a brief history of the 7th marines

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A member of Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines ,holding an M-14 rifle, waits for his companion to firean M- 79 grenade launcher at a Viet Cong position i nMarch 1966 . (USMC Photo A186813) .


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A BRIEF HISTORY OFTHE 7TH MARINES

b yJames S . San tell i

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIO NHEADQUARTERS, U.S . MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D .C .1980


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FOREWORD

This historical monograph is the tenth in a series of regimental histories . When com-pleted, this series will cover in similar fashion each of the infantry and artillery regiments i nthe Fleet Marine Force, active and reserve . The present narrative not only highlights thesignificant act ions of the 7th Marines, but also furnishes a general history of Marine C orp sactivities in which it took part .

Mr . J ames S . Santel l i was a m em ber of the staff of the Division of History and Museum sfrom June 1967 to November 1974, during which time he occupied positions in both theReference S ection and Histories Section of the division . He holds both a Bachelor of Art sdegree and a Master of Arts degree in history from the University of San Francisco . Mr .Santelli has coauthored articles on Marine Corps topics that have appeared in variou spublicat ions de al ing with m il itary subjects . Presently, he is a writer for the Department ofLabor .

In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the Division of History and Museum swelcomes com me nts on this booklet from key part ic ipants, Marine C orps act ivit ies, and in -terested individuals .

E . H. SIMMON SBrigadier General, U . S . Mar ine C orps (Ret . )Director of Marine Corps History and Museum s

PCN 19000308200

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PREFACE

A Brief History of the 7th Marines is a concise narrat ive of the regiment from its init ia lactivation over a half century ago through its participation in World War II, the KoreanWar, and the war in Vietnam . Official records of the Marine Corps and appropriatehistorical works were utilized in compiling this chronicle. This booklet is published for th einformation of those interested in the 7th Marines and in the events in which it has par-ticipated .

The monograph was produced under the editorial direction of Mr . Henry I . Shaw, Jr . ,C hief Historian of the History and Museum s Division . Final review and preparation of th em anuscript was done by Miss Gabr ie l le M . Neufeld . Ms. Cora B . Lett of Word ProcessingSection of Headquarters Marine C orps typed the prel iminary draft . Miss C a ther ine A . Stollof the Publicat ions Production Se ction set the m anuscript in type and a ssisted Mr . DouglasJohnston in laying out the history . The ma ps were prepared by Sergeant E ric A . Clark an dStaff Sergeant Je rry L . Jakes who also prepared the cover and title page art work . All il-lustrations are official Department of Defense (Marine Corps) photographs from the files o fthe Still Photograph Depository, History and Museums Division .

JA M ES S . SANTELL I

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Forewordi iPrefaceGenesis and the Cub an PreludeWorld War I I Rebirth and S outh Pacific Deploym entGuadalcanalNew Bri ta in3Peleliu9Okinawa5North China Interve ntion and Occupation9Aggression in KoreaR eturn to Asia2Cuba Again and a New C ar ibbean Deployment1The Second Indochina War2Conclusion0Notes3Appendix A: C omm anding Officers, 7th Marines7Appendix B : C hronology, 7th Marines9Appendix C : Honors of the 7th Marines1Appendix D : 7th Marines Meda l of Honor Recipients3

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A Brief History ofthe 7th Marine s

Genesis and the Cuban Prelude

The 7th Marines, because of its participation i nnumerous military operations and campaigns in theWestern Pac if ic and in Asia , has long been assoc ia te dwith the Far East . The reason for the regiment's ac-tivation, however, did not originate in this region ofthe world but in the Caribbean . Internal disorder i nCuba in 1917 was the immediate cause that led to th ecreation of the 7th Regiment, the ancestor of the pre -sent 7th Marines . The outbreak of political unrest i nOriente Province early that year caused considerabl edismay among American business interests on theisland . Anxiety existed over the security of American -owned property, especially the sugar cane plantat ions .To ease these apprehensions and to put an end to th ethreats to American property, the United States i nFebruary 1917 ordered Marines ashore from severa lships ' detachments to protect the plantations an dsugar mills . Less than 2 months later, the Unite dStates declared war on Germany and entered Worl dWar I . America ' s active participation in the war onl yamplified the necessity for the United States to con-t inue safeguarding Cuban sugar as i t was considered astrategic m aterial . Maintenan ce of the supply of suga rnot only to the United States but to other All ied coun-tries was of vital concern to the American Govern-m e n t . The United States, nevertheless, starte dwithdrawing i t s Marines f rom C uba in spr ing 1917 . Ithad been presumed tha t these t roops would be neede din Europe .

It soon became apparent that the withdrawal hadbeen premature even though political unrest in Cuba

had tapered off . Intelligence reports indicated thepresence of Germ an agen ts in the sugar-growing areas .These agents reportedly had given support to rebe lforces and had encouraged them to perpetrate acts ofsabotage on Am erican-owned sugar instal lat ions . TheAmerican Government decided to reintroduc emilitary forces that summer. An Army cavalry regi-ment was originally slated for deployment, but it coul dnot be sent because of the pressing needs for man -power in France . ' The Marine C orps was subsequent-ly directed to furnish an expeditionary unit . All ex-isting regiments were at the time either involved i npreparat ions for deployme nt to France or were on ex-peditionary duty in Haiti or the Dominican Republic .None of these regim ents could be spared for service i nCuba .

As a result, the Marine Corps activated the 7t hRegiment in Philadelphia on 14 August 1917 . Head-quarters Detachment and the 93d and 94th Com-panies w ere i ts original compone nt organizat ions . O n15 August, the 37th Company joined from Mar eIsland, C alifornia ; on the 18th, the 59th Companycame from New York Ci ty ; and on the 20th, the 71st,72d, 86th, and 90th Companies arrived from Sa nDiego, Ca l ifornia . Lieutenant C olonel Melvil le J . Sha wassumed command of the regiment on 19 August .Shaw was no stranger to Cuba . During the Spanish -Am erican War he wa s brevetted to first l ieutenant fo rgallantry in the June 1898 battle for Guantanam oBay . Upon tak ing comm and Shaw imm edia te ly bega npreparat ions for the forthcoming expedit ion . Within 2

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s i o n o f a c t i n g a s a g a r r i s o n a n d s e c u r i t y f o r c e w o u l d b em a d e p u b l i c a t a l a t e r d a t e .T h e 7 t h R e g i m e n t r e m a i n e d a t t h e n a v a l b a s e a tG u a n t a n a m o f o l l o w i n g i t s a r r i v a l a n d d i d n o t i m -m e d i a t e l y v e n t u r e i n t o n e a r b y t r o u b l e s p o t s . T h en a t u r e o f t h e d e p l o y m e n t t h u s w a s o s t e s i b 1 y c o n -t i n u e d a s a r o u t i n e t r a i n i n g o p e r a t i o n . R e p o r t s o f G e r -2

m a n a c t i v i t y i n t h e a r e a s t i l l p e r s i s t e d , c a u s i n g c o n c e r na m o n g A m e r i c a n a u t h o r i t i e s . L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e lS h a w f e l t t h a t G e r m a n p r o p a g a n d a w a s a d v e r s e l y i n -f l u e n c i n g t h e " l o w e r c l a s s e s " i n O r i e n t e a n dC a m a g u e y P r o v i n c e s . H e , t h e r e f o r e , e x p e c t e d d i f -f i c u l t i e s o n t h e p l a n t a t i o n s . H e r e c o m m e n d e d t h e c o n -t i n u a t i o n o f t h e t r a i n i n g r u s e t o a l l a y s u s p i c i o n s o f t h ea c t u a l i n t e n t b e h i n d t h e d e p l o y m e n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , h es a i d i t w o u l d b e " m a d e t o a p p e a r t h a t t h e t r o o p s a r et h e r e f o r t r a i n i n g p u r p o s e s . " 4

P e r m i s s i o n t o m o v e i n t o t h e i n t e r i o r w a s g r a n t e d b yt h e C o m m a n d a n t i n l a t e O c t o b e r . E l e m e n t s o f t h e 7 t hR e g i m e n t b e g a n m o v i n g f r o m G u a n t a n a m o B a y t ov a r i o u s c i t i e s i n t h e r e g i o n o n t h e 2 4 t h . D e t a c h m e n t sw e r e d e p l o y e d t o S a n t i a g o , C a m a g u e y C i t y , S a n L u i s ,a n d G u a n t a n a m o C i t y . H e a d q u a r t e r s w a s e s t a b l i s h e do n S a n J u a n - I i l l , m a d e f a m o u s b y T h e o d o r eR o o s e v e l t a n d h i s R o u g h R i d e r s d u r i n g t h e S p a n i s h -A m e r i c a n W a r . ' A l l t h e c a m p s w e r e l o c a t e d i n e a s t e r nC u b a , a r u g g e d , m o u n t a i n o u s a r e a . F o r t y y e a r s l a t e r ,F i d e l C a s t r o s t a r t e d a r e v o l t t h e r e t h a t e v e n t u a l l y l e d


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National Archives Photo No . 127-G-22288A detachment of mounted M arines rests near Cam aguey, Cuba . Horses gave the 7th Re gime nt greater mobilityand enabled the Marines to respond quickly to emergencies .to the establishment of the first Communist regime inthe Am ericas . The Marines were not to suppress dissi -dent natives but were ordered to counteract the ac-tivities of agents of Germany and the other Centra lPowers . It was hoped that the presence of Americanmilitary units would of itself counterbalance propagan -da and attempts at sabotage. A prime objective of thedeployme nt was to bring about a stabil izing and calm-ing effect over the local populace .

Although the regiment did not engage in antirebe loperat ions, it did act ively guard Ame rican property b yconducting wide-ranging patrols and reconnaissancemissions . Often the Leathernecks were m ounted to in -crease their mobility . The use of horses enabled themen to respond quickly to an em ergency on the widel yscattered plantations . 6 Marine Headquarters late inSeptember authorized an increase of 400 horses forthe regiment . The saddles were obtained from source sin both the United States and Cuba . The additionalhorses were intended to provide the unit with thecapac ity of having 500 of i t s men m ountedover ha lfthe regiment . A desired byproduct of this m ove was t omake the Marines more visible in the countryside .The me n enthusiast ical ly accepted the horses and thei rinstruction in horsem anship . By late November, Shaw

reported that he was pleased with his mounted units .He was particularly happy with the "very goodeffect" they were having in the vicinity of Guan-tanam o City . The imm ediate area contained 15 impor-tant sugar m il ls . E arl ier disorders at the m il ls subside dafter Marine patrols were instituted .' One techniqueutilized to quiet unrest without resorting to force wasthe subterfuge of "practice marches . " Where therewere potential disturbances and reports of pro-Germansympathy, units of the regiment would conspicuouslymove into the countryside under the guise that th eMarines were conducting a training exercise . This"showing the flag " usually had the desired effect s

Although the intervention by America ntroopsnothing new in Cubaw as welcomed by th eCuban Government, Shaw reported the laborers an dpeasants did not accept it "in their hearts ." Hetherefore set about to improve relat ions w ith the peo-ple . By the beginning of 1918, the regimental com-mander had made great strides in that direction .Cuban workers were by now accustomed to the sigh tof the Marines . Since there had been no occasionwhere armed force was necessary, most peasants ac-cepted, at least grudgingly, the presence of theAmericans . They were looked upon more a s

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policemen than as an occupying army . Shaw ' s effortswere praised by both Cuban and American officials .Governor Guil lerm o F . Masacaro of Sant iago de Cub aProvince personally lauded Shaw ' s attempts toestablish harmonious relations . In March 1918 ,Henry M . Wolcot t , the American consul in Sa nt iago ,wrote the State Department that Shaw and his regi-ment were "deserving of high commendation . " Con-sul Wolcott stated that the men's conduct "had bee nexemplary and their relations officially and sociall ywith the Cuban pe ople was m ost cordial a t a l l t imes . "He went on to declare that :

There is no doubt that the presence of these troops an dthe intelligent, tactful activity of the commanding officer ,have been very important factors in the maintenance o forder throughout the country, consequent upon which ha sbeen the progress and safety the sugar crop . 'In carrying out their assigned tasks the Marines o f

the 7th Regiment never had to resort to force as the ywere n ot openly opposed in their patroll ing . The onlyfighting that occurred between the Marines andA lone Marine sentry stands guard duty . While inCuba, the 7th Regiment actively guarded A merica nproperty during World War I and the imm ediat epostw ar period .

National Archives Photo No . 127-G-519743

Cubans came during off-duty hours, and this was notcombat in the traditional sense of the word . Thecauses, too much liquor and arguments over women ,we re age -old sources of trouble that plague all militar yorganizations . In one serious incident in June 1918 ,off-duty Cuban Arm y soldiers and me mb ers of the 7thRegiment engaged in a fist fight in the red light distric tof Santiago . The brawl quickly deteriorated into a roc kthrowing match . Reportedly, the C ubans pulled knive sand attacked the Marines . A few of the Cubans thenfired on the Ame ricans w ith handguns and rifles caus-ing the unarmed Marines to scatter . The fight ende dwith three Leatherne cks being injured, one seriously .In all about 25 shots were fired at the group o fMarines . To avoid similar episodes in the future, San-tiago ' s red light district was sub sequently put off limit sto the 7th Regiment . "

Colonel Newt M . Hal l, who received a brevet to ma -jor for valor during the Boxer Rebellion, replace dLieutenant Colonel Shaw as commanding officer of th eregiment in September 1918 . Hall continued thepolicies of his predecessor and in the next 3 monthsthe 7 th Regiment covered approximate ly 3 , 200 m ile son foot and on horseback in its patrol work . Thepatrols according to Colonel Hall had a "very good ef-fect on the men employed in the mills and on theneighboring plantations, as the Marines are looke dupon as a guarantee of order ." Officers of the regi-ment had additional duties in that they conducted in-vest igat ions of persons suspected of pro-Germa n sym -pathies and act ivities . This task had been assumed a tthe request of the United States L egation in Havana .' 2The m ountainous terrain had taken its effect on th e7th's livestock . By January 1919, the regiment ,although still carrying out extens ive patrolling, was in-creasingly una ble to rely on its anima ls for transporta-tion . There were only 305 horses in the unit at th ebeginn ing of the month . A sizable percentage of thesewere n ot in the best of shape and could not, therefore ,be fully utilized . The 7th Regiment also suffered fro ma lack of pack animals . Cuban horses were found to b etoo small , while m ules were expensive . The price ha ddoubled within a short time with the minimum bein g$950 a horse in January 1919 . As a result, the regi-m ent began to depend m ore upon motorized vehicles .At this time it had in its inventory 14 trucks (theheaviest being 2 tons), 1 ambulance, 2 cars, and 4motorcyles . There was, however, a drawback in theuse of m otor vehicles . They could only be utilized inthe cities where the roads w ere good . The roads in th ecountryside were for the m ost part so poor that moto r

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transportation could only be used sparingly . In therainy season they became impassable, and the onl ypractical way to travel along them was by horse o rmule . "

During its deployment in Cuba, the 7th Regimen twas assigned to two different higher echelon organiza-t ions. First , i t joined the 3d P rovisional Brigade on 2 6December 1917 . Other units of the Brigade were the8th and 9th Regiments . The 9th Regiment hadentered Cuba that same month with the mission ofass is t ing the 7 th Regim ent . The 8th Regiment, on theother hand, did not go to Cuba but was instead ordere dto Galveston, Texas . Subsequently, the brigade' sheadquarters and the 9th Regiment were also transfer -red to Texas . When these units departed on 31 Jul y1918, the 7th Regiment was detached from the 3 dProvisional Brigade . An assignment to another highe rechelon did not take place for a number of months .Finally, on 21 December 1918, the regiment was at-tached to the 6th Provisional Brigade . The 1st Regi-ment, which had recently arrived in Cuba, was th eother subordinate element of the brigade . "

For 2 years the 7th Regiment protected American -owned sugar plantations, sugar mills, railroads, an dother installations . It was instrumental in seeing tha tthe va luable sugar supply w as processed and exporte dwith only a minimal amount of interruption . WithWorld War I over and with the easing of interna ldisorders, the American Government decide to recal lmost of its forces from Cuba . The 6th Provisiona lBrigade was deactivated on 21 June 1919, but the 7th

Regiment stayed on the island for 2 more monthsbefore being ordered home . The regim ent was the la s tmajor Marine force to be withdrawn ; two Marin ecompanies , however , continued to occupy Ca ma gue yProvince until February 1922. Relocation of the 7thRegiment to Philadelphia was completed on 4September 1919 . The first overseas deploym ent of th eunit thus passed into history, but this would not b e th elast time the regiment would see Cuba .

Postwar demobilization led to the deactivation of th e7th Regiment on 6 September 1919 ." The regimen tremained in an inactive status throughout most of theinterwar period . Activation of a unit bearing thedesignation of 1st B attal ion, 7th Regim ent occurred a tSan Diego on 1 April 1921, but it was subsequentl yredesignated as the 1st Battal ion, 5th Brigade . It reac-quired its initial designation on 21 March 1922 . Thebattalion continued on active duty until 1 Septembe r192 4 when it was deactivated with its personnel bein gabsorbed by the newly reorganized 4th Regiment . 1 6Shortly after the de activat ion of the 1st B attal ion, 7t hRegiment, there appeared on the east coast a Reserv e7th Marine Regiment . It functioned off and on as aReserve organization until the early 1930s . This uni tis considered a separate organization and, in terms oflineage and honors, it is not connected to the presen t7th Marines . "

On 6 September 1933, the regiment, bearing th epresent design ation of 7th Marines, was reactivated a tQuantico, Virginia . Colonel Richard P . Will iams, aveteran of World War I and a former commander o f

Members of the 7th Regiment march through the countryside of eastern Cuba in 1917 .National Archives Photo No . 127-G-51827 6

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the Garde d ' Haiti, was assigned as the commandin gofficer . The composition of the unit included Head -quarters and Headquarters Company, Service Com-pany, and two battalions of five companies each . Ittotaled 58 officers, 8 warrant officers, and 1,108enl is ted m en . Personnel used to reform the regimen tcame from barracks and detachments located a tPhiladelphia and Anna polis, Marylan d, and Quantico ,Norfolk, and Portsmouth, Virginia .

As had been the case in 1917, the regiment wasbrought into existence for a possible move to Cub abecause of an internal crisis that threatened Am erica ninterests . But in this instance the entire regiment di dnot sail to the Caribbean . The first element to deploywas a machinegun platoon, consisting of 78 officer sand men, that departed on 23 September 1933 onboard the bat t leship USS New Mexico . The platoon ' sjourney was cut short and it was soon returned t oQuantico . 1 8 Deployment of the 2 d Bat ta lion began o n3 October when it moved first to Norfolk . It s ai le d 6days later on the b at t leship USS W yoming, arriving a tGuantanamo Bay on 14 October . The ship subse-Colonel Richard P. W illiams, first com manding office rof the regiment when it was reactivated in 1933, isshown he re in the uniform he w ore as Com mandant ofthe Garde d ' Haiti 1930-1933 USMC Photo 524533

quently proceeded to Havan a, but no troops were pu tashore . E xcept for two short redeploym ents to Floridathe battalion remained in Cuban waters through theend of January 1934 . No landing was n ecessary , bu tthe bat tal ion ma intained a ready posture and was pois-ed to land to protect American interests should it hav ebecome necessary .

The rest of the regiment in the meantime wa sassigned on 18 December 1933 to the newly create dFleet Marine Force . A further reorganization duringthe next month led again to the deactivation of th eregiment . Headquarters Company and Service Com-pany were disbanded on 17 January 1934, while th e1st and 2d Battlions were redesignated as the 1st an d2d Battalions, Fleet Marine Force, respectively . Thelatter battalion was still in Cuban waters when thi schange occurred. This brief regenesis w as the last fo rthe 7th Marines until short ly b efore the Second W orldW ar . 1 9

World War II Rebirth andSouth Pacific De ploym en tThe United States entered the 1940s with ap-

prehension over the widening conflict in E urope . It in-itially desired to remain uninvolved but practicalit ydictated that it prepare for any eventuality, includingthe likelihood of war . The Marine Corps, as a result ,embarked on a program of expansion in 1940 . Thisgradual increase led to the reactivation of the 7t hMarines on 1 January 1941 . Ironically, Cuba wasonce more woven into the fabric of the history of th e7th Marines as this rebirth occurred at Guantanam oBay . Colonel E arl H . Jenkins, an act ive part icipant i nnumerous expeditions to the Caribbean in the year sfollowing World War I, took comm and of the reforme dunit. Besides a headquarters company, the regimen thad three infantry battalions of five companies each .Personnel came mainly from the 5th Marines an dfrom recruits recently arrived from the United S tates .The regimen t was assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade .A month later the brigade was enlarged an dredesignated as the 1st Marine Division . 2 0Shortly after its reconstitution the regiment par-ticipated in landing exercises at Guantanamo and a tCulebra . These maneuvers lasted until early sprin gwhen the regime nt was ordered to the United States . Itboarded the transport USS Barnett* and sailed on 8

'The ship, commissioned in September 1940, was named i nhonor of Major General George Barnett, the 12th Commandant o fthe Marine Corps . It was redesignated APA 5 in 1943 .6


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April for Charleston, South Carolina . The regimen tsoon established itself at the Marine Corps ' recrui tdepot at Parris Island . There i t resume d i ts training . I naddit ion to am phibious exercises, emphasis w as place don night maneuvers, combat firing problems, beachreconnaissance, chemical warfare, demolitions, an dair-ground comm unicat ions .

One reason for this intense training was to prepar ethe regiment for a possible landing on the FrenchCaribbean is land of Mart in ique . Tens ion was growin gbetween Vichy France, a German satellite, and theUnited States over a sizable French naval force at Mar-tinique . The American Government was concerne dthat the naval flotilla and the island would be turne dover to Germany . Plans were drawn up so the Unite dStates would be ready to take decisive action if negotia -tions failed . The 1st Marine Division plus elements o fthe Army's 1st Infantry Division were assigned th eresponsibility of making an amphibious landing o nMartinique should that prove necessary . Fortunately ,the United States did not have to resort to hostilities .The 7th Marines moved to New River, Nort hCarolina, during the latter part of September 1941 .The base was la te r renamed C amp Lejeune in honor o fformer Major General Commandant John A .Lejeune . 2 1

The 7th Marines, following the attack on Pear lHarbor by the Japanese, went on immediate aler t for apossible overseas deployment . None took place ,however, until the following spring . At that time theunit, minus its 3d Battalion, was detached from th e1st Marine Division and attached on 21 March to thenewly created 3d Marine Brigade . The Regimenta lWeapons Company was activated on the same day .Deployment to the Pacific began on 2 April 1942 ,when the regiment minus the 3d Battalion, moved b ytrain to Norfolk, Virginia . It subsequently loaded onboard the transports USS Heywood, McCawley, an dFuller departure was on the 10th. Meanwhile, the 3 dBattalion had entrained for San Diego where it em -barked on the USS Harris. * * The ship sailed on the13th with Samoa as its destination. The entire regi-me nt had in fact been ordered there . First to arrive wa sthe 3d Battalion ; it disembarked at American Samoaon 28 April. The remainder of the regiment arrive dand disembarked on British-held Upolu in Wester nSam oa between 8 and 10 May . The 3d B attal ion even-tually transferred to Wallis Island, a French posses-

"Later APAs 6, 4, 7, and 2 respectively . All four ships wer enamed appropriately for former Commandants of the Marin eCorps .

sion . 2 2 All uni ts of the regime nt and the 1st Battalion ,11th Marines, an artillery unit, were assigned theresponsibility for garrisoning and defending the Sa-moan Islands . Their mission was one of repulsin gJapanese incursions and helping to keep open the l ine sof communications between the United States an dAustral ia and New Zealand. Fortunately, the Japanes emade no real thrust into the area .

Guadalcanal

The men of the 7th Marines received word duringthe summer that they would be redeployed upon thecompletion of intensive jungle training . The regimentwas relieved by the 22d Marines in August 1942 .Upon being detached it began movement to the Sant aCruz Islands . I ts m iss ion wa s the occupation of Nden iIsland . The regiment, however, never reached th eisland . New orders directed the 7th Marines to rein -force Marine units already on Guadalcanal in thei rstruggle with the enemy for control of the islan dwhich is located in the southern Solomons . Personne lfrom the reinforced regimentalmost 4,300 men- -went ashore on Guadalcanal on 18 September . Thes efresh troops were promptly brought up to the line ofbatt le and deployed ne ar the 1st Marines in the vicini-ty of Lunga Point on the north coast of the island . "Within a week the 7th Marines, now commanded b yColonel Amor LeR . Sims, had joined the rest of the 1s tMarine Division in combat operations against th eJapanese .Ini t ially, the 1st Battalion was m ost involved in ac-tive engagements with the enemy . Major GeneralAlexander A. Vandegrift, the division commanderand later Commandant of the Marine Corps, desire dm ore offensive operations . He, therefore, initiated anumber of probing patrols beyond the Marines 'perimeter with the objective of securing informationon Japanese t roop m ovements . The 1st Battalion, 7thMarines was given one such ass ignment . I t had ordersto cross the Matanikau River, investigate the territorybetwe en the r iver and the vi l lage of Kokumbona, the nturn and make for the coast . The battalion under it scommanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B .("Chesty") Puller, famed Banana Wars veteran, mov-ed out on 23 September . A clash, the first betwee n a nenemy and a unit of the regiment, occurred on thefollowing day . Shortly after nightfall Puller 's men sur -

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USMC Photo 5133 5Marines head for the frontlines near the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal . Elements of the 2d Battalion, 7t hMarines were involved in a fierce battle with Japanese units east of the river in October 1942 .prised a force of Japanese on the slopes of MountAusten, southwest of Lunga Point . This brief skirmis hcost the Marines 32 casualties . Reinforcements fro mthe 2d Battalion, 5th Marines joined the battalion onthe 25th and the combined group of Americans push-ed on, minus the wounded who were taken back t oAm erican-held Henderson Field . The Matanikau wa sreached on the 26th but no crossing was attempted ;instead the two units turned north toward the sea .During the afternoon the column came under fir efrom the opposite bank . I t halted and the 2 d Battalion ,5 th Marines tr ied to make a crossing but was repulsed .Fighting broke off at dusk. The 1st Raider Battal ion i nthe meantime had reached the scene of the engage-ment and Colonel Merritt A. ("Red Mike") Edson ,i ts comm anding officer, assumed com ma nd of al l thre eunits . Edson, a veteran of World War I and a Nav yC ross recipient for action in N icaragua, later receive dthe Medal of Honor for his leadership on Guadalcanal .Lieutena nt Colonel Puller acted as his executive office rwhile the three battalions were operating together .

Combat resumed on the following day with the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, minus Company C, makin gan amphibious landing west of Point Cruz on thenorth coast . The intent of this maneuver was tolaunch an attack on the enemy 's rear while he . ,v a sengaging the other two Marine units . The landin gcam e off smoothly and the bat tal ion began hacking it sway through the dense jungle . Suddenly, a strongenemy force hit the unsuspecting Marines . MajorOtho Rogers who was in charge of the operation fel ldead in the initial burst of fire . The attacking Japaneseforced the Marines to establish defensive positions as

heavy fire stymied the men from making any furtherheadway . The Raiders and the 2d Battalion, 5t hMarines in the meantime had renewed the battle ontheir front but were still unable to penetrate enem ylines . Lieutenant Colonel Puller, learning of his bat-talion ' s tenuous position, boarded the destroyer USSBallard (DD 2 67) to effect a rescue . After making con -tact with the beleaguered b attal ion, the ship be gan fir-ing on Japanese positions . Sergeant Robert D .Raysbrook, braving enemy fire, stood on a ridge tosemaphore the Ballard the much-needed fire contro linstructions . Under the guns of the destroyer, th eMarines s tar ted withdrawing to the beach to await th earrival of landing craft to extricate them . As the me nstruggled to return to the beach they desperatelyfought off the a t tacking Ja panese . A numb er of heroi cdeeds occurred during the movement to the beach .One act of valor was especially conspicious . Platoo nSergeant Anthony P. Malanowski, Jr ., knowing thatit would mean sure death, chose to remain behind tocover the withdrawal of Company A. He was even-tual ly overrun and kil led by the ene my , but most of hi sunit 's men were able to reach the beach safely .

As Navy a nd Coa st Guard landing craft approache dthe shore, Japanese a rt i llery opened up on the expose dvessels . A num ber of boats we re s truck and casualt ie swere sustained by the crews . Their movement to theselected pickup area was seriously impeded . Observin gthe action below and the difficulties the boats wer ehaving, a lone Marine scout bomber, piloted by 2 dLieutenant Dale M . Leslie of VMSB-231, descende dto a low level and m ade a num ber of strafing runs ove renemy artillery sites . Heartened by the passes of the

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"Dauntless" SBD the coxswains renewed their at -tempts to reach the shore . With Coast GuardSignalman First Class Douglas Munro leading th eway, the boats succeeded in maneuvering throug hcontinuous Japanese fire to finally reach the beach .Munro was subsequently killed as he covered the ex-trication phase of the withdrawal . Perseverance com-bined w ith a strenuous effort resulted in the removal o fthe battalion, although the enemy fusillade haddelayed complet ion of the rescue . Sergeants Raysbrookand Malanowski and Lieutenant Leslie were eachawarded the Navy Cross for their efforts in th ewithdrawal. Signalman Munro received the Medal ofHonor for helping to ma ke the rescue a success . Oncesafely on board the Ballard, the 1st Battalion counte dits casualties and found the Japanese fire had taken aheavy toll24 killed and 23 wounded . Z "

Another attempt at driving across the Matanika ubegan on 7 October with elem ents of the assault grou pcoming from the 2d, 5th, and 7th Marines . The latte runit, less its 3d Battalion which remained in reserve ,crossed without incident . Resistance to the attackingforce w as encountered eve ntually b y a ll uni ts af ter th eMarines were established on the opposite bank . Onceagain the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines made the mostsignificant contact of the probe . Puller 's unit on 9 Oc-tober found a strong concentration of Japanese in adeep ravine located about 1,500 yards inland fromPoint Cruz . The tenacious commander immediatelybrought art i llery and m ortar f ire to bear on the en em y .Those who survived the barrage tried to scramble upthe far side of the ravine . E scape proved fruitless as th eMarines raked the side of the hill with rifle an dmachinegun fire . Following the destruction of thisgroup of enemy, the battalion and the rest of th eraiding force of Marines withdrew back across theriver . Fighting had lasted for 3 days with theAm ericans inf licting 700 casualt ies on the Ja panese . '

The next major engagement for the 7th Marine stook place on 25 October* with the 1st Battalionagain bear ing the brunt of a s trong enemy a t tack . Th eunit at this time was deployed southeast of Lung aPoint and Henderson Field . Shortly after midnight alarge enemy unit positioned itself opposite the bat-talion 's defenses ; once ready, the Japanese rushedforth in a headlong banzai charge against the 1st Bat-

This battle resulted in Lieutenant Colonel Puller being awardedhis third Navy Cross, He already had two for Nicaragua . Subse-quently, he would acquire two more : one for the New Bri tain Cam-paign and one during the Korean War .

USMC Photo 5697 6Sergeant John Basilone, 1st Battalion, 7t hMarinesMedal of Honor, Guadalcanal .talion's lines . The Ma rines held against the onslaugh tuntil reinforcements from the Army's 3d Battalion ,164th Infantry Regiment arrived. The concentrate dfires from the two battalions plus supporting artiller yrepulsed the attack . By 0700, the Japanese ha ddeparted the scene of the battle, leaving the fiel dstrewn with the bodies of their dead . Sergeant John("Manila John") Basilone received the Medal o fHonor for this fight, because of the courage h edisplayed in manning his machinegun and in bravin genemy fire to bring up much needed ammunition . Hethus had the double distinction of being the firs tenlisted Marine in World War II and also the firs tmem ber of the 7 th Marines to be awarded the meda l.

Another strong Japanese assault was launched o nthe 26th. This t ime it hit e lem ents of the 2 d Battal ion ,7th Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Her -man H. Hanneken, * a veteran of the occupation ofboth Haiti and Nicaragua . The Americans threw th eattackers back after a fierce, but brief fight in an are anear the coast and just east of the Matanikau River .The 7th Marines acquired its second Medal of Honorwinner as a result of the engagement . Platoon

"Hanneken, already a holder of the Medal of Honor and tw oNavy Crosses for his exploits in Latin America, received a Silve rStar for an engagement that took place in early November 1942

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USMC Photo 5697 4Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige had already bee ncomm issioned as a second lieutenant when he rece ive dthe M edal of Honor for his performance o nGuadalcanal .Sergeant (later Colonel) Mitchell Paige directed th efire of his machinegun section until the crews wereeither killed or wounded . He then singlehandedlymanned first one gun then a second . In the latterstages of the batt le Paige organized and led a bay one tcharge which drove the enemy off and prevented abreakthrough in Marine lines . Major (later Brigadie rGeneral) Odell M . Conoley, the bat tal ion executive of-f icer, earned the Navy C ross during the sam e engage -m e n t . 2 7

Between 8 and 12 November 1942, the 1st and 2dBattalions were involved in a number of sharp en -counters with enemy units around Koli Point, whic his about 5 miles east of Lunga Point ; but heav yfighting for the regiment soon ended as the entire 7t hMarines pulled back to the Lunga Point defensive area .For the next se veral we eks the uni t carr ied out routinepatrols to eliminate those Japanese soldiers who stil lremained behind in the areas seized by theAmericans . 2 8 On 9 December, the 1st Marine Divi-sion began stand down procedures . Command of alltroops ashore subsequently passed from Genera lVandegrift to Major General Alexander M. Patch,commander of the Army 's Americal Division . Mostof the 1st Marine Division had seen 4 months of in -tense fighting and, as a re sult , a large percentage of i t sunits were weakened by casualties, malaria, and just

plain fatigue . The men nee ded a rest from the rigors o fGuadalcanal's unhealthy climate and harsh terrain . 2 9

Relief on the 7th Marines took place in Januar y1943 . The entire regiment sailed from Guadalcana lon the 5th on board the transports USS PresidentJackson (A P 37), President Adams (AP 38), andPresident H ayes (A P 3 9) . A we ek later the three shipsdropped anchor in Port Phillip Bay off Melbourne ,Australia . The regiment moved ashore and went intocam p at Mount Martha, a few m iles outs ide of the ci-ty . Eventually all members of the 1st Division wer erelocated to Australia . 3 0 Back on Guadalcanal the bat-t le continueda responsibil ity of the U .S . Army . Th ecampaign finally came to an end on 9 February afte rthe Japanese completed the withdrawal of their forces .Although the enemy was able to evacuate thousand sof troops, the Japanese lost nearly 25 ,000 men ki lled ,died of wounds and disease, missing, and captured i nfighting on Guadalcanal . American Marine and Armyunits during the campaign sustaine d over 6,300 kille dand wounded . The first United States offensive agains tthe Japanese had resulted in a tangible Am erican vic-tory . The forward thrust of the enemy into the SouthPacif ic had be en s topped ; America now prepared toroll the Japanese back from their initial conquests .

The first order of business in Australia was to giv ethe me n a well-deserved l iber ty . Melbourne, with it smany similarities to an American city, was the focalpoint for Marines on leave . The Australian peopleresponded to the arrival of the 1st Division with grea twarmth and genuine hospitality . The newspapers, infact, welcomed the Americans by calling them "thesaviours of Australia . " Most Marines viewed thei rstay in Australia as an enjoyable respite from theunpleasantries and horrors of war . Fond mem or ies o fboth the country and the people are carried by the me nwho were stationed in Australia in 1943 .Once replacements and supplies arrived from th eUnited States, the division reorganized and made plan sto initiate a series of training exercises . Before the divi-sion could embark on maneuvers, lost and wornou tequipment had to be replaced . One item that wouldprove to have a significant effect in la ter bat t les of thewar was acquired by the 7th Marines . The M-1, thefirst semiautomatic service rifle to be produced i nquantity by the United States, was issued to the 1s tDivision shortly after its arrival in Australia . Begin-ning in April, training was conducted with the newweapons instead of the old bolt-action Springfields .Combat training emphasized the techniques of am-phibious warfare with a number of practice assaults

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USMC Photo 5333 0Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, CMC, makes an inspection tour of the 7th Marines on Guadalcanal i nDecember 1942. Left to right : Major General Alexander A . Vandegrift, 1st Division commander; Lieutenan tGeneral Holcomb ; Colonel A m or L . Sim s, regime ntal comm ander; and Lieutenant Colonel Julian N . Frisbie, ex -ecutive of f icer.taking place that spring in Port Phillip Bay . These ex-ercises were designed in anticipation of further cam-paigns in the South Pacific . "

New Britain

The regiment in summer 1943 received notif icationof its inclusion in the forthcoming 1st Marine Divisio nlanding at Cape Gloucester on the western tip of theisland of New Britain . American strategists bym id-1943 be gan formulat ing plans for there capture o fthe Phil ippines . To facilitate an ap proach to the forme rcolony, it was necessary to force an opening of th eVitiaz and Dampier Straits separating New Guine aand New Britain . With the straits in friendly hand sJapanese bases along the New Guinea coast wouldbecome vulnerable to pressure by the United States .Relat ively safe a ccess to the Phil ippines could then b eexploited . In accord with this thinking the decisionwas made to establish an American presence on

western New Britain . A sucess ful seizure of this are awould hopefully accomplish a secondary objec-t ivefurther isolat ion of the enem y bas t ion at Rabau lin eastern New Britain . The 1st Ma rine Divis ion, no wcommanded by Major General William H . Rupertus ,had the assignment of carrying out the assault . Thelanding phase of the campaign was scheduled for 2 6December 1943 with Cape Gloucester as thedesignated target . 3 2

In early fall after 8 months in Australia, the 7thMarines left in two echelons for the staging area a tOro Bay, New Guinea . The first arrived on 2 October ;the second on 9 October . Beginning on the lat ter date ,the troops were subjected to intermittent Japanes eaerial bombardment . Although the bombing con-tinued until the end of the month, the regiment wa sstill able to conduct amphibious exe rcises as part of th epreparation for the upcoming operation ." Over 2mon ths elapsed before the invasion force started m ov-ing to the objective with the 7th Marines leaving o nChristmas Eve . The regiment, under Colonel JulianN . Frisbie, had been delegated the responsibility o fsecuring the beachhead as quickly as possible . Frisbie ,

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a Banana Wars veteran, won a Silver Star o nGuadalcanal while he w as exective officer of the regi-m e n t .

The convoy carrying the assault force rendezvouse din Buna Harbor north of Oro Bay before sailing t oCape Gloucester on D-minus-1 ; arrival came early o nthe following day, the 26th. As H-hour drew near ,Navy cruisers and destroyers opene d f ire on predeter-mined targets . Air strikes were also employed . Themen of the 7th Marines in the meantime prepared t ot ransfer from their destroyer transports (APDs) to lan-ding craft . With the Navy's guns hammering away a tJapanese positions, the Marines loaded on boar dLC VPs (Landing C raft , Vehicle and Personne l) for th ejourney to the beach . Shortly after the last salvo wa sfired, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines headed for shore .It landed at 0746 . It was the first unit of the invasio nforce to land on the narrow beach and was im m ediate-ly followed by the 1st Battal ion which waded ashore 2minutes later . The last battalion of the regiment, th e2d, made its way through the surf to the beach approx-imately an hour after the other two units had set foo ton the island . All units of the division succeeded i ncoming ashore on time . The landings on D-day, 26December, had taken place without a hitch .

The assault troops met little resistance . One bris kbut deadly clash, however, did take place in the ini t ia llandings . Elements of Lieutenant Colonel William R .Will iams ' 3d Battalion, 7th Marines upon reachingthe shore came under long-range machinegun fir efrom hidden enemy bunkers . Reduction of the for-tifications was carried out by the 3d Battalion, 1s tMarines which suffered a number of casualties . Forthe most part , the real enemy w as not the Japanese bu tthe dense jungles . New Britain 's tropical rain fores tand near ly impene t rab le swamps combined to hampe rthe m aneuverabil i ty of the invasion force once it push-ed out from the beach . The Americans were als oplagued by a nea r constant rain that fel l in the first da yof the cam paign . The deluge brought on by the adv en tof the rainy season often turned normally dry, high -ground areas into quagmires . 3 4Opposi t ion from the Japa nese continued to be l igh tthroughout the first day . Bad terrain notwithstanding ,all major division objectives were attained, includin gthe 1st Battalion, 7th Marines ' capture of the keygeographical feature of the regionTarget H ill . Divi-sion units next concentrated their attention on thenearby Cape Glouces te r a i rdrome . The troops hackedand s lashed their way through the jungle to attack th eJapanese installation . 3 3 The beachhead meanwhile

steadily expanded with the Americans making littlecontact with the enemy .The Japane se delay ed their counter thrust, however ,only unti l the m orning of D-plus-1 . Attacking durin ga driving rainstorm , the enem y ' s 2d Battalion, 53d In-fantry then hit the positions of the 2d Battalion, 7t hMarines, which held the center of the Marin eper imeter . Three t im es the enem y hurled his troops a tthe battalion, but on each occasion the American sheld . No significant penetration occurred . The bat-ta l ion now unde r Lieutenant C olonel Conoley (recent-ly promoted) inflicted severe losses on the Japanese .Two hundred dead were counted on the battlefield .Those who survived retreated into the jungle shortl yafter daybreak . Conoley later received the Silver Sta rfor his leadership in the repulse of the attack . 3 6

The 1st Division pressed on with its drive towar dthe airfield that morning, but the first Marines did no treach it until 29 December . The field was secured b yelements of the 1st and 5th Marines on the 30th afte ra brief fight ." Brigadier General Lem uel C . Shepherd ,Jr ., assistant division commander and later the 20thCom mandant of the Marine Corps , then headed a ne wdrive southward along Borgen Bay following th eseizure of the airdom e . The main units in this thrust,which started on 2 January 1944, were the 7t hMarines ; 3d Battalion, 5th Marines ; and the 1st and4th Battalions, 11th Marines . The last two units pro-vided artillery support . One major encounter with th eenem y took place along a sm all stream which soon ac-quired the nickname "Suicide Creek . " For 2 days ,the entrenched Japanese halted the Marines . Thestalem ate wa s f inally broken w ith tank support . Onlyby laborious effort had the arm or been b rought up an dplaced into positions to assault the enemy fortifica-tions . A new advance was ordered with the tank sleading the wa y . This time the obstacles were b reach-ed and Japanese resistance disintegrated . Once thebreakthrough had been achieved the column pushe don and continued its march . "

Another significant engagement began on 9January when Lieutenant C olonel Lewis W . Walt ' s 3 dBattalion, 5th Marines, with Companies K and L o fthe 3d Battalion, 7th Marines attached, discovered astrong enem y defensive posit ion that included a maz eof intricate bunkers extending along Aogiri Ridge .Walt, later a full general and the Assistant Comman-dant of the Marine Corps, had his men attack theJapane se s tronghold, but in an all-day f ight they w er eunable to pene t ra te the enem y ' s defenses . By evening ,however, the Americans through sheer tenacity gain -

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USMC Photo 7229 0Marines ford a Cape Gloucester stream while searching for a Japanese pillbox . The jungle terrain and torrentia lrains on New Britain added to the difficulties .

USMC Photo 7763 6M em bers of the 7th M arines' regim ental staff at Cape Glouceste r are, left to right : Major Victor H. Ste it, opera-tions off icer; Lieutenant Colonel Lew is B . Puller, ex ecutive off icer; First L ieute nant Francis T Farrell, intelligenc eoff icer; Major Thomas J. Cross, quartermaster; Captain R . T. Musselwhite, Jr., comm unications officer ; FirstLieutenant John J. Aubuchon, assistant operations officer

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USMC Photo 72616Senior officers of the 7th Marines in January 1944 . From left to right : Lie utenant Colonel Ode ll M . Conoley, 2dBattalion ; Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B . Puller, executive officer; Colonel Julian N. Frisbie, regimental com-mander; Lieutenant Colonel Henry W. Buse, Jr., 3d B attalion ; Lieute nant Colonel John E . W ebe r, 1st Battalion ;Captain Joseph W. B uckley, W eapons Company .ed a foothold on the crest of the ridge . Japanesedefenders, beginning at 0115 on 10 January, launch-ed the f i rs t of f ive counterattacks against the Marines .The Leathernecks held in spite of the furiou sonslaughts . By dawn all the enemy reserves had bee nspent, forcing the Japanese to retreat . The ridge wa spermanently lost to the enemy as he had no furthe rtroops available for a new counterattack . 3 9

The only important enemy stronghold left in thearea was on Hill 660 . General Shepherd wanted thejungle-covered hill seized . He assigned this task to th e3d Battalion, 7th Marines which was now unde rLieutenant Colonel Henry W . ("Bill") Buse, Jr ., late rchief of staff of the Marine Corps and commandin ggeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific . The battalion ,supported by Weapons Company, 7th Marines, in-itiated a number of sorties over the next 2 days tha tprobed enemy positions on the hill . Then, a dramaticrush to the top through a heavy downpour occurre don 14 January 1944 . The sudden surge took th eJapanese completely by surprise . The exhausted an drainsoaked Marines dug in on the crest and waited fo rthe expected counterattack . The anticipated thrus tcame before sunrise on the 16th . Although vicious a ttimes the fighting did not last long . Buse 's skillful useof available firepower wrought devastating and lethal

destruction upon the attacking force . Buse receive dthe Silver Star for the capture of the hill . The repulseof the enem y on Hil l 660 m arked the end of organize dresistance in the Cape Gloucester-Borgen Bay area . Inthis phase of the New Britain Campaign, the 7t hMarines and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines plus sup -porting units had borne the brunt of the heaviestfighting in a region that contained some of the mos tdifficult jungle territory in the worldterritory mad eeven less pa ssable b y torrential rains and the result in gmud . Colonel Frisbie received the Navy C ross for hi sleadership during this part of campaign . 4 0

Marine operations in western New Britain im-mediately following the successful push to Hill 660were in the form of extensive patrolling missions toseek out the elusive Japanese . The enemy in hisretreat hoped to reach Rabaul on the opposite end o fthe island . The 7th Marines thus received a new mis-sionthe destruction of the fleeing en em y troops . Theregiment had this responsibility until the end o fFebruary when it was then ordered to participate i nthe defense of the Cape Gloucester airstrip agains tJapane se stragglers . All comba t-associated act ivity fo rthe regiment and for the division ended in the latte rpart of April . The numbe r of enem y kil led by the divi-sion was est im ated at 4,000 while the Marines lost ap -

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USMC Photo 72081A M arine fires a Thom pson submachine gun into a Japanese pillbox bef ore v enturing inside . Mem bers of the 7thMarines probed enemy positions on Hill 660 in January 1944 .proximately 1,300 men killed and wounded . The Ar-m y ' s 40th Infantry Division relieved the 1st Marin eDivision of its duties on the island and the Marine swithdrew to Pavuvu in the Russell Islands . Arrival ofthe 7th Marines occurred in early May ." Pavuvu wasconsiderab ly less than idea l as a site for a unit to obtai nthe rest and recuperaton required after months in ajungle environment. There the men found mud andmore mud plus the ever incessant tropical heat . Tomake matters worse the island was infested with ratsand land crabs . Adversities and illness, especiall ymalaria, continued to afflict the troops as they had o nNew Britain . Hardship notwithstanding, the 1s tMarine Division reorganized and reequipped itself an dprepared for the next campaign .

Peleliu

Operation Stalemate, code name for the seizure o fthe Palaus, got underway in September 1944 . The IIIAmphibious Corps (I I I AC) under Major General Ro yS . Geiger' had the responsibility of taking the islands .

'Geiger, a pioneer in Marine aviation, commanded a Marinesquadron in France during World War I and won a N avy C ross dur-ing his tour there . He also commanded a squadron in Haiti i n1920 .

General Geiger in June had detached a provisiona lplanning staff from III AC to plan the operat ion . Thegroup was sent to Pearl Harbor and received thedesignation X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps .Major General Julian C. Smith, the deputy com-mander of the V Amphibious Corps, was placed i ncharge . The Palaus were Japan ' s main bastion in th ewestern Carolines and only 530 miles east of Min-danao in the Phil ippines . Justification for the operatio ncame from General Douglas MacArthur, suprem ecomm ander of All ied Forces in the Southwest Pacific .He believed that no invasion of the Philippines couldsucceed unless the potential enemy threat from th ePalaus was el iminated . The Japanese there represente da real dange r to his l ines of comm unicat ion that couldnot be overlooked . Admiral Chester W . Nimitz, com -m ander in chief, Pacific Fleet , added another just if ica-tion : the need to secure a base w here Am erican force scould support MacArthur 's operations into thesouthern Phil ippines .

American planners focused their attention on tak-ing the southernmost islandsPeleliu and Angaur .The task of capturing Peleliu with its important air -field fell to the 1st Marine Division still commande dby Major General Rupertus, who was to receive theDistinguished Service Medal for the campaign . 4 2Pelel iu contained extensive d efenses , and its fort ifica-t ions included both antitank and antiboat guns in rein -forced pillboxes, minefields, barded w ire, and antitan k

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USMC Ph o to 94 93 7M em bers of the 1st Marine D ivision take cov er on Orange B each 3 at Peleliu . A m phibious tractors hit while car-rying the Leathernecks ashore burn in the backgroun dobstacles . The Umurbrogol Ridge which dominatedPeleliu was the key to the enemy defense set up . Theridge was masked by dense jungle and honeycombe dwith caves and tunnels, some natural and some man -made . In addition, the Japanese had effectively con-structed exits, firing ports, and artillery positions inthe ridge ' s hard coral limestone . The enemy ' sdefenses, as it soon became apparent, had been mad epractically impervious to naval and air bom bardm ent .The Navy felt its bombardment was more than suffi-cient . Years la ter General Gerald C . Thomas,' formerAss i stan t Com ma ndant of the Mar ine Corps , sum me dup the attitude of one of the naval commanders a tPeleliu : " They ' re [the Japanese] all dead, go onashore and take over the island . We fired a ll these gun sand they ' re al l dead, now y ou just go over and occup ythe area . "4 3

The campaign began early on 15 September 194 4with the 1st Marine Division poised to strike at th esouthwest coast of the island . Shortly after dawn th etroops clambered on board LVTs (Landing Vehicle ,Tracked) . The amphibious tractors began movingtoward the beach at approximately 0800 . Less than 4 0minutes later, the first waves of infantry landed an drapidly fanned out over the coral sands . The 1s tMarines assaulted the northern sector . The 5thMarines we re in the center . The 7th Marines, less the2d Battalion which was in reserve, landed in the

'In 1944 Brigadier General Thomas was the director of Divisio nof Plans and Polic ies at Headquarters , Marine C orps . Previously hehad been chief of staff of the 1st Division .

southern zone of the beachhead. Colonel Herman H .Hanneken, former commanding officer of the 2d Bat-tal ion, 7th Marines, now comm anded the regime nt i nwhat would prove to be i ts m ost difficult cam paign u pto that time . "

E ven before i ts units reached the shore the regimen tcame up against heavy enem y firea foretaste of wha twas to come . Intense antiboat, mortar, an dm achinegun f ire raked the 7th Marines as the landin gcraft churned through the surf . The resulting confu-sion due to the enemy ' s enfilade fire caused element sof the 3 d Battalion, 7th Marines to m istakenly land inthe 3d Battalion, 5th Marines ' zone . Once thebeachhead had been established, heavy fightin gdelaye d the taking of the 7th ' s first day objectives . Ma-jor (later Brigadier General) Edward H . Hurst's 3dBattalion, 7th Marines had a particularly hard tim eagainst Japanese soldiers stubbornly resisting fromcaves and b lockhouses . Hurst personally led his me nin attacks on the enemy which by the next da yresulted in the an nihilat ion of one reinforced b attal io nof approximate ly 1,600 m en . Major Hurst was subse -quently awarded a Silver Star for his leadership i neliminating this Japanese unit . 4 3

Mean while, forward progress on D-day ende d earl ythat evening with the men directed to prepare a defen-sive perimeter . The beachhead held by the 1st Divi-sion was 3,000 yards in length and averaged 500yards in depth with one maximum penetration of1,500 yards . Seve ral counterattacks hi t the per im ete rthat night with the Japa nese launching their s tronges tattack against the lines of Company C, 1st Battalion ,

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USMC Photo 95787Colonel Herman H. Hanneken, who won early fam eas a captain in the Garde d ' Haiti, took command ofthe regiment on New Britain and led it through th eassault on Pe leliu .7th Marines . Four hours of fighting ensued ; theJapane se final ly broke contact a t 0600 . The attempt a ta breakthrough had failed, although some enem ysoldiers had succeeded in penetrating a few forwar dposi t ions before they were repulsed .

A new regime ntal drive to secure the southern t ip o fthe island got underway on D-plus-1 . This sweeplasted until the afternoon of the 18th when the 7t hMarines reported to division headquarters that thearea had indeed been seized . Private First Class Arthu rJ . Jackson of the 3d Battalion contributed im-measurably to the regiment's success . On the 18th,he vir tually becam e a one-m an assault force in s torm -ing one enemy gun position after another . Jacksonsucceeded in personally wiping out 12 pillboxes an dkilling 50 Japanese soldiers . He was subsequentl yawarded the Medal of Honor. 4 7 In the first 4 days othe Peleliu Campaign, the regiment, less its 2d Bat-talion, killed 2,609 of the enemy while suffering 4 7dead, 414 wounded, and 36 missing in action . Onewell-trained enemy infantry battalion had been com-pletely destroyed . The number of enemy casualtie swas indicative of the Japanese determination to fight tothe death . 4 8While m ost of the regiment wa s st i l l locked in bat t l ein the south, the 2d Battalion, under Lieutenant Col-onel Spencer S . Berger, was put ashore and ordere dnorth to assist the 1st Marines . When the unit movedinto the l ine on 17 Septem ber 1944, the new ly arr ive dMarines found the 1st Marines pressing an a t tack on asection of the Umurbrogol . The vicious bat t le had bat-tered the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines to the degree tha tit had to be withdrawn and replaced by the 2d Bat -

USMC Photo 9577 1The 3d B attalion, 7th M arines m ove s to the front lines of Peleliu . A regimental drive to secure the southern en dof the island began on D -plus-l .

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O K I N A W S H I M A


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USMC Photo 30230 7Second Lieutenant A rthur J. Jackson was a privat efirst class when he won the M edal of Honor o nPeleliu .talion, 7th Marines . The assault continued with littleground gained, yet the cost to the Americans remain-ed high . In one furious exchange of hand grenade sPrivate First Class Charles H . Roan saved four of hi scomrades by jumping on a grenade that land in thei rmidst . Posthumously, he was awarded the Medal o fHonor . The rest of the regiment redeployed to theUm urbrogol and joined in the attack on the 20th . The2d Battalion subsequently went into reserve . No for -ward progress occurred even with the addition of tw onew battalions . Frontal assaults were of little avail .The Japanese could not be dislodged . Fighting rem ain-ed bloody and a rduous, and it was m ade m ore difficul tby the precipitous terrain . The Umurbrogol appeare dto be impregnable as the advance ground to a halt . 4 9Another posthumous M edal of Honor was aw arde dto a member of the 2d Battalion during a battle tha toccurred on 25 September. Private First Class John D .New and two other men f rom C ompany F were d i rec-ting mortar fire on enemy positions when a Japanes egrenade landed in their midst . New flung himse lf ontoit and absorbed the full impact of the explosion tha tfollowed, thus saving the lives of his companions . Asimilar instance of unselfish valor occurred a fe wdayslater . Private Wesley Phelps of Company K, 3 dBattalion, 7th Marines saved the life of a fellow

Marine when he jumped on a Japanese grenade tha thad been thrown into their foxhole . His award wasalso posthumous .

A new drive was ordered with fresh Army troopsfrom the 81st Infantry Division being brought up fo radded m uscle . Units from this division had just suc-ceeded in seizing Angaur, an island about 10 mile ssouth of Peleliu . The Japanese stubbornly resisted thelatest attempt at overwhelming the Umurbrogol ,although other enemy-held areas on Peleliu had beentaken by United States forces . The Umurbrogol pocke thad only been made smaller, not eliminated . By theend of September, the entire island was in America nhands and all that remained was the reduction of th eJapanese-dominated r idge . S General Rupertus agai nordered another attack . It was scheduled for the 30t hwith the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marine sspearheading the assault . Before i t could be launche denemy troops struck the lines of the 7th Marines o nthe proceeding night. The enem y at tack cam e during aheavy rainstorm and resulted in much confusion andin a num ber of casualt ies, but i t did not delay plans fo r3 0 Sep tember .

The 7th's drive began on time with both battalion smaking some rather substantial gains . The advanc e

USMC Photo 9687 3M en of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines traverse th erocky ground of the Umurbrogol. This Japanese -dominated ridge was the last area on Peleliu to fall tothe Americans .

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forced the Japanese to withdraw from a number o fdefensive posit ions and enabled the Ame ricans to cap-ture one mountain gun and knock out severa lma chinegun emplacements . Considerable sniper andharassing fire in the mean time took a heavy toll on th erest of the regimen t which had rem ained s tationary i nthe forward area . As the day wore on resistance stiffen -ed . The two assaulting battalions often had to engag ein hand-to-hand combat . Hand grenades, flame -throwers, and high explosives were employed to roo tout the enem y f rom hi s caves . Marine losses mounte das the battle raged. Recurring illnesses, especiall ydysentery, and casualties depleted the ranks of boththe 1st and 3d Battalions . At the end of the da yLieutenant Colonel John J . Gormley ' s 1st Battalionhad an effective s trength of only 90 men . The 3d Bat-talion ' s combat efficiency was placed at less than 5 0percent . The momentum of the attack could not longbe sustained with the loss of so many men .

The spent 1st Ba ttalion m oved to the rear while th e2d Battalion was brought up . Renewa l of the drive o nthe Umurbrogol began on the morning of 3 Octobe rwith Company G jumping off first . It advanced forrapidly towards i ts objectiveW alt Ridge, nam ed fo rLieutenant Colonel Lewis W . Walt, then the executiv eofficer of the 5th Marines . Once Com pany G gained afoothold on the ridge the enemy opened up with aheavy volume of fire . The rest of the 2d B attalion, 7t hMaines followed by the 3 d Battal ion rushed forward t oassist Company G. Although temporarily pinne ddown, uni ts of the 2 d Battalion were a ble to push thei rway over the crest by late afternoon . Dogged enem yresistance forced a halt to the drive at nightfall .Elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines eventually

deployed to the front to reinforce those units alreadyon the crest . Casualties for the day mounted to ove r100 for the regiment .

Most of the next day was spent in consolidatingnewly won ground and in m opping-up operations . I none such maneuver a platoon from Company L, 3 dBattalion, 7th Marines moved to seize Hill 120 nea rBaldy Ridge, an enemy fortified position . After theMarines had occupied their objectives, the Japaneseunleashed a murderous barrage from the security o fBaldy . The men attempted to withdraw but were cutoff by heavy shelling from enemy mortars and can-nons . Withering fire took a devastating toll . Below thescene of the battle the rest of Company L stoodhelpless . Attempts at rescuing the trapped Marine sproved fruitlessand costly . Captain James V .Shanley, the comm anding off icer , in trying to recove ran injured r if lem an wa s hi t by m ortar shell fragm ent sand fell mortally wounded . Second Lieutenant Ralp hH . Stadler rushed to his aid but was killed as he ra nacross open ground . Shanley was posthumouslyawarded his second Navy Cross ; his first had come fo rvalorous conduct in the battle for Hill 660 on Ne wBritain . Of the 48 m en who we re on Hill 120 only 1 1made it to safety and just 5 emerged unscathed . Thebattalion could only look upon this engagement as atragedy . The entire regiment, in fact, had sufferedsevere losses throughout the cam paign . Following th enear calam ity on Hil l 120, the 7th Marines w as rel iev-ed by the 5th Marines . At this point it simply coul dnot function effectively as a comba t organization on aregimen tal scale . "E leme nts of the regim ent came back into the l ine inmid-October 1944 to participate in yet another at -

USMC Photo 9470 9Se nior office rs of the 7th M arines during Peleliu are show n (left to right) : Major E. Hunter Hurst, commandingoff icer, 3d B attalion ; L ieutenant Colonel N orm an Hussa, regimental exe cutive off icer; Colonel Herman H. Han-neken, regimental commander; Lieutenant Colonel Spencer S. Berger, commanding officer, 2d Battalion ; andLieutenant Colonel John J Gormley, commanding officer, 1st Battalion .

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tempt at reducing the Umurbrogol pocket . The 1s tBattalion came up on the 14th and remained engagedin operations for 3 days when it was then relieved b ythe Army's 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry Regiment .Headquarters and Weapons Companies remaine dbehind the lines and were employed as a defensiveforce for the island ' s airfield . The 2d Battalion wa sassigned to patrolling operations on the island snortheast of Peleliu . On 17 October, elements of the3d Battalion, 7th Marines were dispatched to theUmurbrogol and a rather costly battle ensued . Thi sturned out to be the last engagement of the campaig nfor a unit of the 7th Marines . On 20 October the 81stInfantry Division took over all responsibility for conti-nuing operat ions against the diehard enem y units . Th e1st Marine Division stood down and all elements o fthe 7th Marines except the 3d Battalion left fo rPavuvu on the 22d . The remaining battalionredeployed on 30 October . 3 2

Although the bloody battle for Peleliu was over fo rthe 7th Marines and the 1st Marine Division, it con-tinued for the Army until 27 November 1944 whenthe las t fortif ied enem y stronghold was overrun . Eve nthen, f ighting did not end as sma ll skirmishes b etwee nAmerican troops and Japanese soldiers occurred form any w eeks after the official term ination of organize dresistance ." The capture of Peleliu brought to a closeone of the hardest-fought battles in the Pa cific War an done of the m ost costly . Almost 10,400 casualties wer eincurred by the Marine Corps, Army, and Navy dur-ing the cam paign . Of this figure the 7th Marines suf-fered nearly 1,500 battle losses .' 4

OkinawaAfter filling its thinned ranks with replacements ,the 7th Marines b egan prepa ring for i ts role in Ope ra-

tion Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa . The 1st Marin eDivision in January 1945 began rotating its infantryregiments to Guadalcanal to conduct training exer-cises s ince rat-infested Pa vuvu was too sm all for suc hmane uvers . The divis ion was now comm anded by Ma-jor General Pedro A . del Valle, an a rtillery officer wh ohad commanded the 11th Marines on Guadalcanal .The division was slated to part ic ipate in the a ssault o nOkinawa a s an integral part of a m uch larger force. A sa result, it had to face new problems of control an dcoordination with which it had no previous ex-perience . The 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were th emain units of the III Amphibious Corps which itsel fformed a major element of the Tenth Army, the

USMC Photo 11642 5Marines land unopposed on Okinawa. They en -countered little resistance in the first days and objec-tives we re taken w ell ahead of schedule .organization responsible for the seizure of Okinawa .Command of this huge force was given to ArmyLieutenant Genera l S imon B . Buckner who was subse-quently killed' by hostile fire during the closing daysof the campa ign .

The principal reason for undertaking the Okinawainvasion was obviousthe island 's proximity toJapan . I t l ay only 3 5 0 miles away . Nume rous sites fo rair and naval bas es existed on the island . In Americanhands Okinawa could be turned into a veritable bas-tion from which the United States could strike withimpunity at the heart land of the Japanese Empire . Ad-ditionally, it afforded the United S tates a poten tial stag -ing area for a future amphibious invasion of th eJapanese home i s lands .

Training for the operation ended in early March1945 . By mid-March, units of the invasion force ha dassemb led and we re proceeding to the objective . L-day ,the day of the assault, was set for Easter Sunda y whic hfel l on 1 April that year . Plans called for the landing t otake place on the southwestern side of the island . "The two divisions of the III Amphibious Corps wer e

'Upon the death of General Buckner, command of the TenthArmy fell to Lieutenant General Roy S . Geiger who ini t ially com-manded the III Amphibious Corps during the struggle fo rOkinawa . This was the first time a Marine general commanded a nAmerican field army .

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USMC Photo 10871 4Colonel Edward W . Sne dek er, later lieutenant general,commanded the 7th Marines before and during theassault on Okinawa .scheduled to land abreast on the beaches north of thetown of Hagushi ; to the south two divisions of the Ar-my's XXIV Corps would come ashore . The 1st Divi-sion after landing would assist the 6th Division in cap-tur ing Yontan airf ield be fore s tr iking inland . The f irstassault waves began making their way to the beache sshortly after 0800 . In the vanguard were the arm ore damphibian tractors followed closely by the troop -carrying LVTs . Among the first Marine units to lan dwere the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Marines . Much tothe surprise of the Americans only slight enem yresistance was encountered . Advancing Marines m ade

rapid progress . Consequently, the 3 d Battalion, whic hhad been in reserve, was put ashore and joined themovement inland . 7 6 Objectives were taken ahead o fschedule . For example, Colonel (later Lieutenan tGeneral and Commandant of the Marine Corp sSchools) E dward W . Snedeker 's 7th Marines was abl eto reach the east coast late on 3 April . Although themen met some moderate opposition, fighting did notseriously impede their progress . Rugged terrain an dpoor roads caused the most difficulty . Spearheadin gthe drive was the 3d Battalion under Lieutenant Col-onel Hurst which had the honor of being the firs tMarine unit to make it to the opposite side of theisland . Okinawa had thus effectively been cut in two .The 2d B attal ion, st il l comm anded by Lieutenant C ol-onel Berger, followed by the 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J .Gormley, wen t into reserve after reaching the coast o nthe 4th. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines continued tobe deployed along the front to the north but attachedto the 5th Marines. For the rest of April, the 7t hMarines primarily occupied itself with patrollingoperations in the rugged hi lls that lay behind the l ine sas the 6th Divis ion cleared M otobu Peninsula and th enorthern end of the is land and the Arm y XX IV Corp sattacked to the south . I t had the m ission of destroyingsmall bands of enemy that had been by passed in the ad -vance on the north . "

The 1st Marine Division on 1 May redeployedsouth to assist the Army's XXIV Corps in its ad-vance . The 7th Marines, the last major unit of thedivision to transfer to the new theater of battle, com-pleted its redeployment on 2 May . Progress agains tthe enemy in the south had been halted at the ShuriLine, a s trong network of Japanese defenses . The Ar-my's repeated attempts at breaching the enemy's for -

USMC Photo 116632M arines, including one e quipped w ith a flam ethrower, climb a stone w all as they drive across Okinawa . The 7thMarines reached the east coast on 3 April .

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A machinegun opens up on an enemy position . Marine units move dresistance ceased in the north .

USMC Photo 121760to southern Okinawa after organize d

forced its way onto the ridge b yifications proved futile . General Buckner called foranother effort but felt a breakthrough would requirereinforcements . Both Marine divisions, therefore ,shifted their zones of operation to southern Okinawa .Most Marine units were free to move since organize dresistance in the north had ended on 21 April . "

The 1st Division maneuvered into assault position sopposite the Dakeshi-Awacha hill complex, a heavil ydefended s ect ion of the Shuri Line . A new attack waslaunched by the Tenth Army in early May .Murderous fire slowed the 1st Marine Division's ad-vance on the Shuri Line . The 7th Marines, however ,did gain a firm hold on Dakeshi Ridge . The assaultstarted on the morning of 11 May 1945 . Prior to the7th Marines ' push, the Japan ese unleashe d a fusi l lad eof mortar and machinegun fire on the 3d Battalion 'spositions . A foolhardy charge by the enem y followed .Division artillery opened up on the onrushing soldier swhile the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines hurried to rende rsupport . The two battalions with artillery assistanc ebeat back the attack and inflicted many casualties onthe attackers . The 7th Marines subsequently wentahead with its own attack which started on schedule .Although weakened by their thrust, the Japanese re-mained capable of offering vigorous resistance to th eAmerican assault . The 1st and 2 d Battal ions, especial-ly, found the going difficult , but the regim ent by sheer

determinatio nnightfall.

Considerable credit for the regiment's success wa sgiven to Lieutenant Colonel James M. Masters, Sr . ,the 7th Marines' executive officer . Masters, who late rbecame a lieutenant general and commandant ofMarine C orps Schools, establ ished an advanced obser -vation post in the only possible positionon thefrontlines . From there he observed and helped direc tthe attack . He continued to man the post, in spite ofintense enemy mortar and small arms fire, and toreport information vital to the capture of the desperate -ly defended Da keshi Ridge . He was awarded a NavyC ross for his efforts . A sees aw b att le for control of theridge raged on 12 May . The fighting was so violen tthat i t brought back m em ories of the bat t les of Pelel iu .Dakeshi Ridge was f inally secured on the 13th . S 9 Theenemy apparent ly had remained de te rmined to f ight t othe las t ma n, because he held out for nearly the whol eday despite the employment by the Marines of tanks ,self-propelled 75mm guns, and 37mm antitan kguns .6 0

Com pany E , following the seizure of Dakeshi Ridge ,sent a platoon towards Wan a Ridge but forward move -ment was halted by the enemy . The Marines had topull back to Da keshi Ridge for the night . The 1st and2 d Battal ions rested and reorganized during the next 3

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days . Mopping-up operations also occurred, but no of-fensive engagements were ordered because of th eweakene d condit ion of both units . The 3d B attal ion o nthe 17th relieved the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines sinc eit could only muster a s ingle company of effectives . O n17 May the 3d Battalion pressed the attack up Wan aRidge, but its ranks were thinned by a heavy volume o fenem y f i re . Lieutenant Colonel Hurst, the battalio ncomm ander, received a Navy C ross for assist ing in th eevacuation of a wounded man over a path swept byJapanese small arms fire . Bloodied and battered, thebattalion was in turn relieved on 19 May by the 3 dBattalion, 1st Marines. In 4 days of fighting Hurst' sunit lost 12 officers, producing a severe shortage ofleadership in the battalion . Equally as important wasthe painful fact that the entire regiment had sustaine dapproximately 1,250 casualties from all causes bet-ween 10 and 19 May . 6 '

The regiment stayed in reserve during near cons-tant rain until 2 June 1945 . A few days earlier ,Japanese defenses along the Shuri Line crumpled wit henemy units retreating to the island ' s southern tip fo rwhat looked like a last-ditch stand. The 7th Marinesm oved up to the front near N aha, the capi tal , and int opositions previously occupied by elements of the 22 dand 29th Marines, regiments of the 6th Division . The2d Battalion, 7th Marines immediately crossed theKokuba River and encountered a sma ll Japanese forc ewhich was quickly brushed aside . 6 2 Once the reg im en testablished itself on the south bank of the river, itscommanding officer, Colonel Snedeker, ordered hismen to storm nearby hostile emplacements .Snedeker ' s goal was to close the neck of the Orok uPeninsula south of Naha, thus entrapping Japaneseforces that had withdrawn there . Units of the 6thMarine Division in the meantime launched a directassault on the peninsula itself . This coordinated opera-tion resulted in the annihilation of practically al lenemy soldiers on the peninsula . The 1st Divisionordered another major advance upon com plet ion of th ebottling up of the Japanese on Okoku . Marine unitswere directed to push south and west toward the sea .Rain, mud, and rough terrain slowed the drive, but th eMarines nevertheless reached the coast on 7 June .This resulted in the open ing of a ne w supply route fo rthe division . It now could be easily supplied by se arather than by the arduous overland route .Dependence upon hazardous air drops was als oel iminated .

The division next made a stab at the Itoman-Ter aarea . The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines initiated two at-

tempts at seizing high ground overlooking Tera bu tboth failed. Concurrently, the 2d Battalion struck atenemy positions in the vicinity of Itoman . The nex tday, 10 June, the unit crashed through Japanes edefenses and swept beyond the southern edge of thetown . Success did not come w ithout a pricefive bat-talion officers were hit by enemy fire in the first 7minutes of fighting . The 1st Battalion, aided by an ar-tillery barrage, meanwhile seized its objective of theprevious day . 6 3The offensive continued with both battalions turn-ing their attention to Kunishi Ridge, a heavily defend-ed coral escarpment . On 11 June, the 2d Battalionpushed out from Itoman while the 1st Battalionstarted a drive from Tera . The frontal attack wasquickly halted by accurate small arms fire and concen-trated artillery and mortar volleys . Colonel Snedekerordered a night assault to avoid needless casualties .Com panies E and F m oved out ea r ly on the 12th whi l eit was still dark . The Americans surprised th eJapanese and reached the crest of the ridge . Acounterattack temporarily cut the companies off fro mthe rest of the regiment . Reinforcing units with tanksupport forced their way onto the heights , but intens efire from the defenders thwarted the seizure of th eridge . The enemy was so well entrenched that the 2 dBattalion, 1st Marines came up to assist in breakingthe will of the Japan ese to resist . The 3 d Battalion, 7thMarines, which had be en in division reserve, a lso join -ed in the operation . Forward progress continued to b eslow as Japa nese opposition did not abate in s pite of in -creased pressure . Naval gunfire had to be em ployed t odestroy pockets of die-hard holdouts . The tired 7thMarines finally withdrew from the battle on the 18t has the f ighting drew to a close . I ts place wa s taken b ythe 8th Marines, a fresh unit from the 2d MarineDivision . Colonel Snedeker eventually received theNavy Cross for leading his regiment through the las tstages of the Okinawa campaign, including the suc-cessful penetration of hostile defenses on Kunish iRidge .

Com bat did not cease a l together for the 7th Marine seven through it had been pulled back from thefrontlines . Ene m y snipers were active in i ts area caus-ing a numb er of Marine casualties . In one encounter aconcealed Japanese riflem an wounded Lieutenant C ol-onel Hurst in the neck . The 28-year-old battalioncommander had to be evacuated and the command o fthe 3d Battalion, 7th Marines passed to Lieutenan tColonel Stephen V . Sabol on 19 June . Organize dresistance ended 2 days later and the 7th Marine s

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redeployed north to the Motobu Penins ula for rest an drehabil i ta t ion . b " E nem y casualt ies were extraordinarilyhigh during the struggle for Okinawa . No exact tollhas been tabulated, but various estimates have place dJapanese dead at well over 100,000 . Unfortunately ,many of these were civilians . American forces alsopaid a heavy price : 12,000 killed and over 36,600wounded . All hostilities in the Pacific ended on 1 5August, and the Second W orld War official ly w as con-cluded on 2 September 1945 when Japan formall ysurrendered to the Allies in Tokyo Bay .

North China Intervention and Occupatio nAs part of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Marine s

had slogged its way through four rough, gruellin gcampaigns . The regiment had seen some of thetoughest and bloodiest fighting of the war . With thewar over the Marines felt relieved in knowing thatthey would not have to face the prospect of anothe rbattle . They expected an immediate return home, bu tthis did not prove to be the case . Shortly after the sur-render of Japan, the 1st Marine Division receivedorders to transfer to China .Japane se forces in large num bers held vast sections

of North China . The Chinese Nationalist Govern-m ent, having no readily ava ilable troops to rel ieve th eJapa

a brief history of the 7th marines

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