a brave new world for turkey and armenia?

8/8/2019 A Brave New World for Turkey and Armenia?

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Analysis

ISTANBUL — Public discussions o the initialed protocols between Turkey and Armenia that were released on the

night o August 31 are ongoing in bothcountries. Initially, this developmentwas applauded by enthusiasts andhammered by critics, with overratedhopes and ears respectively. By now,a slightly more nuanced debate istaking hold.

The protocols oer concrete termstoward what is commonly reerredto as “normalization o relations,”and thus can be welcomed as the basis

or a more inormed discussion.However, aspects o the protocolswhich have intentionally been letopen to interpretation raise suspicionson both sides, and it is premature tocelebrate the protocols in and o themselves. Conusion prevailsregarding the link between theKarabakh resolution process andthe implementation o the stepsoreseen in the protocols. Moreover,there are many open questions on theimplications o the more complicatedaspects o the roadmap, such as theoreseen “dialogue on the history dimension.” All eyes are now turnedto whether Armenian President SerzhSargsyan will visit Turkey on October14, 2009 or a soccer match betweenthe two countries. I protocols can

ensure that the delicate process o normalization is not derailed, they willhave served an important purpose.

Managing expectations thereater willstill require strong leadership.

The Karabakh confusion

The clock or implementation o the protocols will start ticking notwhen the protocols are signed—which is expected to take place inOctober—but when they are ratiied.The protocols may not express a linkbetween the implementation o

the roadmap and progress on theNagorno-Karabakh deadlock;however, it is an increasingly opensecret that the Turkish side expectsprogress toward withdrawal romsome o the occupied territoriessurrounding the Karabakh enclavebeore the protocols are brought ora vote to the loor o the TurkishParliament.

Because Karabakh is not mentioned inthe protocols, the Armenian side canclaim there is no “precondition,” whilethe Turkish side can ensure Azerbai-

jani counterparts and Turkish skepticsthat the two processes are “synchro-nized.” The dierence o wording ismerely a play o words. This ormulao ambiguity may have been the only

A Brave New World for Turkey and Armenia?

by Nigar Göksel*

October 1, 2009

* Nigar Goksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative and editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views ex-

pressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF or those of the European Stability Initiative.

Washington, DC•Berlin •Bratislava • Paris

Brussels • BelgraDe • ankara • BuCharest

www.gmfus.org

O f f i c e s

Summary: Public discussions of the

initialed protocols between Turkey

and Armenia that were released on

the night of August 31 are ongoing

in both countries. The protocols

can be welcomed as the basis for a

more informed discussion. How-ever, aspects of the protocols which

have intentionally been left open to

interpretation raise suspicions on

both sides.

Building trust between the

societies is a challenge and will

require straightforward and genuine

words and actions. Of course the

timing to take up the most difcult of

questions will be critical for the

political capital of both sides;

however, the timing may not be

totally in the control of the politicians

as the interaction between many

stakeholders takes on a life of its

own.



way to (appear to) agree, and

supposedly allows or dierent interpretations to besustained; however, it also carries risks. Whether it is calleda precondition or not, and whether it is presented as a acto Turkey’s democracy or envisioned as Turkey’s grandleverage to solve rozen conlicts, Karabakh is in the mix.

The scenario envisioned appears to be that the protocolswill empower President Sargsyan to take a bold, albeitsmall, step regarding the occupied territories surroundingKarabakh, which in turn will be responded to by Turkey with a bigger step. A virtuous cycle can be set into motion,

oering gains to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, in awin-win equilibrium. I the process unravels as such, theregion will inally have a perspective or stability andintegration, and Turkey will celebrate the victory o its sotpower—though the risk and burden will be on the leaderso Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, Turkey also risks aserious blow to its credibility and regional interests i astep that can be ramed as a breakthrough in talks betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan does not take place.

The gamble is multi-layered. The tactic Armenian andTurkish authorities jointly signed o on—i.e. blurring or

avoiding the issues on which sensitivities and red lines seemincompatible, can aggravate the trust deiciency, particularly in Armenia toward Turkey but also among Azerbaijanis.The cards are neither open nor well-concealed. Ultimately Turkish politicians’ statements and assurances about theKarabakh link are heard by Armenians and Azerbaijani’salike—it is not possible to sustain dierent rhetoric indierent settings.

An end to history?

Arguably, the most controversial aspect o the protocols isthe plan to set up a joint sub-commission on history whichwould work on an “impartial scientiic examination o his-torical records and archives to deine existing problems andormulate recommendations.” This has been perceived as aTurkish victory. The assumption is that as long as thiswork is ongoing, third countries will abstain rom passingparliament resolutions that label the tragic events o 1915-1917 “genocide.”

Another objection voiced by Armenian analysts to the

idea o a history commission is that it will inevitably beinconclusive, as historians on both sides—politicized asthey are- will simply battle on behal o the oicial line o their country. Indeed, i a verdict about history is aimed or,every step o the process is going to be iercely debated andcriticized by Armenians and Turks worldwide. It is, there-ore, understandable to argue that the narratives o bothnations can be brought closer more eectively by merely allowing or ull reedom o expression, acilitatingindependent research, and supporting as many civilianinitiatives to this end as possible.

Ultimately, the parameters that will be set and theindividuals who will take part will determine the meritso the planned sub-commission. Will third countries’historians join? Will the Armenian and Turkish historiansnecessarily be representing their countries’ oicial perspec-tive? How will their mandate be ramed? Rather thanreducing the debate to “will the United States be providedwith a reason not to proceed with HR252,” we need moreideas generated about how to maximize the legitimacy o the joint history work on the basis o intellectual integrity.I more archival research can be acilitated, more criticalthought can be stirred, more diverse opinions can be heard;

in the long term, this can help open minds and bridgedivides. Both Turks and Armenians will beneit rom adeeper understanding o the dynamics leading up to 1915,the dierent experiences in various localities o Anatolia,the role o external actors, and the consequences.

Having an ongoing joint dialogue about history will notprevent reerences to 1915 as “genocide” around the worldand, in all likelihood, will not reeze the eorts o theArmenian diaspora to pass parliamentary resolutions. Thepattern o struggle will continue in academic, political, andlegal environments. As 2015 nears, there will in any case bemore attention paid to the plight o Ottoman Armenians.1

Many Turks—including in oicial circles—are convincedthat the pursuit o genocide recognition in third countriesby the Armenian diaspora is a process the administrationin Armenia can control. This expectation is unounded andcan lead to setbacks in the process o normalization. It isimportant that the “willingness to chart a new pattern andcourse or their relations on the basis o common interests,

2

Analysis

1 Osman Bengur (2009). “Turkey’s Image and the Armenian Question.” Turkish Policy Quarterly,

Spring 2009. Retreived at: www.turkishpolicy.com



Analysis

2For an argument about the consequences of recognition: ESI Report, Noah’s Dove Returns: Armenia,

Turkey and the Debate on Genocide. April 21, 2009, p. 21. Retreived at: www.esiweb.org 3The exception to criticism of the border issue among opposition is Levon Ter Petrossian—who leads the

inuential opposition bloc called the Armenian National Congress.4 The Kars Treaty of 1921 that denes the current borders was signed between Turkey and Bolshevik

Russia, as well as the Soviet Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and is seen by many

Armenians as a humiliating page in the history of Armenia.

goodwill and in pursuit o peace, mutual understandingand harmony,” which is airmed in the protocols is notinterpreted in Turkey as a promise or the campaign orgenocide resolutions to end. Such parliamentary resolutionsshould be put into perspective, and their consequences notoverestimated, by either side.2 Strong political leadershipin Turkey will be crucial to manage public opinion on thisissue.

The reality is that the debate about history will not be“tamed” by an oicially set up sub-commission. Therewill still be Turkish intellectuals who use the word

“genocide” and press or change in Turkey’s stance, as they have intensely or the past 5-10 years. Whatever conclusionsreached, i any, they are not likely to convince all parties thatsee themselves as legitimate stakeholders. Expectations needto be set at reasonable levels or the beneits o the work o the commission to be reaped.

The border debate

For years the lack o relations between the two countrieshas oered an environment in Armenia in which thedream o border revision could be preserved and uelled

particularly by opposition politicians and unaccountableopinion leaders. The voicing o territorial demands romArmenian counterparts consequently played into the handso the hardliners in Turkey. The reerence in the protocols to“mutual recognition o the existing border between the twocountries” is being ramed as a concession by the leadingopposition in both countries.3

On the one hand, or the opposition in Armenia, today,to criticize the protocols on the basis o Armenia “beingdeprived o grounds or territorial claims rom Turkey” begsthe question o what, realistically, the alternative is. Onthe other hand, or Turkish opposition to stir Turkishsensitivities about territorial integrity by pointing out thenon-mention o the Kars treaty in the protocols is at best

unhelpul.4

Building trust between the societies is a challenge and willrequire straightorward and genuine words and actions.O course the timing to take up the most diicult o questions will be critical or the political capital o bothsides; however, the timing may not be totally in the controlo the politicians as the interaction between many stake-holders takes on a lie o its own.

About the GMF The German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a nonpar-

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a brave new world for turkey and armenia?

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