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History of the 9th Medium Regiment RA

Chapter One8 th Battalion “The Buffs” (1940-42)

The Battalion takes shapeThe 9th Medium Regiment was a war raised unit, and began its life as the 8th Battalion, “The Buffs” (Royal East Kent Regiment). Men of the 8th Battalion trained as infantry soldiers. The story begins in the summer of 1940 as the battalion took shape. On July 4th 16 officers and 150 other ranks formed the nucleus of the battalion at Bodmin Barracks in Cornwall, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel T.T. Laville (late of the Indian Army). Shortly after they moved to Dropmore Hall in Buckinghamshire to prepare for new intakes of men. Tents were erected, cookhouses and latrines built. Work also began on the defence of nearby Cookham Bridge. The first intake arrived and were equipped and clothed. However, the War Diary reports ‘no rifles available’. A vast amount of modern weaponry had been lost at Dunkirk, and therefore few rifles were available at this time for training battalions. Harry Kemp, who joined the battalion in July 1940, remembers the rather unhappy circumstances in which new recruits found themselves:

We were to be trained as infantry by a contingent from the D.C.L.I, who had just returned from India, all regular soldiers. They tried to take advantage of us, and tried to bully us unmercifully. The food was atrocious, and we had to eat out to obtain enough food, on our nine shillings a week. At one time, we actually went on strike, and on a parade the C.O. accused us of mutiny, and threatened to have us shot. It turned out that the cooks were selling the rations to local traders and they were court- martialled. This, of course, was all hushed up and the D.C.L.I. personnel gradually were either posted or got rid of somehow, and the battalion really took shape and we became quite efficient. However, it was a long time after we were formed in Dropmore Hall, Burnham, Buckinghamshire before we had any weapons. We trained with long poles. The first rifles we had were 1914 vintage, could not fire and were used for marching only!

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Joining the battalion a little later, Alan London remembers being sent, after enlistment at Canterbury, to Taplow in Berkshire, where, living under canvas, rigorous training began with foot-drill, bayonet practice and twelve mile route marches. For these men, mostly from Kent and London, initiation into the ways and life of the wartime Army was underway. Scarcely had these raw recruits (which were of a very high standard according to the War Diary) begun to feel their feet when orders came to move to the West Country.

Coastal defenceThe Battalion arrived in Paignton by train and was instructed to man beach defences to protect this coastal region from enemy attack. At this time the threat of invasion was very real. HQ and D Company settled in at Torquay, B at Goodrington, A at Brixham and C at Paignton. Miles of barbed wire was placed on the Battalion front at St. Mary’s Bay, Berry Head, Hope’s Nose and Oddicombe. Sandbagged positions were dug in on the cliff tops, and patrols organised. Harry Kemp recalls.

We were employed in fixing Danart wire (barbed) on to the beaches along the sea front. The plan was that if the Germans had invaded, we were to retire to

positions a mile inland and dig slit trenches!

Forming the 209 Infantry Brigade along with the 7th and 9th

‘Buffs’ Battalions they became part of 77th Division, and settled into what amounted to front-line conditions. Such was the fear of invasion, orders stressed that full strength was of ‘primary importance’ on the beaches. The role of the Battalion was outlined in Operational Order No1 thus: ‘To destroy the enemy with Inf. Weapons as he attempts to disembark or is in the process of disembarking’ and ‘to prevent any enemy infiltration inland. Ominously, this order stated ‘The Battalion will hold out against all invasion attempts, under all circumstances and will fight to the last round and the last man….THERE WILL BE NO WITHDRAWAL.’ This was written at a time when the Battalion was under-equipped, and one can speculate that in the event of an invasion (and if these orders were adhered to) they would have been wiped out. It was a tale of frustration for officers, however, as these valuable coastal defence duties delayed the development of the battalion into a cohesive fighting unit. Furthermore, ammunition, rifles, transport and material in general were woefully short. Rifle ranges were unobtainable in the early days and companies made their own

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arrangements, and fired out to sea (when they could obtain practice ammunition). Inexperience in handling weapons led to a very unfortunate incident at the Exbury Hotel billet, Torquay. On the 16th of November, 28 year old Pte Austen of D Company, accidentally shot himself in the head with a rifle. His body was taken home to Kent for burial. Nonetheless, the situation gradually improved. The 8th Battalion took over 6pdr. guns from the Royal Artillery for use in the defences should the occasion arise. The men showed proficiency in handling these unfamiliar weapons. Gun drill and marksmanship were ‘very satisfactory.’ A rifle range was eventually allotted for firing practise, and in the snow of early January 1941 soldiers honed their skills at marksmanship. Slowly, weapons and vehicles began to arrive. February saw the arrival of 7 Bren guns and 24 Thompson sub-machine guns. Three armoured lorries, fitted with Bren guns, were also received. The War Diary reveals some confusion over the exact defence role of these lorries. Given that the Battalion’s job was one of static defence of the coastal crust, this is not surprising. A useful scheme was organised whereby companies took turns to man defences, and those not involved were able to continue with their training. During Torquay War

Weapons Week the battalion had a chance to show off. Detachments from all companies, carriers and the aforementioned armoured lorries processed proudly through the streets. The enemy was often active on the Battalion front. A tanker was torpedoed off Berry Head, and a second set on fire by a bomb with all hands lost. The Luftwaffe bombed Paignton, Torquay and Brixham on several occasions. In one attack on April 11th 400 incendiary bombs were dropped on Paignton. Although the fires were all under control within 15 minutes, one ARP worker was killed and a further 6 injured. The fishing trawlers were machine-gunned by enemy aircraft and in May 1941 three trawlers were sunk and five damaged in the harbour at Brixham. Corporal Edlin of ‘D’ Company exacted some revenge. While on trawler duties aboard the ‘Victoire Roger’, he shot down and destroyed an enemy bomber fifteen miles off Brixham. The bomber dived into the sea about half a mile away from the trawler with no survivors.Elements of the Battalion had an interesting assignment when they were called upon to play the enemy in an exercise. No.2 S.S. (Special Service) Commando practised a landing at Fishcombe Point, and ‘The Buffs’ did their best to ‘repel’ the assault. This was all observed by the

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courageous and much-decorated (V.C. and three D.S.O’s) General Lord Gort, commander of the B.E.F.. The battalion desperately needed time out for its own training as a whole unit, and the opportunity to do so came in May 1941. Orders were to move to Newton Abbot for a month. It was an occasion marred by tragedy. In Brixham the battalion formed up and prepared to march out. A German plane spotting the khaki figures tightly packed together in the streets dropped two bombs and opened up with machine guns. Two houses were completely demolished and falling masonry killed Pte. Dodge of ‘Z Company’ and three civilians. Five civilians were also injured. The aircraft went on to strafe a parade at the Canadian Convalescent Depot at St. Mary’s Bay.The following obituary appeared in the East Kent Gazette on 24th May 1941:

LOCAL BUFF KILLED

Three Days After Leave

After being home on leave, Private Ronald Dodge, The Buffs of 65, Chalkwell-road, Milton, left on Friday in last week to re-join his unit. On Monday his young wife was officially notified that he had lost his life as a result of enemy action.

He was the son of Mr. and Mrs. I. Dodge, of 32 Stanley Avenue, Queenborough. Before joining the army last July he was employed as a conductor by the Maidstone and District Motor Services, and was well-known in this area.Private Dodge had been married for six months, his wife being the only daughter of Mr. A. and the late Mrs. Godman. They made their home with Mr. Godman at Chalkwell-road. The funeral will take place tomorrow at the Sittingbourne Cemetery at 2.15.

After Newton Abbot orders were to move to Falmouth in Cornwall to take on beach duties again. This was to be a short stay. There was a small air-raid while the battalion were based here. Six bombs caused damage to property but there were no casualties. Lt. Col. W.H. Rowe (who had taken over as commander 8th Battalion in late 1940), issued a ‘special order of the day’ on the 4th of July.

Special order of the Day, by Lt. Col. W.H. Rowe, D.S.O.

Commanding, 8 th Bn. The Buffs. 4/7/41

Today, 4th July is a great day in the history of a young battalion, belonging to one of the oldest and most famous Regiments in

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the British Army – the 8th Bn., The Buffs, to which we all have the honour to belong. It is the 1st Anniversary of our formation…..We can look back on the past year with some satisfaction and no little pride. But it is to the future that I wish every officer and other rank in this Battalion to look……I can think of no better resolution than the one which follows, and which I expect every one to do his level best to live up to during the forthcoming year.

“I am resolved to do my utmost to make myself better fitted, in every way, to carry out the duties which lie ahead of me, whatever and wherever they may be. I must not slacken, for one moment, my own efforts towards greater efficiency. Rather must I redouble them, if I am to be worthy of my King, my country, my Regiment and my fellow-men, and to take my full share in the defence of our Country and Empire, and the Victory over our enemy in which we all profess to be so confident.”

FALMOUTH

Despite the stirring words the ‘forthcoming year’ saw the Battalion returning to Torbay to take part in various inter-battalion and brigade exercises. Although Hitler had turned his attention to Russia, there was still doubt over his intentions. In

particular, a commando style raid to collect prisoners or attack an installation could not be ruled out, and indeed was anticipated by high command at a local level. Therefore, the battalion trained with civil-defence to practise cooperation in the event of an attack; learned how to defend an aerodrome and took part in beach-manning exercises. Denbury (still in Devon, and near Newton Abbot) became the home of the Battalion for the first two months of 1942. A large number of new recruits arrived at this time from Infantry Training Centres, some of them Danes. There had been a long standing connection between the Buffs and Denmark going back to the seventeenth century. During the First World War King Christian of Denmark was appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, and worked tirelessly for Buffs prisoners of war. So in the Second World War Danes were welcomed into the ranks of the Buffs. There followed a short return to Newton Abbott where anti-invasion exercises continued, and a significant number of men began to be drafted overseas. A river crossing exercise took place which was aptly named ‘BATH’. Further bombing raids were experienced. On the night of Thursday, April 23-24th the Luftwaffe despatched 45 bombers to the Exeter area, dropping bombs wildly. Two

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men from the Battalion were injured by flying glass in Newton Abbot. Shortly after, in the early hours of May 4th fire fighting detachments were sent out from the battalion to put out heath fires caused by enemy incendiary bombs at Colleywell Bottom. Nearby Exeter suffered badly on this night, experiencing its worst raid of the whole war. Private Christiansen, one of the aforementioned Danish recruits, met an unfortunate end. Arriving back at camp very drunk after a night out, he fell from his top bunk. Some of his mates put him back to bed expecting him to sleep off the effects of the alcohol. However, in the morning they found him dead. He had broken his neck when falling from the bunk. Private Christainsen’s funeral took place at Wolborough Cemetery, and was attended by the Danish Minister’s representative. Summer 1942 was spent at Stover Camp (near Newton Abbot). The threat of invasion was slowly beginning to recede. Consequently, there was a shift in the training, which began to emphasise the offensive. Exercise ‘Petertavy’ simulated a dawn attack with support from medium and field artillery. There were plenty of opportunities for sport, and leisure too. A sports meeting was held to celebrate the formation of the 8th, 9th and 10th

Buffs Battalions. The battalion came second in the competition.

Prizes were handed out by the Divisional Commander, followed by a concert compered by Captain Denham, who was shortly after appointed Battalion Entertainments Officer. Brigade sports were held at Torquay cricket ground, which the Battalion won comfortably. The band of the 9th Battalion was in attendance to add a bit of pomp to the occasion.

‘Hell-fire Corner’ In late September 1942 advance parties left the West Country for Dover. Dover was Britain’s front line town, and just 22 miles away from the enemy. The Battalion split up with elements stationed at St. Margaret’s Bay and Battalion HQ and one company at the castle. B Company, for example, settled into the Granville Hotel at St. Margaret’s Bay; BHQ occupied a requisitioned house (much of the area had in fact been evacuated). The Company stood to at dawn and dusk with all soldiers carrying 50 rounds. On one occasion, Lt. Gibson recalls, the sentries were slow in taking post, and Major Curry, who commanded B Company, decided to take immediate action. He fired several shots into a pillbox from his revolver, which had the desired effect in encouraging the sentries to man the position very quickly! The town suffered regular bombing and shelling from

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German heavy gun batteries near Calais. Shortly after arrival the Battalion experienced a cross channel gun duel. British cross channel guns opened up on a convoy, and within minutes the German guns replied with 49 shells, most of which landed in the Dover area. Five civilians were killed and several houses demolished. A barrack hut near Swingate was damaged but members of the Battalion were spared. The War Diary records further duels in November, causing damage in Dover and at St. Margaret’s Bay. One shell landed in the grounds of the Granville Hotel; a lucky escape for B Company. Lt. Hendley remembers that the shelling was much more frightening than the bombing, particularly the air bursts. Shells could arrive very quickly (time of flight from Calais was about 58 seconds) and with little warning. Remarkably, there were no fatalities among the Battalion from enemy shelling during its stay in Dover. Two years later they would have a chance for revenge, and played a part in the capture of these long-range enemy guns! There was a lot of aerial activity. Several aircraft plunged into the sea at St. Margaret’s Bay; the luckier pilots being fished out by the Air Sea Rescue craft; Fw 190’s and Me 109’s screamed in across The Channel, flying at low altitude on strafing runs. Coastal searchlights from the Calais area

swept the Channel, probably looking for shipping. This illuminated the whole front, and made everyone feel a little exposed and vulnerable. Sporting events gave some light relief, however. The battalion thrashed RAF Dover (4-0) at soccer! One job of the 8th Buffs was to defend the harbour. Lt. Hendley had the most forward platoon. He held a position in a building that got the nickname ‘Pack of Cards’ because it shook so much from the shelling and bombing. On the eastern arm of the harbour a large wagon filled with explosive was part of the defences. It was Hendley’s job to push this wagon into position and set off the explosives in the event of a successful enemy invasion. However, the wagon proved to be rusted to the track and wouldn’t budge an inch! Hendley was thankful he never had to use this Heath Robinson device for real. Peter Howard (then a second lieutenant) remembers his time in Dover:

I had to be duty officer and do the rounds at night. It was very eerie going up to the lookout point at the top of the Keep. I wondered if the Jerries were climbing up the cliffs!

There were several famous faces in Dover during the battalion’s stay. Some soldiers caught only a glimpse of these visitors, but others came face to face. On

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October 23rd the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Smuts, Sir Kingsley Wood, and Admiral Harriman visited Dover Castle. The Battalion formed a guard of honour. Captain Howard recalls:

I was nominated second i.c. of a Guard of Honour to Mr. Churchill. He asked me if I had read any ‘war books’ recently. I’m afraid I said yes but was thinking of American Westerns and schoolboy horrors!

In the same month Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of the US President, paid an informal visit to the castle. Chris Wanstall was on gate, telephone and escort duties at the castle. A very attractive naval despatch rider caught his eye. She was, in fact, the daughter of J.B. Priestley.A tragic accident also occurred. After a trip to the NAAFI, Pte. Emery and Pte.Curtis were cheerfully coming back to their hotel billet on the cliff-top at St. Margaret’s Bay, when a nervous sentry challenged them: ‘Halt! Who goes there?’ Their reply didn’t follow fast enough, and a burst of fire from the sentry’s Thompson sub-machine gun killed Pte.Curtis instantly and seriously wounded Pte. Emery. With the burden of guilt proving too much to bear, this unfortunate sentry tried to take his own life. However, little is known about his fate or what actions were taken against him.

In his defence, patrolling the cliff tops alone and in the dark, knowing that the enemy might raid the coast to take prisoners, must have been a very unnerving experience. Pte. Joe Johnson recalls that some men were ‘jittery’ and if the tin cans on the barbed-wire strung out along the cliff rattled they fired. For those men of the Battalion whose previous military ‘experience’ was in camps in Devon, Dover was a baptism of fire. Here, they really were in the front line. In contrast Lt. Gibson recalled: ‘Conditions did not worry me, as I found them no worse than being in the Blitz in 1940- in some ways, less bothersome.’

Conversion to artillery It was while stationed at Dover in December of 1942 that the news came that the Battalion was to be converted from infantry in a coastal defence role into artillery. They were to lose their identity owing to the ever-increasing demands for men in the Royal Artillery. There were mixed feelings about this change. Most men were reluctant to pick up the flag of the Royal Regiment. Proud to belong to a famous British Regiment (the Buffs were the third most senior infantry regiment) or mindful of their Kentish roots some found the transition difficult. Others felt their infantry training had just been a waste of time. Lt. Gibson felt ‘desperate’ about this change.

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To him nearly two years of soldiering had been wasted, and there was a great deal of apprehension about artillery training. Gunnery was something he had no experience of and as a young infantry officer he wondered whether he would be up to the challenge. When Pte. Fred Humphrey, took this news home, his father’s reaction was one of relief. As a veteran of the First World War (Gallipoli) he knew how the infantry suffered. With hindsight, Peter Howard could see the advantage of serving in the artillery:

Officers were given the option: to remain as infantry or train as gunners. This was lucky for me as infantry platoon commanders did not last very long in action!

Despite the undercurrent of grumbling, Lt. Gibson comments that ‘a year later most of us found gunnery absorbing and did not want to return to the infantry.’

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Chapter TwoGunnery Training (1943-44)

Boston (Jan-April)After leaving Dover, and the role of coastal defence behind them, the men of the 8th Battalion found themselves travelling to Boston in Lincolnshire to begin a year of intensive training. They came under the tutelage of the 53rd Medium Regiment R.A., whose charter was the conversion of the 8th Battalion into the 9th Medium Regiment R.A.. Officers of the 9 th and 53 rd interchanged for training. Lt. Col. W H Rowe took command of 53rd Medium at Culverthorpe, and Major J J Corbett of the 210 Battery at Sleaford. Lt. Col Brazier MC assumed command of the 9th Medium Regiment RA. The 53rd, an experienced T.A. unit, had seen action in France in 1940, and this arrangement worked well.On the 8th January the M.G.R.A., Major General O M Lund CB DSO visited and welcomed the Regiment into the Royal Regiment of Artillery. Also in January the Regiment was officially designated as 81 and 82 Battery. Medium artillery regiments were always made upof an RHQ and two batteries (see Appendix 3 for details). All ranks

got on with learning new skills, and the process of conversion from infantry to artillery began in earnest. February 1st 1943 was an important date because the Regiment fired its first shell. The C.O., Lt. Col W.H. Rowe DSO, fired the first gun (‘A’ Troop) of the Regiment. ‘B’ Troop under Captain W. M. Denham fired for the first time the following day as did C Troop (under command of Captain C.F. Bailey), and D Troop (under command Captain T. Lemmon). This was supervised by Lt. Col Brazier and T/Major H W Pyle (an IG attached to the Regiment for this period of training). First World War, 6 inch howitzers (dated 1916) were used as the modern 5.5 inch guns were in short supply at this time. Captain Maurice Denham, incidentally, was one of the Regiment’s personalities. He entertained fellow officers with his many character voices that were to make him famous. During this period Denham compered the broadcast of ‘Ack-Ack, Beer Beer’ at the BBC. He later became a well known TV and film star.

The Regiment receives its guns

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Individual and troop training continued up to 23rd April 1943 when all the Regiment moved to the Culverthorpe, Sleaford, Ruskington area with RHQ based at Culverthorpe Hall near Grantham, 81 Battery at Ruskington and 82 Battery at Sleaford. Here the Regiment finally received its own guns. Sixteen 5.5 inch guns in all were delivered (8 to each battery). A few days later the Regiment packed out a local cinema in Sleaford to watch a training film about the 5.5 inch gun. One distinguishing feature of this gun was the pair of horns, one on either side of the barrel (these cylinders contained spring balancing presses to counter the weight of the barrel during firing). The ammunition for the gun was of the type known as separate loading, which meant that the shell had to be first loaded into the breech followed by a bag containing a propellant charge. On closing the breech a special primer cartridge was inserted and fired by pulling a lanyard. With the greatest weight of charge and appropriate barrel elevation the gun could fire out to a maximum range of 16,500 metres (just over 10 miles). It was served by a crew of ten, and two rounds per minute of fire could be achieved. The 5.5 inch gun was a reliable and effective weapon. At this time a new AGRA was formed, and designated 9 AGRA.

9th Medium Regiment was placed under command along with 10th and 11th Medium Regiments RA, which had also been recently converted from infantry. Because of its inexperienced regiments, the AGRA was to be Home Forces AGRA. If it was to join 21st Army Group it would be necessary to prove efficiency. All regiments were determined to succeed, and reach the required standard. On the 24th May the Regiment marched by road to Otterburn practise camp, Northumberland: a lonely and empty stretch of country where the army maintained a firing range. Several days were spent firing on the range, and participating in an exercise set by commander 9 AGRA (Brigadier Cleeve DSO, MC). June saw the Regiment return to Culverthorpe area, but there was little respite. Elements of both batteries took part in shooting at Hobson’s Moss Dyke Range, near Sheffield, using 75mm guns (on loan from 545 Coast Regiment RA). The next move was to Daventry in Northamptonshire where training, maintenance and firing practise continued throughout the next few months. Training consisted of using artillery instruments, humping heavy shells and charges, wireless drills, digging gun pits, orderly road moves, maintaining vehicles and guns, camouflage and track

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plans (learning not to leave a trail on the ground that might be spotted from the air). In September, 9 AGRA complete took to the road for the first time in the strangely named ‘Exercise Grand Cauliflower’. In October (8th-18th) the Regiment took part in another exercise called ‘Scamper.’ This Gallop (exercise over several days, which included firing on several ranges) again involved the whole of 9 AGRA, and took the formation to Westdown in Wiltshire and by a series of night marches to Sennybridge in North Wales (a round trip, covering a distance of some 800 miles). Predictably the weather in Wales was grisly and rain had made the ground very boggy which meant it was difficult to get the guns in position. This training exercise replicated the movement, occupation of gun areas and firing of the Regiment in combat. It was an exhausting and sometimes dangerous experience for all ranks. It is difficult to imagine the coordinated movement of thousands of vehicles at night without lights, and without the benefit of a modern road network (no motorways). In fact, when in column at night only the lead vehicle was allowed masked lights, and drivers were on the road for hours at a time. Tempers could become frayed. Lt. Gibson recalls one such incident. Two pool petrol lorries were being

held up by the Regiment’s vehicles. Their drivers were very unhappy and complained bitterly. The Colonel took quick action and with great presence of mind threatened to inform the authorities that the drivers were causing trouble and that they should be called up immediately. Mindful of their ‘cushy’ job, and realising that the Colonel meant business, they quickly quietened down! At the conclusion of ‘Scamper’, the 9th Mediums travelled to Felixstowe (Suffolk) where the first job was to help gather in the harvest of sugar beet. This was not too bad as the men got extra pay, and contact with the Women’s Land Army! Lt. Gibson could see the funny side of this turn of events and made a joke to Major Yool about the ‘9th Agricultural Comedians’. Unfortunately Major Yool did not share his sense of humour and was not amused! Nonetheless, the formation was being taken seriously, as at this time the great news arrived that 9 AGRA would be part of the 21st Army Group (as GHQ, reserve AGRA) and orders were to move to Hove (21-22 November 1943). All ranks were proud to sew onto their battledress the crusader shield.

Hove, and a visit from Monty

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Billets were found in some large properties in The Drive, and Willbury Road (see Appendix 6, Map1). 82nd Battery also occupied Cottesmore School. Guns and vehicles were parked in the road. Life was very agreeable in Hove and there was plenty to do with a cinema and some pubs were open. Brighton and Hove was full of men collecting together for the invasion, and on the whole they got on well. However, Lt. Gibson recalls seeing a group of Canadians involved in a brawl. One soldier fell to the ground and was brutally beaten and kicked in the head. This incident took place close to the Regiment’s billets and Gibson wondered whether to intervene but thought better of it not wanting to provoke an international incident. The only other friction was caused by local residents who objected to having their kerbstones torn up by heavy military vehicles. The Covenentor tank issued to the Regiment as an armoured OP (with a dummy gun) could cause considerable damage to road surfaces and pavements, particularly when turning. Being close to the south coast an enemy raid could not be ruled out. Therefore, defensive posts were set up, patrols and AA positions organised. Each Battery split into sections of 9 men and an NCO, equipped with 5 rifles, 1 Bren gun and four Sten guns. Each section had responsibility to

defend an area, building or road in the event of an enemy attack. However, training occupied most of the Regiment’s time, and there was an intensive drive on individual and Troop training. This was greatly assisted by the close proximity of Alfriston Ranges and the South Downs. A lot of firing practise took place on the ranges in the next few months. Orders for mobilization were received around Christmas, and the feeling was that the Regiment, as part of 9AGRA, would be assured a place in the expeditionary force about to invade France. Throughout the early part of 1944, further steps were taken to get the Regiment ready for battle. The War Diary records AA LMG firing, vehicle waterproofing courses, and vehicle wading at Eastbourne and Maresfield (East Sussex). Of course, these activities were vital and taken very seriously as everything would depend on the Regiment getting its guns ashore and into action quickly. However, anti-tank shooting is something of a surprise. You don’t visualise medium guns doing this kind of shoot, but for the forthcoming operation it was vital that every precaution was taken against the enemy breaking through and getting tanks up to the gun positions. The Regiment successfully completed its anti-tank training at Belle Tout Range (Beachy Head) in March. Unfused shells were used during

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this training as solid shot (to penetrate tank armour) and fired out to sea.During this practice an aircraft crashed into the side of a hill about a quarter of a mile away from 82 Battery wagon lines. Pte Curtis of the Army Catering Corps, who was cooking at the time, went off to the scene of the crash to see if he could help. He found the aircraft well ablaze and ammunition was exploding all around. Pte Curtis went closer to the wreckage and succeeded in rescuing two of the crew who were lying unconscious in the aircraft. This brave and selfless act was recognised by the award of the British Empire Medal. On February 4th the Regiment, along with the rest of the AGRA, attended a parade in Battle, East Sussex, which was inspected and addressed by General Montgomery, Commander of the 21st Army Group. This was one of the great series of parades held up and down the country to let the troops see and listen to him for themselves and so gain added confidence in their leader before the battle. After waiting for some time in a snowstorm, the AGRA was marshalled fifteen deep in a hollow square to receive the Army Group Commander. Monty eventually stepped out of his car wearing the inevitable beret, battledress and a pair of golfing trousers! After being introduced to the CO’s of the regiments, he walked among the men. Then,

clambering onto the bonnet of a jeep, he put it to the troops that some of them must be descendants of those who fought the Normans at this historic spot. Whether or not it boosted morale, it was no doubt an unforgettable experience for all who were there. 4th March is an important date because a special exercise was set for the AGRA by 12 Corps. It was to be watched by Montgomery and the CCRA (Elliot). The object of this was to decide on the fitness of the formation for war. From this exercise (called ‘Febmar’) the AGRA emerged with flying colours. At the end of April 1944 the Regiment moved north to Bingley, Yorkshire to make way for formations with a higher priority for concentration than the Regiment. Before leaving for the north AGRA decided to inspect the billets in Hove. 9th Medium received a rocket for the state of their accommodation!

Albert DocksIn the middle of Exercise Bonzo, came an unexpected and sudden message to end exercise. The code word ‘Cornelius’ was received, meaning that the Regiment was to concentrate for Operation Overlord. The invasion was underway. Thus, between June 1st and 5th the Regiment moved to a concentration area in New

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Milton, Hampshire. During the long drive south (with a stop at a staging camp at Lutterworth) members of the Regiment saw the extent of the invasion preparations: miles of piled up bombs and ammunition, other convoys of trucks, tanks and guns. This was a most impressive sight. On arrival the necessary waterproofing of vehicles took place, and driver’s practised embarkation on ‘mock-up’ landing craft. These events suggest that the AGRA was to land on D-Day or more probably shortly after, but changes of plan (reasons for which are unknown) meant that this was not to be as we shall see. Whatever decisions the top brass were making, Bdr. Bernard Lambert and other drivers made their own preparations for their departure. Not wanting to be without a regular brew in France they raided the kitchens for tea, milk and sugar. These essential ingredients were placed in biscuit tins and waterproofed for the journey! It was at this time that the Regiment received a message from Montgomery, which began as follows: ‘The time has come to deal the enemy a terrific blow in Western Europe…’ The date was June 6, D-Day. However, the 9th Medium Regiment’s time had not come yet. The Regiment spent the next few weeks experiencing toughening up

parades, route marches, and map reading exercises. Everyone was wondering when they were to go. Firing practise took place again on Alfriston ranges, and it seemed that ‘the day’ would never come. On July 6th Peter Lawrence Birkin (of the Birkin Lace firm in Nottingham) joined the Regiment. He had already had an eventful war. At the battle of Knightsbridge (North Africa) Birkin commanded 425 Battery, 107 Regiment, South Notts. Hussars, Royal Horse Artillery. In this battle he was taken prisoner by the Italians, escaped, and spent six months on the run, before returning to England. For his efforts in North Africa and for his escape he was twice mentioned in dispatches. He rose to second in command of the 9th Medium Regiment in the campaign in North West Europe. It wasn’t until July 8th that the Regiment moved in a night march to a Marshalling Area on Blackheath in London. One assumes this was with waterproofed vehicles! This would, therefore, have been a very slow journey as waterproofed vehicles overheated if they exceeded 25mph! Members of the Regiment witnessed the doodlebug attacks on London, which were at their height at this time. The first week of July saw the flying bomb attack reach its zenith. Peter

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Howard remembers how close they dropped:

I had a motorcycle accident whilst at Brighton and was sent on convalescent leave. However, I rejoined the Regiment moving to the docks – we were dispersed on Blackheath whilst waiting to embark. During our stay on Blackheath the doodlebugs were dropping on London. I’m sure one came through the door of my tent and out the other side!

This experience made everyone the more determined to hit back

at the enemy with all his might at the first possible opportunity. The paraphernalia needed for the journey to Normandy was issued: French phrase books, water purification tablets, 24-hour ration packs, vomit bags, ‘tommy cookers’, fuel tablets, life belts and cigarettes compliments of ‘His Majesty’. On the 10th the Regiment embarked at Albert Docks, London, ready to sail for France. As L/Bdr. Alan London comments, it was ‘a well-trained and confident’ Regiment that joined the battle for Normandy.

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Chapter ThreeNormandy

Landing and baptism of fireThe 9th Medium Regiment began its journey to Normandy on the 11th of July, moving in two US Liberty Ships (one was called ‘Ocean Vigour’). The Regiment beached north of Graye-sur-Mer on the 14th of July without any casualties. Chris Wanstall (81 Battery) recalls:

‘I remember waiting for my lorry to be lifted by crane from the hold and when my number was called had to climb down a rope ladder on to the landing craft to await its arrival.’

All vehicles were successfully waded. Bill Abel remembers the competition between himself and his co-driver as to who was to take the wheel in the drive up the beach. Each man has his own memory of initiation into the realities of warfare. L/Bdr. Bernard Lambert remembers driving off a Landing Ship Tank into 5’ of water, which was ‘quite an experience.’ While sorting themselves, and their vehicle out, a soldier from a first aid tent came nearby with a spade andstarted digging a hole. He showed the Lance-Bombardier the grisly contents of a sandbag sack: a leg cut off below the knee

with sock and boot still attached. Lt. Jack Hendley recalls how well organised the beaches were, and the reaction of the French:

‘The French were very friendly- considering how damaged their houses and farms were…they were always offering us cider…. we dug slit trenches to sleep in and all woke covered in mosquito bites.’

After concentrating in Manvieux, the Regiment moved to an area near Sequiville-en-Bessin. These locations were cramped, the area being packed with troops and vehicles from various units. Although the Regiment was not under direct attack, it was quite a frightening scene, which left nobody in doubt that they had entered the battle. At night searchlights swept the sky, and a stream of tracer rounds kept away any marauding aircraft. There followed a move to St. Manvieu where the Regiment relieved the 61st Medium Regiment, and prepared to fire its first shots in anger. This area, some four miles west of Caen, was not pleasant. It stank, for it was liberally bespattered with

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dead animals, and shell holes were numerous. The Regiment was under command of 12th Corps whose strategy, at this time, was to maintain pressure on the grisly Hill 112 and surrounding area. This was designed to keep German reserves tied down and distract attention from the area where Operation Goodwood was to be launched (to the east of Caen). Veterans remember vividly the speed at which the guns were brought into action for the first time against enemy targets ‘near Caen’. There was no gradual introduction to battle. Representatives of the Regiment went off to various locations in order to coordinate artillery support. One Troop Commander went to a tank OP with 4RHA, one Battery Commander went to 112 Field Regiment RA, and another Troop Commander was attached to HQRA 43 Div.. The business of ‘repping’ or representing the Mediums needs a little explanation. At the field regiment’s HQ, an officer from the 9th with his signaller, and NCO assistant would be in touch by wireless with RHQ. He could, therefore, relay requests for fire to his guns. If several ‘reps’ from different regiments were present then the fire of hundreds of guns could be switched onto a target from there.Captain Lemmon (82 Battery) manned an exposed OP at this time in front of the infantry

FDLs. The OP had protection from two infantry soldiers but little could be done about the enemy snipers who hid the cornfields, and were a constant source of danger. The OP was also regularly stonked by mortar and shellfire. Captain Lemmon stayed in these frightening and dangerous conditions for 5 days ensuring that the infantry got the fire support they needed. The War Diary reports that the first targets for the guns were chiefly hostile mortars. Predicted and observed tasks were fired. For the infantry, mortars were very troublesome, and accounted for around 70% of all casualties. Indeed, much of the work given to the Regiment was counter-battery. Medium regiments tended to specialise in counter-battery work because of their longer range and heavier shell. For example, on the 20th eight bombards (engagement of enemy batteries by predicted fire) were fired on information received from 7th Survey Regiment, and 181 Field Regiment’s OP’s. A German prisoner taken at this time stated that six of his guns had been destroyed by our CB fire, which “was very accurate, and which knocked the hell out of us.” The enemy made some attempt to hit back at the gun positions with aircraft. Night time could get a little ‘hot’, and gunners crawled under their vehicles for protection or got underground

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quickly. Bombs were dropped into the surrounding countryside. Ack-Ack hammered away, coloured tracers lighting up the night sky. The Regiment received its baptism of fire proper, however, when A Troop was shelled during the night of the 19/20th of July. Fortunately, the shelling caused no casualties or damage. At this time the Regiment suffered its first fatal casualty (a signalman from the Signals Section, attached to RHQ). Signalman Warner met an unfortunate end when he was accidentally shot by a sentry. It is likely that this signaller was fatally wounded whilst going about his duties, which were very important, as the Regiment depended at all times on good communications by telephone and radio. There was also a sudden change in the weather and torrential rain fell for a few days; slit trenches and gun-pits were flooded out. This delayed major offensive operations for a couple of days. On July 22nd, with the weather improving, the Regiment played a role (firing timed concentrations) in ‘Operation Express.’ Captain Lemmon of 82 Battery went forward as a FOO for this attack. The plan was for the 4th and 5th Wiltshires (43rd Division) to take the village of Maltot. Objectives were thoroughly pounded by the power and fury of two AGRAs.

At 1955 hours the enemy attempted a counter-attack on Maltot with a large group of tanks (about fifteen in total). Six medium regiments (including the 9th) were laid in front of the tanks, which would not advance in the face of this awesome fire. Tanks feared medium and heavy artillery as a shell of this size could easily knock out a tank. On several occasions in the campaign the 9th proved themselves as good ‘tank-busters’. The Wiltshiremen held on to their hard won gains and the Maltot battle ranks high on the battle honours of this regiment. In these early days there was sufficient enemy activity to keep the guns of the 9th Mediums and other regiments of the AGRA firing around the clock, which meant a lot of hard work, especially for the gun crews. Over the next few days numerous enemy targets were successfully engaged and harassed. For example, an AOP shoot engaged a target for 43rd Division, and on the 25th OP’s directed fire on German tanks and infantry digging in.

Giberville (the left flank) On the 28th July orders were received to move to the left flank of the bridgehead, through the Stalingrad of Caen, to a desolate place called Giberville. The village was deserted; its church and graveyard ruined by the

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ravages of battle. Below the church ran a high railway embankment broached by craters with tangled rails sprawling all over it. Completing this depressing scene was the remains of a factory at Mondeville, about a mile or so distant. Here support was given to Canadian attacks against enemy strong points of Tilly la Compagne, Roquancourt, and Verriers. These villages had been fortified by the Germans, and blocked the route south to Falaise. The Regiment fired many counter battery and harassing fire tasks in support of 2nd Canadian Corps. HF and DF tasks were also fired for 4th Cdn. Armd. Div. whose attack on the fortified hamlet of Tilly (2nd August) had been unsuccessful. Defended in strength by elite S.S. troops this failure was hardly surprising. OPs spotted a group of around 100 enemy infantry digging in, and they were dispersed by all the guns of the AGRA. An AOP shoot (3rd August), also by the whole AGRA, engaged a fire burning in enemy territory, which resulted in a huge conflagration with smoke rising hundreds of feet into the air. In the fields and orchards around Giberville the 9th Medium Regiment occupied the slit trenches and dugouts left by the retreating enemy, and by 77th Medium Regiment who had previously occupied this position.

These holes were to prove useful as the Regiment was again subjected to spasmodic enemy shelling over several days. This fire was rumoured to be from enemy SP guns. The distant ‘boomph’ of the gun gave a little warning to get underground. However, it wasn’t long before somebody got caught out. There was one fatal casualty from this shelling (Bdr. Rickson) and one vehicle was also destroyed. Indeed, it was difficult for the enemy to miss because at this time the bridgehead covered a fairly small area, and the fields around Giberville were packed tight with vehicles and men from a variety of units, including the Guards Armoured Division, waiting for orders to move forward into the battle. It is as well to remember that sometimes the wagon lines were as vulnerable as the gun positions themselves. Wagon lines, a term that harks back to Horse Artillery days, describes the area a few miles in the rear where all motor transport not required on the gun position was kept, until the next move forward. Veteran Ronald Discombe and ‘Joe’ Johnson, with the wagon lines in nearby Blainville, recall a mortar bomb striking a 15 cwt truck. The round burst on the engine of the vehicle. In the back of the truck a signaller was busy at his 22 set, which dropped into his lap with the force of the explosion. He walked away completely

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unharmed, but somewhat dazed! A few men climbed the trees to see if they could spot the culprit, but saw nothing. The mortar is a fairly close range infantry weapon (range between 500m and 1200m) so it is surprising that the Regiment’s wagon lines were targeted. More misfortune was to befall the Regiment on the 2nd of August when during a night firing Counter Battery task, No. 2 gun, A Troop, exploded, igniting ammunition and creating an inferno in which six men were killed. There are different theories put forward, but it is thought that the gun loader had removed the fuse cover from a shell, and placed it too near to the gun. When the gun recoiled it struck the waiting shell, which exploded. L/Bdr. Lambert recalls the unpleasant task of clearing up the following morning. The largest piece of body collected was only about two feet square. Gunners Charles Shipley and Alan Oakley, Bombardiers Leonard Meredith and Geoffrey Tribe and Lance-Bombardiers James Ashdown and Leslie Horton were all killed. This was the blackest day for the Regiment in Normandy. All the dead are buried in a collective grave in Ranville War Cemetery.

A tribute to Charlie Shipley, one of the Regiment killed in the aforementioned incident, appeared in the local press of his home-town, Lichfield, in Staffordshire. At only 20 years of age he was the youngest member of the Regiment to be killed in the campaign.

‘This week his parents received a letter from the platoon (battery/ gun) sergeant expressing deep sorrow and adding: Charlie came to me almost a year ago and since the time he joined us he proved himself a fine friend as well as a gunner. He was very popular and had made many friends in a short while, and with myself and his officers I include their very deep sympathy for you in your sorrow and loss. His character was beyond any reproach and he set himself a high standard of efficiency of which he was duly proud. Everything that was at all possible was done at his burial with a service and particulars were placed on a cross made by the regiment.’

Bill Abel had played football with Les Horton, who perished in the explosion, and he remembers that members of 81 Battery were deeply shaken by this tragedy. However, for one soldier this was a story of a lucky escape. Because the guns had to be manned at all times the detachment split into two groups,

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which worked in shifts. Just before the explosion Sergeant Bignall went to change his boots. He was replaced by Bdr. Tribe while he did so: a split second second decision to which he owed his life.On this day the Regiment also lost the 2 i/c, Major Hingston, who had to be evacuated to hospital. Whilst instructing a group of men in the P.I.A.T., he sustained a facial injury. The P.I.A.T. had a tendency to kick violently when fired. Ammunition was also considered unreliable as the fuse of the warheads had a habit of detonating prematurely. One might speculate whether this weapons training, with a close range anti-tank weapon, was going to be of much practical use to the personnel of a medium artillery regiment. Rather more worrying than enemy tanks, were the nightly visits from the Luftwaffe. Enemy aircraft were still often active at night, flying in low and usually managing to hit something. On the 3rd of August the Regiment took its turn to be attacked by the Luftwaffe. Flares were dropped and gun positions strafed and bombed at night. One detachment had a surprise when a UXB was discovered in their gun pit! Once again, there was intermittent enemy shelling. 2nd Canadian Corps war diary reported that some stored ammunition ‘was hit’ in 9 AGRA ‘area’ during this

attack. Incredibly, there were no casualties or damage to the guns. Guns were protected by their pits and detachments sheltered in dugouts within a few feet of the gun pits, which helped to minimise casualties. Nonetheless, it was perhaps with some relief that the 9 AGRA war diary reports that two troops of 112 LAA were expected to move into the area offering some protection. At this time the AGRA was allocated a Mobile Bath Unit. It had set up in a nearby industrial area, which was under spasmodic shell fire. So, feeling a little vulnerable, the men stripped off for their first proper wash since landing in Normandy (about 20 days). Clean underwear was also obtained, and everyone felt a little more civilised.Totalize9 AGRA was one of four AGRA’s allotted to Operation Totalize, a complex two phase operation designed to break through the German defences south of Caen, and reach the high ground that dominated Falaise. 350 rounds per gun were dumped on the position so this was going to be a big attack. There was an air of excitement in the gun pits. As zero hour drew near everything went quiet. When the order ‘Fire!’ came through the tannoy the night sky was lit by hundreds of flashes like lightening. It was 2345 hours, August 7th, and phase one had begun with a massive barrage

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fired by all regiments in 9 AGRA. This creeping barrage, was to take forward the 51st (H) Infantry Division riding on tanks. It stretched across a frontage of 4050 yards, to a depth of 6000 yards and advanced over 100 yards a minute. Firing this sort of barrage took great care, and the NCOs concentrated hard on their gun programmes giving the elevation and line alterations to be applied to the gun by the layer. 9 Medium Regiment had representatives up with the infantry of 154 Brigade who were spearheading the advance. Their task was to punch a hole in the forward enemy positions, penetrate to a depth of some 5000 yards, occupy and hold the area of Cramesnil – St Aignan – Garcelles Sequeville. Under the eerie glow of ‘artificial moonlight’ 154 Brigade’s column of vehicles rumbled forward, four abreast. Somewhere in this column, Captain Clayton and Gunner Smith, both of 82 Battery, manned a tank OP, and were ready to call in artillery support as needed. The night advance went well with only small hold ups due to sunken roads, high embankments and small pockets of enemy resistance. By light the infantry were on their objectives, and dug in. Heavy German artillery and mortar fire signalled the start of a counter attack. A number of

infantry around Captain Clayton’s OP quickly became casualties. Under fire from small arms and 88mm guns, Gunner Smith helped to dress wounds and comfort the wounded. Once the counter attack was over and successfully defeated, Captain Clayton ordered his tank to take the wounded back to the Battalion RAP. Part of the way back they met up with soldiers from the battalion who took off all the wounded except for one man who was bleeding profusely from a serious leg wound, whom Captain Clayton decided to take right up to the RAP. Unfortunately when the RAP was located the approach was over an open stretch of ground covered by hidden 88mm guns. It was far too risky to proceed, except perhaps on foot. Gunner Smith immediately volunteered to take the wounded infantryman to the RAP himself. With the help of another infantry soldier and a stretcher Gunner Smith scurried across the open ground as bullets buzzed like wasps above him and 88mm HE shells crashed into the ground all around. The wounded man was delivered safely to the RAP: an action that undoubtedly saved his life.

Friendly FireFor Phase Two 9th Medium Regiment switched support to the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, which advanced alongside the Route Nationale 158. The

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Division had given the Regiment a list of targets for ‘concs on call.’ It began, however, with a heavy air attack to soften up the German positions. All went well until allied aircraft became disorganized in heavy flak and dropped short. At 13.30 on the 8th

silver B-17’s of the US Eighth Air Force (351st Bomber Group) jettisoned their fragmentation bombs on 9 AGRA HQ, which was located in a large manor house on the outskirts of Vaucelles, and near the gun positions. The officers had just begun their dessert of prunes and custard when an almighty explosion brought the ceiling down and shattered the windows. One officer was killed by a bomb splinter, and one mess waiter had a huge piece of bomb through his calf, which stuck out both sides. As more bombs exploded, the survivors were ushered into the cellars.This caused some disorientation for a few hours whilst casualties were evacuated, and damage repaired. 9 AGRA was temporarily not able to accept any fire orders from the regiments. AGRA HQ was, therefore, transferred to HQ 9th Medium Regiment which had been lucky and not suffered too badly in the bombing. A frank and rather cold report appeared in the AGRA HQ War Diary: ‘This HQ bombed by allied aircraft, 1 Offr. and 4 OR’s killed, 1 Offr.

and 7 OR’s wounded. 2nd Canadian Corps ammunition dump hit and set on fire (300 yds away).’ A number of HQ vehicles were also destroyed (one estimate suggests 75%). The spearhead units for this second phase of Totalize were criticized for their lack of dash, and the limited artillery support due to ‘friendly fire’ incidents may have been just one factor in this. Gnr. Ronald Discombe:

‘The guns of the Regiment were firing from near Giberville when we observed what appeared to be a returning American Flying Fortress drop bombs on an ammo dump near Caen. I recollect seeing a huge explosion. Thankfully we were a few miles away.’

A popular saying at the time was: ‘When the British come over, the Germans take cover, when the Germans come over, we take cover, and when the Americans come over everyone takes cover!’The Regiment moved forward to follow up the breakthrough to a position in Verriers. From here it could more effectively support the Canadian armoured units, of the 4th Armoured Brigade, at the front. The next day a further move brought the guns of the Regiment to the village of Cintheaux on the Caen ‘plain’ (a wide, open area of cornfields). Operation Totalize had ground to

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a halt at a new German defence line, with Quesnay Wood as one of its key bastions. This wood sat astride the RN 158, and was stubbornly defended by elements of the 12th SS, a company of the 102 SS Heavy Panzer Battalion with Tiger tanks, and anti-tank guns. It became a focus of the Regiment’s attention. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division put in an assault under the cover of a heavy artillery barrage laid down by 9 AGRA. The attack was a terrible failure, however, with the leading battalions suffering heavy casualties. The fire plan had been arranged in haste without detailed knowledge of enemy positions, and it proved impossible to provide accurate artillery support. Subsequently, as part of the effort to reach Falaise from the West, an attack was put in by 2nd Canadian Division across the Laize River. 9th Mediums sent representatives to 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment, and 4th Brigade. Support was duly given, but these attacks were overshadowed by the next ‘big push.’ A second great armoured assault on the enemy defences north of Falaise began on August 14th. It was called Operation Tractable. Unlike Totalize it took place in broad daylight. 9th Medium Regiment were in support of 4th Canadian Armoured Division. C.O.’s reps were out with S.A.R. (tanks) and an infantry battalion

of 10th Cdn. Inf. Bde. (lorried). While the battle raged Bomber Command struck Quesnay Woods and targets around Potigny. However, 77 of the 811 bombers misidentified their targets, and dropped bombs into the rear areas. It was a bright, sunny afternoon, and the gunners strained their eyes to look at the vast armada of black planes with bomb bays open. To their utter surprise bombs started to fall on and around their position. Several bombs crashed into the railway embankment just ahead of the Regiment’s guns. Haut Mesnil located a few hundred yards away up the hill (gun areas for Canadian field regiments) was plastered with bombs, and a huge dust cloud rose into the blue sky. A stick of bombs also thudded into the slope leading down to the tunnel through the railway embankment. The earth shook violently like an earthquake, and shrapnel whizzed viciously through the air. Gnr. Ronald Discombe (RHQ) gives his view of the disaster:

‘It appears the Polish armoured division were in position in a wood some miles from us, waiting to advance on another wood where the enemy were well dug in. A large bomber raid was laid on to soften them up, it seemed the orders were to bomb the smoke. Unfortunately the wind blew it back over the Polish line, you can imagine what

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happened then, another sad mistake. As the planes came over us we actually saw the bombs leaving the aircraft. Then soon after we witnessed many frightened troops in various forms of transport fleeing back to the rear.

ORSM Harry Kemp also recalls the traumatic experience of being bombed by ‘friendly’ aircraft. His account also suggests the chaos and confusion caused by such an attack.

I was one of those who lay in a small slit trench about four feet long and two feet deep that had previously been dug by the Germans when they were there. Lying there for what seemed like hours on end, watching the bomb doors of those planes open up and the bombs falling out all around us, why we were not killed I shall never know. The Poles did evacuate their forward position and left our regiment in the front line. If the Germans had made an attack at that time I am sure we would have been pushed back to the coast. To me this was the worst experience I had ever had in my life.

It was recorded that 661 Squadron AOP sent up tiny Auster planes in a brave attempt to stop the bombing. Veteran Bill Abel remembers a spotter plane buzzing around the huge bombers ‘like a little fly.’ These

courageous pilots fired red Very lights in an attempt to indicate that something was wrong. L/Bdr. Lambert remembers that a Spitfire also tried to distract the raiders. Futile messages were sent to AGRA HQ and passed onto 2nd Canadian Corps HQ saying that bombs were falling in map square 0854 (virtually on top of the Regiment) but it was too late.The details of what happened on the ground in the vicinity of the 9th Mediums on this day are alittle unclear, as one might expect. Naturally eyewitnesses interviewed had different stories to tell, which depended on their location at the time. TheRegiment and its different elements covered quite a wide geographical area so each man had a different perspective. At any rate, the history of 9 AGRA states that several men were wounded in the bombing. As if this day hadn’t been trying enough, the War Diary records that Gunner Arthur Heap was killed, and one 5.5 in. gun was put out of action. No explanation was given, and one might have concluded that this was a result of the ‘friendly fire’. However, veteran Joe Johnson recalled that during one of the fire programmes a gun in B Troop split open due to a premature explosion of a shell. Gun Layer, Arthur Heap, was hit in the back by metal fragments as he turned away, fingers in ears, to protect

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them from the noise of the gun firing. He was killed instantly.Shells, mosquitoes and dysentery!Most Normandy veterans have their own ‘shell story’ to tell, and here are couple from members of the Regiment. The first takes place when the Regiment was located near Giberville. Lt. Hendley, 81 Battery Asst. CPO, recalls coming under counter battery fire while visiting RHQ. On the arrival of an 88mm shell some 50 yards from his party Lt. Hendley dashed forward, without a thought for his own safety and compass in hand, to get a bearing on the fall of the shell! He was immediately recalled and received a verbal lashing from Lt. Col. Wade (Commander 9th Medium Regiment, nicknamed ‘Bongo’). On this occasion the Germans were only 50 yards away from a lucky shot, and the Regiment came close to losing its commander! Ronald Discombe (RHQ), who was with the wagon lines at Roquancourt, also recalls a lucky escape. A shell landed 20 yards from him. In his own words:

‘I remember talking to Sergeant Campbell near to the cook’s truck when we heard one coming. Both of us diving together for a small slit trench which was really a hopeless cause, luckily for ourselves and the rest of the chaps around it did not explode.’

Driver Chris Wanstall (81 Battery) had a very similar experience:

I remember being parked in a field with about twenty others nose to tail…there was a small gap between each lorry with camouflage netting for cover and we drivers used the space to eat our meals…Jerry decided to wake us up with a few shells, one shell fell under the wheel of the lorry by which we were sitting but it failed to explode. We made a hasty retreat!

Dud shells were not uncommon in Normandy, and there are many miraculous-escape-from-death stories. Slave workers in Nazi factories often sabotaged shells, and hundreds of allied soldiers no doubt owe their lives to these brave people. Shells were not the only problem in Normandy. Life was made uncomfortable by the intense heat and dust and also by a plague of wasps, mosquitoes and flies. According to 9 AGRA magazine the mosquitoes were ‘as formidable an enemy as any S.S. man!’ Captain Denham was stung in the mouth by a wasp, which resulted in an agonising swelling. At Cintheaux many men in the 9th suffered from dysentery brought on by the myriad of flies, poor diet and inadequate hygiene. Bill Abel recalls the frequent shout, ‘Where’s the shovel?’

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Fortunately, this problem could be fairly quickly cured by a dose of Chlorodine from the M.O.

The Falaise PocketWith Operation Tractable sputtering to a close on the high ground north of Falaise, the job of taking the town itself was given to 2nd Canadian Infantry division. The 4th Canadian Armoured Division was ordered to the south east to secure a crossing over the Ante River at Damblainville and take Trun to cut off one of the escape routes out of the developing pocket. The Regiment supported both these formations. The first move was to Tornebu on the 15th of August, but due to rapid advances the enemy were too far to the east and therefore out of range. After the area had been recced, the Regiment occupied fields surrounding Villers Canivet, and came into action in support of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. This once picturesque village was blighted by SS graves and grotesque, bloated Norman cows. Fortunately, this position was only occupied for a short time (16th-17th). A gun area followed in Perrieres, near to a quarry, and just outside the village (or what was left of it). With fourteen, instead of sixteen guns in action, tasks were fired to support 2nd Canadian Infantry Division still mopping

up pockets of resistance in Falaise and also for 4th Canadian Armd. who were trying to close the pocket. Evidence of a German collapse in Normandy started to come into the Regiment HQ. A 9th Medium Regiment officer with the latter division at an OP overlooking Damblainville had a grandstand view and reported seeing through his field glasses groups of enemy surrendering and waving white flags. During the night the Luftwaffe was active in the vicinity, dropping flares, bombing and machine-gunning at low level. This was another (unsuccessful) attempt to re-supply troops in the pocket with food and petrol rations.After two days in Perrieres the Regiment moved again to Norrey-en Auge, where for a short time 9th Mediums came under the command of 2nd Canadian AGRA, and fired their shells into an enemy that was desperately trying to escape encirclement. Roads in the pocket were littered with burnt out tanks and vehicles and thousands of dead horses and men: an unforgettable sight and smell for all who witnessed it. The battle for Normandy was over and this short period of rapid advances for the Regiment had come to an end. In AGRA column the Regiment moved to a concentration area at Livarot.

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Chapter FourThe Battle for the Channel Ports

Le HarveWhile Second Army hurried northwards from the Seine, the First Canadian Army, with 1st Corps under command, was given the task of reducing some of the strongly defended Channel ports. After a short period in harbour (i.e. out of action in a static position), while it was decided where the AGRA was most needed, the guns moved to take part in the battle for Le Harve (Operation Astoria). Le Harve was one of the strongest fortresses of the Atlantic Wall. It had a garrison of 12,000 and was protected on the east by an anti-tank ditch and extensive mine-fields and wire obstacles. Of enemy guns capable of use in the ground role there were 108 of 8.8 cm calibre and over. 9 AGRA, including the 9th Medium Regiment, were responsible for Counter Battery fire before H hour and during the operation. CB neutralization programmes, observed and corrected by air

OP’s, were fired at the opening of each phase of the attack, in particular during the gapping of minefields and anti tank obstacles. Thereafter CB was on call from 661 and 652 AOP

Squadron. ‘V’ and HF targets were also fired. At 11.30 on the morning of the 12th of September the Garrison Commander surrendered after only 48 hours of fighting. He later stated that 75 per cent of his guns had been put out of action or prevented from firing by the Counter Battery fire of the British guns. In fact, no CB fire was attempted by the enemy guns in this operation.

Boulogne/Calais“Operation Wellhit,” the battle for Boulogne, was joined on the 17th of September from positions near Bellebrune (behind Mont Lambert and the Foret de

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Boulogne). It was thought that some 90 enemy guns of 75mm calibre or greater were in Boulogne. To this end a comprehensive CB fire plan was organised by 2nd Canadian Corps - probably the most detailed of its kind ever produced. Included in this was a counter-flak programme (called ‘Apple Pie’ in artillery speak) against hostile heavy AA guns, whilst our own aircraft flew over their targets. Every known strong point and gun position was included in the list of artillery concentrations. The six day operation was successful although the defences proved more difficult to crack than at first anticipated. Heavy shelling held up the infantry, suggesting that the fire plan was not as successful as at Le Harve. Incredibly, enemy batteries appeared to have withstood our artillery and air attack (80,000 rounds fired on CB tasks and 3000 tons of bombs). Of the 600 casualties suffered by the Canadians during this operation, the majority were caused by enemy shell-fire. While this operation continued new gun areas were ‘recced’ for Operation Undergo, the attack on Calais. 200 rounds per gun were dumped at the new positions in Audembert, and holding parties awaited the arrival of the Regiment. Planning for this assault followed the pattern of the previous operations with

heavy bombardment from the air and all available artillery. 9th Mediums supported 8th Canadian Brigade in their attack on the Sangatte and Cap Blanc Nez batteries. A representative was sent to their HQ. The Regiment moved to Audembert on the 21st of September. The Dover coastline looked very close, and yet at the same time so impossibly far to the men. Ominous sound of heavy gunfire was heard in the direction of Cap Griz Nez, and the Regiment braced itself for the inevitable. The mighty German batteries at Cap Griz Nez began to cause trouble over the next few days, as they were able to fire in enfilade into the gun areas. Particularly troublesome were the huge 28cm guns of Batterie Grosser Kurfurst- The Great Elector- named after Frederich Whilhelm (1640-1688). Often called the Framzelle battery from the name of the little village nearby, it was unique amongst all the cross-Channel big guns in that the four emplacements had a 360 degree arc of fire. This was made possible by mounting standard naval turrets on top of concrete casemates. Grosser Kurfurst turned its turrets inland and slammed shells into the gun areas of 9 AGRA at the rate of 10 per hour. There were fatal casualties in other regiments of the AGRA but 9th Medium was spared.

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Two other incidents occurred during these battles, and were reported in the War Diary. There was a premature on one gun, splitting the barrel, which totally destroyed it. It will be recalled that the Regiment had been ‘unlucky’ with prematures, but fortunately, there were no casualties this time. A Signals Officer and NCO were also blown up on a mine whilst travelling in a jeep. Neither were seriously hurt. Fire support switched to 7 Brigade in its assault on Calais. The garrison resisted fiercely, and concentrations were engaged by the whole of 9AGRA in the area of the Citadel where a group of enemy machine-gunners were putting up stubborn resistance. On the 28th of September the guns of the 9th Medium Regiment were ordered to turn around to engage the batteries at Cap Griz Nez, which continued to make a considerable nuisance of themselves. It is unlikely that this shelling had any physical effect because the Germans had thick concrete shelters, but it no doubt dented morale. With the support of the medium guns, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade put in an attack, and winkled out the German garrison. An OP was established with Captain Howard in charge, and he was able to watch the action unfold from a German pillbox on a hill overlooking Framzelle village. AVRE’S, flail tanks, crocodiles

and infantry cleared the trenches and bunkers providing Howard and his party with a cinematographic picture of a modern battle. Although it was difficult to get down fire, as friend and foe were locked in close quarter fighting, the Regiment fired some concentrations successfully. On the 29th the guns of Cap Griz Nez fell silent forever. Peter Howard recalls an amusing incident that happened at this ‘pill-box’ OP:

We had been living off bully-beef and biscuits for some time and were often thinking of fresh meat and rabbit pie (just like my mother used to make). L/Bdr. Hilliard, our bren-carrier driver (and cook) rang up to the OP to say he had caught a rabbit and would we like it for lunch. The answer was of course “Yes please! But do you know how to deal with it?” “I think so,” was his reply. A little while later he rang again to say “I’m not getting on too well with the rabbit – it keeps looking at me out of the billy-can and all its fur is coming to the surface of the stew.” My answer was fairly unprintable. However, a short time later a beautiful stew arrived in our mess tins with tinned potatoes and carrots. I apologised! Lt. Hendley recalls being told to interrogate prisoners from the German batteries at Cap Griz Nez. This assignment led to the

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acquisition of a nice trophy. Hendley spied a large flag, and felt that it ought to be his, especially since the Buffs had been on the receiving end of the German batteries fire while in Dover.The focus of the fighting shifted then back to Calais itself, and both batteries moved forward

1400 yards to engage Calais town. With the civilians evacuated a fire plan could be arranged on an unprecedented scale in support of the assaulting units of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. At 1845 hours on the 30th resistance ceased.

Chapter FiveThe Scheldt Pocket

‘Operation Switchback’On the 1st of October the whole of 9 AGRA moved to a harbour area near Ypres, and stayed there for two days before moving on to the area of Eecloo, not far from the Dutch border. It was here that the Regiment became the victim of friendly fire for the second time when rocket-firing Typhoons attacked vehicles. There were some injuries but luckily no fatalities. It is worth noting that their own side in one way or another caused 62% of the Regiment’s fatalities! Anticipating that the AGRA would be in this vicinity for the next two or three weeks a rest Centre was set up in Eecloo. The centre was in part of a factory building where good sleeping accommodation was available, a well lighted dining room, and a canteen with reading and writing rooms. 12 men per regiment were

allowed to stay at this centre for a period of 48 hours each to take a well-earned rest and to seize the opportunity to clean clothes and equipment. An added attraction was the opening of a train service to Ghent and a number of men

availed themselves of the opportunity to buy gifts to send home.Following the recce and digging parties the Regiment established itself in new gun areas at Kaprijke, and prepared for Operation Switchback, the clearing of the so called Breskens Pocket on the south bank of the Scheldt. The Breskens Pocket was defended by over 10,000 well equipped soldiers under the command of the experienced Major General Knut Eberding.

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This was to be a tough battle for the artillery as well as the infantry. Conditions were unpleasant. It was wet most of the time, mud clung to everything and boots weighed pounds more. In order to give accurate support to the Canadians it was necessary during the battle for the guns to change position several times within the Troop area. On one occasion a move of just 100 yards (!) was required. Gun pits had to be re-dug, and this was no easy task at night and in poor weather. It took a supreme effort from all those involved. Detachments well deserved their rum ration in these circumstances! Support was given to the 7th Canadian Brigade in their attack across the Leopold Canal, and later the 9th and 8th Canadian Brigades in their action at the rear of the Breskens Pocket. For the attack across the canal the Regiment shelled 64th Infantry Division HQ in Oostburg, the village of Aardenburg, key road junctions and enemy AA and machine gun positions that threatened the Canadian advance. There was no shortage of targets because an enormous quantity of guns and ammunition had been left in the pocket by formations which had been evacuated across the Scheldt. A tough battle ensued in which the Canadians made continuous calls on the artillery for help. HF and CB tasks were fired by the Regiment,

and some hostile batteries were engaged by AOP observation (B Flt, 661 Sqn). Progress was slow, and the enemy remained very aggressive. On the night of the 8/9th of October enemy fighting patrols were even reported in the vicinity of the gun areas! The attack by 7 Brigade was halted just 400 yards north of the canal. Given the tenuous nature of the situation civilians were evacuated from St. Laurens, Kaprijke, and the houses in the vicinity of the gun areas. The Regiment was kept very busy over the next few days with more harassing fire tasks, concentrations and counter battery tasks to assist the infantry (on 7 and 9 Brigade fronts) in crushing the pocket. By the 14th of October the War Diary reports proudly that their fire had been ‘very effective’ and the Canadian infantry brigades that they were supporting had made ‘considerable progress’. On the 16th the 9th Medium Regiment took over close support of 9 Brigade from the 10th Medium Regiment. Mike targets were fired as the Canadians fought their way into the hamlets of Slijkplaat and Sasput.The focus now became the attack on Breskens itself. The Regiment moved forward to a new gun area in Ijzendijke. On the 20th of October an elaborate set-piece attack was put in and the 9th Mediums supported the leading brigade. Mike targets were again

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fired in close support of 9 Brigade. An OP deployed with 14 Field Regiment RCA in support of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (SDG’s) of 9 Brigade. This unit reported that our artillery fire was very effective, and POW’s were very shaken. Nonetheless, heavy guns on Flushing brought down accurate fire onto the attackers, and OP parties from the Regiment came under very heavy shell-fire. In an attempt to disrupt vital supplies, the enemy’s main ammunition dump was given Scale 10 by the Regiment, and the rest of the AGRA (all guns firing 10 rounds). In addition, 9th Medium Regiment with the Air OP took on an enemy oil tank, and scored a direct hit! During the Breskens battle the Regiment engaged a GNF (Guns Now Firing) target using 3rd Division’s AOP. Three active hostile enemy batteries were shelled with excellent results. Getting ammunition up to the guns during this battle proved very difficult. The roads were usually narrow and bordered by deep ditches. In some cases the roads were under water, and distances from the wagon lines to the guns were considerable. To make matters worse the use of lights was impossible due to the nature of the country. That ammunition always came up to the guns was a credit to the drivers and their NCOs who

worked extremely hard, and in no small way contributed to the Allied success in crushing the enemy pocket.

South Beveland and Walcheren IslandKlousterzande was the next gun area for the Regiment, from which support could be given tothe 2nd Canadian Infantry Division for a new operation: an attack on South Beveland and the causeway (a narrow strip of land that connected Walcheren and South Beveland). This move was carried out at short notice and via roads, which were in very poor condition. The effort to clear the German forces from South Beveland and Walcheren was vital. As the advance continued eastwards into Germany and north through Holland it became increasingly clear that the port of Antwerp was essential for the unloading of supplies. This port could not be put into operation until Walcheren and South Beveland had been cleared of the enemy. Walcheren was the key to the Scheldt but its capture depended on the conquest of the neighbouring peninsula of South Beveland. With the support of the 9th Medium Regiment, the 2nd Canadian Division probed along the Isthmus of South Beveland. Major Paterson was sent to HQ 4/5 battalion RSF with two FOOs (Captain Howard and Captain Rowland-Jones) for the next phase of the operation. Both

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FOOs had the authority to shoot the whole AGRA if necessary. All three men were to move with the infantry in the first wave of the seaborne attack on South Beveland.On the 26th of October seaborne landings by the 52nd Lowland Division took place on South Beveland (codenamed Operation Vitality). Tasks were fired by the Regiment for 156 Brigade, and many observed targets were engaged in close support of 4/5 RSF. This dramatic episode in the history of the 9th Mediums is worth re-telling in detail. At 02.45 hours the flotilla set off from the little port of Terneuzen, and headed for two beaches on the south-eastern corner of Beveland, code named Amber and Green. Travelling in Buffaloes from 5th Assault Regiment RE, The Royal Scots Fusiliers with Captain Howard, Captain Rowland-Jones and Major Paterson were headed for Green Beach. The Buffaloes would swim eastwards up the Scheldt for three miles then turn to cross it diagonally making for Green Beach another four miles away. Ingenious precautions were taken to ensure that the flotilla would not stray from its course. Bofors guns on the Ossenisse Peninsula fired tracer shells across Green Beach to prevent craft from going too far north. Marker shells were also fired from time to time onto the beaches direct. Since it was a

very dark night with no moon these showed up well. The historian of the 52nd (L) Division comments that this all added to the tension of strain on the troops in the tight packed and heaving Buffaloes, most of whom were going into action for the first time.Fifteen minutes before the Buffaloes were due to arrive, the Regiment shelled the beach area. Commander R.D. Franks RN who navigated the flotilla paid tribute to the artillery fire which was ‘most accurate and heartening’. This fire lifted after ten minutes and concentrations on call were then fired when needed. Despite all the precautions Major Paterson was to have quite an eventful trip. The Buffalo in which he was travelling became separated from the assault force, and drifted dangerously off course. Paterson took charge of the situation and guided the Buffalo to a successful landing. Despite difficult conditions of mud and enemy shell and mortar fire the Buffalo got over the dyke and re-joined the Battalion. Captain Howard, with B Company, had a less eventful landing on the mud, silt and sand of the Beveland beach. There was no serious opposition to the initial landings, but there was some shelling and inaccurate machine gun fire from the Hoedekenskerke area. As dawn broke, Howard and his OP party

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could see the familiar Dutch pattern of flat green fields, isolated farmhouses, windmills and much water! Howard was forced to site his OP on a dyke embankment given the open, flat nature of the terrain. Then, the enemy began to retaliate. The OP was shelled and mortared throughout the day, but they continued to offer valuable support to the infantry by shelling suspected enemy positions. Just before dusk the Germans counter-attacked. Howard immediately called for fire support from the guns while he and members of his OP party engaged the enemy with small arms. Howard killed one German soldier with his Bren gun at only 30 yards range. In fact, the Germans got so close to the OP party that use of the wireless became dangerous as their voices could be heard by the enemy. Captain Howard was awarded the Military Cross for his part in this action. His citation reads: ‘With his coolness and disregard for his own personal safety he set a first class example to those around him (most of whom were in action for the first time).’ Peter Howard gives his personal view of the attack:

My OP party (Bdr. Hilliard, L/Bdr. Hennesey, L/Bdr. O’Death) supported the Walcheren attack. We sailed with the infantry in Buffalos. A Bofors gun, firing tracer every

approximate 30 seconds, kept us in line on the sea. We landed easily with no casualties. The next evening there was a counter attack and we brought down a lot of fire (the whole AGRA at one stage) and broke up the attack. We also had to dispose of an enemy mortar, which was getting too close. I did not know I was being put in for a medal until some time later and explained to my party it was for a joint effort. Not very satisfactory. They were not honoured.

Like Howard, Rowland-Jones who was with A Company 4/5 RSF, directed fire onto enemy counter attacks, bringing shells down onto his own position, which was within yards of the enemy. His actions, and the first-class shooting by the guns of the 9th Medium Regiment and the AGRA had helped to save the situation. Rowland-Jones was also awarded the Military Cross.The bridgehead on South Beveland was slowly but surely expanded with continued close support being given by the Regiment to 4/5 RSF. Each moving along their allotted axis, the Canadians and the Lowlanders successfully cleared South Beveland. For the Regiment a short period of harbour in Lovendegem, near Ghent followed.

Operation Infatuate

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In the next phase of the operation against Walcheren itself the Regiment was in action in support of 155 Infantry Brigade landing at Flushing (Operation Infatuate1) and the 4th Special Service Brigade landing at Westkapelle (Operation Infatuate 2). Captain Lemmon (of D Troop) was sent to Battalion HQ of 4 KOSB, 155 Brigade, as the C.O’s representative at the sharp end. New gun areas were established for this operation, codenamed ‘Infatuate,’ at Slijkplaat. This position was very near to the water of the Scheldt Estuary. Only the murky waters of the Scheldt separated the Regiment from a vigilant enemy in Flushing, which made everyone feel a little uneasy. The weather on the 31st October began damp and misty, but as it cleared it was possible to see across the estuary to the German held side. It followed that the Germans could see the British guns and began to try to pick them off with their 88’s. Gnr. Frank White was killed in this confrontation and six others wounded. Casualties suffered in this position by the Regiment were the heaviest of the campaign from enemy fire, and it was the only time they were engaged over open sights, and at such short range. Despite this setback the Regiment got into action to support the landings on

Walcheren. At H-70 on November 1st some 300 guns that had assembled in the fields on the south side of the estuary opened fire. This was the biggest crash of artillery since Caen, with an allocation of 275 rounds per gun. The gunners working hard to maintain this barrage would not be able to see the dramatic scene visible to the men on landing craft crossing the estuary. The southern coastline was silhouetted by hundreds of muzzle flashes, while on the northern side sudden bright pinpricks of light showed where the shells were exploding. Soon Flushing was alight, and its windmill stood out defiantly against the orange flame.The enemy positions on Walcheren were coded by the RAF, and each numbered target prefixed with a letter W. The Regiment fired on W209, a road dyke and enemy machine-gun positions on the outskirts of Flushing. For Infatuate 2 the guns also ranged on W11, a battery of four 150mm guns in bunkers (located in dunes high above the hamlet of Dishoek), and W265B, a section of dunes containing enemy mortars and machine-gun nests. It was important that thesepositions were suppressed as they could fire on the landing beaches, and cause considerable disruption. Captain Lemmon and his small party of signallers, landed on

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Uncle Beach (Flushing) with Battalion HQ of 4 K.O.S.B., which followed the Commandos who had already secured the beach area. However, by the time the LCA s carrying HQ arrived, the Germans had recovered from the initial shock of the assault and machine gun fire and mortars raked the beach. Fortunately, suffering only light casualties, the battalion immediately became engaged with the Commandos in clearing the town and dock area. HQ, along with Captain Lemmon and his party, set up in an old air raid shelter in Grave Straat, and did what they could to offer support. Some pillboxes and gun emplacements proved obstinate. So as well as firing a timed programme at the start of the operation the Regiment was kept busy thereafter with concentrations on call and stonks (linear targets usually ordered to several regiments at once). W1 (anti-aircraft battery) and W211 (fortified buildings) were among the targets engaged. Slowly but surely white flags began to appear as each enemy strongpoint gave up the fight. On November 2nd 5 K.O.S.B. landed on Uncle Beach at 0500hrs, and passed through 4 K.O.S.B. Captain Lemmon and his party were ordered to join them as advanced northwards, and swung east to reach the Middelburg canal. They made steady progress but the dock area

to the east of the canal remained in enemy hands.The 3rd was a day of consolidation for 155 Bde.. The Borderers received fire support from the Regiment as they hunted out the remaining fanatics still hiding among factory buildings. The oil refinery, codenamed ‘Haymarket’ (W213) which had been harassing the Scots, was treated to an artillery shoot. Next, under cover of artillery, 5 K.O.S.B. crossed the canal and entered the eastern dock area where it found the Germans still holding out. The war diary for 9th

Medium Regiment states that the dock area was eventually reported to be ‘in our hands’ at 8:10am on the 4th. Elements of 5 K.OS.B. and 4 K.O.S.B. then turned north and advanced up the banks of the canal towards Middelburg. Strongpoints facing the Scots were shelled, and subjected to a Typhoon rocket strike. Meanwhile, on the eastern corner of Walcheren, 157 Bde were attempting to cross a cement causeway from the peninsula of South Beveland (the only way onto the island), and thus cut off the Walcheren garrison. A Fire Plan Task was fired by the regiment to help the Scots of 157 Bde., but it wasn’t until November 6th that they finally joined 155 Bde troops in Middelburg.

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At 2345 hrs., during the night of November 5th (whilst engaged in firing HF on Middelburg) the Regiment was stood down. Their battle for Walcheren was over. With only mopping up to do on the island, they moved to Budel and went into harbour for a period of rest and maintenance.The Divisional Commander of the 52 Lowland Division (Major General Hackwell-Smith) expressed his appreciation of the efforts of the Regiment and its sister regiments, in 9 AGRA, during the Scheldt battle. Hackwell-Smith wrote:

We were fortunate in having the support of the 9th AGRA for the ZUID BEVELAND, and both the 9th AGRA and 2nd Canadian AGRA…for WALCHEREN. Both were quite first class but 9th AGRA were magnificent. They did everything and more that I asked and there is no doubt that the fire of their guns was the major factor in breaking the Bosche morale.

A close friendship had also built up with the Canadians over the past months. Major General D.C. Spry, commanding 3 Canadian Infantry Division wrote to Brigadier Crosland at HQ 9 AGRA:

As you leave us to go away in support of another formation, I wish to take this opportunity on behalf of all ranks of 3 Canadian Inf. Div. to thank you and all those who serve with you in 9 AGRA for splendid fire support and very close and friendly cooperation which you have given us, not only in the current operation but also during the battles for Boulogne, Cap Griz-Nez and Calais. I am sure that there is not one single soldier in the Division that is not aware of how much our recent successes have been the results of your support.

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Chapter SixTarget Germany

Venlo/Roermond PocketA German counter-attack (launched while the Regiment was still in the Scheldt area) created a bridgehead over the River Maas, which became known as the Venlo-Roermond Pocket. As long as this pocket remained any attack into the Rhineland was clearly unsound. Thus, the 51st (Highland) Division and the 53rd (Welsh) Division were earmarked to clear the pocket. 9 AGRA were to give their support. From battle positions at Weert ‘Operation Mallard’ was joined on the 14th of November, and went very well from the start. Timed programmes were fired in support of 51st Highland Division and 53rd Welsh

Division. Opposition was described as ‘slight.’ Regimental representatives Clayton, Howard and Rowland-Jones and their OP parties were sent to 81, 83 and 133 Field Regiments RA respectively for close support of 53rd Welsh Division. The Regiment moved again on the 15th to gun areas at Ell, Gom and Hunsel in order to support 71 Brigade of the 53rd (W) Division in its attack on Horn. RHQ was located close to the village of Ell, while the guns were positioned in

flat, open fields between Ell and Hunsel. The locality was under spasmodic 88mm fire during the afternoon, and following day from a few German artillery pieces lurking in woods near Heijthuijzen, a few miles away. Most shells landed

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in the village of Ell itself, and some on the road bordering D and C Troop positions. The infantry moving up in TCVs to attack Horn had to stop in Ell, Gom and Hunsel for two hours due to engineering problems with bridges they had to cross. However, they did get forward and tasks were fired by the Regiment to support the attack on Horn. By nightfall the whole area was liberated. The Regiment continued to fire during the night to harass the enemy in this sector. In the morning there was some excitement at RHQ when soldiers of the Belgian Brigade, who were patrolling the Wessum Canal, brought in six German POW’s. The Belgians were due to move from this sector on the 17th, and perhaps this is why they handed over their ‘prize’ to the 9th Medium Regiment. On this day a move was made to Heuthhuijzen to support an attack on Roermond, and fire a bombard fire plan for 49th Division. The Regiment now occupied a densely wooded area. 88mm guns, located in positions across the Maas, lightly shelled gun areas of the AGRA at 2300 hrs.. The Regiment did try to silence these, and other enemy guns shelling the front; CB tasks were fired for CBO, 12 Corps over the next few days. Although these enemy guns often only operated in ones and twos they could do considerable damage and sap morale.

Also, at this time a very unfortunate accident took place as the guns were moving position, which resulted in the death of Gunner Cecil Aldridge (from 81 Battery). He was helping to push a gun (weighing some six tons) out of the mud, when he slipped and fell under the wheels. He was first buried in Hunsel, but his body was later moved to Nederweert War Cemetery. On the 19th the guns were tested out by firing into Germany for the very first time. The 9th Medium Regiment was the first Regiment in the AGRA to fire onto German soil. Brigadier Elliot DSO of 12th Corps visited the Regiment to observe Germany from a tower in the grounds of RHQ. At this point 81st Medium Battery had fired 34,552 rounds, and 82nd

Medium Battery 36,329 rounds. That is equivalent to 7,000,000 lbs of iron. If all of these rounds were fired at once the total lethal area would be 27 square miles! If all these shells were laid end to end they would cover a distance of over 32 miles!On the 21st 71 Brigade was again given close assistance to attack what remained of the enemy bridgehead on the west bank of the Maas. This area was stubbornly defended by units of the Fallschirmjager, and re-trained infantry elements of the German Air Force Regiment. Fire plans were fired (at 1930 hrs

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and 0430 hrs) with 81 Field Regiment (5 rounds per gun) in support of 4 RWF, and 1 Ox and Bucks. A German Company Sergeant Major from his position in the bridgehead near a brickworks gave his account of being on the receiving end of this fire.

On the night of the 21/22nd November, there was an hour long artillery barrage directed on our positions and I ensured that the perimeter defences were fully manned. There were several casualties, including Captain Paul with concussion, and a new Captain took over as leader of the Battalion.

The History of the 53rd Welsh division states:

Undoubtedly the most intimate cooperation between arms was between the Artillery and the infantry. Not only was it essential to success in any undertaking; but unless liaison was very close and very careful arrangements made, the consequences could be serious - for the infantry…support given by the Army Artillery should not be forgotten – the 3rd and 9th Army Groups Royal Artillery…and others.

New gun areas were recced for an attack on Venlo, and on the 24th two incidents are worth reporting. The Regimental Survey Officer (Lt. K. D.

Banyard) was wounded by a wooden box mine whilst driving in his jeep. His wounds were serious and he was evacuated to England. Two of the C.O.’s representatives went to 5RHA for the purpose of destroying two towers being used as observation posts by the enemy. Shooting triumphs included one tower successfully demolished, and a Tiger tank knocked out by the fire of the guns. This was no easy task. Our OP directing the fire would need to take up a vulnerable position, such as a church steeple, in order to see the enemy, and then attempt to hit a small target with indirect fire at some 12,000 yards range! The Regiment also engaged hostile batteries, which replied by shelling 9 AGRA gun areas in the late afternoon, and early evening of the 25th. On the 26th the Regiment moved to Rinkesfort for the attack on Venlo where a small pocket of enemy were holding out. This location will be remembered for during the night the gun areas were bombed and shelled. It was a rare appearance by the Luftwaffe, and planes dropped anti-personnel bombs and flares in this sharp attack. Fortunately, there were no casualties, although other regiments of the AGRA reported casualties (11th Medium Regiment had one driver killed by an anti-personnel bomb). However, the Regiment never actually supported the

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attack on Venlo, and were relieved by 72nd Medium Regiment RA (3 AGRA).

‘Holding the line’ with the 52nd (L) divisionA move to 30 Corps area followed on the 28th of November and the Regiment remained in harbour at Bilsen (near Maastricht) for the next week. Men could get a little rest and guns and vehicles could be cleaned and maintained. Good accommodation was found here. However, the war was never far away. The population were worried by flying bombs, and several V1’s were observed flying over, some being spectacularly destroyed by AA fire. At new battle positions in Grotenrath (Germany) the Regiment came under the command of 5 AGRA. RHQ set up in the village itself, and the guns were dug in and camouflaged in a nearby forest. Chris Wanstall (81 Battery) recalls:

‘We were on the edge of a forest… and we had to dig slit trenches and erect tents over the top and sleep the best we could.’

The first target was aptly named ‘Operation Wallop’. 5 AGRA Operational Order No. 23 stated that the aim was to ‘…kill as many Bosche artillerymen as possible.’ In total, the Regiments

involved, fired some 12,000 rounds onto all known enemy batteries. You could think of it as an early Christmas present!The 52nd (L) Division were holding the line between Geilenkirchen and Hastenrath in front of the Regiment’s guns. Major Yool motored down to their HQRA located in a school in Brunssum to control fire in their support. On the 17th of December news arrived of a large German counter-offensive, which had started against US Armies in the Ardennes. Diaries report that there was much aerial activity on this day in the skies over the area occupied by the AGRA. A glance at a map will show that the Regiment was positioned at the extreme right of the British line, and German thrusts were effectively in the rear of the regiments of the AGRA. The deeper the enemy drive the more important became the bridges at Maastricht, and it was considered that an attack might come by way of nearby Geilenkirchen or Sittard. Elements of the 6th Panzer Army were in Munchen Gladbach, as well as the 15 Panzer Grenadier Div.. There were numerous reports of enemy paratroop landings and rumours abounded. It was thought that it might be necessary to defend the guns from infantry attacks. Of course, these fears were not realised, but at the time it seemed credible. Lt. Hendley (whom we

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last met in the Cap Griz Nez battle) was sent to the Fire Direction Centre ofX111 US Corps to maintain a close liason with the American flanking artillery and cooperate against enemy targets where necessary.

The Regiment spends Christmas ‘in action.’ The Regiment settled into a defensive role, harassing the enemy and breaking up counter attacks when they developed. CB, DF, and HF tasks were fired for the 52(L) Division. Single guns shot up specific enemy targets spotted by the AOP. Here, at Grotenrath, the guns were protected by ‘F’ Troop, 359 Battery, 109 LAA Regiment. They did good work in keeping at bay any marauding enemy aircraft. On the 27th they fired several rounds at an ME 262 (jet aircraft) passing over the regimental area. Christmas day was spent in action, and men took turns to eat dinner as the guns had to be attended at all times. A visit by Brigadier Crosland, Commander 9 AGRA, and by Sergeant Midgley, official Army photographer, made this day a memorable one. The photographs are something of a sham as they show 82nd Battery preparations for a Christmas dinner that was just not possible in the conditions faced at the time. One photograph shows the cook (Bdr.

Jack Ward) preparing a Christmas pudding mixture (reputed to be sand and water)! This was pure theatre,propaganda for the folks at home. The weather at this time, freezing cold and snow, did nothing to lift spirits. The ‘official’ and amusing caption to accompany Midgley’s set of pictures reads:

R.A. MEN’S XMAS IN GERMANYMany British soldiers will celebrate Xmas in Germany, and here are some positions of gun emplacements in the centre of a ‘Christmas Tree’ forest where much felling has been necessary. Much to the troops’ delight three fat geese strayed into the gun area yesterday. They did not halt for the sentry, and so they paid the penalty. But they still have a date with the Artillerymen on Christmas Day.

In Brunssum, a nearby coal-mining town, the men of the Regiment could obtain some recreation, and respite. A shower unit was set up in a coalmine complex, called Prinz Hendrik. There was a cinema, NAAFI, a photographer’s studio, and a theatre was found to stage a show put together by the ‘9 AGRA Concert Party.’ All Regiments of the AGRA were entertained at some point over the festive period.

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Several small enemy counter attacks along the front, held by 52nd Lowland Division, had to be broken up. On the 28th, for example, an attack developed at Kifuelburg and Tripsrath (1 Glasgow Highlanders locality). At 06.00 hours German infantry

attacked through a snowstorm, yelling and shouting as they came (no doubt the partial successes of the Ardennes offensive had heartened them). The attack was made from the rear after clever infiltration. Fire from the Regiment’s guns helped to restore the situation. Blind DF tasks were called for until the Air OP could take off! Thereafter, harassing fire at key locations ensured that the enemy were not able to build up a larger attacking force. At one minute past midnight on the first day of 1945 the command ‘Fire!’ came across the tannoy, and all guns fired one shell at enemy positions: a New Years Day gift! A move to the south of Brunssum took place on the 1st of January. From the 1st to the 11th targets were engaged in support of 52nd (L) Division, interspersed by the odd ‘quiet day.’Enemy OP zones were targeted. The Germans had set up an OP platform in Straeten church tower. A destructive shoot by the Regiment registered four direct hits on the tower, and no doubt made the enemy think twice

about occupying this position again! A company attack by 7/9 Royal Scots was supported by the Regiment with a timed programme and concentrations at call. The aim was to clear the enemy defended area near Kraudorf on the Geilenkirchen-Randerath road. It was also hoped that a particularly unpleasant group of German mortars would be wiped out at the same time. Operation Joyful began on the 8th in perfect weather, as a snowstorm was blowing in the enemy’s faces. D company 7/9 RSF achieved complete surprise, and brought back a number of prisoners. Notably, during this period General Ritchie, commander of X11 Corps visited 82nd Battery, and Field Marshal Montgomery came to the area to present medal ribbons to Captain Rowland Jones and Captain Howard who had distinguished themselves back in the Scheldt Pocket. 9 AGRA and 12 Corps Troops shared in 52 Lowland Div’s investiture parade at the Casino in Treebeek. Monty gave a little speech about Brussels and UK leave schemes, about German POWs (900,000 since D-Day), but mainly about the Ardennes Offensive. He commented on how the fighting had been ‘very interesting’ to him.

Battle of the Roer Triangle: back on the offensive.

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The Regiment re-deployed for Operation Blackcock, an offensive operation to clear the enemy from between the Maas and the Roer. In freezing cold weather they moved to positions in Schinveld near Brunssum. The attack was to consist of three thrusts with 7th Armd. on the left, 52nd (L) Div. in the centre and 43rd Div. on the right. The plan was divided into phases, and the following were the main phases supported by the Regiment:

1.Phase ‘ANGEL’ during which the 7th Armd. were to capture Dieteren, and then advance to Schilberg and Echt.2.Phase ‘BEAR’ 8 Armd. Bde., and 155 Bde. to advance South East and capture Waldfeucht, Bocket, and Koningsbosch.3.Phase ‘CROWN’ 52 Div. to break through enemy forward localities at Hongen.4.Phase ‘HART’ 43 Div. on the right to capture Langbroich, Waldenrath, and Straeten. Each Phase was to be supported by the Corps artillery, which meant a move forward for the Regiment during the operation. This it did after Phase ‘HART.’ The Regiment mainly supported their old friends in the 52nd Lowland. A representative from the Regiment went to HQ 52nd Lowland Div. to help coordinate fire from the AGRA. This HQ was set up in a school in Munster Geleen, near Sittard. It made

quite a good HQ until a V1 flying bomb blew out all the windows, and let in the cold! D-Day for Blackcock was January 15th. The Regiment fired a preliminary bombardment on hostile enemy artillery and then tasks on call for Phase ‘ANGEL’. An Arty/R sortie was also taken on with 3 AGRA. It went well, though slowly. A Task Table was fired for Phase ‘CROWN.’ A 30 minute preliminary bombardment was fired and concentrations on the flanks of the break in. Unfortunately, due to a sudden thaw which slowed the rate of advance, this fire plan had to be repeated. From the 18th – 20th January the Regiment continued to support 52 (L) Div, and 43rd Div. in their advance, and harassed enemy communications during the night. Early on the 21st 155 Bde. (52nd Div.) were ordered to capture Waldfeucht and Echterbosch. Fire support was duly given, and both places were captured without much difficulty. The enemy objected strongly to this and counter attacked with a strong force of tanks (including Tigers), and infantry. It was difficult to give direct artillery support in this confused fighting but air OP’s (little Auster planes) directed guns onto individual tanks when they gave themselves away by fire or movement in the open. The Regiment engaged 2 tanks in this way, and thus made an important contribution to

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victory. Harassing fire was once again kept up on the enemy axis of advance. A CB programme and a Task Table were fired on this day in support of 130 Brigade, 4 Dorsets (of 43rd Div.) who attacked Schier Waldenrath, moving forward in kangaroos. Opposition was light as the enemy had been hammered by the bombardment (only 12 prisoners were taken). This was a typical action in Operation Blackcock: the great weight of infantry and armour, with artillery support, pushing slowly forward over bare snow covered fields to capture the next enemy held village. On the following day, one section of 81st Battery, with AOP observation, fired successfully on an enemy Battalion HQ. In addition, fire plan ‘HART’ was fired at 0530 hrs. in support of 43rd Div.. In order to keep pace with the advance, new gun areas were established at Langbroich on the 23rd of January. A Task Table was fired for the attack on Straeten by 4 Wilts of 43rd Div.. The troops, clothed in their snow suits descended on their objectives before the enemy had time to put their heads up. Meanwhile 4 Somerset Light Infantry attacked Scheifendahl. Encouraged by their success they decided to push on to the next enemy held village of Erpen. This location was given Scale 1

(each gun firing one shell) ten times by the Regiment, and not surprisingly its garrison quickly collapsed. 150 enemy prisoners were taken, as well as several field guns. The Regiment then became engaged once more in support of the 52nd Division as they surrounded Heinsberg. Fire was brought down on the community trench in the opening barrage; it then lifted to screen the flanks of the attack. By the morning of the 24th the Germans had given up this last important position in the Ruhr Triangle. Enemy artillery was still troublesome, however. So with Arty R. observation a ‘V’ target was fired onto four enemy guns, and two direct hits were registered. 43rd Div advance continued with shells from the Regiment helping to sap enemy morale. Utterath, after heavy bombardment, fell to the 5 Wilts. without a struggle. By the 26th the enemy was nearly completely withdrawn from the west of the River Roer. The overwhelming strength of artillery in Operation Blackcock proved a major force, and saved many infantry casualties. The guns of the Regiment had given continuous support over the last 14 days in harsh winter conditions. This was achieved through a lot of hard work, especially on the gun positions. The enemy did, however, try to hit back. Shells from super-heavy

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guns, probably on the Siegfried Line, fell a thousand yards west of the gun areas during the night of the 28th-29th. Recce parties in position in a new gun area (4 miles north of Langbroich, near Echterbosch) also reported enemy shelling.

Enemy mines The weather at this time was intense cold and snow. The men crammed on as many layers as possible under the battledress, with leather jerkins and woollen scarves. Greatcoats were not so popular as they restricted movement. On the 31st, however, a thaw began and caused its own problems. Enemy mines that had been frozen were released by the thaw, and several vehicles fell victim. Bill Abel and Joe Johnson recall clearly one such incident. A Matador, driven by Gnr. Green, exploded a teller- mine, which blew the front wheel off. Fortunately Gnr. Green suffered only minor leg wounds, which were ‘patched up.’ Many vehicles had passed over the same spot without trouble, and this is probably explained by the recent thaw. Operation Veritable After a short, but welcomed period out of action (harbouring in Moll) the Regiment was ordered to take a long night march and deploy for Operation Veritable, which was designed to break through Hitler’s West

Wall, and clear the enemy up to the River Rhine. The guns and vehicles were moved into position in extremely difficult conditions with some roads and tracks being signposted ‘impassable’. The mud and sludge caused by the thaw was appalling. Water filled shell holes dotted the roads, and banks weakened by the rain collapsed under the weight of heavy military traffic. At one point it appeared that the Regiment would not make the deployment area in time. There were several accidents and lots of winching and towing was necessary to extricate vehicles from the clinging mud. Lt. Hendley, referring to moving the Regiment in the dark and along bad roads, comments: ‘We felt lucky to be alive after 6-7 hours of this’. To make matters worse, strict orders were received concerning movement to the gun areas. In order to conceal the build up, vehicles were allowed sidelights until crossing the canal at Beek, after which axle lights only could be used. All movement was to be completed by first light, and guns concealed close to their final positions in hedges, farmyards or barns and where necessary covered with nets, tarpaulins and brushwood. In fact, the Regiment had been warned that the position they were to occupy was very near to the enemy, and overlooked by high ground in the Reichswald

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Forest, close to the German FDLs. This forward deployment was necessary as the Corps Commander had dictated that the maximum fire support should be available to cover a deep penetration without involving the AGRA’s in any major moves. Veritable commenced on the 8th of February at 0500 hours. Against the odds, the Regiment had successfully made it to their deployment area at Haps and became occupied bombarding localities west of the Reichswald Forest: HQ s, communications and enemy gun batteries were neutralised with 91 rounds being allocated per gun. Post action reports (issued by XXX Corps, CBO) reveal damage to targets engaged by the Regiment’s fire. In one position an 88mm had received two direct hits from medium guns. In another, containing Russian 122mm guns two pits had received direct hits and the position was strewn with bodies. Enemy artillery activity was officially described as ‘slight’ after this retribution. A huge amount of ammunition was expended (over 400 rounds per gun allocated for 9th Medium Regiment alone). This was the heaviest barrage employed by the British Army in the European Campaign, and the Regiment’s 16 guns were joined by hundreds more of various calibres. The noise was deafening, the ground shook, buildings vibrated and loose tiles on the roofs of the

farmhouses clattered to the ground. Waves of concussion whipped tent walls in and out, and speech was almost impossible. The Regiment shifted fire onto the forward enemy positions facing the 51st (H) Division as they went into the attack at 1000 hrs.. This division elected not to use a barrage, but to rely on a series of precisely timed concentrations of fire on specific targets to blast them onto their objectives. This was because enemy localities in this sector were thought to have been accurately located, and the Divisional Commander preferred to have all available fire directed on these selected targets. Two hundred rounds per gun were allocated for this phase of the operation.The operation started well as the Germans were dazed by the weight of fire. Surprise was achieved in the concentration and concealment of so much artillery on the Corps front. Captain Howard and his OP party were up with the infantry moving through the Reichswald Forest.

I got rather badly lost but eventually returned to the infantry HQ. It was very difficult map reading because all the ‘rides’ through the forest looked the same. On one occasion I left my carrier and OP party to respond to a call of nature. Just got my trousers down when a

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jerry came in sight through the forest. I buttoned up very quickly, collected my OP party, and captured him. I think he was more scared than we were.

Operations continued on the 9th February when support switched to the 15 (S) Division whose task was to breach the Siegfried defences north of the Reichswald, capture the Materborn ridges, and sweep onto Cleve. The Regiment fired a task table in support. During the morning an attack went in on the twin knolls of Wolfsberg and Hingstberg which were peppered with artillery concentrations. Targets on call were also fired for 15 (S) Division: artillery targets had been selected in the area of advance. Targets were grouped and given code names so that fire could be called down on a whole group or on individual targets by the FOOs with the leading troops. As our troops attacked the Materborn ridges and closed on Cleve - the guns moved 3000 yards, to an area north-east of Oeffelt - in order to reach the railway line running south-east from Cleve.During the next day the Regiment answered a multitude of calls for fire, mainly from the 51st (H) Division. Once through the trees of the Reichswald, this division’s task was to clear the well defended area between the southern edge of the forest and the Mass. 153 (H) Brigade made

substantial gains along the Mook-Goch road, and 152 (H) Brigade continued its advance along the southern edge of the forest, and came up against the defences of Hekkens. A key road junction, it was essential that this village be reduced, in order to secure an axis of advance for the Corps. General Rennie (51 Div.) arranged for the whole of the Corps artillery to concentrate on Hekkens, and it gave no further trouble after this. On the 12th Gennep was also taken by a successful assault across the river Niers by 5th Black Watch. A regimental fire plan was laid on for the attack. Other battalions (of 154 Brigade) crossed the Niers on the 13th/14th and there was feverish activity as CB Tasks and fire plans were worked out for this action. As the bridgehead expanded and Kessel was captured a steady stream of requests for fire came in. Churchill tanks of 32 Gds. Bde. arrived to reinforce 51 (H) Div. and the 5th Coldstream Guards put in an attack on a section of the Siegfried defences around the villages of Mull and Retut. The attack against light concrete casements and enemy trenches was successfully supported by a regimental Fire Plan codenamed ‘Cold’. 152 Brigade now took the lead (16th February) and advanced down the main road to Goch to clear the villages of Grafenthal, Hervost and Asperden. Fire Plan

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‘Apple’, ‘Banana’ and ‘Cherry’ were fired to soften up the defences. Three notable incidents occurred in the vicinity of the gun areas during this part of the Rhineland battle. 81st Medium Battery had another premature in a chamber of a barrel, which totally wrecked the gun. Three gunners were injured, though not seriously. The enemy had started to use jet-propelled aircraft on hit and run raids. Trying to seek out the gun lines a Me262 dropped three medium bombs near to the Regiment’s position. The enemy also reacted by mortaring the nearby village of Oeffelt. Nobody minded much, however, in view of the quantity of ammunition put into the enemy lines! German patrols were sent into Oeffelt. At this time there was only a thin screen of Recce troops holding the line in front of the Regiment, and the enemy could cross the river Maas, and penetrate well behind the front line. In fact they had booby-trapped houses in Oeffelt and Hoogeind. AGRA felt it necessary to order each Regiment to set up a rota of patrols and protection of forward areas with an alarm system. It also began to rain heavily; a cold, penetrating rain fell for several days almost without let up, and created miserable conditions. 52nd (L) Division joined the Veritable battle on the 16th

and were given a tough nut of their own to crack – the extreme hinge of the German left flank near Afferden, a village about 2 miles due south of Gennep. Just beyond Afferden were a wide anti-tank ditch and a most stubborn point of resistance in the form of Kasteel Blijenbeek, a medieval Dutch frontier castle, to which the Germans were clinging with all the tenacity German troops can command. On the 16th

and 17th 157 Bde (of 52nd (L) Div) advanced through the Broederbosch forest and targets on call were engaged by the Regiment. The attack was not immediately decisive and the enemy held the Division on the line of the anti-tank ditch for some days to come. 9th Medium Regiment continued to offer support when they could, and harassed German positions and communications at night.On the 18th a new phase of the operation began with orders to seize the strongly fortified town of Goch. Goch was shelled ruthlessly without let up; 15 (S) Div attacking from the east and 51 (H) Div clearing the part of Goch that lies south of the River Niers. On this day the Regiment fired in support of all three separate Scottish divisions that were fighting side by side! Sufficient progress had, however, been made by the 19th to allow the Regiment to cross over the River Maas, and occupy new positions in South Gennep.

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The guns arrived on position at 09:15 and were ready on theatre grid at 10:55 hrs.. Troops of 153 Bde., 51 (H) Div were assisted in mopping up pockets of resistance in the suburbs of Goch. The enemy counter-attacked south-east of Goch on the 21st , and this was successfully broken up with the assistance of the Regiment. 15 (S) Div took Buchholt, a village about two and three-quarter miles east of Goch. Fire Plan Thistle was the Regiment’s contribution to this attack. CB programmes and Arty/R engagements also added to the Regiment’s work. A preliminary bombardment was also fired for ‘Operation Leek,’ 53rd Welsh Division’s attack on Weeze. Twelve field regiments, 64 medium guns and 6 heavy guns backed up this operation. This attack provoked considerable hostile shelling (the most accurate since Normandy noted the historian of the 6 RWF). The church tower at Weeze made a perfect enemy OP. 9 Medium Regiment engaged two enemy batteries by Arty/R observation in an effort to assist the hard pressed Welsh infantrymen. There followed a short, and well-deserved regimental rest period of 24 hours. On the 26th the Regiment was back in action to complete Veritable. 51 (H) Div were now advancing south of Goch, beyond the River Kendal (a tributary of

the Niers) to open up the road network which was to be the Corps’ next axis. German positions were bombarded by the Regiment for 154 Bde. attack during the night of 26th/27th.

The death of Lieutenant Moore On the 27th February a reconnaissance of new gun areas two thousand yards west of Goch took place. The Regimental Survey Officer Lieutenant Moore (known as ‘Pundit’ to his friends) left his party at a farmhouse giving instructions for the work in hand, and saying what were to be his last words ‘Be careful of the mines around here. I must be careful too because I’m going on leave in a fortnight.’ Two minutes later at a distance of forty yards from his party Lieutenant Moore met his death on the corner of the road. The corner was mined, and it was estimated that dozens of vehicles passed over this spot before. Sadly in just two weeks time Moore was due to join his wife and two children in Devon. This obituary appeared in 9AGRA magazine.

‘Lieut. Moore has been with the regiment almost since its infancy and the men who will miss him most will be the men of ‘D’ Troop. He was extremely popular in this troop and since he has been at RHQ it has been heard on more than one occasion during visits to the guns “We still

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want you back in ‘D’ Troop, Sir”.

Lieutenant Moore is buried in Milsbeek cemetery, Holland. The Regiment moved into action west of Goch (near Hassom) on the 1st of March, neutralising enemy guns with the morning ‘milkround’: that is, engaging hostile batteries one at a time by all guns that could bear. Goch, part of the Siegfried line defences, was now a pile of rubble, having been pounded by shells and bombs. The whole front now rapidly folded up and the enemy quickly became out of range to all but super-heavy batteries. Notably on the 4th the Prime Minister visited the area and inspected the super-heavy guns of 9 AGRA. He chalked a message on a shell, ‘To Hitler Personal’ and fired it towards the Rhine.

Operation Plunder The Regiment went into harbour at Meerhout, and made careful preparations for what was to be the last major action fought by them: Operation Plunder, the crossing of the River Rhine. The plan was for an assault crossing by ground forces of 12 Corps, followed by an air landing once the initial crossing had been effected. Holding parties moved to new gun areas, south of Xanten; ammunition lorries reported to the new gun areas for the

dumping and camouflaging of large quantities of shells, while the guns were calibrated on Lommel Ranges. Calibration requires a little explanation for the non-technical. The guns of the Regiment had fired a lot of shells in the campaign so far. Each time a gun fires a tiny fraction of metal is removed from the bore so that after a few hundred rounds the bore will have increased in size. It follows from this that the shell will not be as tight a fit when placed in the gun, therefore when the charge is exploded some of the force of the explosion will be wasted up the space between the shell and the bore. As a consequence the shell will not travel as far as it used to. This could result in shells falling amongst our own troops. Calibration means firing a number of rounds on a range to see how far short they fall, and adjusting the angle of the barrel accordingly to prevent this from happening. To return to the narrative, an extremely forward deployment of artillery in the flood plain of the Rhine was adopted for Operation Plunder, in order to obtain maximum range on the far side of the river. This forward deployment presented problems of concealment, since some positions were in full view from enemy observation on the Diersfordter Wald high ground. Strict instructions were therefore

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given to the Regiment concerning the preparation and concealment of the gun areas. Guns and towing vehicles were put into local hides and camouflaged carefully. Slit trenches were only to be dug on D minus 2, and gun pits on D minus 1. The Regiment occupied the gun area at Veen before first light on D minus 1. Veen had been the site of a vicious battle and was criss-crossed with German trenches and littered with abandoned equipment. Knocked out Canadian tanks and abandoned equipment showed that the struggle to take Veen had been brutal. However, day after day was warm and sunny and the trees had started to come out, softening these gaunt outlines of destruction. Orders were issued not to move around the guns until it was necessary for the final preparation for the first fire programme. The civilian population was cleared to a depth of 6000 yards from the Rhine. Finally, a thick smokescreen was laid over the entire front of the assault (some 50 miles). Not surprisingly this had a disagreeable effect on the men working in the gun areas. Major Yool of 82 Battery was sent to HQRA 7th Armd. Div as the CAGRA’s representative. The 7 Armd. Div. RA Group was a mixture of artillery regiments put together to support Operation Widgeon, the assault across the

Rhine by 1 Commando Bde.. 9th Mediums were chosen as the one medium regiment from 9AGRA to be in close support after the river had been crossed. Operation Plunder opened at 18:00 hours on the 23rd of March with a massive barrage. 250 Lancaster and Mosquito bombers dropped over 2,000 tons of HE on Wesel. The battle for the Rhine crossing was on. For the first phase the Regiment was concentrated on hostile battery locations (Operation Blotter). Some 90 hostile batteries were engaged on the now customary ‘milkround’ system. Thereafter, fire support was given to the 1st Commando Brigade in their crossing of the Rhine near Wesel (Operation Widgeon). Their objective was to take and hold a compact area of Wesel; the intention being to deny the Germans the routes through the town and hence disrupt any counter-attacks on the bridgehead. At 2030 hrs. the 9th shelled the landing zones around the mud flats of Grav Insel, a little to the north of Wesel. After that the Regiment remained on call to help the Commandos as they consolidated their positions in Wesel, and attempted to fight off any counter-attacks. The Signal Log of the 7th Armoured Div RA, records the messages to and fro between the Regiment and HQRA 7 Div. in the early hours of the 24th:

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To 9 Uncle Target 5303 MR 21754307, scale 3From 9 Shot U5303To 9 Target 5117 TOT immediate, scale 3From 9 Shot 5117To 9 V Target 5200, MR246416, scale 2, TOT 0650, infantry counter-attack.From 9 Shot Next, the Regiment fired a counter-flak bombardment (Fire Plan Carpet) timed to stop just before the leading aircraft carrying the 6th Airborne and the 17th US Airborne Divisions passed over the gun areas (Operation Varsity). 12 Corps observers behind the gun areas, and another in an observation tower in Xanten woods, gave warning of the approaching aircraft. In the event the order to “STOP” came eight minutes early. Once they stopped all guns were to remain silent until authorised to start shooting again by CCRA 12 Corps. In this period of silence the men of the Regiment had a grandstand view of this great air armada as it flew directly overhead at 600ft on route for dropping zones east of Wesel. It was a most impressive sight. The figures are staggering: over 1,700 aircraft and 1,300 gliders delivered 14,000 airborne troops to the battle area. First came the Dakotas in formations of forty at a time, carrying the parachute regiments, then more Dakotas towing gliders and finally Stirlings towing a heavier

type of glider. Despite intense AA fire they landed and achieved their objectives, successfully linking up with the ground forces. During the early hours of the 25th

a strong enemy counter-attack, accompanied by continuous shelling from SP guns, developed in the north-east sector of 1 Cdo. Bde. positions in Wesel. This was repulsed by 45 (RM) Commando and by accurate artillery fire. The Regiment fired two Victor targets, and the enemy sustained considerable casualties from this shelling. Enemy armour was very cautious as there was doubt over the level of artillery support the Commandos could bring to bear. The Regiment was then ordered to move to new positions closer to the river (near the hamlet of Werrich), where they could more easily support the 15(S) Division in its continuing advance into enemy territory. 15 (S) Div had successfully crossed the Rhine in the early hours of the 24th. ‘V’ and ‘Y’ targets were fired on call on the 26th. The following day Mike, Yoke and Victor targets were fired to deal with small groups of determined enemy soldiers, and stem the flow of reinforcements to the front. A counter-attack by 15 Panzer Grenadier Division around Haldern was held up by a Yoke target (all the AGRA guns firing at once) at 1736 hours. DF target ‘Curlew’ was also fired in

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support of 15 (S) Division. Major Yool and Captain Lemmon were out as CO’s representative and FOO with 131 Field Regiment RA to be in close support of 227 Bde., 15 (S) Division. Yoke targets were fired on call. By the 28th the feeling was that final

victory was near, and resistance against attacks of the 15th (S) Div began to fizzle out as the enemy weakened.

Chapter SevenCease Fire

‘The end’ and occupation dutiesOn the 29th March the Regiment ceased firing as there was no further targets in range. On the 30th it came out of action and was officially ‘grounded.’ The Regiment concentrated at Ginderich. Much to the annoyance of those drivers now sunning themselves on the banks of the Rhine, the majority of 3-ton lorries and other vehicles formed the No.9 RA Transport Platoon, with Captain Howard in command. It was to help R.A.S.C. companies in the task of carrying forward supplies necessary to maintain the general advance of the columns penetrating deep into the heart of the Reich. Captain Howard recalls:

After the breakout our tanks were moving so fast so that our guns were taken out of action, and all available transport was used to ferry petrol up to the armoured divisions. On one occasion, when we were returning from one of these missions I led the convoy down a mined road ( you will realize we had no lights and the night was pitch black). My jeep escaped damage but the second lorry from me blew up. I tried to

take the wounded driver in my jeep across the fields but unfortunately we got stuck because the fields were so wet and soggy. I had to wake a local jerry farmer up and persuade him at gun point to harness a horse and pull us out. I dropped

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the wounded driver off at a First Aid Post.

Howard returned to the scene with BSM Mott the next day and managed to recover one of the 3 ton lorries from the mined road. By April the Regiment became fully occupied, under the command of 1st British Corps, with various ‘line of communication’ duties such as road maintenance and battlefield clearance, initially in the Aalten - Groenlo - Winterswijk area (then later Vreden – Stadholn – Ahaus area). The Regiment also guarded frontier control posts on the Dutch-German border, and provided train guards. There was a lot of trouble from displaced persons (D.P.s). A German farmer was murdered at Ammelos, and numerous violent robberies were reported. Patrols were established by Batteries to tour the regimental area after the curfew. Lt. Veugen of A Troop caught three Russian DPs stealing bicycles and arrested them. One German farmer, fearing for his life after threats from DPs, had to be guarded by a group of men from the Regiment under the command of an NCO. There was time, however, for more pleasurable pursuits. The Regiment played football against a team of Russians, and won, of course, 3-2! Skill in improvisation was demonstrated at Vreden, where a ‘bath unit’ was set up by Ronald Discombe

and Sid Mayblatt. Ronald Discombe recalls:

We organised it in a small village called Vreden just after the war ended. There was plenty of timber around for heating the water in a large copper. With two baths in the tent we were charging one mark, sixpence in old money, that was capitalism, but much appreciated by the other chaps!

On the 7th June 1945 the Regiment’s guns were handed back, and transported to

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Antwerp. Members of the Regiment were posted to other units. This was the end of the road.

APPENDIX 1Roll of Honour

8 th Battalion, ‘The Buffs.’ Pte. G.S. AUSTEN, 6294464, 16th November 1940. Age 27.(Buried Hawkinge Cemetery, Kent.)Pte. W.C.M. BARRIER, 6106947, 19th

November 1942. Age 33.(Buried Whyteleafe, St. Luke, Churchyard, Caterham, Surrey.)Pte. A.S. CHRISTIANSEN, 6298646, 26th May 1942.(Buried Newton Abbot Cemetery, Devon.)Pte. W.J. CURTIS, 6354984, 26th November 1942. Age 20.

(Buried Dover, St. James’s Cemetery)Pte. R. DODGE, 6296187, 19th May 1941. Age 29.(Buried Sittingbourne and Milton Cemetery, Kent)L/Cpl. R.M. GABBATISS, 6290106, 27th January 1942. Age 24.(Buried East Ogwell Church, St. Bartholomew, Devon.)Pte. J.P. SULLIVAN, 6295762, 16th December 1940. Age 27.(Buried Brixham, St. Mary Churchyard, Devon.)

9 th Medium Regiment RA Gnr. C.J. ALDRIDGE, 6295522, 17th November 1944. Age 30.(Buried Nederweert War Cemetery, Holland)Lance Bdr. J.H. ASHDOWN, 14594794, 2nd August 1944. Age 36.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)Gnr. A.A. HEAP, 14598767, 14th August 1944. Age 35.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)L.Bdr L.C. HORTON, 6103247, 2nd August 1944. Age 26.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)Bdr. L.R. MEREDITH, 852462, 2nd August 1944. Age 25.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)Lt. J.C. MOORE, 27th February 1945. Age 33.(Buried Milsbeek War Cemetery, Holland)Gnr. A.C. OAKLEY, 5510094, 2nd August 1944. Age 22.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)Bdr. D.A. RICKSON, 1075143, 29th July 1944. Age 33.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)Sgt. E.H. SAMPSON, 6294356, 11th April, 1945. Age 32

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(Buried Kleve War Cemetery, Germany)Gnr. C.H. SHIPLEY, 14301825, 2nd August 1944. Age 20.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)Bdr. G.C. TRIBE, 6293625, 2nd August 1944. Age 24.(Buried Ranville War Cemetery, France)Sgr. A.G.E. WARNER, 14353494, 21st

July 1944. Age 33.(Buried Bayeux War Cemetery, France)Gnr. F.B. WHITE, 6412126, 31st October, 1944. Age 22.

(Buried Adegem Cdn. War Cemetery, Belgium)A note on casualties: most of the 8 Buffs fatalities were the result of accidents. For example, L/Cpl Gabbatiss was electrocuted, Pte Barrier died from injuries sustained in a road accident in Dover and Pte. Sullivan died in a motorcycle crash. In North West Europe fatalities were caused, as far as can be ascertained, by prematures, mines, enemy bombing and shelling, and accidents. This is typical of the medium regiments serving in North West Europe at the time. However, it must be said that the campaign was not as costly as the regiment’s adventures might suggest (the Regiment being in action almost continuously from arrival in France in July 1944 until after the Rhine crossing in March 1945). In addition, it was officially recorded that 1 Officer and 14 other ranks were wounded.

APPENDIX 2Decorations and Awards

Military Cross

T/Capt. T.G. ClaytonFor calmly efficient and consistently successful work as a C.O. or CAGRA representative both in OP’s and at HQ’s in a succession of important operations in Normandy, Channel Ports, Holland, Belgium, and Germany. His work in the OP has always been of the highest order. He has never spared himself and has shown cool courage throughout. After one tank action he dismounted and supervised evacuation of wounded infantry from a heavily shelled area. In the Battery position he proved to be an outstandingly capable officer being able in emergency to take over the job of any other officer and carry it out successfully. By his never failing cheerfulness and zeal he has been an example to all ranks under him for whom he has obtained the very best possible service.

T/Capt. P.J. HowardHe landed as a FOO with the assault wave 4/5 RSF on South Beveland. The OP had to be sited on a dyke embankment in flat country. The OP was shelled and mortared through the day. Valuable support was given by shelling suspected enemy positions. Just before dusk an enemy counter attack was launched. Howard immediately called for fire while he and the OP party engaged enemy with small arms. He showed coolness and determination as he directed the fire. Whilst controlling the fire he killed a German with his sten gun at 30 yards range. His quick action without regard for his own safety saved the situation for the counter attack broke up and the enemy retired. He continued to give support in exposed positions, as no field artillery FOO was available. With his coolness and determination and complete disregard for his own personal safety he set a first class example to those around him (most of whom were in action for the first time).

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T/Capt P. Rowland JonesOn October 26th 1944 he acted as FOO for ‘A’ Coy. 4/5 RSF and landed with the assault wave on South Beveland. Soon under heavy mortar and artillery fire a counter attack was launched. With cool determination he directed fire on enemy positions and broke up the attack. Just after dusk the forward platoon was driven back to Coy. HQ by a counter attack of 150 men. Though in an exposed position he directed fire onto it and brought it close to his own position. His action saved the situation.This officer was elected to go back to battalion HQ, but he decided to stay with company overnight to offer any further help. Further counter attack was broken up and all enemy officers were killed and 85 OR’s and NCO’s surrendered.

Major D.L.E. PatersonMajor Paterson has commanded his battery since its conversion from infantry in January 1943. Throughout the early days of training and since the regiment landed in France in July 1944 Major Paterson has worked with tireless energy. At all times during the campaign whether acting as a CAGRA representative visiting his OP’s or controlling the fire of his battery he has displayed a gallant disregard for his personal safety and his personal bearing has been inspirational to his men. At the assault on South Beveland (20th October 1944) Major Paterson was CAGRA representative with Bn. HQ of 4/5 RSF. During the crossing several of the craft,including Major Paterson’s, became separated from the main body and were drifting dangerously off course. Major Paterson then took charge and guided them to a successful landing. Once on the beach conditions were difficult due to mud, shellfire and mortaring but with disregard for himself and by great resource Major Paterson was able to get his vehicle across the dyke and rejoin his battalion where by his quiet unconcern, efficient communications and skilful control of fire he was able to give excellent moral and material support to troops in action for the first time.

Major G.C. YoolMajor Yool has commanded his battery since July 1943. Since landing in Normandy in July 1944 until after the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945 his battery has been in action almost continuously. Throughout this time Major Yool has displayed the highest qualities of leadership, unselfishness and devotion to duty. He has personally manned OP’s and served as the CAGRA’s representative with the leading Brigade of the 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div., crossing the causeway to South Beveland with the 15(S) Div., in the Reichswald and with 7th Armd. Div. and in support of Commandos on the Rhine Crossing. But his own exploits apart Major Yool has consistently put himself forward to visit his officers in forward OP’s under heavy fire and in the gun area to hearten and encourage his men under the most trying conditions of enemy shelling and bombing and weather. His spirit and enthusiasm and disregard for personal danger have been a source of inspiration to his battery.

Croix de GuerreT/Capt. T. Lemmon (Croix de Guerre with Vermillion Star)During the period 18-22 July 44, before the capture of Maltot, Capt. T Lemmon manned an OP in front of the infantry FDLs. The OP was protected by its own personnel and two infantry soldiers. The area was repeatedly subjected to mortar and shell fire, and unlocated snipers in the cornfields to his front were a constant source of

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danger. For five days Capt Lemmon manned this OP capably and cheerfully. He finally went forward as a FOO in support of the successful attack on Maltot.

Bdr. J. F. Peck (Croix de Guerre with palm)Bdr. J. Peck was senior GPOA in C Troop 82 Bty. 9 Medium Regiment RA for the first 6 months this regiment was in action. This included the support of the crossing of the Leopold Canal and the subsequent operations to clear the sea route to Antwerp. Owing to a shortage of officer replacements he took over the duties of Troop Leader and shared the responsibility of shooting the Troop with his GPO. He showed himself fully capable of doing this, and carried out his job with great drive and initiative, though only a Lance-Bombardier at the time. His cheerfulness, often under very difficult conditions has at all times been an inspiration to the remainder of the Troop and has shown himself to be a thoroughly capable and fearless NCO.

WS/WO II (BSM) G.W. Mott (Croix de Guerre with palm)This WO has throughout the campaign in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany shown the highest degrees of efficiency and endurance and has been an excellent example to all the drivers and others under his supervision. He has never failed to bring up ammunition when required, no matter what conditions of enemy activity, darkness or roads prevailed. In particular, during the weeks in October/November 1944, which the Bty. spent in the North of Belgium assisting the opening of the Scheldt and the opening of the port of Antwerp, he had a particularly difficult job to do, which he performed in an exemplary manner. The roads were narrow and bordered by deep ditches and were in some cases under water, and distances from wagon lines to gun positions were considerable. Owing to the nature of the country, the use of lights was impossible and a daily supply of ammunition had to be maintained, under these conditions. BSM Mott never relaxed his high standard of personal example, hard work and careful surveillance during this protracted battle and so contributed materially to the heavy fire that the Bty. maintained on the enemy, which had considerable effect on the ultimate Allied success.

Gnr. V Smith (Croix de Guerre with Bronze Star)On 7 Aug 44 at St Aignan de Cramesnil the a/m OR was acting as W/T operator to Capt T. G. Clayton RA in his tank OP. The enemy put in a determined counter attack, which failed, but in which a considerable number of casualties were inflicted upon the infantry with whom Capt Clayton was working. Gnr Smith showed great coolness in dressing and tending the wounded, the whole time under fire from small arms and 88mm guns. When the danger from this counter attack was over Capt Clayton took most of the wounded back in the tank to find the Bn. RAP. About halfway back men from the Bn met the tank and took off all the wounded except one who had a serious leg injury, whom Capt Clayton decided to take right up to the RAP. When the RAP was finally located Capt Clayton decided he could not take his tank up to it, as that would mean crsooing an open stretch of ground under fire from 88mm guns. Gnr Smith immediately volunteered to get out and reconnoitre a route to the RAP. This he did, and with the help of an infantry soldier and a stretcher, succeeded in getting the wounded man to the RAP. Both on his way there and returning he was sniped by small arms and shelled by 88mm HE. Gnr Smith’s action undoubtedly saved the life of the wounded man who was losing blood fast.

Gnr. H. Johnson (Croix de Guerre with palm)

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Gnr. H. Johnson performed the duties of OP signaller during the campaign in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany. Throughout this period he performed his duties with outstanding efficiency frequently under very heavy enemy artillery fire. Notably in the operations around Breskens undertaken to open the port of Antwerp, his coolness and devotion to duty under fire from enemy guns at Flushing, and in a heavily mined area were an example to those around him, and his efficient maintenance of communications played a large part in enabling the Battery to bring down heavy and accurate fire on the enemy.

Lt. A. H. Veughen (Chevalier of the Order of Leopold II with palm, and Croix de Guerre with palm).This officer served as GPO throughout the campaign in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany and at all times he showed the highest standard of technical knowledge, endurance and personal disregard for all risks and unpleasant circumstances. In addition he bore throughout a considerable amount of responsibility, both in regard to the men, guns and equipment. In particular his leadership of his troop in October/November 1944, when in action in the North of Belgium during the opening of Antwerp was outstanding. General conditions were extremely unpleasant, and in spite of this, by his unfailing good humour, he kept the spirits of the men at a high level. Tactical and technical considerations made the control of the guns extremely difficult and necessitated many changes of position within the Troop area, but at no time did Lt. Veughen fail to surmount all difficulties of bad visibility, difficult country or physical hardship, and thus contributed in no small way to the heavy volume of fire which the Bty. brought to bear on the enemy during this important battle.

Knight of the Order of Oranje Nassau with Swords

Lt. G.L. HarmsworthLieutenant Harmsworth was CPO of 81 Bty., 9 Medium Regiment RA during the liberation of Holland. During the attack on the Breskens Pocket and the subsequent liberation of Walcheren and South Beveland and also during the clearing of the area west of the River Maas up to Venlo and Roermond he worked tirelessly, cheerfully and accurately under very trying conditions, and always ensuring that the Bty. could answer calls for fire with promptitude. He was frequently called upon to recce fresh gun positions in very exposed areas before mines and similar devices had been lifted.Throughout the campaign his devotion to duty and his standard of hard and accurate work were of a high order and together with his unfailing cheerfulness, were an example and inspiration to all who worked with him.

Silver Star

L Bdr R. GrahamL Bdr Graham has been an OP Wireless Operator throughout the campaign in NW Europe. He took part in the operations in Normandy, the channel ports, the Scheldt, the Roer Pocket, the Reichswald, and the Rhine Crossing. During the assault in South Beveland on 26 October 44, Graham went forward with his officer, an FOO, carrying his 19 set, which he later set up and maintained as a ground station under heavy and

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continuous shell and mortar fire. So close was the fighting that at one time the attacking enemy infantry were engaged by the small arms fire of the OP Party of which Graham was a member.L Bdr Graham distinguished himself by gallantry in action by his tireless efforts which ensured that communications never failed. During the later part of the day his ability under extremely trying conditions enabled him to pass fire orders to his regiment so that prolonged and accurate fire greatly assisted breaking up a counter attack. His coolness and efficiency throughout the day were a source of inspiration and encouragement to all around him, and a notable contribution to the success of the battle.

M.B.E

WS/WO II (ORS) H.S. KempIn December 1942 the Regiment converted from infantry to artillery. Sgt. Major Kemp was faced with the task of reorganising the documentation of the regiment on RA lines and making himself familiar with new terms and new outlook.He has worked with outstanding zeal and ability to ensure the smooth running of his department, so vital to the success of the regiment as a whole. After taking part in nearly all major operations across the continent the regiment was ordered to take a long night march and deploy in support of the attack on the Reichswald Forest. This march was carried out under the most appalling conditions of sudden thaw and rain. At one point it appeared doubtful if the regiment would reach the deployment area in time. Sgt. Major Kemp displayed the highest qualities of leadership and initiative in organising the winching, towing and driving of vehicles. It was very largely due to his untiring efforts and excellent example that the regiment command vehicles were finally got into action. During subsequent moves of the regiment the same conditions pertained with intermittent shelling. Sgt. Major Kemp continued to show outstanding qualities of leadership and example throughout. Although by trade an orderly room clerk his initiative and example in the field has always been a most valuable asset to the regiment and an inspiration to all around him.

T/Captain J.M.Sim (Adjutant)Captain J.M.Sim came to this regiment as Adjutant in July 1943, shortly after it had been converted from infantry. Throughout the following period of intense training, when few of the officers and OR’s knew anything of the technical and administrative details of a gunner regiment, his patience and perseverance played a very large part in making the unit fit for battle. The regiment was in action almost continuously from its arrival in France in July 1944 until after the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945. Throughout this period Captain Sim has shown great skill and quickness of decision both in the many problems that have had to be faced and in the successful coordination of the fire of the regiment. Short handed at headquarters due to casualties has for long periods caused

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additional strain and exhaustion but by his example of unfailing energy and enthusiasm Captain Sim has at all times been master of the situation and an inspiration to those with whom he worked.

O.B.E.

Lt. Col. R.S. Wade (Commanding Officer)Lt. Col. Wade has commanded this regiment for the last 8 months and was largely responsible for the conversion of the 8 Battalion The Buffs East Kents to the 9 Medium Regiment RA. His tremendous perseverance in instructing the regiment has resulted in producing a fundamentally sound organisation in all respects.During the last four months this officer’s loyal and efficient command of his regiment, and the thorough determination with which he tackles every task, he has been a great inspiration to all around him. The regiment which has been in action continuously since its arrival in this theatre has proved itself a first class fighting machine, which is entirely due to the tremendous enthusiasm, methodical approach to all problems, and loyal example of service which is set by its commanding officer.

B.E.M.

Private R. Curtis, Army Catering CorpsOn the 9th February, 1944, during practice at an anti-tank range in Sussex, Private Curtis, who was cooking in the battery wagon lines, saw an aircraft crash into the side of a hill a quarter of a mile away. He went to the scene of the crash, and although the aircraft had caught fire and ammunition on it was exploding, he succeeded in rescuing two of the crew who were unconscious and lying in the burning aircraft.

Commander-in-Chief’s Certificate

ORSM W.O.II H S Kemp

W/Bdr. W. Barker

L/Bdr. J. Berger

(Every attempt has been made to make these lists complete, and any omission is regretted).

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APPENDIX 3

The deployment and structure of a medium regiment in action

Commanding Officer (C.O.)Holding the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he would go to the HQ’s of the Brigade or Division of the unit that the regiment was supporting; giving fire orders if necessary but normally collecting information and passing it to and from the regiment. He would be accompanied by a group of assistants and signallers. Commander of 9th Medium Regiment was Lt. Col. R.S. Wade.

Second in Command (2 i/c)Holding the rank of Major, he would normally be at the gun position end. He was responsible, through the battery C.P.O.’s for the deployment and recce of new gun positions for the two batteries of the regiment.

Regimental Headquarters (RHQ)This would be just behind the gun positions. It would comprise of :

a) Adjutant – ‘general dogsbody’ who could control the fire of the regiment, administer counter battery fire (C.B.) and regimental fire plans through the C.P.O.s.

b) Survey Officer – he would be responsible for ensuring that all the regiment’s guns had an accurate grid reference and were firing on the same bearing. There was a high casualty rate among the survey party as they often travelled

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to areas where mines and similar devices had not been removed. The Regiment lost two survey officers (Lt. Banyard who was seriously wounded and Lt. Moore who was killed) during the campaign, both falling victim to enemy mines.

c) Signals Officer – with his team he would be responsible for communications (both radio and telephone) up to higher HQ’s and down to battery level. This would be a Royal Corps of Signals Appointment.

d) Light Aid Detachment (L.A.D.) – Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (R.E.M.E) would provide a recovery vehicle and a team responsible for repair of the regiment’s guns, vehicles and equipment where possible. If local repair was not possible they would send equipment back to better equipped workshops in the rear.

e) Quartermaster (Q.M.) - responsible for indenting for all ammunition, clothing, weapons, vehicles etc..

f) Medical Officer (M.O.)- doctor, orderly and sanitary man, forming a small Regimental Aid Post for treating sick or wounded men.

Battery Commander (B.C.)Holding the rank of Major, he would go to Battalion H.Q.s of the infantry (or Regimental H.Q.’s of the armour) who were being supported at that time. He would be in touch with the C.O., both his troop commanders and all guns in the regiment. Alternatively, he could form an O.P. of his own. He would be ably supported by a small group of assistants. There would be two of these per Regiment (one in each battery).

Troop Commander (T.C.)Each Battery had two Troop Commanders (one for each troop). Each would be deployed by the B.C. to an O.P. or in direct contact with the infantry company commanders during an attack, where as well as impromptu targets they would be responsible for D.F. S.O.S (Defensive Fire) bringing down fire on pre-arranged targets in support. During the night the guns could be laid (i.e. set on a bearing and range) on an S.O.S. target, so that all the gun detachment had to do was ‘pull the trigger’. The T.C. (rank of captain) was assisted by a driver (L/Bdr.), a signaller and an Observation Post Assistant (O.P.A) capable of all the O.P. officer’s work. As they were often in direct contact with the enemy they travelled around in a bren gun carrier.

The Gun End

Battery Command Post Officer ( C.P.O.) and Assistant Command Post Officer (A.C.P.O.)Along with a group of technical assistants they controlled the fire of the two troop’s guns when firing on battery or higher targets; arranged gun programmes for a set-piece attacks, and C.B. work. The C.P.O. would deploy both troops after instruction from the 2 i/c. In addition, he would arrange battery survey and administration. The command post was often a Bedford three-ton truck, but sometimes, if occupying a position long enough, it might be set up in a house or farm.

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Battery CaptainResponsible for supplies to the battery, and its administration e.g. ammunition, fuel, and food. With the B.S.M. (Battery Sgt.-Major) he would get these supplies to the gun positions, and organize the Wagon Lines (a throw back to horse artillery days, like the expression ‘Stables’ for vehicle maintenance). All supplies would be drawn from the R.A.S.C at the rear.

Gun Position Officer (G.P.O.) and Troop Leader (his second in command for each troop)He would recce. with the C.P.O. their future gun positions and allocate each gun its position, arrange troop survey, decide on digging in and camouflage, control the gun fire of the troop, and arrange local defence. The G.P.O. and Troop Leader were interchangeable and normally the G.P.O. would recce. new gun positions while the Troop Leader would lead the guns to that position.

Gun Sgt.Each Gun Sgt. or No.1 would be responsible for his detachment of ten men, his gun, and towing vehicle (Matador). He would also check that fire orders given by the GPO/Troop Leader were carried out. There were four guns per troop.

The Gun TeamA gun team is ten men numbered 1) The gun sergeant 2) The limber gunner who looks after the loading breech mechanism, and pulls the lanyard to fire the gun 3) The layer who lays the gun on target using Dial Sight, Range Scale Plate and Sight Clinometers 4) and 5) are loading numbers who lift the metal loading tray, put it on the runners behind the breech 6) is the charge man who puts the propellant charge (a long bag of explosive nitro cellulose) in the breech behind the shell 7) 8) and 9) are ammunition numbers who take the plugs out of the nose of shells and put in fuses 10) is a bombardier who covers for the No. 1 and otherwise looks after the ammunition and takes a spell at laying. Most crew members would be able to do each other’s jobs.

Troop B.S.M. (Troop Sgt.-Major)He would be responsible for liason between wagon lines and the guns. He would be capable of taking over from G.P.O. or a No. 1 if necessary, and was instructor on the guns and gun drill.

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Regimental deployment in action

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APPENDIX 4Artillery Methods and Fire Planning

Defensive Fire: used against troops actually attacking and fired on a pre-arranged signal.Harassing Fire: used to reduce morale by hampering the movement of reinforcements, food and ammunition to the front.Counter Battery Fire: neutralize or destroy enemy artillery. This was often carried out with air observation (Air OP or Arty/R). Artillery Preparation: fire intended to damage enemy defences, inflict losses or impair morale prior to an attack.Covering Fire: put down while our troops are moving to assault enemy positions. It might be a barrage (e.g. Operation Totalize) moving ahead of the advancing troops or concentrations in which the fire of a number of guns is concentrated on a target or location. One technique was to group these concentrations in an area under a single code-name (see Appendix 6, Map 7). Some supporting artillery might be placed directly under the commanders of leading units in order to deal quickly with opposition which the pre-arranged covering fire did not overcome. The Fire Plan‘Fire Plan’ was a term used in a broad way to describe any artillery fire that was coordinated with the actions of the supporting arm. The Fire Plan could be small to support the attack of a single company of infantry or very large to support the attack of a whole Corps, and involving days of pre-planning (e.g. Rhine Crossing). Targets could be ‘on call’ or scheduled on a timed programme. Fire Plan orders were issued to the Regiment as map traces annotated with the times and rates of fire or as task tables. Task tables gave target map references with engagement details (times, rates of fire, ammunition supplied for each target). Battery CP s often needed to make further calculations based on the position of their own guns and issue Gun Programmes. The Gun Programme form was completed and issued to each individual gun (the No. 1 would be responsible for this).Quick Fire Plans Quick Fire Plans were sometimes used. This is when orders were sent via wireless from a senior officer of the regiment well forward with the supported arm. No hard copy target lists, traces or schedules would be issued. This sort of Fire Plan was very useful when operations turned to the pursuit or when an advance was made against light opposition. FOO s often used the quick Fire Plan technique.Counter BatteryThe Corps Survey Regiment was the primary artillery target acquisition element for CB. They used techniques such a sound ranging and flash spotting to locate hostile batteries (HB s). Each Corps also had a CB Staff (with a Major as the CBO) who collected intelligence about enemy artillery and issued orders to attack HB s. CB Fire often used a special type of Fire Plan called the ‘Bombard’. CB Staff prepared lists of HB s and issued them to the artillery batteries. The ‘Bombard’, which might be on call or scheduled, used this HB List. Air OP s, as previously mentioned, could also be used for observed CB fire. Many times in the campaign the Regiment took on an HB using the Air OP as ‘its eyes.’ Arty/R (RAF tactical reconnaissance aircraft with fighter escort) was also used, which had the advantage that it could search much deeper into enemy territory.

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Example of a Task Table issued to 9th Medium Regiment RA for Operation Veritable (WO 171/5038). It shows timings, targets for each Regiment, type of ammunition and rate of fire (rounds per minute). For medium artillery rates of fire were as follows: Intense 2, Rapid 1 ½ , Normal 1, Slow 2/3, Very Slow 1/3.

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APPENDIX 5Complete list of locations from July 1944 to March 1945

Location Remarks/BattlesGraye sur Mer (14/7/44) BeachesManviuex (15/7/44) Concentration areaSequeville en Bessin (16/7/44) HarbourSt Manvieu (16/7/44) Hill 112 and Operation ExpressGiberville (28/7/44) Operation TotalizeVerriers (9/8/44)Cintheaux (10/8/44) Operation TractableTornebu (15/8/44) No shootingVillers Canivet (17/8/44)Perriers (18/8/44) FalaiseNorrey en Auge (20/8/44) FalaiseLouviers en Auge (22/8/44)Livarot (23/8/44) ConcentrationLiseaux (25/8/44) HarbourSt. Nicola du Bosc (31/8/44) HarbourLimesey (4/9/44) HarbourTanville (7/9/44) Operation Astoria (Le Harve)Bellebrune (13/9/44) Operation Wellhit (Boulogne)Audembert (21/9/44) Operation Undergo (Calais)Nachtegaal (1/10/44) ConcentrationKapryke (4/10/44) Operation SwitchbackIjzendijke (19/10/44) Breskens Kloosterzande (23/10/44) Operation VitalityLovendegem (30/10/44) HarbourSlijkplaat (31/10/44) Operation InfatuateBudel (7/11/44) HarbourWeert (11/11/44) Operation MallardEll, Gom, Hunsel (15/11/44)Heuthuijzen (17/11/44) Roermond and Operation TurfRinkesfort (26/11/44)Bilsen (29/11/44) HarbourGrotenrath (6/12/44)Brunssum (11/12/44)Schinveld (14/1/45) Operation BlackcockLangbroich (23/1/45) Operation BlackcockMoll (3/2/45) HarbourHaps (4/2/45) Operation VeritableOeffelt (9/2/45) Operation VeritableGennep (19/2/45) Operation VeritableGoch (28/2/45)Meerhout (13/3/45) HarbourVeen (22/3/45) Operation PlunderWerrich (26/3/45) Operation Plunder

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APPENDIX 6Maps

Map1: Local defence responsibilities of 81 Battery in Hove, A-G Sections. Shaded areas are 81 Battery’s accommodation (WO166/11366).

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Map 2: From the beaches to Falaise.

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Map 3: The Channel Ports

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Map 4: The Scheldt

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Map5: The Maas and the Roer.

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Map 6: The Reichswald Forest and the Rhine.

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Map 7: Artillery fire plan for Operation Veritable. Targets for 9th Medium Regiment included several on 51 (H) Div front and for Phase 2 (15 (S) Div) ‘Robeson’, ‘Ambrose’ and ‘Gibbons’.

APPENDIX 7

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Glossary

AA Anti-AircraftAGRA Army Group royal ArtilleryAOP Air Observation Post (usually little Auster aircraft)ARP Air Raid PrecautionsArty/R Artillery Reconnaissance (ranging by RAF aircraft)AVRE Assault Vehicle Royal Engineers (Churchill tank with mortar instead of a gun)Barrage Moving or stationary line of shells (e.g. as fired by the Regiment for Op. Totalize)BEF British Expeditionary ForceBuffalo Tracked lightly armoured amphibianCAGRA Commander Army Group Royal Artillery (Brigadier Crosland for 9 AGRA)CB Counter BatteryCBO Counter Battery OfficerCCRA Commander Corps Royal ArtilleryCO Commanding OfficerConcs on call Concentrations (of shells) on call on a particular targetCPO Command Post OfficerDCLI Duke of Cornwall’s Light InfantryDF Defensive FireDP Displaced PersonsFallschirmjager German Paratroops (fighting as infantry in North West Europe)FDL s Forward Defended LocalitiesFOO Forward Observation OfficerGPO Gun Position OfficerH-Hour Start time of an operation or attackHF Harassing Fire (shells fired deep into enemy territory at crossroads, HQs etc.)IG Instructor of GunneryKangaroos Armoured Personnel Carrier (a Canadian improvisation, like a turret less tank)KOSB Kings Own Scottish BorderersLAA Light Anti-AircraftLCA Landing Craft AssaultLMG Light Machine GunMGRA Major General Royal ArtilleryMIKE Target (M) Target engaged by the whole RegimentMO Medical OfficerNCO Non-commissioned Officer (e.g. Bombardier)OP Observation PostOR Other Ranks (not officers)ORSM Orderly Room Sergeant MajorPIAT Projectile Infantry Anti-TankPOW Prisoner of WarPremature A shell that explodes before reaching the intended target.UXB Unexploded BombRA Royal ArtilleryRCA Royal Canadian ArtilleryRHA Royal Horse ArtilleryRHQ Regimental HeadquartersRSF Royal Scots FusiliersRSO Regimental Survey OfficerRWF Royal Welch FusiliersSAR South Alberta RiflesSOS Save Our Souls (DF target fired to protect an objective from enemy counter attack)SP Self Propelled gunTask/Task Table List of targets to be engagedTCV Troop Carrying VehicleTOT Time On TargetVICTORY target (V) Corps TargetYOKE target (Y) AGRA Target

APPENDIX 8

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Sources and BibliographyPUBLISHED SOURCES-History of 9 Army Group Royal Artillery (October 1945)-The Diary of 85 (Essex) Medium Battery, Royal Artillery (W.J. Parrett Ltd., Margate, 1947)-The History of Headquarters, Royal Artillery, 52nd Lowland Division (Delbruck, Germany 1945)- British Army of the Rhine Battlefield Tour Operation Plunder (Germany, 1947)- British Army of the Rhine Battlefield Tour Operation Veritable (Germany, 1947)Barclay, C.R., The History of the 53rd Welsh Division in the Second World War (William Clowes and Son Ltd., London, 1956) Blackburn, George, The Guns of Normandy (Constable and Company Ltd., London, 1998)Blackburn, George, The Guns of Victory (Constable and Company Ltd., 1996)Blake, George, Mountain and the Flood, The History of the 52nd Lowland Division 1939-45 (Jackson, Son and Company, 1950)Copp, T. and Vogel, R., Maple Leaf Route: Scheldt (Maple Leaf Route, 1985)Couldry, Charles, Memories of a Soldier (Proprint, Peterborough, 1998)Essame, Major-General, H., The 43rd Wessex Division at War 1944-45 (William Clowes and Sons Ltd., 1952)Hart, Stephen, Road to Falaise (Sutton, 2004)Hogg, Ian, Great Land Battles of World War 2 (Blandford, 1987)Moulton, J.L., Battle for Antwerp (Book Club Associates, 1978)Pemberton, A.L., The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment (The War Office, 1950)Rawson, Andrew, Walcheren (Leo Cooper, 2003)Salmond, J.B., The History of the 51st Highland Division 1939-45 (William Blackwood and Sons Ltd., 1953)Thompson, R.W., The Eighty-Five Days, The Story of the Battle of the Scheldt (Hutchinson, London, 1957)Wolfe, Celia, Summon up the Blood, The War Diary of Corporal J A Womack, Royal Engineers (Leo Cooper, 1997)Newspapers and Magazines-The Nine AGRA magazine (produced by members of the Regiment, 1945)New Milton Advertiser (2/9/44)The East Kent Gazette (24/5/41)

UNPUBLISHED SOURCESPublic Record OfficeWO171/1049 War Diaries 9th Medium Regiment RA, 1944WO171/5015 War Diaries 9th Medium Regiment RA, 1945WO166/7230 War Diaries 9th Medium Regiment RAWO166/11366 War Diaries 9th Medium Regiment RAWO166/4169 War Diaries 8th Battalion, The Buffs, 1941WO166/8615 War Diaries 8th Battalion, The Buffs, 1942WO171/2535 War Diaries 738 Company RASC, 1944WO171/6355 War Diaries 738 Company RASC, 1945WO171/911 War Diaries 9 AGRA, 1945WO 171/4746 War Diaries 9 AGRA, 1944WO171/315 War Diaries 12th Corps CBO

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WO171/4087 War Diaries 30th Corps CBOAIR14/861 Operation TractableAIR14/862 Operation TractableAIR37/766 Report on Bombing of Own Troops

Correspondence, interviewsHoward, Capt., P. M.C., 81 Battery, 9th Medium Regiment RAHendley, Lt. J., ACPO, 81 Battery, 9th Medium Regiment RAAbel, W., 81 Battery, 9th Medium Regiment RALambert, L/Bdr. B., 81 Battery, 9th Medium Regiment RALondon, L/Bdr. A., RHQ, 9th Medium Regiment RAGibson, Maj. E., 8th Battalion, ‘The Buffs’Discombe, R., RHQ, 9th Medium Regiment RAKemp, ORSM. H., RHQ, 9th Medium Regiment RA.Morgan, G., RHQ, 9th Medium Regiment RA.Wanstall, M.G., 81 Battery, 9th Medium Regiment RAJohnson, G.J., 81 Battery, 9th Medium Regiment RA.Bramley, G.M., 8th Battalion, ‘The Buffs.’Veugen, Lt. A.H., GPO, 81 Battery, 9th Medium Regiment RA.

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