rgent otion dated June )?, )*+ as$ing for tapproval of the 'greement dated June +, )*+ which 'greement is for thepurpose of retaining their services to protect and defend the interest of thsaid 'dministratri6 in these proceedings and the same has been signed band bears the e6press conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late 5innieJane odges, r. James 5. (ullivan. /t is further prayed that the

'dministratri6 of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges be directed topay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable ase6penses for the administration of the estate of 5innie Jane odges ;pp.)+)-)+2, 8ol. 8, (p. )A?3=.

'n opposition has been filed by the 'dministrator &/0 thru 'tty. ermin9zaeta dated July )), )*+, on the ground that payment of the retainers

of 'ttys. anglapus and Duimpo as prayed for in said anifestation andrgent otion is pre>udicial to the )??K claim of the estate of . 7. odgemployment of 'ttys. anglapus and Duimpo is premature and<orunnecessary" 'ttys. Duimpo and anglapus are representing conflictinginterests and the estate of 5innie Jane odges should be closed andterminated ;pp. )+3*-)+@, 8ol, 8, (p. )A?3=.

'tty. 5eon &. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 2@, )*+ as$ing thathe anifestation and rgent otion filed by 'ttys. anglapus and Duimbe denied because no evidence has been presented in support thereof. 'anglapus filed a reply to the opposition of counsel for the 'dministratorthe . 7. odges estate wherein it is claimed that e6penses ofadministration include reasonable counsel or attorneyBs fees for services the e6ecutor or administrator. 's a matter of fact the fee agreement dated%ebruary 23, )*+ be tween the &/0 and the law firm of 9zaeta, Gibbs 9zaeta as its counsel ;&p. )2@?-)2@, 8ol. 8, (p. )A?3= which stipulatesfees for said law firm has been approved by the ourt in its order datedarch A), )*+. /f payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratof the estate of 5innie Jane odges will cause pre>udice to the estate of 7. odges, in li$e manner the very agreement which provides for thepayment of attorneyBs fees to the counsel for the &/0 will also be

pre>udicial to the estate of 5innie Jane odges ;pp. )@?)-)@), 8ol. 8, (p)A?3=.

'tty. erminio 9zaeta filed a re>oinder dated 'ugust )?, )*+ to the replythe opposition to the anifestation and rgent otion alleging principallythat the estates of 5innie Jane odges and . 7. odges are not similarlsituated for the reason that . 7. odges is an heir of 5innie Jane odgewhereas the latter is not an heir of the former for the reason that 5innie Jodges predeceased . 7. odges ;pp. )@A*-)@@, 8ol. 8, (p. )A?3=" th

'ttys. anglapus and Duimpo formally entered their appearance in behaof 'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges on June )?, )*+ ;p)+A*-)+?, 8ol. 8, (p. )A?3=.

'tty. anglapus filed a manifestation dated !ecember )@, )*+ statingtherein that Judge 0ellosillo issued an order reCuiring the parties to submmemorandum in support of their respective contentions. /t is prayed in thmanifestation that the anifestation and rgent otion dated June )?, )be resolved ;pp. +A4-+A*, 8ol. 8//, (p. )A?3=.

'tty. Roman abanta, Jr. for the &/0 filed a counter- manifestation dateJanuary 4, )*+4 as$ing that after the consideration by the court of all

8/12/2019 863 to 914


allegations and arguments and pleadings of the &/0 in connectiontherewith ;)= said manifestation and urgent motion of 'ttys. anglapus andDuimpo be denied ;pp. +2-+4A, 8ol. 8//, (p. )A?3=. Judge Duerubinissued an order dated January , )*+4 approving the motion dated June )?,)*+ of the attorneys for the administratri6 of the estate of 5innie Janeodges and agreement anne6ed to said motion. The said order furtherstates: HThe 'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges is authorizedto issue or sign whatever chec$ or chec$s may be necessary for the abovepurpose and the administrator of the estate of . 7. odges is ordered tocountersign the same. ;pp. +4)@-+42A, 8ol 8//, (p. )A?3=.

'tty. Roman abanta, Jr. for the &/0 filed a manifestation and motiondated January )A, )*+4 as$ing that the order of January , )*+4 which wasissued by Judge Duerubin be declared null and void and to en>oin the cler$of court and the administratri6 and administrator in these specialproceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or comply with theprovision of the aforesaid order of January , )*+4. /n support of said

manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of January , )*+4 isnull and void because the said order was never delivered to the deputy cler$ 'lbis of 0ranch 8 ;the sala of Judge Duerubin= and the alleged order wasfound in the drawer of the late Judge Duerubin in his office when saiddrawer was opened on January )A, )*+4 after the death of Judge Duerubinby &erfecto Duerubin, Jr., the son of the >udge and in the presence o fE6ecutive Judge Rovira and deputy cler$ 'lbis ;(ec. ), Rule A+, 7ew ivilode= ;&p. ++??-++?+, 8ol. 8///, (p. )A?3=.

'tty. Roman abanta, Jr. for the &/0 filed a motion for reconsiderationdated %ebruary 2A, )*+4 as$ing that the order dated January , )*+ bereversed on the ground that:

). 'ttorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personalheir"

2. /f services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them"

A. 'ttorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests" to thepre>udice of the other heirs not represented by said attorneys"

. %ees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to theestate"

4. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees ;&p. ++24-++A+,8ol. 8///, (p. )A?3=.

'tty. Duimpo for 'dministratri6 agno of the estate of 5innie Jane odgesfiled a motion to submit dated July )4, )*+4 as$ing that the manifestationand urgent motion dated June )?, )*+ filed by 'ttys. anglapus andDuimpo and other incidents directly appertaining thereto be consideredsubmitted for consideration and approval ;pp. +34*-+3+4, 8ol. 8///, (p.)A?3=.

onsidering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of boththe 'dministratri6 and the &/0, and of 'tty. Gellada, hereinbeforementioned, the ourt believes that the order of January , )*+4 is null andvoid for the reason that the said order has not been filed with deputy cler$

'lbis of this court ;0ranch 8= during the lifetime of Judge Duerubin whosigned the said order. owever, the said manifestation and urgent motiondated June )?, )*+ is being treated and considered in this instant order. /tis worthy to note that in the motion dated January 2, )*+ ;&p. ))*- ))+A,8ol. 8, (p. )A?3= which has been filed by 'tty. Gellada and his associatesand 'tty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual

services rendered. owever, the fee agreement dated %ebruary 23, )*+between the 'dministrator of the estate of . 7. odges and 'tty. Gibbswhich provides for retainer fee of &,??? monthly in addition to specific fefor actual appearances, reimbursement for e6penditures and contingentfees has also been approved by the ourt and said lawyers have alreadybeen paid. ;pp . )23A-)23*, 8ol. 8, (p. &roc. )A?3 pp. )A32-)A3A, 8ol. 8,(p. &roc. )A?3=.

#ERE%9RE, the order dated January , )*+4 is hereby declared null avoid.

The manifestation and motion dated June )?, )*+ which was filed by thattorneys for the administratri6 of the testate estate of 5innie Jane odgegranted and the agreement anne6ed thereto is hereby approved.

The administratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges is hereby directedbe needed to implement the approval of the agreement anne6ed to themotion and the administrator of the estate of . 7. odges is directed to

countersign the said chec$ or chec$s as the case may be.

(9 9R!ERE!.

thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the e6istence of independent butsimultaneous administrations.

0e that as it may, again, it appears that on 'ugust +, )*+4, the court, acting on a motion ofpetitioner for the approval of deeds of sale e6ecuted by it as administrator of the estate ofodges, issued the following order, also on appeal herein:

'cting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land othe &/0, 'dministrator of the Testate Estate of . 7. odges in (p. &roc)+32 ;8ol. 8//, pp. 22-224=, dated July )+, )*+4, filed by 'tty. esar TTirol in representation of the law firms of 9zaeta, Gibbs and 9zaeta andTirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of 'tty. Rizal R. Duimpo ;8ol. 8pp. +@))-+@)A= dated July 22, )*+4 and considering the allegations andreasons therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale should bsigned >ointly by the &/0, 'dministrator of the Testate Estate of . 7.odges and 'velina '. agno, 'dministratri6 of the Testate Estate of 5inJane odges and to this effect the &/0 should ta$e the necessary stepsthat 'dministratri6 'velina '. agno could sign the deeds of sale.

(9 9R!ERE!. ;p. 2@, Green Record on 'ppeal.=

7otably this order reCuired that even the deeds e6ecuted by petitioner, as administrator of theEstate of odges, involving properties registered in his name, should be co-signed byrespondent agno. ; 'nd this was not an isolated instance.

/n her brief as appellee, respondent agno states:

'fter the lower court had authorized appellee 'velina '. agno to e6ecufinal deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to sell e6ecuted by . 7. odgeon %ebruary 2?, )*+A ;pp. 4-+, Green R9'=, motions for the approval final deeds of sale ;signed by appellee 'velina '. agno and theadministrator of the estate of . 7. odges, first Joe odges, then 'tty.%ernando irasol and later the appellant= were approved by the lower coupon petition of appellee agnoBs counsel, 'tty. 5eon &. Gellada, on thebasis of section @ of Rule @* of the Revised Rules of ourt. (ubseCuentlythe appellant, after it had ta$en over the bul$ of the assets of the twoestates, started presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt waHotion for 'pproval of !eeds of (ale for Registered 5and andancellations of ortgagesH dated July 2), )*+ filed by 'tty. esar T. Tcounsel for the appellant, thereto anne6ing two ;2= final deeds of sale and

8/12/2019 863 to 914


two ;2= cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee 'velina '. agnoand !. R. &aulino, 'ssistant 8ice-&resident and anager of the appellant;%/ Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, 8ol. 8, pp. )+*-)3?)=. This motion wasapproved by the lower court on July 23, )*+. /t was followed by anothermotion dated 'ugust , )*+ for the approval of one final deed of sale againsigned by appellee 'velina '. agno and !. R. &aulino ;%/ Record, (p.&roc. 7o. )A?3. 8ol. 8, pp. )@24-)@2@=, which was again approved by thelower court on 'ugust 3, )*+. The gates having been opened, a floodensued: the appellant subseCuently filed similar motions for the approval ofa multitude of deeds of sales and cancellations of mortgages signed by boththe appellee 'velina '. agno and the appellant.

' random chec$ of the records of (pecial &roceeding 7o. )A?3 alone willshow 'tty. esar T. Tirol as having presented for court approval deeds o fsale of real properties signed by both appellee 'velina '. agno and !. R.&aulino in the following numbers: ;a= motion dated (eptember 2), )*+ +deeds of sale" ;b= motion dated 7ovember , )*+ ) deed of sale" ;c=

motion dated !ecember ), )*+ deeds of sale" ;d= motion dated%ebruary A, )*+4 @ deeds of sale" ;f= motion dated ay 3, )*+4 *deeds of sale. /n view of the very e6tensive landholdings of the odgesspouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds of sale of realproperties e6ecuted by . 7. odges the lower court has had to constitutespecial separate e6pedientes in (pecial &roceedings 7os. )A?3 and )+32to include mere motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the con>ugalproperties of the odges spouses.

's an e6ample, from among the very many, under date of %ebruary A, )*+4, 'tty. esar T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed Hotion for 'pproval of !eeds of (ale for Registered 5and and ancellations of ortgagesH ;%/Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, 8ol. 8///, pp. +43?-+4*+= the allegations ofwhich read:

H). /n his lifetime, the late . 7. odges e6ecuted Hontracts to (ellH realproperty, and the prospective buyers under said contracts have already paidthe price and complied with the terms and conditions thereof"

H2. /n the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors havealready paid their debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late .7. odges, and are now entitled to release therefrom"

HA. There are attached hereto documents e6ecuted >ointly by the 'dministratri6 in (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3 and the 'dministrator in (p. &roc. 7o.)+32, consisting of deeds of sale in favor

%ernando ano, 0acolod ity, 9cc. 7egros%e agbanua, /loilo ity&olicarpio . &areno, 5a &az, /loilo ityRosario T. 5ibre, Jaro, /loilo ity%ederico 0. Torres, /loilo ityReynaldo T. 5ataCuin, 5a &az, /loilo ity

'natolio T. 8iray, /loilo ity0en>amin Rolando, Jaro, /loilo ity

and cancellations of mortgages in favor of

&ablo anzano, 9ton, /loiloRicardo . !iana, !ao, (an Jose, 'ntiCue(implicio Tingson, /loilo ity

'mado agbanua, &ototan, /loiloRoselia . 0aes, 0olo, Ro6as ity#illiam 0ayani, Rizal Estanzuela, /loilo ity

Elpidio 8illarete, olo, /loilo ity7orma T. Ruiz, Jaro, /loilo ity

H. That the approval of the aforesaid documents wilnot reduce the assets of the estates so as to preventany creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish hdividend.H

'nd the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:

H#ERE%9RE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule @*, (ection @ ofthe Rules of ourt, this honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sand cancellations of mortgages.H ;&p. ))A-))3, 'ppelleeBs 0rief.=

7one of these assertions is denied in &etitionerBs reply brief.

%urther indicating lac$ of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent coand its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed order of 7ovember 2A, )*on pages AA-AA4 of the Green Record on 'ppeal, said respondent court allowed the movant

Ricardo (alas, &resident of appellee #estern /nstitute of Technology ;successor of &anayEducational /nstitutions, /nc.=, one of the parties with whom odges had contracts tha t are inCuestion in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as 'dministrator of the estate of odges andrespondent agno, as 'dministrator of the estate of rs. odges, thus:

onsidering that in both cases there is as yet no >udicial declaration of henor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the oubelieves that payment to both the administrator of the testate estate of .odges and the administratri6 of the testate estate of 5innie Jane odgeor to either one of the two estates is proper and legal.

#ERE%9RE, movant Ricardo T. (alas can pay to both estates or eithethem.

(9 9R!ERE!.

;&p. AA-AA4, Green Record on 'ppeal.=

9n the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent agno was giveauthority to act alone. %or instance, in the other appealed order of !ecember )*, )*+, on pa22) of the Green Record on 'ppeal, the respondent court approved payments made by her oovertime pay to some employees of the court who had helped in gathering and preparing copof parts of the records in both estates as follows:

onsidering that the e6penses sub>ect of the motion to approve paymentovertime pay dated !ecember )?, )*+, are reasonable and are believedby this ourt to be a proper charge of administration chargeable to thetestate estate of the late 5innie Jane odges, the said e6penses are here

'&&R98E! and to be charged against the testate estate of the late 5innJane odges. The administrator of the testate estate of the late harles7ewton odges is hereby ordered to countersign the chec$ or chec$snecessary to pay the said overtime pay as shown by the bills mar$ed 'nnH'H, H0H and HH of the motion.

(9 9R!ERE!.

;&p. 22)-222, Green Record on 'ppeal.=

5i$ewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale e6ecuted by respondent agno aloneas 'dministratri6 of the estate of rs. odges, covering properties in the name of odges,pursuant to Hcontracts to sellH e6ecuted by odges, irrespective of whether they were e6ecuteby him before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also on appeaherein are the following:

8/12/2019 863 to 914


). 9rder of arch A?, )*++, on p. )A3 of the Green Record on 'ppeal, approving the deed ofsale e6ecuted by respondent agno in favor of appellee 5orenzo arles on %ebruary 2, )*++,pursuant to a Hcontract to sellH signed by odges on June )3, )*4@, after the death of his wife,which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of arles to pay the installmentsdue on January 3, )*+4.

2. 9rder of 'pril 4, )*++, on pp. )A*-)?, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellee (alvador Guzman on %ebruary 2@, )*++ pursuant to aHcontract to sellH signed by odges on (eptember )A, )*+?, after the death of his wife, whichcontract petitioner claims it cancelled on arch A, )*+4 in view of failure of said appellee to paythe installments on time.

A. 9rder of 'pril 2?, )*++, on pp. )+3-)+@, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellee &urificacion oronado on arch 2@, )*++ pursuant to aHcontract to sellH signed by odges on 'ugust ), )*+), after the death of his wife.

. 9rder of 'pril 2?, )*++, on pp. )+@-)+*, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellee %lorenia 0arrido on arch 2@, )*++, pursuant to a

Hcontract to sellH signed by odges on %ebruary 2), )*4@, after the death of his wife.

4. 9rder of June 3, )*++, on pp. )@-)@4, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellee 0elcezar ausing on ay 2, )*++, pursuant to aHcontract to sellH signed by odges on %ebruary )?, )*4*, after the death of his wife.

+. 9rder of June 2), )*++, on pp. 2))-2)2, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellee 'rtheo Thomas Jamir on June A, )*++, pursuant to aHcontract to sellH signed by odges on ay 2+, )*+), after the death of his wife.

3. 9rder of June 2), )*++, on pp. 2)2-2)A, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellees Graciano 5ucero and elCuiades 0atisanan on June +and June A, )*++, respectively, pursuant to Hcontracts to sellH signed by odges on June *, )*4*and 7ovember 23, )*+), respectively, after the death of his wife.

@. 9rder of !ecember 2, )*++, on pp. A?A-A?, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellees Espiridion &artisala, #inifredo Espada and Rosario

'lingasa on (eptember +, )*++, 'ugust )3, )*++ and 'ugust A, )*++, respectively, pursuant toHcontracts to sellH signed by odges on 'pril 2?, )*+?, 'pril )@, )*+? and 'ugust 24, )*4@,respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.

*. 9rder of 'pril 4, )*++, on pp. )A3-)A@, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellee 'lfredo atedral on arch 2, )*++, pursuant to a

Hcontract to sellH signed by odges on ay 2*, )*4, before the death of his wife, which contractpetitioner claims it had cancelled on %ebruary )+, )*++ for failure of appellee atedral to pay theinstallments due on time.

)?. 9rder of 'pril 4, )*++, on pp. )A@-)A*, id., approving the deed of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno in favor of appellee Jose &ablico on arch 3, )*++, pursuant to a Hcontractto sellH signed by odges on arch 3, )*4?, after the death of his wife, which contract petitionerclaims it had cancelled on June 2*, )*+?, for failure of appellee &ablico to pay the installmentsdue on time.

)). 9rder of !ecember 2, )*++, on pp. A?A-A?, id., insofar as it approved the deed of salee6ecuted by respondent agno in favor of appellee &epito /yulores on (eptember +, )*++,pursuant to a Hcontract to sellH signed by odges on %ebruary 4, )*4), before the death of hiswife.

)2. 9rder of January A, )*+3, on pp. AA4-AA+, id., approving three deeds of sale e6ecuted byrespondent agno, one in favor of appellees (antiago &acaonsis and two in favor of appellee

'delfa &remaylon on !ecember 4, )*++ and 7ovember A, )*++, respectively, pursuant toseparate Hpromises to sellH signed respectively by odges on ay 2+, )*44 and January A?,)*4, before the death of his wife, and 9ctober A), )*4*, after her death.

/n li$e manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of salee6ecuted by petitioner alone and without the concurrence of respondent agno, and suchapprovals have not been the sub>ect of any appeal. 7o less than petitioner points this out onpages )*-)4? of its brief as appellant thus:

The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments error have already been discussed previously. /n the first abovecited errothe order alluded to was general, and as already e6plained before, it wasas admitted by the lower court itself, superseded by the particular ordersapproving specific final deeds of sale e6ecuted by the appellee, 'velina 'agno, which are sub>ect of this appeal, as well as the particular ordersapproving specific final deeds of sale e6ecuted by the appellant, &hilippinommercial and /ndustrial 0an$, which were never appealed by theappellee, 'velina '. agno, nor by any party for that matter, and which anow therefore final.

7ow, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracsignificance developed. 9n 9ctober 4, )*+A, over the signature of 'tty. 'llison J. Gibbs in

representation of the law firm of 9zaeta, Gibbs L 9zaeta, as counsel for the co-administratorJoe odges and %ernando &. irasol, the following self-e6planatory motion was filed:

/!E0 &O%O0 O A0 ACCO/0%0! A0DDE'%5E8 O AD&%0%A%O0 O -E EAEO C. 0. -OD!E O A'' O -E AE O -CO0J/!A' $A0E-%$ O -E DECEAED'%00%E JA0E -OD!E A0D C 0. -OD!EE1%%0! A O &A8 9:, ;<=> $'/ A'' -EE0, E&O'/&E0 A0D %0CO&E -EEO

9E( 79# the co-administrator of the estate of . 7. odges, Joeodges, through his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitledproceedings, and to this onorable ourt respectfully alleges:

;)= 9n ay 2A, )*43 5innie Jane odges died in /loilo ity.

;2= 9n June 2@, )*43 this onorable ourt admitted to probate the 5ast #and Testament of the deceased 5innie Jane odges e6ecuted 7ovember22, )*42 and appointed . 7. odges as E6ecutor of the estate of 5innieJane odges ;pp. 2-24, Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3=.

;A= 9n July ), )*43 this onorable ourt issued 5etters Testamentary to

7. odges in the Estate of 5innie Jane odges ;p. A?, Rec. (p. &roc. )A?

;= 9n !ecember ), )*43 this onorable ourt, on the basis of thefollowing allegations in a otion dated !ecember )), )*43 filed by 5eon &Gellada as attorney for the e6ecutor . 7. odges:

HThat herein E6ecutor, ;is= not only part owner of theproperties left as con>ugal, but also, the successor tothe properties left 7y the deceased 'innie Jane-od#es.H

;p. , Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3" emphasis supplied.=

issued the following order:

H's prayed for by 'ttorney Gellada, counsel for theE6ecutory, for the reasons stated in his motion datedDecem7er ;;, ;<=> hich the court considers elltaken, all the sales, conveyances, leases andmortgages of all properties left by the deceased 5innJane odges are hereby '&&R98E!. The said

8/12/2019 863 to 914


e6ecutor is further authorized to e6ecute subseCuentsales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of theproperties left by the said deceased 5innie Janeodges in consonance ith the ishes contained in thelast ill and testament of the latter .H

;p. +, Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3" emphasis supplied.=

;4= 9n 'pril 2), )*4* this onorable ourt approved the inventory andaccounting submitted by . 7. odges through his counsel 5eon &. Gelladaon 'pril ), )*4* wherein he alleged among other things

HThat no person interested in the &hilippines of the timeand place of e6amining the herein account, be givennotice, as herein e6ecutor is the only de+isee orle#atee of the deceased, in accordance ith the lastill and testament already pro7ated 7y the -onora7leCourt .H

;pp. 33-3@, Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3" emphasis supplied.=.

;+= 9n July A?, )*+? this onorable ourt approved the H'nnual (tatementof 'ccountH submitted by . 7. odges through his counsel 5eon &. Gelladaon July 2), )*+? wherein he alleged among other things:

HThat no person interested in the &hilippines of the timeand place of e6amining the herein account, be givennotice as herein e6ecutor is the only de+isee or le#ateeof the deceased 'innie Jane -od#es , in accordancewith the last will and testament of the deceased,already probated by this onorable ourt.H

;pp. @)-@2. Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3" emphasis supplied.=

;3= 9n ay 2, )*+) this onorable court approved the H'nnual (tatement of 'ccount 0y The E6ecutor for the Fear )*+?H submitted through 5eon &.Gellada on 'pril 2?, )*+) wherein he alleged:

That no person interested in the &hilippines be givennotice, of the time and place of e6amining the hereinaccount, as herein E6ecutor is the only de+isee orle#atee of the deceased 'innie Jane -od#es, inaccordance ith the last ill and testament of thedeceased, already pro7ated 7y this -onora7le Court .

;pp. *?-*). Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3" emphasis supplied.=

;@= 9n !ecember 24, )*+2, .7. odges died.

;*= 9n !ecember 24, )*+2, on the rgent E62parte otion of 5eon &.Gellada filed only in (pecial &roceeding 7o. )A?3, this onorable ourtappointed 'velina '. agno

H'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges and as (pecial 'dministratri6 of the estate of harles 7ewton odges, in the latter case,because the last will of said harles 7ewton odges is still $ept in his vaultor iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses maybe lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a (pecial 'dministratri6 isappointed.H

;p. )??. Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3=

;)?= 9n !ecember 2+, )*+2 5etters of 'dministration were issued to 'veagno pursuant to this onorable ourtBs aforesaid 9rder of !ecember )*+2

H#ith full authority to ta$e possession of all the propof said deceased in any province or provinces in whit may be situated and to perform all other actsnecessary for the preservation of said property, said

'dministratri6 and<or (pecial 'dministratri6 having fa bond satisfactory to the ourt.H

;p. )?2, Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3=

;))= 9n January 22, )*+A this onorable ourt on petition of 5eon &.Gellada of January 2), )*+A issued 5etters of 'dministration to:

;a= 'velina '. agno as 'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odge

;b= 'velina '. agno as (pecial 'dministratri6 of the Estate of harles

7ewton odges" and

;c= Joe odges as o-(pecial 'dministrator of the Estate of harles7ewton odges.

;p. A, Rec. (p. &roc. )A?3=

;)2= 9n %ebruary 2?, )*+A this onorable ourt on the basis of a motionfiled by 5eon &. Gellada as legal counsel on %ebruary )+, )*+A for 'velin

'. agno acting as 'dministratri6 of the Estate of harles 7ewton odge;pp. ))-))+, (p. &roc. )A?3= issued the following order:

H... se autoriza a aCuella ;'velina '. agno= a firmarescrituras de venta definitiva de propiedades cubiertpor contratos para vender, firmados, en vida, por elfinado harles 7ewton odges, cada vez Cue el preestipulado en cada contrato este totalmente pagado(e autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escriturade cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de bienes realescomo personales cada vez Cue la consideracion decada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.

Hada una de dichas escrituras Cue se otorguen deb

ser sometida para la aprobacion de este Juzgado.H

;p. ))3, (p. &roc. )A?3=.

I&ar ) ;c=, Reply to otion %or Removal of Joe odg

;)A= 9n (eptember l+, )*+A 5eon &. Gellada, acting as attorney for 'veli '. agno as 'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges, alleges:

A. That since January, )*+A, both estates of 5inniJane odges and harles 7ewton odges have beereceiving in full, payments for those Hcontracts to selentered into by . 7. odges during his lifetime, andthe purchasers have been demanding the e6ecutiondefinite deeds of sale in their favor.

. That hereto attached are thirteen ;)A= copiesdeeds of sale e6ecuted by the 'dministratri6 and by co-administrator ;%ernando &. irasol= of the estate 5innie Jane odges and harles 7ewton odgesrespectively, in compliance with the terms and

8/12/2019 863 to 914


conditions of the respective Hcontracts to sellH e6ecutedby the parties thereto.H

;)= The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of (eptember )+, )*+Aare all registered in the name of the deceased . 7. odges.

;)4= 'velina '. agno, it is alleged on information and belief, has beenadvertising in the newspaper in /loilo thusly:

%or (ale

Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges and harles 7ewton odges.

'll Real Estate or &ersonal &roperty will be sold on %irst ome %irst (erved0asis.

'velina '. agno 'dministratri6

;)+= 'velina '. agno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid andstill is paying sums of money to sundry persons.

;)3= Joe odges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during thehearings before this onorable ourt on (eptember 4 and +, )*+A that theestate of . 7. odges was claiming all of the assets belonging to thedeceased spouses 5innie Jane odges and . 7. odges situated in&hilippines because of the aforesaid election by . 7. odges wherein heclaimed and too$ possession as sole owner of all of said assets during theadministration of the estate of 5innie Jane odges on the ground that hewas the sole devisee and legatee under her 5ast #ill and Testament.

;)@= 'velina '. agno has submitted no inventory and accounting of heradministration as 'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges and(pecial 'dministratri6 of the estate of . 7. odges. owever, frommanifestations made by 'velina '. agno and her legal counsel, 5eon &.Gellada, there is no Cuestion she will claim that at least fifty per cent ;4?K=of the con>ugal assets of the deceased spouses and the rents, emolumentsand income therefrom belong to the igdon family who are named inparagraphs %ourth and %ifth of the #ill of 5innie Jane odges ;p. 4, Rec.(p. &roc. )A?3=.

#ERE%9RE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this

onorable ourt, after due hearing, order:

;)= 'velina '. agno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of thefunds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased5innie Jane odges and . 7. odges which have come into herpossession, with full details of what she has done with them"

;2= 'velina '. agno to turn over and deliver to the 'dministrator of theestate of . 7. odges all of the funds, properties and assets of anycharacter remaining in her possession"

;A= &ending this onorable ourtBs ad>udication of the aforesaid issues, 'velina '. agno to stop, unless she first secures the conformity of Joeodges ;or his duly authorized representative, such as the undersignedattorneys= as the o-administrator and attorney-in-fact of a ma>ority of thebeneficiaries of the estate of . 7. odges:

;a= 'dvertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:

;b= Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.

;= (uch other relief as this onorable ourt may deem >ust and eCuitablthe premises. ;'nne6 HTH, &etition.=

'lmost a year thereafter, or on (eptember ), )*+, after the co-administrators Joe odges a%ernando &. irasol were replaced by herein petitioner &hilippine ommercial and /ndustrial0an$ as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of odges approved by court, and because the above motion of 9ctober 4, )*+A had not yet been heard due to theabsence from the country of 'tty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:

&A0%EA%O0 A0D &O%O0, %0C'/D%0!&O%O0 O E O -EA%0! A0D EO'5E?/!E0 &O%O0 O A0 ACCO/0%0! A0DDE'%5E8 O AD&%0%AO O -E EAEO C. 0. -OD!E O A'' -E AE O -ECO0J/!A' $A0E-%$ O -E DECEAED'%00%E JA0E -OD!E A0D C. 0. -OD!EE1%%0! A O &A8 9:, ;<=> $'/ A'' O -EE0, E&O'/&E0 A0D %0CO&E -EEO

O OCOBE =, ;<@:.

9E( 79# &hilippine ommercial and /ndustrial 0an$ ;hereinafterreferred to as &/0=, the administrator of the estate of . 7. odges,deceased, in (pecial &roceedings 7o. )+32, through its undersignedcounsel, and to this onorable ourt respectfully alleges that:

). 9n 9ctober 4, )*+A, Joe odges acting as the co-administrator of theestate of . 7. odges filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an Hrgotion %or 'n 'ccounting and !elivery To 'dministrator of the Estate of 7. odges of all 9f The 'ssets 9f The on>ugal &artnership of The!eceased 5innie Jane odges and . 7. odges E6isting as 9f ay, 2A)*43 &lus 'll 9f The Rents, Emoluments and /ncome TherefromH ;pp. 4A42, %/ Rec. (. &. 7o. )+32=.

2. 9n January 2, )*+ this onorable ourt, on the basis of an amicablagreement entered into on January 2A, )*+ by the two co-administratorthe estate of . 7. odges and virtually all of the heirs of . 7. odges ;p*)2, %/ Rec., (. &. 7o. )+32=, resolved the dispute over who should actadministrator of the estate of . 7. odges by appointing the &/0 asadministrator of the estate of . 7. odges ;pp. *?4-*?+, %/ Rec. (. &. )+32= and issuing letters of administration to the &/0.

A. 9n January 2, )*+ virtually all of the heirs of . 7. odges, Joeodges and %ernando &. irasol acting as the two co-administrators of thestate of . 7. odges, 'velina '. agno acting as the administratri6 of testate of 5innie Jane odges, and essrs. #illiam 0rown and 'rdel Fou

'cting for all of the igdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries othe estate of 5innie Jane odges and various legal counsel representing aforenamed parties entered into an amicable agreement, which wasapproved by this onorable ourt, wherein the parties thereto agreed thacertain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claimsagainst the two estates and that the assets (to the e6tent they e6isted)of7oth estates ould 7e administrated ointly 7y the $C%B as administrator the estate of C. 0. -od#es and A+elina A. &a#no as administratri6 of theestate of 'innie Jane -od#es, sub>ect, however, to the aforesaid 9ctober)*+A otion, namely, the &/0Bs claim to e6clusive possession andownership of one-hundred percent ;)??)3,= ;or, in the alternative, seventfive percent I34K of all assets owned by . 7. odges or 5innie Janeodges situated in the &hilippines. 9n %ebruary ), )*+ ;pp. *A-*A4, Rec., (. &. 7o. )+32= this onorable ourt amended its order of January)*+ but in no way changes its recognition of the aforedescribed basic

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demand by the &/0 as administrator of the estate of . 7. odges to onehundred percent ;)??K= of the assets claimed by both estates.

. 9n %ebruary )4, )*+ the &/0 filed a Hotion to ResolveH the aforesaidotion of 9ctober 4, )*+A. This onorable ourt set for hearing on June )),)*+ the otion of 9ctober 4, )*+A.

4. 9n June )), )*+, because the undersigned 'llison J. Gibbs was absentin the nited (tates, this onorable ourt ordered the indefinitepostponement of the hearing of the otion of 9ctober 4, )*+A.

+. (ince its appointment as administrator of the estate of . 7. odges the&/0 has not been able to properly carry out its duties and obligations asadministrator of the estate of . 7. odges because of the following acts,among others, of 'velina '. agno and those who claim to act for her asadministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges:

;a= 'velina '. agno illegally acts as if she is in

e6clusive control of all of the assets in the &hilippines of both estates including those claimed by the estate of .7. odges as evidenced in part by her loc$ing thepremises at 2?+-2?@ Guanco (treet, /loilo ity on

'ugust A), )*+ and refusing to reopen same untilordered to do so by this onorable ourt on (eptember 3, )*+.

;b= 'velina '. agno illegally acts as though she alonemay decide how the assets of the estate of .7.odges should be administered, who the &/0 shallemploy and how much they may be paid as evidencedin party by her refusal to sign chec$s issued by the&/0 payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant totheir fee agreement approved by this onorable ourtin its order dated arch A), )*+.

;c= 'velina '. agno illegally gives access to and turnsover possession of the records and assets of the estateof .7. odges to the attorney-in-fact of the igdon%amily, r. James 5. (ullivan, as evidenced in part bythe cashing of his personal chec$s.

;d= 'velina '. agno illegally refuses to e6ecute chec$sprepared by the &/0 drawn to pay e6penses of theestate of . 7. odges as evidenced in part by thechec$ drawn to reimburse the &/0Bs advance of&@,4.4? to pay the )*+ income ta6es reported dueand payable by the estate of .7. odges.

3. nder and pursuant to the orders of this onorable ourt, particularlythose of January 2 and %ebruary ), )*+, and the mandate contained in its5etters of 'dministration issued on January 2, )*+ to the &/0, it has

Hfull authority to ta$e possession ofall the property of the deceased .7. odges

Hand to perform all other acts necessary for thepreservation of said property.H ;p. *), %/ Rec., (.&.7o. )+32.=

@. 's administrator of the estate of . 7. odges, the &/0 claims the rightto the immediate e6clusive possession and control of all of the properties,

accounts receivables, court cases, ban$ accounts and other assets,including the documentary records evidencing same, which e6isted in the&hilippines on the date of . 7. odgesB death, !ecember 24, )*+2, andwere in his possession and registered in his name alone. The &/0 $nowof no assets in the &hilippines registered in the name of 5innie Janeodges, the estate of 5innie Jane odges, or, . 7. odges, E6ecutor ofthe Estate of 5innie Jane odges on !ecember 24, )*+2. 'll of the asseof which the &/0 has $nowledge are either registered in the name of .odges, alone or were derived therefrom since his death on !ecember 2)*+2.

*. The &/0 as the current administrator of the estate of . 7. odges,deceased, succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly appointedadministrators of the estate of . 7. odges, to wit:

;a= 9n !ecember 24, )*+2, date of . 7. odgesBdeath, this onorable ourt appointed iss 'velina 'agno simultaneously as:

;i= 'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges)?2, %/ Rec., (.&. 7o. )A?3= to replace the deceas. 7. odges who on ay 2@, )*43 was appointed(pecial 'dministrator ;p. )A. %/ Rec. (.&. 7o. )A?3and on July ), )*43 E6ecutor of the estate of 5innieJane odges ;p. A?, %/ Rec., (. &. 7o. )A?3=.

;ii= pecial Administratri6 of the estate of C. 0. -od#;p. )?2, %/ Rec., (.&. 7o. )A?3=.

;b= 9n !ecember 2*, )*+2 this onorable ourtappointed arold M. !avies as co-special administraof the estate of .7. odges along with 'velina '.agno ;pp. )?@-))), %/ Rec., (. &. 7o. )A?3=.

;c= 9n January 22, )*+A, with the conformity of 'vel '. agno, arold M. !avies resigned in favor of Joeodges ;pp. A4-A+, %/ Rec., (.&. 7o. )+32= whothereupon was appointed on January 22, )*+A by thonorable ourt as special co-administrator of theestate of .7. odges ;pp. A@-? L A, %/ Rec. (.&7o. )+32= along with iss agno who at that time wstill acting as special co-administratri6 of the estate o. 7. odges.

;d= 9n %ebruary 22, )*+A, without ob>ection on the pof 'velina '. agno, this onorable ourt appointedJoe odges and %ernando &. irasol as co-administrators of the estate of .7. odges ;pp. 3+-@) L @4, %/ Rec., (.&. 7o. )+32=.

)?. iss 'velina '. agno, pursuant to the orders of this onorable our!ecember 24, )*+2, too$ possession of all &hilippine 'ssets now claimedby the two estates. 5egally, iss agno could ta$e possession of the assregistered in the name of . 7. odges alone only in her capacity as(pecial 'dministratri6 of the Estate of .7. odges. #ith the appointmenby this onorable ourt on %ebruary 22, )*+A of Joe odges and %ernan&. irasol as the co-administrators of the estate of .7. odges, they legwere entitled to ta$e over from iss agno the full and e6clusivepossession of all of the assets of the estate of .7. odges. #ith theappointment on January 2, )*+ of the &/0 as the sole administrator othe estate of .7. odges in substitution of Joe odges and %ernando &.

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irasol, the &/0 legally became the only party entitled to the sole ande6clusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of . 7. odges.

)). The &/0Bs predecessors submitted their accounting and this onorableourt approved same, to wit:

;a= The accounting of arold M. !avies dated January)@, )*+A ;pp. )+-AA, %/ Rec. (.&. 7o. )+32=" whichshows or its face the:

;i= onformity of 'velina '. agno acting asH'dministratri6 of the Estate of 5innie Jane odges and(pecial 'dministratri6 of the Estate of . 7. odgesH"

;ii= onformity of 5eslie Echols, a Te6as lawyer actingfor the heirs of .7. odges" and

;iii= onformity of #illiam 0rown, a Te6as lawyer actingfor the igdon family who claim to be the only heirs of

5innie Jane odges ;pp. )@, 24-AA, %/ Rec., (. &. 7o.)+32=.

7ote: This accounting was approved by this onorable ourt on January22, )*+A ;p. A, %/ Rec., (. &. 7o. )+32=.

;b= The accounting of Joe odges and %ernando &.irasol as of January 2A, )*+, filed %ebruary 2, )*+;pp. **?-)???, %/ Rec. (.&. 7o. )+32 and pp. )@?+-)@@, %/ Rec. (.&. 7o. )A?3=.

7ote: This accounting was approved by this onorable ourt on arch A,)*+.

;c= The &/0 and its undersigned lawyers are aware ofno report or accounting submitted by 'velina '. agnoof her acts as administratri6 of the estate of 5innie Janeodges or special administratri6 of the estate of .7.odges, unless it is the accounting of arold M. !aviesas special co-administrator of the estate of .7.odges dated January )@, )*+A to which iss agnomanifested her conformity ;supra=.

)2. /n the aforesaid agreement of January 2, )*+, iss 'velina '. agno agreed to receive&)?,???.??

Hfor her services as administratri6 of the estate of 5innieJane odgesH

and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting %ebruary ), )*+, at

Ha monthly salary of &4??.?? for her services as anemployee of both estates.H

2 ems.

)A. nder the aforesaid agreement of January 2, )*+ and the orders ofthis onorable ourt of same date, the &/0 as administrator of the estateof . 7. odges is entitled to the e6clusive possession of all records,properties and assets in the name of . 7. odges as of the date of hisdeath on !ecember 24, )*+2 which were in the possession of the deceased. 7. odges on that date and which then passed to the possession of issagno in her capacity as (pecial o-'dministratri6 of the estate of . 7.

odges or the possession of Joe odges or %ernando &. irasol as co-administrators of the estate of . 7. odges.

). 0ecause of iss agnoBs refusal to comply with the reasonable reCuof &/0 concerning the assets of the estate of . 7. odges, the &/0dismissed iss agno as an employee of the estate of . 7. odgeseffective 'ugust A), )*+. 9n (eptember ), )*+ iss agno loc$ed thepremises at 2?+-2?@ Guanco (treet and denied the &/0 access theretopon the rgent otion of the &/0 dated (eptember A, )*+, thisonorable ourt on (eptember 3, )*+ ordered iss agno to reopen taforesaid premises at 2?+-2?@ Guanco (treet and permit the &/0 accethereto no later than (eptember @, )*+.

)4. The &/0 pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this onorable ourt isagain in physical possession of all of the assets of the estate of . 7.odges. owever, the &/0 is not in e6clusive control of the a foresaidrecords, properties and assets because iss agno continues to assert claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph +, continues to use her own loc

to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 2?+-2?@ Guanco (treet, /loilo and continues to deny the &/0 its right to $now the combinations to thedoors of the vault and safes situated within the premises at 2?+-2?@Guanco (treet despite the fact that said combinations were $nown to onl. 7. odges during his lifetime.

)+. The &hilippine estate and inheritance ta6es assessed the estate of5innie Jane odges were assessed and paid on the basis that . 7.odges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of 5innie Janeodges situated in the &hilippines. 'velina '. agno and her legal counsat no time have Cuestioned the validity of the aforesaid assessment and payment of the corresponding &hilippine death ta6es.

)3. 7othing further remains to be done in the estate of 5innie Jane odge6cept to resolve the aforesaid otion of 9ctober 4, )*+A and grant the&/0 the e6clusive possession and control of all of the records, propertieand assets of the estate of . 7. odges.

)@. (uch assets as may have e6isted of the estate of 5innie Jane odgeswere ordered by this onorable ourt in special &roceedings 7o. )A?3 tobe turned over and delivered to . 7. odges alone. e in fact too$possession of them before his death and asserted and e6ercised the righ

e6clusive ownership over the said assets as the sole beneficiary of theestate of 5innie Jane odges.

#ERE%9RE, premises considered, the &/0 respectfully petitions thatthis onorable court:

;)= (et the otion of 9ctober 4, )*+A for hearing at the earliest possibledate with notice to all interested parties"

;2= 9rder 'velina '. agno to submit an inventory and accounting as 'dministratri6 of the Estate of 5innie Jane odges and o-'dministratri6the Estate of . 7. odges of all of the funds, properties and assets of ancharacter belonging to the deceased 5innie Jane odges and . 7. odgwhich have come into her possession, with full details of what she has dowith them"

;A= 9rder 'velina '. agno to turn over and deliver to the &/0 asadministrator of the estate of . 7. odges all of the funds, properties anassets of any character remaining in her possession"

;= &ending this onorable ourtBs ad>udication of the aforesaid issues,order 'velina '. agno and her representatives to stop interferring with t

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administration of the estate of . 7. odges by the &/0 and its dulyauthorized representatives"

;4= En>oin 'velina '. agno from wor$ing in the premises at 2?+-2?@Guanco (treet, /loilo ity as an employee of the estate of . 7. odges andapprove her dismissal as such by the &/0 effective 'ugust A), )*+"

;+= En>oin James 5. (ullivan, 'ttorneys anglapus and Duimpo and othersallegedly representing iss agno from entering the premises at 2?+-2?@Guanco (treet, /loilo ity or any other properties of . 7. odges withoutthe e6press permission of the &/0"

;3= 9rder such other relief as this onorable ourt finds >ust and eCuitablein the premises. ;'nne6 HH &etition.=

9n January @, )*+4, petitioner also filed a motion for H9fficial !eclaration of eirs of 5innie Janeodges EstateH alleging:

9E( 79# &hilippine ommercial and /ndustrial 0an$ ;hereinafter referred to as &/0=, as

administrator of the estate of the late . 7. odges, through the undersigned counsel, and tothis onorable ourt respectfully alleges that:

). !uring their marriage, spouses harles 7ewton odges and 5innie Janeodges, 'merican citizens originally from the (tate o f Te6as, .(.'.,acCuired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the&hilippines and in the (tates of Te6as and 9$lahoma, nited (tates of

'merica. 'll said properties constituted their con>ugal estate.

2. 'lthough Te6as was the domicile of origin of the odges spouses, thisonorable ourt, in its orders dated arch A) and !ecember )2, )*+ ;%/Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, pp. ----" (p. &roc. 7o. )+32, p. ----=,conclusively found and categorically ruled that said spouses had lived andwor$ed for more than 4? years in /loilo ity and had, therefore, acCuired adomicile of choice in said city, which they retained until the time of theirrespective deaths.

A. 9n 7ovember 22, )*42, 5innie Jane odges e6ecuted in the ity of /loiloher 5ast #ill and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Anne6?A? . The beCuests in said will pertinent to the present issue are the second,third , and fourth provisions, which we Cuote in full hereunder.

(E97!: / give, devise and beCueath all of the rest,residue and remainder of my estate, both personal andreal, wherever situated, or located, to my husband,harles 7ewton odges, to have and to hold unto him,my said husband during his natural lifetime.

T/R!: / desire, direct and provide that my husband,harles 7ewton odges, shall have the right tomanage, control, use and en>oy said estate during hislifetime, and he is hereby given the right to ma$e anychanges in the physical properties of said estate bysale of any part thereof which he thin$ best, and thepurchase of any other or additional property as he maythin$ best" to e6ecute conveyances with or withoutgeneral or special warranty, conveying in fee simple orfor any other term or time, any property which he maydeem proper to dispose of" to lease any of the realproperty for oil, gas and<or other minerals, and all suchdeeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple titleto the interest so conveyed in such property as he mayelect to sell. 'll rents, emoluments and income from

said estate shall belong to him, and he is furtherauthorized to use any part of the principal of said estas he may need or desire. /t is provided herein,however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose oany of the improved property now owned by us locatat, in or near the ity of 5ubboc$, Te6as, but he shalhave the full right to lease, manage and en>oy the saduring his lifetime, as above provided. e shall havethe right to sub-divide any farmland and sell lotstherein, and may sell unimproved town lots.

%9RT: 't the death of my said husband, harles7ewton odges, / give, devise and beCueath all of threst, residue and remainder of my estate both real apersonal, wherever situated or located, to be eCuallydivided among my brothers and sisters, share andshare ali$e, namely:

HEsta igdon, Emma owell, 5eonard igdon, Royigdon, (adie Rascoe, Era 0oman and 7imrayigdon.H

. 9n 7ovember ), )*4A, . 7. odges e6ecuted in the ity of /loilo his5ast #ill and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Anne6 ?B/n said #ill, . 7. odges designated his wife, 5innie Jane odges, as hbeneficiary using the identical language she used in the second and thirdprovisos of her #ill, supra.

4. 9n ay 2A, )*43 5innie Jane odges died in /loilo ity, predeceasinghusband by more than five ;4= years. 't the time of her death, she had noforced or compulsory heir, e6cept her husband, . 7. odges. (he wassurvived also by various brothers and sisters mentioned in her #ill ;suprwhich, for convenience, we shall refer to as the /G!97(.

+. 9n June 2@, )*43, this onorable ourt admitted to probate the 5ast #and Testament of the deceased 5innie Jane odges ;'nne6 H'H=, andappointed . 7. odges as e6ecutor of her estate without bond. ;%/Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, pp. 2-24=. 9n July ), )*43, this onorableourt issued letters testamentary to . 7. odges in the estate of 5innieJane odges. ;%/ Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, p. A?.=

3. The #ill of 5innie Jane odges, with respect to the order of successiothe amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic of its testamentaryprovisions, should be governed by &hilippine laws because:

;a= The testatri6, 5innie Jane odges, intended&hilippine laws to govern her #ill"

;b= 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode provides that Hthenational law of the person whose succession is undeconsideration, whatever may be the nature of theproperty and regardless of the country wherein saidproperty may be foundH, shall prevail. owever, theonflict of 5aw of Te6as, which is the Hnational lawH othe testatri6, 5innie Jane odges, provide that thedomiciliary law ;&hilippine law see paragraph 2,supra= should govern the testamentary dispositions asuccessional rights over movables ;personalproperties=, and the law of the situs of the property ;&hilippine law as to properties located in the&hilippines= with regards immovable ;real properties

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Thus applying the HRenvoi !octrineH, as approved andapplied by our (upreme ourt in the case of H/n Theatter 9f The Testate Estate of Eduard E.hristensenH, G.R. 7o.5-)+3*, promulgated January A), )*+A, &hilippine lawshould apply to the #ill of 5innie Jane odges and tothe successional rights to her estate insofar as hermo+a7le and immo+a7le assets in the &hilippines areconcerned. #e shall not, at this stage, discuss what lawshould govern the assets of 5innie Jane odgeslocated in 9$lahoma and Te6as, because the onlyassets in issue in this motion are those within the

>urisdiction of this motion ourt in the two above-captioned (pecial &roceedings.

@. nder &hilippine and Te6as law, the con>ugal or community estate ofspouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided eCually between them. Thus,

upon the death of 5innie Jane odges on ay 2A, )*43, one-half ;)<2= ofthe entirety of the assets of the odges spouses constituting their con>ugalestate pertained automatically to harles 7ewton odges, not 7y ay ofinheritance, 7ut in his on ri#ht as partner in the conu#al partnership . Theother one-half ;)<2= portion of the con>ugal estate constituted the estate of5innie Jane odges. his is the only portion of the conu#al estate capa7leof inheritance 7y her heirs.

*. This one-half ;)<2= portion of the con>ugal assets pertaining to 5innie Janeodges cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her #ill, beenhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruingafter her death on ay 2A, )*43. 5innie Jane odgesB #ill provides that Hallrents, emoluments and income from said estate shall 7elon# to him (C. 0.-od#es) and he is further authori"ed to use any part of the principal of saidestate as he may need or desire.H ;&aragraph A, 'nne6 H'H.= Thus, byspecific provision of 5innie Jane odgesB #ill, Hall rents, emoluments andincomeH must be credited to the one-half ;)<2= portion of the con>ugal estatepertaining to . 7. odges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of 'innie Jane-od#es, capa7le of inheritance 7y her heirs, consisted e6clusi+ely of nomore than one2half (;9) of the conu#al estate, computed as of the time ofher death on &ay 9:, ;<=> .

)?. 'rticles *??, **4 and )??) of the 7ew ivil ode provide that thesurviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants isentitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at leastone-half ;)<2= of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentarydisposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of thesurviving spouse. /n fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half ;)<2=portion of her estate by way of legitime. ;'rticle @@+, ivil ode.= learly,therefore, immediately upon the death of 5innie Jane odges, . 7. odgeswas the owner of at least three-fourths ;A<= or seventy-five ;34K= percentof all of the con>ugal assets of the spouses, ;)<2 or 4?K by way of con>ugalpartnership share and )< or 24K by way of inheritance and legitime= plusall Hrents, emoluments and incomeH accruing to said con>ugal estate fromthe moment of 5innie Jane odgesB death ;see paragraph *, supra=.

)). The late 5innie Jane odges designated her husband .7. odges asher sole and e6clusive heir with full authority to do what he pleased, ase6clusive heir and owner of all the assets constituting her estate, e6ceptonly with regards certain properties Howned by us, located at, in or near theity of 5ubboc$, Te6asH. Thus, even without relying on our laws ofsuccession and legitime, which we have cited above, C. 0. -od#es, 7y

specific testamentary desi#nation of his ife, as entitled to the entirely this ifes estate in the $hilippines.

)2. 'rticle 333 of the 7ew ivil ode provides that Hthe rights of thesuccessor are transmitted from the death of the decedentH. Thus, title to testate of 5innie Jane odges was transmitted to . 7. odges immediatupon her death on ay 2A, )*43. %or the convenience of this onorableourt, we attached hereto as 'nne6 HH a graph of how the con>uga l estaof the spouses odges should be divided in accordance with &hilippine laand the #ill of 5innie Jane odges.

)A. /n his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of 5innie Janeodges as above-stated, . 7. odges, shortly after the death of 5innieJane odges, appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. eoperated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts inconnection with the entirety of the con>ugal estate, in his on name alone

>ust as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late 5innieJane odges was still alive. /pon his death on Decem7er 9=, ;<@9,

therefore, all said conu#al assets ere in his sole possession and controand re#istered in his name alone, not as e6ecutor, 7ut as e6clusi+e oneall said assets.

). 'll these acts of . 7. odges were authorized and sanctionede6pressly and impliedly by various orders of this onorable ourt, asfollows:

;a= /n an 9rder dated ay 23, )*43, this onorable ourt ruled that . 7odges His allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he waengaged, and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceaswas living.H ;%/ Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, p. )).=

;b= 9n !ecember ), )*43, this onorable ourt, on the basis of thefollowing fact, alleged in the verified otion dated !ecember )), )*43 fileby 5eon &. Gellada as attorney for the e6ecutor . 7. odges:

That herein E6ecutor, ;is= not only part owner of the properties left ascon>ugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the decease5innie Jane odges.B ;%/ Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, p. " emphasissupplied.=

issued the following order:

H's prayed for by 'ttorney Gellada, counsel for the E6ecutor, for thereasons stated in his motion dated Decem7er ;;, ;<=>, hich the Courtconsiders ell taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages all the properties left by the deceased 5innie Jane odges e6ecuted by tE6ecutor, harles 7ewton odges are hereby '&&R98E!. The saidE6ecutor is further authorized to e6ecute subseCuent sales, conveyancesleases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased 5innieJane odges in consonance ith the ishes contained in the last ill antestament of the latter .H ;%/ Record. (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, p. +" emphasisupplied.=

2 ems

;c= 9n 'pril 2), )*4*, this onorable ourt approved the verified inventoand accounting submitted by . 7. odges through his counsel 5eon &.Gellada on 'pril ), )*4* wherein he alleged among other things,

HThat no person interested in the &hilippines of the tand place of e6amining the herein account, be givennotice, as herein e6ecutor is the only de+isee or

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le#atee of the deceased, in accordance ith the lastill and testament already pro7ated 7y the -onora7leCourt .H ;%/ Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, pp. 33-3@"emphasis supplied.=

;d= 9n July 2?, )*+?, this onorable ourt approved the verified H'nnual(tatement of 'ccountH submitted by . 7. odges through his counsel 5eon&. Gellada on July 2), )*+? wherein he alleged, among other things.

HThat no person interested in the &hilippines of the timeand place of e6amining the herein account, be givennotice as herein e6ecutor is the only de+isee or le#ateeof the deceased 'innie Jane -od#es , in accordancewith the last will and testament ofthe deceased, alreadyprobated by this onorable ourt.H ;%/ Record, (p.&roc. 7o. )A?3, pp. @)-@2" emphasis supplied.=

;e= 9n ay 2, )*+), this onorable ourt approved the verified H'nnual

(tatement of 'ccount 0y The E6ecutor %or the Fear )*+?H submittedthrough 5eon &. Gellada on 'pril 2?, )*+) wherein he alleged:

HThat no person interested in the &hilippines be given notice, ofthe time andplace of e6amining the herein account, as herein e6ecutor is the onlyde+isee or le#atee of the deceased 'innie Jane -od#es, in accordance iththe last ill and testament ofthe deceased, already pro7ated 7y this-onora7le Court .H ;%/ Record, (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, pp. *?-*)" emphasissupplied.=

)4. (ince . 7. odges was the sole and e6clusive heir of 5innie Janeodges, not only by law, but in accordance with the dispositions of her will,there was, in fact, no need to liCuidate the con>ugal estate of the spouses.The entirely of said con>ugal estate pertained to him e6clusively, thereforethis onorable ourt sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, . 7.odges to manage, operate and control all the con>ugal assets as owner.

)+. 0y e6pressly authorizing . 7. odges to act as he did in connectionwith the estate of his wife, this onorable ourt has ;)= declared . 7.odges as the sole heir of the estate of 5innie Jane odges, and ;2=delivered and distributed her estate to . 7. odges as sole heir inaccordance with the terms and conditions of her #ill. Thus, although theHestate of 5innie Jane odgesH still e6ists as a legal and >uridical personality,it had no assets or properties located in the &hilippines registered in itsname whatsoever at the time of the death of . 7. odges on !ecember24, )*+2.

)3. The #ill of 5innie Jane odges ;'nne6 H'H=, fourth paragraph, providesas follows:

H't the death of my said husband, harles 7ewtonodges, / give, devise and beCueath all of the rest,residue and remainder of my estate both real andpersonal, wherever situated or located, to be eCuallydivided among my brothers and sisters, share andshare ali$e, namely:

HEsta igdon, Emma owell,5eonard igdon, Roy igdon,(adie Rascoe, Era 0oman and7imray igdon.H

0ecause of the facts hereinabove set out there is no Hrest, residue andremainderH, at least to the e6tent of the &hilippine assets, which remains to

vest in the /G!97(, assuming this proviso in 5innie Jane odgesB #ill valid and binding against the estate of . 7. odges.

)@. 'ny claims by the /G!97( under the above-Cuoted provision of 5inJane odgesB #ill is without merit because said provision is void and invat least as to the &hilippine assets. /t should not, in anyway, affect the rigof the estate of . 7. odges or his heirs to the properties, which . 7.odges acCuired by way of inheritance from his wife 5innie Jane odgesupon her death.

;a= /n spite of the above-mentioned provision in the #of 5innie Jane odges, . 7. odges acCuired, notmerely a usufructuary right, but absolute title andownership to her estate. /n a recent case involving avery similar testamentary provision, the (upreme oheld that the heir first designated acCuired fullownership of the property beCueathed by the will, nomere usufructuary rights. ;onsolacion %lorentino de

risologo, et al., vs. anuel (ingson, G. R. 7o. 5 -)A@3+, %ebruary 2@, )*+2.=

;b= 'rticle @+, @32 and @@+ of the 7ew ivil odeclearly provide that no charge, condition or substitutiwhatsoever upon the legitime can be imposed by atestator. Thus, under the provisions of 'rticles *??, *and )??) of the 7ew ivil ode, the legitime of asurviving spouse is )<2 of the estate of the deceasedspouse. onseCuently, the above-mentioned provisiin the #ill of 5innie Jane odges is clearly invalidinsofar as the legitime of . 7. odges was concernwhich consisted of )<2 of the )<2 portion of the con>uestate, or )< of the entire con>ugal estate of thedeceased.

;c= There are generally only two $inds of substitutionprovided for and authorized by our ivil ode ;'rticle@43-@3?=, namely, ;)= simple or common substitutionsometimes referred to as +ul#ar substitution ;'rticle@4*=, and ;2= fideicommissary substitution ;'rticle @+

'll other substitutions are merely variations of these

The substitution provided for by paragraph four of th#ill of 5innie Jane odges is not fideicommissarysubstitution, because there is clearly no obligation othe part of . 7. odges as the first heir designated, preserve the properties for the substitute heirs.;onsolacion %lorentino de risologo et al. vs. anu(ingson, G. R. 7o.5-)A@3+.= 't most, it is a +ul#ar or simple substitutioowever, in order that a +ul#ar or simple substitutioncan be valid, three alternative conditions must bepresent, namely, that the first designated heir ;)= shodie before the testator" or ;2= should not wish to accethe inheritance" or ;A= should be incapacitated to do 7one of these conditions apply to . 7. odges, andtherefore, the substitution provided for by the above-Cuoted provision of the #ill is not authorized by theode, and, therefore, it is void. anresa, commentinon these $isses of substitution, meaningfully stated tH... cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, ypor fallecimiento de este nombra otro u otros, ha de

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entenderse Cue estas segundas designaciones solohan de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de Cue elprimer instituido muera antes Cue el testador, fuera ono esta su verdadera intencion. ...H. ;+ anresa, 3 aed., pag. )34.= /n other words, hen another heir isdesi#nated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, thesecond desi#nation can ha+e effect only in case thefirst instituted heir dies 7efore the testator, hether ornot that as the true intention of said testator . (ince .7. odges did not die before 5innie Jane odges, theprovision for substitution contained in 5innie JaneodgesB #illis void.

;d= /n view of the invalidity of the provision forsubstitution in the #ill, . 7. odgesB inheritance to theentirety of the 5innie Jane odges estate is irrevocableand final.

)*. 0e that as it may, at the time of . 7. odgesB death, the entirety of thecon>ugal estate appeared and was registered in him e6clusively as owner.Thus, the presumption is that all said assets constituted his estate.Therefore

;a= /f the /G!97( wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirsto )< of the con>ugal estate ;the other )< is covered by the legitime of .7. odges which can not be affected by any testamentary disposition=, theirremedy, if any, is to file their claim against the estate of . 7. odges, whichshould be entitled at the present time to full custody and control of all thecon>ugal estate of the spouses.

;b= The present proceedings, in which two estates e6ist under separateadministration, where the administratri6 of the 5innie Jane odges estatee6ercises an officious right to ob>ect and intervene in matters affectinge6clusively the . 7. odges estate, is anomalous.

#ERE%9RE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception ofevidence, this onorable ourt declare:

). That the estate of 5innie Jane odges was and is composed e6clusivelyof one-half ;)<2= share in the con>ugal estate of the spouses odges,computed as of the date of her death on ay 2A, )*43"

2. That the other half of the con>ugal estate pertained e6clusively to . 7.odges as his share as partner in the con>ugal partnership"

A. That all Hrents, emoluments and incomeH of the con>ugal estate accruingafter 5innie Jane odgesB death pertains to . 7. odges"

. That . 7. odges was the sole and e6clusive heir of the estate of 5innieJane odges"

4. That, therefore, the entire con>ugal estate of the spouses located in the&hilippines, plus all the Hrents, emoluments and incomeH above-mentioned,now constitutes the estate of . 7. odges, capable of distribution to hisheirs upon termination of (pecial &roceedings 7o. )+32"

+. That &/0, as administrator of the estate of . 7. odges, is entitled tofull and e6clusive custody, control and management of all said properties"and

3. That 'velina '. agno, as administratri6 of the estate of 5innie Janeodges, as well as the /G!97(, has no right to intervene or participatethe administration of the . 7. odges estate.

&/0 further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed >ust andeCuitable in the premises.H

;Record, pp. 2+4-233=

0efore all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on !ecember 2), )*+4,private respondent agno filed her own Hotion for the 9fficial !eclaration of eirs of the Estof 5innie Jane odgesH as follows:

9E( 79# the 'dministratri6 of the Estate of 5innie Jane odges andthrough undersigned counsel, unto this onorable ourt most respectfullstates and manifests:

). That the spouses harles 7ewton odges and 5innie Jane odges w 'merican citizens who died at the ity of /loilo after having amassed and

accumulated e6tensive properties in the &hilippines"

2. That on 7ovember 22, )*42, 5innie Jane odges e6ecuted a last will atestament ;the original of this will now forms part of the records of theseproceedings as E6hibit HH and appears as (p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, %olio /, pp)3-)@="

A. That on ay 2A, )*43, 5innie Jane odges died at the ity of /loilo at time survived by her husband, harles 7ewton odges, and severalrelatives named in her last will and testament"

. That on June 2@, )*43, a petition therefor having been priorly filed andduly heard, this onorable ourt issued an order admitting to probate thelast will and testament of 5innie Jane odges ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, %olio pp. 2-24, 2+-2@="

4. That the reCuired notice to creditors and to all others who may have anclaims against the decedent, 5innie Jane odges has already been printepublished and posted ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3, %olio /. pp. A-?= and thereglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago lapsed and e6pirewithout any claims having been asserted against the estate of 5innie Janodges, approved by the 'dministrator<'dministratri6 of the said estate, ratified by this onorable ourt"

+. That the last will and testament of 5innie Jane odges already admitteto probate contains an institution of heirs in the following words:

H(E97!: / give, devise and beCueath all of the resresidue and remainder of my estate, both personal areal, wherever situated or located, to my belovedhusband, harles 7ewton odges to have and to hounto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetim

T/R!: / desire, direct and provide that my husbandharles 7ewton odges, shall have the right tomanage, control, use and en>oy said estate during hlifetime, and, he is hereby given the right to ma$e anchanges in the physical properties of said estate, bysale of any part thereof which he may thin$ best, andthe purchase of any other or additional property as hmay thin$ best" to e6ecute conveyances with or withogeneral or special warranty, conveying in fee simple for any other term or time, any property which he ma

8/12/2019 863 to 914


deem proper to dispose of" to lease any of the realproperty for oil, gas and<or other minerals, and all suchdeeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple titleto the interest so conveyed in such property as he electto sell. 'll rents, emoluments and income from saidestate shall belong to him, and he is further authorizedto use any part of the principal of said estate as he mayneed or desire. /t is provided herein, however, that heshall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of theimproved property now owned by us located at, in ornear the ity of 5ubboc$ Te6as, but he shall have thefull right to lease, manage and en>oy the same duringhis lifetime, above provided. e shall have the right tosubdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and maysell unimproved town lots.

%9RT: 't the death of my said husband, harles

7ewton odges, / give, devise and beCueath all of therest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real andpersonal, wherever situated or located, to be eCuallydivided among my brothers and sisters, share andshare ali$e, namely:

Esta igdon, Emma owell, 5eonard igdon, Royigdon, (adie Rascoe, Era 0oman and 7imroy igdon.

%/%T: /n case of the death of any of my brothersand<or sisters named in item %ourth, above, prior to thedeath of my husband, harles 7ewton odges, then itis my will and beCuest that the heirs of such deceasedbrother or sister shall ta$e >ointly the share which wouldhave gone to such brother or sister had she or hesurvived.H

3. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-Cuoted, 5innie Jane odges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all herestate to her husband, harles 7ewton odges, and a vested remainder-estate or the na$ed title over the same estate to her relatives namedtherein"

@. That after the death of 5innie Jane odges and after the admission toprobate of her last will and testament, but during the lifetime of harles7ewton odges, the said harles 7ewton odges with full and complete$nowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon him by the will sincehe was then acting as 'dministrator of the estate and later as E6ecutor ofthe will of 5innie Jane odges, uneCuivocably and clearly through oral andwritten declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimedand repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of 5innie Janeodges"

*. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of 5innie Janeodges pursuant to her last will and testament, are her named brothers andsisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta igdon, Emma owell, 5eonard igdon,

'line igdon and !avid igdon, the latter two being the wife and sonrespectively of the deceased Roy igdon, (adie Rascoe Era 0oman and7imroy igdon, all of legal ages, 'merican citizens, with residence at the(tate of Te6as, nited (tates of 'merica"

)?. That at the time of the death of 5innie Jane odges on ay 2A, )*43,she was the co-owner ;together with her husband harles 7ewton odges=of an undivided one-half interest in their con>ugal properties e6isting as of

that date, ay 2A, )*43, which properties are now being administeredsometimes >ointly and sometimes separately by the 'dministratri6 of theestate of 5innie Jane odges and<or the 'dministrator of the estate of .odges but all of which are under the control and supervision of thisonorable ourt"

)). That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests husband and wife in the combined con>ugal estate, as there has been nosuch separation or segregation up to the present, both interests havecontinually earned e6actly the same amount of Hrents, emoluments andincomeH, the entire estate having been continually devoted to the businesof the spouses as if they were alive"

)2. That the one-half interest of 5innie Jane odges in the combinedcon>ugal estate was earning Hrents, emoluments and incomeH until her deon ay 2A, )*43, when it ceased to be saddled with any more charges oe6penditures which are purely personal to her in nature, and her estate $on earning such Hrents, emoluments and incomeH by virtue of their having

been e6pressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated by harles 7ewtoodges to whom they were beCueathed for life under the last will andtestament of 5innie Jane odges"

)A. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of harles 7ewton odin the combined con>ugal estate e6isting as of ay 2A, )*43, while it mayhave earned e6actly the same amount of Hrents, emoluments and incomeas that of the share pertaining to 5innie Jane odges, continued to beburdened by charges, e6penditures, and other dispositions which are purpersonal to him in nature, until the death of harles 7ewton odges himon !ecember 24, )*+2"

). That of all the assets of the combined con>ugal estate of 5innie Janeodges and harles 7ewton odges as they e6ist today, the estate of5innie Jane odges is clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty percent;4?K= as compared to the portion to which the estate of harles 7ewtonodges may be entitled, which portions can be e6actly determined by thefollowing manner:

a. 'n inventory must be made of the assets of thecombined con>ugal estate as they e6isted on the deaof 5innie Jane odges on ay 2A, )*43 one-half

these assets belong to the estate of 5innie Janeodges"

b. 'n accounting must be made of the Hrents,emoluments and incomeH of all these assets agaione-half of these belong to the estate of 5innie Janeodges"

c. 'd>ustments must be made, after ma$ing a deducof charges, disbursements and other dispositions maby harles 7ewton odges personally and for his owpersonal account from ay 2A, )*43 up to !ecembe24, )*+2, as well as other charges, disbursements aother dispositions made for him and in his behalf sin!ecember 24, )*+2 up to the present"

)4. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as theestate of 5innie Jane odges is concerned but to complete the liCuidationher estate, segregate them from the con>ugal estate, and distribute themher heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.

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#ERE%9RE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved andprayed that this onorable ourt, after a hearing on the factual mattersraised by this motion, issue an order:

a. !eclaring the following persons, to wit: Esta igdon, Emma owell,5eonard igdon, 'line igdon, !avid igdon, (adie Rascoe, Era 0omanand 7imroy igdon, as the sole heirs under the last will and testament of5innie Jane odges and as the only persons entitled to her estate"

b. !etermining the e6act value of the estate of 5innie Jane odges inaccordance with the system enunciated in paragraph ) of this motion"

c. 'fter such determination ordering its segregation from the combinedcon>ugal estate and its delivery to the 'dministratri6 of the estate of 5innieJane odges for distribution to the heirs to whom they properly belong andappertain.

;Green Record on 'ppeal, pp. A@2-A*)=

whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January @, )*+4 aforeCuoted, as it hadbeen doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing the abovemotion of respondent agno, filed a motion on 'pril 22, )*++ alleging in part that:

). That it has received from the counsel for the administratri6 of thesupposed estate of 5innie Jane odges a notice to set her Hotion for9fficial !eclaration of eirs of the Estate of 5innie Jane odgesH"

2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matterspending before this onorable ourt, such as:

a. The e6amination already ordered by this onorableourt of documents relating to the allegation of 'velinaagno that harles 7ewton odges Hthrough ... writtendeclarations and sworn public statements, renounced,disclaimed and repudiated life-estate and usufruct overthe estate of 5innie Jane odgesB"

b. That Hrgent otion for 'n 'ccounting and !eliveryto the Estate of . 7. odges of 'll the 'ssets of theon>ugal &artnership of the !eceased 5innie Janeodges and . 7. odges E6isting as of ay 2A, )*43&lus 'll the Rents, Emoluments and /ncomeTherefromH"

c. 8arious motions to resolve the aforesaid motion"

d. anifestation of (eptember ), )*+, detailing actsof interference of 'velina agno under color of title asadministratri6 of the Estate of 5innie Jane odges"

which are all pre>udicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all factsinvolved therein being matters of record, and therefore reCuire only theresolution of Cuestions of law"

A. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have couldbe very easily threshed ou t in the Testate Estate of harles 7ewtonodges"

. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and twoadministrators only results in confusion and is unduly burdensome upon theTestate Estate of harles 7ewton odges, particularly because the bondfiled by 'velina agno is grossly insufficient to answer for the funds and

property which she has inofficiously collected and held , as well as thosewhich she continues to inofficiously collect and hold "

4. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects andinconveniences not only the estate but also third-parties dealing with it"H;'nne6 H8H, &etition.=

and then, after further reminding the court, by Cuoting them, of the relevant allegations of itsearlier motion of (eptember ), )*+, 'nne6 , prayed that:

). /mmediately order 'velina agno to account for and deliver to theadministrator of the Estate of . 7. odges all the assets of the con>ugalpartnership of the deceased 5innie Jane odges and . 7. odges, plusthe rents, emoluments and income therefrom"

2. &ending the consideration of this motion, immediately order 'velinaagno to turn over all her collections to the administrator &hilippineommercial L /ndustrial 0an$"

A. !eclare the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3closed"

. !efer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of hein the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges until the matters hereinaboveset forth are resolved.;&rayer, 'nne6 H8H of &etition.=

9n 9ctober )2, )*++, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent courtdenied the foregoing motion, holding thus:

9 R ! E R

9n record is a motion ;8ol. 1, (p. )+32, pp. A3*-A*?= dated 'pril 22,)*++ of administrator &/0 praying that ;)= /mmediately order 'velinaagno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the estate of . odges all assets of the con>ugal partnership of the deceased 5innie Janodges and . 7. odges, plus all the rents, emoluments and incometherefrom" ;2= &ending the consideration of this motion, immediately orde

'velina agno to turn over all her collections to the administrator &/0" !eclare the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3=closed" and ;= !efer the hearing and consideration of the motion fordeclaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges until thematters hereinabove set forth are resolved.

This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending befothis court such as ;a= the e6amination already ordered by this onorableourt of documents relating to the allegation of 'velina agno that har7ewton odges thru written declaration and sworn public statementsrenounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over thestate of 5innie Jane odges ;b= the urgent motion for accounting anddelivery to the estate of . 7. odges of all the assets of the con>ugalpartnership of the deceased 5innie Jane odges and . 7. odges e6istas of ay 2A, )*43 plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;c= various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion" and ;d= manifestation(eptember ), )*+, detailing acts of interference of 'velina agno undcolor of title as administratri6 of the estate of 5innie Jane odges.

These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre->udicial involvino issues of facts and only reCuire the resolution of Cuestion of law" that the motion of 9ctober 4, )*+A it is alleged that in a motion dated !ecemb)), )*43 filed by 'tty. 5eon Gellada as attorney for the e6ecutor . 7.odges, the said e6ecutor . 7. odges is not only part owner of the

8/12/2019 863 to 914


properties left as con>ugal but also the successor to all the properties left bythe deceased 5innie Jane odges.

(aid motion of !ecember )), )*43 was approved by the ourt inconsonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of5innie Jane odges.

That on 'pril 2), )*4* this ourt approved the inventory and accountingsubmitted by . 7. odges thru counsel 'tty. 5eon Gellada in a motion filedon 'pril ), )*4* stating therein that e6ecutor . 7. odges is the onlydevisee or legatee of 5innie Jane odges in accordance with the last willand testament already probated by the ourt.

That on July )A, )*+? the ourt approved the annual statement of accountssubmitted by the e6ecutor . 7. odges thru his counsel 'tty. Gellada onJuly 2), )*+? wherein it is stated that the e6ecutor, . 7. odges is the onlydevisee or legatee of the deceased 5innie Jane odges" that on ay 2,)*+) the ourt approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by

e6ecutor, . 7. odges for the year )*+? which was submitted by 'tty.Gellada on 'pril 2?, )*+) wherein it is stated that e6ecutor odges is theonly devisee or legatee of the deceased 5innie Jane odges"

That during the hearing on (eptember 4 and +, )*+A the estate of . 7.odges claimed all the assets belonging to the deceased spouses 5innieJane odges and . 7. odges situated in the &hilippines" thatadministratri6 agno has e6ecuted illegal acts to the pre>udice of the testateestate of . 7. odges.

'n opposition ;(p. )+32, 8ol. 1, pp. )4-2)= dated 'pril 23, )*++ ofadministratri6 agno has been filed as$ing that the motion be denied forlac$ of merit and that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of theestate of 5innie Jane odges be set for presentation and reception ofevidence.

/t is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the e6amination of documentswhich are in the possession of administratri6 agno can be made prior tothe hearing of the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of5innie Jane odges, during said hearing.

That the matters raised in the &/0Bs motion of 9ctober 4, )*+A ;as well asthe other motion= dated (eptember ), )*+ have been consolidated for the

purpose of presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing on thedetermination of the heirs of the estate of 5innie Jane odges. /t is furtheralleged in the opposition that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of 5innie Jane odges is the one that constitutes a pre>udicialCuestion to the motions dated 9ctober 4 and (eptember ), )*+ becauseif said motion is found meritorious and granted by the ourt, the &/0Bsmotions of 9ctober 4, )*+A and (eptember ), )*+ will become moot andacademic since they are premised on the assumption and claim that theonly heir of 5innie Jane odges was . 7. odges.

That the &/0 and counsel are estopped from further Cuestioning thedetermination of heirs in the estate of 5innie Jane odges at this stagesince it was &/0 as early as January @, )*+4 which filed a motion forofficial declaration of heirs of 5innie Jane odges that the claim of any heirsof 5innie Jane odges can be determined only in the administrationproceedings over the estate of 5innie Jane odges and not that of . 7.odges, since the heirs of 5innie Jane odges are claiming her estate andnot the estate of . 7. odges.

' reply ;(p. )+32, 8ol. 1, pp. A+-= dated ay )), )*++ of the &/has been filed alleging that the motion dated 'pril 22, )*++ of the &/0 isnot to see$ deferment of the hearing and consideration of the motion forofficial declaration of heirs of 5innie Jane odges but to declare the testaestate of 5innie Jane odges closed and for administratri6 agno toaccount for and deliver to the &/0 all assets of the con>ugal partnershipthe deceased spouses which has come to her possession plus all rents aincome.

' re>oinder ;(p. )+32, 8ol. 1, pp. 4@-+2= of administratri6 agno datay )*, )*++ has been filed alleging that the motion dated !ecember )))*43 only sought the approval of all conveyances made by . 7. odgesand reCuested the ourt authority for all subseCuent conveyances that wbe e6ecuted by . 7. odges" that the order dated !ecember ), )*43 oapproved the conveyances made by . 7. odges" that . 7. odgesrepresented by counsel never made any claim in the estate of 5innie Janodges and never filed a motion to declare himself as the heir of the said

5innie Jane odges despite the lapse of more than five ;4= years after thdeath of 5innie Jane odges" that it is further alleged in the re>oinder thatthere can be no order of ad>udication of the estate unless there has beenprior e6press declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in theestate of 5innie Jane odges ;(p. )A?3= has been made.

onsidering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the &/0well as those in the opposition and re>oinder of administratri6 agno, theourt finds the opposition and re>oinder to be well ta$en for the reason thso far there has been no official declaration of heirs in the testate estate 5innie Jane odges and therefore no disposition of her estate.

#ERE%9RE, the motion of the &/0 dated 'pril 22, )*++ is hereby!E7/E!.;'nne6 H#H, &etition=

/n its motion dated 7ovember 2, )*++ for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner allegedinter alia that:

/t cannot be over-stressed that the motion of !ecember )), )*43 was bason the fact that:

a. nder the last will and testament of the deceased5innie Jane odges, the late harles 7ewton odgewas the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties the &hilippines are concerned"

b. (aid last will and testament vested upon the said harles 7ewton odges rights over said propertieswhich, in sum, spell ownership, absolute and in feesimple"

c. (aid late harles 7ewton odges was, therefore,Hnot only part owner of the properties left as con>ugabut also, the successor to all the properties left by thdeceased 5innie Jane odges.

5i$ewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granteby this onorable ourt Hfor the reasons statedH therein.

'gain, the motion of !ecember )), )*43 prayed that not only Hall the saleconveyances, leases, and mortgages e6ecuted byH the late harles 7ewodges, but also all Hthe subseCuent sales, conveyances, leases, andmortgages ...H be approved and authorized. This onorable ourt, in itsorder of !ecember ), )*43, Hfor the reasons statedH in the aforesaid

8/12/2019 863 to 914


motion, granted the same, and not only approved all the sales,conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased5innie Jane odges e6ecuted by the late harles 7ewton odges, but alsoauthorized Hall subseCuent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages ofthe properties left by the said deceased 5innie Jane odges. ;'nne6 H1H,&etition=

and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges had alreadybeen factually, although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of odges andad>udication to him, as sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate of his wife, in theorder of !ecember ), )*43, 'nne6 G. (till unpersuaded, on July )@, )*+3, respondent courtdenied said motion for reconsideration and held that Hthe court believes that there is no

>ustification why the order of 9ctober )2, )*++ should be considered or modifiedH, and , on July)*, )*+3, the motion of respondent agno Hfor official declaration of heirs of the estate of 5innieJane odgesH, already referred to above, was set for hearing.

/n conseCuence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on 'ugust ), )*+3;albeit petitioner had to pay another doc$eting fee on 'ugust *, )*+3, since the orders in

Cuestion were issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, 7os. )A?3 and )+32, in thecourt below=.

Together with such petition, there are now pending before s for resolution herein, appeals fromthe following:

). The order of !ecember )*, )*+ authorizing payment by respondentagno of overtime pay, ;pp. 22), Green Record on 'ppeal= together withthe subseCuent orders of January *, )*+4, ;pp. 2A)-2A2, id.= 9ctober 23,)*+4, ;pp. 223, id.= and %ebruary )4, )*++ ;pp. 44-4+, id.= repeatedlydenying motions for reconsideration thereof.

2. The order of 'ugust +, )*+4 ;pp. 2@, id.= reCuiring that deeds e6ecutedby petitioner to be co-signed by respondent agno, as well as the order of9ctober 23, )*+4 ;pp. 23+-233= denying reconsideration.

A. The order of 9ctober 23, )*+4 ;pp. 2*2-2*4, id.= en>oining the deposit ofall collections in a >oint account and the same order of %ebruary )4, )*++mentioned in 7o. ) above which included the denial of the reconsiderationof this order of 9ctober 23, )*+4.

. The order of 7ovember A, )*+4 ;pp. A)A-A2?, id.= directing the paymentof attorneyBs fees, fees of the respondent administratri6, etc. and the order

of %ebruary )+, )*++ denying reconsideration thereof.

4. The order of 7ovember 2A, )*+4 ;pp. AA-AA4, id.= allowing appellee#estern /nstitute of Technology to ma$e payments to either one or both ofthe administrators of the two estates as well as the order of arch 3, )*++;p. +2, id.= denying reconsideration.

+. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds ofsale e6ecuted by respondent agno in favor of appellees arles, atedral,&ablito, Guzman, oronado, 0arrido, ausing, Javier, 5ucero and0atisanan, ;see pp. A4 to A3 of this opinion=, together with the two separateorders both dated !ecember 2, )*++ ;pp. A?+-A?@, and pp. A?@-A?*, FellowRecord on 'ppeal= denying reconsideration of said approval.

3. The order of January A, )*+3, on pp. AA4-AA+, Fellow Record on 'ppeal,approving similar deeds of sale e6ecuted by respondent agno, as those in7o. +, in favor of appellees &acaonsis and &remaylon, as to which nomotion for reconsideration was filed.

@. 5astly, the order of !ecember 2, )*++, on pp. A?4-A?+, Fellow Record on 'ppeal, directing petitioner to surrender to appellees 5ucero , 0atisanan,

Javier, &ablito, 0arrido, atedral, ausing, Guzman, and oronado, thecertificates of title covering the lands involved in the approved sales, as twhich no motion for reconsideration was filed either.

(trictly spea$ing, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, >ust as thaffect distinctly different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellaon pp. )2-2? thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three ;AA= appeals before s, for which reasopetitioner has to pay also thirty-one ;A)= more doc$et fees.

/t is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with theseappeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight ;5118///= alleged errors, the respectdiscussions and arguments under all of them covering also the fundamental issues raised inrespect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus ma$ing it feasible and more practical the ourt to dispose of all these cases together.

The assignments of error read thus:

/ to /8

TE 9R!ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE!( 9%('5E /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE(, &E&/T9 G. /F59RE(,E(&/R/!/97 &'RT/('5', #/7/%RE!9 . E(&'!' '7! R9('R/9

'5/7G'(', E1ETE! 0F TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79,98ER/7G &'RE5( 9% 5'7! 9#7E! 0F TE !EE'(E!,'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, '7! TE 97TR'T( T9 (E5598ER/7G #/ #ERE E1ETE! 0F / !R/7G /( 5/%ET/

8 to 8///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE !EE!( 9% ('5E /%'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE(, &E&/T9 G. /F59RE(, E(&/R/!/97&'RT/('5', #/7/%RE!9 . E(&'!' '7! R9('R/9 '5/7G'(',98ER/7G &'RE5( 9% 5'7! %9R #/ TEF '8E 7E8ER &'/7 %55 /7 '9R!'7E #/T TE 9R/G/7'5 97TR'T( T9 (E

/1 to 1//

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 !ETER/7/7G TE R/GT( 9%9#7ER(/& 98ER RE'5 &R9&ERTF 9% TE '&&E55EE(, &E&/T9/F59RE(, E(&/R/!/97 &'RT/('5', #/7/%RE!9 . E(&'!' '7!R9('R/9 '5/7G'(', #/5E 'T/7G '( ' &R90'TE 9RT.

1/// to 18

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE!( 9%('5E /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE( '!E5%' &RE'F597 ;59T 79)?2=, ('7T/'G9 &''97(/(, '7! '!E5%' &RE'F597 ;59T 79.)?=, E1ETE! 0F TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79, 98ER/7&'RE5( 9% 5'7! 9#7E! 0F TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T99!GE(, '7! TE 97TR'T( T9 (E55 98ER/7G #/ #ERE1ETE! 0F / !R/7G /( 5/%ET/E.

18/ to 18///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE !EE!( 9% ('5E /%'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE( '!E5%' &RE'F597 ;59T 79. )?2=,('7T/'G9 &''97(/(, '7! '!E5%' &RE'F597 ;59T 79. )?=98ER/7G &'RE5( 9% 5'7! %9R #/ TEF '8E 7E8ER &'/7 %55 /7 '9R!'7E #/T TE 9R/G/7'5 97TR'T( T9 (E

1/1 to 11/

8/12/2019 863 to 914


TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 !ETER/7/7G TE R/GT( 9%9#7ER(/& 98ER RE'5 &R9&ERTF 9% TE '&&E55EE( '!E5%'&RE'F597 ;59T 79. )?2=, ('7T/'G9 &''97(/(, '7! '!E5%'&RE'F597 ;59T 79. )?= #/5E 'T/7G '( ' &R90'TE 9RT.

11// to 118

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE!( 9%('5E /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE( 59RE7N9 'R5E(, J9(E&'05/9, '5%RE!9 'TE!R'5 '7! ('58'!9R (. GN'7,E1ETE! 0F TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79, 98ER/7G&'RE5( 9% 5'7! 9#7E! 0F TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T979!GE(, '7! TE 97TR'T( T9 (E55 98ER/7G #/ #EREE1ETE! 0F / !R/7G /( 5 /%ET/E.

118/ to 11/1

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE! 9%

('5E E1ETE! /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE(, 59RE7N9 'R5E(,J9(E &'05/9, '5%RE!9 'TE!R'5 '7! ('58'!9R (. GN'7&R('7T T9 97TR'T( T9 (&E55 #/ #ERE '7E55E!

'7! RE(/7!E!.

111 to 111/8

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 !ETER/7/7G TE R/GT( 9%9#7ER(/& 98ER RE'5 &R9&ERTF 9% TE 59RE7N9 'R5E(,J9(E &'05/9, '5%RE!9 'TE!R'5 '7! ('58'!9R (. GN'7,#/5E 'T/7G '( ' &R90'TE 9RT.

1118 to 1118/

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE!( 9%('5E /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE(, %59RE7/' 0'RR/!9 '7!&R/%/'/97 9R97'!9, E1ETE! 0F TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7'

'. 'G79, 98ER/7G &'RE5( 9% 5'7! 9#7E! 0F TE!EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, '7! TE 97TR'T( T9(E55 98ER/7G #/ #ERE E1ETE! 0F / !R/7G /(5/%ET/E.

1118// to 1118///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE !EE!( 9% ('5E /7%'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE(, %59RE7/' 0'RR/!9 '7! &R/%/'/979R97'!9, '5T9G TEF #ERE /7 'RRE'R( /7 TE &'FE7T(

'GREE! &97 /7 TE 9R/G/7'5 97TR'T T9 (E55 #/ TEFE1ETE! #/T TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, /7TE '97T 9% &)?,+@?.?? and &,2@.*?, RE(&ET/8E5F.

111/1 to 15

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 !E&R/8/7G TE !EE'(E!,'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, 9% TE 97TR'T'5 R/GT,E1ER/(E! TR9G /( '!/7/(TR'T9R, TE /7(T'7T

'&&E55'7T, T9 '7E5 TE 97TR'T( T9 (E55 9% TE '&&E55EE(, %59RE7/' 0'RR/!9 '7! &R/%/'/97 9R97'!9.

15/ to 15///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE!( 9%('5E /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE(, GR'/'79 5ER9, 'R/TE9T9'( J'/R '7! E5D/'!E( 0'T/('7'7, E1ETE! 0F TE

'&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79, 98ER/7G &'RE5( 9% 5'7!

9#7E! 0F TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, '7! T97TR'T( T9 (E55 98ER/7G #/ #ERE E1ETE! 0F /!R/7G /( 5/%ET/E.

15/8 to 158/

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE! 9%('5E /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE(, GR'/'79 5ER9, 'R/TE9T9'( J'/R '7! E5D/'!E( 0'T/('7'7, &R('7T T997TR'T( T9 (E55 E1ETE! 0F TE #/T TE !EE'(E!,'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, TE TER( '7! 97!/T/97( 9%#/ TEF '8E 7E8ER 9&5/E! #/T.

158// to 15/1

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 !E&R/8/7G TE !EE'(E!,'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, 9% /( R/GT, E1ER/(E! TR9G/( '!/7/(TR'T/97, TE /7(T'7T '&&E55'7T, T9 '7E5 TE

97TR'T( T9 (E55 9% TE '&&E55EE(, GR'/'79 5ER9, 'R/TE9 T9'( J'/R '7! E5D/'!E( 0'T/('7'7, '7! /7!ETER/7/7G TE R/GT( 9% TE ('/! '&&E55EE( 98ER RE'5&R9&ERTF #/5E 'T/7G '( ' &R90'TE 9RT.

5

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE %/7'5 !EE!( 9%('5E /7 %'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE, 0E5E('R '(/7G, E1ET0F TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79, 98ER/7G &'RE5( 9%5'7! 9#7E! 0F TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, 'TE 97TR'T( T9 (E55 98ER/7G #/ #ERE E1ETE! 0/ !R/7G /( 5/%ET/E.

5/

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE !EE!( 9% ('5E /%'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE, 0E5E('R '(/7G, '5T9G E #/7 'RRE'R( /7 TE &'FE7T( 'GREE! &97 /7 TE 9R/G/7'597TR'T T9 (E55 #/ E E1ETE! #/T TE !EE'(E!'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, /7 TE '97T 9% &2,AA3.4?.

5//

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '&&R98/7G TE !EE! 9% ('5E /7%'89R 9% TE '&&E55EE, 0E5E('R '(/7G, '5T9G TE('E #'( 79T E1ETE! /7 '9R!'7E #/T TE R5E( 9%9RT.

5/// to 51/

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE '&&E55'7T,&/5/&&/7E 9ER/'5 '7! /7!(TR/'5 0'7M T9 (RRE7!ERTE 9#7ERB( !&5/'TE ERT/%/'TE( 9% T/T5E 98ER TERE(&ET/8E 59T( 98ERE! 0F TE !EE!( 9% ('5E E1ETE!0F TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79, /7 %'89R 9% TE 9TER

'&&E55EE(, J9(E &'05/9, '5%RE!9 'TE!R'5, ('58'!9R (.GN'7, %5RE7/' 0'RR/!9, &R/%/'/97 9R97'!9, 0E5E('(/7G, 'R/TE9 T9'( J'/R, '1/' 0'T/('7'7 '7!GR'/'79 5. 5ER9.

51//

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 RE(958/7G TE 9T/97 9% TE '&&E55EE, #E(TER7 /7(T/TTE 9% TE7959GF, !'TE!

8/12/2019 863 to 914


798E0ER A, )*+4, #/T9T '7F 9&F TERE9% '8/7G 0EE7(ER8E! &97 TE '&&E55'7T, &/5/&&/7E 9ER/'5 L/7!(TR/'5 0'7M.

51///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 E'R/7G '7! 97(/!ER/7G TE9T/97 9% TE '&&E55EE, #E(TER7 /7(T/TTE 9% TE7959GF,!'TE! 798E0ER Ard, )*+4, 97 798E0ER 2A, )*+4, #E7 TE79T/E %9R TE E'R/7G TERE9% #'( %9R 798E0ER 2?, )*+4.

51/8

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 GR'7T/7G TE '&&E55EE, #E(TER7/7(T/TTE 9% TE7959GF ' RE5/E% 9TER T'7 T'T &R'FE!%9R /7 /T( 9T/97, !'TE! 798E0ER A, )*+4, /7 TE '0(E7E 9%

' &R'FER %9R GE7ER'5 RE5/E% 97T'/7E! TERE/7.

518

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '559#/7G TE '&&E55EE, #E(TER7/7(T/TTE 9% TE7959GF, T9 97T/7E &'FE7T( &97 '97TR'T T9 (E55 TE TER( '7! 97!/T/97( 9% #/ /T '(%'/5E! T9 %5%/55.

518/

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 !ETER/7/7G TE R/GT( 9% TE '&&E55EE, #E(TER7 /7(T/TTE 9% TE7959GF 98ER TE RE'5&R9&ERTF (0JET 'TTER 9% TE 97TR'T T9 (E55 /TE1ETE! #/T TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(,#/5E 'T/7G '( ' &R90'TE 9RT.

518//

59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 '559#/7G TE 97T/7'T/97 9%&'FE7T( 0F TE '&&E55EE, #E(TER7 /7(T/TTE 9%TE7959GF, &97 ' 97TR'T T9 (E55 E1ETE! 0F /T '7!TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, T9 ' &ER(97 9TERT'7 /( 5'#%55F '&&9/7TE! '!/7/(TR'T9R.

518///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE &'FE7T 9%RET'/7ERB( %EE( %R9 TE (&&9(E! E(T'TE 9% TE!EE'(E!, 5/77/E J'7E 9!GE(, #E7 TERE /( 7E/TER (E(T'TE 79R '((ET( TERE9%.

51/1

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE &'FE7T 9%RET'/7ERB( %EE( 9% 5'#FER( 9% '55EGE! E/R( T9 TE(&&9(E! E(T'TE 9% TE !EE'(E!, 5/77/E J'7E 9!GE(.

511

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 /&5EE7T/7G TE '55EGE! 'GREEE7T 0ET#EE7 TE E/R( 9% TE (&&9(E! E(T'TE 9%TE !EE'(E!, 5/77/E J'7E 9!GE(, '7! TE/R 5'#FER(.

511/

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE &RE'TRE!/(TR/0T/97 9% E(T'TE '((ET( T9 '55EGE! E/R( 9R0E7E%//'R/E( TERE9%, 0F #'F 9% RET'/7ERB( %EE(.

511//

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G T'T '55 %/7'5 !EE!( ('5E E1ETE! &R('7T T9 97TR'T( T9 (E55 E7TERE!/7T9 0F TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE(, !R/7G 5/%ET/E, 0E (/G7E! J9/7T5F 0F TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '.'G79, '7! TE '&&E55'7T, &/5/&&/7E 9ER/'5 '7!/7!(TR/'5 0'7M, '7! 79T 0F TE 5'TTER 975F '( TE5'#%55F '&&9/7TE! '!/7/(TR'T9R 9% /( E(T'TE.

511///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE &'FE7T 9% 5EG'E1&E7(E( %R9 TE (&&9(E! E(T'TE 9% TE !EE'(E!,

5/77/E J'7E 9!GE(, #E7 TERE /( 7E/TER ( E(T'TE 7 '((ET( TERE9%.

511/8

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE &'FE7T 9% 5EG'E1&E7(E( 9% 5'#FER( 9% '55EGE! E/R( T9 TE (&&9(E!E(T'TE 9% TE !EE'(E!, 5/77/E J'7E 9!GE(.

5118

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE &RE'TRE!/(TR/0T/97 9% E(T'TE '((ET( T9 '55EGE! E/R( 9R0E7E%//'R/E( TERE9%, 0F #'F 9% 5EG'5 E1&E7(E(.

5118/

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G TE &'FE7T 9%9&E7('T/97 T9 TE &R&9RTE! '!/7/(TR'TR/1 9% TE(&&9(E! E(T'TE 9% TE !EE'(E!, 5/77/E J'7E 9!GE(, T/7(T'7T '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79, #E7 TERE /( 7E/TER( E(T'TE 79R '((ET( TERE9%.

5118//

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G T'T TE %7!( 9% TTE(T'TE E(T'TE 9% TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T97 9!GE0E &5'E! /7 ' J9/7T '97T 9% TE '&&E55'7T, &/5/&&/7E9ER/'5 '7! /7!(TR/'5 0'7M, '7! TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7

'. 'G79, #9 /( ' 9&5ETE (TR'7GER T9 TE '%9RE('/!E(T'TE.

5118///

TE 59#ER 9RT ERRE! /7 9R!ER/7G T'T TE '&&E55EE, '8E5/7' '. 'G79, 0E G/8E7 ED'5 'E(( T9 TE RE9R!( TE TE(T'TE E(T'TE 9% TE !EE'(E!, 'R5E( 7E#T979!GE(, #E7 (E /( ' 9&5ETE (TR'7GER T9 TE

'%9RE('/! E(T'TE. ;&p. 3A-@A, 'ppellantBs 0rief.=

To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably e6tended narration of the factual setting othese cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of rs. odgeshave respondent agno removed as administratri6, with the proposed appointment of 0enito 5opez in her place, and that respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, the ourt declared the said order of respondent court violative of its in>unction of 'ugust @, )*

8/12/2019 863 to 914


hence without force and effect ;see Resolution of (eptember @, )*32 and %ebruary ), )*3A=.(ubseCuently, 'tty. Efrain 0. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for theproposed administrator 5opez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated 9ctober 2+,)*32 informed the ourt that a motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal ofpetitioner &/0 as administrator of the estate of . 7. odges in (pecial &roceedings )+32,which removal motion alleged that 22.*+@)*K of the share of . 7. odges had already beenacCuired by the heirs of rs. odges from certain heirs of her husband. %urther, in thisconnection, in the answer of &/0 to the motion of respondent agno to have it declared incontempt for disregarding the ourtBs resolution of (eptember @, )*32 modifying the in>unctionof 'ugust @, )*+3, said petitioner anne6ed thereto a >oint manifestation and motion, appearing tohave been filed with respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22K of the share of . 7. odges had already been bought by the heirs of rs. odges, as alreadystated, certain other heirs of odges representing )3.AA34?K of his estate were >oining causewith the heirs of rs. odges as against &/0, thereby ma$ing somewhat precarious, if notpossibly untenable, petitionersB continuation as administrator of the odges estate.

RE(95T/97 9% /((E( /7 TE CE%OA% '7!

&R9/0/T/97 '(E(/

As to the Alle#ed ardinessof the $resent Appeals

The priority Cuestion raised by respondent agno relates to the alleged tardiness of all theaforementioned thirty-three appeals of &/0. onsidering, however, that these appeals revolvearound practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that some of them have beentimely ta$en, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and e6plained ma$e it ofno conseCuence whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the lapsing of therespective periods to appeal them, #e do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness ofany of said appeals.

//

he $ropriety -ere of Certiorari and $rohi7ition instead of Appeal

The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civilaction of certiorari and prohibition in view of the e6istence of the remedy of appeal which itclaims is proven by the very appeals now before s. (uch contention fails to ta$e into accountthat there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals

which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and conseCuent eventual appeals. /f for thisconsideration alone, and without ta$ing account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort,e6pense and time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of suchincidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as #e do hold, that the remedy of appeal is notadeCuate in the present cases. /n determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lac$ or e6cess of

>urisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeale6ists or is possible. /t is indispensable that ta$ing all the relevant circumstances of the givencase, appeal would better serve the interests of >ustice. 9bviously, the longer delay, augmentede6pense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same wor$ attendant to the presentmultiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues that can be moree6peditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, ma$e the remedies ofcertiorari and prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving thecommon basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of appeal. 0esides,the settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflictbetween the parties and render more simple the determination of the secondary issues in eachof them. 'ccordingly, respondent agnoBs ob>ection to the present remedy of certiorari andprohibition must be overruled.

#e come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, &hilippine ommercial L /ndustr0an$, ;&/0, for short= in the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.

///

On 3hether or 0ot here is till Any $art of the estateEstate &rs. -od#es that may 7e Adudicated to her 7rothersand sisters as her estate, of hich respondent &a#no is theunquestioned Administratri6 in special $roceedin#s ;:>.

/n the petition, it is the position of &/0 that the respondent court e6ceeded its >urisdiction orgravely abused its discretion in further recognizing after !ecember ), )*43 the e6istence of Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therof respondent agno. ain ground for such posture is that by the aforeCuoted order ofrespondent court of said date, odges was already allowed to assert and e6ercise all his righas universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, Cuoted earlier, hence, nothinelse remains to be done in (pecial &roceedings )A?3 e6cept to formally close it. /n other worthe contention of &/0 is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of

odges as sole and e6clusive heir of his wife and the conseCuent formal unCualifiedad>udication to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close (pecial &roceeding)A?3, hence respondent agno should be considered as having ceased to be 'dministratri6 the Testate Estate of rs. odges since then.

'fter carefully going over the record, #e feel constrained to hold that such pose is patentlyuntenable from whatever angle it is e6amined.

To start with, #e cannot find anywhere in respondent 9rder o f !ecember ), )*43 the sensebeing read into it by &/0. The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. Thdeclaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its mosimportant function, and this ourt is not disposed to encourage >udges of probate proceedingbe less than definite, plain and specific in ma$ing orders in such regard, if for no other reasonthan that all parties concerned, li$e the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, thdevisees and legatees, should $now with certainty what are and when their respective rights obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the camay be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and conseCuent litigations similar those that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. #hile it is true that in instancewherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have already actuallydistributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyoneconcerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it would naturally almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is

inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be consideredterminated, the respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, andthe e6ecutor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relievedalready of all functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of theprobate court to such effect.

/ndeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and uneCuivocal. (ection ) of Rule *?provides:

(ET/97 ). 3hen order for distri7ution of residue made. #hen thedebts, funeral charges, and e6penses of administration, the allowance tothe widow and inheritance ta6, if any, chargeable to the estate inaccordance with law have been paid, the court, on the application of thee6ecutor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and aftehearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the personsentitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to whicheach is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover theirrespective shares from the e6ecutor or administrator, or any other personhaving the same in his possession. /f there is a controversy before the coas to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the

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distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, thecontroversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

7o distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations abovementioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fi6ed by the court, conditioned for thepayment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for thesettlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, ;)= there shouldhave been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedentamong or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but ;2= such order shall not be issued untilafter it is shown that the Hdebts, funeral e6penses, e6penses of administration, allowances,ta6es, etc. chargeable to the estateH have been paid, which is but logical and proper. ;A=0esides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose ofthe interested party or parties, and not of the court.

... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges,

e6penses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance ta6shall have been effected that the court should ma$e a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the residue. ;oran, omments onthe Rules of ourt, 2nd ed., 8ol. //, p. A*3, citing apistrano vs. 7adurata,* &hil., 32+" 5opez vs. 5opez, A3 9ff. Gaz., A?*).= ;J/9G'-97 v.0E597TE, @ &hil. 44, 4@= ;p. @+, 'ppelleeBs 0rief=

666 666 666

nder (ection 34A of the ode of ivil &rocedure, ;corresponding to(ection ), Rule *?= what brings an intestate ;or testate= proceeding to aclose is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to thepersons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by thedeceased. ;(antiesteban vs. (antiesteban, +@ &hil. A+3, A3?.=

/n the cases at bar, #e cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings andorders before s that the above indispensable prereCuisites for the declaration of heirs and thead>udication of the estate of rs. odges had already been complied with when the order of!ecember ), )*43 was issued. 's already stated, #e are not persuaded that the proceedingsleading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of ay 23, )*43, 'nne6 !of the petition, the order of even date, 'nne6 E, and the motion of !ecember )), )*43, 'nne6 ,all aforeCuoted, are what the law contemplates. #e cannot see in the order of !ecember ),)*43, so much relied upon by the petitioner, anything more than an e6plicit approval of Hall thesales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased 5innie Janeodges e6ecuted by the E6ecutor harles 7. odgesH ;after the death of his wife and prior tothe date of the motion=, plus a general advance authorization to enable said HE6ecutor toe6ecute subseCuent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the saiddeceased 5innie Jane odges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will andtestament of the latterH, which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of ad>udication of the estateof the decedent to odges contemplated in the law. /n fact, the motion of !ecember )), )*43 onwhich the court predicated the order in Cuestion did not pray for any such ad>udication at all.#hat is more, although said motion did allege that Hherein E6ecutor ;odges= is not only partowner of the properties left as con>ugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by thedeceased 5innie Jane odgesH, it significantly added that Hherein E6ecutor, as 5egatee ;sic=, hasthe right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the &hilippines during hislifetimeH, thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than eitherthe en>oyment by odges of his rights under the particular portion of the dispositions of his wifeBswill which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of thecon>ugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. /n other words, the authorityreferred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in (ection 2 ofRule )?* which permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms ofa duly probated will before final ad>udication or distribution when the rights of third parties would

not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouto dispose of his own share of he con>ugal estate, pending its final liCuidation, when it appearthat no creditors of the con>ugal partnership would be pre>udiced thereby, ;see the RevisedRules of ourt by %rancisco, 8ol. 8-0, )*3? ed. p. @@3= albeit, from the tenor of said motions,#e are more inclined to believe that odges meant to refer to the former. /n any event, #e arfully persuaded that the Cuoted allegations of said motions read together cannot be construeda repudiation of the rights uneCuivocally established in the will in favor of rs. odgesB brotheand sisters to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.

/ndeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subseCuently acted upon thepremise suggested by petitioner. 9n the contrary, on 7ovember 2A, )*+4, when the courtresolved the motion of appellee #estern /nstitute of Technology by its order #e have Cuotedearlier, it categorically held that as of said date, 7ovember 2A, )*+4, Hin both cases ;(pecial&roceedings )A?3 and )+32= there is as yet no >udicial declaration of heirs nor distribution ofproperties to whomsoever are entitled thereto.H /n this connection, it may be stated furtheragainst petitioner, by way of some $ind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January @, )*+4,already Cuoted in full on pages 4-+3 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declar

that H. 7. odges was the sole and e6clusive heir of the estate of 5innie Jane odgesH, whicwould not have done if it were really convinced that the order of !ecember ), )*43 was alrethe order of ad>udication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawnwhen agno filed her own motion for determination and ad>udication of what should correspoto the brothers and sisters of rs. odges does not alter the indubitable implication of the praof the withdrawn motion.

/t must be borne in mind that while it is true that rs. odges beCueathed her whole estate toher husband and gave him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during hislifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever should remain thereof upohis death should go to her brothers and sisters. /n effect, therefore, what was absolutely givenodges was only so much of his wifeBs estate as he might possibly dispose of during his lifetihence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend to ad>udicate the whestate to himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected ordiminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what wouremain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentaryprovision in Cuestion allowed him to so ad>udicate any part of the estate to himself as topre>udice them. /n other words, irrespective of whatever might have been odgesB intention inhis motions, as E6ecutor, of ay 23, )*43 and !ecember )), )*43, the trial courtBs ordersgranting said motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded, could not have hadthe effect of an absolute and unconditional ad>udication unto odges of the whole estate of hwife. 7one of them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under sa

will. 'nd it may be added here that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions inCuestion may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of odges to send notices to any of themas admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified,they could not have ta$en said motions to be for the final distribution and ad>udication of theestate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final distribution and ad>udication, to eithee6ercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wifeBs estate in accordance with thebeCuest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of(ection 2 of Rule )?*, or ma$e use of his own share of the con>ugal estate. /n any event, #e dnot believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not onlybecause of the clear language of the will but also because none of the interested parties hadbeen duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. (tated differently, if the orders of ay 23)*43 and !ecember , )*43 were really intended to be read in the sense contended bypetitioner, #e would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.

&etitioner cites the case of Austria +s. 5entenilla, G. R. 7o. 5-)??)@, (eptember )*, )*4+,;unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in ** &hil. )?+*= in support of its insistence thwith the orders of ay 23 and !ecember ), )*43, the closure of rs. odgesB estate hasbecome a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of ad>udication anddistribution ordained by (ection ) of Rule *?. 0ut the parallel attempted to be drawn betweenthat case and the present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear,

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distinct and e6press order of ad>udication and distribution more than twenty years before theother heirs of the deceased filed their motion as$ing that the administratri6 be removed, etc. 'sCuoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as follows:

En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el >uzgado la encuentraprocedente ba>o la condicion de Cue no se hara entrega ni ad>udicacion delos bienes a los herederos antes de Cue estos presten la fianzacorrespondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el 'rt. 34 del odigo de&rocedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece Cue hayan sido nombradoscomisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. !icha fianza podra ser por unvalor igual al de los bienes Cue correspondan a cada heredero segun eltestamento. reo Cue no es obice para la terminacion del e6pediente elhecho de Cue la administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el inventariode los bienes" pues, segun la ley, estan e6entos de esta formalidad osadministradores Cue son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes yhayan prestado fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, yaparece en el testamento Cue la administradora 'le>andra 'ustria reune

dicha condicion.&9R T9!9 59 E1&E(T9, el >uzgado declara, ).o: no haber lugar a lamocion de Ramon 8entenilla y otros" 2.o, declara asimismo Cue los unicosherederos del finado 'ntonio 8entenilla son su esposa 'le>andra 'ustria,aria 8entenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon 8entenilla, aria8entenilla, Ramon (oriano, Eulalio (oriano, Jose (oriano, Gabriela8entenilla, 5orenzo 8entenilla, %elicitas 8entenilla, Eugenio 8entenilla y

'le>andra 8entenilla, en representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas,atalino y %roilan, hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas Cue laheredera 'le>andra 'ustria tiene derecho al remanente de todos los bienesde>ados por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion Cuecorresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado enlas clausulas @.a, *.a, )?.a, )).a, )2.a y )A.a del testamento" A.o, seaprueba el pago hecho por la administradora de los gastos de la ultimaenfermedad y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador afavor de la Escuela a &ublica del unicipio de angatarem, y de las misasen sufragio del alma del finado" .o, Cue una vez prestada la fianzamencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y ad>udicacion delos bienes, conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declararen este auto" 4.o, y, finalmente, Cue verificada la ad>udicacion, se dara porterminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la

administradora, y cancelando su fianza.

'(/ (E 9R!E7'.

ndoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceed ings for thesettlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.

/n the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do notappear e62facie to be of the same tenor and nature as the order >ust Cuoted, and, what is more,the circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of thecourt, for nothing could have been more violative of the will of rs. odges.

/ndeed, to infer from odgesB said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years)*4@, )*4* and )*+?, ' 'nne6es /, M and , respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed thatHherein e6ecutor ;being= the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the lastwill and testament already probated,H there is Hno ;other= person interested in the &hilippines ofthe time and place of e6amining herein account to be given noticeH, an intent to ad>udicate untohimself the whole of his wifeBs estate in an absolute manner and without regard to the contingentinterests of her brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is notlegally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record herein. odges $new or ought tohave $nown that, legally spea$ing, the terms of his wifeBs will did not give him such a right.

%actually, there are enough circumstances e6tant in the records of these cases indicating thathad no such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. /n his very motions in Cuestion, odalleged, thru counsel, that the Hdeceased 5innie Jane odges died leaving no descendants anascendants, e6cept 7rothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as sur+i+in# spouse, to inherit

properties of the decedent H, and even promised that Hproper accounting will be had in allthese transactionsH which he had submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereimplying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. 's alleged by respondagno in her brief as appellee:

nder date of 'pril ), )*4*, . 7. odges filed his first H'ccount by theE6ecutorH of the estate of 5innie Jane odges. /n the H(tatement of7etworth of r. . 7. odges and the Estate of 5innie Jane odgesH as o!ecember A), )*4@ anne6ed thereto, . 7. odges reported that thecombined con>ugal estate earned a net income of &A2@,?2.+2, dividedevenly between him and the estate of 5innie Jane odges. &ursuant to the filed an Hindividual income ta6 returnH for calendar year )*4@ on theestate of 5innie Jane odges reporting, under oath, the said estate as

having earned income of &)+,2?).A), e6actly one-half of the net incomehis combined personal assets and that of the estate of 5innie Jane odg;p. *), 'ppelleeBs 0rief.=

nder date of July 2), )*+?, . 7. odges filed his second H'nnual(tatement of 'ccount by the E6ecutorH of the estate of 5innie Jane odge/n the H(tatement of 7etworth of r. . 7. odges and the Estate of 5innJane odgesH as of !ecember A), )*4* anne6ed thereto, . 7. odgesreported that the combined con>ugal estate earned a net income of&23?,+2A.A2, divided evenly between him and the estate of 5innie Janeodges. &ursuant to this, he filed an Hindividual income ta6 returnH forcalendar year )*4* on the estate of 5innie Jane odges reporting, underoath, the said estate as having earned income of &)A4,A)).++, e6actly onhalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of theestate of 5innie Jane odges. ;pp. *)-*2, id.=

nder date of 'pril 2?, )*+), . 7. odges filed his third H'nnual (tatemof 'ccount by the E6ecutor for the year )*+?H of the estate of 5innie Janeodges. /n the H(tatement of 7et #orth of r. . 7. odges and the Estaof 5innie Jane odgesH as of !ecember A), )*+? anne6ed thereto, . 7.odges reported that the combined con>ugal estate earned a net income&A),@43.*, divided of 5innie Jane odges. &ursuant to this, he filed an

Hindividual evenly between him and the estate income ta6 returnH forcalendar year )*+? on the estate of 5innie Jane odges reporting, underoath, the said estate as having earned income of &)43,2@.*3, e6actly ohalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of theestate of 5innie Jane odges. ;pp. *2-*A, id.=

/n the petition for probate that he ;odges= filed, he listed the sevenbrothers and sisters of 5innie Jane as her HheirsH ;see p. 2, Green R9'=.The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted of the heirs, Roy igdon ;see p. ), Green R9'=. /mmediately, . 7.odges filed a verified motion to have Roy igdonBs name included as anheir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records Hin order ;that= theheirs of deceased Roy igdon may not thin$ or believe they were omittedand that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased 5inJane odgesH.

Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wifeBs estate from his ownshare of the con>ugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years after that ohis wife. e never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging e6clusively to himseThe only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis fthe eventual transmission of his wifeBs estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not ha

8/12/2019 863 to 914


been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with here6pressed desire, as intimated in his ta6 return in the nited (tates to be more e6tensivelyreferred to anon. 'nd assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance ta6esin the &hilippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarilyinconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. #ithout purporting to rule definitelyon the matter in these proceedings, #e might say here that #e are inclined to the view thatunder the peculiar provisions of his wifeBs will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance ta6laws, odges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of theremaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, andwhatever ad>ustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matterthat could well be ta$en care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.

/t is to be noted that the lawyer, 'tty. 5eon &. Gellada, who signed the motions of ay 23, )*43and !ecember )), )*43 and the aforementioned statements of account was the very same onewho also subseCuently signed and filed the motion of !ecember 2+, )*+2 for the appointment of respondent agno as H'dministratri6 of the Estate of rs. 5innie Jane odgesH wherein it wasalleged that Hin accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of 5innie Jane

odges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death of her husband, harles 7ewtonodges, the said properties shall be eCually divided among their heirs.H 'nd it appearing thatsaid attorney was odgesB lawyer as E6ecutor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason thathis understanding of the situation, implicit in his allegations >ust Cuoted, could somehow bereflective of odgesB own understanding thereof.

's a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same 'tty. Gellada dated July ), )*43, aHReCuest for /nclusion of the 7ame of Roy igdon in the 9rder of the ourt dated July )*, )*43,etc.H, reference to which is made in the above Cuotation from respondent agnoBs brief, are over the oath of odges himself, who verified the motion. (aid allegations read:

). That the on. ourt issued orders dated June 2*, )*43, ordering theprobate of the will.

2. That in said order of the on. ourt, the relatives of the deceased5innie Jane odges were enumerated. owever, in the petition as well as inthe testimony of E6ecutor during the hearing, the name Roy igdon wasmentioned, but deceased. /t was unintentionally omitted the heirs of saidRoy igdon who are his wife 'line igdon and son !avid igdon, all of age,and residents of Duinlan, Te6as, .(.'.

A. hat to strai#hten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased oy-i#don may not think or 7elie+e they ere omitted, and that they ere really

and are interested in the estate of deceased 'innie Jane -od#es , it isreCuested of the on. ourt to insert the names of 'line igdon and !avidigdon, wife and son of deceased Roy igdon in the said order of the on.ourt dated June 2*, )*43. ;pars. ) to A, 'nne6 2 of agnoBs 'nswer Record, p. 2+?=

's can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of odges inregard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.

/n connection with this point of odgesB intent, #e note that there are documents, copies ofwhich are anne6ed to respondent agnoBs answer, which purportedly contain odgesB ownsolemn declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged ta6 return he filedwith the nited (tates Ta6ation authorities, identified as (chedule , ;'nne6 of her answer=and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, 'nne6 4. /n said (chedule , odges appears tohave answered the pertinent Cuestion thus:

2a. ad the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between ;)=the provisions made in h is or her favor by the will and ;))= dower, curtesy ora statutory interestO ;1= Fes ; = 7o

2d. !oes the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electto ta$e dower, curtesy, or a statutory interestO ;1= Fes ; = 7o

A. 'ccording to the information and belief of the person or persons filing treturn, is any action described under Cuestion ) designed or contemplate; = Fes ;1= 7o ;'nne6 , 'nswer Record, p. 2+A=

and to have further stated under the item, H!escription of property interests passing to survivispouseH the following:

7one, e6cept for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, ta6and other legal charges. %t is the intention of the sur+i+in# hus7and ofdeceased to distri7ute the remainin# property and interests of the deceasin their Community Estate to the de+isees and le#atees named in the ilhen the de7ts, lia7ilities, ta6es and e6penses of administration are finaldetermined and paid . ;'nne6 , 'nswer Record, p. 2+A=

/n addition, in the supposed affidavit of odges, 'nne6 4, it is stated:

/, . 7. odges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the nit(tates Estate Ta6 Return was filed in the Estate of 5innie Jane odges o

'ugust @, )*4@, / renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive trents, emoluments and income from said estate, as shown by the statemcontained in (chedule at page 2* of said return, a copy of whichschedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.

he purpose of this affida+it is to ratify and confirm, and % do here7y ratifyand confirm, the declaration made in chedule & of said return and hereformally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of thesaid rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife5innie Jane odges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate froany liability for the payment of income ta6es on income which has accrueto the estate of 5innie Jane odges since the death of the said 5innie Jaodges on ay 2A, )*43. ;'nne6 4, 'nswer Record, p. 2+=

'lthough it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the courtbelow, and #e cannot, therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present proceedings, st#e cannot close our eyes to their e6istence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor >ibeswith 9ur conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related to the orders of ay 23and !ecember ), )*43. 4 (omehow, these documents, considering they are supposed to becopies of their originals found in the official files of the governments of the nited (tates and

the &hilippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension that 9ur conclusion from the otheevidence of odgesB manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is withou t basis in fact.

8erily, with such eloCuent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of hiswife, #e find it very hard to believe that odges did as$ the court and that the latter agreed thhe be declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be ad>udicated to him without so much

>ust annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereoupon his demise. 9n the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to assume that odgewas well aware of his position as e6ecutor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind thefollowing admonition made by the ourt in $amittan +s. 'asam, et al ., +? &hil., *?@, at pp. *)*):

pon the death of 0ernarda in (eptember, )*?@, said lands continued tocon>ugal property in the hands of the defendant 5asam. /t is provided inarticle ))@ of the ivil ode that upon the dissolution of the con>ugalpartnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and this court inconstruing this provision in connection with section +@4 of the ode of &rocedure ;prior to its amendment by 'ct 7o. A)3+ of 7ovember 2, )*2has repeatedly held that in the event of the death of the wife, the lawimposes upon the husband the duty of liCuidating the affairs of the

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partnership without delay ;desde luego= ;'lfonso vs. 7atividad, + &hil., 2?"&rado vs. 5agera, 3 &hil., A*4" !e la Rama vs. !e la Rama, 3 &hil., 34"EnriCuez vs. 8ictoria, )? &hil., )?" 'mancio vs. &ardo, )A &hil., 2*3" Ro>asvs. (ingson Tongson, )3 &hil., 3+" (ochayseng vs. Tru>illo, A) &hil., )4A"olera vs. olera, ? &hil., 4++ " 7able Jose vs. 7able Jose, ) &hil., 3)A.=

/n the last mentioned case this court Cuoted with approval the case of'eatherood +s. Arnold ;++ Te6as, ), )+, )3=, in which that courtdiscussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the administration of thecommunity property. 'ttention was called to the fact that the survivinghusband, in the management of the con>ugal property after the death of thewife, was a trustee of uniCue character who is liable for any fraud committedby him with relation to the property while he is charged with itsadministration. /n the liCuidation of the con>ugal partnership, he had widepowers ;as the law stood prior to 'ct 7o. A)3+= and the high degree of trustreposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the fact that he was theowner of a half interest in his own right of the con>ugal estate which he was

charged to administer. e could therefore no more acCuire a title byprescription against those for whom he was administering the con>ugalestate than could a guardian against his ward or a >udicial administratoragainst the heirs of estate. (ection A@ of hapter /// of the ode of ivil&rocedure, with relation to prescription, provides that Hthis chapter shall notapply ... in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust.H The survivinghusband in the administration and liCuidation of the con>ugal estateoccupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not permittedby the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those forwhose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administration andliCuidation. 7o liCuidation was ever made by 5asam hence, the con>ugalproperty which came into his possession on the death of his wife in(eptember, )*?@, still remains con>ugal property, a continuing andsubsisting trust. e should have made a liCuidation immediately ;desdeluego=. e cannot now be permitted to ta$e advantage of his own wrong.9ne of the conditions of title by prescription ;section ), ode of ivil&rocedure= is possession Hunder a claim of title e6clusive of any other rightH.%or a trustee to ma$e such a claim would be a manifest fraud.

'nd $nowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, #e are not convinced that odgesarrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wifeBs brothers andsisters.

&/0 insists, however, that to read the orders of ay 23 and !ecember ), )*43, not asad>udicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by odgesin a wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said orders void for beingviolative of the provisions of Rule @* governing the manner in which such dispositions may bemade and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may be secured./f #e sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said orders should be declaredineffective either way they are understood, considering #e have already seen it is legallyimpossible to consider them as ad>udicatory. 's a matter of fact, however, what surgesimmediately to the surface, relative to &/0Bs observations based on Rule @* , is that from suchpoint of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no more than some non->urisdictionaltechnicalities of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection ofparties interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government onaccount of the ta6es due it" and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are ob>ectingto said orders or would be pre>udiced by the unobservance by the trial court of the procedurepointed out by &/0, #e find no legal inconvenience in nor impediment to 9ur giving sanction tothe blan$et approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution is definitely preferablein law and in eCuity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested by &/0 would result in thedeprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of rs. odges, whereas readingthem the other way will not cause any pre>udice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind

and stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in the light of thpeculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.

7ow, the inventory submitted by odges on ay )2, )*4@ referred to the estate of his wife asconsisting of H9ne-half of all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereattached and mar$ed as H'nne6 'H.H 'lthough, regrettably, no copy of said 'nne6 ' appears ithe records before s, #e ta$e >udicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in thesecases, that the same consists of considerable real and other personal $inds of properties. 'nsince, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime,with full power and authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be anyremainder upon his death, such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, andfurthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof that odges had in fact disposed of of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had $ept them moor less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of odges, there was no moreestate of rs. odges to spea$ of. /t is 9ur conclusion, therefore, that properties do e6ist whicconstitute such estate, hence (pecial &roceedings )A?3 should not yet be closed.

7either is there basis for holding that respondent agno has ceased to be the 'dministratri6

said proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, theattempt to replace her with r. 0enito 5opez without authority from the ourt having beene6pressly held ineffective by 9ur resolution of (eptember @, )*32. &arenthetically, on this lastpoint, &/0 itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not Cuestioning said respondentBs statuas such administratri6. /ndeed, it is not clear that &/0 has any standing to raise any ob>ectionthereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of rs. odges is concerne

/t is the contention of &/0, however, that as things actually stood at the time of odgesB deattheir con>ugal partnership had not yet been liCuidated and, inasmuch as the propertiescomposing the same were thus commingled pro indiviso and, conseCuently, the propertiespertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is &/0 alone, asadministrator of the estate of odges, who should administer everything, and all that respondagno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining estatof rs. odges have been duly segregated and delivered to her for her own administration.(eemingly, &/0 would li$en the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges to a party having a claof ownership to some properties included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of decedent, ;here that of odges= and who normally has no right to ta$e part in the proceedingspending the establishment of his right or title" for which as a rule it is reCuired that an ordinaryaction should be filed, since the probate court is without >urisdiction to pass with finality onCuestions of title between the estate of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or evan heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.

#e do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. 's #e see it, the situation obtainingherein cannot be compared with the claim of a third party the basis of which is alien to thepending probate proceedings. /n the present cases what gave rise to the claim of &/0 ofe6clusive ownership by the estate of odges over all the properties of the odges spouses,including the share of rs. odges in the community properties, were the orders of the trial cissued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the ordof ay 23 and !ecember ), )*43 so often mentioned above. /n other words, the root of theissue of title between the parties is something that the court itself has done in the e6ercise of iprobate >urisdiction. 'nd since in the ultimate analysis, the Cuestion of whether or not all theproperties herein involved pertain e6clusively to the estate of odges depends on the legalmeaning and effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no >urisdiction to ta$ecognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. /f it was within the competence of the coto issue the root orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their true significanand intent, to the end that the parties may $now whether or not the estate of rs. odges hadalready been ad>udicated by the court, upon the initiative of odges, in his favor, to the e6clusof the other heirs of his wife instituted in her willO

't this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronthe courts and the parties in these cases was the failure of odges to secure, as e6ecutor of wifeBs estate, from ay, )*43 up to the time of his death in !ecember, )*+2, a period of more

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than five years, the final ad>udication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings. Therecord is bare of any showing that he ever e6erted any effort towards the early settlement of saidestate. #hile, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as already discuss that he hadintentions of leaving intact her share of the con>ugal properties so that it may pass wholly to hisco-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating theproceedings, his interests in his own half of the con>ugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. 9bviously, such a situation could not beconducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to hisco-heirs upon his death. aving these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium forsuch procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his estate were to begiven e6clusive administration of all the properties in Cuestion, which would necessarily includethe function of promptly liCuidating the con>ugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregatingwithout unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as constituting theestate of rs. odges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inheriteCually among themselves.

To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party

and his acts are deemed to be ob>ectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concernedwith the estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it maybe said that even if &/0 wereto act alone, there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. 9n the other hand,however, it is evidently implicit in section + of Rule 3@ fi6ing the priority among those to whomletters of administration should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the administratoris not his impartiality alone but, more importantly, the e6tent of his interest in the estate, so muchso that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Ta$ingboth of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to odgesB own inventorysubmitted by him as E6ecutor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties werecon>ugal which means that the spouses have eCual shares therein, it is but logical that bothestates should be administered >ointly by representatives of both, pending their segregation fromeach other. &articularly is such an arrangement warranted because the actuations so far of &/0evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to e6clude the other heirs of rs. odges fromtheir inheritance. 0esides, to allow &/0, the administrator of his estate, to perform now whatodges was duty bound to do as e6ecutor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of (ection 2 ofRule 3@ which e6pressly provides that HThe e6ecutor of an e6ecutor shall not, as such,administer the estate of the first testator.H /t goes without saying that this provision refers also tothe administrator of an e6ecutor li$e &/0 here.

#e are not unmindful of the fact that under (ection 2 of Rule 3A, H#hen the marriage isdissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,administered, and liCuidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings

of the deceased spouse. /f both spouses have died, the con>ugal partnership shall be liCuidatedin the testate or intestate proceedings of either.H /ndeed, it is true that the last sentence of thisprovision allows or permits the con>ugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to besettled or liCuidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because saidsentence allows or permits that the liCuidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter ofsound >udicial discretion in which one it should be made. 'fter all, the former rule referring to theadministrator of the husbandBs estate in respect to such liCuidation was done away with by 'ctA)3+, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule >ust cited.

Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of odges, there was already the pending >udicial settlement proceeding of the estate of rs. odges, and, more importantly, that theformer was the e6ecutor of the latterBs will who had, as such, failed for more than five years tosee to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from oughtthat appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not beingindebted and there being no immediate heirs other than odges himself. (uch dilatory orindifferent attitude could only spell possible pre>udice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritancedepend entirely on the e6istence of any remainder of rs. odgesB share in the communityproperties, and who are now faced with the pose of &/0 that there is no such remainder. adodges secured as early as possible the settlement of his wifeBs estate, this problem would notarisen. 'll things considered, #e are fully convinced that the interests of >ustice will be better

served by not permitting or allowing &/0 or any administrator of the estate of odges e6clusadministration of all the properties in Cuestion. #e are of the considered opinion and so hold what would be >ust and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act con>ointly unafter said estates have been segregated from each other.

't this >uncture, it may be stated that we are not overloo$ing the fact that it is &/0Bs contentiothat, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of rs. odgesB brothers sisters may not be given effect. To a certain e6tent, this contention is correct. /ndeed, legallyspea$ing, rs. odgesB will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under 'rticle @of the ivil ode nor for a fideicommissary substitution under 'rticle @+A thereof. There is novulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either ;)= predecease of the testaby the designated heir or ;2= refusal or ;A= incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, asreCuired by 'rticle @4*" and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because noobligation is imposed thereby upon odges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyoelse. 0ut from these premises, it is not correct to >ump to the conclusion, as &/0 does, that ttestamentary dispositions in Cuestion are therefore inoperative and invalid.

The error in &/0Bs position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition e6clusively

the light of substitutions covered by the ivil ode section on that sub>ect, ;(ection A, hapteTitle /8, 0oo$ ///= when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointein a will Hso that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted,H ;'rticl@43, id.= and, in the present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers andsisters of rs. odges are not substitutes for odges because, under her will, they are not toinherit what odges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of frhis inheritance" rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with odges,sub>ect, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as odges was concernedand correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. /t is partiallyresolutory, since it beCueaths unto odges the whole of her estate to be owned and en>oyed him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, whmeans that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter +i+oanyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what mremain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuas the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already uponthe death of rs. odges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of thedeath of odges in the event of actual e6istence of any remainder of her estate then.

ontrary to the view of respondent agno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estateas contemplated in 'rticle @+* of the ivil ode, that she beCueathed to odges during hislifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime

only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whoor any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The ourt sees no legal impediment to t$ind of institution, in this >urisdiction or under &hilippine law, e6cept that it cannot apply to thelegitime of odges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering trs. odges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. ;'rts. @32, *??, and *?, 7ew ode.=

0ut relative precisely to the Cuestion of how much of rs. odgesB share of the con>ugalpartnership properties may be considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as tohow 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode 7 should be applied. 9n the one hand, petitioner claims thatinasmuch as rs. odges was a resident of the &hilippines at the time of her death, under sa

'rticle )+, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Te6as and the principle of ren+oi , whashould be applied here should be the rules of succession under the ivil ode of the &hilippinand, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said con>ugalproperties, the other fourth being, as already e6plained, the legitime of her husband ;'rt. *??ivil ode= which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition ;'rt. @32,ivil ode=. 9n the other hand, respondent agno denies that rs. odges died a resident othe &hilippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her originalresidence of birth in Te6as, nited (tates of 'merica, and contends that, anyway, regardless the Cuestion of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Te6as, under said 'rticle )+ the ivil ode, the distribution of her estate is sub>ect to the laws of said (tate which, accordin

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to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of rs. odges areentitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the con>ugal partnership propertiesconsisting of one-half thereof. Respondent agno further maintains that, in any event, odgeshad renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by thedocuments touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legalsignificance of which petitioner seemingly Cuestions. 0esides, the parties are disagreed as towhat the pertinent laws of Te6as provide. /n the interest of settling the estates herein involvedsoonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined inthese proceedings. The ourt regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason thatneither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in theirrespective briefs and memoranda before s, of their respective contentions on the pertinentlegal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to s to be adeCuate enough to enable sto render an intelligent comprehensive and >ust resolution. %or one thing, there is no clear andreliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Te6as are. 7@ Then also, thegenuineness of documents relied upon by respondent agno is disputed. 'nd there are anumber of still other conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but which itis not proper to mention here. /n Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all

other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedingshereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and ad>udicating and<or distributingthe estate of rs. odges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.

To be more e6plicit, all that #e can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: ;)= that regardless of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the&hilippines or of Te6as, and ta$ing for granted either of the respective contentions of the partiesas to provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be proven bycompetent evidence that odges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is easily anddefinitely discernible from the inventory submitted by odges himself, as E6ecutor of his wifeBsestate, that there are properties which should constitute the estate of rs. odges and ought tobe disposed of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said (pecial &roceedings)A?3" ;2= that, more specifically, inasmuch as the Cuestion of what are the pertinent laws ofTe6as applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and, considering that the soledifference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to thesupposed legitime of odges it being the stand of &/0 that odges had such a legitimewhereas agno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes ofthese proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of Te6as applicablehereto, the estate of rs. odges is at least, one-fourth of the con>ugal estate of the spouses"the e6istence and effects of foreign laws being Cuestions of fact, and it being the position now of&/0 that the estate of rs. odges, pursuant to the laws of Te6as, should only be one-fourth ofthe con>ugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and conseCuently, it would

be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less,irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws ofTe6as" ;A= that (pecial &roceedings )A?3 for the settlement of the testate estate of rs. odgescannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there having beenno proper and legal ad>udication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved" and ;= thatrespondent agno remains and continues to be the 'dministratri6 therein. ence, nothing in theforegoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properlybefore the ourt now, namely, ;)= whether or not odges had in fact and in law waived orrenounced his inheritance from rs. odges, in whole or in part, and ;2= assuming there hadbeen no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode, and in thelight of what might be the applicable laws of Te6as on the matter, the estate of rs. odges ismore than the one-fourth declared above. 's a matter of fact, even our finding above about thee6istence of properties constituting the estate of rs. odges rests largely on a generalappraisal of the size and e6tent of the con>ugal partnership gathered from reference madethereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the records onappeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which e6actly those properties are, to the moreconcrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of theirrespective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual issues. /n the interest of

>ustice, the parties should be allowed to present such further evidence in relation to all theseissues in a >oint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved. 'fter all, the court a quo

has not yet passed sCuarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do in the first instance.

Relative to 9ur holding above that the estate of rs. odges cannot be less than the remaindof one-fourth of the con>ugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during thedeliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent wit9ur other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicablaws of Te6as, .(.'. Hwith respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successiorightsH that may be willed by a testator which, under 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode, are controllingthe instant cases, in view of the undisputed Te6an nationality of the deceased rs. odges,these cases should be returned to the court a Cuo, so that the parties may prove what said laprovides, it is premature for s to ma$e any specific ruling now on either the validity of thetestamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of inheritance to which the brothers asisters of rs. odges are entitled. 'fter nature reflection, #e are of the considered view thatthis stage and in the state of the records before s, the feared inconsistency is more apparenthan real. #ithal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner &/0 to ma$e any claim that under thlaws of Te6as, the estate of rs. odges could in any event be less than that #e have fi6ed

above./t should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the Cuestion of what are the laws of Te6asgoverning the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary the rule that foreign laws may not be ta$en >udicial notice of and have to be proven li$e any otfact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare e6ception in instances whthe said laws are already within the actual $nowledge of the court, such as when they are weand generally $nown or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. ;4 oran, omments on the Rules of ourt, p. )*3? ed.= /n luemer +s. -i6 , 4 &hil. +)?, it was held:

/t is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was e6ecuted in El$ins #est 8irginia, on7ovember A, )*24, by i6 who had his residence in that >urisdiction, and that the laws of #es8irginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section A@+@ of 'cts )@@2, c. @ afound in #est 8irginia ode, 'nnotated, by ogg harles E., vol. 2, )*), p. )*+?, and ascertified to by the !irector of the 7ational 5ibrary. 0ut this was far from a compliance with thelaw. The laws of a foreign >urisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the&hilippine /slands are not authorized to ta$e >udicial notice of the laws of the various (tates othe 'merican nion. (uch laws must be proved as facts. ;/n re Estate of Johnson I)*)@, A*&hil., )4+.= ere the reCuirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the bofrom which an e6tract was ta$en was printed or published under the authority of the (tate of#est 8irginia, as provided in section A?? of the ode of ivil &rocedure. 7or was the e6tract

from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sof the (tate of #est 8irginia, as provided in section A?) of the ode of ivil &rocedure. 7oevidence was introduced to show that the e6tract from the laws of #est 8irginia was in force athe time the alleged will was e6ecuted.H

7o evidence of the nature thus suggested by the ourt may be found in the records of the caat bar. Duite to the contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing versions in theirrespective pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. 'nd even if #e too$ into accountthat in A"nar +s. !arcia, the ourt did ma$e reference to certain provisions regardingsuccession in the laws of Te6as, the disparity in the material dates of that case and the presenones would not permit s to indulge in the hazardous con>ecture that said provisions have nobeen amended or changed in the meantime.

9n the other hand, in /n re Estate of Johnson, A* &hil. )4+, #e held:

pon the other point as to whether the will was e6ecuted in conformitywith the statutes of the (tate of /llinois we note that it does notaffirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony adduced in thtrial court that any witness was e6amined with reference to the law of /llinon the sub>ect of the e6ecution of will. The trial >udge no doubt was satisfthat the will was properly e6ecuted by e6amining section )@3 of the

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Revised (tatutes of /llinois, as e6hibited in volume A of (tarr L urtisBs 'nnotated /llinois (tatutes, 2nd ed., p. 2+" and he may have assumed thathe could ta$e >udicial notice of the laws of /llinois under section 234 of theode of ivil &rocedure. /f so, he was in our opinion mista$en. That sectionauthorizes the courts here to ta$e >udicial notice, among other things, of theacts of the legislative department of the nited (tates. These words clearlyhave reference to 'cts of the ongress of the nited (tates" and we wouldhesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, ta$e >udicial noticeof the multifarious laws of the various 'merican (tates. 7or do we thin$ thatany such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in thesame section, where it is said that our courts may ta$e >udicial notice ofmatters of public $nowledge HsimilarH to those therein enumerated. Theproper rule we thin$ is to reCuire proof of the statutes of the (tates of the

'merican nion whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues inany action litigated in the &hilippine courts.

7evertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in ta$ing

>udicial notice of the law of /llinois on the point in Cuestion, such error is notnow available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state anyfact from which it would appear that the law of /llinois is different from whatthe court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error andargument for the appellant in this court raises no Cuestion based on suchsupposed error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure con>ectureas to the law prevailing in the (tate of /llinois, its >udgment could not be setaside, even upon application made within si6 months under section ))A ofthe ode of ivil &rocedure, unless it should be made to appearaffirmatively that the con>ecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, statesin general terms that the will in Cuestion is invalid and inadeCuate to passreal and personal property in the (tate of /llinois, but this is merely aconclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompaniedcontain no reference to the sub>ect, and we are cited to no authority in theappellantBs brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness ofthe conclusion of the trial court. /t is very clear, therefore, that this pointcannot be urged as of serious moment.

/t is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign lawsconcerned, the parties in a given case do not have any controversy or are more or less inagreement, the ourt may ta$e it for granted for the purposes of the particular case before it thatthe said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of reCuiring the

presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in theinstant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that even if thepertinent laws of Te6as were $nown and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertainingto the heirs of rs. odges is as #e have fi6ed above, the absence of evidence to the effectthat, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of anyconseCuence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. /n other words, since &/0,the petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode and thepertinent laws of Te6as, the amount of the estate in controversy is >ust as #e have determined itto be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, &/0 may notnow or later pretend differently.

To be more concrete, on pages 2?-2) of its petition herein, dated July A), )*+3, &/0 statescategorically:

/nasmuch as 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode provides that Hintestate andtestamentary successions both with respect to the order of succession andto the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity oftestamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the personwhose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature ofthe property and regardless of the country wherein said property may befoundH, while the law of Te6as ;the odges spouses being nationals of

.(.'., (tate of Te6as=, in its conflicts of law rules, provides that thedomiciliary law ;in this case &hilippine law= governs the testamentarydispositions and successional rights over movables or personal propertiewhile the law of the situs ;in this case also &hilippine law with respect to aodges properties located in the &hilippines=, governs with respect toimmovable properties, and applying therefore the Brenvoi doctrineB asenunciated and applied by this onorable ourt in the case of /n re Estatof hristensen ;G.R. 7o. 5-)+3*, Jan. A), )*+A=, there can be no Cuestthat &hilippine law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the5ast #ill and Testament of the deceased 5innie Jane odges, as well as successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well ato immovables situated in the &hilippines.

/n its main brief dated %ebruary 2+, )*+@, &/0 asserts:

he la #o+ernin# successional ri#hts.

's recited above, there is no Cuestion that the deceased, 5innie Jane

odges, was an 'merican citizen. There is also no Cuestion that she wasnational of the (tate of Te6as, .(.'. 'gain, there is li$ewise no Cuestionthat she had her domicile of choice in the ity of /loilo, &hilippines, as thihas already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the lower coupronouncements which are by now res adudicata ;par. Ia, (ee. *, RuleA*, Rules of ourt" /n re Estate of Johnson, A* &hil. )4+=.

'rticle )+ of the ivil ode provides:

HReal property as well as personal property is sub>ect to the law of thecountry where it is situated.

owever, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to thorder of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to theintrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by thenational law of the person whose succession is under consideration,whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the countrywherein said property may be found.H

Thus the aforecited provision of the ivil ode points towards the nationalaw of the deceased, 5innie Jane odges, which is the law of Te6as, asgoverning succession Hboth with respect to the order of succession and tthe amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamen

provisions ...H. 0ut the law of Te6as, in its conflicts of law rules, provides tthe domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and successionrights over movables or personal property, while the law of the situs govewith respect to immovable property. (uch that with respect to both movabproperty, as well as immovable property situated in the &hilippines, the laof Te6as points to the law of the &hilippines.

'pplying, therefore, the so-called Hrenvoi doctrineH, as enunciated andapplied by this onorable ourt in the case of H/n re hristensenH ;G.R. 75-)+3*, Jan. A), )*+A=, there can be no Cuestion that &hilippine lawgoverns the testamentary provisions in the 5ast #ill and Testament of thedeceased 5innie Jane odges, as well as the successional rights to herestate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in &hilippines.

The sub>ect of successional rights.

nder &hilippine law, as it is under the law of Te6as, the con>ugal orcommunity property of the spouses, harles 7ewton odges and 5innieJane odges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon

8/12/2019 863 to 914


the death of 5innie Jane odges, one-half of the con>ugal partnershipproperty immediately pertained to harles 7ewton odges as his ownshare, and not by virtue of any successional rights. There can be noCuestion about this.

'gain, &hilippine law, or more specifically, 'rticle *?? of the ivil odeprovides:

/f the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or heshall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate ofthe deceased spouse, and the testator may freelydispose of the other half.

/f the marriage between the surviving spouse and thetestator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and thetestator died within three months from the time of themarriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as thesole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,

e6cept when they have been living as husband and wifefor more than five years. /n the latter case, the legitimeof the surviving spouse shall be that specified in thepreceding paragraph.

This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by afideicommisary substitution ;'rt. @+, ivil code=, nor by any charge,condition, or substitution ;'rt, @32, ivil code=. /t is clear, therefore, that inaddition to one-half of the con>ugal partnership property as his own con>ugalshare, harles 7ewton odges was also immediately entitled to one-half ofthe half con>ugal share of the deceased, 5innie Jane odges, or one-fourthof the entire con>ugal property, as his legitime.

9ne-fourth of the con>ugal property therefore remains at issue.

/n the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated 'pril A?, )*+@, the following appears:

0riefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:

a. That the odges spouses were domiciled legally in the &hilippines ;pp.)*-2?, petition=. This is now a matter of res ad>udicata ;p. 2?, petition=.

b. That under &hilippine law, Te6as law, and the renvoi doctrine, &hilippinelaw governs the successional rights over the properties left by thedeceased, 5innie Jane odges ;pp. 2?-2), petition=.

c. That under &hilippine as well as Te6as law, one-half of the odgesproperties pertains to the deceased, harles 7ewton odges ;p. 2),petition=. This is not Cuestioned by the respondents.

d. That under &hilippine law, the deceased, harles 7ewton odges,automatically inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the odgesproperties as his legitime ;p. 2), petition=.

e. That the remaining 24K of the odges properties was inherited by thedeceased, harles 7ewton odges, under the will of his deceased spouse;pp. 22-2A, petition=. pon the death of harles 7ewton odges, thesubstitution Bprovision of the will of the deceased, 5innie Jane odges, didnot operate because the same is void ;pp. 2A-24, petition=.

f. That the deceased, harles 7ewton odges, asserted his sole ownershipof the odges properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion;pp. 24-2*, petition=. e in fact assumed such ownership and such was thestatus of the properties as of the time of his death ;pp. 2*-A, petition=.

9f similar tenor are the allegations of &/0 in some of its pleadings Cuoted in the earlier part this option.

9n her part, it is respondent-appellee agnoBs posture that under the laws of Te6as, there is nsystem of legitime, hence the estate of rs. odges should be one-half of all the con>ugalproperties.

/t is thus unCuestionable that as far as &/0 is concerned, the application to these cases of 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode in relation to the corresponding laws of Te6as would result in that &hilippine laws on succession should control. 9n that basis, as #e have already e6plainedabove, the estate of rs. odges is the remainder of one-fourth of the con>ugal partnershipproperties, considering that #e have found that there is no legal impediment to the $ind ofdisposition ordered by rs. odges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, furtherthat the contention of &/0 that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitutionuntenable. 's will be recalled, &/0Bs position that there is no such estate of rs. odges ispredicated e6clusively on two propositions, namely: ;)= that the provision in Cuestion in rs.odgesB testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the ivil ode and ;2= thatany event, by the orders of the trial court of ay 23, and !ecember ), )*43, the trial court h

already finally and irrevocably ad>udicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estatethe e6clusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, #e have overruled. 7owhere its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does &/0 maintain that the application of the laws ofTe6as would result in the other heirs of rs. odges not inheriting anything under her will. 'ndsince &/0Bs representations in regard to the laws of Te6as virtually constitute admissions of fwhich the other parties and the ourt are being made to rely and act upon, &/0 is Hnotpermitted to contradict them or subseCuently ta$e a position contradictory to or inconsistent wthem.H ;4 oran, id, p. +4, citing unanan vs. 'mparo, @? &hil. 223" (ta. 'na vs. aliwat, 5-2A?2A, 'ug. A), )*+@, 2 (R' )?)@=.

'ccordingly, the only Cuestion that remains to be settled in the further proceedings herebyordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fi6ed above is the estate of odges, and this would depend on ;)= whether or not the applicable laws of Te6as do provideeffect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and ;2= whether or notodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from rs. odges.

/n the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the ourt that to avor, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of thodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible conseCuences of dispositionsmade by odges after the death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates withouany e6press indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to dispose ofpart of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the con>ugal estate as well as

those made by &/0 after the death of odges. 'fter a long discussion, the consensus arrivedat was as follows: ;)= any such dispositions made #ratuitously in favor of third parties, whethethese be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be ofproperties constituting part of odgesB inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor ohis motions of ay 23 and !ecember )), )*43 that in as$ing for general authority to ma$e saor other disposals of properties under the >urisdiction of the court, which include his own sharethe con>ugal estate, he was not invo$ing particularly his right over his own share, but rather hright to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife" ;2= as regards sae6changes or other remunerati+e transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties ta$eby virtue of such e6changes, shall be considered as merely the products of Hphysical changesof the properties of her estate which the will e6pressly authorizes odges to ma$e, provided twhatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of odgesshould go to her brothers and sisters" ;A= the dispositions made by &/0 after the death ofodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estateconsidering that being only the administrator of the estate of odges, &/0 could not havedisposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. 7either could such dispositions beconsidered as involving con>ugal properties, for the simple reason that the con>ugal partnershautomatically ceased when rs. odges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, underdiscussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of odgto her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of &/0Bs administration. 'ccordingly,

8/12/2019 863 to 914


these construction of the will of rs. odges should be adhered to by the trial court in its finalorder of ad>udication and distribution and<or partition of the two estates in Cuestion.

-E A$$EA'

' cursory e6amination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant &/0Bs brief wouldreadily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as odgeshad already ad>udicated unto himself all the properties constituting his wifeBs share of thecon>ugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of !ecember ),)*43, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of rs. odges of which appelleeagno could be administratri6, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations assuch are not in accordance with law. (uch being the case, with the foregoing resolution holdingsuch posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of >ustice that forthe time being the two estates should be administered con>ointly by the respectiveadministrators of the two estates, it should follow that said assignments of error have lost theirfundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to therespective orders in Cuestion, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification.%or instance, some of them authorized respondent agno to act alone or without concurrence of

&/0. 'nd with respect to many of said orders, &/0 further claims that either the mattersinvolved were not properly within the probate >urisdiction of the trial court or that the procedurefollowed was not in accordance with the rules. ence, the necessity of dealing separately withthe merits of each of the appeals.

/ndeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro2indi+iso,due to the failure of odges and the lower court to liCuidate the con>ugal partnership, torecognize appellee agno as 'dministratri6 of the Testate Estate of rs. odges which is stillunsegregated from that of odges is not to say, without any Cualification, that she was thereforeauthorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned thoughthey might have been by the trial court. 's a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro2indi+iso ofthe two estates that should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from &/0, asadministrator of the estate of odges, >ust as, for the same reason, the latter should not haveauthority to act independently from her. 'nd considering that the lower court failed to adhereconsistently to this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act independently of each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the ourt hasto loo$ into the attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able to determinewhether any of them has to be set aside or they may all be legally maintained notwithstandingthe failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end onlythat graver in>ury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary andundesirable proliferation of incidents in the sub>ect proceedings may be forestalled. /n other

words, #e have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances e6tant inthe record, there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodo6 approach, soas to cause the least disturbance in rights already being e6ercised by numerous innocent thirdparties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of theapplicable purely ad>ective rules.

/ncidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that i t was principally on account of the confusionthat might result later from &/0Bs continuing to administer all the community properties,notwithstanding the certainty of the e6istence of the separate estate of rs. odges, and toenable both estates to function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that theourt ordered in the resolution of (eptember @, )*32 the modification of the in>unction issuedpursuant to the resolutions of 'ugust @, 9ctober and !ecember +, )*+3, by virtue of whichrespondent agno was completely barred from any participation in the administration of theproperties herein involved. /n the (eptember @ resolution, #e ordered that, pending thisdecision, (pecial &roceedings )A?3 and )+32 should proceed >ointly and that the respectiveadministrators therein Hact con>ointly none of them to act singly and independently of eachother for any purpose.H pon mature deliberation, #e felt that to allow &/0 to continuemanaging or administering all the said properties to the e6clusion of the administratri6 of rs.odgesB estate might place the heirs of odges at an unduly advantageous position which couldresult in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or in>ury to the other parties concerned. /t isindeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said resolution, the

same has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondagno has filed in these proceedings a motion to declare &/0 in contempt for alleged failureabide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have allbeen denied soon after they were filed. 9

Going bac$ to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to 9ur mind to bthe simplest, and then proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, without regard to tnumerical seCuence of the assignments of error in appellantBs brief or to the order of thediscussion thereof by counsel.

Assi#nments of error num7ers'11%%, '115%% and '115%%%.

These assignments of error relate to ;)= the order of the trial court of 'ugust +, )*+4 providingthat Hthe deeds of sale ;therein referred to involving properties in the name of odges= shouldsigned >ointly by the &/0, as 'dministrator of Testate Estate of .7. odges, and 'velina '.agno, as 'dministratri6 of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges, and to this effect, the&/0 should ta$e the necessary steps so that 'dministratri6 'velina '. agno could sign the

deeds of sale,H ;p. 2@, Green Rec. on 'ppeal= ;2= the order of 9ctober 23, )*+4 denying themotion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, ;pp. 23+-233, id.= ;A= the other order alsodated 9ctober 23, )*+4 en>oining inter alia, that H;a= all cash collections should be deposited the >oint account of the estate of 5innie Jane odges and estate of . 7. odges, ;b= thatwhatever cash collections ;that= had been deposited in the account of either of the estatesshould be withdrawn and since then ;sic= deposited in the >oint account of the estate of 5innieJane odges and the estate of . 7. odges" ... ;d= ;that= 'dministratri6 agno allow the&/0 to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her possession, ithe same manner that 'dministrator &/0 is also directed to allow 'dministratri6 agno toinspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possessionH and H;e= that accountant of the estate of 5innie Jane odges shall have access to all records of thetransactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of 5innie Jane odges" and in li$emanner, the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of . 7. odges shallhave access to the records of transactions of the 5innie Jane odges estate for the protectionthe estate of . 7. odgesH, ;pp. 2*2-2*4, id.= and ;= the order of %ebruary )4, )*++, denyinamong others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of 9ctober 23, )*+4 last referred to;pp. 44-4+, id.=

's may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the ourtBsabove-mentioned resolution of (eptember @, )*32 modifying the in>unction previously issued

'ugust @, )*+3, and, more importantly, with what #e have said the trial court should havealways done pending the liCuidation of the con>ugal partnership of the odges spouses. /n fac

as already stated, that is the arrangement #e are ordering, by this decision, to be followed.(tated differently, since the Cuestioned orders provide for >oint action by the two administratorand that is precisely what #e are holding out to have been done and should be done until thetwo estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. 'ccordingly theforegoing assignments of error must be, as they are hereby overruled.

Assi#nments of error 0um7ers '15%%% to '11% and '11%%% to '115%.

The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with e6pendituresmade by appellee agno, as 'dministratri6 of the Estate of rs. odges, in connection with hadministration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error 7umbers 51/1 to 511/ put intoCuestion the payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, asconstituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of rs. odges.

ore specifically, assignment 7umber 511/// refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid toemployees of the court and three other persons for services in copying the court records toenable the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all the incidents in theproceedings. The reimbursement was approved as proper legal e6penses of administration pthe order of !ecember )*, )*+, ;pp. 22)-222, id.= and repeated motions for reconsiderationthereof were denied by the orders of January *, )*+4, ;pp. 2A)-2A2, id.= 9ctober 23, )*+4, ;p

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233, id.= and %ebruary )4, )*++. ;pp. 44-4+, id.= 9n the other hand, 'ssignments 7umbers518/// to 511/, 511/8 and 5118 Cuestion the trial courtBs order of 7ovember A, )*+4 approvingthe agreement of June +, )*+ between 'dministratri6 agno and James 5. (ullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of rs. odges, as &arties of the %irst &art, and 'ttorneys Raul anglapusand Rizal R. Duimpo, as &arties of the (econd &art, regarding attorneys fees for said counselwho had agreed Hto prosecute and defend their interests ;of the &arties of the %irst &art= incertain cases now pending litigation in the ourt of %irst /nstance of /loilo , more specifically in(pecial &roceedings )A?3 and )+32 H ;pp. )2+-)2*, id.= and directing 'dministratri6 agno Htoissue and sign whatever chec$ or chec$s maybe needed to implement the approval of theagreement anne6ed to the motionH as well as the Hadministrator of the estate of . 7. odges to countersign the said chec$ or chec$s as the case maybe.H ;pp. A)A-A2?, id.=, reconsiderationof which order of approval was denied in the order of %ebruary )+, )*++, ;p. 4+, id.=

'ssignment 7umber 5118/ imputes error to the lower courtBs order of 9ctober 23, )*+4, alreadyreferred to above, insofar as it orders that H&/0 should counter sign the chec$ in the amount of&24? in favor of 'dministratri6 'velina '. agno as her compensation as administratri6 of 5innieJane odges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges only.H ;p. 2*, id.=

ain contention again of appellant &/0 in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there isno such estate as the estate of rs. odges for which the Cuestioned e6penditures were made,hence what were authorized were in effect e6penditures from the estate of odges. 's #e havealready demonstrated in 9ur resolution above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thisposture is incorrect. /ndeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the parties in thesecases are ultimately resolved, 1/ the final result will surely be that there are propertiesconstituting the estate of rs. odges of which agno is the current administratri6. /t follows,therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such administratri6, to hire the persons whom shepaid overtime pay and to be paid for her own services as administratri6. That she has not yetcollected and is not collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant &/0 is toher credit.

9f course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority toenter into contracts for attorneyBs fees in the manner she had done in the agreement of June +,)*+. 'nd as regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, #e see no reasonto disturb the discretion e6ercised by the probate court in determining the same. #e have goneover the agreement, and considering the obvious size of the estate in Cuestion and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional standing of counsel, #e cannot saythat the fees agreed upon reCuire the e6ercise by the ourt of its inherent power to reduce it.

&/0 insists, however, that said agreement of June +, )*+ is not for legal services to the estatebut to the heirs of rs. odges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the case, any

payment under it, insofar as counselsB services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, wouldbe in the nature of advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the estate. 'gain, #ehold that such posture cannot prevail.

pon the premise #e have found plausible that there is an e6isting estate of rs. odges, itresults that >uridically and factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and differentfrom those involved in her estate of odges and vice versa. /nsofar as the matters relatede6clusively to the estate of rs. odges, &/0, as administrator of the estate of odges, is acomplete stranger and it is without personality to Cuestion the actuations of the administratri6thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of odges. 'ctually, considering the obviouslyconsiderable size of the estate of rs. odges, #e see no possible cause for apprehension thatwhen the two estates are segregated from each other, the amount of attorneyBs fees stipulated inthe agreement in Cuestion will pre>udice any portion that would correspond to odgesB estate.

'nd as regards the other heirs of rs. odges who ought to be the ones who should have a sayon the attorneyBs fees and other e6penses of administration assailed by &/0, suffice it to saythat they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact,James 5. (ullivan and have not otherwise interposed any ob>ection to any of the e6pensesincurred by agno Cuestioned by &/0 in these appeals. 's a matter of fact, as o rdered by thetrial court, all the e6penses in Cuestion, including the attorneyBs fees, may be paid withoutawaiting the determination and segregation of the estate of rs. odges.

#ithal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at thstage of the controversy among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the e6istence or noe6istence of the estate of rs. odges. /n this respect, the interest of respondent agno, as tappointed administratri6 of the said estate, is to maintain that it e6ists, which is naturallycommon and identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers and sisters of rodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both agno and these heirs have seeminglyagreed to retain but one counsel. /n fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient aneconomical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest between agno and the heirs of rsodges would be, at this stage, Cuite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. 0esides,should any substantial conflict of interest between them arise in the future, the same would bematter that the probate court can very well ta$e care of in the course of the independentproceedings in ase 7o. )A?3 after the corresponding segregation of the two sub>ect estates#e cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of rs.odges cannot be represented by a common counsel.

7ow, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in Cuestion that should correspond to the heconstitutes premature partial distribution of the estate of rs. odges is also a matter in whic

neither &/0 nor the heirs of odges have any interest. /n any event, since, as far as therecords show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance ta6ese6cept those of the brothers and sisters of rs. odges, have already been paid, 11 no pre>udcan caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of a ttorneyBs fees in Cuestion. 'nd this connection, it may be added that, although strictly spea$ing, the attorneyBs fees of thecounsel of an administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable laton by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact othe heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inCuire whether or not thesanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.

%or the foregoing reasons, 'ssignments of Error 518/// to 511/ and 511/// to 5118/ should bas they are hereby overruled.

Assi#nments of error % to %5, 1%%% to 15, 11%% to 115, 1115 to 111 5%, 1'% to 1'%%% and '.

These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale oreal properties registered in the name of odges but e6ecuted by appellee agno, as

'dministratri6 of the Estate of rs. odges, purportedly in implementation of correspondingsupposed written Hontracts to (ellH previously e6ecuted by odges during the interim betweay 2A, )*43, when his wife died, and !ecember 24, )*+2, the day he died. 's stated on pp))@-)2? of appellantBs main brief, HThese are: the, contract to sell between the deceased,

harles 7ewton odges, and the appellee, &epito G. /yulores e6ecuted on %ebruary 4, )*+)"the contract to sell between the deceased, harles 7ewton odges, and the appellantEsperidion &artisala, e6ecuted on 'pril 2?, )*+?" the contract to sell between the deceased,harles 7ewton odges, and the appellee, #inifredo . Espada, e6ecuted on 'pril )@, )*+?the contract to sell between the deceased, harles 7ewton odges, and the appellee, Rosar

'lingasa, e6ecuted on 'ugust 24, )*4@" the contract to sell between the deceased, harles7ewton odges, and the appellee, 5orenzo arles, e6ecuted on June )3, )*4@" the contract sell between the deceased, harles 7ewton odges, and the appellee, (alvador (. Guzmane6ecuted on (eptember )A, )*+?" the contract to sell between the deceased, harles 7ewtoodges, and the appellee, %lorenia 0arrido, e6ecuted on %ebruary 2), )*4@" the contract to sbetween the deceased, harles 7ewton odges, and the appellee, &urificacion oronado,e6ecuted on 'ugust ), )*+)" the contract to sell between the deceased, harles 7ewtonodges, and the appellee, Graciano 5ucero, e6ecuted on 7ovember 23, )*+)" the contract tosell between the deceased, harles 7ewton odges, and the appellee, 'riteo Thomas Jamir,e6ecuted on ay 2+, )*+)" the contract to sell between the deceased, harles 7ewton odgand the appellee, elCuiades 0atisanan, e6ecuted on June *, )*4*" the contract to sell betwethe deceased, harles 7ewton odges, and the appellee, 0elcezar ausing, e6ecuted on%ebruary )?, )*4* and the contract to sell between the deceased, harles 7ewton odges, athe appellee, 'delfa &remaylon, e6ecuted on 9ctober A), )*4*, re Title 7o. )A@)4.H

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Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant &/0 that, inasmuch as pursuant to the willof rs. odges, her husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it wasas absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales that he e6ecuted theaforementioned contracts to sell, and conseCuently, upon his death, the implementation of saidcontracts may be underta$en only by the administrator of his estate and not by the administratri6of the estate of rs. odges. 0asically, the same theory is invo$ed with particular reference tofive other sales, in which the respective Hcontracts to sellH in favor of these appellees weree6ecuted by odges before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee (antiago&acaonsis, 'lfredo atedral, Jose &ablico , #estern /nstitute of Technology and 'delfa&remaylon.

'nent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell e6ecuted by odges after thedeath of his wife, those enumerated in the Cuotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, itis Cuite obvious that &/0Bs contention cannot be sustained. 's already e6plained earlier, ) 1@ allproceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by odges after the death of his wifeshould be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, sub>ect to the terms ofher will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that

such proceeds, whether in cash or property have been subseCuently conveyed or assignedsubseCuently by odges to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could notthereby belong to him anymore at the time of his death, they automatically became part of theinheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in Cuestion involve transactions whichare e6actly of this nature. onseCuently, the payments made by the appellees should beconsidered as payments to the estate of rs. odges which is to be distributed and partitionedamong her heirs specified in the will.

The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell e6ecuted odges during the lifetime of hiswife, present a different situation. 't first blush, it would appear that as to them, &/0Bs positionhas some degree of plausibility. onsidering, however, that the adoption of &/0Bs theory wouldnecessarily have tremendous repercussions and would bring about considerable disturbance ofproperty rights that have somehow accrued already in favor of innocent third parties, the fivepurchasers aforenamed, the ourt is inclined to ta$e a pragmatic and practical view of the legalsituation involving them by overloo$ing the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which would not, after all, detract materially from what should substantiallycorrespond to each and all of the parties concerned.

To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved" asmuch as possible, they should not be made to suffer any pre>udice on account of >udicialcontroversies not of their own ma$ing. #hat is more, the transactions they rely on weresubmitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from already $nown and recorded

actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on theirmotions, since appellee agno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her, beenallowed to act in her capacity as administratri6 of one of the sub>ect estates either alone orcon>ointly with &/0. 'll the sales in Cuestion were e6ecuted by agno in )*++ already, butbefore that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned e6pressly many of heract as administratri6 involving e6penditures from the estate made by her either con>ointly with orindependently from &/0, as 'dministrator of the Estate of odges. Thus, it may be said thatsaid buyers-appellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. 'ccordingly,unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly fatalinfirmity the ourt would rather affirm them.

/t is Cuite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are eCuivalent onlyto a fraction of what should constitute the estate of rs. odges, even if it is assumed that thesame would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the con>ugal properties of the spouses as ofthe time of her death or, to be more e6act, one-half of her estate as per the inventory submittedby odges as e6ecutor, on ay )2, )*4@. /n none of its numerous, varied and voluminouspleadings, motions and manifestations has &/0 claimed any possibility otherwise. (uch beingthe case, to avoid any conflict with the heirs of odges, the said properties covered by theCuestioned deeds of sale e6ecuted by appellee agno may be treated as among thosecorresponding to the estate of rs. odges, which would have been actually under her controland administration had odges complied with his duty to liCuidate the con>ugal partnership.

8iewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be pre>udiced by theappealed orders referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could,therefore, have the reCuisite interest to Cuestion them would be only the heirs of rs. odgesdefinitely not &/0.

/t is of no moment in what capacity odges made the Hcontracts to sellB after the death of hiswife. Even if he had acted as e6ecutor of the will of his wife, he did not have to submit thosecontracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the rules, ;(ections 2, , 4, +, @ and * of Rule@* Cuoted by appellant on pp. )24 to )23 of its brief= for the simple reason that by the veryorders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of ay 23, )*43 and !ecember ))*43, odges was Hallowed or authorizedH by the trial court Hto continue the business in whichhe was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living;9rder of ay 23= which according to the motion on which the court acted was Hof buying andselling personal and real propertiesH, and Hto e6ecute subseCuent sales, conveyances, leasesand mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased 5innie Jane odges in consonancewith the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.H ;9rder of !ecember )= other words, if odges acted then as e6ecutor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by

virtue of these blan$et orders, and &/0 does not Cuestion the legality of such grant of authoon the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its main contention in these case9n the other hand, if, as &/0 contends, he acted as heir-ad>udicatee, the authority given to by the aforementioned orders would still suffice.

's can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the Hcontracts to sellH upon which thedeeds in Cuestion were based were e6ecuted by odges before or after the death of his wife.a word, #e hold, for the reasons already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds beiassailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of rs. odges" hence, anysupposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court may be invo$ed only by her henot by &/0, and since the said heirs are not ob>ecting, and the defects pointed out not beingstrictly >urisdictional in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders arenot disturbed.

/n view of these considerations, #e do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error undiscussion.

Assi#nments of error 5 to 5%%%, 15% to 15%%%, 115% to 11%1, 1115%% to 1115%%%, 1'%5 to 1'5% and '%.

'll these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective

vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referreto in the assignments of error >ust discussed. /t is claimed that some of them never made fullpayments in accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others,li$e 5orenzo arles, Jose &ablico, 'lfredo atedral and (alvador (. Guzman, the contracts wthem had already been unilaterally cancelled by &/0 pursuant to automatic rescission clauscontained in them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. 0ut&/0Bs posture is again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deedsCuestion could not pertain to the estate of rs. odges. #e have already held above that, itbeing evident that a considerable portion of the con>ugal properties, much more than theproperties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of rs. odges, to avunnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of suchestate. %rom this point of view, it is apparent again that the Cuestions, whether or not it wasproper for appellee agno to have disregarded the cancellations made by &/0, therebyreviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the rules governingnew dispositions of properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not be raised by &/0 only by the heirs of rs. odges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps thgovernment because of the still unpaid inheritance ta6es. 0ut, again, since there is no pretenthat any ob>ections were raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be pre>udiced, tcontentions of &/0 under the instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.

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Assi#nments of error %1 to 1%%, 1%1 to 11%, 111 to 11%5, 111%1 to 1',

1'5%% to 1'%1, '%% and '%%% to '1%.

&/0 raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental,namely: ;)= that in approving the deeds e6ecuted by agno pursuant to contracts to sell alreadycancelled by it in the performance of its functions as administrator of the estate of odges, thetrial court deprived the said estate of the right to invo$e such cancellations it ;&/0= had madeand ;2= that in so acting, the court Harrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate court, thepower to determine the contending claims of third parties against the estate of odges over realproperty,H since it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of therespective contracts to sell e6ecuted by odges in favor of the buyers-appellees concernedwere complied with by the latter. #hat is worse, in the view of &/0, is that the court has ta$enthe word of the appellee agno, Ha total stranger to his estate as determinative of the issueH.

'ctually, contrary to the stand of &/0, it is this last point regarding appellee agnoBs havingagreed to ignore the cancellations made by &/0 and allowed the buyers-appellees toconsummate the sales in their favor that is decisive. (ince #e have already held that the

properties covered by the contracts in Cuestion should be deemed to be portions of the estate of rs. odges and not that of odges, it is &/0 that is a complete stranger in these incidents.onsidering, therefore, that the estate of rs. odges and her heirs who are the real parties ininterest having the right to oppose the consummation of the impugned sales are not ob>ecting,and that they are the ones who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, theassignments of error under discussion have no basis and must accordingly be as they arehereby overruled.

#ith particular reference to assignments 5/// to 51/, assailing the orders of the trial courtreCuiring &/0 to surrender the respective ownerBs duplicate certificates of title over theproperties covered by the sales in Cuestion and otherwise directing the Register of !eeds of/loilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of thebuyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court waswithin its rights to so reCuire and direct, &/0 having refused to give way, by withholding saidownersB duplicate certificates, of the corresponding registration of the transfers duly and legallyapproved by the court.

Assi#nments of error '1%% to '15%%

'll these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee#estern /nstitute of Technology. 's will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of realproperty covered by a con tract to sell e6ecuted by odges prior to the death of hi s wife. 's of

9ctober, )*+4, it was in arrears in the total amount of &*2,+*).?? in the payment of itsinstallments on account of its purchase, hence it received under date of 9ctober , )*+4 and9ctober 2?, )*+4, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from &/0 and appelleeagno, in their respective capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the odgesspouses, albeit, while in the case of &/0 it made $nown that Hno other arrangement can beaccepted e6cept by paying all your past due accountH, on the other hand, agno merely saidshe would Happreciate very much if you can ma$e some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obliga tion.H ;(ee pp. 2*4-A)), Green R. on '.= 9n7ovember A, )*+4, the /nstitute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and willingto pay &2?,??? on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it should pay &/0or agno, it prayed that it be Hallowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pendingresolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators.H 'cting on this motion, on 7ovember 2A,)*+4, the trial court issued an order, already Cuoted in the narration of facts in this opinion,holding that payment to both or either of the two administrators is Hproper and legalH, and soHmovant can pay to both estates or either of themH, considering that Hin both cases ;(pecial&roceedings )A?3 and )+32= there is as yet no >udicial declaration of heirs nor distribution ofproperties to whomsoever are entitled thereto.H

The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. %rom theprocedural standpoint, it is claimed that &/0 was not served with a copy of the /nstituteBs

motion, that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on 7ovember 2A, )*+4, whereathe date set for its hearing was 7ovember 2?, )*+4, and that what the order grants is differenfrom what is prayed for in the motion. 's to the substantive aspect, it is contended that thematter treated in the motion is beyond the >urisdiction of the probate court and that the orderauthorized payment to a person other than the administrator of the estate of odges with whothe /nstitute had contracted.

The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. #e must assume, absany clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it thatappellant was duly notified. 9n the other hand, there is nothing irregular in the courtBs havingresolved the motion three days after the date set for hearing the same. oreover, the recordreveals that appellantsB motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was deniby the trial court on arch 3, )*++ ;p. +2, Green R. on '.= #ithal, #e are not convinced thathe relief granted is not within the general intent of the /nstituteBs motion.

/nsofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that theyare mere reiterations of contentions #e have already resolved above adversely to appellantsposition. /ncidentally, #e may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not

disturbing the lower courtBs orders sanctioning the sales Cuestioned in all these appeal s by&/0, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property e6ecuted by adeceased person raises substantial ob>ections to its being implemented by the e6ecutor oradministrator of the decedentBs estate that (ection @ of Rule @* may not apply and,conseCuently, the matter has, to be ta$en up in a separate action outside of the probate court"but where, as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in agreementhat the conveyance be made, it is properly within the >urisdiction of the probate court to give sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule >ust mentioned. 'nd with respect to thesupposed automatic rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell e6ecuted by odgesfavor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the saidcontracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if theyamount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted Hpromises to sell;'rt. )3*, ivil ode of the &hilippines, 2nd paragraph= the pactum commissorium or theautomatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there habeen a previous notarial or >udicial demand by the seller ;)? anresa 2+A, 2nd ed.= neither ofwhich have been shown to have been made in connection with the transactions herein involve

onseCuently, #e find no merit in the assignments of error 7umber 51// to 518//.

/ & & A 8

onsidering the fact that this decision is unusually e6tensive and that the issues herein ta$enand resolved are rather numerous and varied, what with appellant ma$ing seventy-eightassignments of error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the court a Cuo, if only tofacilitate proper understanding of the import and e6tent of our rulings herein contained, it isperhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made together with ourconclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .

The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late harles 7ewton odges as well as that ofhis wife, 5innie Jane odges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half. /n theirrespective wills which were e6ecuted on different occasions, each one of them provided mutuas follows: H/ give, devise and beCueath all of the rest, residue and remainder ;after funeral anadministration e6penses, ta6es and debts= of my estate, both real and personal, whereversituated or located, to my beloved ;spouse= to have and to hold unto ;him<her= during ;his<hnatural lifetimeH, sub>ect to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived theother, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is Hgive;n=, devise;d= andbeCueath;ed=H to the brothers and sisters of the latter.

rs. odges died first, on ay 2A , )*43. %our days later, on ay 23, odges was appointedspecial administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was Hallowedauthorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, ;buying and selling personal areal properties= and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living.H

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(ubseCuently, on !ecember ), )*43, after rs. odgesB will had been probated and odgeshad been appointed and had Cualified as E6ecutor thereof, upon his motion in which he assertedthat he was Hnot only part owner of the properties left as con>ugal, but also, the successor to allthe properties left by the deceased 5innie Jane odgesH, the trial court ordered that Hfor thereasons stated in his motion dated !ecember )), )*43, which the ourt considers well ta$en, ...all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased 5innieJane odges e6ecuted by the E6ecutor, harles 7ewton odges are hereby '&&R98E!. Thesaid E6ecutor is further authorized to e6ecute subseCuent sales, conveyances, leases andmortgages of the properties left by the said deceased 5innie Jane odges in consonance withthe wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter.H

'nnually thereafter, odges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account ofhis administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urgethe that Hno person interested in the &hilippines of the time and place of e6amining the hereinaccounts be given notice as herein e6ecutor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased inaccordance with the last will and testament already probated by the onorable ourt.H 'll saidaccounts approved as prayed for.

7othing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or odges until !ecember 24,)*+2. /mportantly to be the provision in the will of rs. odges that her share of the con>ugalpartnership was to be inherited by her husband Hto have and to hold unto him, my said husband,during his natural lifetimeH and that Hat the death of my said husband, / give, devise andbeCueath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, whereversituated or located, to be eCually divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share ali$eH,which provision naturally made it imperative that the con>ugal partnership be promptly liCuidated,in order that the Hrest, residue and remainderH of his wifeBs share thereof, as of the time ofodgesB own death, may be readily $nown and identified, no such liCuidation was everunderta$en. The record gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, itappears therein:

). That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of .7. odges and the Estate of 5innie Jane odges, odges repeatedly andconsistently reported the combined income of the con>ugal partnership andthen merely divided the same eCually between himself and the estate of thedeceased wife, and, more importantly, he also, as consistently, filedcorresponding separate income ta6 returns for each calendar year for eachresulting half of such combined income, thus reporting that the estate ofrs. odges had its own income distinct from his own.

2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order

probating the will of rs. odges, the name of one of her brothers, Royigdon then already deceased, odges lost no time in as$ing for the proper correction Hin order that the heirs of deceased Roy igdon may not thin$ orbelieve they were omitted, and that they were really interested in the estateof the deceased 5innie Jane odgesH.

A. That in his aforementioned motion of !ecember )), )*43, he e6presslystated that Hdeceased 5innie Jane odges died leaving no descendants orascendants e6cept brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as thesurviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedentH, therebyindicating that he was not e6cluding his wifeBs brothers and sisters from theinheritance.

. That odges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the nited(tates inheritance ta6 authorities indicating that he had renounced hisinheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs, which attitude he issupposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed andsworn to here in the &hilippines and in which he even purportedly statedthat his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his wifeBswill was to Habsolve ;him= or ;his= estate from any liability for the payment of

income ta6es on income which has accrued to the estate of 5innie JaneodgesH, his wife, since her death.

9n said date, !ecember 24, )*+2, odges died. The very ne6t day, upon motion of hereinrespondent and appellee , 'velina '. agno, she was appointed by the trial court as

'dministratri6 of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges, in (pecial &roceedings 7o. )A?3 as (pecial 'dministratri6 of the estate of harles 7ewton odges, Hin the latter case, becausethe last will of said harles 7ewton odges is still $ept in his vault or iron safe and that the reand personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless (pecia

'dministratri6 is appointed,H ;9rder of !ecember 2+, )*+2, p. 23, Fellow R. on '.= although,soon enough, on !ecember 2*, )*+2, a certain arold M. !avies was appointed as her o-(pecial 'dministrator, and when (pecial &roceedings 7o. )+32, Testate Estate of harles7ewton odges, was opened, Joe odges, as ne6t of $in of the deceased, was in due timeappointed as o-'dministrator of said estate together with 'tty. %ernando &. irasol, to replaagno and !avies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner &/0 alone.

't the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding >ointly, with eachadministrator acting together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. &/0 used to

secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of agno in transactions it wanted toenter into and submitted the same to the court for approval as their >oint acts. (o did agno dli$ewise. (omehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of thembegan acting later on separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of ttrial court. Thus, &/0 had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conductthe business of the estate independently of agno and otherwise acted as if all the propertiesappearing in the name of harles 7ewton odges belonged solely and only to his estate, to te6clusion of the brothers and sisters of rs. odges, without considering whether or not in faany of said properties corresponded to the portion of the con>ugal partnership pertaining to theestate of rs. odges. 9n the other hand, agno made her own e6penditures, hired her ownlawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of rs. odges, and dealth with some of properties, appearing in the name of odges, on the assumption that they actually corresponthe estate of rs. odges. 'll of these independent and separate actuations of the twoadministrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, thedifferences reached a point wherein agno, who was more cognizant than anyone else abouthe ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her loand intimate association with them, made it difficult for &/0 to perform normally its functions administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present >udicialcontroversies came about.

&redicating its position on the tenor of the orders of ay 23 and !ecember ), )*43 as well a

the approval by the court a quo of the annual statements of account of odges, &/0 holds tothe view that the estate of rs. odges has already been in effect closed with the virtualad>udication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to odges, and that, therefore, agnhad already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters rs. odges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by odges. ainly upon suchtheory, &/0 has come to this ourt with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that thlower courtBs orders allowing respondent agno to continue acting as administratri6 of the estof rs. odges in (pecial &roceedings )A?3 in the manner she has been doing, as detailedearlier above, be set aside. 'dditionally, &/0 maintains that the provision in rs. odgesB wilinstituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of atestamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, inaccordance with the pertinent provisions of the ivil ode, it is ineffective and may not beenforced. /t is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the odges spouses were boresidents of the &hilippines, following the decision of this ourt in 'znar vs. Garcia, or the casof hristensen, 3 (R' *4, the estate left by rs. odges could not be more than one-half ofher share of the con>ugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Te6as,.(.'., in accordance with 'rticle )+ in relation to 'rticles *?? and @32 of the ivil ode. /nitia#e issued a preliminary in>unction against agno and allowed &/0 to act alone.

't the same time &/0 has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approvingindividual acts of appellee agno in her capacity as administratri6 of the estate of rs. odge

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such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring e6penses of administration for differentpurposes and e6ecuting deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties which arestill registered in the name of odges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding Hcontracts to sellHe6ecuted by odges. The said orders are being Cuestioned on >urisdictional and proceduralgrounds directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the propertiesof the two estates belong already to the estate of odges e6clusively.

9n the other hand, respondent-appellee agno denies that the trial courtBs orders of ay 23 and!ecember ), )*43 were meant to be finally ad>udicatory of the hereditary rights of odges andcontends that they were no more than the courtBs general sanction of past and future acts ofodges as e6ecutor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. 's to the pointregarding substitution, her position is that what was given by rs. odges to her husband underthe provision in Cuestion was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the con>ugal partnership, with thena$ed ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. 'nent the application of 'rticle )+of the ivil ode, she claims that the applicable law to the will of rs. odges is that of Te6asunder which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of rs. odgescannot be less than her share or one-half of the con>ugal partnership properties. (he further

maintains that, in any event, odges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced hisinheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers andsisters effective at the latest upon the death of odges.

/n this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues >ust summarized, #eoverrule &/0Bs contention that the orders of ay 23, )*43 and !ecember ), )*43 amount toan ad>udication to odges of the estate of his wife, and #e recognize the present e6istence ofthe estate of rs. odges, as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name ofodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of rs. odges in the con>ugalpartnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of saidshare still e6isting and undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to herbrothers and sisters share and share ali$e. %actually, #e find that the proven circumstancesrelevant to the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court intended to ma$e therebysuch alleged final ad>udication. 5egally, #e hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis forsuch a conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings hadnot yet reached the point when a final distribution and ad>udication could be made. oreover,the interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would be done. 'tbest, therefore, said orders merely allowed odges to dispose of portions of his inheritance inadvance of final ad>udication, which is implicitly permitted under (ection 2 of Rule )?*, therebeing no possible pre>udice to third parties, inasmuch as rs. odges had no creditors and allpertinent ta6es have been paid.

ore specifically, #e hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently e6tant in the record, andon the assumption that odgesB purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of rs.odges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate ofthe spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever odges had gratuitously disposed oftherefrom during the period from, ay 2A, )*43, when she died, to !ecember 24, )*+2, whenhe died provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the sameperiod, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to bepart of his wifeBs estate, unless it can be shown that he had subseCuently disposed of them#ratuitously .

't this >uncture, it may be reiterated that the Cuestion of what are the pertinent laws of Te6as andwhat would be the estate of rs. odges under them is basically one of fact, and consideringthe respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemedas settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that couldpossibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourthof the con>ugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has referencesolely to the legitime of odges, &/0 being of the view that under the laws of Te6as, there issuch a legitime of one-fourth of said con>ugal estate and agno contending, on the other hand,that there is none. /n o ther words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at thesubseCuent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Te6as on the matter would no longer be ofany conseCuence, since &/0 would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of

rs. odges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related tothe effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts li$e any other controverted fcreate estoppel.

/n the process, #e overrule &/0Bs contention that the provision in rs. odgesB will in favor oher brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. 0ut neither are #esustaining, on the other hand, agnoBs pose that it gave odges only a lifetime usufruct. #ehold that by said provision, rs. odges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters asco-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have completerights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the formerwould be only the remainder thereof at the time of odgesB death. /n other words, whereas thare not to inherit only in case of default of odges, on the other hand, odges was not obligeto preserve anything for them. learly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitutioare absent" the provision in Cuestion is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution oheirs, whereby the institution of odges is sub>ect to a partial resolutory condition the operativcontingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.

#e also hold, however, that the estate of rs. odges inherited by her brothers and sisterscould be more than >ust stated, but this would depend on ;)= whether upon the properapplication of the principle of ren+oi in relation to 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode and the pertinentlaws of Te6as, it will appear that odges had no legitime as contended by agno, and ;2=whether or not it can be held that odges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritancfrom his wife. nder the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record ofthese cases, as of now, the ourt is not in a position to ma$e a final ruling, whether of fact or olaw, on any of these two issues, and #e, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedingand resolution in the first instance by the court a Cuo, as hereinabove indicated. #e reiterate,however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, 9ur consideropinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of rs. odges, herhusband could not have anyway legally ad>udicated or caused to be ad>udicated to himself hewhole share of their con>ugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof durinhis lifetime, the resulting estate of rs. odges, of which agno is the uncontestedadministratri6, cannot be less than one-fourth of the con>ugal partnership properties, as of thetime of her death, minus what, as e6plained earlier, have been #ratuitously disposed oftherefrom, by odges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, ascontended by &/0, under 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode and applying ren+oi the laws of the&hilippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her freedisposable portion, ta$ing into account already the legitime of her husband under 'rticle *?? the ivil ode.

The foregoing considerations leave the ourt with no alternative than to conclude that inpredicating its orders on the assumption, albeit une6pressed therein, that there is an estate ors. odges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that respondent agno is tlegal administratri6 thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its >urisdiction. 'ccordinglythe petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The ourt feels however, that pendthe liCuidation of the con>ugal partnership and the determination of the specific propertiesconstituting her estate, the two administrators should act con>ointly as ordered in the ourtBsresolution of (eptember @, )*32 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decisio

'nent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee agnoas administratri6, of e6penses of administration and attorneyBs fees, it is obvious that, with 9uholding that there is such an estate of rs. odges, and for the reasons stated in the body ofthis opinion, the said orders should be affirmed. This #e do on the assumption #e find >ustifiby the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant &/0, that the size and valuthe properties that should correspond to the estate of rs. odges far e6ceed the total of theattorneyBs fees and administration e6penses in Cuestion.

#ith respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee agnoadministratri6, covering properties registered in the name of odges, the details of which arerelated earlier above, a distinction must be made between those predicated on contracts to se

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e6ecuted by odges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised oncontracts to sell entered into by him after her death. 's regards the latter, #e hold that inasmuchas the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to theestate of rs. odges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of ay 23 and!ecember ), )*43, said payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intentobviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size andvalue of the properties to correspond to the estate of rs. odges would e6ceed the total valueof all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said propertiesmay be deemed as pertaining to the estate of rs. odges. 'nd there being no showing thatthus viewing the situation, there would be pre>udice to anyone, including the government, theourt also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practicalapproach as discussed above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. 0eing a stranger to theestate of rs. odges, &/0 has no personality to raise the procedural and >urisdictional issuesraised by it. 'nd inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of rs. odges orthe government has ob>ected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, theree6ists no reason for said orders to be set aside.

D%$O%%5E $A /7 8/E# 9% '55 TE %9REG9/7G &RE/(E(, >udgment is hereby rendered !/(/((/7G thepetition in G. R. 7os. 5-23@+? and 5-23@*+, and '%%/R/7G, in G. R. 7os. 5-23*A+-A3 and theother thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the correspondingdoc$et fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages A4 to A3and @? to @2 of this decision" the e6istence of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges, withrespondent-appellee 'velina '. agno, as administratri6 thereof is recognized, and it is declaredthat, until final >udgment is ultimately rendered regarding ;)= the manner of applying 'rticle )+ ofthe ivil ode of the &hilippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and ;2= the factual andlegal issue of whether or not harles 7ewton odges had effectively and legally renounced hisinheritance under the will of 5innie Jane odges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of thecommunity properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on ay 2A,)*43, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third personsfrom said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, theproceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wifeBs estate, unless subseCuently disposed ofgratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciationbe declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate" inconseCuence, the preliminary in>unction of 'ugust @, )*+3, as amended on 9ctober and!ecember +, )*+3, is lifted, and the resolution of (eptember @, )*32, directing that petitioner-appellant &/0, as 'dministrator of the Testate Estate of harles 7ewton odges, in (pecial&roceedings )+32, and respondent-appellee 'velina '. agno, as 'dministratri6 of the Testate

Estate of 5innie Jane odges, in (pecial &roceedings )A?3, should act thenceforth alwayscon>ointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and thesame is made part of this >udgment and shall continue in force, pending the liCuidation of thecon>ugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from eachother of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this >udgment, the trial courtshould immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, tothe end that the one-half share thereof of rs. odges may be properly and clearly identified"thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth hereinad>udged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent forher e6clusive administration in (pecial &roceedings )A?3, while the other one-fourth shallremain under the >oint administration of said respondent and petitioner under a >oint proceedingsin (pecial &roceedings )A?3 and )+32, whereas the half unCuestionably pertaining to odgesshall be administered by petitioner e6clusively in (pecial &roceedings )+32, without pre>udice tothe resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator 12" and thisarrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi andrenunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the correspondingcomplete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from thesaid resolution.

Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adherehenceforth, in all their actuations in (pecial &roceedings )A?3 and )+32, to the views passedand ruled upon by the ourt in the foregoing opinion.

'ppellant &/0 is ordered to pay, within five ;4= days from notice hereof, thirty-one additionalappeal doc$et fees, but this decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the partiesherein after fifteen ;)4= days from the respective notices to them hereof in accordance with thrules.

osts against petitioner-appellant &/0.

4aldi+ar, Castro, Es#uerra and ernande", JJ., concur.

&akasiar, Antonio, &uo" $alma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.

Seara(e O%&%o&'

FERNAN*O, J., concurring:

/ concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.

TEE3AN4EE, J., concurring:

/ concur in the result of d ismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in ases 5-23@+?and 5-23@*+ and with the affirmance of the appealed orders of the probate court in ases 5-23*A+-A3.

/ also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the >udgment penned by r. Justice0arredo decreeing the liftin# of the ourtBs writ of preliminary in>unction of 'ugust @, )*+3 asamended on 9ctober , and !ecember +, )*+3 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that the ourtBsresolution of (eptember @, )*32 2 which directed that petitioner2appellant &/0 as administraof . 7. ;harles 7ewton= odgesB estate ;(p. &roc. 7o. )+32 and respondent-appellee 'veli

'. agno as administratri6 of 5innie Jane odgesB estate ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3= should actalways conointly never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated ashall continue in force and made part of the >udgment.

/t is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant &/0Bs primal contention in the cases atbar belatedly filed by it with this ourt on Au#ust ;, ;<@> ;over ten ;)?= years after 5innie JanodgesB death on &ay 9:, ;<=> and ;over five ;4= years after her husband .7. odgesB deaon Decem7er 9=, ;<@9 during which time both estates have been pendin# settlement anddistribution to the decedentsB respective rightful heirs all this time up to now= that the probacourt per its order of !ecember ), )*43 ;supplementing an earlier order of ay 24, )*43= ; igranting . 7. odgesB motion as E6ecutor of his wife 5innieBs estate to continue their H7usineof buying and selling personal and real propertiesH and approving Hall sales, conveyances,leases and mortgagesH made and to be made by him as such e6ecutor under his obligation tosubmit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of his wifeBs estate and nothingremains to be done e6cept to formally close her estate ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3= as her estate wathereby merged with his own so that nothin# remains of it that may be ad>udicated to herbrothers and sisters as her designated heirs after him, is wholly untenable and deservesscant consideration.

'side from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, thiscontention of &/0 that there no longer e6ists any separate estate of 5innie Jane odges aftethe probate courtBs order of !ecember ), )*43 goes against the very acts and >udicialadmissions of .7. odges as her e6ecutor whereby he consistently recognized the separatee6istence and identity of his wifeBs estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own

8/12/2019 863 to 914


share of their con>ugal partnership and estate and Hnever considered the whole estate as asingle one belonging e6clusively to himselfH during the entire period that he survived her for over five ;4= years up to the time of his own death on !ecember 24, )*+2 5 and against the identicalacts and >udicial admissions of &/0 as administrator of .7. odgesB estate until &/0 soughtin )*++ to ta$e over 7oth estates as pertaining to its sole administration.

&/0 is now barred and estopped from contradicting or ta$ing a belated position contradictory toor inconsistent with its previous admissions + ;as well as those o f .7. odges himself in hislifetime and of whose estate &/0 is merely an administrator= recognizing the e6istence andidentity of 5innie Jane odgesB separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of herbrothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.

&/0Bs petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in 5innie JaneodgesB estate subseCuent to its order of !ecember ), )*43 as Hnull and void for having beenissued without >urisdictionH must therefore be dismissed with the re>ection of its belated anduntenable contention that there is no longer any estate of rs. odges of which respondent

'velina agno is the duly appointed and acting administratri6.

&/0Bs appeal 7 from the probate courtBs various orders recognizing respondent agno asadministratri6 of 5innieBs estate ;(p. &roc 7o. )A?3= and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts e6ecuted by her with the various individualappellees, which involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whetherthere still e6ists a separate estate of 5innie of which respondent-appellee agno may continueto be the administratri6, must necessarily fail a result of the ourtBs main opinion at bar thatthere does e6ist such an estate and that the to estates ;husbandBs and wifeBs= must beadministered coointly by their respective administrators ;&/0 and agno=.

he dispositi+e portion of the main opinion

The main opinion disposes that:

/7 8/E# 9% '55 TE %9REG9/7G &RE/(E(, >udgment is herebyrendered !/(/((/7G the petition in G. R. 7os. 5-23@+? and 5-23@*+, and

'%%/R/7G, in G. R. 7os. 5-23*A+-A3 and the other thirty-one numbershereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding doc$etfees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail onpages A4 to A3 and @? to @2 of this decision:

The e6istence of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges, withrespondent-appellee 'velina '. agno, as administratri6 thereof isreco#ni"ed , and

/t is declared that, until final >udgment is ultimately rendered regarding ;)=the manner of applying 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode of the &hilippines to thesituation obtaining in these cases and ;2= the factual and legal issues ofwhether or not harles 7ewton odges has effectively and legallyrenounced his inheritance under the will of 5innie Jane odges, the saidestate consists of one2fourth of the community properties of the saidspouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on ay 2A, )*43, minus whatever the husband had already #ratuitously disposed of in favor of thirdpersons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect toremunerati+e dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part ofthe ifes estate, unless subseCuently disposed of #ratuitously to thirdparties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made fromsaid estate"

/n conseCuence, the preliminary inunction of 'ugust @, )*+3, as amendedon 9ctober and !ecember +, )*+3, is lifted and the resolution of(eptember @, )*32, directing that petitioner-appellant &/0, as

'dministrator of the Testate Estate of harles 7ewton odges in (pecial

&roceedings )+32, and respondent-appellee 'velina '. agno, as 'dministratri6 of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges in (pecial&roceedings )A?3, should act thenceforth always conointly , neverindependently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated , andsame is made part of this ud#ment and shall continue in force, pendin# tliquidation of the con>ugal partnership of the deceased spouses and thedetermination and se#re#ation from each other of their respective estateprovided, that upon the finality of this >udgment, the trial court shouldimmediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates othe spouses, to the end that the one2half share thereof of rs. odges mbe properly and clearly identified"

hereafter , the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of theone2fourth herein ad>udged to be her estate and cause the same to beturned over or delivered to respondent for her e6clusi+e administration in(pecial &roceedings )A?3, while the other one2fourth shall remain under

>oint administrative of said respondent and petitioner under a oint

proceedin#s in (pecial &roceedings )A?3 and )+32, whereas the half unCuestionably pertaining to -od#es shall be administered by petitionere6clusi+ely in (pecial &roceedings )+32, without pre>udice to the resolutby the trial court of the pendin# motions for its remo+al as administrator"

'nd this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the issues of ren+oi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing anddetermination, and the corresponding complete segregation and partitionthe two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution

Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo aredirected to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in (pecial &roceedin)A?3 and )+32, to the views passed and ruled upon by the ourt in theforegoing opinion. 8

&inimum estimate of &rs. -od#es estateFOne2fourth of conu#al properties.

The main opinion in declaring the e6istence of a separate estate of 5innie Jane odges whicshall pass to her brothers and sisters with right of representation ;by their heirs= as her dulydesignated heirs declares that her estate consists as a minimum ;i.e. assumin# ;)= that unde

'rticle )+ of the &hilippine ivil ode . 7. odges as surviving husband was entitled to onehalf of her estate as le#itime and ;2= that he had not effectively and legally renounced his

inheritance under her will= of Hone2fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as the time of the death of the wife on ay 2A, )*43, minus whatever the husband had already#ratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,H with the provithat proceeds of remunerati+e dispositions or sales for valuable consideration made by . 7.odges after his wife 5innieBs death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subseCuentdisposed of by him #ratuitously to third parties sub>ect to the condition, however, that if he is hto have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his wifeBs will, no deductions oany dispositions made by odges even if #ratuitously are to be made from his wife 5innieBsestate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in herwill to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband . 7. odges.

Differences ith the main opinion

/ do not share the main opinionBs view that 5innie Jane odges instituted her husband as herheir under her will Hto have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime ... as a7solute onof the properties ...H 9 and that she beCueathed Hthe whole of her estate to be owned and en>oby him as universal and sole heir with a7solute dominion over them only during his lifetime,which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof int+i+os to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights towhat might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingeninasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested

8/12/2019 863 to 914


already upon the death of rs. odges, would automatically become operative upon theoccurrence of the death of odges in the event of actual e6istence of any remainder of herestate then.H 1/

's will be amplified hereinafter, / do not subscribe to such a view that 5innie Jane odges willedHfull and absolute ownershipH and Habsolute dominionH over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband . 7. odges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs itha term under 'rticle @@4 of our ivil ode, to wit, odges as instituted heir with a resolutory termwhereunder his right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of hisdeath on !ecember 24, )*+2 and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensi+e term whereunder their right to the succession commenced e6 die upon arrival of the suspensiveterm of the death of . 7. odges on !ecember 24, )*+2.

ence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositionsmade by . 7. odges after his wifeBs death remain an integral part of his wifeBs estate whichshe willed to her brothers and sisters, / submit that . 7. odges could not validly ma$e#ratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wifeBs estate Hcompletely and absolutelydispose of any portion thereof inter +i+os to anyone other than himselfH in the language of the

main opinion, supra and thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothersand sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to her hole estate Hat the death of ;her=husband.H /f according to the main opinion, odges could not ma$e such gratuitous Hcompleteand absolute dispositionsH of his wife 5innieBs estate Hmortis causa,H it would seem that by thesame to$en and rationale he was li$ewise proscribed by the will from ma$ing such dispositionsof 5innieBs estate inter +i+os.

/ believe that the two Cuestions of ren+oi and renunciation should be resolved preferentially ande6peditiously by the probate court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the con>ugal or community properties constituting 5innie Jane odgesB separate estate,which tas$ considering that it is now seventeen ;)3= years since 5innie Jane odgesB death andher con>ugal estate with . 7. odges has remained unliquidated up to now might ta$e a similarnumber of years to unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizableestates involved.

(uch partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two pre>udicial Cuestionsof ren+oi and renunciation were resolved favorably to 5innieBs estate meaning to say that if itshould be held that . 7. odges is not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate hehad totally renounced his inheritance under the will=, then 5innieBs estate would consist not onlyof the minimum one-fourth but one2half of the con>ugal or community properties of the odgesspouses, which would reCuire again the partition and segregation of still another one-fourth ofsaid. properties to complete 5innieBs separate estate.

y differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects andconseCuences of the testamentary dispositions of 5innie Jane odges in her will and theCuestion of the best to reach a solution of the pressing Cuestion of e6pediting the closing of theestates which after all do not appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute betweenthe heirs and should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years without any furtherundue complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for their full en>oyment and benefit.

's no consensus appears to have been reached thereon by a ma>ority of the ourt, / propose tostate views as concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of someassistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an e6peditious closing and settlementof the estates of the odges spouses.

o Assumptions

's indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of rs. odgesB estate as one-fourth of thecon>ugal properties is based on two assumptions most favorable to . 7. odgesB estate and hisheirs, namely ;)= that the probate court must accept the ren+oi or Hreference bac$H 11 allegedlyprovided by the laws of the (tate of Te6as ;of which state the odges spouses were citizens=whereby the civil laws of the &hilippines as the domicile of the odges spouses would governtheir succession notithstandin# the provisions of 'rticle )+ of our ivil ode ;which providesthat the national law of the decedents, in this case, of Te6as, shall govern their succession= with

the result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of the con>ugal propertiessince the le#itime of her husband ;the other one-fourth of said con>ugal properties or one-halfher estate, under 'rticle *?? of our ivil ode= could not then be disposed of nor burdened wany condition by her and ;2= that .7. odges had not effectively and legally renounced hisinheritance under his wifeBs will.

These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee agno as rs.odgesB administratri6, who avers that the law of the (tate of Te6as governs her succession adoes not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to thwhole of her share of the con>ugal properties which is one2half thereof and that in any event,odges had totally renounced all his rights under the will.

The main opinion concedes that H;/=n the interest of settling the estates herein involved sooneit would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in theseproceedings.H /t observes however that this cannot be done due to the inadeCuacy of theevidence submitted by the parties in the probate court and of the partiesB discussion, +i" , Htheis no clear and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Te6as are. Then also, thegenuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent agno Ire odgesB renunciation is

disputed.H 12

ence, the main opinion e6pressly reserves resolution and determination on these twoconflicting claims and issues which it deems Hare not properly before the ourtnow,H 1; and specifically holds that H;'=ccordingly, the only Cuestion that remains to be settledthe further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is ho much more than fi6ed above is the estate of rs. odges, and this would depend on ;)= whether or not theapplicable laws of Te6as do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no le#itime provided therein, and ;2= whether or not odges has validly ai+ed his whole inheritance fromrs. odges.H 1

u##ested #uidelines

onsidering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonancewith the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the prompt settlement of the estates ofdeceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way ofinheritance considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since ;<=> an;<@9 , respectively it was felt that the ourt should lay down specific guidelines for theguidance of the probate court towards the end that it may e6pedite the closing of the protracteestates proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of adissatisfied party elevating its resolution of this only remaining issue once more to this ourt dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.

'fter all, the only Cuestion that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of thetwo Cuestions of ren+oi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether . 7. odges can claim a le#itimand hether he had renounced the inheritance. 0ut as already indicated above, the ourtwithout reaching a consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and nowthis case opted that Hthese and other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and<or distributthe estate of rs. odges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.H 15

The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effecand conseCuences of 5innie Jane odgesB testamentary dispositions in relation to her con>ugpartnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband . 7. odges and Hthin$ing outHthe end results, depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by theprobate court would bear out that under ren+oi . 7. odges was or was not entitled to claim legitime of one-half of his wife 5innieBs estate and<or that he had or had not effectively and varenounced his inheritance should help clear the dec$s, as it were, and assist the probate couresolving the only remaining Cuestion of ho much more than the minimum one-fourth of thecommunity properties of the odges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded asthe separate estate of 5innie, particularly since the views e6pressed in the main opinion havenot gained a consensus of the ourt. ence, the following suggested guidelines, which needlto state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:

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). To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, Haccording to odgesB own inventorysubmitted by him as e6ecutor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties wereconu#al which means that the spouses have equal shares therein.H 1

2. pon the death of rs. odges on &ay 9:, ;<=> , and the dissolution thereby of the marriage,the law imposed upon odges as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering andliCuidating the con>ugal or community property. 17 odges failed to discharge this duty ofliquidatin# the con>ugal partnership and estate. 9n the contrary, he sought and obtainedauthorization from the probate court to continue the conu#al partnershipBs 7usiness of buyingand selling real and personal properties.

/n his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as e6ecutor of &rs. -od#es estate,odges thus consistently reported the considerable com7ined income ;in si6 figures= of theconu#al partnership or coonership and then divided the same equally between himself andrs. odgesB estate and as consistently filed separate income ta6 returns and paid the incometa6es for each resulting half of such com7ined income corresponding to his own and to rs.odgesB estate. )@ ;&arenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he ad>udicated 5innieBsentire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that

Hodges ai+ed not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves.H 19

0y operation of the law of trust 2/ as well as by his own ac$nowledgment and acts, therefore, alltransactions made by odges after his wifeBs death were deemed for and on behalf of theirunliquidated conu#al partnership and community estate and were so reported and treated byhim.

A. #ith this premise established that all transactions of odges after his wifeBs death were forand on behalf of their unliquidated con>ugal partnership and community estate, share and shareali$e, it should be clear that no #ratuitous dispositions, if any, made by . 7. odges from hiswife 5innieBs estate should be deducted from her separate estate as held in the main opinion. 9nthe contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be charged to his own share of thecon>ugal estate since he had no authority or right to ma$e any #ratuitous dispositions of 5innieBsproperties to the preudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession uponhis death, not to mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court per itsorders of ay 24, and !ecember ), )*43 was to continue the con>ugal partnershipBs businessof buying and selling real properties for the account of their unliCuidated con>ugal estate and co-ownership, share and share ali$e and not to ma$e any free dispositions of 5innieBs estate.

. 'll transactions as well after the death on Decem7er 9=, ;<@9 of odges himself appearperforce and necessarily to have been conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf oftheir unliquidated conu#al partnership and<or co-ownership, share and share alike since the

con>ugal partnership remained unliCuidated which is another way of saying that suchtransactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect to have beenmade for the respective estates of . 7. odges and of his wife 5innie Jane odges, as bothestates continued to have an eCual sta$e and share in the con>ugal partnership which was notonly left unliquidated 7ut continued as a co-ownership or >oint business with the probate courtBsapproval by odges during the five-year period that he survived his wife.

This e6plains the probate courtBs action of reCuiring that deeds of sale e6ecuted by &/0 asodgesB estateBs administrator be Hsi#ned ointly H by respondent agno as rs. odgesB estateBsadministratri6, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the odges toeither estate, since Hthere is as yet no >udicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties towhomsoever are entitled thereto.H 22

'nd this eCually furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued con>oin t administrationby the administrators of the two estates of the deceased spouses, ?pendin# the liquidation of theconu#al partnership,? 2; since Hit is but logical that both estates should be administered >ointly bythe representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. &articularly ... becausethe actuations so far of &/0 evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to e6clude the otherheirs of rs. odges from their inheritance.H 2 4. 'ntly by the representatives of both, pendingtheir segregation from each other. &articularly ... because the actuations so far of &/0 evince a

determined, albeit groundless, intent to e6clude the other heirs of rs. odges from theirinheritance.H 2

4. 's stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how mucmore than the minimum of one2fourth of the community or con>ugal properties of the odgesspouses pertains to rs. odgesB estate depends on the twin Cuestions of renunciation andren+oi . /t directed conseCuently that Ha >oint hearing of the two probate proceedings hereininvolvedH be held by the probate court for the reception of Hfurther evidenceH in order to finallyresolved these twin Cuestions. 25

;a= 9n the Cuestion of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is toreceive formally in evidence the various documents anne6ed to respondent agnoBs answer abar, 2 namely: opy of the .(. Estate Ta6 Return filed on 'ugust @, )*4@ by . 7. odges fohis wife 5innieBs estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncin# his inheritancunder his wifeBs will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs designated with him and thit was his Hintention ;as= surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining properand interests of the deceased in their community estate to the de+isee and le#atees named ithe ill when the debts, liabilities, ta6es and e6penses of administration are finally determined

and paid"H 27 and

The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation ;which places him in estoppel = allegedlye6ecuted on 'ugust *, )*+2 by . 7. odges in /loilo ity wherein he reaffirmed that H... on

Au#ust G, ;<=G , / renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emolumentand income from said estateH and further declared that H;T=he purpose of this affidavit is to raand confirm, and / do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule of saidreturn and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any ri#ht on my part to recei+e any of the srents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, 5innie Jane odges. Thaffidavit is made to a7sol+e me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income ta6eon income which has accrued to the estate of 'innie Jane -od#es since the death of the said5innie Jane odges on ay 2A, )*43.H 28

;b= 9n the Cuestion of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receiveevidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the (tate of Te6as governing the succession5innie Jane odges and her husband . 7. odges as citizens of said (tate at the time of therespective deaths on &ay 9:, ;<=> and Decem7er 9=, ;<@9 . 29

+. The te6t and tenor of the declarations by . 7. odges of renunciation of his inheritance frohis wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will ;her brothers and sisters and their respecheirs= as ratified and reiterated e6pressly in his affidavit of renunciation e6ecuted four years lafor the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income ta6es on income which

has accrued to his wifeBs estate since her death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.

9nce the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivityestablished by the probate court, the renunciation by . 7. odges must be given due effect the result that . 7. odges therefore acCuired no part of his wifeBs one2half share of thecommunity properties since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. 0ysimple substitution then under 'rticles @43 and @4* of our ivil ode ;/ and by virtue of the winstitution of heirs, since Hthe heir originally instituted . 7. odges= does not become an heirby force of his renunciation, rs. odgesB brothers and sisters whom she designated as herheirs upon her husbandBs death are called immediately to her succession.

onseCuently, the said community and con>ugal properties would then pertain pro indi+iso shand share ali$e to their respective estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its owne6penses of administration, estate and inheritance ta6es, if any remain unpaid, attorneysB feeand other li$e e6penses and the net remainder to be ad>udicated directly to the decedentsBrespective brothers and sisters ;and their heirs= as the heirs duly designated in their respectivwills. The Cuestion of ren+oi becomes immaterial since most laws and our laws permit suchrenunciation of inheritance.

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3. /f there were no renunciation ;or the same may somehow be declared to have not been validand effective= by . 7. odges of his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be theconseCuenceO

;a= /f the laws on succession of the (tate of Te6as do provide for ren+oi or Hreference bac$H to&hilippine law as the domiciliary law of the odgesB spouses governing their succession, thenpetitionersB view that rs. odgesB estate would consist only of the minimum of H one2fourth ofthe community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of ;her= death on ay 2A, )*43Hwould have to be sustained and . 7. odgesB estate would consist of three2fourths of thecommunity properties, comprising his own one-half ;or two-fourths= share and the other fourth of rs. odgesB estate as the legitime granted him as sur+i+in# spouse by $hilippine la ;'rticle*?? of the ivil ode= which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by rs.odges as testatri6.

;b= /f the laws on succession of the (tate of Te6as do not provide for such ren+oi and respondentagnoBs assertion is correct that the Te6as law which would then prevail, provides for nole#itime for . 7. odges as the surviving spouse, then respondent agnoBs assertion that rs.odgesB estate would consist of one-half of the community properties ;with the other half

pertaining to . 7. odges= would have to be sustained. The community and con>ugal propertieswould then pertain share and share alike to their respective estates, with each estateshouldering its own e6penses of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraphof paragraph + hereof. .

@. 's to the nature of the institution of he irs made by rs. odges in her will, the main opinionholds that H;T=he brothers and sisters of rs. odges are not su7stitutes for odges" rather, theyare also heirs instituted simultaneously with odges,H but goes further and holds that Hit was notthe usufruct alone of her estate ... that she beCueathed to odges durin# his lifetime, but the fullonership thereof, althou#h the same as to last also durin# his lifetime only , even as there wasno restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof any7ody otherthan himself H and describes odges Has uni+ersal and sole heir with a7solute dominion overrs. odgesB estate ;e6cept over their 5ubboc$, Te6as property =, ;2 adding that Hodges wasnot obliged to preserve anything for themH ;referring to rs. odgesB brothers and sisters asinstituted co-heirs=. ;;

ontrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of rs. odgesBwill did not grant to .7. odges Hfull ownershipH nor Habsolute dominionH over her estate, suchthat he could as Huniversal and sole heirH by the mere e6pedient of #ratuitously disposing to thirdpersons her hole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and sisters ashis co-heirs to succeed to her hole estate Hat the death of (her) hus7and ,H depri+e them of anyinheritance and ma$e his own brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate

but of his ifes estate as well.

Thus, while 5innie Jane odges did not e6pressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutesfor odges because she willed that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still itcannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, Hthat they are also heirs institutedsimultaneously with odges, sub>ect however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar asodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensi+e with reference to his brothers andsisters-in-law.H ;

ence, if odges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be asubstitution of heirs in fact and in law since 5innieBs brothers and sisters as the heirsHsimultaneously institutedH with a suspensi+e term would be called immediately to hersuccession instead of waiting for the arrival of suspensi+e term of odgesB death, since as theheir originally instituted he does not become an heir by force of his renunciation and thereforethey would Henter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally institutedH ;odges= underthe provisions of 'rticle @43 and @4* of our ivil ode, supra, ;5 thus accelerating theirsuccession to her estate as a conseCuence of odgesB renunciation.

onseCuently, 5innie Jane odges willed that her husband .7. odges would Hduring hisnatural lifetime ... mana#e, control, use and enoy said estateH and that only Hall rents,emoluments and incomeH alone shall belong to him. (he further willed that while he could sell

and purchase properties of her estate, and Huse any part of the principal estate,H such principnotwithstanding Hany chan#es in the physical properties of said estateH;i.e. new propertiesacCuired or e6changed= would still pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death wouldpass in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and uni+ersal heirs of heestate. ;

The testatri6 5innie Jane odges in her will thus principally provided that H/ give, devise andbeCueath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to mybeloved hus7and , harles 7ewton odges, to have and to hold with him ... durin# his naturallifetime"H ;7 that H;he= shall have the right to mana#e, control, use and enoy said estate durin#his lifetime, ... to ma$e any chan#es in the physical properties of said estate, by sale ... and th

purchase of any other or additional property as he may thin$ best ... . All rents, emoluments aincome from said estate shall 7elon# to him and he is further authorized to use any part of theprincipal of said estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of aof the improved property now owned by us, located at ... ity of 5ubboc$, Te6as ... . e shallhave the right to su7di+ide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell unimpro+ed tonlots"H ;8 that H(A)t the death of my said hus7and , harles 7ewton, / give, devise and beCueath

of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally di+idamong my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta igdon, Emma owell,5eonard igdon, Roy igdon, (adie Rascoe, Era Roman and 7imroy igdon"H ;9 and that H(%)case of the death of any of my brothers and<or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... theirs of such deceased 7rother or sister shall ta$e ointly the share which would have gone tosuch brother or sister had she or he survived.H /

(uch provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully e6pounded above that alltransactions and sales made by odges after his wife 5innieBs death were by operation of thelaw of trust as well as by his own acknoled#ment and acts deemed for and on behalf of theiunliquidated con>ugal partnership and community estate, share and share ali$e, with the e6prauthori"ation of the probate court per its orders of ay 24, and !ecember ), )*43 grantingodgesB motion to continue the con>ugal partnership business of buying and selling real estateven after her death. 0y the same to$en, odges could not conceivably be deemed to have hany authority or right to dispose #ratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose successionshe had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.

*. (uch institutions of heirs ith a term are e6pressly recognized and permitted under 0oo$ //hapter 2, section of our ivil ode dealing with Hconditional testamentary dispositions andtestamentary dispositions ith a term.H 1

Thus, 'rticle @@4 of our ivil ode e6pressly provides that:

'RT @@4. The designation of the day or time when the effects of theinstitution of an heir shall commence or cease shall be +alid .

/n both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the successuntil the arrival of the period or its e6piration. 0ut in the first case he shalnot enter into possession of the property until after having given sufficiensecurity, with the intervention of the instituted heir.

'ccordingly, under the terms of rs. odgesB will, her husbandBs right to the succession as thinstituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on!ecember 24, )*+2, while her brothersB and sistersB right to the succession also as institutedheirs commenced e6 die, i.e. upon the e6piration of the suspensive term ;as far as they wereconcerned= of the death of . 7. odges on !ecember 24, )*+2 . 2

's stated in &adillaBs treatise on the ivil ode, H' term is a period whose arrival is certainalthough the e6act date thereof may be uncertain. ' term may have either a suspensive or aresolutory effect. The designation of the day when the legacy Hshall commenceH is e6 die, or aterm with a suspensive effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacyHshall ceaseH is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day.H e adds that H'legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is not a condition but a term. the arrival of the term would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. /f the arrival of th

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term would terminate his right, it is resolutoryH and that Hupon the arrival of the period, in case ofa suspensive term, the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case of a resolutoryterm, his right terminates.H ;

)?. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerablyprotracted period ;of seventeen years counted from 5innieBs death in )*43=, and all that is left tobe done is to resolve the only remaining issue ;involving the two Cuestions of renunciation andren+oi = hereinabove discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution tothe deceased spousesB respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly institutedin their wills long admitted to probate. ence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and theirheirs in turn to come to terms for the ad>udication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of theup to now unliCuidated community properties of the estates of the odges spouses ;derivedfrom their unliquidated con>ugal partnership= rather than to get bogged down with the formidabletas$ of physically se#re#atin# and partitionin# the two estates with the numerous transactions,items and details and physical changes of properties involved. The estates proceedings wouldthus be closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-in-fact to wor$ out thedetails of segregating, dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community properties or

liCuidating them which can be done then on their own without further need of intervention onthe part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to en>oy and ma$e use of theincome and cash and liCuid assets of the estates in such manner as may be agreed uponbetween them.

(uch a settlement or modus +i+endi between the heirs of the unliCuidated two estates for themutual benefit of all of them should not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in themain opinion that 22.*+@)*K of the share or undivided estate of . 7. odges have alreadybeen acCuired by the heirs of 5innie Jane odges from certain heirs of her husband, whilecertain other heirs representing )3.AA34K of odgesB estate were >oining cause with 5innieBsheirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the removal of petitioner &/0 as administratorof odgesB estate, 5 apparently impatient with the situation which has apparently degeneratedinto a running battle between the administrators of the two estates to the common pre>udice ofall the heirs.

)). 's earlier stated, the writer has ta$en the pain of suggesting these guidelines which mayserve to guide the probate court as well as the parties towards e6pediting the winding up andclosing of the estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and theirsuccessors duly entitled thereto. The probate court should e6ert all effort towards this desiredob>ective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the ourtBs admonition inprevious cases that Hcourts of first instance should e6ert themselves to close up estate withintwelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allo any

compensation to e6ecutors and administrators ho do not acti+ely la7or to that end, and theymay even adopt harsher measures.H

imeliness of appeals and imposition of thirty2one (:;) additional docket fees

Two appeals were doc$eted with this ourt, as per the two records on appeal submitted ;onewith a green cover and the other with a yellow cover=. 's stated at the outset, these appealsinvolve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there stille6ists a separate estate of 5innie Jane odges which has to continue to be administered byrespondent agno. onsidering the main opinionBs ruling in the affirmative and that her estateand that of her husband ;since they >ointly comprise unliquidated community properties= must beadministered conointly by their respective administrators ;&/0 and agno=, the said appeals;involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court approving sales contracts and otheracts of administration e6ecuted and performed by respondent agno on behalf of 5innieBsestate= have been necessarily overruled by the ourtBs decision at bar.

;a= The Hpriority CuestionH raised by respondent agno as to the patent failure of the two recordson appeal to show on their face and state the material data that the appeals were timely ta$enwithin the A?-day reglamentary period as reCuired by Rule ), section + of the Rules of ourt,has been brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is Hnot necessary to pass

upon the timeliness of any of said appealsH since they Hrevolve around practically the same missues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been timely ta$en.H 7 The main opinion thproceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defectthe appellant &/0Bs records on appeal and their failure to state the reCuired material datashowing the timeliness of the appeals.

(uch disposition of the Cuestion of timeliness deemed as Hmandatory and >urisdictionalH in anumber of cases merits the writerBs concurrence in that the Cuestion raised has beensubordinated to the paramount considerations of substantial >ustice and a Hliberal interpretatioof the rulesH applied so as not to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of rules, +i" Hthe proper and >ust determination of a litigationH 8 which calls for Hadherence to liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain their ob>ective of substantial >usticand of avoiding denials of substantial >ustice due to procedural technicalities.H 9

Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantia >ustice has li$ewise overruled respondentsB ob>ection to petitionerBs ta$ing the recourse of Hthepresent remedy of certiorari and prohibitionH Hdespite the conceded availability of appealH on the ground that Hthere is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these th

three appeals ;which= deal with practically the same basic issues that can be moree6peditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action . . . H 5/

;b= (ince the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar ;as abstated= with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of the ourtBs >udgment as to the continuede6istence of a separate estate of 5innie Jane odges and the affirmance as a necessaryconseCuence of the appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent agnoBs salescontracts and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the mainopinion reCuiring the payment by &/0 of thirty-one ;A)= additional appeal doc$et fees. Thisdoubt is further enhanced by the Cuestion of whether it would ma$e the cost of appeal undulye6pensive or prohibitive by reCuiring the payment of a separate appeal doc$et fee for eachincidental order Cuestioned when the resolution of all such incidental Cuestioned orders involvbasically one and the same main issue ;in this case, the e6istence of a separate estate of 5inJane odges= and can be more e6peditiously resolved or determined in a sin#le special civilactionH ;for which a sin#le doc$et fee is reCuired= as stated in the main opinion. 51 onsideringthe importance of the basic issues and the magnitude of the estates involved, however, thewriter has pro hac +ice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one ;A)=additional appeal doc$et fees.

MA4ALINTAL, C.J., concurring:

/ concur in the separate op inion of Justice Teehan$ee, which in turn agrees with the dispositiv

portion of the main opinion of Justice 0arredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorariand prohibition in ases 5-23@+? and 5-23@*+ and affirms the appealed orders of the probatecourt in cases 5-23*A+-A3.

owever, / wish to ma$e one brief observation for the sa$e of accuracy. Regardless of whetheor not . 7. odges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased wifeBs estate which Cuestionstill to be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Te6as andupon its applicability in the present case the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourthof the con>ugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a ma6imum beyondthat. /t is important to bear this in mind because the estate of 5innie odges consists of hershare in the con>ugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not beendistributed by order of the court.

The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the con>ugalproperties as 5innie odgesB minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only toindicate that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime, then thedisposition made by 5innie odges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as toone-half of her share, or one-fourth of the con>ugal properties, since the remainder, whichconstitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute ownership,unburdened by any substitution, term or condition, resolutory or otherwise. 'nd until the estat

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finally settled and ad>udicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administrationmust continue to cover 5innieBs entire con>ugal share.

Seara(e O%&%o&'

FERNAN*O, J., concurring:

/ concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.

TEE3AN4EE, J., concurring:

/ concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in ases 5-23@+?and 5-23@*+ and with the affirmance of the appealed orders of the probate court in ases 5-23*A+-A3.

/ also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the >udgment penned by r. Justice

0arredo decreeing the liftin# of the ourtBs writ of preliminary in>unction of 'ugust @, )*+3 asamended on 9ctober , and !ecember +, )*+3 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that the ourtBsresolution of (eptember @, )*32 2 which directed that petitioner2appellant &/0 as administratorof . 7. ;harles 7ewton= odgesB estate ;(p. &roc. 7o. )+32 and respondent-appellee 'velina

'. agno as administratri6 of 5innie Jane odgesB estate ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3= should actalways conointly never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated andshall continue in force and made part of the >udgment.

/t is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant &/0Bs primal contention in the cases atbar belatedly filed by it with this ourt on Au#ust ;, ;<@> ;over ten ;)?= years after 5innie JaneodgesB death on &ay 9:, ;<=> and ;over five ;4= years after her husband .7. odgesB deathon Decem7er 9=, ;<@9 during which time both estates have been pendin# settlement anddistribution to the decedentsB respective rightful heirs all this time up to now= that the probatecourt per its order of !ecember ), )*43 ;supplementing an earlier order of ay 24, )*43= ; ingranting . 7. odgesB motion as E6ecutor of his wife 5innieBs estate to continue their H7usiness of buying and selling personal and real propertiesH and approving Hall sales, conveyances,leases and mortgagesH made and to be made by him as such e6ecutor under his obligation tosubmit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of his wifeBs estate and nothingremains to be done e6cept to formally close her estate ;(p. &roc. 7o. )A?3= as her estate wasthereby merged with his own so that nothin# remains of it that may be ad>udicated to herbrothers and sisters as her designated heirs after him, is wholly untenable and deservesscant consideration.

'side from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, thiscontention of &/0 that there no longer e6ists any separate estate of 5innie Jane odges afterthe probate courtBs order of !ecember ), )*43 goes against the very acts and >udicialadmissions of .7. odges as her e6ecutor whereby he consistently recognized the separatee6istence and identity of his wifeBs estate apart from his own separate estate and from his ownshare of their con>ugal partnership and estate and Hnever considered the whole estate as asingle one belonging e6clusively to himselfH during the entire period that he survived her for over five ;4= years up to the time of his own death on !ecember 24, )*+2 5 and against the identicalacts and >udicial admissions of &/0 as administrator of .7. odgesB estate until &/0 soughtin )*++ to ta$e over 7oth estates as pertaining to its sole administration.

&/0 is now barred and estopped from contradicting or ta$ing a belated position contradictory toor inconsistent with its previous admissions + ;as well as those o f .7. odges himself in hislifetime and of whose estate &/0 is merely an administrator= recognizing the e6istence andidentity of 5innie Jane odgesB separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of herbrothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.

&/0Bs petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in 5innie JaneodgesB estate subseCuent to its order of !ecember ), )*43 as Hnull and void for having been

issued without >urisdictionH must therefore be dismissed with the re>ection of its belated anduntenable contention that there is no longer any estate of rs. odges of which respondent

'velina agno is the duly appointed and acting administratri6.

&/0Bs appeal 7 from the probate courtBs various orders recognizing respondent agno asadministratri6 of 5innieBs estate ;(p. &roc 7o. )A?3= and sanctioning her acts of administratiosaid estate and approving the sales contracts e6ecuted by her with the various individualappellees, which involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whetherthere still e6ists a separate estate of 5innie of which respondent-appellee agno may continuto be the administratri6, must necessarily fail a result of the ourtBs main opinion at bar thathere does e6ist such an estate and that the to estates ;husbandBs and wifeBs= must beadministered coointly by their respective administrators ;&/0 and agno=.

he dispositi+e portion of the main opinion

The main opinion disposes that:

/7 8/E# 9% '55 TE %9REG9/7G &RE/(E(, >udgment is hereby

rendered !/(/((/7G the petition in G. R. 7os. 5-23@+? and 5-23@*+, a '%%/R/7G, in G. R. 7os. 5-23*A+-A3 and the other thirty-one numbershereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding doc$efees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail onpages A4 to A3 and @? to @2 of this decision:

The e6istence of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges, withrespondent-appellee 'velina '. agno, as administratri6 thereof isreco#ni"ed , and

/t is declared that, until final >udgment is ultimately rendered regarding ;)the manner of applying 'rticle )+ of the ivil ode of the &hilippines to thsituation obtaining in these cases and ;2= the factual and legal issues ofwhether or not harles 7ewton odges has effectively and legallyrenounced his inheritance under the will of 5innie Jane odges, the saidestate consists of one2fourth of the community properties of the saidspouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on ay 2A, )*43, minus whatever the husband had already #ratuitously disposed of in favor of thpersons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect toremunerati+e dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be partthe ifes estate, unless subseCuently disposed of #ratuitously to thirdparties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciatbe declared legally effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made frosaid estate"

/n conseCuence, the preliminary inunction of 'ugust @, )*+3, as amendeon 9ctober and !ecember +, )*+3, is lifted and the resolution of(eptember @, )*32, directing that petitioner-appellant &/0, as

'dministrator of the Testate Estate of harles 7ewton odges in (pecia&roceedings )+32, and respondent-appellee 'velina '. agno, as

'dministratri6 of the Testate Estate of 5innie Jane odges in (pecial&roceedings )A?3, should act thenceforth always conointly , neverindependently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated , andsame is made part of this ud#ment and shall continue in force, pendin# tliquidation of the con>ugal partnership of the deceased spouses and thedetermination and se#re#ation from each other of their respective estateprovided, that upon the finality of this >udgment, the trial court shouldimmediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates othe spouses, to the end that the one2half share thereof of rs. odges mbe properly and clearly identified"

hereafter , the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of theone2fourth herein ad>udged to be her estate and cause the same to be

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turned over or delivered to respondent for her e6clusi+e administration in(pecial &roceedings )A?3, while the other one2fourth shall remain under the

>oint administrative of said respondent and petitioner under a oint proceedin#s in (pecial &roceedings )A?3 and )+32, whereas the half unCuestionably pertaining to -od#es shall be administered by petitionere6clusi+ely in (pecial &roceedings )+32, without pre>udice to the resolutionby the trial court of the pendin# motions for its remo+al as administrator"

'nd this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the twoissues of ren+oi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing anddetermination, and the corresponding complete segregation and partition ofthe two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.

Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo aredirected to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in (pecial &roceedings)A?3 and )+32, to the views passed and ruled upon by the ourt in theforegoing opinion. 8

&inimum estimate of &rs. -od#es estateFOne2fourth of conu#al properties.

The main opinion in declaring the e6istence of a separate estate of 5innie Jane odges whichshall pass to her brothers and sisters with right of representation ;by their heirs= as her dulydesignated heirs declares that her estate consists as a minimum ;i.e. assumin# ;)= that under

'rticle )+ of the &hilippine ivil ode . 7. odges as surviving husband was entitled to one-half of her estate as le#itime and ;2= that he had not effectively and legally renounced hisinheritance under her will= of Hone2fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as ofthe time of the death of the wife on ay 2A, )*43, minus whatever the husband had already#ratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,H with the provisothat proceeds of remunerati+e dispositions or sales for valuable consideration made by . 7.odges after his wife 5innieBs death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subseCuentlydisposed of by him #ratuitously to third parties sub>ect to the condition, however, that if he is heldto have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his wifeBs will, no deductions ofany dispositions made by odges even if #ratuitously are to be made from his wife 5innieBsestate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in herwill to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband . 7. odges.

Differences ith the main opinion

/ do not share the main opinionBs view that 5innie Jane odges instituted her husband as herheir under her will Hto have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime ... as a7solute oner of the properties ...H 9 a

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G.R. No. 11;725. Ju&e 29, 2///.B

JO3NN? S. RAA*ILLA, 1, Petitioner , C. "OURT OF A!!EALS AN* MARIA MARLENA 2"OS"OLUELLA ? ELLEA +ILLA"ARLOS, Respondents.

* E " I S I O N

!URISIMA, J.D

This is a petition for review of the decision of the ourt o f 'ppeals, A dated !ecember 2A, )**A,in '-G.R. 7o. 8-A4444, which set aside the decision of 0ranch 42 of the Regional Trial ourtin 0acolod ity, and ordered the defendants-appellees ;including herein petitioner=, as heirs of!r. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over 5ot 7o. )A*2, together with its fruits and interests, to

the estate of 'le>a 0elleza.

The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

/n a odicil appended to the 5ast #ill and Testament of testatri6 'le>a 0elleza, !r. JorgeRabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny (. Rabadilla, was instituted asa devisee of 4)),@44 sCuare meters of that parcel of land surveyed as 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the0acolod adastre. The said odicil, which was duly probated and admitted in (pecial&roceedings 7o. ?+ before the then ourt of %irst /nstance of 7egros 9ccidental, containedthe following provisions:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H%/R(T

/ give, leave and beCueath the following property owned by me to !r. Jorge Rabadilla resident of )) &. 8illanueva, &asay ity:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

;a= 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the 0acolod adastre, covered by Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. RT-??2;)?*2=, which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of !eeds of7egros 9ccidental.

;b= That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights

which / shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and ac$nowledged by the children andspouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

6 6 6

%9RT

;a= /t is also my command, in this my addition ;odicil=, that should / die and Jorge Rabadillashall have already received the ownership of the said 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the 0acolod adastre,covered by Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. RT-??2 ;)?*2=, and also at the time that the leaseof 0albinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall e6pire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligationuntil he dies, every year to give aria arlina oscolluela y 0elleza, (eventy ;34= ;sic= piculs ofE6port sugar and Twenty %ive ;24= piculs of !omestic sugar, until the said aria arlinaoscolluela y 0elleza dies.chanrobles virtuaP Paw Pibrary

%/%T

;a= (hould Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the 0acolodadastre, covered by Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. RT-??2 ;)?*2=, shall have the obligation

to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the %ourth paragraph of his testament, to ariaarlina oscolluela y 0elleza on the month of !ecember of each year.

(/1T

/ command, in this my addition ;odicil= that the 5ot 7o. )A*2, in the event that the one to wh/ have left and beCueathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said 5ot, the buylessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly 97E 7!RE;)??= piculs of sugar to aria arlina oscolluela y 0elleza, on each month of !ecember,(E8E7TF %/8E ;34= piculs of E6port and T#E7TF %/8E ;24= piculs of !omestic, until ariaarlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respecmy command in this my addition ;odicil=, aria arlina oscolluela y 0elleza, shallimmediately seize this 5ot 7o. )A*2 from my heir and the latterQs heirs, and shall turn it over tmy near desendants, ;sic= and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the 97E7!RE! ;)??= piculs of sugar until aria arlina shall die. / further command in this myaddition ;odicil= that my heir and his heirs of this 5ot 7o. )A*2, that they will obey and followthat should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my ne

descendants and my sister.H

&ursuant to the same odicil, 5ot 7o. )A*2 was transferred to the deceased, !r. JorgeRabadilla, and Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. *@ thereto issued in his name.

!r. Jorge Rabadilla died in )*@A and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny;petitioner=, 'urora, 9felia and Nenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

9n 'ugust 2), )*@*, aria arlena oscolluela y 0elleza 8illacarlos brought a complaint,doc$eted as ivil ase 7o. 44@@, before 0ranch 42 of the Regional Trial ourt in 0acolod ityagainst the above-mentioned heirs of !r. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of sub>ecodicil. The omplaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the odicil, that:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

). 5ot 7o. )A*2 was mortgaged to the &hilippine 7ational 0an$ and the Republic &lanters 0ain disregard of the testatri6Qs specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the neardescendants and sister of the testatri6.

2. !efendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred ;)??= piculs ofsugar ;34 piculs e6port sugar and 24 piculs domestic sugar= to plaintiff aria arlenaoscolluela y 0elleza from sugar crop years )*@4 up to the filing of the complaint as mandate

by the odicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.

A. The ban$s failed to comply with the +th paragraph of the odicil which provided that in casthe sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall li$ewise havthe obligation to deliver )?? piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private espondent .

The plaintiff then prayed that >udgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey<retu5ot 7o. )A*2 to the surviving heirs of the late 'le>a 0elleza, the cancellation of TT 7o. *the name of the deceased, !r. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title inthe names of the surviving heirs of the late 'le>a 0elleza.

9n %ebruary 2+, )**?, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on arch 2@, )**? th9rder of !efault was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny (. Rabadilla, who filed his 'nswaccordingly.

!uring the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

9n 7ovember )4, )**@, the plaintiff ;private respondent= and a certain 'lan 'zurin, son-in-lawthe herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendaheirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a emorandum of 'greement on th

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obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

HThat for crop year )*@@-@*, the annuity mentioned in Entry 7o. *?3 of TT 7o. @* will bedelivered not later than January of )*@*, more specifically, to wit:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

34 piculs of 'Q sugar, and 24 piculs of 0Q sugar, or then e6isting in any of our names, ary RoseRabadilla y 'zurin or 'lan 'zurin, during !ecember of each sugar crop year" in 'zucar (ugarentral" and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the samemanner will compliance of the annuity be in the ne6t succeeding crop years.

That the annuity above stated for crop year )*@4-@+, )*@+-@3, and )*@3-@@, will be complied incash eCuivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreedupon, ta$ing into consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, whichis in the total amount of 97E 7!RE! %/8E T9('7! &E(9( ;&)?4,???.??=.

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment,payable on or before the end of !ecember of every sugar crop year, to wit:chanrob)es virtual

)aw library

%or )*@4-@+, T#E7TF (/1 T9('7! T#9 7!RE! %/%TF ;&2+,24?.??= &esos, payableon or before !ecember of crop year )*@@-@*"

%or )*@+-@3, T#E7TF (/1 T9('7! T#9 7!RE! %/%TF ;&2+,24?.??= &esos, payableon or before !ecember of crop year )*@*-*?"

%or )*@3-@@, T#E7TF (/1 T9('7! T#9 7!RE! %/%TF ;&2+,24?.??= &esos, payableon or before !ecember of crop year )**?-*)" and

%or )*@@-@*, T#E7TF (/1 T9('7! T#9 7!RE! %/%TF ;&2+,24?.??= &esos, payableon or before !ecember of crop year )**)-*2.H 4

owever, there was no compliance with the aforesaid emorandum of 'greement e6cept for apartial delivery of 4?.@? piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year )*@@-)*@*.

9n July 22, )**), the Regional Trial ourt came out with a decision, dismissing the complaintand disposing as follows:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H#ERE%9RE, in the light of the aforegoing find ings, the ourt finds that the action is

prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor ofplaintiff. #hile there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated e6action fromthem simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder<owner of the lot inCuestion, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall./ncidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff mayinitiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order togive full meaning and semblance to her claim under the odicil.

/n the light of the aforegoing findings, the omplaint being prematurely filed is !/(/((E!without pre>udice.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

(9 9R!ERE!.H +

9n appeal by plaintiff, the %irst !ivision o f the ourt of 'ppeals reversed the decision of the trialcourt" ratiocinating and ordering thus:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

HTherefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellantQs right to receive )??piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of 5ot 7o. )A*2" defendants-appelleeQs obligationunder 'le>a 0ellezaQs codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amountof sugar to plaintiff-appellant" defendants-appelleeQs admitted non-compliance with said

obligation since )*@4" and, the punitive conseCuences en>oined by both the codicil and the iode, of seizure of 5ot 7o. )A*2 and its reversion to the estate of 'le>a 0elleza in case of sucnon-compliance, this ourt deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over 5ot 7o. )Afrom the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of 'le>a 0elleza. owever, plaintiff-appellantmust institute separate proceedings to re-open 'le>a 0ellezaQs estate, secure the appointmenan administrator, and distribute 5ot 7o. )A*2 to 'le>a 0ellezaQs legal heirs in order to enforce hright, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of )?? piculs of sugar per year out othe produce of 5ot 7o. )A*2 until she dies.

'ccordingly, the decision appealed from is (ET '(/!E and another one entered orderingdefendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over 5ot 7o. )A*2, togethwith its fruits and interests, to the estate of 'le>a 0elleza.

(9 9R!ERE!.H 3

!issatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the ourt of 'ppeals, petitioner found his way tothis ourt via the present petition, contending that the ourt of 'ppeals erred in ordering the

reversion of 5ot )A*2 to the estate of the testatri6 'le>a 0elleza on the basis of paragraph + othe odicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of !r. Jorge Rabadilla is a modalinstitution within the purview of 'rticle @@2 of the 7ew ivil ode.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

&etitioner contends that the ourt of 'ppeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with 'rticle @@2 of the 7ew ivil ode on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issueraised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. &etitioner maintains that

'rticle @@2 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatri6 intenda mere simple substitution i.e. the instituted heir, !r. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substitutedthe testatri6Qs Hnear descendantsH should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein privaterespondent be not complied with. 'nd since the testatri6 died single and without issue, there cbe no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that thesubstituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as HneardescendantsH without a definite identity or reference as to who are the Hnear descendantsH antherefore, under 'rticles @A @ and @4 * of the 7ew ivil ode, the substitution should bedeemed as not written.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. ontrary to his supposition that the ourt of 'ppedeviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of thecomplaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. Theourt of 'ppeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioneThe disCuisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondenhad a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to sub>ect odicil" on which issthe ourt of 'ppeals ruled in accordance with law.

/t is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from moment of death of the decedent )? and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operationlaw. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and thewidow or widower, are compulsory heirs. )) Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, ascompulsory heirs of the instituted heir, !r. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to themfrom the moment of death of the decedent, !r. Jorge Rabadilla.chanrobles.com.ph : red

nder 'rticle 33+ of the 7ew ivil ode, inheritance includes all the property, rights andobligations of a person, not e6tinguished by his death. onformably, whatever rights !r. JorgeRabadilla had by virtue of sub>ect odicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of hdeath. 'nd since obligations not e6tinguished by death also form part of the estate of the

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decedent" corollarily, the obligations imposed by the odicil on the deceased !r. JorgeRabadilla, were li$ewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

/n the said odicil, testatri6 'le>a 0elleza devised 5ot 7o. )A*2 to !r. Jorge Rabadilla, sub>ect tothe condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent everyyear. pon the death of !r. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights andtitle over said property, and they also assumed his ;decedentQs= obligation to deliver the fruits ofthe lot involved to herein private espondent . (uch obligation of the instituted heir reciprocallycorresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissingthe complaint below.

&etitioner also theorizes that 'rticle @@2 of the 7ew ivil ode on modal institutions i s notapplicable because what the testatri6 intended was a substitution !r. Jorge Rabadilla was tobe substituted by the testatri6Qs near descendants should there be non-compliance with theobligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private espondent .

'gain, the contention is without merit.

(ubstitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to ta$e the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. nder substitutions in general, the testator may either ;)= provide for thedesignation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should diebefore him<her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simplesubstitution, )2 or ;2= leave his<her property to one person with the e6press charge that it betransmitted subseCuently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. )A Theodicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

/n simple substitutions, the second heir ta$es the inheritance in default of the first heir by reasonof incapacity, predecease or renunciation. ) /n the case under consideration, the provisions ofsub>ect odicil do not provide that should !r. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease,incapacity or renunciation, the testatri6Qs near descendants would substitute him. #hat theodicil provides is that, should !r. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposedin the odicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatri6Qs neardescendants.

7either is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. /n afideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to

transmit the same later to the second heir. )4 /n the case under consideration, the instituted heiris in fact allowed under the odicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with thenear descendants or the sister of the testatri6. Thus, a very important element of afideicommissary substitution is lac$ing" the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir thepreservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. H#ithout this obligation topreserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution.H )+

'lso, the near descendantsQ right to inherit from the testatri6 is not definite. The property will onlypass to them should !r. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of theusufruct to private espondent .

'nother important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. nder 'rticle@+A, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not bebeyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. ' fideicommissary substitution is therefore,void if the first heir is no t related by first degree to the-second heir. )3 /n the case under scrutiny,the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, !r. Jorge Rabadilla.

The ourt of 'ppeals erred not in ruling that the institution of !r. Jorge Rabadil la under sub>ectodicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, 'rticle @@2 of the 7ew ivil ode isthe provision of law in point. 'rticles @@2 and @@A of the 7ew ivil ode provide:chanrob)esvirtual )aw library

'RT/5E @@2. The statement of the ob>ect of the institution or the application of the property by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless iappears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted hor his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return ofanything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they shoulddisregard this obligation.

'RT/5E @@A. #hen without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding artcannot ta$e effect in the e6act manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in amanner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in 'rticle @@2 is what is $nown in the law ofsuccession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. /n a modal institution, the testatstates ;)= the ob>ect of the institution, ;2= the purpose or application of the property left by the

testator, or ;A= the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. )@ ' HmodeH imposes anobligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to thesuccession. )* 9n the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition muhappen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The conditionsuspends but does not obliga te" and the mode obligates but does not suspend. 2? To somee6tent, it is similar to a resolutory condition. 2)

%rom the provisions of the odicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatri6intended that the sub>ect property be inherited by !r. Jorge Rabadilla. /t is li$ewise clearlyworded that the testatri6 imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, arlenaoscolluela 0elleza, during the lifetime of the latter. owever, the testatri6 did not ma$e !r.Jorge RabadillaQs inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on tperformance of the said obligation. /t is clear, though, that should the obligation be not compliwith, the property shall be turned over to the testatri6Qs near descendants. The manner ofinstitution of !r. Jorge Rabadilla under sub>ect odicil is evidently modal in nature because itimposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of suchinstitution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposeupon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the #ill itse

that such was the intention of the testator. /n case of doubt, the institution should be considereas modal and not conditional. 22

7either is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent hasonly a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heirbecause the right to seize was e6pressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgag

/n the interpretation of #ills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the #ill, as to theapplication of any of its provisions, the testatorQs intention is to be ascertained from the wordsthe #ill, ta$ing into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. 2A (uchconstruction as will sustain and uphold the #ill in all its parts must be adopted. 2

(ub>ect odicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver 9ne undred ;)?piculs of sugar yearly to arlena 0elleza oscuella. (uch obligation is imposed on the instituheir, !r. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mor tgagee should they sell, leamortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The odicil further provides that in theevent that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, arlena 0elleza oscuella shaseize the property and turn it over to the testatri6Qs near descendants. The non-performance othe said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof tothe testatri6Qs near descendants. (ince the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatri6, n

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only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by thetestatri6 in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should eCually apply to the instituted heir andhis successors-in-interest.

(imilarly unsustainable is petitionerQs submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, thesaid obligation imposed by the odicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whateverobligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee" that petitioner is deemed to havemade a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummatedsettlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated asettlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of theobligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of sub>ect property.

(uffice it to state that a #ill is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a persondisposes of his property, to ta$e effect after his death. 24 (ince the #ill e6presses the manner inwhich a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testatormust be strictly followed. Thus, a #ill cannot be the sub>ect of a compromise agreement whichwould thereby defeat the very purpose of ma$ing a #ill.

#ERE%9RE, the petition is hereby !/(/((E! and the decision of the our t of 'ppeals,dated !ecember 2A, )**A, in '-G.R. 7o. 8-A4444 '%%/RE!. 7o &ronouncement as tocosts.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

(9 9R!ERE!.

elo, J., / concur as well in the separate opinion of Justice 8itug.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., too$ no part.

Seara(e O%&%o&'

8/TG, J., concurring:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

0y virtue of a codicil appended to her will, 'le>a 0elleza devised a 4)),@4+-sCuare meter parcelof land in 0acolod ity, denominated 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the 0acolod adastral (urvey, to JorgeRavadilla ;predecessor-in-interest of petitioner=, ) carrying with it an obligation to deliver toprivate respondent, aria arlena oscolluela y 0elleza, one hundred piculs of sugar per cropyear during her lifetime. The portions of the codicil, pertinent to the instant controversy,

read:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H%/R(T

H/ give, leave and beCueath the following property owned by me to !r. Jorge Rabadilla, residentof )) &. 8illanueva, &asay ity:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H;a= 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the 0acolod adastre, covered by Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. RT-??2;)?*2=, which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of !eedsof 7egros 9ccidental.

b= That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rightswhich / shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and ac$nowledged by the children andspouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

6 6 6

%9RT

H;a= /t is also my command, in this my addition ;codicil=, that should / die and Jorge Rabadillashall have already received the ownership of the said 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the 0acolod adastre,covered by Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. RT-??2;)?*2=, and also at the time that the leasof 0albinito Guanzon of the said lot shall e6pire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation unthe dies, every year to give to aria arlina oscolluela y 0elleza, (eventy ;34= ;sic= piculs oE6port sugar and Twenty %ive ;24= piculs of !omestic sugar, until the said aria arlinaoscolluela y 0elleza dies.

H%/%T

H;a= (hould Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give 5ot 7o. )A*2 of the 0acolodadastre, covered by Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. RT-??2 ;)?*2=, shall have the obligatto still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the %ourth paragraph of this testament, to ariaarlina oscolluela y 0elleza on the month of !ecember of each year.

H(/1T

H/ command, in this my addition ;odicil= that the 5ot 7o. )A*2, in the event that the one towhom / have left and beCueathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said 5ot, tbuyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly 97E7!RE! ;)??= piculs of sugar to aria arlina oscolluela y 0elleza, on each month of!ecember, (E8E7TF %/8E ;34= piculs of E6port and T#E7TF %/8E ;24= piculs of !omestic,until aria arlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee, or the mortgagee of this lot, nothave respected my command in this my addition ;odicil=, aria arlina oscolluela y 0ellezshall immediately seize this 5ot 7o. )A*2 from my heir and the latterQs heirs, and shall turn itover to my near descendants, 2 and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the 97E7!RE! ;)??= piculs of sugar until aria arlina shall die. / further command in this myaddition ;odicil= that my heir and his heirs of this 5ot 7o. )A*2, that they will obey and followthat should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my nedescendants and my sister.H A

&ursuant to the above provisions of the codicil, ownership of 5ot 7o. )A*2 was transferred toJorge Rabadilla and Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. T-*@ was issued in hisname.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

(ometime in )*@A, Jorge Rabadilla died, survived by his wife, Rufina, and their children John 'urora, 9felia and Nenaida.

9n 2) 'ugust )*@*, on account of the failu re of the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla to comply with thobligation under the codicil, private respondent filed an action, doc$eted ivil ase 7o. 44@@,against the Rabadilla heirs before the Regional Trial ourt, 0ranch 42, of 0acolod ity for thereconveyance of 5ot )A*2 to the heirs of 'le>a 0elleza and the cancellation of Transferertificate of Title 7o. *@ covering the property in the name of Jorge Rabadilla.

The trial court dismissed the complaint Hwithout pre>udice.H 9n appeal ta$en by privaterespondent to the ourt of 'ppeals, the appellate court set aside the appealed decision andheld:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

HTherefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellantQs right to receive )??piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of 5ot 7o. )A*2" defendants-appelleesQ obligationunder 'le>a 0ellezaQs codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amouof sugar to plaintiff-appellant" defendants-appelleesQ admitted non-compliance with saidobligation since )*@4" and, the punitive conseCuences en>oined by both the codicil and the iode, of seizure of 5ot 7o. )A*2 and its reversion to the estate of 'le>a 0elleza in case of sucnon-compliance, this ourt deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over 5ot 7o. )Afrom the estate of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of 'le>a 0elleza. owever, plaintiff-appellantmust institute separate proceedings to re-open 'le>a 0ellezaQs estate, secure the appointmenan administrator, and distribute 5ot 7o. )A*2 to 'le>a 0ellezaQs legal heirs in order to enforce h

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right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of )?? piculs of sugar per year out ofthe produce of 5ot 7o. )A*2 until she dies.

H'ccordingly, the decision appealed from is (ET '(/!E and another one entered orderingdefendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over 5ot 7o. )A*2, togetherwith its fruits and interests, to the estate of 'le>a 0elleza.

(9 9R!ERE!.H 4

&etitioner, in the instant petition for review, submits that the appellate court has erred in: ;)=ordering the reversion of 5ot )A*2 to the estate of 'le>a 0elleza on the basis of paragraph si6 ofthe codicil, and ;2= in ruling that the testamentary institution of !r. Jorge Rabadilla is a modalinstitution within the purview of 'rticle @@2 of the ivil ode. 'dditionally, he avers thatrespondent court has improvidently deviated from the sole issue raised which is the prematurityof the action before the court a Cuo. pon the other hand, respondent would have this ourtsustain the assailed decision of the ourt of 'ppeals contending that the appellate court iscompletely >ustified in delving into the nature of the institution in the codicil, the same having a

direct significance on the issue of whether or not the complaint before the trial court has beenprematurely filed. &rivate respondent adds that the institution in Cuestion is modal within theconte6t of 'rticle @@2 of the ivil ode which gives her the right to seize the sub>ect property.

/ agree with my colleagues that HsubstitutionH is not here apropos. (ubstitution is theappointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heiroriginally instituted. + (ubstitution is simple when the testator designates one or more persons tosubstitute the heir or heirs instituted in case the latter should die before him, or should not wish,or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance, and a substitution without a statement ofthe cases to which it refers shall comprise all said three cases. 3 There is no simple substitutionthat ta$es place where the heir originally instituted is able to succeed. @ %ideicommissarysubstitution, on the other hand, occurs when the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted withthe obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance. *Every fideicommissary substitution should be e6pressly made in order that it may be valid. )?The term Hfideicommissary substitutionH need not, however, be used in the will" /t is enough thatthere is a clear and uneCuivocal statement that one shall en>oy usufructuary or other rights, shortof na$ed ownership or title, over certain property of the testator with the obligation to preservethe property and to transmit it to a second heir. )) /t is essential for the validity of afideicommissary substitution that both heirs are living and Cualified to succeed at the time ofdeath by the testator and that the substitute does not go beyond one degree from the heiroriginally instituted. The term Hone degreeH has been the sub>ect of varied interpretation. 9ne

view is to the effect that the term means one transfer, citing the (upreme Tribunal of (pain andas advocated by eminent civilists as Justices J.0.5. Reyes, R. &uno, E. aguioa, and !. Jurado./n Ramirez v. Ramirez, )2 decided on )4 %ebruary )*@2, the ourt, however, adopted the literalview that Hone decreeH means relationship or generation as so advanced by eCually eminentwriters !r. '. &adilla, Justice E. &aras and !r. '. Tolentino. /n the subseCuent case of theTestate Estate case of %r. 'ranas, )A however, the ourt upheld the usufructuary right of theRoman atholic hurch under a legacy that now renders doubtful the continued validity of theRamirez doctrine.chanrobles.com.ph : red

The institution of Jorge Rabadilla in the 0elleza codicil partoo$ the nature of an institution submodo, rather than one of substitution, governed by the provisions of 'rticle @@2 of the ivilode. This law provides:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H'RT/5E @@2. The statement of the ob>ect of the institution, or the application of the propertyleft by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unlessit appears that such was his intention.

HThat which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return ofanything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should

disregard this obligation.H ;Emphasis supplied =

' mode is distinguished from a condition contemplated in the rules on succession in that thelatter dictates the efficacy, either in a suspensive or resolutory manner, of a testamentarydisposition while the former obligates the instituted heir to comply with the mandate made by testator but does not prevent the heir from at once claiming the inheritance provided he givessecurity to ensure compliance with the will of the testator and the return of the thing receivedtogether with its fruits and interests, Hshould ;the heir= disregard this obligation.H The obligatioimposed upon the heir or legatee is deemed not to be a condition for his entry forthwith into thinheritance unless a contrary intention of the testator is evident. /n case of doubt, the institutiois considered modal, rather than conditional. uch of the variance in the legal effects of the twclasses, ) however, is now practically theoretical and merely conceptual. nder the 9ld ivode )4 an institucion sub modo could be said to be more a$in to an institution subdemonstratione, or an e6pression of a wish or suggestion of the testator that did not have anyreal obligatory force, that matter being left instead to the discretion of the heir, i.e., whether toabide by it or not. The amendatory provisions of the 7ew ivil ode now hardly differentiatesbetween the principal effect of the non-compliance with the mode and that of the occurence o

resolutory condition e6pressed in the will. /n both instances, the property must be returned to estate of the decedent to then pass on under the rules of intestacy.

'9R!/7G5F, / also vote for the dismissal of the instant petition.

&anganiban, J., concurs.

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G.R. No. L-;/977. Ja&uary ;1, 1972.B

"ARMEN LA!U S?, rere'e&(e# by er 'ub'(%(u(e MA"ARIO LA!U, Petitioner- Appellant , C. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO a6%a' EUFEMIO S? U?, Respondent-Appellee.

Jo'e =. *%o&o or e(%(%o&er a&# Appellant .

*eora0%a' ". Eue$%o or re'o&#e&( a&# ae66ee.

S?LLAUS

). /8/5 5'#" 'T/97 %9R 5EG'5 (E&'R'T/97" 7'TRE 9% 'T/97" E%%ET 9% !E'T9% &5'/7T/%% 0E%9RE %/7'5 !EREE. The death of the plaintiff before final decree in anaction for legal separation abates the action. 'n action for legal separation which involves

nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses ;there being no absolutedivorce in this >urisdiction= is purely personal. The ivil ode of the &hilippines recognizes this inits 'rticle )??, by allowing only the innocent spouse ;and no one else= to claim legal separationand in its article )?@, by providing that the spouses can, by reconciliation, stop or abate theproceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. 0eing personal incharacter, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

2. /!." /!." /!." E%%ET 9% !E'T 9% &5'/7T/%% 0E%9RE %/7'5 !EREE 97 &R9&ERTFRE5'T/97(. ' review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses showsthat they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation" hence, they can not survive thedeath of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

A. /!." /!." /!." /!." 5'/ T9 R/GT( 7!ER 'RT. )?+, /8/5 9!E 9% TE &/5/&&/7E(,E1T/7G/(E! &97 TE !E'T 9% TE (&9(E /78958E!. %rom 'rt. )?+ of theivil ode of the &hilippines it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the con>ugalpartnership or gains ;or of the absolute community of property=, the loss of right by the offendingspouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disCualificationto inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as revocation testamentary provisions infavor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by thevery terms of ivil ode article, are vested e6clusively in the persons of the spouses" and bytheir nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or

transmissible. ence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that His not thereby e6tinguishedH aftera party dies, under section )3 Rule A of the Rules of ourt, to warrant continuation of the actionthrough a substitute of the deceased party. The same result flows from a consideration of theenumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in (ection ), Rule +3, of theRevised Rules of ourt which shows that neither action for legal separation or for annulment ofmarriage can be deemed fairly included therein.

. /!." /!." /!." /!." /!." RE'(97. The reason why an action is abated by the death of theplaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree ofseparation, their source being the decree itself" without the decree such rights do not come intoe6istence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in e6pectation. /fdeath supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, deathproducing a more radical and definitive separation" and the e6pected conseCuential rights andclaims would necessarily remain unborn.

4. /!." /!." /!." 'T/97 %9R !E5'R'T/97 9% 755/TF '0 /7/T/9 9% 'RR/'GE" E%%ET9% !E'T 9% &5'/7T/%% &97 !E%E7!'7TQ( &R9&ERTF R/GT(. ' petition for adeclaration of nullity ab initio of marriage becomes moot and academic upon the death of thewife, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, thatautomatically dissolved the Cuestioned union. 'ny property rights acCuired by either party as a

result of 'rt. ) of the ivil ode of the &hilippines could be resolved and determined in aproper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the Appellant .

+. /!." /!." /!." 'T/97 %9R '775E7T 9% 0/G'9( 89/!'05E 'RR/'GE" E%%E9% !E'T 9% 97E &'RTF" &R9&ER &R9EE!/7G( %9R 5/D/!'T/97 97JG'5&'RT7ER(/&. Even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidabunder 'rticle @A, par. 2 of the ivil ode, because the second marriage had been contractedwith the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had beegenerally believed dead, still the action for annulment became e6tinguished as soon as one othe three persons involved had died, as provided in 'rticle @3, par. 2 of the ode, reCuiring ththe action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involv

'nd furthermore, the liCuidation of any con>ugal partnership might have resulted from suchvoidable marriage must be carried out Hin the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceasedspouseH, as e6pressly provided in section A of the Revised Rule 3A, and not in the annulmentproceedings.

* E " I S I O N

RE?ES, J..L.

&etition, filed after the effectivity of Republic 'ct 4?, for review by certiorari of an order, dat2* July )*+*, of the Juven ile and !omestic Relations ourt of anila, in its ivil ase 7o.2?A@3, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the thereinplaintiff, armen 9. 5apuz (y, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated thecause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the ob>ectionacario 5apuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff ;and petitioner herein= who sought to substitthe deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final >udgment.

9n )@ 'ugust )*4A, armen 9. 5apuz (y filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 2) (eptember )*A andcanonically on A? (eptember )*A" that they had lived together as husband and wifecontinuously until )*A when her husband abandoned her" that they had no child" that theyacCuired properties during their marriage" and that she discovered her husband cohabiting wia hinese woman named Go io$ at )A)* (isa (treet, anila, on or about arch )**. (heprayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order thathe defendant Eufemio (. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the con>ugal partnershipprofits.

/n his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio (. Eufemio allegedaffirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and otproperties, counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with armen 95apuz (y, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to hineslaw and customs, with one Go io$, alias 7go io$.

/ssues having been >oined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence0ut before the trial could be completed ;the respondent was already scheduled to presentsurrebuttal evidence on * and )@ June )*+*=, petitioner armen 9. 5apuz (y died in a vehicuaccident on A) ay )*+*. ounsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.

9n * June )*+*, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the Hpetition for legal separationH ) otwo ;2= grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-yearperiod provided for in 'rticle )?2 of the ivil ode" and that the death of armen abated theaction for legal separation.

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9n 2+ June )*+*, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased armen byher father, acario 5apuz. ounsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

9n 2* July )*+*, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 /n the body ofthe order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to beresolved on the Cuestion of whether or not the plaintiffQs cause of action has survived, which thecourt resolved in the negative. &etitionerQs moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on )4(eptember )*+*.

'fter first securing an e6tension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissalissued by the >uvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on )9ctober )*+*. The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent,who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. A

'lthough the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio (. Eufemio, filed counterclaims,he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case. e acCuiesced in the dismissalof said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the

petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-5apuz marriage tobe null and void ab initio.

0ut petitioner armen 9. 5apuz (y ;through her self-assumed substitute for the lower courtdid not act on the motion for substitution= stated the principal issue to be asfollows:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H#hen an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declarationof nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedingsOH

The issue as framed by petitioner in>ects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suitto one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner assertedthat Hthe respondent has acCuiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaimH ;&etitionerQs 0rief,page 22=. 7ot only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare thenullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate ad>udication. They are notinseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullityby the counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the petition fornullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition.

The first real issue in this case is: !oes the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an actionfor legal separation, abate the actionO /f it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves

property rightsO

'n action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses ;there being no absolute divorce in this >urisdiction= is purely personal. The ivilode of the &hilippines recognizes this in its 'rticle )??, by allowing only the innocent spouse;and no one else= to claim legal separation" and in its 'rticle )?@, by providing that the spousescan, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legalseparation already rendered. 0eing personal in character, it follows that the death of one party tothe action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

H. . . #hen one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage isdissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse ta$es place duringthe course of the suit ;'rticle 2, (ection A=. The action is absolutely dead ;ass., July 23,)@3), !. 3). ). @)" ass. reC., ay @, )*AA, !. !. )*AA, AA2.H

Harriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action fordivorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. Theaction is one of a personal nature. /n the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the Cuestion ofseparation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of >urisdiction, both over the persons of

the parties to the action and of the sub>ect-matter of the action itself. %or this reason the courare almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, beforefinal decree, abates the action. ) orpus Juris, 2?@" #ren v. oss, 2 Gilman, 32" !anforth v.!anforth, ))) ///. 2A+" atter of Grandall, )*+ 7.F. )23, @* 7.E. 43@" )A 'm (t. Rep. @A?" )3

'nn. as. @3" #ilcon v. #ilson, 3A ich, +2?, ) 7.#. @)3" (tric$land v. (tric$land, @? 'r$.42, *3 (. #. +4*" curley v. curley, +? d. )@4. 4 'm. Rep. 3)3" 0egbie v. 0egbie, )2al. )44, +? &ac. ++3, * 5.R.'. )).H 4

The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance ;Johnson0ates, 'r$. )?) (# )2" ) orpus Juris 2?@=.

' review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they aresolely the effect of the decree of legal separation" hence, they can not survive the death of thplaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. 9n the point, 'rticle )?+ of the ivil odeprovides:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H'rt. )?+. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:>gc:chanrobles.com.

H;)= The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bondsshall not be severed"

H;2= The con>ugal partnership of gains or the absolute con>ugal community of property shall bedissolved and liCuidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profearned by the partnership or community, without pre>udice to the provisions of article )3+"

H;A= The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unlessotherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoinguardian"

H;= The offending spouse shall be disCualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse byintestate succession. oreover, provisions in favor of the o ffending spouse made in the will othe innocent one shall be revo$ed by operation of law..H . .

%rom this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the con>ugal partnership of ga;or of the absolute community of property=, the loss of right by the offending spouse to any shof the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disCualification to inherit byintestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favof the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the v

terms of the ivil ode article, are vested e6clusively in the persons of the spouses" and by thnature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable ortransmissible. ence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that His not thereby e6tinguishedH afa party dies, under (ection )3, Rule A, of the Rules of ourt, to warrant continuation of theaction through a substitute of the deceased party.

H(ec. )3. !eath of party. 'fter a party dies and the claim is not thereby e6tinguished, the courshall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to besubstituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty ;A?= days, or within such time as may begranted. . . .Hcralaw virtua)aw library

The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for against administrators in (ection ), Rule @3, of the Revised Rules ofourt:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H(ET/97 ). 'ctions which may and which may not be brought against e6ecutor oradministrator. 7o action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shbe commenced against the e6ecutor or administrator" but actions to recover real or personalproperty, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions torecover damages for an in>ury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced

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against him.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

7either actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly includedin the enumeration.

' further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even ifproperty rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of separation, theirsource being the decree itself" without the decree such rights do not come into e6istence, so thatbefore the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in e6pectation. /f death supervenesduring the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a moreradical and definitive separation" and the e6pected conseCuential rights and claims wouldnecessarily remain unborn.

's to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of hismarriage to armen 5apuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon thedeath of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after herdemise, that automatically dissolved the Cuestioned union. 'ny property rights acCuired by either

party as a result of 'rticle ) of the ivil ode of the &hilippines + could be resolved anddetermined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the Appellant .

/n fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under 'rticle@A, paragraph 2, of the ivil ode, because the second marriage had been contracted with thefirst wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generallybelieved dead, still the action for annulment became e6tinguished as soon as one of the threepersons involved had died, as provided in 'rticle @3, paragraph 2, of the ode, reCuiring that theaction for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.

'nd furthermore, the liCuidation of any con>ugal partnership that might have resulted from suchvoidable marriage must be carried out Hin the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceasedspouseH, as e6pressly provided in (ection 2 of the Revised Rule 3A, and not in the annulmentproceeding.

'9R!/7G5F, the appealed >udgment of the anila ourt of Juvenile and !omestic Relationsis hereby affirmed. 7o special pronouncement as to costs.

oncepcion, C.J., a$alintal, Naldivar, astro, %ernando, Teehan$ee, 0arredo, 8illamor anda$asiar, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 822;; Mar0 22, 199/

JOSE ARITUA a&# E*GAR ITAN"OR, $etitioners, vs. 3ONORALE "OURT OFA!!EALS, NI"OLAS NA"ARIO a&# +I"TORIA RON*A NA"ARIO, espondents.

Domin#o 'ucenario for petitioners.chanro7les +irtual la li7rary

Ernesto A. Atien"a for pri+ate respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.D

This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to e6isting relevant lawsand applicable >urisprudence the decision 1 of the ourt of 'ppeals dated !ecember )), )*@3which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial ourt, 0ranch 111//, at &ili, amarines(ur. 2 The challenged decision ad>udged the petitioners liable to the private respondents in thetotal amount of &2?,4?4.?? and for costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The facts are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

/n the evening of 7ovember 3, )*3*, the tricycle then being driven by 0ienvenido 7acario alongthe national highway at 0arangay (an ayetano, in 0aao, amarines (ur, figured in an accidentwith J0 0us 7o. @? driven by petitioner Edgar 0itancor and owned and operated by petitionerJose 0aritua. ; 's a result of that accident 0ienvenido and his passenger died and the tricyclewas damaged. 57o criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. chanrobles virtuallaw library

(ubseCuently, on arch 23, )*@?, as a conseCuence of the e6tra->udicial settlement of thematter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer - &hilippine %irst /nsurance ompany,/ncorporated ;&%// for brevity= - 0ienvenido 7acarioBs widow, 'licia 0aracena 8da. de 7acario,received &)@,4??.??. /n consideration of the amount she received, 'licia e6ecuted on arch 23,)*@? a HRelease of laimH in favor of the petitioners and &%//, releasing and foreverdischarging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resultedin her husbandBs death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving.

'licia li$ewise e6ecuted an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lac$ ofinterest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7chanrobles virtuallaw library

9n (eptember 2, )*@), or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on7ovember 3, )*3*, the private respondents, who are the parents of 0ienvenido 7acario, filed acomplaint for damages against the petitioners with the then ourt of %irst /nstance of amarines(ur. 8 /n their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceasedson, the petitioners through their representatives promised them ;the private respondents= thatas e6tra->udicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funerale6penses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price ofwhich they ;the private respondents= only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however,reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The 7acario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitionersherein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of &24,???.?? for the death of their son0ienvenido, &)?,???.?? for the damaged tricycle, &24,???.?? for compensatory and e6emplarydamages, &4,???.?? for attorneyBs fees, and for moral damages. 9chanrobles virtual law library

'fter trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants;herein petitioners= to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased 0ienvenido to the e6clusion of his parents, the plaintiffs ;herein privaterespondents=, e6tinguished any claim against the defendants ;petitioners=. 1/chanrobles virtuallaw library

The parents appealed to the ourt of 'ppeals which reversed the >udgment of the trial court. Theappellate court ruled that the release e6ecuted by 'licia 0aracena 8da. de 7acario did notdischarge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the privaterespondents in their own capacity and not as Hheirs, representatives, successors, and assignsHof 'licia" and 'licia could not have validly waived the damages being prayed for ;by the private

respondents= since she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death their son. %urthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners Hfailed to rebut the testimoof the appellants ;private respondents= that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that wdamaged in the incident. 'ppellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establisuch fact in their testimony . . . 11 'nent the funeral e6penses, H;T=he e6penses for the funeralwere li$ewise shouldered by the appellants ;the private respondents=. This was nevercontradicted by the appellees ;petitioners=. . . . &ayment ;for these= were made by theappellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

onseCuently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the privaterespondents &)?,???.?? for the damage of the tricycle, &4,???.?? for HcompleteH funeralservices, &4?.?? for cemetery lot, &44.?? for oracion adulto, and &4,???.?? for attorneyBs fe1; The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courtBs decision 1but their motion was denied. 15 ence, thpetition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the

petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of &2?,4?4.??despite the agreement of e6tra>udicial settlement between the petitioners and the victimBscompulsory heirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The petition is meritorious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

9bligations are e6tinguished by various modes among them being by payment. 'rticle )2A) othe ivil ode of the &hilippines provides:

'rt. )2A). 9bligations are e6tinguished:chanrobles virtual law library

;)= By payment or performance"chanrobles virtual law library

;2= 0y the loss of the thing due"chanrobles virtual law library

;A= 0y the condonation or remission of the debt"chanrobles virtual law library

;= 0y the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor"chanrobles virtual law librar

;4= 0y compensation"chanrobles virtual law library

;+= 0y novation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

;Emphasis ours.=

There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from theaccident that occurred on 7ovember 3, )*3*. The only Cuestion now is whether or not 'licia, tspouse and the one who received the petitionersB payment, is entitled toit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

'rticle )2? of the ivil ode of the &hilippines enumerates the persons to whom payment toe6tinguish an obligation should be made.

'rt )2?. &ayment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has beenconstituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.

ertainly there can be no Cuestion that 'licia and her son with the deceased are the successin interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The ivil odestates:

'rticle @@3. The following are compulsory heirs:chanrobles virtual law library

). 5egitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents andascendants"chanrobles virtual law library

2. %n default of the fore#oin#, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their legitimatchildren and decendants"chanrobles virtual law library

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A. The widow or widower"chanrobles virtual law library

. 'c$nowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction"chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

4. 9ther illegitimate children referred to in 'rticle [email protected] law library

ompulsory heirs mentioned in 7os. A, and 4 are not e6cluded by those in 7os. ) and 2.7either do they e6clude one another. ;Emphasis ours.= chanrobles virtual law library

'rticle *@4. %n default of le#itimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents andascendants shall inherit from him, to the e6clusion of collateralrelatives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

;Emphasis ours.=

/t is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without alegitimate descendant. 9n the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs.

's it has been established that 0ienvenido was married to 'licia and that they begot a child, theprivate respondents are not successors-in-interest of 0ienvenido" they are not compulsory heirs.The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with 'licia as the widow of0ienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if 'licia had beenestranged from 0ienvenido. ere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disCualification of asurviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw library

7either could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of 0ienvenido, see$ relief andcompensation from the petitioners. #hile it may be true that the private respondents loaned to0ienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the e6penses for hisfuneral, the said purchase price and e6penses are but money claims against the estate of theirdeceased son. 1 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we havesaid, had been released by the agreement of the e6tra->udicial settlement they concluded with

'licia 0aracena 8da. de 7acario, the victimBs widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian oftheir child, her co-heir. 's a matter of fact, she e6ecuted a HRelease 9f laimH in favor of thepetitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

#ERE%9RE, the petition is GR'7TE!" the decision of the ourt of 'ppeals is RE8ER(E!and (ET '(/!E and the decision of the Regional Trial ourt is hereby RE/7(T'TE!. ostsagainst the private respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(9 9R!ERE!.

&elencio2-errera, $aras, $adilla and e#alado, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 8;8. February 12, 199/.B

"ELE*ONIA SOLI+IO, Petitioner , C. T3E 3ONORALE "OURT OF A!!EALS a&#"ON"OR*IA JA+ELLANA +ILLANUE+A, Respondents.

Re) Su%a "a'(%66o& or Petitioner .

Sa6a' < +%66area6 or Private Respondent .

S?LLAUS

). REE!/'5 5'#" JR/(!/T/97" ' 0R'7 9% REG/97'5 TR/'5 9RT !9E( 79T'8E JR/(!/T/97 98ER &'RT/T/97 '(E #/5E &R90'TE &R9EE!/7G( /(&E7!/7G /7 '79TER 0R'7 9% TE ('E 9RT. 'fter a careful review of the

records, we find merit in the petitionerQs contention that the Regional Trial ourt, 0ranch 2+,lac$ed >urisdiction to entertain oncordia 8illanuevaQs action for partition and recovery of hershare of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings ;(pl. &roc. 7o. 24?=for the settlement of said estate are still pending in 0ranch 2A of the same court, there being asyet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratri6Qs inventory and accounting,distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings.

2. /!." (ETT5EE7T 9% E(T'TE" 9R!ER 9% !/(TR/0T/97 9% E(T'TE E7!(/7TE(T'TE &R9EE!/7G(. /t is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residueof the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, putsan end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties ;(antiestebanv. (antiesteban, +@ &hil. A+3, &hilippine ommercial and /ndustrial 0an$ v. Escolin, Et 'l., 5-23@+?, arch 2*, )*3, 4+ (R' 2++=.

A. /!." /!." /!." !E5'R'T/97 9% (95E E/R !/! 79T T955 E7! 9% &R9EE!/7G(. The assailed order of Judge 'dil in (pl. &roc. 7o. 24? declaring eledonia as the sole heir ofthe estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. 's a matter of fact,the last paragraph of the order directed the administratri6 to Hhurry up the settlement of theestate.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

. /!." /!." /!." /!." REE!F /7 '(E 9% !E7/'5 9% TE 9T/97 T9 (ET '(/!E TE9R!ER !E5'R/7G ' &ER(97 '( (95E E/R /( 0F &ET/T/97 %9R RE8/E#. /n view of

the pendency of the probate proceedings in 0ranch )) of the ourt of %irst /nstance ;now RT,0ranch 2A=, oncordiaQs motion to set aside the order declaring eledonia as sole heir ofEsteban, and to have herself ;oncordia= declared as co-heir and recover her share of theproperties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in (pl. &roc. 7o. 24?. er remedy whenthe court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the ourt of 'ppeals for review oncertiorari . owever, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, aseparate action for the same purpose in 0ranch 2+ of the court. #e hold that the separate actionwas improperly filed for it is the probate court that has e6clusive >urisdiction to ma$e a >ust andlegal distribution of the estate.

4. /!." /!." /!." /!." /!." ' 9RT (95! 79T /7TER%ERE #/T &R90'TE&R9EE!/7G( &E7!/7G /7 ' 9-ED'5 9RT. /n the interest o f orderly procedure andto avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedentQs estate, a court should not interferewith probate proceedings pending in a co-eCual court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of theourt of %irst /nstance of &ampanga, 5-2++*+, January A), )*32, A (R' ))), ))3, where adaughter filed a separate action to annul a pro>ect of partition e6ecuted between her and herfather in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother: H. . . The better practice,however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a propermotion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate oradministrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action,

which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order ofthe probate or intestate court already final and e6ecuted and re-shuffle properties long agodistributed and disposed of.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

+. /!." /!." &R90'TE &R9EE!/7G( 'RE /7 RE" &05/'T/97 9% 79T/E 9%&R9EE!/7G( /( ' 97(TRT/8E 79T/E T9 TE #95E #9R5!" '(E 'T 0'R. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. 7otice of the time and place of hearing of tpetition is reCuired to be published ;(ec. A, Rule 3+ in relation to (ec. A, Rule 3*, Rules ofourt=. 7otice of the hearing of eledoniaQs original petition was published in the H8isayanTribuneH on 'pril 24, ay 2 and *, )*33. (imilarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petitioof ay 2+, )*33 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in H0agoMasanagH ;7ew 5ight= issues of ay 23, June A and )?, )*33. The publication of the notice othe proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. oncordia was not deprived of hright to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of thesame.

3. /!." /8/5 &R9E!RE" &ET/T/97 (%%//E7T T9 /789ME JR/(!/T/97 '7!

&R9EE!/7G #'( /7 RE 'F 79T 0E 'TT'E! 955'TER'55F. The court notedthat oncordiaQs motion did not comply with the reCuisites of a petition for relief from >udgmennor a motion for new trial. The rule is stated in * orpus Juris (ecundum @?A? as follows:H#here petition was sufficient to invo$e statutory >urisdiction of probate court and proceedingwas in rem, no subseCuent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attac$.H ;0edwell!ean )A2 (o. 2?=

@. /!." (ETT5EE7T 9% E(T'TE" 9/((/97 T9 (T'TE TE 9-E/R /7 &ET/T/97 !/!79T 97(T/TTE '7 E1TR/7(/ %R'!. eledoniaQs allegation in her petition that shewas the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his motherQs side was not false.oreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties ofEsteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as EstebanQs nearest surviving relativeon his motherQs side, is the rightful heir to them. /t would have been self-defeating andinconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that oncordia was herco-heir. er omission to so state did not constitute e6trinsic fraud.

*. /!." /!." /!." %/5/7G 9% &ET/T/97 !9E( 79T &RE5!E 9TER E/R %R9 %/5/7G '79TER &ET/T/97. /t should be remembered that a petition for administration of adecedentQs estate may be filed by any Hinterested personH ;(ec. 2, Rule 3*, Rules of ourt=. Tfiling of eledoniaQs petition did not preclude oncordia from filing her own.

)?. /8/5 9!E" (E((/97" RE(ER8' TR97'5" !9E( 79T '&&5F T9 &R9&ERTF/7ER/TE! 0F ' !E(E7!'7T %R9 /T( '(E7!'7T. learly, the property of thedeceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not anascendant, but the descendant o f his mother, (alustia (olivio, from whom he inherited theproperties in Cuestion. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance sub>ect to a reservation in faof his aunt, eledonia (olivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his motherQs side.The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant whoinherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. /t does not apply to property inheriteby a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by 'rticle @*).

)). /!." /!." '&&5/'T/97 9% 'RT/5E( )??A '7! )??* 9% TE /8/5 9!E /7 '(E 'T0'R. (ince the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants,illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should applthe distribution of his estate are 'rticles )??A and )??* of the ivil ode which provide: H0othplaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degrin the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the sub>ect estate without distinction ofline or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,Q and is entitled toone-half ;)<2= share and share ali$e of the estate.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

)2. /!." /!." TE E/R #9 '5T9G '! 79T #'/8E! /7ER/T'7E, /( 097! 0F

8/12/2019 863 to 914


ER 'GREEE7T T9 &5'E E(T'TE /7 %97!'T/97" ' J!//'5 '!/((/97 /(975(/8E. owever, inasmuch as oncordia had agreed to deliver the estate of thedeceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, (alustia (olivio 8da. de Javellana ;fromwhom the estate came=, an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her Hotion toReopen and<or Reconsider 9rder dated 'pril A, )*3@H which she filed in (pl. &roceeding 7o.24?: she is bound by that agreement. /t is true that by that agreement, she did not waive herinheritance in favor of eledonia, but she did agree to place all of EstebanQs estate in theH(alustia (olivio 8da. de Javellana %oundationH which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, plannedto set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students aswell. er admission may not be ta$en lightly as the lower court did. 0eing a >udicial admission, itis conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement ;unanan v. 'mparo,@? &hil. 223=.

* E " I S I O N

ME*IAL*EA, J.D

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 2+, )*@@ of the ourt of 'ppeals in'-GR 8 7o. ?*?)? ;oncordia 8illanueva v. eledonia (olivio= affirming the decision of thetrial court in ivil ase 7o. )A2?3 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession anddamages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H#ERE%9RE, >udgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and againstdefendant:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

Ha= 9rdering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two ;2= shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. %rom both shares shall be eCually deducted thee6penses for the burial, mausoleum and related e6penditures. 'gainst the share of defendantsshall be charged the e6penses for scholarship, awards, donations and the (alustia (olivio 8da.de Javellana emorial %oundation"Q

Hb= !irecting the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but notlimited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of theproperty of the estate, within thirty ;A?= days from receipt of this >udgment" one-half ;)<2= of thisproduce shall belong to plaintiff"

Hc= 9rdering defendant to pay plaintiff &4,???.?? as e6penses of litigation" &)?,???.?? for and asattorneyQs fees plus costs.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

H(9 9R!ERE!.H ;pp. 2-A, Rollo=

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war %ilipino novel H#ithout (eeing the !awn,H who died a bachelor, without descendants,ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. is only surviving relatives are: ;)= hismaternal aunt, petitioner eledonia (olivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, (alustia(olivio" and ;2= the private respondent, oncordia Javellana-8illanueva, sister of his deceasedfather, Esteban Javellana, (r.

e was a posthumous child. is father died barely ten ;)?= months after his marriage in!ecember, )*)+ to (alustia (olivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

(alustia and her sister, eledonia ;daughter of Engracio (olivio and his second wife Josefa%ernandez=, a teacher in the /loilo &rovincial igh (chool, brought up Esteban, Jr.

(alustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties ;various parcels of land in alinog, /locovered by 2 titles= which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria elo, Engracio (olivifirst wife ;p. A24, Record=, but no con>ugal property was acCuired during her short-lived marriato Esteban, (r.

9n 9ctober )), )*4*, (alustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,including a house and lot in 5a &az, /loilo ity, where she, her son, and her sister lived. /n duetime, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

!uring his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, e6pressed to his aunt eledonia andsome close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to helppoor but deserving students obtain a college education. nfortunately, he died of a heart attaon %ebruary 2+, )*33 without having set up the foundation.

Two wee$s after his funeral, oncordia and eledonia tal$ed about what to do with EstebanQsproperties. eledonia told oncordia about EstebanQs desire to place his estate in a foundatioto be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping

indigent students in their schooling. oncordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.This fact was admitted by her in her Hotion to Reopen and or Reconsider the 9rder dated 'A, )*3@H which she filed on July 23, )*3@ in (pecial &roceeding 7o. 24?, where shestated:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H. That petitioner $new all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph Itherein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younsister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein, because prior to the filing the petition they ;petitioner eledonia (olivio and movant oncordia Javellana= have agreed ma$e the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely $nown each other dto their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each otherQs house which are not away for ;sic= each other.H ;p. 2A, Record" Emphasis supplied .=

&ursuant to their agreement that eledonia would ta$e care of the proceedings leading to theformation of the foundation, eledonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed arch @, )*33 (pl. &roceeding 7o. 24? for her appointment as special administratri6 of theestate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. ;E6h. 2=. 5ater, she filed an amended petition ;E6h. 4= prayingthat letters of administration be issued to her" that she be declared sole heir of the deceased"and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate bead>udicated to her ;p. ))4, Rollo=.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

'fter due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she wasdeclared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (he e6plained that this was done forthree reasons: ;)= because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, (alustia(olivio" ;2= that she is the decedentQs nearest relative on his motherQs side" and ;A= with her asole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would befacilitated.

9n 'pril A, )*3@, the court ;0ranch //, %/, now 0ranch 2A, RT= declared her the sole heir ofEsteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the ta6es and other obligationof the deceased and proceeded to set up the H('5(T/' (95/8/9 8!'. !E J'8E55'7'%97!'T/97H which she caused to be registered in the (ecurities and E6change ommission July )3, )*@) under Reg. 7o. ?)???23 ;p. *@, Rollo=.

%our months later, or on 'ugust 3, )*3@, oncordia Javellana-8illanueva filed a motion forreconsideration of the courtQs order declaring eledonia as Hsole heirH of Esteban, Jr., becausshe too was an heir of the deceased. 9n 9ctober 23, )*3@, her motion was denied by the cofor tardiness ;pp. @?-@), Record=. /nstead of appealing the denial, oncordia filed on January)*@? ;or one year and two months later=, ivil ase 7o. )A2?3 in the Regional Trial ourt of/loilo, 0ranch 2+, entitled Honcordia Javellana-8illanueva v. eledonia (olivioH for partition,recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

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9n (eptember A, )*@, the said trial court rendered >udgment in ivil ase 7o. )A2?3, in favorof oncordia Javellana-8illanueva.

9n oncordiaQs motion, the trial court ordered the e6ecution of its >udgment pending appeal andreCuired eledonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. /n her motions forreconsideration of those orders, eledonia averred that the properties of the deceased hadalready been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the H(alustia (olivio 8da. deJavellana %oundation.H The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.

/n the meantime, eledonia perfected an appeal to the ourt of 'ppeals ;'-GR 8 7o.?*?)?=. 9n January 2+, )*@@, the ourt of 'ppeals, Eleventh !ivision, rendered >udgmentaffirming the decision of the trial court in toto. ence, this petition for review wherein she raisedthe following legal issues:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

). whether 0ranch 2+ of the RT of /loilo had >urisdiction to entertain ivil ase 7o. )A2?3 forpartition and recovery of oncordia 8illanuevaQs share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.

even while the probate proceedings ;(pl. &roc. 7o. 24?= were still pending in 0ranch 2A of thesame court"

2. whether oncordia 8illanueva was prevented from intervening in (pl. &roc. 7o. 24? throughe6trinsic fraud"

A. whether the decedentQs properties were sub>ect to reserva troncal in favor of eledonia, hisrelative within the third degree on his motherQs side from whom he had inherited them" and

. whether oncordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place thesame in the H(alustia (olivio 8da. de Javellana %oundation,H and notwithstanding the fact thatconformably with said agreement, the %oundation has been formed and properties of the estatehave already been transferred to it.

/. The Cuestion of >urisdiction

'fter a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitionerQs contention that the RegionalTrial ourt, 0ranch 2+, lac$ed >urisdiction to entertain oncordia 8illanuevaQs action for partitionand recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings;(pl. &roc. 7o. 24?= for the settlement of said estate are still pending in 0ranch 2A of the samecourt, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratri6Qs

inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating theproceedings ;p. A), Record=.

/t is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the personsentitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administrationand thus far relieves the administrator from his duties ;(antiesteban v. (antiesteban, +@ &hil.A+3, &hilippine ommercial and /ndustrial 0an$ v. Escolin, Et 'l., 5-23@+?, arch 2*, )*3, 4+(R' 2++=.

The assailed order of Judge 'dil in (pl. &roc. 7o. 24? declaring eledonia as the sole heir ofthe estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. 's a matter of fact,the last paragraph of the order directed the administratri6 to Hhurry up the settlement of theestate.H The pertinent portions of the order are Cuoted below:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H2. 's regards the second incident Iotion for !eclaration of iss eledonia (olivio as (oleeir, dated arch 3, )*3@, it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and thepublication of these proceedings as reCuired by law, no other heirs came out to interpose anyopposition to the instant proceeding. /t further appears that herein 'dministratri6 is the onlyclaimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on %ebruary 2+, )*33.

H!uring the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on arch )3, )*3@, it was establishethat the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any $nown issue, and without any survivinparents. is nearest relative is the herein 'dministratri6, an elder Isic sister of his late motherwho reared him and with whom he had always been living with Isic during his lifetime.

H6 6 6H

H2. iss eledonia (olivio, 'dministratri6 of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legheir of the late Esteban (. Javellana, who died intestate on %ebruary 2+, )*33 at 5a &az, /loility.

HThe 'dministratri6 is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that itcan be terminated. ;pp. )-)+, Record=.

/n view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in 0ranch )) of the ourt of %irst /nstance;now RT, 0ranch 2A=, oncordiaQs motion to set aside the order declaring eledonia as soleheir of Esteban, and to have herself ;oncordia= declared as co-heir and recover her share of

the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in (pl. &roc. 7o. 24?. er remedywhen the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the ourt of 'ppeals for reviewon certiorari . owever, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, aseparate action for the same purpose in 0ranch 2+ of the court. #e hold that the separate acwas improperly filed for it is the probate court that has e6clusive >urisdiction to ma$e a >ust anlegal distribution of the estate.

HThe probate court, in the e6ercise of its >urisdiction to ma$e distribution, has power to determthe proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . . . The power to determine thelegality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the >urisdiction of the court ma$a >ust and legal distribution of the inheritance . . . To hold that a separate and independent actis necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the >urisprudence ofavoiding multiplicity of suits" and is further, e6pensive, dilatory, and impractical.H ;arcelino v.

'ntonio, 3? &hil. A@@=.

H' >udicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is e6clusively withinthe range of the administratri6 proceedings and can not properly be made an independentaction.H ;5itam v. Espiritu, )?? &hil. A+=

H' separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.H ;&imentel v. &alanca, 4 &hil. A+

/n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of adecedentQs estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-eCuacourt. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the ourt of %irst /nstance of &ampanga, 5-2++*January A), )*32, A (R' ))), ))3, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a pro>of partition e6ecuted between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of theestate of her mother:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

HThe probate court loses >urisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Thefinality of the approval of the pro>ect of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probateproceeding ;Timbol v. ano, ) (R' )23), )23+, 5-)44, 'pril 2*, )*+)" (iguiong v. Tecson@* &hil. pp. 2@, A?=. 's long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been compliewith, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated ;(iguiong v. Tecson,supra=" because a >udicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirsfrom bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has notelapsed ;ari v. 0onilla, @A &hil. )A3=. The better practice, however, for the heir who has notreceived his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate oradministration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if ithad already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried byanother court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate

8/12/2019 863 to 914


court already final and e6ecuted and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed ofH;Ramos v. 9rtuzar, @* &hil. 3A?, 3)-32" Timbol v. ano, supra" Jingco v. !aluz, 5-4)?3, 'pril2, )*4A, *2 &hil. )?@2" Roman atholic v. 'gustines, 5-)3)?, arch 2*, )*+?, )?3 &hil. 44,+?-+)" Emphasis supplied =

/n 5itam, Et 'l., v. Rivera, )?? &hil. A+, where despite the pendency of the special proceedingsfor the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael 5itam, the plaintiffs-appellantsfiled a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of thedeceased to a hinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the con>ugalproperties acCuired during his marriage to arcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil casedeclared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties inCuestion were paraphernal properties of his wife, arcosa Rivera, and that the latter was hisonly heir. 9n appeal to this ourt, we ruled that Hsuch declarations ; that arcosa Rivera was theonly heir of the decedent= is improper, in ivil ase 7o. 2?3), it being within the e6clusivecompetence of the court in (pecial &roceedings 7o. )4A3, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and,will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the pro>ect of partition.H ;p. A3@=

owever, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed andterminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the pro>ect of partition was allowedto continue. onsidering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, butnonetheless, oncordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in saidproceedings, #e have opted li$ewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interestof >ustice.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The orders of the Regional Trial ourt, 0ranch 2+, in ivil ase 7o. )A2?3 setting aside theprobate proceedings in 0ranch 2A ;formerly 0ranch ))= on the ground of e6trinsic fraud, anddeclaring oncordia 8illanueva to be a co-heir of eledonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr.,ordering the partition of the estate, and reCuiring the administratri6, eledonia, to submit aninventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for thesematters lie within the e6clusive competence of the probate court.

//. The Cuestion of e6trinsic fraud

#as oncordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by e6trinsic fraudemployed by eledoniaO /t is noteworthy that e6trinsic fraud was not alleged in oncordiaQsoriginal complaint in ivil ase 7o. )A2?3. /t was only in her amended complaint of arch +,)*@?, that e6trinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.

HE6trinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of >udgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailingparty which prevented a fair submission of the controversy ;%rancisco v. !avid, A@ 9.G. 3)=. 'fraud which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or onewhich operates upon matters pertaining, not to the >udgment itself, but to the manner by whichsuch >udgment was procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the controversy.%or instance, if through fraudulent machination by one Ihis adversary, a litigant was induced towithdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of actionin the case wherein the >udgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived ofhis day in court through no fault of his own, the eCuitable relief against such >udgment may beavailed of. ;Fatco v. (umagui, +2A-R, July A), )*3)=.H ;cited in &hilippine 5aw !ictionary, )*32Ed. by oreno" 8arela v. 8illanueva, Et 'l., *4 &hil. 2@=

H' >udgment may be annulled on the ground of e6trinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished fromintrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme e6ecuted by a prevailing litigant outsidethe trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby saiddefeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case . . . Theoverriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a partyfrom having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affectsand goes into the >urisdiction of the court.QH ;5ibudan v. Gil, 5-2))+A, ay )3, )*32, 4 (R' )3,23-2*" (terling /nvestment orp. v. Ruiz, 5-A?+*, 9ctober A), )*+*, A? (R' A)@, A2A=

The charge of e6trinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:chanroblesvirtual lawlibrary

). oncordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by eledonia. (admitted in her complaint that she and eledonia had agreed that the latter would Hinitiate thenecessary proceedingH and pay the ta6es and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph + of hcomplaint alleged:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H+. . . . for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana,Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that tdefendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of ta6es and otherobligations, and to do everything else reCuired by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of testate between her and the plaintiff,H Ialthough eledonia denied that they agreed to partitionthe estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation. ;p. 2, Record" Emphasupplied =

Evidently, oncordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. (he stayed awaby choice. 0esides, she $new that the estate came e6clusively from EstebanQs mother, (alust(olivio, and she had agreed with eledonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased hadplanned to do.

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. 7otice of the time and place of hearing othe petition is reCuired to be published ;(ec. A, Rule 3+ in relation to (ec. A, Rule 3*, Rules oourt=. 7otice of the hearing of eledoniaQs original petition was published in the H8isayanTribuneH on 'pril 24, ay 2 and *, )*33 ;E6h. , p. )*3, Record=. (imilarly, notice of the heariof her amended petition of ay 2+, )*33 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of thecourt, published in H0agong MasanagH ;7ew 5ight= issues of ay 23, June A and )?, )*33 ;pp)@2-A?4, Record=. The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice towhole world. oncordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she hactual, as well as constructive notice of the same. 's pointed out by the probate cour t in its oof 9ctober 23, )*3@:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H. . . The move of oncordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after eledonia(olivio was declared as the sole heir . . .

Honsidering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as reCuired by ladespite which the present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for

sleeping on her alleged right.H ;p. 22, Record=.

The court noted that oncordiaQs motion did not comply with the reCuisites of a petition for relfrom >udgment nor a motion for new trial.

The rule is stated in * orpus Juris (ecundum @?A? as follows:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H#here petition was sufficient to invo$e statutory >urisdiction of probate court and proceedingwas in rem, no subseCuent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attac$.H ;0edwell!ean )A2 (o. 2?=

eledoniaQs allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the thirddegree on his motherQs side was not false. oreover, it was made in good faith and in the honbelief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, aEstebanQs nearest surviving relative on his motherQs side, is the rightful heir to them. /t wouldhave been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in herpetition that oncordia was her co-heir. er omission to so state did not constitute e6trinsicfraud.

H%ailure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat oneQs own cla

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or defense is not such e6trinsic fraud as will >ustify or reCuire vacation of the >udgment.H ;*.J.(. @*, citing Foung v. Foung, 2 (E 2d +22" %irst 7ational 0an$ L Trust o. of Ming ity v.0owman, )4 (# 2d @2" &rice v. (mith, )?* (# 2d )), ))*=.

/t should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedentQs estate may be filed byany Hinterested personH ;(ec. 2, Rule 3*, Rules of ourt=. The filing of eledoniaQs petition didnot preclude oncordia from filing her own.

///. 9n the Cuestion of reserva troncal

#e find no merit in the petitionerQs argument that the estate of the deceased was sub>ect toreserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on hismotherQs side. The reserva troncal provision of the ivil ode is found in 'rticle @*) which readsas follows:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H'RT. @*). The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter mayhave acCuired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to

reserve such property as he may have acCuired by operation of law for the benefit of relativeswho are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said propertycame.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H). The person obliged to reserve is the reservor ;reservista= the ascendant who inherits byoperation of law property from his descendants.

H2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees ;reservatorios= relativeswithin the third degree counted from the descendant ;propositus=, and belonging to the line fromwhich the property came.

HA. The propositus the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue,ma$ing his other ascendant inherit by operation of law.H ;p. +*2, ivil 5aw by &adilla, 8ol. //,)*4+ Ed.=

learly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana , Jr., is not reservable property, forEsteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, (alustia (olivio, fromwhom he inherited the properties in Cuestion. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance sub>ectto a reservation in favor of his aunt, eledonia (olivio, who is his relative within the third degree

on his motherQs side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from adescendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. /t does not apply toproperty inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by

'rticle @*).

(ince the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimatechildren, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in thedistribution of his estate are 'rticles )??A and )??* of the ivil ode which provide:chanrobleslaw library

H'RT. )??A. /f there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a survivingspouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordancewith the following articles.

H'RT. )??*. (hould there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, theother collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

HThe latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason ofrelationship by the whole blood.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

Therefore, the ourt of 'ppeals correctly held that:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H0oth plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the thirdegree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the sub>ect estate withoutdistinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,Q anentitled to one-half ;)<2= share and share ali$e of the estate.H ;p. 43, Rollo=

/8. The Cuestion of oncordiaQs one-half share

owever, inasmuch as oncordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to thefoundation in honor of his mother, (alustia (olivio 8da. de Javellana ;from whom the estatecame=, an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her Hotion to Reopen and<orReconsider 9rder dated 'pril A, )*3@H which she filed in (pl. &roceeding 7o.24?:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H. That . . . prior to the filing of the petition they ;petitioner eledonia (olivio and movantoncordia Javellana= have agreed to ma$e the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides

they have closely $nown each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have beenvisiting each otherQs house which are not far away for ;sic= each other.H ;p. 2A, Record"Emphasis supplied =

she is bound by that agreement. /t is true that by that agreement, she did not waive herinheritance in favor of eledonia, but she did agree to place all of EstebanQs estate in theH(alustia (olivio 8da. de Javellana %oundationH which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planneto set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students well.

er admission may not be ta$en lightly as the lower court did. 0eing a >udicial admission, it isconclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement ;unanan v. 'mparo&hil. 223" Granada v. &hilippine 7ational 0an$, 5-2?34, (ept. 2, )*++, )@ (R' )" (ta. 'naaliwat, 5-2A?2A, 'ug. A), )*+@, 2 (R' )?)@" &eople v. Encipido, G.R. 3??*), !ec. 2*,)*@+, )+ (R' 3@" and Rodillas v. (andiganbayan, G.R. 4@+42, ay 2?, )*@@, )+) (R'A3=.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by oncordia who, significantly, did not evetestify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedlyindisposed to attend the trial. 9nly her husband, 7arciso, and son-in-law, Juanito !omin,actively participated in the trial. er husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and

eledonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, buonly one-half, of her share to the foundation ;p. A2A, Record=

The records show that the H(alustia (olivio 8da. de Javellana %oundationH was established aduly registered in the (ecurities and E6change ommission under Reg. 7o. ?)???23 for thefollowing principal purposes:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H). To provide for the establishment and<or setting-up of schola rships for such deservingstudents as the 0oard of Trustees of the %oundation may decide of at least one scholar each study at #est 8isayas (tate ollege, and the niversity of the &hilippines in the 8isayas, botlocated in /loilo ity.

H2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for (t. lements Redemptorist ommunitfor a deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.

HA. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement andenrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts.(cholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors ato$en of gratitude for their contributions.

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H. To direct or underta$e surveys and studies in the community to determine community needsand be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.

H4. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the (olivio-Javellanamausoleum at hrist the Ming emorial &ar$, Jaro, /loilo ity, and the Javellana emorial at the#est 8isayas (tate ollege, as a to$en of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of thelate Esteban (. Javellana which has made this foundation possible. 'lso, in perpetuation of hisRoman atholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their eCuivalents will beoffered every %ebruary and 9ctober, and ReCuiem masses every %ebruary 24th and 9ctober))th, their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.

H+. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loansfrom whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay orapply only the income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for suchendeavors as may be necessary to carry out the ob>ectives of the %oundation.

H3. To acCuire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, e6change, sell,

transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personalproperty of every $ind and description or any interest herein.

H@. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishmentsof any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to theprotection or benefit of the corporation, including the e6ercise of the powers, authorities andattributes concerned upon the corporation organized under the laws of the &hilippines ingeneral, and upon domestic corporation of li$e nature in particular.H ;pp. *-)?, Rollo=

's alleged without contradiction in the petition for review:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

HThe %oundation began to function in June, )*@2, and three ;A= of its eight Esteban Javellanascholars graduated in )*@+, one ;)= from &8 graduated um 5aude and two ;2= from #8(graduated with honors" one was a um 5aude and the other was a recipient of 5agos 5opezaward for teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher.

HThe %oundation has four ;= high school scholars in Guiso 0arangay igh (chool, the site ofwhich was donated by the %oundation. The (chool has been selected as the &ilot 0arangayigh (chool for Region 8/.

HThe %oundation has a special scholar, %r. Elbert 8asCuez, who would be ordained this year. e

studied at (t. %rancis 1avier a>or Regional (eminary at !avao ity. The %oundation li$ewise isa member of the Redemptorist 'ssociation that gives yearly donations to help poor students whowant to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. /t gives yearly awards for reative writing$nown as the Esteban Javellana 'ward.

H%urther, the %oundation had constructed the Esteban (. Javellana ultipurpose enter at the#est 8isayas (tate niversity for teachersQ and studentsQ use, and has li$ewise contributed toreligious, civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst others.H ;p. )?, Rollo=

aving agreed to contribute her share of the decedentQs estate to the %oundation, oncordia isobligated to honor her commitment as eledonia has honored hers.

#ERE%9RE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the ourt of 'ppeals are hereby (ET '(/!E. oncordia J. 8illanueva is declared an heir of the late EstebanJavellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. owever, comformably with the agreementbetween her and her co-heir, eledonia (olivio, the entire estate of the deceased should beconveyed to the H(alustia (olivio 8da. de Javallana %oundation,H of which both the petitionerand the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an eCualnumber of trustees to constitute the 0oard of Trustees of the %oundation which sha ll administerthe same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratri6 of the estate,

shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceasedpreparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

(9 9R!ERE!.

7arvasa, ruz, Gancayco and GriSo-'Cuino, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 185. NoCe$ber 15, 1919. B

EN"ARNA"ION FLORENTINO ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, C. MER"E*ES FLORENTINOET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

Ra$o& >uerub%&, S%$eo& Ra$o' a&# Ore&'e < +era or Appellants.

+%0e&(e Fo, Jo'e S%&'o& To&'o& a&# A&e6 E&0ar&a0%o& or Appellees.

S?LLAUS

). RE(ER8'05E &R9&ERTF The property proceeding from an ascendant or from a brother of a deceased descendant who may have acCuired same by lucrative title and from whom

afterwards another ascendant of deceased will inherit is by law invested with the character of reservable property in favor of said deceasedQs relatives, within the third degree, of the line from

whence such property proceeds. ;'rt. @)) of the ivil ode.=

2. /!." #E7 /T 59(E( T/( 'R'TER. The ascendant, who inherits property of areservable character from his deceased descendant who has a relative within the third degreestill living, is no more than a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of said reservable property. 0ut if,

during the lifetime of the said ascendant, all the relatives, within the third degree, of hispredecessor in interest should die or disappear, according to law the condition of reservation

with which the property had been burdened ceases to e6ist, and said property now becomes apart of the legitimate legitime of the ascendant who had inherited same through the death of

those for whom it had been reserved ;reservatarios=.

A. /!" R/GT( 9% (E((/97. 'ccording to the order of succession prescribed by law for legitimes, when there are relatives within the third degree of the deceased descendant, the rightof the relativeQs nearest reservative ;reservatario= to the property e6cludes that of the one more

remote. #herefore the property ought to be handed over to said relative by the reservist;reservista=, without it being possible to allege a right of representation when he who attemptsthe same is not comprehended within the third degree, among the predecessor-in-interestQs

relatives. /nasmuch as the right conceded by the aforementioned article @)) of the ivil ode is,in the highest degree, for the personal and e6clusive benefit of the persons pointed out by law, inno manner can there be included relatives of the fourth and succeeding degrees, not recognize

by law.

. /!., 7'TRE 9%. Reservable property neither comes nor falls under the absolute dominionof the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his deceased descendant and, therefore,

neither forms part of his estate nor integrates the legitime of his forced heirs. /t becomes theascendantQs own property, received as an inheritance, only under the condition that all of the

deceased descendantQs relatives, within the third degree, shall have died. nder thesecircumstances the property, transmitted by the predecessor in interest to his ascendant, has lost

its character of reservation.

4. /!., /!. Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant;reservista= to other with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir,

forms no part of the latterQs lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as saidproperty continued to be reservable the heir receiving same as an inheritance from his

ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of thepredecessor in interest, without pre>udicing the right of the heir to an aliCuot part of property, if he

has at the same time the right of a reservatario.

* E " I S I O N

TORRES, J. D

9n January )3, )*)@, counsel for Encarnacion ;together with her husband (imeon (errano=,Gabriel, agdalena, Ramon, iguel, 8ictorino, and 'ntonio of the surname %lorentino" foriguel %lorentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario %lorentino" for Eugenio (ingson, thefather and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, 5ourdes, aridad, and !olores of the surname(ingson y %lorentino" and for Eugenio (ingson, guardian of the minors Jose and 'suncion%lorentino, filed a complaint in the ourt of %irst /nstance of /locos (ur, against ercedes%lorentino and her husband, alleging as follows:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

That 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino // married the first time 'ntonia %az de 5eon" that during themarriage he begot nine children called Jose, Juan, aria, Encarnacion, /sabel, Espirita, Gabr&edro, and agdalena of the surname %lorentino y de 5eon" that on becoming a widower hemarried the second time (everina %az de 5eon with whom he had two children, ercedes an

'polonio /// of the surname %lorentino y de 5eon" that 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino // died on%ebruary )A, )@*?" that he was survived by his second wife (everina %az de 5eon and the techildren first above mentioned" that his eleventh son, 'polonio ///, was born on the following

of arch )@*?.

That of the deceased 'polonio /sabeloQs aforementioned eleven children, Juan, aria and /sadied single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants" that Ramon, iguel, 8ictorino,

'ntonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose %lorentino who was onof the children of the deceased 'polonio /sabelo" that Emilia, Jesus, 5ourdes, aridad, and!olores are the legitimate children of Espirita %lorentino, now deceased, and her husbandEugenio (ingson" that Jose and 'suncion are the children of &edro %lorentino, another son othe deceased 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino.

That on January )3 and %ebruary )A, )@*?, 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino e6ecuted a will beforthe notary public of /locos (ur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten childrethe posthumos 'polonio /// and his widow (everina %az de 5eon" that he declared, in one of tparagraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of bothmarriages.

That, in the partition of the said testatorQs estate, there as given to 'polonio %lorentino ///, hisposthumos son the property mar$ed with the letters ', 0, , !, E, and % in the complaint, a gorosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestoc$, palay, some personal property aother ob>ects mentioned in the complaint.

That 'polonio %lorentino ///, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in )@*)" that his

mother, (everina %az de 5eon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint" that widow, (everina %az de 5eon died on 7ovember )@, )*?@, leaving a will instituting as heruniversal heiress her only living daughter, ercedes %lorentino" that, as such heir, said daughtoo$ possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, (everina %az de 5eon" thatamong same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said (everina %ade 5eon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos 'polonio, as reservable property" thas a reservist, the heir of the said ercedes %lorentino deceased had been gathering for hersalone the fruits of lands described in the complaint" that each and every one of the partiesmentioned in said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable propertydescribed therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentionedparagraph * of the complaint.

That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, as$ed the defendants to delivetheir corresponding part of the reservable property" that without any >ustifiable motive thedefendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value" that fornine years ercedes %lorentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, A+?bundles of palay at fifty pesos per bundle and *? bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle" ththereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred andtwenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos andfifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos ;&),???= fo

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the un>ustifiable retention of the aforementioned reservable property and for the e6penses of thissuit. #herefore they pray it be declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property"that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the Cuantity and proportion mentionedin the aforementioned paragraph * of the complaint" that the defendants ercedes %lorentinoand her husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in Cuestion, ofthe palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value" and that they be condemned to paythe plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos ;&),???= together with the costs of this instance.

To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause ofaction is based on the obligation of the widow (everina %az de 5eon to reserve the property sheinherited from her deceased son 'polonio %lorentino y %az de 5eon v. o, in turn, inheritedsame from his father 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino" that, there being no allegation to the contrary,it is to be presumed that the widow (everina %az de 5eon did not remarry after the death of thishusband nor have any natural child" that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentionedin article *+@ and the following articles, but that established in article @)) of the ivil ode" thatthe ob>ect of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of saidreservable property to those e6traneous to the family of the owner thereof" that if the property

inherited by the widow (everina %az de 5eon from her deceased son 'polonio %lorentino y %azde 5eon ;property which originated from his father and her husband= has all passed into thehands of the defendant, ercedes %lorentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the commonancestorQs second marriage ;said 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino with the deceased (everina %azde 5eon= it is evident that the property left at the death of the posthumos son 'polonio %lorentinoy %az de 5eon did not pass after the death of his mother (everina, his legitimate heirs as anascendant, into the hands of strangers" that said property having been inherited by ercedes%lorentino y Encarnacion from her mother ;(everina=, article @)) of the ivil ode is absolutelyinapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant ercedes, by operation of law,entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited from hermother (everina %az de 5eon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost thecharacter of reservable property there being a legitimate daughter of (everina %az de 5eonwith the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions" that the restraints of the lawwhereby said property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch asthe said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as ercedes %lorentino is a forced heiress ofher mother (everina %az de 5eon" that, in the present case, there ii no property reserved for theplaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of the widow(everina %az de 5eon who never remarried" that the obligation to reserve is secondary to theduty of respecting the legitime" that in the instant case, the widow (everina %az de 5eon was induty bound to respect the legitime of her daughter ercedes, the defendant" that her obligationto reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the pre>udice of the legitime which belongs to her

forced heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme court of (painof January , )*))" that, finally, the application of article @)) of the ivil ode in favor of theplaintiffs would presuppose the e6clusion of the defendant from her right to succeed e6clusivelyto all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, altho the said defendant has abetter right than the plaintiffs" and that there would be in>ustice if the property claimed bead>udicated to the plaintiffs, as well as a violation of section 4 of the Jones 5aw which invalidatesany law depriving any person of an eCual protection. #herefore they prayed that the demurrerbe sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.

'fter the hearing of the demurrer, on 'ugust 22, )*)@, the >udge absolved the defendants fromthe complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.

ounsel for the plaintiffs e6cepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial"said motion was overruled" the plaintiffs e6cepted thereto and filed the corresponding bill ofe6ceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the cler$ of this court.

9n appeal the trial >udge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of theplaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the period prescribedby the rules undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the factsconstituting the cause of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in

the complaint as well as in the demurrer, every Cuestion reduced itself to one of the law, alreasubmitted to the decision of the court the said >udge, disregarding the ordinary procedureestablished by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from the complaint and bycondemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.

There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering thecomplaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that tfacts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. owever, the >udge preferreto absolve the defendants, thereby ma$ing an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the sambecause undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between the parties, that thearguments adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants wouldallege in their answer those dealing with a mere Cuestion of law which the courts would hato decide and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist thecould do no less upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and ifanother demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint withcosts against the plaintiffs in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that plaintiffs absolutely lac$ the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.

0eing of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary as in thicase what has been done does not pre>udice the parties the appellate court will now proceto decide the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisionsapplicable to the Cuestion of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater e6penmay be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit wouldsubseCuently decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfuand conscientiously formed for its determination.

/n order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invo$e, in their favor, theprovisions of article @)) of the ivil ode, and whether the same article is applicable to theCuestion of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the propertyenumerated in paragraph 4 of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property" and, if so,whether in accordance with the provision of the ivil ode in article @)), (everina %az de 5eo;the widow of the deceased 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino= who inherited said property from herson 'polonio %lorentino /// ;born after the death of his father 'polonio /sabelo= had the obligatto preserve and reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioneddeceased son 'polonio ///.

The above mentioned article reads:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H'ny ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acCuired by the latter gratuitoufrom some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the propas he may have acCuired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degreebelonging to the line from which such property came.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

!uring the marriage of 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino // and (everina %az de 5eon two childrenwere born, namely the defendant ercedes %lorentino and 'polonio %lorentino /// ;born after death of his father=. 't the death of 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino under a will, his eleven childresucceeded to the inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son 'polonio ///, was givenas his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. /n )@*) the saidposthumos son 'polonio %lorentino /// died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother(everina %az de 5eon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying, 7ovember )@, )*instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter, ercedes %lorentino, the defendaherein, who too$ possession of all property left by her father, same constituting the inheritanc/ncluded in said inheritance is the property, specified in paragraph 4 of the complaint, which hbeen inherited by the posthumos son 'polonio %lorentino /// from his father 'polonio /sabelo%lorentino, and which, at the death of the said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by hmother, (everina %az de 5eon. Even if (everina left in her will said property, together with herown, to her only daughter and forced heiress, ercedes %lorentino, nevertheless this propertyhad not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the

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litigants, 'polonio /sabelo" was inherited by his son 'polonio ///" was transmitted by same ;byoperation of law= to his legimate mother and ascendant, (everina %az de 5eon.

The posthumos son, 'polonio %lorentino ///, acCuired the property, now claimed by his brothers,by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father, 'polonio /sabelo%lorentino //. 'lthough said property was inherited by his mother, (everina %az de 5eon,nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article @)) of the ivil ode, to reserve theproperty thus acCuired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line fromwhich such property came.

'ccording to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but itsen>oyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserveand preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants-reservists, ;ta$ing into consideration the nature of the line from which such property came=acCuire the ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner asforced heirs ;because they are also so such= said property reverts to said line as long as theaforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant reservists, acCuire in fact the

right of reservatarios ;persons for whom property is reserved=, and are relatives, within the thirddegree, of the descendant from whom the reservable property came.

'ny ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within thethird degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of thereservable property received. e is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which isnot reservable property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article @?* of the ivilode. 0ut if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant ;fromwhom came the reservable property= die or disappear, the said property becomes free property,by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who cantransmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has nowlost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, calledreservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such property came.

%ollowing the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of thedescendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over theproperty which the reservista ;person holding it sub>ect to reservation= should return to him,e6cludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when theone claming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives withinthe third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the rightgranted by the ivil ode in article @)) is in the highest degree personal and for the e6clusive

benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person fromwhom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeedingdegrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them assuch.

/n spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleginghis right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there isright of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned bylaw, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable propertycame. These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants ;fathers and mothers=who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree inaccordance with article @)) of the ivil ode.

/n this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabrieland agdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased 'polonio /sabelo%lorentino //" that Ramon, iguel, eferino, 'ntonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of

'polonio /sabelo %lorentino //, and children of his deceased son, Jose %lorentino" that the samehave the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose %lorentino" that Emilia, Jesus,5ourdes, aridad, and !olores are the legitimate children of the deceased Espirita %lorentino,one of the daughters of the deceased 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino //, and represent the right of

their aforementioned mother" and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and 'suncion, have also the rto represent their legitimate father &edro %lorentino, one of the sons of the aforementioned

'polonio /sabelo %lorentino //. /t is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of tfirst marriage of the deceased 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino // died without issue so that thisdecision does not deal with them.

There are then seven HreservatariosH who are entitled to the reservable property left at the deof 'polonio ///" the posthumos son of the aforementioned 'polonio /sabelo //, to wit, his threechildren of his first marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, agdalena" his three children, Jose,Espirita and &edro who are represented by their own twelve children respectively" and erce%lorentino, his daughter by a second marriage. 'll of the plaintiffs are the relatives of thedeceased posthumos son, 'polonio %lorentino ///, within the third degree ;four of whom beinghalf-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his threehalf-brothers=. 's the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and thother twelve are such by representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios the property which came from the common ancestor, 'polonio /sabelo, to 'polonio %lorentinoby inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, (everina

%az de 5eon, widow of the aforementioned 'polonio /sabelo %lorentino //.

/n spite of the provision of article @)) of the ivil ode already cited, the trial >udge refused toaccept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter frothe complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case,inasmuch as the defendant ercedes %lorentino survived her brother, 'polonio ///, from whomthe reservable property came and her mother, (everina %az de 5eon, the widow of her father,

'polonio /sabelo %lorentino //" that the defendant ercedes, being the only daughter of (ever%az de 5eon, is li$ewise her forced heiress" that when she inherited the property left at the deof her mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother 'polonio ///, thefundamental ob>ect of article @)) of the ode was thereby complied with, inasmuch as thedanger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers hadbeen avoided" and that the hope or e6pectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acCuthe property of the deceased 'polonio /// never did come into e6istence because there is aforced heiress who is entitled to such property.

The >udgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article @)) of the ivil ode dnot destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to appsaid article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair thforced legitime which e6clusively belongs to the defendant ercedes %lorentino, in violation othe precept of article @)A of the same ode which provides that the testator cannot deprive h

heirs of their legitime, e6cept in the cases e6pressly determined by law. 7either can he imposeupon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any $ind whatsoever, saving the provisionsconcerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the (upreme ourt of(pain of January , )*)).

The principal Cuestion submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whetthe property left at the death of 'polonio ///, the posthumos son of 'polonio /sabelo //, was orwas not invested with the character of reservable property when it was received by his mother(everina %az de 5eon.

The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 4 of their complaint came, without anydoubt whatsoever from the common ancestor 'polonio /sabelo //, and when, on the death of

'polonio /// without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimatmother, (everina %az de 5eon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the provisioof article @)) of the ode, with the ob>ect that the same should not fall in to the possession ofpersons other than those comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from

'polonio /sabelo //, the source of said property. /f this property was in fact clothed with thecharacter and condition of reservable property when (everina %az de 5eon inherited same froher son 'polonio ///, she did not thereby acCuire the dominion or right of ownership but only thright of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or retu

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it as such reservable property to her deceased sonQs relatives within the third degree, amongwhom is her daughter, ercedes %lorentino.

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant whoinherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his ownproperty nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. /t becomes his own property only in casethat all the relatives of his descendant shall have died ;reservista=, in which case said reservableproperty losses such character.

#ith full right (everina %az de 5eon could have disposed in her will of all her own property infavor of her only living daughter, ercedes %lorentino, as forced heiress. 0ut whatever provisionthere is in her will concerning the reservable property received from her son 'polonio ///, orrather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers andnephews of her daughter ercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is nother own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve andto deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, ercedes %lorentino.

/t cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an e6press provision of law, that by operation oflaw all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by (everina %az de 5eon from herson, 'polonio ///, constitutes or forms part of the legitime pertaining to ercedes %lorentino. /fsaid property did not come to be the legitimate and e6clusive property of (everina %az de 5eon,her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant ercedes, could not inherit all by operationof law and in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives ofthe deceased 'polonio ///, within the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to suchreservable property.

%or this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of ercedes %lorentino, comingfrom the inheritance of her mother (everina %az de 5eon, has been reduced and impaired" andthe application of article @)) of the ode to the instant case in no way pre>udices the rights of thedefendant ercedes %lorentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservableproperty, there being no lawfull or >ust reason which serves as real foundation to disregard theright to 'polonio ///Qs other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the reservableproperty in Cuestion. 's these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an indisputableright, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld andwhy they should not be granted eCual participation with the defendant in the litigated property.

The claim that because of (everina %az de 5eonQs forced heiress, her daughter ercedes, theproperty received from the deceased son 'polonio /// lost the character, previously held, of

reservable property" and that the mother, the said (everina, therefore, had no further obligationto reserve same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased 'polonio ///, is evidentlyerroneous for the reason that as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will bythe aforementioned (everina to her only daughter ercedes, does not form part of theinheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress ercedes. Just because she hasa forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve (everina of her obligation toreserve the property which she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose thecharacter of reservable property held before the reservatarios received same.

/t is true that when ercedes %lorentino, the heiress of the reservista (everina, too$ possessionof the property in Cuestion, same did not pass into the hands of strangers. 0ut it is li$ewise truethat the said ercedes is not the only reservataria. 'nd there is no reason founded upon lawand upon the principle of >ustice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews,relatives within the third degree in accordance with the precept of article @)) of the ivil ode,should be deprived of portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.

%rom the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the (upreme ourt of(pain on January , )*)), for the violation of articles @)), *+@ and conseCuently of the ivilode is not applicable in the instant case.

%ollowing the provisions of article @)A, the (upreme ourt of (pain held that the legitime of thforced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is e6pressly respected in thisdecision.

owever, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not beenshown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was under thabsolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third degree of the persofrom whom same came" that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress the deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former" and that the said forcedheiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an e6clusive right to receive all of said properand to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree, of certain portionsthereof.

oncerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the deliverythe fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage whcan give rise to the obligation of refunding same. 's to the second, the delivery of the fruitsproduced by the land forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are

undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs si6-sevenths of the fruits or rents of theportions of land claimed in the complaint, in the Cuantity e6pressed in paragraph )) of the samfrom January )3, )*)@, the date the complaint was filed" and the remaining seventh part shougo to the defendant ercedes.

%or the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed frowe should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by thedeceased (everina %az de 5eon from her son 'polonio %lorentino ///, is reservable property" the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased 'polonio /// within the third degree, are entitled tosi6-sevenths of said reservable property" that the defendant ercedes is entitled to theremaining seventh part thereof" that the latter, together with her husband 'ngel Encarnacion,shall deliver to the plaintiffs, >ointly, si6-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portioof the land and of the Cuantity claimed, from January )3, )*)@, until fully delivered" and that tindemnity for one thousand pesos ;&),???= prayed for in the complaint is denied, without spefindings as to the costs of both instances. (o ordered.

'rellano, C.J., Johnson, 'raullo, (treet, alcolm and 'vanceSa, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 878 Se(e$ber 1;, 191;

MAR"ELINA E*ROSO, $etitioner2Appellant , vs. !ALO a&# ASILIO SALAN, opponents-appellees.

rancisco Domin#ue" for appellant.Crispin O7en for appellees.

ARELLANO, C.J.D chanrobles virtual law library

The sub>ect matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as reCuired bylaw to be reserved. arcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcelsof land situated in the municipality of &agsan>an, &rovince of 5aguna, one of ) hectare 33 aresand +A centares, and the other ) hectare + ares and 2+ centares. Two applications were filed,one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single

>udgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library

arcelina Edroso was married to 8ictoriano (ablan until his death on (eptember 22, )@@2. /nthis marriage they had a son named &edro, who was born on 'ugust ), )@@), and who at his

fatherBs death inherited the two said parcels. &edro also died on July )4, )*?2, unmarried andwithout issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to hismother, arcelina Edroso. ence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application forregistration of her ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Two legitimate brothers of 8ictoriano (ablan - that is, two uncles german of &edro (ablan -appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that theregistration be denied, Hor that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents berecorded in the registration of each parcel.H ;0. of E., )), )2.=chanrobles virtual law library

The ourt of 5and Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through abill of e6ceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in Cuestion parta$eof the nature of property reCuired by law to be reserved and that in such a case application couldonly be presented >ointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of &edro(ablan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced ;second assignment of error=, anddenies that the land which are the sub>ect matter of the application are reCuired by law to bereserved - a contention we regard as indefensible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw library

%acts: ;)= The applicant acCuired said lands from her descendant &edro (ablan by inheritance";2= &edro (ablan had acCuired them from his ascendant 8ictoriano (ablan, li$ewise byinheritance" ;A= 8ictoriano (ablan had li$ewise acCuired them by inheritance from hisascendants, ariano (ablan and aria Rita %ernandez, they having been ad>udicated to him inthe partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are admittedfacts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

' very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuableconsideration Igratuitous title, and it is so characterized in article *+@ of the ivil ode, for hewho acCuires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives" and a very definiteconclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acCuired without avaluable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation toreserve what he has acCuired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the thirddegree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. ;ivil ode, art. @)).=

arcelina Edroso, ascendant of &edro (ablan, inherited from him these two parcels of landwhich he had acCuired without a valuable consideration - that is, by inheritance from anotherascendant, his father 8ictoriano. aving acCuired them by operation of law, she is obligated torelatives within the third degree and belong to the line of ariano (ablan and aria Rita

%ernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial courtBs ruling that they parta$e of the naturproperty reCuired by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with thelaw.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

0ut the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in Cuestion havebeen acCuired by operation of law, and that only property acCuired without a valuableconsideration, which is by operation of law, is reCuired by law toreserved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellees >ustly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, buonly herein. ertainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that H&edro (ablan acCuired tproperty in Cuestion in )@@2, before the enforcement of the ivil ode, which establishes thealleged right reCuired by law to be reserved, of which the opponents spea$" hence, prescriptioof the right of action" and finally, opponentsB renunciation of their right, admitting that it e6istedand that they had itH ;p. *=.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

owever that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicaninherited the two parcels of land from her son &edro, who died Hunmarried and without issue.H

The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any ob>ection on the appellantBs part. ;0E., )3, 2?.= #hen &edro (ablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of hright to her sonBs legal portion under article *A4 of the ivil ode:

/n the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shallfrom him, to the e6clusion of collaterals.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these landhad passed into her possession by free disposal in her sonBs will" but the case presents notestamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, by operation of law, but by her sonBs wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the twoparcels of land was abintestate o r by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of thepredecessor in interest. ;'ct 7o. )*?, sec. AA, 7o. 2+.= 'll the provision of article @)) of theivil ode have therefore been fully complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtulaw library

/f &edro (ablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all hleft at death would not be reCuired by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforcleft her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.

The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estaof the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with te6ception of what is established in article @A+. ;ivil ode, art. @?*.=

/n such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be reCuired by law to be reservebecause it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her sonBs inheritance" theother half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article @)) of the ivilode says.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

7o error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the sub>ect mattethe application are reCuired by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not provethat either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of herson.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

&roof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. /t must be admittedthat a half of &edro (ablanBs inheritance was acCuired by hi s mother by operation of l aw. Thelaw provides that the other half is also presumed to be acCuired by operation of law - that is, bintestate succession. 9therwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by theinterested party, that is, that the other half was acCuired by the manBs wish and not by operatioof law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

7or is the third assignments of error admissible - that the trial court failed to sustain therenunciation of the right reCuired by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to theopponents. (uch renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the

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fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:chanroblesvirtual law library

The day after my 7rother2in2la $a7lo a7lan dies and was buried, his brother came to myhouse and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already tal$ed about ma$ingdelivery of them. ;p. *)=.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The other brother alluded to is 0asilio (ablan, as stated on page *2. %rom the fact that 0asilio(ablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot bededuced that he renounced the right reCuired by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue ofthe provisions of article @)) of the ivil ode, for they really belong to her and must be deliveredto her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. Theappellant alleges prescription of the opponentBs right of action for reCuiring fulfillment of theobligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right reCuired by law to bereserved, in accordance with the provisions of the ortgage 5aw" and as such obligation iscreated by law, it prescribed in the time fi6ed in 7o. 2 of section A of 'ct 7o. )*?. (he adds:

H&rescription of the ri#ht alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invo$ed.H ;Eightallegation.=chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the ortgage 5aw are. 7or didshe do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is Cuoted from the record: H/do not refer to the prescription of the right reCuired by law to be reserved in the property" / referto the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the #uaranty of that right forsee$ing that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the ortgage 5aw grants a periodof time for recording it in the property registry, if / remember correctly, ninety days, for see$ingentry in the registry" but as they have not e6ercised that right of action, such right of action forsee$ing here that it be recorded has prescribed. he ri#ht of action for requirin# that the property 7e reser+ed has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registrythat this property is reCuired by law to be reservedH ;p. +* of therecord=.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellees reply: /t is true that their right of action has prescribed for reCuiring the applicantto constitute the mortgage imposed by the ortgage 5aw for guaranteeing the effectiveness ofthe reCuired by law to be reserved" but because that right of action has prescribed, that propertyhas not been divested of its character of property reCuired by law to be reserved" that it has suchcharacter by virtue of article @))2 of the ivil ode, which went into effect in the &hilippine in!ecember, )@@*, and not by virtue of the ortgage 5aw, which only went into effect in thecountry by law of July ), )@*A" that from !ecember, )@@*, to July, )@*A, property which under

article @)) of the ivil ode acCuired the character of property reserved by operation of law wassuch independently of the ortgage 5aw, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country" that although the ortgage 5aw has been in effect in the country since July, )@*A,still it has in no way altered the force of article @)) of the ivil ode, but has operated toreinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the rightis reserved by operation of law to reCuire of the person holding the property a guaranty in theform of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right" that to lose the rightof action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself" that the right reserved is the principalobligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not meanloss of the principal. ;%ifth and si6th allegations.=chanrobles virtual law library

The e6istence of the right reCuired by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in Cuestionbeing indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the ortgage 5awgrants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to bedetermined by this appeal is the Cuestion raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how saidtwo parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly establishedby the ortgage 5aw, but in the registry newly organized by 'ct 7o. *+. 0ut as the haveslipped into the allegations Cuoted some rather ine6act ideas that further obscure such anintricate sub>ect as this of the rights reCuired to be reserved in (panish-&hilippine law, a brief

disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.chanroblesvirtualawlibrchanrobles virtual law library

The ortgage 5aw of July ), )@*A, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of thecolonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and conseCuently in the &hilippines. The preamof said amended ortgage 5aw states:

The ortgage 5aw in force in (pain for thirty years went into effect, with the modificationsnecessary for its adaptation, in the 'ntilles on ay ), )@@?, and in the &hilippines on !ecemb), )@@*, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real property, andconseCuently of agrarian credit.

The ivil ode went into effect in the &hilippines in the same year, )@@*, bu t on the eightday.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Two $inds of property reCuired by law to be reserved are distinguished in the ivil ode, as sforth in article *+@ thereof, where it says:chanrobles virtual law library

0esides the reservation imposed by article G;;, the widow or widower contracting a seconds

marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage thownership of all the property he or she may have reCuired from the deceased spouse by will, intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration.Hchanroblesvirtual law library

The ortgage 5aw of (pain and the first law that went into effect in the &hilippines on !ecem), )@*, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article @)) ofivil ode, for such right is a creation of the ivil ode. /n those laws appear merely theprovisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the fimarriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. 7evertheless, the holding the supreme court of (pain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of 7ovember )@*, has been reiterated:

That while the provisions of articles *33 and *3@ of the ivil ode that tend to secure the righreCuired to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second olater marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article @because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be theconstruction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forththe chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and becausearticle *+@, which heads the section that deals in general with property reCuired by law to bereserved, ma$es reference to the provisions in article @))" and it would conseCuently becontradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to ho

them applicable to that right.

Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, !ecember A?, )@*3, that: H's the supremecourt has already declared, the guaranties that the ode fi6es in article *33 and *3@ for therights reCuired by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the speciaright dealt with in article @)), because the same principle e6ists and because of the generalnature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found.Hchanrobles virtual law library

%rom this principle of >urisprudence it is inferred that if from !ecember, )@@*, to July, )@*A, acase had occurred of a right reCuired to be reserved by article @)), the persons entitled to sucright would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must ma$e the reservationproceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article *33 and *3@ grant to the children of afirst marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings forassurance, under article *33" are: /nventory of the property sub>ect to the right reserved,annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of personal property" and the guaranty, under article *3@, is the assurance by mortgage, in thecase of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtual law library

0ut since the amended ortgage 5aw went into effect by law of July ), )@*A, in the &hilippinthis is not only a principle of >urisprudence which may be invo$ed for the applicability to the rig

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reserved in article @)) of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reservedin article *+@, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of(pain, to wit, article )**, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article @)) of the ivil ode canonly be reCuired by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age"if minors, it will be reCuire by the person who should legally represent them. /n either case theright of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the samereCuisites as set forth in the preceding article ;relative to the right reserved by article *+@ of theivil ode=, applying to the person o7li#ated to reserve the right the provisions with respect tothe father .

/n article )+@ of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article )**Cuoted, so that said article )+@ reads as thus:

5egal mortgage is established:chanrobles virtual law library

). . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. /n favor of the relatives to whom article @)) of the ivil ode refers, for the property reCuiredto be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.

This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period ofninety days fi6ed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to reCuire the mortgage thatguarantees the effectiveness of the right reCuired by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it isnecessary to lay down a principle in this matter. 7ow it should by noted that such action has notprescribed, because the period of ninety days fi6ed by the ortgage 5aw is not for the e6erciseof the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of theobligation of the person who must ma$e the reservation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtual law library

'rticle )*) of the reads thus: H/f ninety days pass without the fatherBs instituting in court theproceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demandfulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article )**, to the person obligated to reserve theright the provisions with respect to the father.Hchanrobles virtual law library

'rticle 2?A of the regulation for the application of the ortgage 5aw says: H/n the case of article)** of the law the proceedings to which article )*? thereof refers will be instituted within theninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the personobligated to reserve the property" after this period has elapsed , the interested parties mayreCuire the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age" and in any other case, their legal

representatives.Hchanrobles virtual law library

Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the e6piration by prescription ofthe period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them toe6ercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. (o, if the annotation of the right reCuiredby law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in Cuestion must be made in the propertyregistry of the ortgage 5aw, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to thatend, and an allegation of prescription against the e6ercise of such right of action cannot besustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(ince the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action forrequirin# that the property 7e reser+ed , for she e6plicitly so stated at the trial, and as the casepresents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with theprovisions of the ortgage 5aw, this prescription of the right of action cannot ta$e place,because such right of action does not e6ist with reference to instituting proceedings forannotation in the registry of 'ct 7o. *+ of the right to the property reCuired by law to bereserved. /t is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the registrationproceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reservedin either parcel of land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

7ow comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of thifinding set forth in its decision:

'bsolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncof the deceased &edro (ablan, and the application cannot be made e6cept in the name of all them in common. ;0. of E., p. 2?.=

/t must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, en>oy, dispose of, andrecover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownershof the thing" otherwise, the person who has the right to use and en>oy will have the usufruct, athe person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by lawact, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an en>oying, anthen he is said not to have the fee simple - that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, whichpertain to another who, after the usufruct e6pires, will come into fullownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Cuestion set up in the first assignment of error of the appellantBs brief is this:

3hat are the ri#hts in the property of the person ho holds it su7ect to the reser+ation of artiG;; of the Ci+il CodeH

There are not lac$ing writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belongingthe person in whose favor the reservation is made. /f that were so, the person holding theproperty could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must bereserved, with the formerBs consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although itappears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of (pain of ay 2), )@+), and Ju)@, )@@?, prior to the ivil ode, and of June 22, )@*4, somewhat subseCuent to theenforcement thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

'nother writer says: HThis opinion only loo$s at two salient points - the usufruct and the feesimple" the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holdingthe property will en>oy it and that he must $eep what he en>oys for other persons.H ;anresa, )@*.=chanrobles virtual law library

/n another place he says: H#e do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained - this, that the surviving spouse ;the person obliged by article *+@ to ma$e the reservation= can bregarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner" such theoryhas no serious foundation in the ode.H ; %7id ., 2A@.=chanrobles virtual law library

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latterBs wish or by operation

law, reCuires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. 'll thattributes of the right of ownership belong to him e6clusively - use, en>oyment, disposal andrecovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in theleast, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the propertyproceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope ofthis limitation must be determined with e6actness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wisto be effective. The opinion which ma$es this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heirthe condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of di sposal and recovery, donot seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that hehas been e6pressed in spea$ing of the rights of the father or mother who has married again.There is a mar$ed difference between the case where a manBs wish institutes two persons asheirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendin article @)) or of the father or mother in article *+@. /n the first case, there is not the slightestdoubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispoof and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of thehereditary property ;e6cept that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with theprovisions of article @? of the ivil ode=, or any act of recovery thereof e6cept the limited oin the form prescribed in article @+ of the ode itself, because he totally lac$s the fee simple

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0ut the ascendants who holds the property reCuired by article @)) to be reserved, and the fatherof mother reCuired by article *@+ to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they mightitself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, andrecover it from anyone who may un>ustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right isreCuired to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or ofrecovery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

'rticle *34 states e6plicitly that the father or mother reCuired by article *+@3 to reserve the rightmay dispose of the property itself:

'lienation of the property reCuired by law to be reserved which may be made by the survivingspouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimatechildren or descendants of the first marriage survive, without pre>udice to the provisions of theortgage of 5aw.

/t thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under acondition subseCuent, to wit: H/f at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of thefirst marriage survive.Hchanrobles virtual law library

/f the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereofwould necessarily be null and void, as e6ecuted without a right to do so and without a rightwhich he could transmit to the acCuirer. The law says that the alienation subsists ;to sub>ect is tocontinue to e6ist= Hwithout pre>udice to the provisions of the ortgage 5aw.H 'rticle )?* of this5aw says:

The possessor of property sub>ect to conditions subseCuent that are still pendin# may mortgageor alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in saidconditions by e6pressly reserving that right in the registration.

/n such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right isreserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subseCuent ispending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because itmight easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person inwhose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the conditionsubseCuent that they survive him, and, the ob>ect of the law having disappeared, the rightreCuired to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also invery way absolutely effective. onseCuently, the alienation is valid when the right reCuired bylaw to be reserved to the children is respected" while the effects of the alienation depend upon acondition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to e6ist or cease to e6ist,according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation ofarticle *+@, wherein the legislator e6pressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts asecond marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage onership.

'rticle @)) says nothing more than that the ascendants must ma$e thereservation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

anresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the sub>ect under the heading, H i#hts andobligations during the e6istence of the right reCuired by law to be reserved,H in thesewords:chanrobles virtual law library

!uring the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right reCuired by law to bereserved and the e6tinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that intheir turn may pertain to them has been assured , have only an e6pectation, and therefore theydo not even have the capacity to transmit that e6pectation to theirheirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and en>oy the things accordingto their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of theode referring to use and usufruct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

0ut since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in feesimple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article *3 and *3+ of thesame ode. !oubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion !eneral of the registries, in an

opinion of June 24, )@*2, declared that articles *3 and *34, which are applicable by analogyfor they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of thelegislator on this sub>ect, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privilegein the right reserved in article @)) than the children in the right reserved by article *34, chieflythe reason that the right reCuired to be reserved carries with it a condition subseCuent, and thproperty sub>ect to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article )?* of ortgage 5aw, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition.H ;ivil ode, 823?.=chanrobles virtual law library

'nother commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. e says:

The ascendants acCuires that property with a condition subseCuent, to wit, whether or not thee6ists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whomthey inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. /f such relatives e6ist, they acCuireownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. /f they do not e6ist, the ascendantscan freely dispose thereof. /f this is true, since the possessor of property sub>ect to conditionssubseCuent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property reCuiredlaw to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can giv

what does not belong to him, and the acCuirer will therefore receive a limited and re+oca7le tiThe relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an e6pectation to the property whilethe ascendant lives, an e6pectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these arealso within the third degree. 'fter the person who is reCuired by law to reserve the right has dthe relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty reCuired by law to be reserved and they wcomplete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have beenterminated by the death of the usufructuary. ; &orell, Estudios so7re 7ienes reser+a7le, A?,A?4.=

The conclusion is that the person reCuired by article @)) to reserve the right has, beyond anydoubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. e has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legtitle and dominion, although under a condition subseCuent. learly he has, under an e6pressprovision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is toalienate, although under a condition. e has the right to recover it, because he is the one whopossesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. /n aword, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives

'fter the right reCuired by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that agenuine owner can do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

9n the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reservedcannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively orformally, in their possession" and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the

fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person wmust reserve the right should die before them will they acCuire it, thus creating a fee simple, aonly then will they ta$e their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they arerelatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimatesuccession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. /f any of the persons in whofavor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare todispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act wouldnull and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of !ecember A?, )@*3, impossible to determine the part Hthat might pertain therein to the relative at the time hee6ercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right reCuired by law to bereserved the e6tent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before thperson reCuired to reserve it, >ust as may even become absolute should that persondie.Hchanrobles virtual law library

areful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter +i+os ofperson reCuired by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it isreserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, e6cepthat the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acCuirer may ascertain fromthe registry in order to $now that he is acCuiring a title sub>ect to a condition subseCuent. /nconclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other

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than relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to bereserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the ob>ect of the law: HToprevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property thatwould otherwise have remained therein.H ;!ecision of !ecember A?, )@*3.=chanrobles virtuallaw library

&ractically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to thecondition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attac$the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law reCuires to be reserved, inthe present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in Cuestion to athird party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is eCuivalent to an alienationof the usufruct, which is authorized by article @? of the ivil ode, and, practically, use anden>oyment of the property reCuired by law to be reserved are all that the person who mustreserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thingwould be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The Cuestion as to whether or not shetransmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is thecase of the institution of two hei rs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the e6press

wish of the predecessor in interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library/f the person whom article @)) reCuires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent inownership, he can use, en>oy, dispose of and recover it" and if, in addition to usufructuary, he isin fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the wholeCuestion is reduced to the following terms:chanrobles virtual law library

annot the heir of the property reCuired by law to reserved, merely because a conditionsubseCuent is anne6ed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of theproperty he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be madedegree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded,as the law providesOchanrobles virtual law library

/t is well $nown that the vendee under pacto de retracto acCuires all the rights of the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. ;ivil ode, art. )4)).=

/f the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has onceacCuired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subseCuentanne6ed - that the alienation the purchaser may ma$e will be terminated, if the vendor shoulde6ercise the right granted him by article )4?3, which says:chanrobles virtual law library

onventional redemption shall ta$e place when the vendor reserves to himself the right torecover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article )4)@, and whatever more may

have been agreed upon,H that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the priceof the sale and other e6penses. 7otwithstanding this condition subseCuent, it is a point not at alldoubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thingmortgaged - that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with theconsent of the vendor. e may alienate the thing bought when the acCuirer $nows by well fromthe title entered in the registry that he acCuires a title revocable after a fi6ed period, a thing muchmore certain and to be e6pected than the purely contingent e6pectation of the person in whosefavor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the lawwould be defeated in not applying to the person who must ma$e the reservation the provisiontherein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is themore power and conclusive" u7i eadem ratio, eadem le#is dispositi+o.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, we reverse the >udgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare thatthe applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the sub>ectmatter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right reCuired by article @)) to bereserved to either or both of the opponents, &ablo (ablan and 0asilio (ablan, should theysurvive her" without special findings as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

orres, &apa, Johnson, Carson and rent, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-12957. Mar0 2, 191.B

"ONSTAN"IO SIENES, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, C. FI*EL ES!AR"IA, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellees.

!ro0e'o R. Re$o66o, or Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Leo&ar#o O. Ma&0ao or Defendants-Appellees.

S?LLAUS

). HRE(ER8' TR97'5H " RE(ER8'05E &R9&ERTF" RE(ER89R '( 5EG'5 T/T5E '7!!9/7/97 98ER &R9&ERTF (0JET T9 ' RE(95T9RF 97!/T/97" '5/E7'T/97('!E 0F / (0JET T9 RE(ER8'T/97" TR'7(%EREEQ( R/GT RE89ME! 0F TE

(R8/8'5 9% ' RE(ER8EE &97 !E'T 9% RE(ER89R. The reservor has the legal titleand dominion to the reservable property but sub>ect to a resolutory condition. Thus he mayalienate the same but sub>ect to reservation, i.e., the rights acCuired by the transferee beingrevo$ed upon the survival of reservees at the time of death of the reservor ;Edroso v. (ablan, 24&hil., 2*4" 5unsod v. 9rtega, + &hil., ++" %lorentino v. %lorentino, ? &hil., @?" and !irector of5ands v. 'guas, +A &hil., 23*.=

2. /!." /!." RE(ER8' /7(T/TTE! 0F 5'# /7 %'89R 9% RE(ER8EE( /( '5/E7'05E T9 'RE(95T9RF 97!/T/97. TE reserva instituted in favor of the heirs within the thirddegree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real rightwhich the reservee may alienate and dispose of, although conditionally, the condition being thatthe alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives thereservor.

A. /!." /!." #E7 RE(ER8EE 0E9E( E15(/8E 9#7ER. pon the death of thereservor, there being a surviving reservee, the reservable property passes in e6clusiveownership to the latter.

* E " I S I O N

*ION, J.D

'ppellants commence this action below to secure >udgments ;)= declaring null and void the salee6ecuted by &aulina and ipriana Faeso in favor of appellees, the spouses %idel Esparcia and&aulina (ienes" ;2= ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants 5ot AA+@ of theadastral (urvey of 'yuCuitan ;now 'mlan=, 9riental 7egros" and ;A= ordering all the appelleesto pay, >ointly and severally, to appellants the sum of &4??.?? as damages, plus the costs of suit./n their answer appellees disclaimed any $nowledge or information regarding the sale allegedlymade on 'pril 2?, )*4) by 'ndrea Gutang in favor of appellants and a lleged that if such salewas made, the same was void on the ground that 'ndrea Gutang had no right to dispose of theproperty sub>ect matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been inpossession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuouspossession thereof since the death of %rancisco Faeso. 0y way of affirmative defense andcounterclaim, they further alleged that on July A?, )*4), &aulina and ipriana Faeso, as the onlysurviving heirs of %rancisco Faeso, e6ecuted a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses%idel Esparcia and &aulina (ienes, the said sale having been registered together with anaffidavit of ad>udication e6ecuted by &aulina and ipriana on July )@, )*4), as sole survivingheirs of the aforesaid deceased" that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the

property as owners.

'fter trial upon the issues thus >oined, the lower court rendered >udgment asfollows:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H/n view of all the foregoing, >udgment is hereby rendered declaring ;)= that the sale of 5ot 7oAA+@ made by 'ndrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses onstancio (ienes and Genoveva (ilayvoid, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied" ;2= that the sale made by &aulina aipriana Faeso in favor of defendants %idel Esparcia and &aulina (ienes involving the same lis also void, and they have no valid title thereto" and ;A= that the reservable property in Cuestiis part of and must be reverted to the estate of ipriano Faeso, the lone surviving relative andheir of %rancisco Faeso at the death of 'ndrea Gutang as of !ecember )A, )*4). 7opronouncement as to costs.Hcralaw virtua)aw library

%rom the above decision the (ienes spouses interposed the present appeal, their principalcontentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that 5ot AA+@ of the adastral(urvey of 'yuCuitan was a reservable property" secondly, in annuling the sale of said lot

e6ecuted by 'ndrea Gutang in their favor" and lastly, in holding that ipriana Faeso, asreservee, was entitled to inherit said land.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:chanrob)es virtual )aw library

5ot AA+@ originally be long to (aturnino Faeso. #ith his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had fourchildren named 'gaton, %ernando, &aulina and ipriana, while with his second wife, 'ndreaGutang, he had an only son named %rancisco. 'ccording to the cadastral records of 'yuCuitathe properties left by (aturnino upon his death - the date of which does not clearly appear ofrecord - where left to his children as follows: 5ot AA++ to ipriana, 5ot AA+3 to %ernando, 5otAA34, to 'gaton, 5ot AA33 ;southern portion= to &aulina, and 5ot AA+@ ;western portion= to%rancisco. 's a result of the cadastral proceedings. 9riginal ertificate of Title 7o. )?234covering 5ot AA+@ was issued in the name of %rancisco. 0ecause %rancisco was a minor at thtime, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for ta6ation purpos;E6hs. ' L '-)=, and paid the ta6es due thereon ;E6hs. 0, , -) L '-2=. #hen %rancisco dieon ay 2*, )*A2 at the age of 2?, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his soleheir, e6ecuted the public instrument E6hibit % entitled e6tra->udicial settlement and sale whereamong other things, for and in consideration of the sum of &@??.??, she sold the property inCuestion to appellants. #hen thereafter said vendees demanded from &aulina Faeso and herhusband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of 9riginal ertificate of Title 7o. )?234 which was itheir possession the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion

the cadastral record 7o. 4?3. The same, however, was denied ;E6hs. @ L *=.

Thereafter, or more specifically, on July A?, )*4), ipriana and &aulina Faeso, the survivinghalf-sisters of %rancisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name on Januar)*4) e6ecuted a deed of sale in favor of the spouses %idel Esparcia and &aulina (ienes ;E6h2= who, in turn, declared it in their name for ta6 purposes and thereafter secured the issuancetheir name of Transfer ertificate of Title 7o. T-2)) ;E6hs. 4 and 4-'=.

's held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in Cuestion wareservable property. %rancisco Faeso inherited it by operation of law from his father (aturninoand upon %ranciscoQs death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by mother, 'ndrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefirelatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if anysurvived her. The record discloses in this connection that 'ndrea Gutang died on !ecember ))*4), the lone reservee surviving her being ipriana Faeso who died only on January )A, )*4;E6h. )?=.

/n connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserva creates tworesolutory conditions, namely, ;)= the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and ;2= thesurvival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from

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which the property came ;+ anresa 2+@-2+*" + (anchez Roman )*A=. The ourt has held inconnection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservableproperty but sub>ect to a resolutory condition" that he is li$e a life usufructuary of the reservableproperty" that he may alienate the same but sub>ect to reservation, said alienation transmittingonly the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservista, the rights acCuired by thetransferee being revo$ed or resolved by the survival of reservatorios at the time of death of thereservista ;Edroso v. (ablan, 24 &hil., 2*4" 5unsod v. 9rtega, + &hil., ++" %lorentino v.%lorentino, ? &hil., @?" and !irector of 5ands v. 'guas, +A &hil., 23*=.

The sale made by 'ndrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, sub>ect to the conditionthat the vendees would definitely acCuire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if thevendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. /nasmuchas when 'ndrea Gutang died, ipriano Faeso was still alive, the conclusion becomesinescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legaleffect and the reservable property sub>ect matter thereof passed in e6clusive ownership toipriana.

9n the other hand, it is also clear that the sale e6ecuted by the sisters &aulina and iprianaFaesco in favor of the spouse %idel Esparcia and &aulina (ienes was sub>ect to a similarresolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degreebelonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which thereservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienationshall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obligedto reserve. /n the present case, ipriana Faeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when

'ndrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absoluteowner of the reservable property upon 'ndreaQs death. #hile it may be true that the sale madeby her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of theresolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as itorders the reversion of the property in Cuestion to the Estate of ipriana Faeso, because thevendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.

#ERE%9RE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, andwithout pre>udice to whatever action in eCuity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estateof ipriana Faeso for the reconveyance of the property in Cuestion.

0engzon, 'ctg. C.J., &adilla, 0autista 'ngelo, 5abrador, oncepcion, Reyes, J.0.5., 0arrera and&aredes, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-;;95 May 19, 1981

EATRI L. GONALES, petitioner,vs."OURT OF FIRST INSTAN"E OF MANILA RAN"3 +:, ENITO F. LEGAR*A, ROSARIO L.+AL*E, ALEJAN*RO LEGAR*A, TERESA LEGAR*A, JOSE LEGAR*A, ENITOLEGAR*A ? FERNAN*E, "ARMEN LEGAR*A ? FERNAN*E, FILOMENA LEGAR*A ?3ERNAN*E, "ARMEN LEGAR*A ? 3ERNAN*E, ALEJAN*RO LEGAR*A ?3ERNAN*E, RAMON LEGAR*A ? 3ERNAN*E, FILOMENA LEGAR*A ? LOREGAT,JAIME LEGAR*A ? LOREGAT, "ELSO LEGAR*A ? LOREGAT, ALEJAN*RO LEGAR*A

? LOREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGAR*A ? LOREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGAR*A ?LOREGAT, JOSE LEGAR*A ? LOREGAT, ROSARIO LEGAR*A ? LOREGAT, ENITOLEGAR*A ? LOREGAT, E*UAR*O LEGAR*A ? LOREGAT, TRINI*A* F. LEGAR*A,a&# (e ESTATE OF *ONA FILOMENA RO"ES *E LEGAR*A, respondents.

A>UINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët

0eatriz 5egarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the ourt of %irst /nstance of anila,dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, asnot sub>ect to reser+e troncal , the properties which her mother %ilomena Races inherited in )*Afrom %ilomena 5egarda ;ivil ase 7o. 3AAA4=. The facts are as follows:

0enito 5egarda y !e la &az, the son of 0enito 5egarda y Tuason, died Ianila on June )3,)*AA. e was survived by his widow, %ilomena Races, and their seven children: four daughtersnamed 0eatriz, Rosario, Teresa and %ilomena and three sons named 0enito, 'le>andro andJose.

9n July )2, )*A*, the real properties left by 0enito 5egarda y Tuason were partitioned in threeeCual portions by his daughters, onsuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son 0enito5egarda y !e la &az who were represented by 0enito %. 5egarda.

%ilomena 5egarda y Races died intestate and without issue on arch )*, )*A. er sole heiresswas her mother, %ilomena Races 8da. de 5egarda.

rs. 5egarda e6ecuted on ay )2, )*3 an affidavit ad>udicating e6tra>udicially to herself theproperties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, %ilomena 5egarda. The saidproperties consist of the following: ;Iph;.Kt

;a= (avings deposit in the 7ational ity 0an$ of 7ew For$ with a creditbalance of &A,+**.+A.

;b= ),2* shares of the 0enguet onsolidated ining ompany and a )<3interest in certain shares of the (an iguel 0rewery, Tuason L 5egarda,5td., &hilippine Guaranty ompany, /nsular 5ife 'ssurance ompany andthe &anila imes.

;c= )<3 of the properties described in TT 7os. @?22+, @?2A3 to @?2A ;3titles=, @?2+?, @?2+) and 434)2 of the anila registry of deeds.

)<2)st of the properties covered by TT 7os. @)+, @3), @2?), @2?2,@2?4, @2?A, @2?+, @)+? and @)*2 of the anila registry of deeds"

)<2)st of the property described in TT 7o. 34 of the registry of deeds ofRizal, now Duezon ity" )<)th of the property described in TT 7o. *++ ofthe registry of deeds of 0aguio"

)<3th of the lot and improvements at )23 'viles described in TT 7o. )@+2of the anila registry of deeds" )<3th of the lots and improvements at )@)(an Rafael describe in TT 7os. 4?*4 and @)+) of the anila registry ofdeeds"

)<3th of the property described in TT 7o. @)+A of the anila registry odeeds ;(treets="

l<2)st of the properties described in TT 7os. @)** and 4344) of theanila registry of deeds ;(treets and Estero=:

2<2)st of the property described in TT 7o. )A4@ of tile registry of deedT?ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. 's a result of the affidavit of ad>udication,%ilomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter %ilomena 5egarda as co-owner of theproperties held proindi+iso by her other si6 children.

rs. 5egarda on arch +, )*4A e6ecuted two handwritten /dentical documents wherein shedisposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of hsons, 0enito, 'le>andro and Jose ;si6teen grandchildren in all=. The document reads:;Iph;.Kt

' mis hi>os :

!ispongo Cue se reparta a todos mis nietos hi>os de 0en, andu y &epitlos bienes Cue he heredado de mi difunta hi>a %ilomena y tambien losacciones de la !estileria 5a RosarioB recientemente comprada a loshermanos 8alues 5egarda.

!e los bienes de mi hi>a %ilomena se deducira un tote de terreno Cue yo ?donada a las i>as de Jesus, en Guipit

5a case 7o. )@) (an Rafael, la cede a mi hi>o andu solo la casa" proCuella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos 5egarda Races.;Iph;.Kt

;(gd.=%/59E7'R9E(5EG'R!'

+ arzo )*4A

!uring the period from July, )*4@ to %ebruary, )*4* rs. 5egarda and her si6 surviving childrpartitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of 0enito 5egarda yTuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, 0enito 5egarda y !e la &a

rs. 5egarda died on (eptember 22, )*+3. er will was admitted to probate as a holographicwill in the order dated July )+, )*+@ of the ourt of %irst /nstance of anila in (pecial&roceeding 7o. 3?@3@, Testate Estate of %ilomena Races 8da. de 5egarda. The decree ofprobate was affirmed by the ourt of 'ppeals in 'e#arda +s. !on"ales, '-G.R. 7o. A@?-RJuly A?,)*3+.

/n the testate proceeding, 0eatriz 5egarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatri6, filed on ay)*+@ a motion to e6clude from the inventory of her motherBs estate the properties which sheinherited from her deceased daughter, %ilomena, on the ground that said properties arereser+a7le properties which should be inherited by %ilomena 5egardaBs three sisters and threebrothers and not by the children of 0enito, 'le>andro and Jose, all surnamed 5egarda. Thatmotion was opposed by the administrator, 0enito %. 5egarda.

#ithout awaiting the resolution on that motion, rs. Gonzales filed on June 2?, )*+@ an ordincivil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her motherBs estate for thepurpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which rs5egarda could not beCueath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the e6clusion of hethree daughters and her three sons ;(ee &az vs. adrigal, )?? &hil. )?@4=.

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's already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of rs. Gonzales. ln this appeal underRepublic 'ct 7o. 4? she contends in her si6 assignments of error that the lower court erred innot regarding the properties in Cuestion as reservable properties under article @*) of the ivilode.

9n the other hand, defendants-appellees in their si6 counter-assignments of error contend thatthe lower court erred in not holding that rs. 5egarda acCuired the estate of her daughter%ilomena 5egarda in e6change for her con>ugal and hereditary shares in the estate of herhusband 0enito 5egarda y !e la &az and in not holding that rs. Gonzales waived her right tothe reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of rs. GonzalesBpetition for review is a closed matter. This ourt in its resolution of !ecember )+, )*3) deniedrespondentsB motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.

/n an appeal under Republic 'ct 7o. 4? only legal issues can be raised under undisputedfacts. (ince on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue ofwhether the properties in Cuestion are sub>ect to reser+a troncal that is the only legal issue to be

resolved in this appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters,cannot be resolved in this appeal. 's the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is noruling which can be reviewed by this ourt.

The Cuestion is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article @*) ofthe ivil ode, formerly article @)), and whether %ilomena Races 8da. de 5egarda coulddispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the e6clusion of her si6 children.

!id rs. 5egarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter%ilomena to the reservees within the third de#ree and to bypass the reservees in the secondde#ree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the si6children of rs. 5egardaO

's will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a Cuestion of first impression. lt wasresolved in lorentino +s. lorentino, ? &hil. @?. 0efore discussing the applicability to this caseof the doctrine in the lorentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to ma$e a brief discourse on the nature of reser+e troncal, also called lineal, familiar, e6traordinaria o semi2troncal.

uch time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on thenature of reser+e troncal which together with the reser+a +iudal and re+ersion le#al, was

abolished by the ode ommission to prevent the decedentBs estate from being entailed, toeliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation ;which uncertainty impedes theimprovement of the reservable property= and to discourage the confinement of property within acertain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and isincompatible with the socialization of ownership.

The ode ommission regarded the reser+as as remnants of feudalism which fomentedagrarian unrest. oreover, the reser+es, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, isconsidered un>ust and ineCuitable.

owever, the lawma$ing body, not agreeing entirely with the ode ommission, restored thereser+e troncal, a legal institution which, according to anresa and astan Tobenas hasprovo$ed Cuestions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

eser+a troncal is provided for in article @)) of the (panish ivil ode, now article @*), whichreads: ;Iph;.Kt

'RT. @)). El ascendiente Cue heredare de su descendiente bienes Cue estehubiese adCuirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano,se halla obligado a reservas los Cue hubiere adCuirido por ministerio de la

ley en favor de los parientes Cue eaten dentro del tercer grade ypertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden

'RT. @*). The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any propertywhich the latter may have acCuired by gratuitous title from anotherascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as hmay have acCuired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who arewithin the third degree and who belong to the line from which said propercame.

/n reser+e troncal ;)= a descendant inherited or acCuired by gratuitous title property from anascendant or from a brother or sister" ;2= the same property is inherited by another ascendanis acCuired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and ;A= the said ascendantshould reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree frothe deceased descendant ; prepositus= and who belong to the line from which the said propercame.

(o, three transmissions are involved: ;/= a first transmission by lucrative title ;inheritance or

donation= from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant" ;2= a posteriortransmission, by operation of law ;intestate succession or legitime= from the deceaseddescendant ;causante de la reser+e= in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reser+istawhich two transmissions precede the reservation, and ;A= a third transmissions of the sameproperty ;in conseCuence of the reservation= from the reservor to the reservees ; reser+atariosor the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant ;+ astan Tobenas !erecho iv&art l, )*+?, +th Ed., pp. )*@-*=.

/f there are only two transmissions there is no reser+e. Thus, where one 0onifacia 5acerna diand her properties were inherited by her son, Juan arbebe, upon the death of Juan, thoselands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the e6clusion of his maternal first cousins. Thesaid lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article @)) ;5acerna vs. 8da. deorcino, l l l &hil. @32=.

The persons involved in reser+e troncal are ;)= the ascendant or brother or sister from whom property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, ;2= the descendant o

prepositus ; prepositus= who received the property, ;A= the reservor ; reser+ista= the otherascendant who obtained the property from the ; prepositus= by operation of law and ;= thereserves ;reser+atario= who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs tothe ;line o tronco= from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserveby the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters ;Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, )?) &hil. )?*@" hvs. ourt of %irst /nstance of 7egros 9ccidental, 5-2**?), 'ugust A), )*33, 3@ (R' )2=.%ourth degree relatives are not included ;Jardin vs. 8illamayor, 32 &hil. A*2=.

The rationale of reser+e troncal is to avoid Hel peligro de Cue bienes poseidos secularmente puna familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos e6traSas por el azar de los enlaces ymuertes prematuras or impeder Cue, por un azar de la vide personas e6tranas a una familiapuedan adCuirir bienes Cue sin aCuel hubieran Cuedado en ella ;+ astan Tobenas !erechoivil, &art l, +th Ed., )*@?, p. 2?A" &adura vs. 0aldovino, )? &hil. )?+4=.

'n illustration of reser+e troncal is found in Edroso +s. a7lan, 24 &hil. 2*4. ln that case, &ed(ablan inherited two parcels of land from his father 8ictorians. &edro died in )*?2, single andwithout issue. is mother, arcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.

/t was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of arcelina. The reservees we&ablo (ablan and 0asilio (ablan, the paternal uncles of &edro (ablan, the prepositus. arcecould register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land wasreservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be notin the title.

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/n another case, it appears that aria 'glibot died intestate in )*?+. er one-half share of aparcel of con>ugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana aSalac. #hen Juliana diedintestate in )*2?, said one-half share was inherited by her father, 'nacleto aSalac who ownedthe other one-half portion.

'nacleto died intestate in )*2, survived by his second wife and their si6 children. lt was heldthat the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of 'nacleto aSalac and,upon his death, should be inherited by 5eona 'glibot and Evarista 'glibot, sisters of aria andmaterna aunts of Juliana aSalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portioncame ;'glibot vs. aSalac )) &hil. *+=.

9ther illustrations of reser+a troncal are found in %lorentino vs %lorentino, ? &hil. @?" 7ievaand 'lcala vs. 'lcala and !eocampo, ) &hil. *)4" aghirang and !utierre" +s. Balcita + &hil.44)" 'unsod +s. Orte#a, + &hil. ++" Di"on +s. !alan# , @ &hil. +?)" iosa +s. ocha, @ &hil.3A3" Centeno +s. Centeno 42 &hil. A22" 5elayo Bernardo +s. ioo, 4@ &hil. @*" Director of'ands +s. A#uas, +A &hil. 23*" allorfina +s. A7ille, ' A* 9.G. )3@.

The person from whom the degree should be rec$oned is the descendant, or the one at the end

of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.e is called the prepositus ;abardo vs. 8illanueva. &hil. )@+, )*?=.

/n the Ca7ardo case, one ornelia 'bordo inherited property from her mother, 0asilia abardo.#hen ornelia died, her estate passed to her father, 5orenzo 'bordo. ln his hands, the propertywas reservable property. pon the death of 5orenzo, the person entitled to the property wasRosa abardo, a maternal aunt of ornelia, who was her nearest relative within the thirddegree.

%irst cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot evenrepresent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree;%lorentino vs. %lorentino, ? &hil. @?=.

#ithin the third degree, the nearest relatives e6clude the more remote sub>ect to the rule ofrepresentation. 0ut the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus ;&adura vs. 0aldovino, )? &hil. )?+4=.

eser+a troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship byaffinity are e6cluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrati+o refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing inreturn such as donacion and succession ;abardo vs. 8illanueva, &hil. )@+, )@*-)*?, citing +anresa, odigo ivil, 3th Ed., )*4 l, p. A+?=.

The reser+a creates two resolutory conditions, namely, ;)= the death of the ascendant obliged toreserve and ;2= the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degreebelonging to the line from which the property came;(ienes vs. E Esparcia l l l &hil. A*, A4A=.

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but sub>ect to theresolutory condition that such title is e6tinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. Thereservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. e may alienate it sub>ect to thereservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. ThetransfereeBs rights are revo$ed upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of thereservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. ;(ienes vs.Esparcia, ))) &hil. A*, A4A" Edroso vs. (ablan, 24 &hil. 2*4" 5unsod vs. 9rtega, + &hil. ++"%lorentino vs. %lorentino, ? &hil. @?: !irector of 5ands vs. 'guas, +A &hil. 23*.=

The reservorBs title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale orto a fideicomiso conditional .

The reservorBs alienation of the reservable property is sub>ect to a resolutory condition, meaningthat if at the time of the reservorBs death, there are reservees, the transferee of the propertyshould deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservorBs death,

the transfereeBs title would become absolute. ;5unsod vs. 9rtega, + &hil. ++" Gueco vs.5acson, ))@ &hil. *" ono vs. 7eCuia *A &hil. )2?=.

9n the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, e6pectant or contingent right. ise6pectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absoluteshould the reservor predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can reCuire that threservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser ;Riosa vs. Rocha @ &hi3A3" Edroso vs. (ablan, 24 &hil. 2*4, A)2-A" Gueco vs. 5acson, ))@ &hil. *=.

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reserveeBs right to the reservable property is illefor being a contract regarding future inheritance ;8elayo 0ernardo vs. (io>o, 4@ &hil. @*, *+=.

'nd there is a dictum that the reserveeBs right is a real right which he may alienate and disposof conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee onland when the reserves survives the reservor ;(ienes vs. Esparci a, ))) &hil. A*, A4A=.;Iph;.Kt

The reser+atario receives the property as a conditional heir of thedescendant ; prepositus= said property merely reverting to the line of origfrom which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reser+islifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios thatsurvive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have en>oyed no mothan a than interest in the reservable property. ;J. J. 0. 5. Reyes in ane!irector of 5ands, )?4 &hil. l4.=

Even during the reser+istas lifetime, the reser+atarios, who are the ultimacCuirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent thereser+ista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary rightand, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in theregistry of property even while the ;reservista= is alive ;5ey ipotecaria dltramar, 'rts. )+@, )**" Edroso vs. (ablan, 24 &hil. 2*4=.

This right is incompatible with the mere e6pectancy that corresponds to tnatural heirs of the reservista lt is li$ewise clear that the reservable propeis no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them ;it=will, so long as there are reservatarios e6isting ;'rroyo vs. Gerona, 4@ &22+, 2A3=.

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reser+ista but from the

descendant ;prepositus= of whom the reser+atarios are the heirs mortiscausa, sub>ect to the condition that they must survive the reser+ista.;(anchez Roman, 8ol. 8/ Tomo 2, p. 2@+" anresa, ommentaries, 8ol. +th Ed., pp. 23, A)?, cited by J. J.0.5. Reyes in &adura vs. 0aldovino, 5))*+?, !ecember 23, )*4@, )? &hil. )?+4=.

ence, upon the reser+istas death, the reser+atario nearest to the prepositus becomes,Hautomatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.H ;ane vs. !irectof 5ands, )?4 &hil. l4.=

/n the instant case, the properties in Cuestion were indubitably reservable properties in thehands of rs. 5egarda. ndoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certaintywhen at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the preposi%ilomena 5egarda were living or they survived rs. 5egarda.

(o, the ultimate issue in this case is whether rs. 5egarda, as reservor, could convey thereservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third de#ree ;her si6tgrandchildren= to the e6clusion of the reservees in the second de#ree, her three daughters anthree sons. 's indicated at the outset, that issue is already res udicata or cosa u"#ada.

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#e hold that rs. 5egarda could not convey in her holographic will to her si6teen grandchildrenthe reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter %ilomena because thereservable properties did not form part of her estate ;abardo vs. 8illanueva, &hil. )@+, )*)=.The reservor cannot ma$e a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as thereservees survived the reservor.

's repeatedly held in the Cano and $adura cases, the reservees inherit the reservableproperties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

'rticle @*) clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearestrelatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the si6 children of rs.5egarda. (he could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be givenand deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to ma$e a testamentary disposition of the reservable p ropertiesin favor of the reservees in the third de#ree and, conseCuently, to ignore the reservees in thesecond de#ree would be a glaring violation of article @*). That testamentary disposition cannotbe allowed.

#e have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of lorentino +s. lorentino, ?&hil. @?, a similar case, where it was ruled: ;Iph;.Kt

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death ofascendant ;reser+ista= together with his own property in favor of another ofhis descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latterBs lawfulinheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said propertycontinued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritancefrom his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives,within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest ; prepositus=, withoutpre>udicing the right of the heir to an aliCuot part of the property, if he has atthe same time the right of a reser+atario ;reserves=.

ln the %lorentino case, it appears that 'polonio %lorentino // and his second wife (everina %azde 5eon begot two children, ercedes and 'polonio ///. These two inherited properties from their father. pon 'polonio /// death in )@*), his properties were inherited by his mother, (everina,who died in )*?@. ln her will, she instituted her daughter ercedes as heiress to all herproperties, including those coming from her deceased husband through their son, 'polonio ///.

The surviving children, begotten by 'polonio // with his first wife 'ntonia %az de 5eon and thedescendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued ercedes %lorentino for therecovery of their share in the reservable properties, which (everina de 5eon had inherited from

'polonio /// which the latter had inherited from his father 'polonio // and which (everina willed toher daughter ercedes.

&laintiffBs theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed ofin (everinaBs will in favor of ercedes only. That theory was sustained by this ourt.

%t as held that the said properties, 7ein# reser+a7le properties, did not form part of e+erinasestate and could not 7e inherited from her 7y her dau#hter &ercedes alone.

's there were seven reservees, ercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of theproperties. The other si6 sevenths portions were ad>udicated to the other si6 reservees.

nder the rule of stare decisis et non quieta mo+ere, we are bound to follow in this case thedoctrine of the lorentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservorBs lifetimeand upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless ofwhether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant fromwhom the property came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go tothe nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whomthe reservable property should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of (anchez Roman that there is no reser+a troncal when the only relativewithin the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and theascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of ruling in the lorentino case.

/t is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in Cuestion are not reservableproperties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survivedand that when rs. 5egarda willed the said properties to her si6teen grandchildren, who arethird-degree relatives of %ilomena 5egarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason fothe reser+a troncal has been satisfied: Hto prevent persons outside a family from securing, bysome special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained thereinH.

That same contention was advanced in the lorentino case where the reservor willed thereservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the othsi6 reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

/n re>ecting that contention, this ourt held that the reservable property beCueathed by thereservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservorBs estate nor of the daughterBs esta

but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within thethird degree.

This ourt noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserveit did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is li$ewise true that the heiress of treservor as only one of the reser+ees and there is no reason founded upon la and usticehy the other reser+ees should 7e depri+ed of their shares in the reser+a7le property ;pp. @*4=.

'pplying that doctrine to this case, it results that rs. 5egarda could not dispose of in her willproperties in Cuestion even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degreefrom %ilomena 5egarda. The said properties, by operation of 'rticle @*), should go to rs.5egardaBs si6 children as reservees within the second degree from %ilomena 5egarda.

/t should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reser+o7ut from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa sub>ect to thecondition that they must survive the reservor ;&adura vs. 0aldovino, 5-))*+?, !ecember 23,)*4@, )? &hil. )?+4=.

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-e6istence of third-degree relatives of %ilomena 5egarda at the time of the death of the reservors. 5egarda, belonging to the 5egarda family, He6cept third-degree relatives who pertain tobothH the 5egarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been e6tinguished only by the absencereservees at the time of rs. 5egardaBs death. (ince at the time of her death, there were ;andstill are= reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did notlose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made inaccordance with article @*) or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with thereservorBs holographic will. The said properties did not form part of rs. 5egardaBs estate. ;avs. !irector of 5ands, )?4 &hil. l, =.

#ERE%9RE, the lower courtBs decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby ad>udged thatthe properties inherited by %ilomena Roces 8da. de 5egarda from her daughter %ilomena5egarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to0eatriz, Rosario, Teresa, 0enito, 'le>andro and Jose, all surnamed 5egarda y Roces, asreservees. The shares of Rosario 5. 8aldes and 0enito %. 5egarda, who died in )*+* and )*3respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. osts against the private respondents.

(9 9R!ERE!.

Barredo, !uerrero, A7ad antos and De Castro, JJ., concur.;Iph;.K t

Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on lea+e.

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Justice !uerrero as desi#nated to sit in the econd Di+ision.

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G.R. No. L-1/7/1. Ja&uary 1, 1959.B

MARIA "ANO, a6%0a&(-ae66ee, C. *IRE"TOR OF LAN*S, EUSTA>UIA GUERRERO, ETAL., ppositors-Appellants. JOSE FERNAN*E, ET AL., ppositors-Appellants.

Ra$o& ". Fer&a&#e or Appellants.

Jo'e . *ea60a or Appellee.

S?LLAUS

). (E((/97" RE(ER8' TR97'5" RE9R! RE(ER8'" !E'T 9% RE(ER8/(T'"/(('7E 9% ERT/%/'TE 9% T/T5E 9% RE(ER8EE. 9nce an original cer tificate of titleby virtue of the final decree of the land court was duly issued in the name of the reservista,

sub>ect to reserva troncal, and subseCuently the latter died, the registration court, in view of thesaid recorded reserva has authority under (ec. ))2 of 'ct *+ to order the reservatario" for thereason that the death of the reservista vested the ownership of the property in the solereservatario troncal.

2. /!." /!." /!." /!." E1E&T/97. #here, however, the registration decree merely specifiesthe reservable character of the property, without determining the identity of the reservatario ;asin the case of !irector of 5ands v. 'guas, +A &hil., 23*= or where several reservatories disputethe property among themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable.

A. /!." /!." /!." RED/(/TE( T9 8E(T T/T5E /7 RE(ER8E. The only reCuisites for thepassing of the title from the reservista to the reservee are ;)= the death of the reservista" and ;2=the fact the reservitario has survived the reservista.

. /!." /!." RE(ER8'T/97 79T RE(ER8/(T'Q( (E((9R 9RT/( '('. Thereservatario is not the reservistaQs successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part ofthe reservistaQs estate" the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of thedescendant ;prepositus=, the property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it hadtemporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservistaQs lifetime. The authorities are allagreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed tohave en>oyed no more a life interest in the reservable property.

4. /!." /!." !E'T 9% RE(ER8/(T'" RE(ER8'T'R/9 'T9'T/'55F 0E9E( 9#7ER9% RE(ER8'05E &R9&ERTF. pon the death of the reservatario nearest to the prepositusbecomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.

+. /!." /!." RE(ER8'05E &R9&ERTF '779T 0E TR'7(/TTE! 9RT/( '(' 0FRE(ER8/(T'. The reservable property cannot be transmitted by a reservista to her or hisown successors mortis causa so long as a reservatario, within the third degree from theprepositus and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in e6istence when thereservista dies.

* E " I S I O N

RE?ES, J..L., J.D

/n an amended decision dated 9ctober *, )*4), issued in 5and Registration ase 7o. )2, G. 5.9. Rec. 7o. 2@A4, the ourt of %irst /nstance of (orsogon decreed the registration of 5ots. 7os.

)3*@ and )3** of the Juban ;(orsogon= adastre, under the following terms andconditions:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H/n view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and postas reCuired by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two parcels of lais registrable in law, it is hereby ad>udged and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order ofgeneral default, that the two parcels of land described in plan (#9-2)42, $nown as 5ots 7o)3*@ and )3** of the adastral (urvey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered in thname of aria ano, %ilipina 3) years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of(orsogon, with the understanding that 5ot 7o. )3** shall be sub>ect to the right of reservationfavor of EustaCuia Guerrero pursuant to 'rticle @*) of ivil ode. 'fter this decision shall havbecome final for lac$ of appeal therefrom within the A?-day period from its promulgation, let thcorresponding decree issue.

(o ordered.H ;Rec. 'pp. pp. )@-)*=

The decision having become final, the decree and the ertificate of Title ;7o. ?-2?= were issu

in the name of aria ano, sub>ect to reserva troncal in favor of EustaCuia Guerrero. /n 9cto)*44, counsel for the reservee ;reservatario= Guerrero filed a motion with the adastral ourtalleging the death of the original registered owner and reservista, aria ano, on (eptember )*44, and praying that the original ertificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new oneissued in favor of movant EustaCuia Guerrero" and that the (heriff be ordered to place her inpossession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo %ernandez, sons othe reservista aria ano, who contended that the application and operation of the reservatroncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registrationourt did not have >urisdiction to grant the motion.

/n view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as e6pressly noted in the final decreeregistration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for thereason that the death of reservista vested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as thsole reservatario troncal.

The oppositors, heirs of the reservista aria ano, duly appealed from the order, insisting thathe ownership of the reservatario can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. ))2 of '*+, but reCuires a >udicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as thereservatario entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. /n this connection, appellaargue that the reversion in favor of the reservatario reCuires the declaration of the e6istence othe following facts:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H;)= The property was received by a ascendant by gratuitous titled from an ascendant or frombrother or sister"

;2= (aid descendant dies without issue"

;A= The property ascendant by operation of law" and

;= The e6istence of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which saidproperty came.H ;'ppellantsQ 0rief, p. @=

#e find the appeal untenable. The reCuisites enumerated by appellants have already beendeclared to e6ist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatartroncal were e6pressly recognized:>gc:chanrobles.com.ph

H%rom the above-Cuoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that 5ot 7o. )3** was acCuirby the applicant aria ano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, 5ourdes Guerrero win turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence falls sCuarely under provisions of 'rticle @*) of the ivil ode" and that each and everyone of the private oppositoare within the third degree of consanguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who

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belonging to the same line from which the property came.

/t appears, however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with e6ception of EustaCuiaGuerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his formermarriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his formermarriages. EustaCuia Guerrero, being the nearest of $in, e6cludes all the other privateoppositors, whose degree of relationship to the decedent is remoter ;'rticle *+2, ivil ode"!irector of 5ands v. 'guas, +2 &hil., 23*=.H ;Rec. 'pp. pp. )+-)3=

This decree having become final, all persons ;appellees included= are barred thereby fromcontesting the e6istence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only reCuisites for thepassing of the titled from the reservista to the appellee are: ;)= the death of the reservista" and;2= the fact that the reservatario has survived the reservista. 0oth facts are admitted, and theire6istence in nowhere Cuestioned.

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that thereservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not

true. The reservatario is not the reservistaQs successor mortis causa nor is the reservableproperty part of the reservistaQs estate" the reservatario receives the property as a conditionalheir of the descendant ;prepositus=, said property merely reverting to the line of origin fromwhich it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservatarios that survive thereservista, the latter must be deemed to have en>oyed no more than a life interest in thereservable property.

/t is a conseCuence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatarionearest to the prepositus ;the appellee in this case= becomes, automatically and by operation oflaw, the owner of the reservable property. 's already stated, that property is no part of the estateof the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. ence, its acCuisition bythe reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings,since the basic reCuisites therefor appear of record. /t is eCually well settled that the reservableproperty can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa, ;li$eappellants herein= so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus andbelonging to the line whence the property came, is in e6istence when the reservista dies.

9f course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of theproperty, without determining the identity of the reservatario ;as in the case of !irector of 5andsv. 'guas, +A &hil., 23*= or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves,further proceedings would be unavoidable. 0ut this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria

EustaCuia Guerrero have been e6pressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there areother reservatarios of eCual or nearer degree. /t is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservistaare merely endeavoring to prolong their en>oyment of the reservable property to the detriment ofthe party lawfully entitled thereto.

#e find no error in the order appealed from therefore, the same is affirmed with costs againstappellants in both instances. (o ordered.

&aras, C.J., 0engzon, &adilla, ontemayor, 0autista 'ngelo, 5abrador, oncepcion andEndencia, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 1189. February 11, 1998

LAURO G. +I"ON*E, $etitioner , + . , "OURT OF A!!EALS, REGIONAL TRIAL "OURT,ra&0 12/, "a6oo0a& "%(y, a&# RAMON G. NI"OLAS, espondents.

* E " I S I O N

FRAN"IS"O, J .D

&etitioner 5auro G. 8izconde and his wife Estrellita 7icolas-8izconde had two children, +i" .,armela and Jennifer. &etitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael7icolas and (alud Gonzales-7icolas. The other children of Rafael and (alud are 'ntonio7icolas" Ramon 7icolas" Teresita 7icolas de 5eon, and Ricardo 7icolas, an incompetent.

'ntonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Nenaida, and their fourchildren.

9n ay 22, )*3*, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of )?,))? sC. m.located at 8alenzuela, 0ulacan ;hereafter 8alenzuela property= covered by TT 7o. ;T-A+3A=)A2?+ for 9ne undred Thirty %ive Thousand &esos ;&)A4,???.??=, evidenced by a 5ubusang

0ilihan ng 0ahagi ng 5upa na 7asasa$upan ng Titulo TT 79. T-A+3A. ) /n view thereof, TT7o. 8-44 covering the 8alenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. 2 9n arch A?, )**?,Estrellita sold the 8alenzuela property to 'melia 5im and aria 7atividad 0alictar hiu for Threeillion, %our undred %ive Thousand, (i6 undred Twelve &esos ;& A,?4,+)2.??=.A /n June ofthe same year, Estrellita bought from &remiere omes, /nc., a parcel of land with improvementssituated at 8inzon (t., 0% omes, &araaCue ;hereafter &araaCue property= using a portion of theproceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a ban$.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and her twodaughters, armela and Jennifer, were $illed on June A?, )**), an incident popularly $nown asthe 8izconde assacre. The findings of the investigation conducted by the 70/ reveal thatEstrellita died ahead of her daughters. 'ccordingly, armela, Jennifer and herein petitionersucceeded Estrellita and, with the subseCuent death of armela and Jennifer, petitioner was leftas the sole heir of his daughters. 7evertheless, petitioner entered into an E6tra-Judicial(ettlement of the Estate of !eceased Estrellita 7icolas-8izconde #ith #aiver of (hares, 4 withRafael and (alud, Estrellitas parents. The e6tra->udicial settlement provided for the division ofthe properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and(alud. The properties include ban$ deposits, a car and the &araaCue property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related e6penses in the burial of Estrellita, armelaand Jennifer, amounts to Three illion &esos ;&A,???,???.??=.+ The settlement gave fiftypercent ;4?K= of the total amount of the ban$ deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael,e6cept (aving 'ccount 7o. )?-)))2))-? under the name of Jennifer which involves a to$enamount. The other fifty percent ;4?K= was allotted to petitioner. The &araaCue property and thecar were also given to petitioner with Rafael and (alud waiving all their claims, rights, ownershipand participation as heirs3 in the said properties.

9n 7ovember )@, )**2, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an intestateestate proceeding@ doc$eted as (p. &roc. 7o. -)+3*, with 0ranch )2? of the Regional Trialourt ;RT= of aloocan ity listing as heirs (alud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife ;Nenaida= andchildren of 'ntonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed (pecial 'dministratri6 of Rafaels estate.

'dditionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of (alud, now senile, and Ricardo,her incompetent brother. erein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition * dated arch 2,)**A, praying to be appointed instead as (alud and Ricardos guardian. 0arely three wee$spassed, Ramon filed another opposition)? alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the8alenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not les than (i6 illion &esos ;& +,???,???.??=before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legalityand validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children,)) Estrellitaincluded. 9n ay )2, )**A, Ramon filed his own petition, doc$eted as (p. &roc. 7o. -)+**,entitled /natter 9f The Guardianship 9f (alud G. 7icolas and Ricardo G. 7icolas and averredthat their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his childrenby Rafael during his lifetime.)2 Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by

right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter ofEstrellita.)Acrlwvirtualibrry

/n a consolidated 9rder, dated 7ovember *, )**A, the RT appointed Ramon as the Guardiaof (alud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the (pecial 'dministratri6 ofRafaels estate. The courts 9rder did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs.) 7eitwas the &araaCue property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate.)4 (ubseCuently, the RT in an 9rder dated January 4, )**, removed Ramon as (alud andRicardos guardian for selling his wards property without the courts $nowledge andpermission.)+crlwvirtualibrry

(ometime on January )A, )**, the RT released an 9rder giving petitioner ten ;)?= days 6 6within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar asthe case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed byboth the counsels for Ramon 7icolas and Teresita de 5eon. /n response, petitioner filed aanifestation, dated January )*, )**, stressing tha the was neither a compulsory heir nor aintestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RT notesaid anifestation in its 9rder dated %ebruary 2, )**.)3 !espite the anifestation, Ramon,

through a motion dated %ebruary ), )**, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estateproceeding and as$ed that the &araaCue property, as well as the car and the balance of theproceeds of the sale of the 8alenzuela property, be collated.)@ 'cting on Ramons motion, the court on arch )?, )** granted the same in an 9rder which pertinently reads as follows:

6 6 6

9n the otion To /nclude 5auro G. 8izconde /n /ntestate proceedings in instant case andconsidering the comment on hi anifestation, the same is hereby granted.)*

6 6 6

&etitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid 9rder which Ramon opposed. 2? 'ugust )2, )**, the RT rendered an 9rder denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. provides:

6 6 6

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses 8izconde were then financiaincapable of having purchased or acCuired for a valuable consideration the property at8alenzuela from the deceased Rafael 7icolas. 'dmittedly, the spouses 8izconde were thenliving with the deceased Rafael 7icolas in the latters ancestral home. /n fact, as the argumenfurther goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael 7icolas. 'nd

5auro 8izconde left for the nited (tates in, de2facto separation, from the family for sometimeand returned to the &hilippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and hetwo daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses 8izconde were financially incapable to buy theproperty from the late Rafael 7icolas, 5auro 8izconde claims that they have been engaged inbusiness venture such as ta6i business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing.owever, no competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the businessunderta$ings adverted to.

/n fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acCuisition of the property from Rafael7icolas was for a valuable consideration.

'ccordingly, the transfer of the property at 8alenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father wasgratuitous and the sub>ect property in &araaCue which was purchased out of the proceeds of said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael 7icolas in favor of Estrellita, is sub>ect tocollation.

#ERE%9RE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby !E7/E!.2) ;nderscoring added=

&etitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent ourt of 'ppeals. /n itsdecision of !ecember ), )**, respondent ourt of 'ppeals22 denied the petition stressing t

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the RT correctly ad>udicated the Cuestion on the title of the 8alenzuela property as the >urisdiction of the probate court e6tends to matters incidental and collateral to the e6ercise of itsrecognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased ;f.: (ec. ), Rule*?, Revised Rules of ourt=.2A !issatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review oncertiorari . %inding prima facie merit, the ourt on !ecember , )**4, gave due course to thepetition and reCuired the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts 9rder, which respondent ourt of 'ppeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the 8alenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita anddeclaring the &araaCue property as sub>ect to collation.

The appeal is well ta$en.

0asic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. 'rticle )?+) of the ivil odespea$s of collation. /t states:

'rt. )?+). Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into themass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during

the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may becomputed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

ollation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in thedivision of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which theyreceived from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of thetestator.2 ollation is only reCuired of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirsand involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of thedecedent.24 The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor ininterest in ma$ing a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something inadvance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all hisheirs eCually, in the absence of any e6pression to the contrary. 2+ ollation does not impose anylien on the property or the sub>ect matter of collationable donation. #hat is brought to collation isnot the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated,23 the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon itsacceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.2@crlwvirtualibrry

The attendant facts herein do no ma$e a case of collation. #e find that the probate court, as wellas respondent ourt of 'ppeals, committed reversible errors.

%irst : The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estateproceeding. &etitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs. 'rticle @@3 of

the ivil ode is clear on this point:

'rt. @@3. The following are compulsory heirs:

;)= 5egitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents andascendants"

;2= /n default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimatechildren and ascendants"

;A= The widow or widower"

;= 'c$nowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction"

;4= 9ther illegitimate children referred to in article 2@3.

ompulsory heirs mentioned in 7os. A, , and 4 are not e6cluded by those in 7os ) and 2"neither do they e6clude one another.

/n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit fromthem in the manner and to the e6tent established by this ode.

#ith respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditorRafael is considered a third person or a stranger.2* 's such, petitioner may not be dragged inthe intestate estate proceeding. 7either may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he hano personality or interest in the said proceeding,A? which petitioner correctly argued in hismanifestation.A)crlwvirtualibrry

(econd: 's a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of aproperty which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings.A2 (uch determination isprovisional in character and is sub>ect to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.AA /nthe case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its

>urisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the 8alenzuela propertybetween Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the sub>ect property between theconcerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of thecontracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside tprobate courts >urisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action. #ereiterate:

6 6 6 we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which ta$es cognizance of testate or

intestate proceedings has power and >urisdiction to determine whether or not the propertiesincluded therein or e6cluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such

determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without pre>udice to the right of the interesparties, in a proper action, to raise the Cuestion bearing on the ownership or e6istence of th

right or credit.Acrlwvirtualibrry

Third: The order of the probate court sub>ecting the &araaCue property to collation is prematuRecords indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. #e findnothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired towarrant collation. #e thus advert to our ruling in darbe v. Jurado, 4* &hil. )), )A-), to wit:

#e are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. /n accordance with the provisions ofarticle )?A4A4 of the ivil ode, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that thedonations received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and pre>udiced thelegitimate or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. /n the absence of evidence to thateffect, the collation sought is untenable for lac$ of ground or basis therefor.

%ourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court,nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the &araaCue property. #e note what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the 8alenzuela property. The&araaCue property which Estrellita acCuired by using the proceeds of the sale of the 8alenzuproperty does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. /ndeed collation of the

&araaCue property has no statutory basis.A+

The order of the probate court presupposes that &araaCue property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, howethat the &araaCue property was conveyed for and in consideration of &*??,???.??, A3 by &remomes, /nc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner whinherited and is now the present owner of the &araaCue property is not one of Rafaels heirs.Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have anyinterest in Rafaels estate. 's it stands, collation of the &araaCue property is improper for, torepeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime this compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the &araaCue property.oreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntaril y and willfully waived any claims, righ ts,ownership and participation as heir A@ in the &araaCue property.

%ifth: %inally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the 8alenzuela propermay be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. /n fact, it wRafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the 8alenzuela propertyence, even assuming that the 8alenzuela property may be collated collation may not beallowed as the value of the 8alenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of RafaeTherefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and bindingpurpose.

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=3EREFORE, the decision of the ourt of 'ppeals appealed from is hereby RE8ER(E! '7!(ET '(/!E.

SO OR*ERE*.

NarCa'a, C.J., "a%r$a&:, Ro$ero, 4au&a&, a&# !ur%'%$a, JJ., 0o&0ur.

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