8thsem 3rd defence

8/16/2019 8thsem 3rd Defence

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ABSTRACT

Since the last few years VANET have received increased attention as the potential technology to enhance

active and preventive safety on the road, as well as travel comfort. Security and privacy are indispensable

in vehicular communications for successful acceptance and deployment of such a technology. Generally,

attacs cause anomalies to the networ functionality. A secure VANET system, while e!changing

information should protect the system against unauthori"ed message in#ection, message alteration,

eavesdropping.

Figure 1 : Threat Levels

INTRODUCTION

Vehicular ad hoc networ $VANET% can offer various services and bene&ts to VANET users and

thus deserves deployment effort. VANETs with interconnected vehicles and numerous services

promise superb integration of digital infrastructure into many aspects of our lives, from vehicle'

to'vehicle, roadside devices, base stations, tra c lights, and so forth. A networ of a hugeffi

number of mobile and high'speed vehicles through wireless communication connections has

become electronically and technically feasible and been developed for e!tending traditional

tra c controls to brand new tra c services that o er large tra c'related applicationsffi ffi ff ffi .

VANET SECURITY NECESSITIES

The security design of VANET should guarantee following(


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). *essage Authentication, i.e. the message must be protected from any alteration.

+. ata integrity does not necessarily imply identification of the sender.

-. Entity Authentication, so that the receiver is not only ensured that sender generated a message,

in addition has evidence of the liveness of the sender.

. /onditional 0rivacy must be achieved in the sense that the user related information, including

the driver1s name, the license plate, speed, and position and traveling routes.

2. 3n some speci&c application scenarios, /on&dentiality, to protect the networ against

unauthori"ed message in#ection, message alteration, and eavesdropping, respectively.

FIGURE : RSA ! RIVEST S"A#IR ADLE#AN$ Cr%&t's%ste(

SECURITY AS)ECTS RESTRICTED TO VANET


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). 0osition veri&cation techni4ues to thwart position spoo&ng attacs.

+. Traceability by trusted networ authorities $e.g., networ administrator% for privilege

revocation once misbehavior is detected.

-. 3dentity and location privacy preserving mechanisms against unlawful tracing and user

pro&ling.

. Non'frameability of an honest user who cannot be falsely accused of having misbehaved,

2. etecting and correcting malicious data to ensure data consistency.

5. The system must have light overheads in terms of computational costs and high e ciency.ffi

6. 0reventing impersonation attacs, that is, no one can impersonate another authori"ed member

to cause service abuse problems and to damage the security of VANETs.

7. 0reventing eavesdropping, in other words, an intruder cannot discover some valuable

information from communications between members in VANETs.

FIGURE *: Ge+eral authe+ti,ati'+ &r',ess

#ET"ODOLOGY

The scenario for VANET communication we consider in this pro#ect includes communicating

entities of the service providers $S0%, the cars, and the access points $A0% operated on behalf of

service providers. The S0s and the A0s can communicate with each other by some application'

layer proprietary protocols via 3nternet. The A0s are deployed along the roadside with reasonable

wireless coverage to facilitate communication. A car typically belongs to one wireless networ


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service provider, and communicates with the A0s for accessing the internet along the road it

travels through. 8hen it travels, it also roams into wireless coverage that provide by other

authorities.

To mae the authentication process time'efficient, traditional solutions using centrali"ed

authentication server $AS% is not preferable because of the large amount of messages e!changedamong the car, the A0s and the ASes. 3f the overlay networ interconnecting the A0s and the

ASes is based on 3nternet, the delay for e!changing authentication messages could be prohibitive

given the shortness of communication duration between the fast moving car and an individual

A0. Thus the authentication protocols are devised such that after the car initiates communication

re4uests until the communication session is established, the protocol should involve as less

parties as possible besides the car and the A0, and as less on demand communication over

3nternet as possible besides the wireless lin between the communicating two parties. 3n

addition, the number of messages e!changed in order for authentication should be controlled. 3n

our design, the user authentication will be performed at the A0s, i.e., the user will prove to the

A0 that it is a legitimate one. A more strict security will re4uire the A0 to prove it is a legitimate

one as well, so to have mutual authentication.

F

IGURE - :)a,.ets e/,ha+ge 0uri+g i0e+tii,ati'+


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LI#ITATIONS

The security of VANETs is one of the most critical issues because their information transmission

is propagated in open access environments. 3t is necessary that all transmitted data cannot bein#ected or changed by users who have malicious goals.

TOOLS USED

Asymmetric cryptography or public'ey cryptography is cryptography in which a pair of eys is

used to encrypt and decrypt a message so that it arrives securely. 3nitially, a networ user

receives a public and private ey pair from a certificate authority. Any other user who wants to

send an encrypted message can get the intended recipient9s public ey from a public directory.

They use this ey to encrypt the message, and they send it to the recipient. 8hen the recipient

gets the message, they decrypt it with their private ey, which no one else should have access to.

OUT)UT

Figure 2 : Out&ut

CODE SNI))ET

pacage vanet:


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;

/lass.forName$Dcom.mys4l.#dbc.riverD%: System.out.println$D/onnecting to database...D%:

conn C river*anager.get/onnection$@BF, SEB, 0ASS%:

stmt C conn.createStatement$%: String 4uery C DSE VANETD:

stmt.e!ecutepdate$4uery%:

System.out.println$Database selected VANETD%:

K catch$SLFE!ception se%>

System.out.println$Dnable To /onnect to atabaseMMD%:

K catch$E!ception e%>

System.out.println$D?@/ B3VEBS not initiali"edD%:

K System.out.println $D*END

DOn).New Vehicle BegistrationD

DOn+.BS AuthenticationD

DOn-.V3 N*@EB En4uiryD DOn.EP3TD

DOn2.Enter Qour /hoiceD%:

Scanner in C new Scanner$System.in%: int a:

a C in.ne!t3nt$%:

try>

if$stmtMCnull%

stmt.close$%:

K


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catch$SLFE!ception se+%>

K;; nothing we can do

try> if$connMCnull%

conn.close$%:

Kcatch$SLFE!ception se%> System.out.println$Database is in nsafe state 0lease close the databaseD%:

K

K

K

BIBLIOGRA)"Y

). http(;;airccse.org;#ournal;nsa;22)-nsaH7.pdf ' SE/B3TQ /RAFFENGES, 3SSES AN

TRE3B SFT3NS B VANET Bam Shringar Baw , *anish Uumar , Nanhay Singh

+. https(;;ar!iv.org;ftp;ar!iv;papers;)+H5;)+H5.)--6.pdf ' Security Analysis of Vehicular Ad Roc Networs $VANET% Ghassan Samara, 8afaa A.R. Al'Salihy, B. Sures

-. http(;;www.cse.wustl.edu;#ain;cse26)');ftp;vanetsecurity;inde!.html ' Security in VANETs

*ohan Fi mohan.li $at% wustl.edu $A paper written under the guidance of 0rof. Ba# ?ain
http://airccse.org/journal/nsa/5513nsa08.pdfhttps://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1206/1206.1337.pdfhttp://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/ftp/vanet_security/index.htmlhttp://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/index.htmlhttp://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/index.htmlhttps://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1206/1206.1337.pdfhttp://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/ftp/vanet_security/index.htmlhttp://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/index.htmlhttp://airccse.org/journal/nsa/5513nsa08.pdf

8thsem 3rd defence

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