a century of rice improvement in burma

A Century of Rice Improvement in Burma U KHlN WIN

IRRI 1991

INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE P.O. Box 933, 1099 Manila Philippines

The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was established in 1960 by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations with the help and approval of the Government of the Philippines. Today IRRI is one of the 13 nonprofit international research and training centers supported by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The CGIAR is sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The CGIAR consists of 50 donor countries, international and regional organizations, and private foundations.

IRRI receives support, through the CGIAR, from a number of donors including the Asian Development Bank, the European Economic Community, the Ford Foundation, the International Development Research Centre, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the OPEC Special Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, UNDP, the World Bank, and the international aid agencies of the following governments: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.

The responsibility for this publication rests with the International Rice Research Institute.

Copyright © International Rice Research Institute 1991 All rights reserved. Except for quotations of short passages for the

purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of IRRI. This permission will not be unreasonably withheld for use for noncommercial purposes. IRRI does not require payment for the noncommercial use of its published works, and hopes that this copyright declaration will not diminish the bona fide use of its research findings in agricultural research and development.

The designations employed in the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IRRI concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area, or of its authorities, or the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

ISBN 971-22-0024-8

Contents

Foreword vii Preface ix Abbreviations and acronyms xi

I. Introduction 1 Soils and climate 1 Rice production 2 Colonization-generated forces 6 Independence-generated forces 8 Science-generated forces 9 Rice cultivation 10 Rice varieties 12 Population 14 Administration 14

Rice area and production 18 Area 18 Yield and production 19 Varieties 20 Seed distribution 22 Fertilizer and agrochemical use 23

II. Rice production under the British Government 17

Agricultural loans 23 Draft cattle 25 Support services 27

Investment 27 Research 27 Extension 28 Irrigation 28 Mechanization 28

Cropping intensity 28

iii

Rice trading 29 Rice milling 29 Rice consumption 31 Rice exports 32

Beneficiaries of production 33 Stability and sustainability 33 Equity 34 Impact 35

111. Rice production under the Independent Burmese Government 37 Rice area and production 38

Area 38 Yield and production 39 Varieties 40 Seed distribution 40 Fertilizer and agrochemical use 40

Agricultural loans 41 Draft cattle 43 Support services 44

Investment 44 Research 45 Extension 45 Irrigation 45 Mechanization 46

Cropping intensity 47 Rice trading 48

Rice milling 48 Rice consumption 49 Rice exports 50


IV. Rice production under the Socialist Republic Government 55 Rice area and production 57

Area 57 Yield 60 Production 62 Varieties 63 Seed distribution 66 Fertilizers 67 Agrochemicals 73

Agricultural loans 75 Draft cattle 77

iv

Support services 78 Investment 79 Agricultural research 80 Agricultural extension 83 Proven new technology 86 Government support and leadership 86 Selectivity and concentration 87 Mass participation 88 Demonstration and competition 88 Pilot program 89 Full-scale program 93 Analysis of the program 97 Results of analysis 99 Further analysis 100 Evaluation of the program 107 Multiplier effect 110 Irrigation 112 Mechanization 113

Cropping intensity 115 Rice trading 116

Rice milling 121 Rice consumption 123 Rice exports 124


V. Implications for the future 129 Investment alternatives 130 Farmer participatory research and extension 131

Selection of scientists 132 Motivation of scientists 133 Preprogram activities 133 A detailed working program 134 Farmer participatory extension 135

VI. Conclusions 137

References cited 139 List of statistical appendices 143 Conversion factors 155 Index 157

V

Foreword

Rice dominates Burma’s economy and is extensively interwoven into the social and economic fabric of its people’s lives. Burma is a rice-surplus country, but has a great potential for still higher production.

U Khin Win has been closely involved in Burma’s agricultural development since 1950, as a scientist and extension worker, and as managing director of the Agricultural Corporation, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

One of U Khin Win’s assignments while serving as a visiting scientist at the International Rice Research Institute from 1987 to 1989 was to document the history of rice improvement in Burma.

He drew on almost four decades of professional work and an intimate knowledge of rice to write A century of rice improvement in Burma. U Khin Win has analyzed patterns of rice production in Burma over the last 100 years, identifying the forces that generated its production growth, and how this has affected the lives of the Burmese population.

This book is a comprehensive treatment of all important factors that influenced Burma’s rice production growth. U Khin Win also suggests technological approaches to trigger a second wave of development.

Scientists and policymakers will find the book valuable for analysis of developmental processes in Southeast Asia. It should contribute to increased rice production with the ultimate objective of improving the well-being of present and future generations of rice farmers and consumers, particularly those with low incomes.

Klaus Lampe Director General

vii

Preface

Rice is Burma’s most important crop. It dominates the agricultural sector, which is the largest and most productive part of the economy; changes in rice production have a direct and profound influence on the entire population. Burma’s rice output must continually increase to feed the growing populations and boost the country’s economy.

Studies of rice production over the last 100 yr have shown both periods of rapid growth and periods of stagnation. There is growing awareness among agricultural development workers that production is still short of its potential. Considering the complexities of agricultural development, the various forces that have influenced rice production need examination. An understanding of long-term rice production trends will be useful in the formulation of future development strategies.

As a visiting scientist at the International Rice Research Institute, I was assigned to analyze Burma’s experience in rice production. This led me to study the country’s long-term rice production profile and, in the process, to examine significant aspects that contributed to various changes since 1830. The development process that took place before World War II was well-documented. I was personally involved in the agricultural development process in the years after the war (a total of 37 yr) in various capacities as a researcher, extension worker, and administrator. This book is the outcome of my personal experiences, which have influenced the inferences I have made about available statistical data. The book is a comprehensive treatment of rice production in the past 100 yr. It presents important critical issues in production and other related areas.

Chapter I gives background information about the country. Chapter II describes rice production under the British Government, with emphasis on the various forces that generated growth. Chapter III presents the situation after the country gained independence from the British, and the problems that prevented progress. Chapter IV details research development and technology transfer activities, focusing on an extension strategy that dramatically increased

ix

rice production in the last decade. The development, implementation, and evaluation of this extension strategy take a considerable part of this chapter. In all these chapters, the impact of rice production on the social and economic conditions of the population is discussed. Chapter V presents the farmer participatory research and extension approach and proposes a methodology for applying it.

This analysis is by no means exhaustive, but all available data related to the rice industry have been collected and collated. I trust that the study brings forth some significant aspects of rice production performances that will lead students of agricultural development to initiate appropriate action.

I am grateful to U Kyi Win, Deputy General Manager of the Agricultural Corporation, Burma, for the statistical analysis of data, and to U Win Pe, Director General of the Cultural Department, Burma, for reviewing the original manuscript.

I alone am responsible for any errors and inferences drawn from the data.

x

Abbreviations and acronyms

AC = Agricultural Corporation ADB = Asian Development Bank AFPTC = Agriculture and Farm Produce

AMD = Agricultural Mechanization De-

ARD = Applied Research Division ARDC = Agricultural and Rural Devel-

opment Corporation ARI = Agricultural Research Institute B Ag = Bachelor of Agriculture BSPP = Burma Socialist Program Party DA = Department of Agriculture FAO = Food and Agriculture Organiza-

FYM = farmyard manure GA = General Administration IRRI = International Rice Research Insti-

K = Kyat, Burmese currency LV = Local variety MEIC = Myanma Export Import Corpo-

Trade Corporation

partment

tion

tute

ration

MV = Modern variety RGUB = Revolutionary Government of

the Union of Burma Rs = Rupees, Indian currency (used in

Burma during the independent period)

SAB = State Agricultural Bank SAC = Security and Administrative

SAMB = State Agricultural Marketing

SRUB = Socialist Republic of the Union of

UNDP = United Nations Development

VEM = Village extension manager WB = World Bank WOP = Without program WP = With program WTRPP = Whole Township Rice Produc-

Committee

Board

Burma

Programme

tion Program

xi

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Burma is situated in Asia, lying between 10° and 28° N latitude and between 92° and 101° E longitude. It occupies an area of 678,034 km 2 —slightly larger than France and nearly double the size of Japan. It shares borders with China (2185 km in the north and northeast), Laos (235 km in the east), Thailand (2325 km in the east and southeast), India (1454 km in the northwest), and Bangla- desh (258 km in the west). It has a coastline of 2330 km along the Bay of Bengal on the west and the Gulf of Martaban on the south. The width of the country measures 800 km from east to west, and the length spans about 1300 km from north to south, with the long narrow Tenasserim coastal strip constituting 800 km. The country is bounded on three sides by high mountain ranges forming valleys where agriculture is practiced.

Soils and climate The country has a wide range of soil and climate favoring the domestication of numerous crop species. The climate is mainly tropical but is subtemperate-like in hills and plateaus.

The rice-growing soils of Burma were classified by Soviet soil scientists into 18 main soil types and 7 soil groups. These soil types approximated the FAO/UNESCO nomenclature (Ye Goung et al 1978). The main rice-growing soil groups fall under Gleysols, Fluvisols, humic Planosols, and pallic Vertisols.

The country has three distinct seasons: rainy, winter, and summer. The rainy season is influenced by the southwest monsoon, which generally starts in mid-May and ends in mid-October. Precipitation under the monsoon varies greatly with location and year. The rainy season is followed by a cooler 3-mo winter period, and then by 3 or more dry summer months. Except for some precipitation in some parts of the country during the winter and summer months due to northeasterly winds, Burma is dry from November to April. The country may be divided into five zones with respect to annual precipitation (Table 1).

Table 1. Mean annual precipitation (mm) in different zones in Burma (Agricultural Corporation 1977-87).

Zone Rainy Winter Summer Av (1977-87)

Coastal Deltaic Dry Northern Hill

3988 2007 559

1676 1499

356 229 178 229 279

533 356 178 229 203

4877 2592

915 2134 1981

Precipitation under monsoonal influence is very erratic, and thus mean annual precipitation is often misleading. Distribution rather than mean precipitation determines the influence of weather on rice production. The irregu- larity of monsoonal rain follows five distinct patterns: early onset of monsoon, late onset of monsoon, break in monsoon, early departure of monsoon, and late departure of monsoon. This monsoonal behavior, which causes varying amounts of precipitation in various parts of the country, determines rice production in a particular year.

Other climatic factors like temperature also have some influence on crop production. They may be aggregated into four groups (Table 2).

Agroecological zones have been specified by superimposing the soil and climatic conditions of the country. Soils have been graded into five groups (S1- S5) and climate in terms of precipitation has been graded into three (R3, R4, and R5—following the FAO system) to form 10 important agroecological zones— R3S1, R3S3, R3S5, R3S6, R4S1, R4S5, R4S6, R5S1, R5S4, and R5S5 (Khin Win and Nyi Nyi 1979). Coastal and deltaic conditions fall under R3S1 and R4S1, constituting the main rainfed rice-growing regions (Fig. 1, 2).

Rice production

Burma is an agricultural country with over 10 million ha of cropped land planted to about 60 crops. In 1983, agriculture accounted for 50% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 47% of its export earnings (Hill

Table 2. Mean temperature range a in various parts of Burma (Agricultural Corporation, 1977-87).

Mean temperature range (°C) Group

Minimum Maximum

Lower Burma Central Burma Northern Burma Shan Plateau

16 12 10

6

37 40 34 30

a Av of 10 yr, 1977-87.

2 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

1. Trends in rice area and production.

and Jayasuriya 1986). The same pattern was observed in 1984 and 1985. In earlier years, agriculture represented even a larger share of GDP and exports. Burma’s economy is clearly dependent on agriculture. Crop production is the major agricultural activity and is largely dependent on weather. A limited irrigation system, restricted to the dry zone of Upper Burma, offers some help, largely in the form of supplemental water.

Soils and climatic conditions in many parts of Burma favor rice cultivation. Rice is the principal agricultural crop and is the staple food of the entire population. Rice dominates the national economy, and any shortages in supply cause spiralling price increases in many other commodities, thus creating political instability. A rice-surplus country, Burma has one of the highest levels of per capita rice consumption in the world. Rice has been cultivated in Burma for domestic consumption since prehistoric times. Rice is life for the Burmese, being interwoven with the social and economic fabric of the people’s lives. This book examines the rice economy of Burma over the 100- yr period from 1885 to 1985.

Rice production in the country increased nearly 1400% in 100 yr, but growth was not even. An annual rice production of a mere 1 million t in 1870 rose to over 14 million t in 1985 (Fig. 3).

INTRODUCTION 3

2. Rainfall distribution.


3. Soil distribution.

INTRODUCTION 5

Due to the involvement of a huge land area and a great majority of the population in the rice industry, all governments in the time period discussed gave priority to the development of rice production. However, policy objectives and implementation methods differed from government to government. Governmental policy determined the direction in which development took place. Three distinct patterns occurred in the 100-yr period and their causes and effects were the results mainly of different governmental policies.

Three governments administered the country during the period: the British Colonial Government (1885-1948), the Burmese Independent Gov- ernment (1948-62), and the Revolutionary Council followed by the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (SRUB) Government (1962-85). This study collected and collated data covering these three administrations.

Rice production data reveal three distinct and significant growth trends generated by various forces at different times. The first growth period occurred in 1885-1910, after the final annexation of the country by the British. The second growth period came in 1955-65, a few years after the country gained independence. The third growth period took place in 1975-85, when technology development and transfer systems provided clear dividends. Forces that generated rice production growth differed with the period, creating differential impacts on the population.

Rice production, however, cannot be taken as a single aggregate factor influencing the population. The impact of production stability, sustainability, and equity aspects on the socioeconomic conditions of the country at different times must be considered. Production stability here means spatial and temporal variability and profit. Sustainability is reckoned in terms of the long-term maintenance of production and profit levels. Equity applies to the distribution of benefits that result from production. This study emphasizes the agronomic feasibility, economic viability, and social acceptability of rice production at varying times. The long-term rice production trend is an important socioeconomic indicator.

Colonization-generated forces In pre-British days, the Burmese King adopted a restrictive commercial policy prohibiting the export of many products, including rice (Cheng 1968). This restriction on rice exports discouraged farmers from growing more than was required for their own consumption. In addition, the low returns on rice offered very little incentive for farmers to produce more than they needed for food, seed, and taxes. The price of rice was reported to be Rs 5 for 2100 kg in the domestic market, while the same amount of wheat sold for Rs 40 (Adas 1974). The Burmeseruler imposed many duties and restrictionson the merchants who traded in the country.

The British colonized the country in three stages. The Arakan and Tenasserim coastal strips were colonized in 1826, Pegu and Martaban in 1852,


and the rest of the country in 1885. Rice development was initiated by the British after the second colonization stage by putting the Irrawaddy deltaic area under rice cultivation. This deltaic area offered a favorable rice environment in terms of both weather and soil. With a view to exporting rice to Europe, the British government encouraged increased production in every possible way.

Land, labor, and capital are the three main resources necessary for rice production. Favorable deltaic land was there, but labor was needed to clear the swamps and to cultivate rice. The British government introduced an immigration scheme to induce the people of Upper Burma to move to Lower Burma. It also imported Indian workers under various immigration programs. Moreover, it improved river and rail transportation to facilitate north-south movement between Upper Burma and the delta. There were also attractive land tenure systems. The need for capital was fulfilled by providing loans to pioneer settlers. Private moneylenders, well-protected by the law, provided the greater share of the capital requirement.

These activities, aimed at increasing rice production through the expansion of cultivated area, were organized by the government, while the whole process of production was facilitated by enacting the necessary legislation and introducing various incentives. At the same time, the government encouraged the rice milling industry and trade, both internal and external, by helping many commercial firms and private enterprises. These forces spurred rice production growth during this era, increasing it to a remarkable level in a short time. Production rose sharply between 1885 and 1910.

The rice-sown area of 1.5 million ha in 1885 increased to 4 million ha in 1910. While the yield remained almost the same, the rapid area expansion increased production from 2 million to 6 million t. As a result, rice exports also rose from a few hundred thousand to 1.5 million t.

Such remarkable and rapid growth in the country’s rice industry was made possible by a multitude of factors, five of which are considered most significant: 1) availability of vast areas of deltaic land favorable for rice cultivation, 2) provision of various incentives and inducements by the government, 3) lifting of the ban on rice exports, 4) great demand for rice by the expanding rice and allied industries in Europe, and 5) development of the steam-powered ship engine and the opening of the Suez Canal, which shortened the distance between Europe and Burma.

Production stability during the period was striking, in spite of the fact that rice cultivation relied totally on the weather. No serious flood or drought adversely affected production. The trend followed a linear pattern. The price of the crop did not fluctuate much—from Rs 95 in 1885 to Rs 110 for 100 baskets (or 2100 kg) of unhusked rice.

Production sustainability was also remarkable, since ricelands had been recently cleared for cultivation. This provided high inherent fertility that assured continued production. The use of cow dung also helped sustain production.

INTRODUCTION 7

The equity of production, however, was not so encouraging. While land was cleared by the pioneer settlers, ownership slowly changed from tillers to moneylenders because of the farmers’ inability to repay loans at the stipulated time. This resulted in landlord and tenant classes in Burmese society. The moneylenders continued to play the role of landlord cum moneylender. The original owners of resources for rice production then became the beneficiaries. Small farmers who grew rice spent 84% of their output as paid-out costs, leaving them only 16%. Land rent and high interest rates took up a large share of their output. As a result, unequal distribution of production output created economic and consequently social inequality. And there were no effective measures to reduce these economic and social inequalities.

The colonial government that induced rapid rice production through the expansion of area finally created political instability. The relationship between landlords and tenants deteriorated to such an extent that the country experienced racial conflict and political uprisings resulting from the agrarian crisis. The impact of higher rice production ended in the frustration of farmers as a result of land alienation. World War II ended these regrettable events.

Independence-generated forces The second rice production growth period occurred between 1955 and 1965. It started when the country gained independence from the British. The people had great hopes that, once freed from colonial domination, the country would become prosperous. The newly independent government implemented the Land Nationalization Act to ensure equitable distribution of land. Govern- mental action on remission of debt, low-interest loans, security of land tenure, and other incentives once more increased rice production.

The new government drew and implemented an agricultural sector plan that placed emphasis on elimination of landlordism, application of scientific methods to agriculture, and raising rice exports to prewar levels. The government planned to use the rice areas abandoned during the war. But many factors prevented implementation of the plan, and it took 15 yr to recover the rice area and restore production to prewar levels. The government did not fully achieve its objective, but it pushed rice production growth upward from the low level brought about by the war.

The rice-sown area increased from 4 million to 5 million ha, raising production from 6 million to 8 million t. Again, the rice production trend followed a linear pattern. The price of rice did not change much during this period. The cost of 100 baskets (2100 kg) of unhusked rice was about 300 kyats (about $38). There was a slight increase in yield due to the use of improved varieties and a small amout of chemical fertilizer. Agrarian problems were lessened to some extent, and there was noticeable improvement in the plight of farmers. Rice exports rose to nearly 2 million t but still fell short of the prewar level.


Rice production growth during this period was also brought about by the expansion of area, along with a slight increase in yield. But stability and sustainability of production were less impressive. The country experienced poor weather conditions in 1957 and 1961, significantly reducing rice production. Political strife forced some of the experienced farmers to move to the cities, leaving behind their lands in the hands of unskilled workers. Further- more, unstable rural conditions prevented the farmers from fully attending to their lands. Lack of skilled personnel was caused by the departure of foreign consultants, leaving behind untrained nationals who could not fill the void. This applied to all work spheres-technical, administrative, and social. The administrative structure was simply not appropriate for the implementation of development plans.

In this period, the equity of production improved considerably. Farmers needed to spend 57% of their output as paid-out costs, which compared favorably with the first growth period. Reduction in land rent was mainly responsible for this improvement. However, farmers still had to rely on private moneylenders for their credit needs.

The impact of rice production growth during this period was less than expected. After World War II, shortages of food in many countries offered good opportunities for the rice export trade. But in time, as the major customers managed to raise their own food under self-sufficiency programs, Burma found it difficult to dispose of its rice surplus. Reduced trade caused storage problems, along with disputes regarding quality, shipment, and payment, and other aspects common to a buyer’s market. Finally, the rice surplus was disposed of at lower prices and through barter. The reduction of export earnings necessitated the abandonment of some development plans, which constrained rice production growth.

Independence-generated forces propelled rice production and marked a second distinct growth period, but internal security and a weak international market retarded growth and put an end to the hopes anxiously entertained by the population.

Science-generated forces The third period of growth, which occurred between 1975 and 1985, was generated by science. The time was most appropriate for practicing scientific methods. Skilled manpower became increasingly available to implement agricultural development plans. Internal security conditions had also improved, and an international organization stood ready to assist the government in the implementation of development plans.

The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in Los Baños, Philippines, released dwarf, early-maturing, fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding varieties and promoted modern agronomic techniques. The environment was conducive to development, but acceptance of the new varieties and modern technol-

INTRODUCTION 9

ogy was slow and unenthusiastic in the beginning. The application of a “selective concentrative extension strategy,” which took advantage of the conducive conditions at the time, changed the whole situation. The intensive use of high-yielding varieties, together with the greater use of chemical fertilizers in selected areas, increased yield. The area devoted to rice remained constant during this period, with slight variations due to weather abnormalities. Sown areas remained at 5 million ha, but production rose from 9 million to 14 million t, brought about mainly by dramatic increases in yield. The rate of growth was very impressive in the beginning but slowed down with time.

Stability and sustainability of production were comparatively less encouraging during this growth period. Technology brought good results up to a certain point, after which new factors came into play and impeded further growth. The use of modern technology demanded more and more inputs as its coverage expanded. Procurement, storage, transportation, marketing, and distribution of inputs became limiting factors beyond a certain magnitude. The country’s resources simply could not cope with the increasing demand. The expansion of high-yielding rice varieties beyond favorable environments needed newer varieties that would suit the adverse environments. The changing times and changing needs required a new extension strategy appropriate to the situation. New forces became imperative to maintain the growth momentum and push it further upward.

Regarding equity of production, higher rice production during this period benefited both the individual farmer and the country. The new technology required more expenditures than did traditional practices, but the return was proportionately larger. The farmers needed to pay only 30% of their output as paid-out costs, a significant improvement compared with 84 and 57% in the first and second growth periods, respectively. The price of rice remained constant at 900 kyats (about $113) for 100 baskets. However, the price of rice on the international market went down drastically. Extension services and subsidies on chemical fertilizers helped maintain, to a certain extent, the stability, sustainability, and equity of rice production. Science-generated forces that powered rice production influenced a third growth period but called for new factors to push the growth further upward.

Rice cultivation Burmese agriculture originated from subsistence agriculture. Being the major staple food, rice is cultivated in every part of the country, irrespective of agroecological suitability. However, rice-growing areas are grouped based on hydrological environment: rainfed lowland rice (R3S1, R4S1, R3S5, and R3S4); winter rice (R3S1 and R3S5); deepwater rice (R3S1 and R3S4); upland rice (R3S3 and R4S5); and irrigated rice (R5S4 and R5S1).

Rice cultivation follows traditional methods using simple implements (Fig. 4, 5). It is labor-intensive, and cattle are the main source of animal power.


4. Rice threshing with cattle.

5. Rice winnowing.

Generally, rice cultivation starts with tillage operations in the nursery plot (usually one-tenth of the transplanted area). After the seedlings are planted, 1 mo remains to carry out tillage operations in the fields to be transplanted (Fig. 6). Transplanting is done in July-August, solely by women (Fig. 7). In areas where soil fertility is poor, labor is scarce, seedlings are insufficient, and water control is lacking, broadcasting instead of transplanting is also practiced. There is a slack period after transplanting until harvest in October or Novem-

INTRODUCTION 11

6. Tillage using a wooden spike-harrow.

ber depending on the growth duration of the variety. Rice is manually harvested by sickle and left in ihe field for 3 d for sun drying. The panicles are then bundled and carried to homesteads for threshing, which is done by allowing cattle to walk on the bundles (Fig. 4). The threshed rice is winnowed in January or February, when most days are windy (Fig. 5).

Rice varieties The usual practice for obtaining the next season’s seed is to separately harvest and thresh the best panicles. They are then dried and stored for future use. There are many rice varieties; some are named with respect to locality, some for their growth duration, some for the size and color of their grain, some for their aroma, and some for their appearance.

Many local names of rice varieties are undoubtedly synonymous. Differ- ent names are given to the same variety in different localities. Some 2000 varieties have been recorded in the country. A multitude of varieties posed no problem in the days of subsistence farming systems. But once they entered market-oriented agriculture, mixed varieties that differ in shape, size, and hardness of grain caused inefficient milling and produced inferior products.


7. Transplanting.

Farmers classify rice in many different ways, some of which are widely accepted. The three best known classifications use time of sowing, water regime, and growth duration as criteria.

With respect to classification based on time of sowing, four types have been denoted: premonsoon rice, monsoon rice, late monsoon rice, and ”mayin rice” or winter rice. Premonsoon rice sown with irrigation in March and harvested in July constitutes nearly 2% of the total rice area. It is planted in the central part of the country. Generally, premonsoon rice is followed by monsoon rice. Although premonsoon rice covers a small area, it carries considerable significance in the region, where there is rice shortage. It is harvested at a time when the rice stock in the area has been almost exhausted. Monsoon rice occupies the largest portion of the rice area: 81%. It is sown in mid-June, transplanted in mid-July, and harvested in October or November. This type is planted in all states and divisions of the country. Late monsoon rice, sown in August, is transplanted in favorable places in September and harvested in January. It is planted in low-lying delta areas as floodwater subsides in the latter part of the rainy season. It also covers about 2% of the total rice area. Mayin rice is sown in November, transplanted in December, and harvested in March. It covers 15% of the total rice area and is commonly planted along river valleys and deltas.

INTRODUCTION 13

Classification based on water regime includes three situations—irrigated, upland, and rainfed. Irrigated rice, covering 17% of the total area is restricted mainly to the central part of the country, where irrigated water is available. But there are many small patches in every part of the country having irrigation from ponds or small rivers, some privately owned, others village-owned. Another situation is upland rice, covering about 4% of the total area, dominating the central part of the country and the hilly regions, where irrigation water is not available. The rest of the area is rainfed, covering 79% of the rice area in the country. This includes saline conditions in coastal areas (3%) and deepwater conditions in deltaic areas (8%).

Classification according to growth duration consists of three groups- short-duration rice (140-145 d seed to seed)) that matures in October is called “kaukyin,” medium-duration rice (150-170 d) that ripens in November is known as “kauklat,” and late-duration rice (170-200 d) that ripens in December is called “kaukkyi.”

Population The population of the country was recorded as 4 million in 1824 (Harvey 1946) and grew to 37 million in 1985, with an annual growth rate of 1.99% (Ministry of Planning and Finance 1987). The agricultural sector employs 63% of the population. According to age group, 36.7% are under 14 years of age; 56.6% are between ages 15 and 59; and 6.7% are above 60. Males and females are almost equal.

Burma can thus be reckoned as a country of mainly young and middle- aged people. The population density is 55 persons/km 2 , with highest densities in the deltas. The population is concentrated mostly in the river valleys and flat plains, where agriculture can be easily developed. The Burmese are a cheerful and cooperative people. Their literacy rate is high due to the widespread traditional monastic education system.

Administration For administrative purposes, the country is divided into seven states and seven divisions under the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Govern- ment (Fig. 8). Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions constitute the delta, where 50% of rice is cultivated. There are four levels of administration: the central level in Rangoon, the capital of the country; the state or divisional level in the capital cities of the divisions and states; the township level in the capital cities of the townships; and the village tract level. These levels are administered by council members, who are elected every 4 yr.

The country thus witnessed three distinct and significant rice production growth periods during 1885-1985 with varying impacts on the population.


8. States and Divisions (1-7 are divisions, 8-14 are states).

These impacts may be designated as a period of “frustration” during the first period, a period of “hope” during the second period, and a period of “progress” during the third period. Long-term analysis suggests some future action consistent with the country’s conditions. The in-depth analysis of relevant factors accompanying rice production growth reveals important insights that will be useful in the development of future strategies.

INTRODUCTION 15

CHAPTER II

Rice production under the British Government

After their first annexation in 1826, the British exported rice from Arakan and Tenasserim to India. Rapid development of rice culture took place after the second annexation, when the Irrawaddy deltaic area was put under rice cultivation. The expansion of rice area took place at striking speed after the final annexation in 1885. The British government created an environment conducive to increased rice production. It lifted the ban on rice exports imposed by the Burmese King and encouraged private firms to enter the export trade. The government made the country a safe and profitable place for foreign investment. It protected investors through legislation. The commercial firms responded by investing capital in rice mills and in the improvement of transport. Other measures taken by the government included introduction of a land tenure system that gave farmers a permanent and inheritable title to their land, which could later be sold, mortgaged, or transferred. All these factors, combined with the great demand for rice, resulted in the rapid expansion of rice area.

The British government also provided various immigration incentives to raise rice production. Examples are the exemption of newly cleared land from land tax for 12 yr and a program to encourage the people of Upper Burma to move to Lower Burma. The improvement of river and rail transport facilitated the movement of people from Upper Burma to Lower Burma under reduced- or free-fare arrangements with the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company and the Burmese Steam Navigation Company. A population census at the time showed that the number of persons in Lower Burma who had been born in Upper Burma was over 300,000, or 8.5% of the total population. In addition, there was an immigration scheme under which the government brought in about 8,500 Indians annually; and there were twice that number of unassisted Indian immigrants in 1870 (Cheng 1968). There was a regular and constant flow of Indian immigrants. A reduced fare scheme for immigrants from India to Burma offered by the British India Steam Navigation Company proved very effective.

The need for capital development in the rice industry was fulfilled through government loans, but both local and Indian moneylenders provided the greater share of the capital requirements.

Rice area and production

Governmental actions helped expand rice area, with the rate of expansion rising rapidly whenever such actions gained momentum. Although there was no improvement in yield, expansion in area resulted in higher production. At the beginning of the 20th century, the rate of area expansion slowed down as the volume of available land became exhausted. As easily cleared land became limited, reclaiming the remaining available wasteland required greater capital outlay. Adverse social and economic conditions retarded further production growth.

Area The expansion of rice area started in the last half of the 19th century, occurring more rapidly in the last two decades. It was confined mainly to the Irrawaddy Delta. Many obstacles confronted the pioneer farmers, but area expansion increased dramatically through their hard work and determination, coupled with various incentives. The earliest recorded data on rice area are for 1830, when area planted to rice was registered at 27,000 ha. This area increased to 5 million ha by 1930 (Table 3).

Table 3 indicates that rice area expansion covered more than 1 million ha during the first 50 yr while the same magnitude was achieved in only 10 yr during the last 2 decades of the 19th century. But in the beginning of the 20th century, the rate of expansion declined to only half that magnitude. The rate slowly rose again in the 1930s and remained constant after that period. The increase in area was largest at the close of the last century.

Table 3. Periodic increase in rice area, 1830-1940 a (Cheng 1968, Grant 1939).

Year Area (million ha)

Increase (million ha)

1830 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940

0.027 1.255 2.329 3.460 4.026 4.172 5.006 5.066

1.228 1.074 1.131 0.566 0.146 0.834 0.060

a For yearly data, see Appendix I.


-

The increase was mainly in Lower Burma in the Irrawaddy Delta. The increase in Upper Burma was much less than that in Lower Burma (Table 4). The expansion of area in Lower Burma was mainly in the delta, where the "kanzo" forest and "kaing" grass were cut to give way to rice. Trees were felled, grasses were cut, and the undergrowth was burned in the first year. The farmers then flooded the area and waited for the roots to rot. The ash of burned- off stubble was plowed under to provide some nutrients.

Small area increases took place in Upper Burma in some marginal lands and irrigated areas whenever supplementary water was provided. In the earlier period, significant area expansion in Lower Burma was concentrated in the Upper Delta, but in time it moved down to the tidal swamps. The government constructed embankments in these areas to prevent flooding and encroachment of saline water. As available land became limited, expansion of area entailed more expense. The problem of wild animals prowling newly cleared land was compounded by malaria, dysentery, and other diseases. Despite these hazards, area expansion in the Irrawaddy Delta was dramatic. Pioneer farmers settled in villages on the edges of rivers or small creeks, or along the rail and road networks. Once the settlers were established, they instituted a fairly standard method of rice cultivation throughout the delta, using very simple implements and some cattle.

Yield and production Reports on rice development in the 19th century do not mention annual average yield for the whole country, but some give average yields for certain areas for a particular year. Yield estimates range from 1.0 to 1.8 t/ha in Upper Burma to 1.4 to 1.9 t/ha in the delta and 1.2 to 1.5 t/ha in the coastal areas. Since the majority of the rice areas were located in the delta, the national average yield was estimated to be 1.7 t/ha (Grant 1939).

During this time, rice yield depended on the fertility of the land and the amount and distribution of rainfall in a particular area. Since the delta had

Table 4. Periodic increase in rice area in lower and upper Burma, 1880-1930 (Grant 1939).

Lower Burma Upper Burma

Year Area (million ha)


Area (million ha)


1880 1.225 1890 1.780 1900 2.662 1910 3.160 1920 b 3.475 1930 4.011

0.525 0.882 0.498 0.315 0.531

- a

0.549 0.798

0.809 0.995

0.867 0.249 0.069

0.186

a No record for Upper Burma. b 1919 and 1921 taken as 1920.

RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 19

- - -

-

these favorable conditions, the highest possible yield could be expected there. The high variation in yield in Upper Burma was due to the fact that some areas had irrigation while others received scanty rainfall.

The Department of Settlement and Land Records (DSLR), through season and crop reports, started recording national average yield data in 1913. The yield data in these reports were estimated from a very small sample plot (one thousandth of an acre or 0.40 ha) and from crop information provided by village elders. The annual yield during the era averaged 1.6 t/ha, slightly lower than estimates made in the 19th century.

The national average yield in 1913 was 1.8 t/ha, while it was 1.6 t/ha in 1940 (Table 5). Rice yield tended to go down with the years for two reasons: a) with time, yield estimates covered wider areas representing different types of soil and climate; and b) the fertility of the land had reached its minimum, and no further decline was likely to occur. The nutrients absorbed by the rice crop became almost equal to natural replenishment.

Although yield tended to decline, rice production during this period increased at a remarkable pace due to the rapid expansion in area. The rate of production increase was more distinct and significant at the close of the last century and at the beginning of this century. It began to stabilize afterward.

Table 6 indicates the rice production trend from 1830 to 1940. It was only 44,000 t in 1830, increasing to 2 million t in 1880. After this take-off period, production rose rapidly, especially at the close of the 19th century. It was well over 5 million t in 1900, rising to 6.5 million t in 1910, after which the rate of growth slowed down. (For annual rice production data, see Appendix I).

During this era, rice production growth was remarkable, but growth between 1885 and 1910 was most distinct and significant. Such a rapid rise in production growth was the result of many factors having differential impacts— some beneficial and some detrimental-on the various segments of the population.

Varieties There were many rice varieties in the country, many of them identical although called by different names in different localities. Many varieties posed no problems in a subsistence system; but as the rice industry developed, mixing

Table 5. Rice yield In selected years, 1913-40 (DSLR, various years).

Year Yield (kg/ha) a

Year Yield (kg/ha) a

1913 1920 1925

1769 1528 1511

1930 1935 1940

1550 1560 1640

a Converted from baskets per acre.


Table 6. Rice production in selected years, 1830-1940 (Grant 1939; DSLR various years).

Rice

(million t) Year production a Increase

(million t) Remark

1830 1880 1885 1900 1910 1920 1930

0.044 1.989 2.418

6.502

7.295

5.588

6.008

1.945 0.429 3.170 0.914

0.793

Increase in 50 yr Increase in 5 yr Increase in 15 yr Increase in 10 yr

Increase in 20 yr

a Production from 1830 to 1913 calculated from the sown area, assuming 95% for harvested area and then multiplying by the estimated yield of 1700 kg/ha.

of varieties produced inferior products. There was a need to systematically classify them. Beale had introduced a scheme of rice varietal classification based on grain length, breadth, and ratio of length to breadth (Table 7) (Beale 1927). All varieties were classified into one of five groups. Those that belonged to groups A and B had long thin, grains while those in C had short, medium grains. Types D and E had short, bold grains. The classification was adopted by the Department of Agriculture (DA) in its work on seed improvement. Rice traders, brokers, and millers also accepted the classification.

Table 7. Classification of rice varieties based on grain dimension (Beale 1927).

Grain dimension Group name With husk Without husk Description

Length Length Length Length (mm) Breadth (mm) Breadth

Emata (A)

Letywezin (B)

Ngasein (C)

Midon (D)

Byat (E)

Over 9.40 8.40 -9.80 7.75

-9.00

7.35 -8.60

9.00 and

upward

Over 3.30 2.80

-3.30 2.40

-2.80

2.00 -2.40

2.25 -3.00

Over 7.0 6.00

-7.00 5.60

-6.40

5.00 -6.00

6.40 -7.35

Over 3.0 2.40

-3.00 2.00

-2.40

1.60 -2.00

2.10 -2.25

Long, slender grain; kernel translucent Slender grain; kernel translucent Short, medium grain; kernel usually translucent, sometimes with abdominal white Short, roundish, bold grain; kernel opaque and chalky Large, broad grain; kernel opaque and chalky


–

– –

The DA distributed 55 improved pureline rice strains through its seed improvement program. Table 8 lists the improved rice varieties distributed in various rice-growing areas of the country during this period. The letters stand for type of grain; the first number denotes the year of selection; and the second number gives the number of the plant selected. A16-34 thus refers to an improved A type strain selected in 1916 from a plant numbered 34.

Varieties widely used during the period belonged to two main groups with respect to growth duration. Long-growth duration "kaukkyi" varieties were popular in low-lying areas, while medium-duration "kauklat" varieties were common in the higher ground, where the water level could be maintained at a shallow level.

Seed distribution Since farmers kept their own seeds, the seed distribution activities of the DA were limited. The improved rice strains from the DA did help improve milling outturn, but their popularity among farmers remained low. The yield of the improved strains was inferior to that of the local strains. Farmers exchanged the seed among themselves in cases of floods or drought.

More seeds were distributed by the DA when it successfully demonstrated the superiority (in yield and quality) of its strains over local varieties. It was estimated that over 20,000 t of improved seed were distributed yearly. This amount of seed could cover 8% of the sown area at the time. As extension

Table 8. Rice varieties distributed in Burma (DA 1958). a

A B C D E

A16-34 A22-53 A26-3 A27-4 A28-6 A28-8 A29-16 A29-20 A29-23 A31-12

B15-1 B23-10

B2518 B27-3 B28-12

B24-92

B28-14

C14-8 C15-10 C19-26 C20-15 C20-16 C21-4 C23-6 C24-71 C24-102 C27-21 C27-31 C28-15 C28-16 C30-18 C30-32 C31-13 C32-1 C33-18 C34-1

D17-88 D25-4 D25-6 D30-4 D34-11 D38-52

E21-37 E27-57 E30-42

a A = Emata, B = Letywezin, C = Ngasein, D = Midon, and E = Byat.


activities expanded, the DA put more efforts into its seed breeding and multiplication program by establishing new experimental stations and renovating existing ones. Rice millers also paid premiums of 5-15% for the pure strains in lieu of the high milling outturn.

Fertilizer and agrochemical use The use of fertilizer in this period was only in the experimental stage. Experimental stations under the DA had conducted numerous fertilizer experiments to study rice response to various nutrients. These results pointed out a 30-100% increase in yield (depending on soil fertility) with equal application of N and P. The DA introduced nicifos, leunaphos, and ammophos, but farmer acceptance was poor; farmers doubted the profitability of using these fertilizers. Besides, they felt that faulty fertilizer management would cause rice varieties with weak straw to lodge.

Farmers used cattle dung, bat guano, fish waste, bone meal, rice bran, and cotton cakes as manure. Of these, cattle dung was the most common, since it was available in every homestead. Records of experimental stations showed that a pair of cattle contributed about 6 t dung/yr. But farmers kept their cattle in their homestead only at night, letting them graze in public pasture during the day. Thus, the dung collected would be much less than that recorded. Yet, if carefully collected and conserved, cattle dung could serve as an important manure source. As part of its extension activities, the DA demonstrated how to store and conserve cattle dung.

The other manures were not readily available. The supply of bat guano or fish meal was limited, while the cost of the others prohibited extensive use. It is therefore not surprising that they had little effect on rice production.

Agrochemicals were not necessary. In spite of extensive rice areas over wide stretches of the country, there was no widespread occurrence of pests and diseases during this period. Intermittent incidences of rice hispa, rice caseworm, and ear-cutting caterpillar were reported, but the damage done appeared insignificant. Reports of damage by crabs, rats, and birds were more common in those days. The rice varieties used by the farmers were the same strains that survived in their own environment after a long time. They were resistant to pests and diseases prevalent in the area. The government had promulgated plant quarantine laws with effective guidelines for implementation. The use of agrochemicals in rice production during the era was not significant.

Agricultural loans The expansion of rice area needed more than the availability of vast areas of swampland in Lower Burma and the willingness of farmers. It needed money for capital investment and operational costs of pioneer farmers. They required seeds, implements, and cattle to clear the land; in addition, the daily family


needs must be provided before the first rice crop could be harvested. The government granted loans to farmers, but the amount was not sufficient.

There existed two sources of government loans—those issued under the Land Improvement Loan Act of 1884 and those awarded through the Agri- culturists’ Loan Act of 1884. These loans were not popular among the farmers in spite of the low interest rate because of the many disadvantages that accompanied the transactions. For one, there were too many forms to be filled out. Before a loan was approved, a borrower had to make frequent visits to the offices concerned; there was too much red tape. Furthermore, the loans specified a definite date of repayment. Table 9 shows the amounts awarded under the two Acts in some years within the period 1905-39. (For a record of loans awarded yearly, see Appendix II.)

These two sources, however, did not solve the farmers’ financial problems. The weakness of the system provided an excellent opportunity for private moneylenders who easily took advantage of the situation. Wealthy Burmese, Chinese, and South Indians known as Chettyars became private money lenders; but the major share was taken up by the Indians, who had efficient and well- organized financial backing. They also charged the lowest rate of interest.

The Banking Enquiry Committee estimated that a sum of 200 million rupees would be annually required for rice loans. As cited in Table 9, the government share amounted to only a fraction of the total requirement. The committee also estimated that of this requirement, 160 million rupees or more than two-thirds of the total was provided by the Chettyars (Cheng 1968). The usual surety for these loans was a parcel of land but houses, cattle, jewelry, and standing crops were alternatives.

Moneylenders even encouraged the farmers to borrow more than they needed and did not stipulate a repayment date. For this the simple farmers were thankful; they did not realize, however, that they were being lured by the moneylenders into putting their lands as surety, which at a later date could be confiscated in case of default. High interest rates, the usual risk of flood and drought attendant to agriculture, fluctuation of rice prices, sickness in the

Table 9. Government loans, 1905-39 (Cheng 1968).

Amount of loan (000 rupees) Period

Land Improvement Agriculturists’ Total Loan Act Loan Act

1905-06 1915-16 1920-21 1923-24 1920-31 1934-35 1938-39

4 5

38 246

6 1 2

676 1299 3161 2206 955 394

0

680 1304 3199 2452

961 395

2


family, and the tendency to overspend on social occasions finally led to the relinquishment of lands to the moneylenders. The moneylenders became landlords, while the pioneer settlers became tenants. Through this process, a great majority of the land came to be owned by the Chettyars.

By 1935, more than half of the riceland was owned by nonagriculturists. Even worse, these people were mostly aliens. Land was considered a good investment and made many Burmese and Chinese landlords wealthy. In earlier days, there were no tenants, because any farmer could become a landowner just by clearing his chosen land. However, only a handful survived to continue owning the land they cleared. This phenomenon was especially true in the deltaic areas of Lower Burma.

The tenant had to pay a certain fixed amount of produce to the landlord, varying with locality and existing landlord-tenant relationship. The terms of lease on the land generally covered 1 yr, renewable every year, and always in favor of the landlords who knew the laws better. At times landlords increased the rent at will, and in some years when the weather did not favor a good harvest, the tenants were left without enough rice for family consumption.

Landlords were not interested in the improvement of the land, since they were not agriculturists. Nor did tenants take interest in developing the land, inasmuch as a continued lease was not assured for the next year. Land productivity understandably went down. In those days, tenants were very mobile, constantly in search of better tenure conditions. With time, the relationship between landlords and tenants deteriorated to the extent that the government had to seriously consider tenancy legislation to provide tenants reasonable security of tenure and fair rent. It was proposed that no land rent should exceed 25% of the produce. The Tenancy Act was passed in 1939, but the concept of a fair rent proved too impractical to institute. Further attempts to correct these deficiencies did not materialize due to the outbreak of World War II.

Draft cattle

Draft cattle served as the main source of power in rice cultivation. These animals were involved from the very first tillage operation up to the last operations of threshing and transporting of produce (Fig. 4,6). Rice production depended on the availability and efficiency of cattle.

The success of the rice crop in Burma in any year depends on three main factors: regular and normal monsoon, good health among cultivators, and adequate supply of healthy draft cattle. For this reason, in subsistence agricultural systems, weather, labor, and draft cattle would constitute the main factors of rice production. Seed, investment, land, crop prices, market, storage, and transport would be less significant. But as the conditions in the rice


industry changed, the role of these factors in rice production would become increasingly important.

Burmese farmers took great care of their cattle. Daily feeding of the cattle and health care were important activities in every farm family. Cattle owners went to the Veterinary Department for vaccination as a preventive measure against contagious diseases and also consulted the same department regarding serious diseases. But for ordinary ailments, cattle were traditionally cured using local herbs.

Draft cattle in Upper Burma were mainly bullocks; but in Lower Burma, both bullocks and buffaloes were common, with bullocks constituting approximately 70%. Although buffaloes appear stronger than bullocks, they cannot work long hours under the heat of the sun. Bullocks are more suited to the work in ricefields and are more docile than buffaloes. In all agricultural operations and for transport, farmers used cattle in pairs. Single-animal operation was used only in some hilly areas.

The indigenous breed of bullock was most suitable for the strenuous rigors of rice cultivation. There was no commercial breeding of cattle, and farmers relied on natural breeding in their own homestead. Areas in drier parts of the country and hills offered opportunities for small-scale cattle breeding because of their natural pastures. There existed a weekly cattle market system in most towns where cattle were either exchanged or sold for cash.

In every town, the government allocated large areas of land as pasture to provide cattle with enough feed. These pastures provided sufficient feed during rainy seasons, but farmers supplemented pasture feeding with rice straw and bran or groundnut cake. Feeding on pasture might be advisable where there was no population pressure on the land. Then there was the question of whether cattle would get more nourishment from cultivated fodder crops, which required only a fraction of the existing pasture area.

The population level of draft cattle in this period might be considered satisfactory, but the workload of cattle slightly decreased with time, showing

Table 10. Draft cattle, population 1901-40 (DSLR, various years).

Gross Draft

(000 ha) (no. x 000) Year sown area cattle Workload a

1901 1904 1909 1914 1919 1924 1929 1939

4798 5240 5720 5987 6249 6711 7104 7568

1763 1920 2279 2437 2745 2849 2996 3148

5.44 5.46 4.98 4.91 4.59 4.71 4.74 4.81

a Workload means area in ha undertaken by a pair of cattle.


that cattle could conveniently accommodate the expansion in rice area: a pair of cattle had to work 5.44 ha in 1901; this decreased to 4.81 ha in 1940. A more aggressive Veterinary Department could have improved the cattle population by reducing mortality among the working cattle. Another factor to consider is the fact that the Burmese disliked beef.

Table 10 shows that the working cattle population increased at a faster rate than did expansion in rice area. This population level might be considered satisfactory, but higher cattle population could have enhanced the gross sown area or increased the cropping intensity. (For yearly population of draft cattle, see Appendix III.)

Support services Higher rice production during this era was brought about with very little assistance from the agricultural support services. The government placed more emphasis on law enforcement and revenue collection than on agricultural development—it took its own course, mainly influenced by the rice trade. The DA, which was responsible for technology development and transfer, was established in 1880 as part of the DSLR. An independent DA was started in 1906, staffed with a few personnel. The staffing strength of the Department began to increase with the addition of a few graduates from the Agricultural Institute of Poona, India. At the same time, the staff was complemented by Diploma of Agriculture graduates from the newly established Agricultural Institute of Mandalay and field workers who came from the farm schools operated by the experimental stations.

Investment Investment in agricultural development began with the establishment of experimental stations under the DA. Diversion weirs constructed by the Burmese King were also rehabilitated. Investment in infrastructure development contributed substantially to agricultural development.

Research The DA established five experimental stations to engage in rice development. The Hmawbi (1906) and Myaungmya (1926) stations served the delta area, while the Akyab (1923) and Mudon (1926) stations served the coastal rice areas. These four stations were responsible for rainfed rice. Another station established in Mandalay in 1907 served irrigated rice farmers. Major emphasis was given to the improvement of quality to satisfy the demands of the international market. Research adopted three methods: pureline selection within indigenous varieties, introduction of the best types of exotic varieties, and hybridization. Major and minor seed farms were also established for the multiplication of improved strains.


Few studies were made on how to increase yield. Some experiments on fertilizers and manures were conducted at the experimental stations, but the results contributed little to yield enhancement.

Extension The extension section of the DA was relatively larger than the research section. Its activities included distribution of pure seed, introduction of new varieties and farm implements, and demonstration of the use of fertilizers and manures. A staff of about 700 personnel (Bachelor or Diploma in Agriculture holders and graduates of farm schools) covered 6 million ha serving about 17 million people. This was considered too small to effectively help improve the agricultural conditions of the country. Moreover, the agricultural profession did not attract the best students.

Irrigation The Burmese had long been irrigation-conscious, because their settlements were situated mainly in the dry zone. They required irrigation water for daily life and for agriculture. Two kinds of irrigation systems were in operation: a large-scale system developed by the King and the other constructed by local people on a communal basis. Communal irrigation included village diversion systems, hand-dug wells, and village tanks. The government rehabilitated the diversion weirs constructed by the King, but no substantial improvement had been made to enhance the irrigation facilities.

Mechanization There were some attempts to introduce tractors in rice cultivation, but many problems cropped up. The tractors designed for upland cultivation did not work satisfactorily on wet riceland. The cultivation of dry land prior to monsoon rain by tractors proved costly. The wear and tear on tractors was excessive after working in small ricefields. Spare parts were hard to replace. Tractor performance was unequal to the work done by bullocks in small wet ricefields. Furthermore, there was ample supply of draft animal power.

Cropping intensity During the period, Burmese agriculture was mainly monoculture, and rice was its major crop. A huge stretch of land remained fallow during the summer months. In Upper Burma, where irrigation was available, farmers practiced double cropping, the main cropping patterns being rice - pulse and sesamum - rice. In some parts of Upper Burma, the sorghum - pulse pattern was practiced, solely relying on rain.

The cropping intensity of the country was recorded as 102% at the beginning of the century. The increase to 107% in 1940 was restricted mainly to Upper Burma. In Lower Burma, rice occupied the whole stretch of land in


the rainy months with almost no second crop during summer. The DA tried the rice - groundnut pattern in the delta areas where soil has high moisture retaining capacity. However, World War II disrupted all the research activities, and not a single recommendation was put into practice.

There were a few other factors that prevented second cropping; among these were: 1) difficulty in choosing land with sufficient moisture-holding capacity to sustain a second crop; 2) lack of capital, draft cattle, labor, and management capability to utilize the residual soil moisture in time; 3) lack of easy access to market; and 4) lack of dynamic extension activities. In addition, availability of land, no pressing need for family subsistence, and the leisure- loving character of the Burmese farmers further inhibited the increase in cropping intensity.

Rice trading

Rice trading involved many persons and many stages. It included farmer producers, brokers, speculators, millers, and traders. Rice passed through many hands before it finally reached the consumers. It was estimated that 17% of the production was retained in the rural areas, and 83% constituted marketable surplus. Exports took 78% of the marketable surplus (or 63% of total output) (Cheng 1968). The increase in rice production was proportionately followed by an expansion in the milling industry and trade. Rice trading, both for internal and external markets, was conducted in the delta and coastal areas.

Rice trading started with farmer producers selling rice immediately after harvest to meet their financial needs and because they have no storage facilities. Thus, as producer, a farmer could not take advantage of the inevi- table increase in prices that occurs later in the season. He had to honor many commitments: the rent to the landlord, payment to his creditors, and labor wages. After paying all these in cash or in kind, he kept a sufficient amount for his family’s consumption and for seed. What was left on the threshing floor after these deductions constituted his saleable surplus.

In rice trading, a village broker negotiated the price and fixed the date for measuring the amount to be sold in standardized local baskets (a volume measure adjusted to a weight of 20.86 kg). The village broker had the financial backing of big brokers or mill brokers, millers, or speculators. He simply received a commission from these financial backers for the purchases he arranged for them. These intermediaries used many tricks to exploit the farmer. They took a large slice of the profit in rice trading.

Rice milling The country had one rice mill in 1861. This increased to 668 in 1940, mostly in Lower Burma. The increase in number of mills was more rapid at the beginning of the century. The number of rice mills from 1894 to 1934 is shown in Table 11.


Table 11. Rice mills, 1894-1934 (DA 1958).

Year Rice mills (no.) Year Rice mills (no.)

1894 1904 1914

54 117 263

1924 1924

508 508

These rice mills were steam-driven using rice husks as fuel. They varied in size and capacity. Generally, large mills were owned and operated by British firms; medium mills, by Indians, Chinese, and Burmese; and small mills, by Burmese.

The rice milling industry needed a considerable amount of labor, and there was stiff competition among Burmese and Indian laborers. Unemployment problems arose as a result of population growth without a proportionate expansion of cultivated area during the latter part of the period. This was compounded by the restrictive tenancy situation. There was a rapid shifting of land ownership from the owner-cultivators to the landlords due to the growing problems of indebtedness. Many landless laborers got into rice cultivation as hired laborers. The growing number of Indian immigrants competed for transplanting and reaping jobs, where more labor was required. This was especially true in areas close to towns or where holdings were large enough to warrant more laborers than the locality could supply. Except in some special cases, Burmese laborers precluded the Indian laborers in rice cultivation. A census report in 1931 showed that the Burmese accounted for 96% of the labor force in agriculture; the Indians contributed 4% (Cheng 1968).

The Burmese also competed with the Indians for the labor requirements of the expanding rice milling industry. Rice millers preferred Indians to Burmese because they charged less and were more disciplined. Rice mills operated by foreigners hired Indian laborers exclusively. Burmese-owned mills had mixed laborers, but a great majority were Burmese.

Most of the rice mills were situated in Lower Burma, on the river banks, or along the railway lines. About one-fifth were located in Upper Burma. The European domination of the rice milling industry was more prominent in earlier days, but due to the rapid growth of small mills in Upper and Lower Burma (which were mostly owned by Asians), the monopoly went to the Asians at the close of the century.

Generally, large mills concentrated on export trade, while small mills took care of internal trade. Rice bran, a major product of the rice milling industry, was also exported, mainly to the United Kingdom and Malaysia as animal feed (Cheng 1968). About 80-90% of the bran produced in Burma entered the export channels, while the remaining amount served as cattle or livestock feed for areas surrounding the rice mills.


Rice consumption Rice served as the staple food of the population. Average consumption per head is very difficult to determine, since individual consumption varied with age, sex, and location. Just as men consumed more rice than women, the rural people ate much more than the urban people.

Consumption also differed when the price of rice increased or decreased in relation to other food prices. Although Burmese rice production exceeded consumption as a whole; there existed areas in the country where rice was in deficit. In the central dry zone where there was a rice shortage, people ate rice mixed with maize, millet, or pulse. Being a rice-surplus country, Burma had the highest per capita consumption of rice. It belonged to a group of countries that had the highest level of per capita rice consumption—about 200 kg/capita per yr—50% above the consumption level of other Asian countries (Barker and Herdt 1985). Accurate data for rice consumption per capita are hard to estimate.

The method often used was to determine the changes in average consumption over a period and then prepare a food balance sheet. Production minus export minus seed minus waste minus stock divided by population gives per capita availability, which is a good indicator of per capita consumption. But this calculation had its own drawbacks. A calculation supported by survey data would certainly provide a better estimate of average per capita consumption.

Using the method mentioned above, per capita rice consumption in the country was 192 kg/person per yr in 1885, declining to 64 in 1940. Binns (1948) inferred average consumption from production and export data and reported that from 1911 to 1940, production was more or less stable, but exports tended to increase. He concluded that production failed to keep pace with population and that in 1930, the population consumed less rice (per head) than in 1920. Seasonal variation in prices, volume of exports, availability of other cereals, and magnitude of production certainly influenced per capita consumption.

Average production per person per year was calculated by dividing the production figure by population for a given year. This turned out to be 575 kg for 1885 and 434 kg for 1940. This means that, although rice production increased with time within this period, the increment was not proportional to population growth. Production gains were neutralized by population growth.

Even by taking 200 kg as rice consumption per person per year, a family of 7 could produce enough rice from a single crop on 1 ha of land with traditional methods. Taking the population and rice area of the country, the person to land ratio was 1.45 for 1880 and 3.38 for 1940. This means that 1 ha of riceland had to feed only 1.45 persons in 1880, but 3.38 persons in 1940. Even with the same yield, this constituted a surplus of rice, enabling the country to export.


Rice exports Burma was a premier rice exporter and took the largest share of the international rice market. It exported 60% of production during the era, reaching 70% at the close of the period. The volume of rice exported in a particular year obviously depended on the output of that year, the level of internal consumption, and the demand on the international market. Considering that the level of rice production remained almost stationary since the early part of the 20th century, but that exports tended to increase in these years, it can be assumed that rice demand on the international market would largely determine the amount of export for a given year.

Rice export was handled mainly by the British firms. Until the end of the 19th century, Europe constituted the largest rice market for Burma, taking over 70% of exports. Unhusked rice was also exported in the earlier period and milled in Europe for both consumption and reexporting to other countries. .As the rice milling industry developed in the country, only milled rice was exported. Europe used Burmese rice as food (thin, long, translucent, hard- grain, A type); as starting materials for fodder, brewing, and starch manufacture; and in other industries.

The rice export trade expanded directly to consuming countries in the later period. India and Sri Lanka were the major buyers early in the 20th century. Since then, the share of the European market in Burma’s rice export dropped to 13%, while India and Sri Lanka took 59% in 1930-39. Unlike the European market, India and Sri Lanka gave preference to the cheaper bold-grain C type. Due to the nearness of India and Sri Lanka market, Burma enjoyed a more favorable and competitive position than Thailand and Indochina. Table 12 shows production and export figures for selected years from 1880 to 1940. (For yearly exports, see Appendix IV.)

During the same period, 60% of production was exported. Production began to stabilize at the beginning of the century, but exports rose steadily until the end of the period. It can be deduced from the data that market demand

Table 12. Rice production and exports in selected years, 1880-1940 (DSLR, various years; Grant 1939; U Chit Lwin 1949). a

Production (million t) Exports Exports as

Unhusked Husked production Year (million t) percentage of

rice rice

1880 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940

1.989 5.588 6.502 6.008 7.295 6.894

1.253 3.520 4.096 3.785 4.596 4.343

0.807 2.097 2.381 2.107 2.839 3.104

64 60 58 56 62 71

a Production from 1880 to 1912 calculated from sown area of rice with a yield of 1700 kg/ha.


rather than production generally determined the volume of exports. Although India and Sri Lanka were also rice-producing countries, low harvest in some years due to natural calamities in these countries raised the rice demand.

Rice for trading in the internal and external markets came from the delta and coastal areas. Rice trade occupied a predominant position in the economic life of Burma especially in the delta area. The rice industry gave employment to a considerable number of people, and the livelihood of the population depended on its development.

Beneficiaries of production

The period covering 1830-1940 saw growth in rice production as a result of expansion in area. Since the rice sown was rainfed, production stability was related more closely to weather than to any other factor.

Stability and sustainability Rice production growth fluctuated depending on the weather pattern, particularly the behavior of the monsoonal rain. Since the majority of the rice areas were in the delta and near the coasts (where the annual rainfall far exceeded the requirement of the crop), fluctuations in rainfall rarely reached a level that seriously affected rice production. However, continuous rain during the early growth period of the rice plant often led to floods, causing reduction in production. The early departure of monsoonal rain left the crop with a high percentage of sterile grain, which diminished the yield, particularly the long- growth duration varieties.

During this period, rice production grew steadily until 1910, after which it slowed down. This was due to the fact that area expansion involved the less favorable environments; this was further compounded by other economic and social events. The price of rice (for 100 baskets or 2100 kg of unhusked rice) increased from Rs 95 in 1885 to Rs 125 in 1915, going down slowly to Rs 100 in 1918. It rose again to Rs 195 in 1925 and slid down again to Rs 80 in 1932. It did not attain the previous price level until the end of the period. (For yearly Rangoon rice prices, see Appendix V.)

The world economic depression of the 1930s affected the economy of Burma during the second decade, striking with full force in the third decade. The sharp drop in rice prices in the international market created a series of chain reactions in the various sectors of the rice industry. The market slump led to economic and social difficulties, and solutions were not readily apparent.

Moneylenders pressed for repayment of loans, usually collecting only the interest in the past years. Many refused to grant new loans even with better surety (e.g., jewelry, cattle, or a house). When payments were not made at the stipulated time, moneylenders confiscated the assets (like land) owned by the


borrowers. This resulted in increased land alienation, leading to more social unrest.

Since ricelands were recently cleared, they provided high inherent fertility that sustained rice production. The common use of cow dung as a manure also helped sustain production growth.

Sustainability of long-term production growth relies on year-to-year stability of production. The events that adversely affected production stability had direct influence on the sustainability of production. In the latter part of this era, the country found it difficult to sustain rice production growth.

Equity Land, labor, and capital are the main resources in rice production. Income generated from rice production was distributed to production inputs (which served as a major resource). Allocation of earnings from these resources followed the pattern of ownership. While land was cleared and tilled by the pioneer farmers, ownership had shifted to the landlords due to the farmer’s indebtedness. Landlords who were also moneylenders enjoyed more benefits.

Government action and the institutional setting did not favor equitable distribution of income during the time. Landlords took their share in the form

Table 13. Labor use, costs and returns for rice production in Burma (1932) (Grant 1939). a

Particular

Labor use (labor-d/ha) Land preparation Raising, pulling, and transplanting seedlings Harvesting, threshing, winnowing, and hauling

Total

Paid-out costs (kg rice/ha) Hired labor 598 Hired animal labor 136 Value of seed 52 Land rent 515

1301 Returns

Farm area (ha) 10.1 Rice yield (kg/ha) 1548 Paid-out cost 1301

Net income (rice 247

Farm income (rice 2497

(rice equivalent kg/ha)

equivalent kg/ha)

equivalent kg/ha)

(46%) (10%) (4%)

(40%)

(100%)

(84%)

Human

30.8 9.9

6.4

47.1

Animal 20.0

0.0

4.0

24.0

a Original data converted by Barker et al 1985.


of rent in kind. High rates of interest also prevailed through money lending. Besides, various exploitative processes in the internal rice trade reinforced inequity. Many brokers, by manipulating volume measures and prices, enabled the rich to strengthen their position of wealth at the expense of the simple and ignorant rural poor. There were, of course, some benefits accruing to labor, but the major share was taken by landlords. The data in Table 13, as reported by the DA (Grant 1939) and recalculated by Barker and Herdt (1985), clearly show allocation of returns from different resources in a traditional agricultural system in Burma in 1932. A farmer growing rice spent 84% of his output as paid-out cost; of this, 40% was for land rent. This means he enjoyed only 16% as his share.

Impact There was no equitable distribution of income. As such, economic inequality led to social inequality. There were no effective measures to reduce these inequalities. These economic dislocations occurred mainly in the deltas. In both rural and urban areas in the country, economic grievances instigated racial disputes and rebellion. Rice production growth during this era may be characterized as a period of frustration for the masses, particularly the farmers.

Although the impact of rapid rice production growth on the farmers in this period was regrettable, the fact remains they endured great hardships for the benefit of the next generation. Lands inherited by the next generation needed to be properly maintained and utilized.


CHAPTER Ill

Rice production under the independent Burmese Government

The Imperial Japanese Army invaded Burma in 1942. The British then evacu- ated the country, in the process destroying railways, bridges, ports, and power stations. In 1945, the allied forces liberated Burma. The war inflicted great damage and produced considerable demographic changes in the country. Urban dwellers moved to rural areas to avoid the hostilities. Later, rural folks went to urban areas to secure jobs.

Burma gained independence from the British in 1948 and the people entertained great hopes for rebuilding the country. Two reconstruction plans were prepared. The first plan was drawn up by the British Government and some officials who had fled the country during the war. Popularly known as the “Simla Plan” (having been finalized at Simla, India) or the “White Paper Plan,” it aimed to bring rice production and exportation to prewar levels. British firms that engaged in rice trading before the war were asked to participate. But, sensing that the country was about to gain independence, these firms were not that enthusiastic to join the program.

The second plan, designated as the “Two-Year Economic Plan,” was drafted by Burmese political leaders and addressed the problems of land tenure, low rice yield, and inadequate rice export. This plan stressed the need to raise the standard of living of the people to free them from exploitation.

After independence, the political leaders promptly put their Two-Year Economic Plan into action. Unfortunately, implementation was unsatisfactory because personnel lacked the necessary management skills.

Then came the “Pyidawtha Plan,” literally “happy land,” which maintained the original objectives of the previous 2-yr plan. Implementation was set for 8 yr, from 1952 to 1960. One of the components was the agricultural sector plan (called the Agricultural and Rural Development Five-Year Plan), which aimed to raise agricultural output to prewar levels in 5 yr. Under this plan, abandoned land was reclaimed, cropping intensity was raised, and scientific methods were applied. The government exerted every effort to explain the plan to the people to gain their support and participation. But the plan did not quite achieve all its objectives because of political rivalries.

Rice area and production Although the plan tried to raise rice production levels using both extensive and intensive methods, the increase was brought about mainly by reclaiming rice- sown areas abandoned during the war. Increase in yield was slight.

Area Nearly half the rice area was abandoned during the war. Table 14 shows the area planted to rice in different years. Riceland dwindled from 5 million ha to a little more than 2.5 million ha during the war. There were about 3.5 million ha in 1950, but this figure still fell short of the target. The plan achieved a little more than 80% of the target despite labor shortages and the lack of capital and work animals.

People from the rural areas moved to the cities. Some went voluntarily, while others had been forced by the Japanese army to help in war support activities. These migrants were employed in the government (which was then in the process of reorganization), a number of them joining the army or police. Still others earned their living as petty traders, transport sector workers, or contractual laborers. The rural folks, at first, were uncomfortable with city life but after some adjustment, they began to settle permanently in the cities. This trend caused a shortage of labor for rice production and made recovery of rice areas more difficult.

Credit was limited after the Chettyars left. Local moneylenders were reluctant to give loans because of the unstable political situation. Government

Table 14. Rice area In Burma, 1940-60 (DA, DSLR, various years).

Year Target area Sown area (million ha) (million ha)

% achievement a

1940 1941 1945 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

4.35 b

4.65 b

4.85 c

4.18 c

4.36 c

4.53 c

4.70 c

4.85 c

4.97 c

5.10 c

5.23 c

5.07 4.99 2.63 3.97 3.65 3.70 3.83 4.02 4.03 3.98 4.05 4.08 3.99 4.09 4.20 4.22

85 82 83 97 91 89 87 82 82 82 81

a Sown area as % of target area. b Two year plan target (Government of Burma 1948). c Pyidawtha plan target (MI 1952).


- - - - -

- - - - -

intervention, in the form of agricultural loans, did not completely solve the problem. The indiscriminate slaughter of cattle during the war caused a shortage of work animals.

Under these circumstances, the target set in the plan proved to be very ambitious. The target for sown area was reset in the Agricultural and Rural Development Five-Year Plan, but recovery of the area followed the same slow pace, indicating that the same problems persisted.

Yield and production During the war years, yield declined appreciably, but it recovered slowly and reached the prewar level in 1958. The decline in yield was due to the unstable political conditions in the rural areas. Farmers could not tend their fields as often as necessary. They usually started late in the morning and trooped back to the village before dark. The average annual yield during that period was 1.5 t/ha, slightly lower than that of the previous period.

Table 15 shows the average annual yield from 1940 to 1960. The yield went down to about 1 t/ha during the war years, but this increased slowly after independence in 1948 (Table 15). Although the agricultural sector plan stressed the need to apply scientific methods to agriculture, the period did not witness any substantial adoption of modern techniques. Farmers spent less time working in the fields because of security reasons. Repair and improvement of embankments and drainage somehow helped raise the yield.

The slow increase in rice area and the low yield meant slow production gains. Rice production was a function of harvested area—generally 95% of the sown area—and yield.

Table 16 shows rice production in Burma in selected years. The area sown in 1960 was only 83% of that sown in 1940, but production was slightly higher because of the slight increase in yield. Production, however, still fell short by a quarter million tons compared with the level attained in 1930. The bad peace and order situation in the rural areas contributed to poor performance.

Table 15. Rice yield in selected years, 1940-60 (DSLR, various years).

Rice Rice Rice Year yield a Year yield a Year yield a

(t/ha) (t/ha) (t/ha)

1940 1942 1945 1948 1949 1950

1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7

1.6 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.5

a Converted from basket/acre to kg/ha.

RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 39

Table 16. Rice production in selected years, 1940-60.

Year production Year production Year Rice

production (million t) a (million t) a (million t) a

Rice Rice

1940 1942 1945 1948 1949 1950

6.894 5.752 2.677 5.164 4.581 5.403

1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

5.601 5.842 5.579 5.651 6.025

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

6.025 6.282 5.423 7.183 7.085

a 1940-54 figures were taken from Yearly seasons and crops reports (DSLR, various years); 1955 60 data came from Agricultural statistics 1964-65 and 1965-66 (RGUB 1966).

Varieties Many rice varieties bred at the experimental stations were lost during the war. The DA reestablished these facilities after the war, concentrating on the collection and reselection of lost breeding lines. Security at these stations was not adequate, and many of the breeding lines recovered were brought to Rangoon for reselection. But even Rangoon could not offer the right atmosphere for reselection work. This paved the way for the establishment of the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI) in 1954. Though mandated to initiate and expand agricultural research activities, the new institute at that time preoccupied itself with staff recruitment, procurement of equipment, and construction of field and laboratory facilities and, therefore, did not contribute much to agricultural development.

Seed distribution Seed multiplication and distribution activities during the period were not significant. The DA distributed 2800 t pure seeds every year, sufficient to plant 50,000 ha. Distribution of seeds (mostly of A and C varieties) was restricted to areas without security problems.

Fertilizer and agrochemical use Fertilizer and agrochemical use remained low. The agricultural sector plan pressed for greater use through more demonstrations and intensified extension services. In 1957, farmers began using small amounts of fertilizers (in the form of ammonium sulfate and ammonium phosphate) in rice cultivation. Farmers, at first, strongly resisted the use of fertilizers, because they thought that fertilizers spoil the soil and affect crop quality.

Table 17 indicates annual fertilizer consumption (reported as urea and triple superphosphate) and the average rate of NP application. The use of fertilizers increased at approximately the rate of 1000 t/yr, with average application amounting to only 0.25 kg NP/ha. During the promotion period, fertilizers were given away free or on credit. Agrochemical use was negligible. Farmers felt no need to protect indigenous varieties in monocultural systems.


Table 17. Fertilizer consumption of rice, 1956-60.

Urea Triple N Year equivalent superphosphate (kg/ha)

in tons equivalent in tons

1957 1958 1959 1960

835 1933 1862 2290

402 520

1160 768

0.16 0.26 0.30 0.36

Corporation (various years). Source: Department reports, Department of Agriculture and Agricultural and Rural Development

Agricultural loans Expansion of rice area required capital. The government tried to satisfy the credit needs of farmers at reasonable interest rates. It revived the old system of issuing agricultural loans (commonly known as General Administration [GA] loans) through township officers.

However, farmer-borrowers complained about too much red tape in obtaining loans. Most township officers did not understand the plight of farmers; they were more concerned with maintenance of law and order and collection of revenues than with agricultural development in their area.

Another type of loan, geared especially for land reclamation, was provided under the Land Improvement Act. It was able to bring back to rice cultivation more than 153,780 ha of land in 1952 (Walinsky 1962). But the money involved in this program was not as substantial as the GA loans.

In 1953, the government established the State Agricultural Bank (SAB), which formed village agricultural banks. The SAB charged the village banks an interest of 6% per annum, while the village banks charged the farmers 12%. The system was designed to enable village banks to accumulate their own capital, continue lending their own resources, and carry out developmental activities in their communities. The SAB reduced the volume of loans channeled through GA, where disbursement and repayment performance was reported to be poor. It likewise issued loans to village cooperatives under the supervision of the Cooperatives Department. Members of village cooperatives availed of this service, thereby satisfying their credit needs to some extent.

Other credit channels performed the same function differently. The Ag- ricultural and Rural Development Corporation (ARDC) provided specific crop loans to farmers. These were for economically important crops (e.g., rice and rubber), or new crops that needed special attention (e.g., cotton and jute).

In spite of these many channels, the farmers’ financial problems remained unsolved. This was because the amount provided by the government was insufficient and the agencies involved in the lending operation were inefficient. Private moneylenders, while operating illegally and charging an interest rate


Table 18. Government loans (million kyats), 1952-60 (Walinsky 1962).

Tenants of State Agricultural Bank Agriculturists' Land Improve- Government Cooperative

Year Loans Act ment Act Estates loans Cooperatives Village banks Total

Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns

1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57

195859 1959-60

1957-58

40.4 34.0 26.9 16.1

22.7 26.9

4.2

18.1

26.1 20.5 16.5 11.2 11.7 16.6

8.9 ...

0.1

0.0 0.1

0.0

...

...

...

...

0.1

0.0 0.1

0.0

...

...

...

...

0.7 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 na

0.1 1.0 0.7

0.0 0.4 0.2 na

0.8

13.9 14.0 11.9 13.3 11.0

0.6 ... ...

12.6 11.7 10.7

7.4 0.4

9.8

...

...

Nil 4.0

9.4. 10.4 10.6

Nil Nil

8.7

Nil 3.9 7.4

10.1 9.9 Nil Nil

8.4

Nil 1.3

5.6

11.9 29.0 42.7

3.8

8.5

Nil 1.3 3.5 5.1 8.5

11.8 27.9 36.5

55.1 54.3 52.2

48.3 46.2 55.9 46.9

44.8

38.9 38.4 38.8 35.4 37.7 39.1 37.0 36.5

Source: L. J. Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma 1951-1950 - The Twentieth Century New York (1962), p. 292. na = means not available.

of 100-400% per annum, still played a significant role. Farmers still relied on private moneylenders to make up for their deficit, and the attachment was such that they could not afford to ruin their credit standing with the moneylenders.

Table 18 shows the amount of agricultural credit provided by government through various channels. In 1952-54, a large share of the loan was GA loans, but the SAB took a larger share in later years. (For yearly loans, see Appendix II.) The discrepancy between the loan figures in Table 15 and those in Appendix II for 1952-60 is due to the various sources of data used.

The SAB reported 70-80% repayment; the GA collected a lower percentage, especially in later years. Poor repayment was attributed to unstable peace and order conditions and to political interference. Loans came from a variety of sources but the amount still fell short of what was required. Some estimated the credit requirement for agriculture to be 200 million kyats; the government loans amounted to only one quarter of this requirement. This allowed private moneylenders, with their higher interest rates, to do business with the farmers. The yearly average agricultural loans totaled 50 million kyats as compared with 2-3 million rupees in the previous period. (Rupees and kyats were equivalent during the period.) Nonetheless, credit for all crops, with rice as the major crop, enjoyed the largest share.

Draft cattle The shortage of draft cattle created by indiscriminate slaughter of animals during the war had a noticeable impact on rice area expansion. Before the war, the country had 3 million head of cattle. This number declined seriously during the war. Moreover, the absence of breeding programs lowered the cattle population further.

The population level of draft cattle during the period is shown in Table 19. In 1953, there were 2.8 million head of draft cattle. This increased to 3.3 million

Table 19. Draft cattle population, 1940-60 (DSLR, various years).

Gross Number of Year sown area draft cattle

(000 ha) (000 head)

Load (ha/pair)

1940 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

7568 6541 6422 6550 6523 6456 6676 6881 6953

3148 2814 2904 2939 2974 3021 3089 3185 3284

4.81 4.65 4.42 4.46 4.39 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.23


in 1960, representing a 17% increase in 7 yr. During that time, gross sown area rose by only 6%, indicating some improvement on the load factor of draft cattle. A pair of cattle had a workload of 4.65 in 1953; this was reduced to 4.23 in 1960. Cattle population (or the load factor of a pair of cattle) appeared to determine area sown—the load of 4 ha had been generally accepted as a reasonable workload for a pair of cattle. The government ban on the slaughter of cattle helped increase the animal population. The Burmese dislike for beef likewise helped raise the cattle population for agriculture. But veterinary care and breeding programs for cattle were still absent during the period.

Support services The reconstruction of the war-torn economy needed strong support services from all sectors. Progress was slow in the agricultural sector because of the lack of trained personnel, equipment, and laboratory facilities. Time was needed to provide these resources.

The DA expanded its agricultural research and extension activities to support implementation of the plan, but being understaffed, its performance was below par. The government again established the Land and Rural De- velopment Corporation (later transformed to ARDC and set out to implement the agricultural sector plan based on sound business principles. ARDC was given a more flexible financial and administrative authority, unlike the rigid rules and regulations that restricted the DA.

The government enacted the Land Nationalization Act in 1948 and again in 1953. This empowered the State, as ultimate owner of all lands, to effect equitable distribution among the landless farmers. It also provided measures for debt remission and easy access to loans at reasonable interest rates.

The government established agricultural high schools to supply the needed manpower. One agricultural institute offered a Diploma in Agricul- ture; the University of Rangoon likewise offered a Bachelor of Science degree in Agriculture. Many outstanding students were sent abroad for further studies.

Investment The objectives of the five-year plan were to be achieved with the aid of irrigation, land reclamation, fertilizer and mechanization programs, complemented with a land nationalization and distribution program. Two schools of thought with regard to investment existed. One believed that highest priority should be given to agriculture inasmuch as the economy of the country mainly depended on it. The other school advocated rapid industrialization to bring the country to speedy economic recovery.

During this period, approximately 9% of public investment was spent in the agricultural sector, amounting to an annual expenditure of 30-50 million


kyats (Walinsky 1962). Investments in the agricultural sector were channeled to agriculture, irrigation, and forestry. Livestock farming got an insignificant amount. This small investment in agriculture was unfortunate, considering the country’s great needs and opportunities for agricultural development.

Of the limited investment for agricultural development, irrigation and crop improvement and expansion programs took the largest share. Expenditures in irrigation included those used to reconstruct old dams, sluice gates and canals, and to build two new dams (in Upper Burma) and embankments (in Lower Burma) for flood control. The crop improvement and expansion program concentrated on rice and other crops like jute, cotton, groundnut, sugarcane, tobacco, rubber, and coconut. The implementation scheme emphasized land improvement, seed and fertilizer distribution, and application of modern techniques. Other substantial expenditures were for the procurement of tractors, the rehabilitation of experimental stations and seed farms, and the establishment of ARI.

Research In 1954, ARI was established by the DA at Gyogon. It had five disciplinary divisions: Agronomy, Soils, Botany, Plant Pathology, and Entomology. The institute had adequate laboratory facilities and equipment, with a farm area of 34 ha. As previously mentioned, ARI activities focused on staff recruitment and equipment procurement only; no substantial research activities were reported.

The DA experimental stations had also been rehabilitated, but the peace and order conditions limited their contributions to productivity. A few postgraduate degree holders joined the DA after returning from their studies abroad. ARI hired agriculture graduates as research assistants.

Extension Extension activities were handled by the staff of the DA and ARDC. The DA people put up demonstration programs, particularly on fertilizer use, in places where the peace and order situation was stable, while the ARDC personnel carried out extension activities on the basis of selected crops. ARDC’s dynamic staff and more flexible management style effectively contributed to these crop projects. Sustainability, however, was lacking. Table 20 summarizes these extension activities in selected years.

Irrigation The war damaged irrigation facilities, and thus production targets at prewar levels were not attained. Since rice enjoyed the largest share of irrigation, it suffered the most.

Table 21 shows irrigated areas for rice and other crops during the period. The war destroyed 15-20% of the irrigation facilities. At this time, the irrigated


Table 20. Summary of extension activities, 1958.

Item Number of plots %

Varietal demonstration Farm implement demonstration Cultural method demonstration Fertilizer use demonstration Manure storage demonstration Manure preparation demonstration

Total

749 1,190 1,737

100,276 515 10

104,377

0.72 1.14 1.67

96.07 0.40

Sources: Department reports, Department of Agriculture (1960).

area of the country averaged 635,000 ha; this further decreased to 574,000 in 1953, and 522,000 in 1954, before it increased (by only 19,000 ha) in 1960. The share of rice in irrigation in prewar days was 92%; it declined to 86% in 1958 but rose a little to 87% at the close of the period. The construction of the new Taungpulu and Alaungsithu Dams in Upper Burma contributed, to a small extent, to this increase. However, no substantial improvement in irrigation facilities was done. Variation in irrigated areas in different years was mostly caused by fluctuation in annual rainfall. Irrigated water was fed from diversion weirs whose capacities vary slightly with annual rainfall.

Mechanization The DA introduced the crawler- and tire-type tractors to Burmese agriculture with a view to applying modern techniques. Tire-type tractors were fitted with lug wheels to avoid slippage in wet ricefields. Table 22 shows the number of tractors, both crawler- and tire-types, used during the period.

Though the DA's new Mechanization Division, with its small fleet of tractors, did not create an impact on the agricultural sector, its activities provided a starting point for future programs. Support services improved

Table 21. Rice areas under irrigation, 1953-60 (RGUB 1964). a

Irrigated area Irrigated area % of Year all crops rice rice in

(million ha) (million ha) irrigation

1936-40 (av) 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

0.635 0.574 0.522 0.549 0.569 0.549 0.527 0.576 0.541

0.587 0.514 0.461 0.487 0.508 0.482 0.453 0.505 0.469

92 90 88 89 89 88 86

87 88

a Original area in acre converted to ha.


Table 22. Tractors used in Burma, 1953-60 (RGUB 1964).

Year Tractors (no.) Year Tractors (no.)

1953 1954 1955 1956

47 91

161

1957 1958 1959 1960

68

158 ab

ab

a Figures not available. b Figures not complete.

slightly during the period, but agricultural mechanization contributed little to bringing back the rice potential lost during the war.

Cropping intensity Cropping intensity during the period remained the same as in the previous period (around 107%). The same cropping patterns — rice-pulse, sesamum - rice, and sorghum - pulse — were predominant. The double-cropped area was restricted to Upper Burma. A few thousand hectares in Lower Burma (where the waterholding capacity of the soil was favorable) had the rice - groundnut pattern.

Lack of capital, draft cattle, and labor were major constraints to crop production.

Table 23 provides data on total cropped area, net sown area, and cropping intensity during the period. Cropping intensity was 107% throughout the period, except in 1958 and 1960, when it was 108%. Total cropped area rose by about 50,000 ha at the time, while net sown area increased by 30,000 ha, indicating a slight increase in area due to higher cropping intensity. This figure could have been higher were it not for the previously mentioned constraints. Thus, the agricultural sector plan did not quite achieve its objective of increasing cropping intensity.

Table 23. Cropping intensity, 1953-60 (RGUB 1964).

Net Total Cropping Year sown area cropped area intensity

(million ha) (million ha) (%)

1936-40 (av) 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

7.065 6.123 6.019 6.125 6.123 6.051 6.266 6.409 6.466

7.561 6.541 6.422 6.550 6.556 6.456 6.676 6.881 6.953

107 107

107 107 107 108 107 108

107


a

Rice trading At the end of World War II, food shortages in many countries gave Burma an opportunity to export rice. It had good prospects—it had a ready surplus stock of rice resulting from the annual harvests and the accumulation of stocks during the war years. But the rice industry, as a whole, was still plagued with many war-related problems that affected cultivation, production, procurement, milling, and transportation.

The British government took steps to revive the rice industry immediately after they reoccupied the country. In accordance with the Simla Plan, the Agricultural Project Board was formed in 1945 to organize and supervise rice production, processing, and marketing activities. In 1947, the Agricultural Project Board was renamed the State Agricultural Marketing Board (SAMB).

After the country gained independence, the new government allowed the SAMB to continue to reactivate the rice trade. As in the previous period, the "old" rice traders, representing both the local and foreign firms and the rice millers, began to procure rice in the villages. Rice procurement through these traders amounted to 80% in the 3-yr period after reoccupation; SAMB procured 20%. After 1948, the rice millers procured 60%, while SAMB acquired around 30%. The business volume handled by rice millers was even larger, around 90%, in the years immediately after independence.

Table 24 shows rice procurement by different agencies during the period. Because of inexperienced staff, the SAMB procurement share remained low until 1953-54. The rice millers took the major share in rice procurement, 34- 94%. The SAMB got a bigger share in 1953-55, after which rice millers again controlled the majority. The SAMB paid 300 kyats for 2100 kg of unhusked rice but traders and millers paid 10-30% more, depending on the time of purchase. At harvest, when every farmer would dispose of his stock, the price offered by traders and millers was less than that offered by SAMB. (For yearly average price during the period, see Appendix V.)

Rice milling Many rice mills were destroyed during the war, and these needed replacement and repair. The SAMB issued loans to renovate the rice mills but credit was diverted to other uses. Only a few millers used the loans for their intended purpose. These loans, together with their rice procurement activities, made the rice millers prosperous, leading many to conclude that this period favored them the most.

The SAMB constructed modern mills in Rangoon, with capacities ranging from 35 to 160 t/day. Construction of small mills in the countryside was likewise encouraged. There were 994 rice mills at the time, with a total daily capacity of 42,000 t.


Table 24. Rice procurement by different agencies, 1946-60 (SAMB, various years).

Percentage of procurement Year

Representatives Millers SAMB

1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60

79.30 87.08 76.44

0

94.19 89.26 84.11 61.77 39.75 33.82 44.75 64.12 67.02 43.87 69.99

20.70 12.92 23.56

5.81 10.74 15.89 38.23 60.25 66.18 55.25 35.88 32.96 56.13 30.01

Interest in the small mills was overwhelming because they required only a small investment, they could be constructed near the source of supply (millers could procure rice by themselves rather than through representatives and thus reduce cost) and they could ensure minimal mixing of different rice varieties and thus achieve a higher head rice yield. With respect to rice yield and transportation, less wastage occurred in small mills than in large mills.

Most of the rice was procured and milled in the open season, and a large volume was exported before the rains came in June. But in 1953, when the international rice market trade slowed down, the rice stock began to accumulate and posed serious storage problems. The SAMB built storage facilities and again provided loans to rice millers to enable them to build warehouses in their compounds. The earning capacity of millers was consequently increased.

Rice consumption The average per capita consumption of rice amounted to 64 kg/yr in 1940, increasing to 107 kg/yr in 1960. However, Steinberg (1981) estimated this figure to be 137 kg/yr. The increase in consumption was apparently the effect of restricted rice exports during the time. The price of rice did not fluctuate much and was placed at around 350 kyats. The quality-conscious Burmese were heavy rice consumers-they ate rice three times a day and they tended to consume more even when other cereals were available. Nevertheless, consumption of wheat in the urban areas increased after the war. Per capita rice consumption was still considered low.

Per capita rice production averaged 434 kg/yr in 1940, decreasing to 204 kg/yr in 1960. The increase in production was not proportional to population growth. The man-to-land ratio was 3.30 in 1940 and 5.43 in 1960. Since one


-

- - - - - - - - - - - -

hectare would produce enough rice for seven persons at the existing yield capacity, the man-to-land ratio still afforded some exportable surplus. As this ratio moved closer to seven, the margin left for export became smaller. To avoid localized shortages, efficiency in processing, transportation, storage, and distribution became essential.

Rice exports The agricultural sector plan projected that rice exports would attain prewar levels. A favorable international rice market provided the country with more earnings, although tonnage exported fell short of the level expected. There was a great demand for rice in the international market—the 15 countries in prewar days to which Burma exported its rice swelled to 30 after the war, though the volume involved was less. Rice was exported either through government-to- government sale or open sale through international tender. The first type commanded a price that was 10-15% lower than that prevailing in the international market. Goodwill and other reciprocal measures characterized the transaction. Two-thirds of the rice exported was sold on a government-to- government basis. Because of the high price of rice at the international market and the greater demand for it immediately after the war, earnings from rice exports provided the country with much needed capital. Of the 30 importing countries, only 4 were major buyers: India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Japan.

During the early 1950s, a sellers’ market prevailed, and the rice trade posed no quality or transport problems. There was hardly any trade dispute. But with time, as major buyers became self-sufficient, rice trading became difficult. Burmese officials went abroad to make transactions, but in spite of all these efforts, sales slowed down, causing storage problems (Fig. 9).

9. Rice storage godowns.


This trade reduction severely affected the country's foreign exchange earnings. The government called for some budget cuts in the investment plan. Some projects were rescheduled, and some were altogether shelved. The country was forced to sell its surplus rice stock at lower prices to China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic, mainly through barter. Barter started in 1954 and took up 17% of the export volume; this proportion declined to 12% in later years.

Table 25 presents the annual rice production and exports during the period. In 1940, 70% of the rice produced was exported (Table 25). After the war, rice exports ranged from 28 to 51% of production. The export volume of postwar years amounted to a little more than half that of the prewar years. Export volume was between 1 and 2 million t, with the highest (1.864 million t) being attained in 1956. The international market demand determined the export volume during the period. Rice trade with Japan had diminished greatly since 1959. The reduced rice trade had an unfavorable impact on the implementation schedule of the agricultural sector plan.

Beneficiaries of production

The period from 1940 to 1960 witnessed a drastic reduction in rice production in the war years and a steady increase in the postwar years. The stability and sustainability of production during the period were not impressive. Two factors were responsible for the erratic growth—abnormal weather (especially rainfall) and unstable peace and order conditions in the rural areas.

Table 25. Rice production and export, 1950-60.

Production (million t) a

Year Export c Export % Unhusked rice Husked rice b (million t)

1940 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

6.894 5.403 5.601

5.579 5.651 6.025

5.423

7.183 7.085

5.842

6.282

6.882

4.343 3.404 3.529 3.680 3.515 3.560 3.796 3.958 3.416 4.336 4.525 4.464

3.104 1.184 1.268 1.260 0.970 1.461 1.639 1.864 1.753 1.410 1.692 1.722

71.5

35.9 34.2 27.6 41.0 43.2 47.1 51.3 32.5 37.4

34.8

38.6

a Production figures from 1940 to 1954 taken from DSLR (various years); 1955-60 data taken from

60 export data from IRRI 1986. RGUB (1966). b Converted using 63% recovery. c 1940 export data from U Lwin Chit 1949; 1950


Stability and sustainability The steady production growth declined in 1949 because of political rivalries. The communist party went underground and posed unwarranted security risks to farmers. This situation forced many farmers to move to urban areas. Rice production declined by nearly half a million tons. After that, production growth continued at a slow pace until 1957, when adverse weather conditions caused another 12% decline. In the following year, the ruling political party was divided into two factions. This development greatly influenced the agricultural sector plan; rice production again fell during the two subsequent years at the end of this era.

Although SAMB procured rice at 300 kyats, brokers bought rice at a lower price during harvest, and they resold it to the SAMB buying depots. As farmers’ stock diminished, the brokers increased their purchase price. In October and November, just before the new harvest, prices paid by brokers were higher than SAMB prices. The income of farmers would thus fluctuate with the time they disposed of their stock. The inability of farmers to hold their rice surplus stock reduced their profits. Despite these less favorable conditions, production was relatively stable and sustainable as a result of returning abandoned land to cultivation.

Equity Legislation regarding land nationalization, debt remission, low-interest loans, fair rent, and security of land tenure had improved the equity of production to a certain extent. But farmers still had to rely on private moneylenders for credit. In this period, thus, farmers were not as exploited, but they continued to share their returns with private moneylenders. There were also traders who earned a lot through speculation. At the time, no report on the costs and returns in rice production was published, but estimates showed an improvement in profit sharing (Table 26). Table 26 indicates an increase of the farmers’ share from 16 to 43%. The higher share was derived from the smaller land rent and the lower interest paid during the period.

Impact Independence stimulated rice production to such an extent that a second distinct growth was observed during the period. However, unstable security

Table 26. Pald-out cost for rice production (1932 and 1960) (DA 1960, Grant 1939).

Particular 1932 1960

Paid-out cost (% of total) Hired labor Hired animal labor

Value of seed Land rent

Farmer’s share (%)

84 46 10 4

40 16

57 53 13 5

28 43


conditions and a weak international market diminished its impact. The growth only partially fulfilled the aspirations of the farmers. Their participation in the implementation of the agricultural sector plan was not fully rewarded. The process of change was slow because of the war, the rapid population growth, and the lack of investment.


CHAPTER IV

Rice production under the Socialist Republic Government

The political rivalry that characterized the previous period finally led to the transfer of government power to the military. In turn, the latter, ruling through a caretaker government, laid the groundwork for a free parliamentary elec- tion. It also effectively introduced changes in the administrative machinery, which was then plagued by inefficiency, lack of discipline, low staff morale, waste, and disorder. It tried to eliminate political influence in the discharge of public duties.

Security and administrative councils (SACs)—consisting of military, police, and civil officials—were established at the division, district, township, and village levels. The SACS reestablished law and order and improved public administration when they handed back power to the elected party in 1960. But this elected government was short-lived (1960-62); in 1962-74, it was replaced by the Revolutionary Government. This then led to the establishment of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.

These changes in government and administrative structure greatly influenced the agricultural development plan. During the period, colonial administration was completely abolished. The country was divided into seven states and seven divisions (Fig. 8). The Commissioner of the Burma Civil Service Office, who used to run a division, was replaced by a Divisional People’s Council; the Township Officer was superseded by a Township People’s Council; and the Headman, by a Village Tract People’s Council. The district structure in the administration setup was removed to bring the township closer to divisions or states. The People’s Council at the different levels was composed of five to seven members who were elected every four years (concurrent with the implementation of the four-year economic plan). Unlike the Burma Civil Service Officers, the People’s Councils took special interest in and responsibility for the development of the area, in addition to maintaining law and order.

People’s representation rather than central appointment was the principal essence of the change. This change facilitated the participation of the people in

the design, implementation, and evaluation of area development and economic plans. Legislation completely abolished landlordism and improved the plight of the poor farmers.

Seminars were organized yearly to give farmers a chance to present their needs and air their grievances. The discussions in these seminars resulted in the formation of Farmers’ Councils (later named Farmers’ Assiayones) in March 1967. The Farmers’ Assiayones promoted unity among farmers and facilitated their adoption of modern technologies. It also enabled them to participate actively in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the agricultural development plan.

Since farmers constituted the basic force in the implementation of the agricultural development plan, their participation ensured its successful completion. The contribution of Farmers’ Assiayones in settling land disputes, disbursing and collecting agricultural loans, and pursuing other developmental activities was significant. For the first time, farmers had a role in the community, and their services received public recognition.

World food shortages and the increasing population demanded greater agricultural production. Consequently, many international research institutes came into existence, like the IRRI in Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines, which was established to work mainly on rice. As part of a technology package, IRRI released modern rice varieties far superior to existing ones. Because of the location-specific nature of crop production, the technologies developed by these international research institutes still had to be refined to suit local conditions. Burmese scholars who went to IRRI for postgraduate studies implemented adaptive research on the new varieties and technologies upon their return. National agricultural research institutes were likewise established and equipped to carry out location-specific research. Other international agencies—the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and Ag- riculture Organization, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank—and some developed countries provided technical and financial assistance to implement Burma’s agricultural development plan.

Many factors contributed to the significant increase in rice production during this period. Peace and order conditions had improved considerably. Moreover, the period was marked by an environment that can be said to be conducive to development. Science stimulated rice production and effected a smooth technology transfer to farmers.

After the Pyidawtha Plan, there was no economic plan laid out until 1970, when the government, guided by the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), drew up long- and short-term economic plans. The long-term plan (20-yr duration), was divided into five 4-yr short-term plans. The implementing guidelines of the BSPP highlighted four priorities for development: 1) to expand production and exports in the agriculture, fishery, livestock, and forestry sectors; 2) to set up consumer goods industries to lessen imports; 3) to


raise production to the highest possible level; and 4) to lay the foundation for heavy industries based on mineral production.

The plan, calling for the transformation of the economic structure from an agricultural to an agriculture-based industrial economy, aimed to raise the standard of living of the people by the plan’s termination date, 1993-94. At this time, the share of contribution to the state should be: 48% from the public sector, 26% from the cooperative sector, and 26% from the private sector. The agricultural sector plan had three basic objectives: 1) to achieve food sufficiency, 2) to provide sufficient raw materials for the industries, and 3) to assure export of surplus products to increase capital investment.

The first 4-year plan (in reality, only 3 yr: from 1971-72 to 1973-74) might be considered a preparatory period. This paved the way for the second 4-yr plan (1974-75 to 1977-78), which, in essence, marked the beginning of the 20- yr plan. The annual plan covers the period from April of the current year to March of the following year.

Considering the targets of the four-year plan, the yearly plan was first formulated at the central level, passed on to the divisional level, forwarded to the township level, and finally sent to the village tract level for evaluation.

With suggested changes, the plan was returned to the central level, using the same channels. The yearly plan was now finalized and submitted to parliament (Pyithu Hluttaw) to be promulgated as law in support of the plan’s implementation for the year. The performance report of the previous year was also simultaneously presented in the ”Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw on the Financial, Economic, and Social Conditions of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.” Most data quoted in this analysis came from such yearly reports and department reports.

Rice area and production Rice production was steady in the beginning of the period and picked up rapidly toward the end. Increased production was initially brought about by area expansion and later by yield increases. Strong support services maintained the momentum. Changes in the government’s administrative structure and people’s participation in the implementation of the national development plan facilitated progress.

Area The agricultural sector plan encouraged crop intensification rather than area expansion to increase rice production. But the plan also called for recultivation of fallow ricelands abandoned during the war. During the period, area devoted to rice increased slowly and reached its prewar level only in 1963, 18 yr after the war. Since then, the rice area remained constant, with slight variations due to weather abnormalities.

RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 57

Table 27 indicates the areas planted to rice in selected years. The rice area at the end of the previous period (4 million ha) rose to 5 million ha, after which it stabilized. As far as area expansion was concerned, the 4-yr plan targets were met in the beginning but not quite in later years. On the whole, target achievement was always excellent and reached 96% (even 100%) in some years.

Table 28 shows the rice area in the states and divisions in 1978, when the area sown was at its highest level. The Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions and the Mon and Arakan States were rice surplus areas while the remaining four divisions and five states were deficit areas. (A rice surplus situation exists when the percentage of sown area to total area exceeds the percentage of population in the area.) The degree of surplus and deficit, though, varied. The Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions belong to the delta areas, which provide surplus rice for both internal and external markets. Rice from surplus areas had to be distributed to deficit areas, with the remaining surplus comprising the export potential. Except for Mandalay and Magwe Divisions, the other five states and two divisions could become self- sufficient in rice if they could raise their annual rice production to a level slightly higher than that of the population. This could be made possible by raising yields through new technologies. Mandalay and Magwe Divisions would require more than yield increases to make them self-sufficient; they would also need more irrigation facilities.

In terms of rice environment, the 14 states and divisions could be grouped into 4: rainfed environment (Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon), partially irrigated

Table 27. Rice area In Burma, 1980-85. a

Year Target area Sown area % (million ha) (million ha) achievement

Remark b

1960 1962 1964 1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

1979 1980 1981 1982

1984 1985

1983

5.23

5.018 5.098 5.166 5.200 5.217

5.238 5.280 5.143 5.075 5.009 5.004 4.917

4.217 4.837 5.109 4.975 5.177 5.204 5.077 5.136 5.243

5.026 5.127 4.921 4.882 4.831 4.917 4.902

81

103 102

99 101

98

96 97 96 96 96

100 98

No plan

SFYP SFYP SFYP SFYP TFYP

TFYP TFYP TFYP FFYP FFYP FFYP FFYP

a 1960-75 data taken from RGUB 1966, 1973, 1978; 1976-85 data taken from SRUB 1984, 1987. b SFYP = second four-year plan, TFYP = third four-year plan, FFYP = fourth four-year plan.


- - -

- - -

Table 28. Rice area and population, by state or division, 1978.

Rice area Population State or division a million ha % of total million % of total

lrrawaddy Pegu Rangoon Arakan Mon Sagaing Shan Kachin Tenasserim Kayah Karen Chin Magwe Mandalay

Total

1.344

0.529 0.327 0.274 0.549

0.119 0.086 0.024 0.192 0.034 0.194 0.335 5.243

0.918

0.318

26

10 6 5

10 6 2 2

0.5 4

0.5 4 6

18 4.157 3.177

1.711 1.313 3.119

0.735 0.716 0.126

0.323 2.635

3.189

3.178

0.865

3.668 28.886

14.7 11.3 11.3

6.3 4.9

11.1 11.0

2.4 2.5 0.4 2.4 1.1 9.4

11.1

Sources: Department reports. Department of Agriculture. a The first five entries were surplus areas; the rest were deficit areas.

dry zone (Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magwe), coastal environment (Mon, Arakan, and Tenasserim), and rainfed elevated environment (Shan, Kachin, Chin, Kayah, and Karen) (Table 29).

The delta zone formed an important rice area in view of its area coverage and surplus production. It had dependable rainfall and good soil conditions suitable to rice cultivation. This zone was composed of four major rice environments as classified by Khush (1984)— rainfed lowland shallow, favorable; rainfed lowland shallow, submergence-prone; rainfed lowland medium deep, waterlogged; and deepwater.

The central dry zone ranked next in terms of area and requirement for local consumption. The majority of the rice area fell under three, classifications— irrigated with favorable temperature, favorable upland with short growing season, and unfavorable upland with short growing season.

Table 29. Rice areas under different environments.

Rice area Environment Remark

million ha % of total

Delta zone Central dry zone

Coastal zone Eastern and

northern zone

2.79 1.08

0.69 0.69

53 21

13 13

Rainfed Partially rainfed and irrigated Rainfed Rainfed


The coastal zone comprised four rice environments similar to those found in the delta zone.

The eastern and northern zones had the majority of the rice area classified as unfavorable upland with long growing season. These lands were highly elevated areas with highly leached acidic soils.

The dry zone offered potential for rice area expansion if irrigation facilities could be provided while the delta could benefit from improvements in embankments and drainage.

Total cropped area increased steadily with time, although rice area did not expand. The increase in total cropped area resulted from planting of some cereals like wheat and maize, and some industrial crops like jute, cotton, sugarcane, and pulses. Rice, which occupied more than 70% of the total cropped area at the start of this century, slowly decreased to 47% in 1985.

Table 30 shows the area under rice in relation to total cropped area in different years. The percentage of rice to total cropped area was 76% in 1900, decreasing to 60% in 1960, and down again to 47% in 1985. The role of rice in the agricultural sector had diminished, but it retained its major role in crop production activities. The economy of the country had yet to rely on it.

Yield Rice yield increased more than 80% during the period. It remained stationary until 1976 and increased slowly afterward. The increase was more dramatic in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s.

Table 31 indicates that the national average rice yield remained at about 1.7 t/ha until 1974; it later increased at a faster pace and reached 3 t/ha in 1982. It stabilized afterward. Such an impressive yield increase was the result of the application of technology and the provision of support services. In the technological aspect, three factors were crucial—the dramatic spread of modern rice varieties (MVs), the greater use of chemical fertilizers, and the farmers’ acceptance of improved agronomic practices.

Table 30. Rice area In relation to total cropped area, 1900-85.

Year Rice area All crops (million ha) (million ha)

% of rice

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1960 1970 1980 1985

3.462 4.026 4.172 5.006 5.066 4.217 4.975 5.127 4.902

4.798 5.720 6.294 7.104 7.568 6.881

9.431 10.385

8.807

76 70 66 70 67 61 56 54 47

Sources: Extracted from Appendix I and Appendix Ill.


Table 31. Rice yield in selected years, 1960-85. a

Year Target yield Actual yield (t/ha) (t/ha)

% achievement Remark

1961 1969 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

1979 1978

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.3

1.6 1.7 1.8

1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1

1.8 99 103 102 103 106 114 122 114 116 100 100

94

No plan No plan No plan SFYP SFYP SFYP SFYP TFYP TFYP TFYP TFYP TFYP FFYP FFYP FFYP

a 1961-82 yield data were taken from SRUB 1984; 1983-85 data came from SRUB 1987.

The enthusiastic adoption of technology by the farmers was the outcome of a new agricultural extension program called the Whole Township Rice Production Program (WTRPP). (The WTRPP will be discussed in detail later.) The achievement of WTRPP was much higher than that obtained by the 20-yr plan. Even with the yearly target adjusted to the performance of the previous year, the yield performance surpassed the adjusted yearly target in most years, especially those between 1975 and 1983 (Table 31). After 1983, the yield began to stabilize. This study was prompted by this phenomenon.

A similar yield trend had occurred in some Asian countries at about the same time. When the rice yields in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines were compared for the period 1970-84, it was found that yield increased (as in the case of Burma) from about 1.7 t/ha in 1970 to 3.10 t/ha in 1984, a gain of 82% in 14 yr. In Indonesia, the yield rose from 2.36 t/ha in 1970 to 3.87 t/ha in 1984, a gain of 64% in the same period. The Philippines recorded a yield of 1.72 t/ha in 1970 which rose to2.49 t/ha in 1984, gaining 45% in the same time frame. But the annual rate of increase in yield among these countries was irregular: 1-16% in Burma, 1-13% in Indonesia, and 1-10% in the Philippines. There were similarities in the reduction of the rate of increase around 1983 (IRRI 1986). All three countries registered less than 1% growth in yield in 1984, compared with 8, 6, and 10% growth in 1981 (in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, respectively) (Table 32).

Yield data from these countries indicate that the rate of yield increase was significant in the 1970s up to the early 1980s (Table 32). It started to slow down in 1984. The three countries launched their own rice production programs. The WTRPP in Burma, the BIMAS in Indonesia, and the Masagana 99 in the Philippines utilized MVs and improved agronomic practices.


- - -

- - -

Table 32. Rice yield in some Asian countries, 1970-84 (IRRI 1986).

Period Burma Indonesia Philippines

Yield Yield Yield (t/ha) %growth (t/ha) %growth (t/ha) %growth

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

1.70 1.72 1.63 1.76 1.76 1.82 1.80 1.95 2.10 2.35 2.73 2.94 3.15 3.08 3.10

1.18

7.97

3.40 0 8.30 7.69

11.90 16.17

7.69 7.14

0.65

2.36 2.27 2.26 2.56 2.63 2.63 2.78 2.79 2.89 2.99 3.29 3.49 3.74 3.87 3.87

13.27 2.73

5.70 0.36 3.50 3.46

10.03 6.07 7.16 3.48

1.72 1.57 1.48 1.63 1.60 1.72 1.82 1.96 2.07 2.14 2.15 2.36 2.39 2.47 2.49

10.00

7.50 5.81 7.60 5.61 3.38 0.47 9.76 1.27 3.35 0.81

Production Although area planted to rice in Burma remained constant during the period, rice production rose dramatically, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was brought about by higher yields. There was a distinct and significant upward trend in production between 1975 and 1985. The country produced more than 10 million t of rice in 1978 (Table 33), fulfilling the target set in the plan.

Table 33. Rice production in Burma in selected year, 1960-85. a

Target Actual production % Year (million t) (million t) achievement Remark

1961 1969 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

8.511 8.744 9.325 9.548

10.021 10.432 11.715 12.969 13.474 14.832 15.023 15.634

6.847 8.000 8.618 8.600 9.225 9.337 9.481

10.549 10.468 13.343 14.174 14.401 14.287 14.255 14.317

101 106 100 99

105 100 114 109 107 96 95 92

No plan No plan No plan SFYP SFYP SFYP SFYP TFYP TFYP TFYP TFYP FFYP FFYP FFYP FFYP

a 1961-82 production data taken from SRUB 1984; 1983-85 data came from SRUB 1987.


– – –

– – –

–

–

–

– – –

–

– – –

–

–

As yield increase leveled off after 1983, production did likewise. Accom- plishment of the plan exceeded 100% in 1974 and slowly slid down to 92% in 1985. There was spectacular achievement from 1980 to 1983 as the WTRPP gained momentum. As a whole, the slow growth after 1983 affected the agricultural sector plan, because the failure to achieve the rice target could not be compensated for by achievements made with other crops. This called for a critical review of the plan. Since the country had just passed the halfway mark in the long-term plan, performance evaluation was needed to provide implementation guidelines for the remaining period. Many blamed the inaccu- rate production statistics, while others pointed to the limited supply of necessary inputs. Notwithstanding this controversy, the fact remained that there was a distinct and significant production growth in 1975, which tapered off after 1983.

Varieties This period witnessed a rapid expansion of area devoted to MVs. The government gave priority to efforts to increase rice production so that it could feed its growing population and improve its dwindling exports. The necessary manpower and laboratory facilities were put in place to carry out technology development and technology transfer programs (Fig. 10). Conditions in the country favored the expansion of MV areas. Farmers were eager to take part in the drive for higher rice production and were enthusiastic about trying MVs. More than 2000 rice varieties have been cultivated by the farmers, a clear demonstration of their incessant search, even during the pre-MV era, for varieties that would perform better than the existing ones.

It all started in 1967 when the Agricultural Corporation (AC) planted IR8 (a dwarf, stiff-strawed, high-yielding variety released by IRRI) at the Kyaukse Experimental Station in Upper Burma, where irrigation was available. In this trial, IR8 exhibited its high-yielding potential and attracted the attention of both researchers and planners. The trial convinced researchers and extension workers of the high-yielding potential of the new variety, giving them more confidence in their work. The planners and administrators responsible for agricultural sector development also witnessed the trial with great satisfaction, and they began to pay more attention to agricultural research activities.

IR8 was named “Yagyaw”—literally “more than a hundred”–which meant it could produce over 100 baskets (or >5 t) from a hectare. The yield potential of IR8 remained superior in extended trials in many areas, but its grain quality proved unacceptable to the farmers. This, however, did not discourage the AC. The AC, thereafter, introduced IR5 by importing 10 t of seeds from the Philippines in late 1968. IR5 outyielded the local varieties but did not reach the yield level established by IR8. Its grain quality was better than that of IR8 but it was still not acceptable to the Burmese taste. In the absence of any other MV, areas planted to IR5 began to expand.


10. Technology development and transfer system in Burma.


In the meantime, local researchers exerted serious efforts to develop new rice varieties and soon released four high-yielding varieties—Ngwetoe, a local selection with a reasonably good response to fertilizer; C4-63, a variety bred by P. B. Escuro, a Filipino breeder; Shwe-wahtun, an IR5 mutant produced through irradiation by U Tin Myint, a local researcher; and Mashuri, a variety introduced from Malaysia. Areas devoted to these four MVs expanded slowly, reaching substantial coverage in the succeeding years. The DSLR monitored the sown area and yield of each variety.

In 1977, U Thein Aung, a farmer from Taikkyi Township, Rangoon Division, introduced a high-yielding variety called Shwe-ta-soke. This proved that farmers are capable of developing new technology.

IR5 was extensively sown throughout the country. However, it was later replaced by the IR5 mutant, which became popular in Lower Burma and became an established MV. Under irrigated conditions, Ngwetoe was extensively sown in Middle Burma, while C4-63 and Mashuri were particularly popular in Upper Burma. Shwe-ta-soke was accepted in low-lying areas of Lower Burma under rainfed conditions. Other MVs were tried and, when proven superior, replaced the previous MVs.

In 1985, researchers reported that there were 15 prospective MVs for the Irrawaddy Division; 13 for the Pegu Dvision; 14 for Rangoon Division; 8 for Arakan State, 7 for Mon and Karen States; 8 for Sagaing Division; 11 for Shan, Chin, Kachin, and Kayah States; and 7 each for Mandalay and Tenasserim Divisions. Pending final technical evaluation from location trials and seed multiplication centers, these new MVs would replace the existing six MVs in accordance with locational suitability.

Table 34. Areas (000 ha) planted to modem variaties in different years, 1970-85. a

Year IR5 Ngwetoe C4-63 IR5 Mutant Mashuri Shwe-ta-soke Others Total

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

173 (91) b

148 (79) 150 (74) 177 (70) 237 (72) 251 (76) 256 (57) 215 (42) 183 (25) 200 (16) 189 (9) 166 (7) 150 (7) 117 (5) 102 (4) 104 (4)

17 (9)

15 (7)

23 (7)

14 (80)

21 (8)

29 (9) 34 (8) 46 (9) 60 (8) 66 (5) 62 (3) 56 (3) 57 (3) 47 (2) 51 (2) 52 (2)

25 (13) 38 (19) 55 (22) 68 (21) 51 (15) 38 (8) 39 (7) 46 (7) 51 (4) 71 (3) 69 (3) 63 (3) 47 (2) 50 (2) 50 (2)

12 (3) 38 (7)

116 (16) 316 (25) 694 (34) 817 (36) 852 (37) 867 (37) 946 (37) 961 (37)

110 (24) 150 (31) 245 (34) 317 (26) 486 (24) 578 (26) 511 (22) 539 (23) 537 (21) 468 (18)

8 (2) 42 (6)

235 (19) 452 (22)

576 (25) 562 (24) 537 (21) 520 (20)

497 (22)

8 (2) 29 (4) 59 (5) 93 (5)

69 (3) 164 (7) 334 (13) 443 (17)

72 (3)

190 (4) c

187 (4) 203 (4) 253 (5) 328 (6) 331 (7) 450 (9) 512 (10) 721 (14)

1244 (25) 2047 (40) 2255 (46) 2278 (47) 2343 (48) 2557 (52) 2598 (53)

a 1970-75 data from SRUB 1977, 1976-82 data from SRUB 1984, and 1983-85 data from department reports. b Figures in parentheses are percentages of area. c Figures in parentheses (last column) refer to MV% of rice area.


- - - - - -

- - - - - -

- - - - - - -

- - - - - - -

The areas devoted to MVs in selected years are shown in Table 34. MV coverage of a mere 19,000 ha (4% of total area in 1970) had swelled to 2.6 million ha in 1985, representing a 53% increase in 15 yr. The rate of expansion was gradual in the beginning, resulting in an annual increase of only 2%, but it rose sharply after 1978, with an annual increase of 10% until 1981; it declined afterward.

IR5, Ngwetoe, and C4-63 were the only three MVs planted until 1976, when the IR5 mutant replaced IR5, and Mashuri substituted for C4-63. Shwe- ta-soke replaced the long-duration local varieties in the low-lying areas of Lower Burma. Areas devoted to promising MVs (which were under evaluation at that time) are listed in Table 34 as ”Others.” Of these promising varieties, the Mashuri mutant showed potential to replace Mashuri and C4-63, and reselected IR42 started replacing Shwe-ta-soke in Lower Burma. The easily shattered grains of Mashuri had long been disliked by the farmers but this variety was nevertheless tolerated because there were no better ones. Similarly, Shwe-ta-soke’s popularity declined as rice millers complained of low outturn as a result of milling it after long storage.

Some MVs, being hybrids, tended to show genetic instability. Farmers aggravated the problem by mixing the different varieties on the threshing floor. The admixture was so severe that, in some instances, farmers needed to harvest twice for — early-maturing grains, which were selectively harvested, and then for the remaining plants (often covering one quarter of the area) which were harvested a few days later.

The area devoted to MVs expanded rapidly in the late 1970s and slowed down after 1981. This change in rate of adoption necessitated an objective evaluation. One question raised concerned the ability of researchers to breed new MVs that would satisfy the needs of farmers and that would suit rice environments never before explored.

Rice, belonging to a different grain type as classified by Beale (1927), also followed a distinct pattern. In the previous two periods, the bold C-type grain was very popular in Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions since it was the one being exported to India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. The European and other markets preferred the thin, long A-type. Furthermore, new high-yielding varieties with thin, long A-type grains were introduced, eventually replacing the C-type grain. With these changes, the rice area devoted to A grain increased.

Table 35 shows the area covered by different grain types during the period. The area under A-type grain increased from 12 to 42%, while the area devoted to C-type grain declined from 58 to 23% . The A-type grain would continue to expand at the expense of the C-type grain.

Seed distribution The DA became more active in its seed distribution program during the period. It distributed pure strains of local rice varieties in the earlier period, but as the


Table 35. Rice area planted, by grain type, 1960-85.

Percentage of area planted to

A 0 C D E Period

1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85

12 13 16 21 42

4 6

10 12 17

58 52 46 42 23

20 21 19 17 10

6 8 9 8 8

Sources: Department files, Agricultural Corporation.

MV area expanded, it concentrated its activities on the new MV seeds. The experimental stations bred new MV strains and carried out breeder and foundation seed multiplication activities.

Seed farms throughout the country were also involved in foundation seed multiplication. There were no commercial seed producers, but the DA registered some farmers who, serving as seed growers, produced certified seed. Seed was important in the drive for higher rice production especially when MVs constituted a critical component. The seed distribution program, however, fell short of expectation. The yearly distribution of improved seed during the period is shown in Table 36.

Table 36 indicates that the volume of seed distributed increased from 1,400 t in 1961 to 10,000-20,000 t in later years. Even this amount covered only 5-7% of the sown area. There remained a lot more room for improvement. The World Bank assisted the seed program by providing the experimental stations and seed farms with the necessary equipment. Under existing threshing practices, seed needed to be replenished with pure strains at least once in 3 yr. The expansion of MVs also required distribution of seeds of new varieties during the first year. There were also seed exchanges among farmers, but a systematic and well-organized seed program was found essential to aid in the drive for higher production.

Fertilizers Chemical fertilizer was an important input during this period. The use of fertilizer increased steadily at an annual rate of approximately 10% until 1967. The rate then increased rapidly as more MVs were used in rice production. MVs would not be able to exhibit their high-yielding potential unless accompanied by a reasonable dose of fertilizers. Acceptance of fertilizers by farmers was largely because of their acceptance of MVs. Before the advent of MVs, fertilizer use was not popular, in spite of low prices and credit availability. Thus, MVs and fertilizers were integrated simultaneously in Burmese agriculture. In subsequent years, a dynamic agricultural extension program greatly promoted fertilizer utilization. Although supply always exceeded demand before this extension effort, demand far surpassed supply during the


Table 36. Distribution of improved seed, 1961-85. a

Amount Area % Year distributed covered

(t) b area

(ha) coverage

1961 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

1,470 10,580

4,650 11,970 14,900 8,880

18.780 19,390 11,330

4,000 4,240 8.940

13,730 36.060 10,730 10,630 13,250 19,020 15,630

28,000 205,000

90,000 232,000 290,000 172,000 365,000 377,000 220,000

78,000 82,000

174,000 267,000 700,000 208,000 206,000 257,000

39,000 304,000

0.6 4.1 1.8 4.7 5.8 3.5 7.2 7.3 4.2 1.5 1.6 3.3 5.1

13.7 4.2 4.2 5.3 7.5 6.2

a 1961, 68-70 data taken from SRUB 1972; 1970-74 data taken from SRUB 1977; 1975-78 data from SRUB 1979; 9179-82 data from SRUB 1984: and 1983-85 data from SRUB 1987. b Amount distributed converted from baskets to t andcalculated for area coverage with the common seeding rate.

program years. The need for more fertilizers became apparent as the area planted to MVs expanded.

In earlier days, farmers did not want to use fertilizers for fear of spoiling the soil or making it too dependent on fertilizers. They also doubted the profitability of using fertilizers. But they soon found out that the high-yielding potential of MVs could not be realized without fertilizers. Compared with other crops, the share of rice in the use of fertilizer was low in the beginning, but it soon took a major portion after more areas were planted to MVs. The yearly utilization of fertilizer is given in Table 37.

Fertilizer utilization in Burma rose from about 17,000 t in 1960 to 417,000 t in 1985, constituting a 25-fold increase in a period of 25 yr (Table 37). The increase was most pronounced in the 1970s. The share of rice in fertilizer utilization was about 40% in the beginning of the period, rising to about 70% as MV areas expanded. Rice enjoyed more than 80% of the share during the special extension program.

Initially, sugarcane, jute, cotton, groundnut, and rubber utilized a substantial amount of fertilizer. (These crops were separately handled by ARDC on a project-to-project basis.) Furthermore, local rice varieties did not respond well to fertilizer. But as more as fertilizer-responsive MVs were sown, rice took


Table 37. Annual utilization of fertilizers (000 t), by crop, 1960-85. a

Year Rice Other crops % utilized by rice Total b

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

6.4 7.2

10.5 14.7 14.6 20.8 17.3 12.2 16.6 56.6 36.0 23.3 47.2 68.0 74.4 88.0 92.1

103.7 160.6 173.9 205.3 227.2 290.8 332.2 304.7 328.4

10.2 12.6 15.7 6.1 7.5 9.8

16.2 12.7 19.6 16.1 24.2 15.1 52.0 47.2 29.3 32.3 20.9 31.2 26.4 35.1 41.2 45.4 61.7 74.5 66.7 88.4

38 37 40 71 66 68 52 49 46 78 60 61 48 59 72 73 82 77 86 83 83 83 83 82 82 79

16.6 19.8 26.2 20.8 22.1 30.6 33.5 24.9 36.2 72.7 60.2 38.4 99.2

115.2 103.7 120.3 113.0 134.9 187.0 209.0 246.5 272.6 352.5 406.7 371.4 416.8

for 1966-72, SRUB 1975; for 1974-75, SRUB 1978; for 1976-78, SRUB 1979; for 1979-82, a Sources: For 1960-62 data, RGUB 1964; for 1963-64, RGUB 1966; for 1965-66, SRUB 1969;

SRUB 1984; and for 1983-85, SRUB 1987. b As ammonium sulfate and ammonium phosphate up to 1965; as urea, triple superphosphate, and muriate of potash after 1965.

a big portion of fertilizer allocation. When the WTRPP was introduced, the government gave priority in fertilizer distribution to ricelands. Rice growers sometimes sold their fertilizer share, at a huge profit, to other farmers who grew other crops like vegetables, sugarcane, or groundnut.

Ammonium sulfate and ammonium phosphate were the two forms of fertilizer distributed up to 1965; they were later replaced by urea, triple superphosphate, and muriate of potash. Some farmers resisted the substitution of urea for ammonium sulfate. Utilization of fertilizer fell in 1966 and 1967 because of the change in form of fertilizer.

Although urea, triple superphosphate, and muriate of potash were introduced as N, P, and K carriers, respectively, urea was the most widely accepted. Farmers liked urea because plant response to it—greener leaves—would be visible a few days after application. It was also the cheapest. Consequently urea amounted to 70% of the total annual consumption, while triple superphosphate and muriate of potash represented only 25 and 5%, respectively.


All fertilizers were imported until 1975, when urea was produced from two local factories (rated capacity, 130,000 t/yr). Production capacity was higher than utilization capacity at the time. Industry officials were concerned about production exceeding utilization, but agriculture officials were optimistic. The rapid expansion in MV areas and the enthusiastic acceptance of fertilizers by farmers removed the doubts entertained by industry. They later found out that urea production was not even enough to satisfy the increasing demand and had to be supplemented through importation. One urea factory doubled its rated capacity, but fertilizer production still fell short of demand. A third factory, with 200,000 t/yr capacity, was then constructed in 1985.

Rice, particularly the MVs, used the largest amount of fertilizer. Table 38 shows the amount of fertilizer used for MVs during the WTRPP.

The MVs utilized a big proportion of the fertilizers, leaving only a small amount (4-7%) for local varieties. This occurred in areas affected by floods, pests, and diseases; fertilizer was used to enable the crops to recover.

The increase in the use of fertilizers between 1969 and 1985 was very high, but Burma used less fertilizer than did many other Asian countries. Con- sumption per hectare of arable and permanently cropped land was 1.2 kg of nutrients in 1966, rising to 16.7 kg in 1982. Compare these figures with 8.4-51.2 kg in Bangladesh, 6.8-75.0 kg in Indonesia, and 11.3-28.8 kg in the Philippines during the same period (ADB 1985). (These levels of fertilizer use were averages of consumption in different years relative to cropped area.) Actual fertilizer rates applied by farmers differed with soil fertility conditions and crops.

Based on fertilizer availability and demand, the AC distributed fertilizer at the rate of 63 kg urea, 33 kg triple superphosphate, and 21 kg muriate of potash/ ha. The recommended rate based on research findings is much higher. Research results from numerous experiments conducted at experimental stations and in farmers’ fields for a number of years indicated that MV rice would require 250 kg urea, 188 kg triple superphosphate, and 94 kg muriate of potash/ha for maximum yield; the optimum requirement per hectare is 104 kg urea, 94 kg triple superphosphate, and 78 kg muriate of potash. These rates take into consideration the prevailing prices of fertilizers and rice (ARI 1975).

Table 38. Utilization of fertilizers (tons) by modern rice varieties, 1979-85 (SRUB 1987).

Year MV Total % utilization of MV

1979

1981

1983 1984

1980

1982

1985

162,206 203,698 226,580

326,421 291,673 327,191

289,978

173,904 205,330 227,167

332,203 304,678 328,436

290,783

93 99

100 100

98 96

100


The rates of fertilizer calculated for distribution were, therefore, much lower than the recommended rates. The supply level of fertilizer determined dosage.

Fertilizer was imported annually. Upon arrival at the Rangoon port in the open season (November to March), it was transported to transit storage places for distribution. Locally produced urea also had to be stored in various parts of the country before distribution. Fertilizer factories maintained daily production, and the AC took care of delivery and storage.

Since more than 80% of the fertilizer was used for rice, the bulk of fertilizer distribution took place between January and May, when farmers disposed of their rice harvest and bought fertilizer for the next season. This, in fact, was the time the farmers had ready money for fertilizer procurement.

Government loans were also disbursed during this time. Annual factory production of fertilizer did not reveal the supply level for that year, but actual supply consisted of urea in storage plus the production output from factories in the open season. This amount of urea, supplemented by imports, was the amount available for distribution during the year. For triple superphosphate and muriate of potash, annual procurement plus the balance made up the supply. Distribution of fertilizer during this limited period often created transportation problems, especially after the energy crisis. Movement of all agricultural products took place during the open season, and fertilizer distribution was only a small portion of this huge volume.

Table 39 shows the chemical fertilizer supply level for different years and in what year utilization was highest. This table was constructed from data presented in Reports to the Pyithu Hluttaw in 1984 and 1987. The fertilizer supply level was 200,000 t in 1979-80 and rose to 407,000 t in 1985-86, an increase of more than 100% in a short time. The increase was mainly due to the increased supply of urea. This amount, however, did not coincide with the utilization figures in Table 37. Utilization of fertilizer in a particular year depends on 1) expansion of MV area, 2) availability of stock at the distribution

Table 39. Fertilizer supply, imports, and domestic production (000 t), 1979-85 (SRUB 1984,1987).

Imports Locally

Period Triple Muriate produced Total Urea superphosphate of potash urea

1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86

9.0 80.7

101.0 172.0 93.8 86.9 47.9

54.0

106.6

61.5 130.1 98.5

62.8

87.5

4.0 9.0

23.5 17.0

30.0

24.8

21.8

133.9 122.2 132.5 100.5 116.5 150.4 230.8

200.9 274.7 364.9 383.5 288.8 389.2 407.2


points, 3) availability of cash among farmers, 4) production of local factories during the open season and amount of importation, and 5) the activities of extension personnel.

Fertilizers were sold throughout the country using a fixed price which reflected neither the cost of producing fertilizer locally nor the international price of imported fertilizer. In the beginning, the selling price of fertilizers was based on the imported price plus charges for handling, storage, and transportation. The prices for different years varied; after 1974, when the use of fertilizer became popular and when it played an important role in agriculture, the prices of fertilizer no longer changed with time. Prices of various fertilizers in different years are given in Table 40.

Urea was sold at 768 kyats/t in 1965-66. Thereafter, with the changing international market price, the price went down to as low as 440 kyats in 1971- 72. After 1975, local urea became predominant, and the selling price was pegged at 360 kyats/t, where it has remained up to this day. The price of triple superphosphate also varied with the years, from 526 kyats/t in 1966-67 to 463 kyats/t in 1971-72. In 1975, it was constant at 1294 kyats/t as the international market prices spiralled because of the world energy crisis. The price of muriate of potash was pegged at 480 kyats/t in 1966-67 and increased to 598 kyats/t in 1975; this price has prevailed until today.

The prices of triple superphosphate and muriate of potash have not changed for the past 13 yr. This has meant a heavy subsidy on fertilizers, with a substantial budget commitment. This burden was somehow eased by fixing the procurement price of rice such that it fell below the international market price. The procurement price of rice in terms of rice equivalent averaged 42% of the average export price for the period 1982-84.

The response of MVs to NPK application has been averaged from a number of fertilizer experiments and expressed in mathematical terms (Khin Win et a1 1975):

Table 40. Selling price of fertilizers (kyats/t) in different years, 1965-85. a

Triple Muriate Period b Urea superphosphate of potash

1965-66 1966-67 1970-71 1971-74 1975-85

768 600 550 440 360

526 526 463

1294

480 480 480 598

Corporation. b Fertilizers were sold in 50-kg bags from 1965 to 1974. From 1975 to 1985, urea a Sources: Department reports, Agricultural and Rural Development Corporation and Agricultural

was sold in 25kg bags and triple superphosphate and muriate of potash were distributed in 50- kg bags.


-

Y = 2447 + 13.65 N - 0.073 N 2

Y = 2447 + 16.11 P 2 O 5 - 0.11 P 2 O 5 2

Y = 2447 + 14.18 K 2 O - 0.14 K 2 O 2

for nitrogen for phosphorus for potassium oxide

where Y is the yield of rice. On the basis of this response curve and the prevailing prices of fertilizer

and rice, one could surmise that the use of fertilizers on MVs would result in a value-cost ratio of 3, meaning that an investment of 1 kyat would result in a profit of 2 kyats. Changing fertilizer and rice prices would certainly affect this ratio. Although the rice trade was controlled all along, it was reported that in 1987, the government had decontrolled rice procurement. This action would change the price of rice and the value-cost ratio. If the fertilizer prices remained the same, the ratio would be in favor of the farmers.

The ADB Agriculture Department calculated the prices and costs of fertilizers and estimated the implicit subsidy of various fertilizers for different years (Table 41). The data indicate that the subsidy on urea constituted three times the sale price; the subsidy on triple superphosphate, three-fourths the sale price; and that on muriate of potash, about twice the sale price.

Agrochemicals The expansion of MVs and the greater use of fertilizers in rice cultivation necessitated the use of agrochemicals. The low cropping intensity, the hot and dry summer months, and the high mountain ranges at the borders served as deterrents to widespread infestation of pests and diseases. Infestation occurred only in localized areas. Farmers, being Buddhists, were reluctant to kill living organisms, and the use of agrochemicals was never fully appreciated. The AC likewise encouraged pest surveillance and scouting and used agrochemicals only in unavoidable cases. This resulted in pest infestations reaching epidemic proportions because of untimely control.

Agrochemicals were used in two forms—emulsified liquid and dust. Some, like Gammexame, DDT, and Lindane, came in both liquid and dust forms and were commonly used because they were cheap. They were used against caseworms Nymphula depunctalis, cutworms Cirphis albistigma, and rice

Table 41. Prices and subsidy costs of fertilizers (kyats/t), 1979-83 (ADB 1985).

Urea Triple superphosphate Muriate of potash Period

Sale Implicit Sale Implicit Sale price subsidy

Implicit price subsidy price subsidy

1979–80 1980–81 1981–82 1982–83 1983–84

360 360 360 360 360

376 765 865

1153 1135

1244 1244 1244 1244 1244

524 1095

935 1186

982

598 598 598 598 598

575 951

1054 1453

965


hispa Hispa armigera. Though annual infestation ranged from 2 to 4% of the sown area, the agrochemicals effectively controlled these pests. In some years, blast disease was reported, and it required the use of perenox or agrosan GN dust. Another commonly used agrochemical was Endrin emulsion concentrate. These agrochemicals, though banned in other countries, remained major items because of their cost competitiveness.

The annual consumption of agrochemicals by ricelands is given in Table 42. In most years, farmers preferred the powder to the liquid form, but there were a few years (1972 and 1984) when more liquid agrochemicals were used than powder agrochemicals. The annual consumption of powders ranged from 100 to 700 t; that of liquids ranged from a low 50 thousand to a high 400 thousand liters. The AC also sold hand dusters, hand sprayers, and power- combined sprayer-dusters. Yearly sales registered between 500 and 3000 units of insecticide applicators only. The use of agrochemicals was more popular in crops other than rice.

Table 42. Annual consumption of agrochemicals, 1962-85. a

Year b Powder chemicals (000 kg) c

Liquid chemicals

(000 liters) c

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

1979

1968

1978

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

329 310 314 135

213 230

232 86

736

181

385

80

312 569 186 144 211 232 167 149 106

96 745

824

97 52 66 66

120 175 182 203 254

375 92 66

177 63

119 212 113 157 152 199

173 96

81

248

a Sources: For 1962-70 data, RGUB 1970; for 1971-73, SRUB 1974: for 1974-78, SRUB 1979; for 1979-82, SRUB 1984; for 1983-85, SRUB 1987. b Some years mentioned utilization of cereals but this was taken as that of rice considering it took more than 90% of consumption. c All data in pound and gallon converted to kg and liter, respectively.


Extensive use of agrochemicals with long-lasting residual action is certainly not desirable. Preventive measures, surveillance and scouting, combined with the introduction of reasonably resistant varieties (rather than increased use of agrochemicals), should constitute the long-range strategy. There were some reports of indiscriminate use of agrochemicals, including a few incidents with fatalities.

A lot more needs to be done in the field of agrochemical utilization before it can contribute significantly to rice production. Especially wanting are efforts to promote protective clothing, correct dispensing, proper use of applicators, containment of health hazards, and use of antidotes in emergency cases.

Agricultural loans In this period, agricultural loans played an increasingly important role as the need for agricultural credit became critical. The new technology required more inputs and needed more hired labor, and this meant additional cost to the farmers. The government was the sole agency that provided agricultural loans, since private moneylending was declared illegal. Aside from the very few private moneylenders taking the risk, government loans adequately covered the farmers’ cultivation costs.

During this period, changes in lending agency, lending amount, lending rate, and lending procedures were instituted. The State Agricultural Bank, which undertook loan disbursement, continued its business with greater efficiency and confidence. The Department of General Administration stopped its loan disbursement activities in 1965. The State Agricultural Bank was renamed Myanma Agricultural Bank (MAB) in 1976, and it took charge of seasonal, medium-term, and long-term agricultural loans. The amount of agricultural loans increased greatly, especially after 1978 when the WTRPP was launched. The lending rate also rose substantially to help solve the farmers’ credit problem.

MAB loans were granted through village banks. Farmers were charged 12% interest per annum and were asked to leave 1% of the loan as compulsory saving. The MAB charged the village bank 8% per annum, leaving 4% as capital to be used by the village bank. The MAB also gave the bank a 10% commission on the loan principal recovered, plus 2% on all interests recovered. It could now accumulate these earnings and use them for future lending without the assistance of the MAB. This change in procedures, with the close supervision of the SACS before 1974 and the People’s Councils after that, contributed to the smooth disbursement and repayment of loans. The national recovery rate for seasonal loans has averaged more than 90% since then. Agricultural loans, thus, supplemented the original objective, with quite a tangible contribution to rice production.


The amounts of agricultural loans given to rice and other crops are given in Table 43. The annual loan disbursement of 57 million kyats in 1960 increased to 1.19 billion kyats in 1985. The increase in agricultural loans was steady until 1978, when a drastic increase occurred. Rice loans comprised 85-88% of the crop loans. From 1974 to 1977, loan disbursement for rice went down as the Trade Corporation (the agency responsible for rice procurement) used an "advanced purchase" system in rice surplus areas. Rice loans disbursed by the MAB during these years were only for areas without procurement centers. The advanced purchase system was discontinued after 1978 when the MAB resumed loan disbursement.

Such high disbursement of loans after 1978 could be attributed to the expansion of area devoted to MVs and to the higher lending rate. The lending rate was 19.77 kyats/ha in the previous period, rising to 29.65 in 1962, 74.13 in 1963, 86.49 in 1967, and 172.97 in 1977. These lending rates, fixed for all rice varieties, were given in two installments—70-80% was disbursed before cultivation, while the remainder was given at harvest. Since 1978, farmers had requested that loans be divided into two equal parts—one half before cultivation and the other half just before harvest. In 1981, the lending rate was raised twice (345.94 kyats/ha) to meet extra expenditures for labor and other inputs.

In 1978, the MAB also made loans available for the purchase of draft cattle, power tillers, and water pumps. Crop loans, however, remained a major component of the lending operations.

Improved lending procedures and closer supervision by responsible personnel resulted in high loan repayment. A repayment rate of 90% compared favorably with 78% in the previous period. The high repayment rate also indicated the profitability of modern rice technology.

An ADB agricultural sector survey team estimated that the MAB loans covered approximately 80% of the credit requirement for rice (ADB 1985). In

Table 43. Agricultural loans (million kyats) granted In selected years, 1960-85. a

Year Rice All crops % share of rice Remark

1960 1970 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

124.7 1.1

693.4 720.8 701.4

1040.8 1063.7 1040.4 1055.1 1033.9

57.4 151.4

3.3 809.6 845.5 826.5

1176.4 1210.1 1190.7 1218.7 1197.6

82 33 86 85 85 88 88 87 87 86

Not mentióned separately

Advanced purchase system

a Sources: For 1960 data, SRUB 1970; for 1970-72, SRUB 1974; for 1974, SRUB 1977; for 1975- 78, SRUB 1979; for 1979–82, SRUB 1984; and for 1983-85, SRUB 1987.


- -

this period, credit could be considered adequate in meeting rice cultivation requirements in spite of the huge area and the large number of farmers involved. The adequacy of the amount of loan could not, in itself, be taken as satisfactory. It should be disbursed on time to cover the partial cost of rice production. In earlier periods, loans were often given late, usually after the planting season, and farmers just spent the money for nonproductive purposes. This misuse of credit was one of the important reasons for low repayment.

The MAB had contributed substantially to higher rice production, but there remained some areas that needed improvement. Credit availability in a relatively adequate amount influenced the decision of farmers to adopt modern technology. Without such a large amount of agricultural loans available, rapid rice production growth would not have been possible.

Draft cattle Draft cattle continued to be the main source of power, providing more than 90% of the requirement. In rice production, draft cattle were involved from tillage operation to threshing and farm transport. During this time, small power tillers were introduced, but their use was limited because of their high repair and maintenance costs and fuel needs. Cattle would remain the main source of power in Burmese agriculture in the foreseeable future.

In the beginning of the period, the cattle population stood at 3.284 million head, rising to 6.516 million head in 1985, with an average annual growth rate of 2.2%. This growth rate surpassed that of gross sown area, resulting in less load share with time. The cattle population level was, therefore, considered favorable to crop production.

Table 44 shows the gross sown area and the corresponding cattle population in different years. Gross sown area increased from 7 million ha in the beginning of the period to more than 10 million ha. The increase came mainly

Table 44. Gross sown area and draft cattle In selected years, 1960-85. a

Gross Draft Year sown area cattle

(000 ha) (000 head)

Load (ha/pair)

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1982 1984 1985

6,935

9,040 9,442

10,038 9,910

10,516 10,385

8,775 3,284 4,242 4,118 5,018 5,734 6,137 6,366 6,516

4.23 4.14 4.39 3.76 3.50 2.23 3.30 3.19

a Sources: For 1960 data, RGUB 1966; for 1965 and 1970, SRUB 1973; for 1975, SRUB 1979; for 1980 and 1982, SRUB 1984; and for 1984 and 1985, SRUB 1987.


from double-cropped areas (Table 44). Cattle also rose from 3.3 million to 6.5 million head, an almost 100% increase. Cattle growth exceeded cropped area growth—the load factor of 4.23 ha/pair decreased to 3.19 in a period of two and a half decades. (For yearly data, see Appendix III.)

This favorable cattle population level, combined with the short growth duration of MVs, increased cropping intensity in the country to an appreciable extent. A pair of cattle at the end of the rice season appeared exhausted; using them for the second crop was simply unreasonable. The farmer either got another pair of cattle or he used a tractor or power tiller to undertake the operations efficiently. Moreover, cattle manure was an important nutrient source supplementing scarce fertilizer. Farmers usually applied farmyard manure to rice nurseries.

Burmese farmers had a strong attachment to the animals and spent substantial amount of money for feed (rice bran, oil cake, or a mixture of the two), almost the same amount they spent for their own food.

Since 1970, the MAB had provided loans for the purchase of draft cattle and carts. These loans (usually six-year duration) had to be repaid in six equal installments at low interest (12% per annum). The cattle purchased were pledged as surety. The size of the loan depended on the local price of draft cattle—between 2000 and 3000 kyats/animal. The cart would cost about 2000 kyats and the loans for cattle and cart were often administered together. However, a separate loan for either cattle or cart was possible. There were loans to acquire power tillers that would relieve the load of cattle and increase farm power, but these were not very popular. Aside from the maintenance and fuel problems of power tillers, the favorable cattle population reduced the need for the machines.

The government lifted the ban on the slaughter of cattle to stabilize meat and fish prices. A close watch by the People’s Councils on the indiscriminate slaughter of cattle at various levels averted the depletion of cattle stock. In spite of the adequate number of cattle in the country, a great potential for further improving this important agricultural asset existed. Population pressure on land was relatively low, and there were many areas that could support cattle raising with success. Climatic conditions in these areas—a critical factor for such an endeavor—were most appropriate for feed and fodder production. Additionally, many crop byproducts could provide high-quality feed. Encour- agement of cattle breeding in these areas, together with proper veterinary care, would further enhance the draft cattle position in the country.

Support services Stronger support services characterized the period. Sufficiently trained manpower and reasonably equipped laboratories—results of international assistance—contributed greatly to agricultural development. The institu-


tional framework reestablished during the last period provided the services demanded by development programs. The peace and order situation in the country had improved. The administrative structure had also been realigned to serve the people effectively. Farmers were well-motivated, and they eagerly participated in the agricultural sector program. The priority enjoyed by the agricultural sector in the earlier period, more of a lip service than anything else, lacked financial support. The government made more investments during this period.

Investment In the agricultural sector, crop production was a major activity and the government made major investments in this subsector. The forestry and livestock subsectors also offered more investment opportunities, but these were less than those found in the crop subsector. Major investments were made in agricultural research, extension, irrigation, and agricultural mechanization, with substantial impact on crop production. Agricultural sector investments accounted for about 10% of total investments in the beginning of the period, increasing to nearly 20% in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This improvement in investment climate resulted in the correspondingly higher contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross domestic product of Burma. Table 45 compares government investment in the agricultural sector against total investment in selected years.

Government investment in all sectors increased steadily in the beginning, but the rate of increment was more substantial since 1977-78 (Table 45). Investment in the agricultural sector increased from 66 million kyats in 1962 to 1.2 billion kyats in 1985. The increase was more pronounced after 1977-78,

Table 45. Government Investment in the agricultural sector in selected years (1962-85) . a

Investment (million kyats) Period

Total all sectors Agricultural sector % of agricultural sector

1962-63 1964-65 1968-69 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1977-78 1978-79 1982-83 1983-84 1985-86

493 572 755 771

735

5124

894

3278

8201 8153 6747

66 79

62 94 73

645

1379 1379

81

a95

1158

13 14 11

11 10 20 17 17 17

8

18

a Sources: SRUB 1972, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1984, 1987.


when investment in the agricultural sector rose by more than 25% a year until 1982-83. The percentage share of the agricultural sector in total investment stood at 13% in 1962; it rose to 20% in 1977-78, and slid down again to 18% in 1985. In spite of this rapid increase, government investment in the agricultural sector was considered low, compared with the 38% allocation to the industrial sector. Industrial sector investment, of course, included agribased industries like fertilizer, power tiller, and water pump factories.

Private investments—in the form of land improvement, drainage, and small-scale irrigation systems—also existed but these were not reflected in the statistics.

More investments are needed to promote crop production, but it would be desirable to consider the investment-worthiness of the various components involved in the agricultural sector.

Agricultural research When the government adopted crop intensification rather than area expansion as a strategy to increase rice production, agricultural research and extension constituted the most important support service in the implementation of the agricultural sector plan. This government action influenced the direction of the country’s research efforts. Research is critical in the achievement of vertical productivity growth rather than of horizontal area expansion. But it took some time for research to seize this opportunity. Research funding increased greatly during the period, especially after the 1970s. Investment in research increased appreciably when foreign-assisted projects were initiated and implemented.

In the beginning of the period until the late 1960s, research was not given the importance it deserved. Research infrastructure, inherited at the onset of independence, had not changed much. The nine central experimental stations undertook mainly varietal improvement research. Research activities failed to produce the technology demanded by the agricultural sector plan. Because of vast differences in soil, water availability, and agronomic management practices between experimental stations and farmers’ fields, one could not expect research recommendations emanating from the stations to achieve the same results in every area. Satisfying the need of individual farmers would also be certainly beyond the capacity of the research stations, but recommendations should suit a large number of potential users. Research facilities, in the beginning of the period, remained inadequate in terms of personnel, equipment, and relevant programs.

Two divisions under AC—the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI) and the Applied Research Division (ARD)—are responsible for the development of technology. In the early 1970s, ARI, situated 15 km north of Rangoon, was moved to Yezin, a good 410 km farther north. Equipped with more laboratory and field facilities, ARI was transferred to serve both Upper and Lower Burma. The United Nations Development Programme and the Food and Agriculture


Organization assisted ARI by providing equipment and expertise, while AC took care of the laboratory and field facilities. ARI had five disciplinary divisions (Soils, Botany, Plant Pathology, Entomology, and Agronomy) and six crop-oriented divisions (Cereal Crops, Oil Crops, Food Crops, Fiber Crops, Sugar Crops, and Horticulture Crops)—all fairly well-equipped and -staffed.

ARD also expanded its experimental stations from 9 to 14, one station for each state or division. In collaboration with ARI, these experimental stations were designed to conduct location-specific research.

The release of MVs that outyielded the local varieties impressed the country’s planners and administrators. Since then, agricultural research was deemed crucial in efforts to increase crop production. Higher crop productivity was regarded possible through technical change.

Agricultural research now enjoyed the prestige it deserved. The government formed the Research Policy Direction Board composed of ministers coming from science-related departments. The Agricultural Science Research Division constituted 1 of the 14 science divisions under this Board. Agricultural research programs were laid down by the Agricultural Research Committee of the Agricultural Science Research Division. The Agricultural Research Com- mittee was composed of members from the AC, faculty members from the Institutes of Agriculture and Economics, and officials of departments involved in agricultural science. The Committee drew long- and short-term research programs in line with the national objectives of the agricultural sector plan.

Implementation of the research program was done mainly by ARI and ARD; other institutes and departments also undertook research programs to the extent permitted by their resources. The Committee also organized an annual research congress where about 25-30 research papers were presented. The Committee also developed technology from these research findings, examining such outputs before passing these to the AC Extension Division for dissemination.

The manpower capability of ARI has expanded to a level that can be reasonably considered sufficient to meet the needs of the country. The technical staff of the two divisions increased from 120 to 931:74 postgraduate degree holders and about twice as many research assistants who hold Bachelor of Agriculture degrees. The research support staff (Bachelor of Agriculture, Diploma, and agricultural high school graduates) assisted the technical staff. The proportion of postgraduate degree holders in the four disciplines (plant breeding, soil science, plant protection, and agronomy) appeared well-balanced. Unlike in the previous years, research was not oriented to plant breeding alone; it covered other fields as well.

Research workers, however, required some motivation, especially the postgraduate degree holders who had been exposed to better working environments in advanced countries. They tended to restrict themselves to the laboratories and avoided working in the fields. Correct attitude and behavior


were deemed essential in dealing with the rural poor, but some researchers lacked an understanding of the very people whom research was supposed to serve. Personal relationships among researchers, extension workers, and farmers needed to be reestablished to accelerate technology development and transfer.

Researchers would view extension workers as unwilling to try the new technology. They also thought that extension workers lacked the seriousness to do their job. They considered them ill-informed about the latest scientific advances. On the other hand, extension workers would view research workers as too theoretical, giving no attention to the social and economic needs of the farmers. Even worse, farmers would view the activities of the other two groups as irrelevant to the actual situation; researchers and extension workers, on the other hand, would regard the farmers as backward and ignorant. A reorientation of the attitudes of these three groups was indeed needed.

Researchers must have the right attitude to be able to offer workable recommendations. During the early part of this period, few farmers followed the recommendations of researchers. Some thought that rejection of the new technology was due to the conservativeness of the farmers, while others blamed the ineffectiveness of the demonstrations conducted by extension workers. Still others cited the inadequacy of credit and other inputs as other factors limiting adoption. Some contended, though less frequently, that the recommended technologies were not appropriate to the farmers’ situation. However, recent experiences have shown that even the poorest farmers, presumably the most tradition-bound and with the least access to inputs, take up certain new technologies while rejecting others, suggesting that more attention be given to the adequacy of recommended technologies (Winkelmann and Moscardi 1979). The situation prevailing in Burma in the early 1960s confirms these observations.

Area development programs like the WTRPP presented an unusual opportunity to bring the researchers closer to the farmers. Researchers involved in the program got the chance to see their research findings put into practice. Some of these were successful; others were not. Proper linkage among researchers, extension workers, and farmers could enhance the process of technology transfer.

National research systems obtained useful plant materials and their technical staff attended short-term and postgraduate training in international agricultural research centers. Burma’s rice research program benefited from several of IRRI’s courses and programs: the Genetic Evaluation and Utilization course, rice production training, cropping systems network, Asian Rice Farming Systems Network, International Network on Soil Fertility and Fertilizer Evaluation, and many others.

The start of the research and extension collaboration was the ARI program that conducted extensive fertilizer trials and demonstrations in farmers’ fields.


The program brought research and extension personnel together, close enough to change their attitude toward each other. Varietal trials using cultivars introduced from other countries offered a good exercise in effective coordination among researchers, extension workers, and farmers.

Farmers’ participation in these programs was impressive. But their involvement was not complete, considering that researchers and extension workers predetermined the treatments (in the case of extensive fertilizer trials) and the varieties (in the case of varietal trials) and imposed these on the farmers at a later stage. Had the farmers participated right from the beginning, had their needs been clearly defined, and had their situation been assessed with due consideration to resources at hand, the results would have been better. Proper linkages and a more thorough understanding of these groups of people were important in developing technologies appropriate to a particular situation and to a specific group.

Many foreign-assisted research projects, both in the experimental stations and in farmers’ fields, were initiated and implemented in the late 1970s. These projects contributed resources in the form of expertise, equipment, and training. Research, then, contributed effectively to the agricultural sector plan.

Agricultural extension The DA and ARDC continued their extension activities in the beginning of the period. ARDC handled economically important crops that needed special attention to raise their productivity. Because of the more flexible administrative and financial structure of ARDC, its actions were more dynamic. They, however, often lacked sustainability because of inadequate technical support. The DA, though it lacked the other agency’s dynamism and mobility, was reasonably well-supported technologically.

These two agencies were merged to form the AC in 1974. The Extension Division of the AC continued its extension activities and, with sufficient staff and funds, achieved what neither one could do alone before. The staff who joined the extension service started as Village Extension Managers (VEMs), irrespective of educational qualification. In time, they were promoted to Village Tract Extension Manager, Township Extension Manager, Deputy Divisional Extension Manager, Divisional Extension Manager, and General Extension Manager. Advanced educational qualifications could accelerate the rate of promotion.

The extension approach employed was the same as that used in the previous period. A new technology, or a new variety, or the use of fertilizer was demonstrated on a carefully selected small plot located at the junction of roads leading to the town. Farmers readily admitted that the yield of this demonstration plot was higher than those of surrounding plots, but they had doubts about input availability and timeliness of delivery. Nor were they sure about the technology’s profitability. They thought that such a technology would only


work in experimental plots endowed with sufficient inputs, but it would not work in their own fields.

A proper understanding of the farmers’ milieu—their problems, potential, limitations, resources, and social processes—was needed to achieve the desired effect. It was generally accepted that when farmers consider a new technology, they go through a logical problem-solving process involving these steps: awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption or rejection (Swanson et al 1984). Neglect of farmers’ feelings or lack of seriousness on the part of the extension workers often reduced the effectiveness of such demonstrations.

The country launched long- and short-term national economic programs embracing the agricultural sector plans. Technology was essential in implementing these plans effectively. Burmese agriculture—consisting of small farms, with the majority at the subsistence level and operated by farmers with low education—needed technology appropriate to their situation. Their current crop production practices were based on experience, accumulated through a number of years, and were passed on from one generation to another. They would not change their practices that easily, unless they were sure that the technology would work in their environment. What the extension workers thought and what the farmers perceived often differed diametrically.

Constantly in touch with farmers, the VEMs served as frontline workers, their success depending on their attitudes toward the farmers and the activities they performed. Young and inexperienced, most of them were not happy with the uncomfortable life in the village. As they gained some experience, they tried to move to urban areas. They realized that conditions prevailing at the institute differed from those in the field. For those who were not really dedicated and mission-oriented, the task facing them proved formidable. They soon found themselves working with farmers who were tough, intelli- gent, hard-working, ingenious, and resilient. The leadership of the young VEMs would not be accepted easily. Farmers were always purposeful and reasonably efficient in managing the resources at their disposal, and they could not stand to see laziness and stupidity in their midst. Moreover, the VEMs were given responsibilities that they could barely undertake. Table 46 shows the average area of responsibility assigned to each VEM.

The number of VEMs increased from 1800 in 1972 to 7075 in 1985 (Table 46). During the same period, gross sown area rose from 8 million to 10 million ha, reducing the average area of responsibility for each VEM from 4600 to 1500 ha. With the existing roads and transportation system, one would consider 1000 ha for each VEM appropriate. Such an area would comprise approximately 350 farm families, probably situated in two or three villages. The present manpower strength of VEMs in AC slightly fell short of requirement, though it increased nearly 400% in a little more than two decades. Agriculture graduates were available, but AC could not provide them job positions. Being a government organization, AC needed time to reorganize and increase its staff.


Table 46. Average area of responsibility for each VEM in different years, 1962-85. a

1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1985

1792 3787 3882 5592 5392 6693 7075

8.376 8.650 9.040 9.500 9.862 9.910

10.385

No. of Gross Average area of Perod VEMs sown area responsibility for

(million ha) each VEM (ha)

4647 2284 2329 1699 1663 1481 1468

a Sources: RGUB 1974, 1979, 1984, 1987.

Unlike the previous era when there were only 10 Bachelor of Agriculture graduates a year, the present period witnessed about 200 students graduating from the Institute of Agriculture annually. Agriculture courses gained promi- nence and attracted many bright students during this period.

Changing administrative structure, changing technology, and changing needs necessitated the design of an extension strategy that would be appropriate to the prevailing conditions in the country. This need became more apparent when the training and visit (T&V) approach employed in World Bank projects proved less effective than expected.

Administrative structure had been completely changed. Prior to this change, the district was the focal point of administration, with the Deputy Commissioner as head. The revamp brought people closer to the central administration, and this expedited many of its developmental functions. Townships and divisions were now administered by elected representatives of the people (the People's Councils) instead of by lone civil officers.

Farmers were also motivated; enthusiastic about the change, they were readily united under the Farmers' Assiayones. Technology was available from international research institutes. What was needed was local adaptive research, agriculture being location-specific. The National Research Institute was staffed by qualified scientists and sufficiently equipped to conduct such location- specific research.

The AC was further strengthened with the addition of some staff positions. Institutional machinery that could develop appropriate technology and transfer it to the farmers was now in place. Now that conditions in the country were conducive to progress, it was only a matter of developing and initiating a suitable extension strategy.

This extension strategy for rice was developed and tried on a pilot scale, and practiced on a wider scale with other crops in subsequent years. It was a "selective concentrative strategy" which became known as the Whole Town- ship Rice Production Program (WTRPP). The strategy radically changed AC's practice of equally allocating its limited resources to its various functions. With


such a practice, resources were spread too thinly to be effective. WTRPP based its action on proven technology that would take maximum advantage of the prevailing conditions while minimizing the effects of constraints. With the active participation of researchers, extension workers, people’s representatives, and farmers themselves, the new rice production technology was diffused to help farmers increase their yield. The township served as the primary unit in the program. An average township has approximately 40,000 ha of riceland, and a population of 100,000. Schools, markets, hospitals, and railway stations were normally found in the capital.

WTRPP has five components—proven new technology, government support and leadership, selectivity and concentration, mass participation, and demonstration and competition.

Proven new technology Results of research about high-yielding MVs, responses of rice to fertilizers, rate and method of fertilizer applications, plant protection practices, optimum plant population densities, and many other components of rice yield were already available. These were carefully examined by both researchers and extension workers and presented as a new technology package.

Government support and leadership The AC specified 10 impact points that would comprise the new rice production technology: 1) MV with high yield potential (both exotic and local), 2) proper tillage, 3) correct plant population, 4) correct seedling age, 5) application of FYM, 6) application of chemical fertilizers, 7) proper weeding, 8) proper water management, 9) control of insects and diseases, and 10) minimizing losses.

Different MVs suited to different environments and those appropriate to the specific townships had to be identified. During the time of insurgency, farmers paid less attention to proper tillage and consequently obtained reduced yields because of weed problems.

As to plant population, the traditional method used 150,000 planting hills/ha based on their experience with long growth-duration, photoperiod- sensitive local varieties. Research revealed 300,000 planting hills/ha as optimum, but this was not accepted by farmers. Considering that transplanting charges were paid on an area basis, transplanters objected to higher plant population because it merely involved more work. Transplanters again did not want to use 25- to 30-day-old seedlings simply because they were used to the bigger 40-to 60-day-old seedlings of local varieties.

For the short-duration MVs, these impact points contributed a lot to the achievement of higher yields. Fertilizer application in rice cultivation-quite a new experience for farmers-required that the right type of fertilizer be applied at the right time in the right amount. This impact point generated the least resistance from farmers. Farmyard manure application, though a well-


established practice among farmers, was set aside when chemical fertilizers became available. Farmers thought that with fertilizers, there was no more need for FYM. They did not realize the complementary nature of the two, and it was thus necessary to correct this misinformation.

The impact point for proper weeding was necessitated by improper tillage operations. A properly tilled plot with good water management seldom required weeding. In this perspective, these two impact points were related. Proper drainage and irrigation or keeping an adequate level of water under rainfed rice cultivation was a technique the farmers had learned through the years.

Control of insects and diseases was especially critical in the case of newly introduced MVs that were prone to insect and disease attack when given higher doses of fertilizer.

The last impact point—minimizing losses—was essential as farmers used to delay harvesting (because of labor shortage) without realizing the magnitude of losses incurred. These losses could be substantial, since their judgment of the right harvest time was always 5-10 d off the optimum.

The BSPP and the Farmers’ Assiayones provided the political leadership, while the state agencies assisted in every possible way to successfully implement WTRPP. At the township level, a Township Party Unit provided political leadership, and the Township People’s Council, assisted by AC, supervised WTRPP implementation. Since the members of the Township Party Unit and the People’s Council belonged to the township, they were familiar with the physical, biological, social, and economic milieu of their constituents. They were authorized to coordinate the activities of the various government agencies within the township and make decisions about program implementation. A Township Extension Manager, with his staff of extension workers, took an active role in technology transfer and input distribution. Each VEM supervised 800 ha (or approximately 300 farm families); this compared favorably with the national average of 1500 ha.

Selectivity and concentration On the national scale, agricultural sector investment had increased, but its share relative to the industrial sector remained small. Rather than spread the limited resources equally but thinly, the strategy opted to use all resources in areas where there was high probability of success. Selectivity was applied in terms of locality, rice variety, extension personnel, and management method. Townships with manageable size, reasonably good physical conditions, and accessibility were selected. From the research results, exotic and local rice varieties were selected to suit chosen localities. Selectivity of extension personnel involved choosing young, active, innovative team workers with the right attitude toward the farmers. Other criteria included technical capability, imagination, diligence, and appreciation of the farmer’s life.


Mass participation The new technology had a high labor requirement. However, rural population increased at a faster pace than did area expansion. There was rural underem- ployment because agriculture, being seasonal, demanded more labor at a specific time-more than what the locality could provide. This was especially true of transplanting and harvesting, the two most labor-consuming operations in rice cultivation. The new technology required transplanting of 25- to 30-day-old seedlings at twice the number of planting hills. The high labor requirement was met by voluntary exchange of labor among villages or townships as organized by the People’s Councils. A mass movement involving students and other workers was likewise mobilized. Musicians and dancers were among the volunteer labor who provided entertainment through songs and dances depicting MV cultivation (Fig. 11, 12). Agriculture, being the main sector of the country’s economy, drew the attention of the masses; its progress was everybody’s concern.

Demonstration and competition The strategy encouraged farmers to demonstrate their capability in rice production by competing with each other in such activities as transplanting, harvesting, and maximizing yield. These competitions among farmers and among townships tested their capabilities to the fullest. Township People’s Councils awarded prizes to farmers who excelled in rice production (Fig. 13). The AC provided prizes to townships that gave the best performance in the program.

11. Voluntary labor contribution.


12. Voluntary labor harvesting rice.

Pilot program The old practice of agricultural extension involved technology dissemination achieved by assigning a number of villages (usually 5-7 villages, depending on population density and accessibility) to each VEM. Under the new strategy, collective work under a collective leadership was the rule. Ten to twelve VEMs were grouped together and assigned to an area comprising 50-80 villages. The VEMs were made to stay together at a technology diffusion center, commonly called a “production camp” (Fig. 14). Each production camp had a dormitory

13. Awarding ceremony.


14. Production camp at Hmawbi township.

for the VEMs and a training hall for both VEMs and farmers. The VEMs stayed in production camps and visited their families once a week. Given the responsibility to implement the WTRPP in the area allotted to the camp, they divided the task among themselves by dividing the same area into three or four subareas.

Such a division clearly defined individual responsibilities and group action. The work of the township and production camps was supervised by a main committee and four subcommittees (Agricultural Management, Culti- vation Activities, Procurement and Distribution of Inputs, and Disease and Insect Control). At the township level, the Chairman of the Township People’s Council led the main committee, composed of representatives from the masses, class organizations, and government agencies. He was assisted by the Township Extension Manager. At the production camp level, one executive member of the Township People’s Council led one subcommittee and was assisted by the most senior VEM. The activities of the four subcommittees were organized and coordinated by the main committee.

The Agricultural Management Subcommittee determined resource availability and allocated shares to places where they were most needed. Statistics on labor, cattle, and land were collected by this subcommittee. It also prescribed individual, communal, and governmental action in the detailed planning of the township.

The Cultivation Activities Subcommittee oversaw timely cultivation— from tilling to harvesting and threshing. It advised farmers on such topics as proper tillage, correct seedling age, correct plant population, and correct time


of harvesting. It sought voluntary labor in cases where operations could not be done on time. It was also responsible for the collective purchase of the required implements and other necessary utensils. It coordinated the irrigation and drainage practices of farmers, always the cause of serious disputes. Since draining of water had to be done from field to field, water requirements were often a debatable issue among neighboring farms.

The Procurement and Distribution of Inputs Subcommittee was responsible for the procurement of MV seeds, fertilizers, agrochemicals, and their timely distribution to farmers. To ensure a smooth flow of inputs and to facilitate distribution, it also made arrangements for adequate transportation and storage facilities.

The Disease and Insect Control Subcommittee regularly monitored insects and diseases in the field, more frequently during unfavorable weather. It coordinated implementation of preventive and control measures with the AC pest control squad. Farmers were usually hesitant to kill insects on a massive scale; and only a few kept their own insecticide applicators. They used to wait until insect occurrence had reached epidemic proportions. Insecticide applicators were kept by AC at the production camps, and the pest control squad was mobilized immediately when the situation demanded.

Each production camp kept necessary statistics on rice area, MV planted, cattle population, labor availability, implement and input availability, agrometeorological data, and the area of responsibility covered by the camp (aided by maps, charts, and tables). The rice production targets, the camp's work programs, and achievements to date were also reflected in these tables, along with names of staff manning the camp.

15. Agricultural extension worker at production camp.


Many slogans explaining the objectives and activities of the program were also posted inside the production camps. Translation of these slogans would lead to loss of essence and meaning, but two translations are worth mention- ing—one slogan said “Problems are inconsequential but human power is critical,” and another pointed to the need to “Appreciate and love the dignity of labor.”

Training and meetings conducted frequently at production camps made them busy places. Other government agencies used the camps to carry out their activities (Fig. 15, 16). The MAB, for instance, used the camps to disburse loans, while the Health Department used them to give out vaccines. In some areas, farmers used the training hall of the camp to entertain guests during weddings. Central and division leaders also used the camps in addition to researchers who were reluctant to visit the rural areas and who would rather stay in the camps for a short period. The people found more uses for the production camps than they expected.

Although the cost of constructing a production camp was part of WTRPP expenditure (on a fixed rate by AC), farmers contributed money to make it better than those in other townships. The townships, having one main camp and four to five smaller camps, competed with each other, not only in rice production but also in the magnificence of their buildings.

The new technology with its 10 impact points was first tried in 1975 on 162 ha in Phalon Village, Taikkyi Township, Rangoon Division. It involved 59 farmers. These preproject activities served as a training ground for 41 extension workers. They also served as a means to test the farmers’ attitude toward technological change and also acted as guide to ascertain the kind of compo-

16. Fertilizer distribution at production camp.


nents that a larger project would require. Researchers also participated in the program.

The results were encouraging. The average rice yield in the area rose from 1.9 to 5.1 t/ha. At the beginning of the rice season, about 8% of the farmers in the area rejected the project, while 52% were indifferent. The remaining 40% cooperated and tried the new technology. At the end of the season, the great increase in rice yield softened the attitude of the other farmers. Surprisingly, those who had initially resisted the technology cooperated more eagerly in the second year, serving as the best unpaid extension workers. The preproject work was expanded in 1976—it now covered 18 villages, 1886 ha, and 506 farmers. Again, the average rice yield increased from 2.1 to 4.0 t/ha.

Full-scale program The experience gained during these past two years, together with the administrative support given by AC, put the program into action starting with two townships in 1977-78. The AC supplemented the township staff with agriculture graduates working on a temporary basis—at a rate of 800 ha per VEM. The overworked township staff were thus relieved, and each VEM got a suitable workload. The young VEMs underwent 2 mo of preservice training on various aspects of agricultural planning, implementation, and evaluation, with special reference to the concepts and implementation programs of WTRPP. This helped improve the knowledge and attitude of the young VEMs, who were the main force behind the program. In-service training of existing township staff on topics like MVs, fertilizers, agrochemicals, and plant protection techniques motivated them to work with more confidence. In recognition of these efforts, a number of AC staff were elected to offices at the different levels of Party functionaries and People's Councils.

The first two townships covered by the WTRPP were Shwebo in Upper Burma (38,315 ha) and Taikkyi in Lower Burma (52,662 ha). Results were encouraging. The rice yield in Shwebo went up from 2.4 to 3.1 t/ha, while that in Taikkyi rose from 2.0 to 2.8 t/ha. Rice production in Shwebo was 24% higher than the target; in Taikkyi, it was 28% higher.

In 1978-79, WTRPP expanded, covering 23 townships and involving 850,000 ha. The yield increased from 2.1 to 2.8 t/ha, a 33% increment. Using multiple regression, a production function was estimated to account for the sources of yield increase. About 97% of the yield change could be explained by this regression analysis. Various factors contributed to the yield increase: urea fertilizer application contributed 40%; correct seedling age, 18%; row transplanting, 24%; potash fertilizer application, 14%; and insect control, 1% (Khin Win et a1 1981).

The success of the program attracted many more townships, and it has become widespread since then. The number of townships increased to 43 in 1979-80, 72 in 1980-81 and 1981-82, and 82 in 1982-83. The number remained the same in the following years until the program ended in 1985-86. The


involvement of more townships representing a wide range of rice environments slackened the pace of the program's implementation and called for a critical analysis of the program.

The 82 townships (of a total of 314) presented a wide variation in environments. Rice area coverage under the program constituted 2.6 million ha or 52% of the total area. These townships could be broadly classified into four distinct rice environments. The delta environment included Irrawaddy, Rangoon, and Pegu Divisions; the coastal area included Mon and Arakan States and the Tenasserim Division; the Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magwe Divisions constituted the dry zone environment comprising both irrigated and rainfed areas; and Kachin, Chin, Shan, Kayah, and Karen States formed the northeastern zone environment. The number of WTRPP townships under different environments in different years is shown in Table 47.

The delta environment had 44 townships, which enjoyed good climatic and soil conditions. The coastal environment had 12 townships, while the rainfed dry zone environment had 10. There were 9 townships belonging to the northeastern zone; 7 townships were under the irrigated dry zone. The average rice sown area in this period, 4.8 million ha, was broken down into approximately 2.6 million ha for the delta environment and approximately 0.7 million ha each for the coastal, dry, and northeastern zone environments. The delta environment thus took 56% of the rice area, while the other three environments constituted 14.5% each.

WTRPP was very often misunderstood as a whole township modern variety program. WTRPP did not encourage the whole township to plant MVs. With selectivity and concentration as bases of the whole strategy, MVs were planted only in areas where the growing conditions were right. Some areas still used local varieties (LVs) because these were suited to their specific field conditions; farmers would use a new variety if it could adapt to said conditions. In the WTRPP area, a mixture of MVs and LVs existed, with MVs being

1977-78 1978-79

1980-81 1979-80

1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 198586

1 11 20 40 43 44 44 44 44

1 5

10 12 12 12 12 12

1 4 7 8 9 9 9 9

2 23 43 72 78 82 82 82 82

Table 47. Townships under the program belonging to different rice environments, 1977-85. a

Number of townships under different environments Period

Delta Coastal Irrigated Rainfed North Total dry zone dry zone eastern zone

1

7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7

10 10

7 10 7 10

4 6

a Sources: Annual department reports, Agricultural Corporation.


Table 48. Changes in area planted to modem varieties (MVs) and local varieties (LVs) and their yields under different environments, 1975-85. a

Area (million ha)

Environment 1975 1985 Yield (t/ha)

MV LV MV LV 1975 1985

Delta Coastal Dry zone Northeastern zone

Total

0.25 0.01 0.12

0.38

2.41 0.68 0.71 0.71

4.51

1.70 0.27 0.52 0.17

2.66

0.96 0.42 0.31 0.54

2.23

1.93 1.59 1.75 1.28

3.43 2.71 2.69 2.18

a Sources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years).

dominant. Table 48 shows areas planted to MVs and LVs and their yields under different environments during the program years.

During the period, the area planted to MVs rose from 0.38 million to 2.66 million ha. This occurred mainly in the delta environment, followed by the dry, coastal, and northeastern zones. Likewise, average yield increased from 1.8 to 3.0 t/ha, with an average increase of 1.50 t/ha in the deltas, 1.12 t/ha in the coastal areas, and 0.9 t/ha in the dry and northeastern zones. The bigger area devoted to MVs was mainly responsible for such yield increases.

Fifty-three percent of the rice area nationwide was planted to MVs. On a regional scale, the delta and dry zones grew MVs on 64% of their riceland; the coastal and northeastern zones had MVs in 39 and 24% of their area, respectively. In the delta environment, future MVs must have traits that would be useful in flood-prone and deepwater situations. Though annual rainfall was fairly regular, its erratic distribution and the poor drainage systems often caused flooding. In the dry zone environment, unreliable and scanty rainfall called for drought-resistant MVs. The coastal environment, on the other hand, had the problem of saline intrusion during monsoons and occasional flooding caused by heavy rains and thus needed saline-resistant MVs. Unlike the other environments, the northeastern zone required cold-tolerant MVs.

Many townships wanted to join the WTRPP as they witnessed the benefits enjoyed by program townships—more inputs (especially fertilizers), more assistance from extension people, access to production camps, greater budg- etary allocation, the use of government vehicles, and more attention from higher authorities. Because of the special facilities, the annual rice production target of the townships included in the program was set 10-15% higher than that specified in the national agricultural sector plan. Townships that are not involved in WTRPP tried their best to expand MV area coverage and applied scientific management practices, working very hard to achieve a performance that would facilitate admission to WTRPP. The WTRPP thus motivated townships outside the program. Calculation of average yields prior to the


-

program, without the program (WOP), and with the program (WP) yielded the data shown in Table 49.

Before the program, the average rice yield was approximately 1.7 t/ha, rising to 2 t/ha WOP and 3 t/ha WP. The WTRPP raised the yield by as much as 50%. Since the program area planted both MVs and LVs, WP yield was slightly less than MV yield and WOP yield was slightly higher than LV yield.

As the WTRPP expanded, the selectivity and concentration strategy began to show signs of stress and strain. It became the victim of its own popularity. As time passed, the growth rate slowed down. Table 50 shows the average national and program township yield and production data during the period. As expected, rice yield in the program townships exceeded the national average. But the difference between the two became narrower with time. In the beginning, the program township yielded more than 50% of the national average (2.94 t/ha vs 1.94 t/ha). But after 1981-82, the gap was limited to about 15% (3.63 t/ha vs 3.0 t/ha). This difference remained the same until 1985-86. The national average yield rose from 1.7 t/ha in the beginning of the period to 3.07 t/ha in 1985-86, an increase of more than 70%, which was mainly attributed to the program.

Since rice sown area remained stable during the program period, rice production in the country exhibited the same phenomenon as did rice yield. The share of the program townships, only 3% of national production in the first year of the program, grew to more than 60% in 1981-82. It then stabilized until the program ended. The country's rice production was recorded at approximately 7 million t before the introduction of the program; it increased to more than 14 million t in 1981-82. The production level remained almost constant thereafter.

The effect of the WTRPP was caused principally by technological change that generated a sharp increase in yield and consequently induced higher rice production. Production growth surpassed population growth and revived the declining rice export trade. Technological change in the program revolved around the 10 impact points that were further energized by institutional and

Table 49. Average yield of rice under different environments In program and nonprogram areas, 1977-85. a

Average yield (t/ha) Environment

Prior to the program WOP b WP

Delta Coastal Dry zone Northeastern zone

Av

2.07 1.65 1.77 1.26

1.66

2.46 1.97 2.00 1.90

2.08

3.42 2.94 3.19 2.68

3.06

a Sources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years). b WOP = without program, WP = with program.


Table 50. Average yield and production of rice at the national and program township levels 1977-85. a

Average yield (t/ha) Production (million t) % of township Period to national

National Program National Program production townships townships

1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86

1.94 2.10 2.35 2.77 2.94 3.15 3.07 3.10 3.07

2.94 2.87 3.12 3.40 3.47 3.63 3.52 3.57 3.51

9.31 10.36 10.28 13.11 13.92 14.15 14.29 14.26 14.32

0.27 2.33 3.72 7.40 8.52 8.91 8.68 8.58 8.57

22.5 2.9

36.2 56.4 61.2 63.0 60.7 60.2 54.8

a Sources: For 1977-82 data, SRUB 1984; for 1983-85. SRUB 1987.

social factors. The institutional factors included improved extension services, production camps, farmer and staff trainings, and active involvement of related government agencies. Social factors, on the other hand, involved mass participation, a motivated farmers' group, and strong leadership by the people's representatives. These factors certainly contributed substantially to the success of the program. Data can be analyzed to estimate the contribution of technical, institutional, and social factors that generated the change.

Analysis of the program Data collected during the program years—some coming from township levels, others from production camps, and still others from sample interviews of farmer-participants—allow for an analysis of the changes in rice yield. Using these data, a linear multivariate response function was estimated to account for the sources of contribution to yield. The variables included in the regression analysis for the whole country are shown below with their symbols. (For detailed observations in different years, see Appendices VI and VII.)

Variable Symbol Variable Symbol

Area (%) sown with MV

Area (%) sown with 25- to 30-day-old Row transplanted area (%)

Area (%) sown with 20- x 15-cm spacing lntercultivated area (%) Water management area (%)

Urea applied (kg/ha) Manure applied (t/ha)

Triple superphosphate applied (kg/ha) Muriate of potash applied (kg/ha) Pest-protected area (%) Pest-infested area (%) Total labor used (d/10 ha) Area per extension worker (ha)

seedlings

Number of production camps in the

Number of staff trained during the year Farmers' training (high level) Farmers' training (medium level) Voluntary labor (high level) Voluntary labor (medium level) Rice environment (delta) Rice environment (coastal) Rice environment (irrigated) Rice environment (dry zone) Rainfall relative to normal Program life (yr experience of the

township

workers)


x 1 x 2

x 3 x 3 1

x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 7

1

x 7 11

x 8 x 9 x 10 x 11

x 12

x 13 x 14 x 15 x 16 x 17 x 18 x 19 x 20 x 21 x 22 x 23

Yield in kg/ha was used as the dependent variable, while the other factors listed (X 1 -X 23 ) were hypothesized to affect yield. Using a complete data set from 1977-78 to 1983-84, the equation was estimated with 308 observations collected from 52 townships.

A stepwise regression procedure was used in such a manner that each equation was estimated with progressively larger subsets of independent variables that best explain yield (based on the F test for statistical significance of the coefficient of determination).

Some variables were found to be correlated to a considerable extent. This was not unexpected, as these technical variables, by their very nature under the new technology, were, in fact, closely related. The correlation coefficient between X 3

1 (spacing indicating the plant population) and X 2 (row transplanted area percentage) and also that between X 3

1 and X 3 (seedling age) were high (see Appendix VIII).

In practice, the row transplanting variable served as a prerequisite to achieving correct plant population, while seedling age, on the other hand, determined the number of seedlings per hill and population density as well. Variables X 2 and X 3 were thus taken into the model as explanatory variables for X 3

1 . Such a high correlation coefficient was also observed among fertilizer variables X 7 (urea), X 7

1 (triple superphosphate), and X 7 11 (muriate of potash).

Thus, X 7 was chosen as the main variable to represent all fertilizer variables. The information obtained about farmers’ training, voluntary labor, and

rice environment had high variability, and the returns were graded as low, medium, and high, respectively.

Area % sown with MV Area % sown with 25 to 30-d-old seedlings Pest-protected area (%) Total labor use (d/10 ha) Number of production camps in townships Farmers’ training (high level) Farmers’ training (medium level) Rice environment (delta) Rice environment (coastal) Rainfall relative to normal Program life

Constant (kg/ha) R 2 value Standard error

9.33**** 3.16*** 2.09*** 0.61***

28.38*** 196.12*** 134.35** 594.55**** 601.78**** 612.27**** 259.84**** 179.71

0.73 358.39

Table 51. Regression coefficients of 11 statistically significant variables using data obtained from 52 townships.

Independent variable Symbol Coefficient a

X 1 X 3 X 8 X 10 X 12 X 14 X 15 X 16 X 19 X 22 X 23

a **** = significant at the 0.1% level, *** = significant at the 1% level, and ** = significant at the 5% level.


Results of analysis Of the variables used, 11 contributed significantly to yield (Table 51). The regression coefficients of 11 statistically significant variables at the 0.1, 1, and 5% levels are shown with a 73% coefficient of determination. The results indicate that yield per hectare was contributed mainly by the following variables:

Area sown with MV Area sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlings Pest-protected area Total labor use Number of production camps in the township Farmers’ training Rice environment (delta and coastal) Rainfall relative to normal Program life

X 1 (area % with MV) provided a coefficient of 9.33; this figure would include the fertilizer effect, which could not be estimated separately by the equation. Likewise, X 3 (area sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlings) and X 8 (pest- protected area) contributed to rice yield. Variable X 10 (total labor use) was also significant, but it yielded a small coefficient. Extension variables like X 10 , X 14 , and X 15 also contributed to the higher rice yield. As to rice environment, the importance of the delta and coastal areas was reflected in the size of the contribution they made to achieve higher rice yield. The equation pointed to the important environments and dominant factors that had substantial impacts on the success of the program. The significance shown by program life (variable X 23 ) underscored the need for management efficiency and motivation of People's Council members and other administrative bodies for successful technology transfer. Variable X 22 (rainfall relative to normal) showed a signifi-

Table 52. Yield differences during the program years.

Variable

Increase due to the program

Symbol kg/ha %

Area % sown with MV Area % sown with correct seedling age Pest-protected area (%) Increase in labor use Number of production camps in townships Farmers' training Rainfall relative to normal Program life Yield increase explained by the model Actual yield increase

X 1 X 3 X 8 X 1 0 X 12 X 14 , X 15 X 22 X 23

260 39 20 73 45 20 37

271 7 75 7 19

36 5 3

10 6 3 5

39 109 100


cant impact on yield. (The average rainfall during the program period was 1.26 with a standard variation of 0.70.)

With these 11 yield-contributing variables, yield changes resulting from the new technology were calculated following the method used by Herdt and Mandac (1979). As shown in Table 52, two variables—program life and area sown with MV—contributed a major portion (75%) of the yield increase. The other factors contributed the remaining 25%, each around 5% of the yield change.

Further analysis With data collected from production camps, the factors that contributed to yield under different rice environments were analyzed following the same multivariate regression analysis. Factors affecting the yield would be different due to the diverse physical, social, and economic conditions in these environments. The independent variables used in the analysis are listed below. The set of variables used was the same as that used in the national model, but some data (e.g., rainfall, labor use, and pest infestation) were not obtained from production camps. To represent weather conditions indirectly, harvested area (%) was taken as one variable in the analysis.

Variable Symbol

Area (%) sown with MV Row transplanted area (%) Area (%) sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlings Area (%) sown with 20- x 15-cm spacing lntercultivated area (%) Water management area (%) Manure applied (t/ha) Urea applied (kg/ha) Triple superphosphate applied (kg/ha) Muriate of potash applied (kg/ha) Pest-protected area (%) Area per extension worker (ha) Number of staff trained during the year Farmers’ training (high level) Farmers’ training (medium level) Voluntary labor (high level) Voluntary labor (medium level) Program life Harvested area (%) Yield (t/ha)

X 1 X 2 X 3 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 7 X 7 X 8 X 11 X 13

X 15 X 16 X 17 X 23 X 24

X 14

Y

Yield was used as a dependent variable, while independent variables X 1 - X 24 were hypothesized to affect yield.


1

1 11

Of the 19 variables used, 11 were statistically significant in the delta environment, 5 in the coastal, 11 in the dry zone rainfed, 3 in the dry zone irrigated, and 8 in the northeastern zone (Table 53).

As expected, variables that contributed to yield varied in different environments: 11 variables (with 1 carrying a negative sign) were found to have contributed to yield in the delta zone; 5 variables (2 positive and 3 negative) represented the coastal environment; 11 variables (7 positive and 4 negative), the dry zone rainfed and irrigated conditions; and 8 variables (2 negative), the northeastern zone. As a whole, the analysis differed from the national model, signifying that factors responsible for yield change in different environments varied widely. However, such variables as X 1 (area sown with MV) and X 23 (program life) had varying degrees of response but had the same effect under almost all conditions.

Table 53 shows that for the delta environment, 11 variables were statistically significant (7 variables at the 0.1% level, 1 variable at the 1% level, and 3

Table 53. Regression coefficients of variables calculated from data obtained from production camps representing different environments. a

Dry North- Variable Symbol Delta Coastal zone Irrigated eastern

rainfed zone

16.09*** ns ns

X 1 X 2 X 3

X 4 X 5

X 7

X 6

X 8

X 13

X 14

X 15

X 16 X 17

X 23 X 24

6.57***

6.36*** ns

10.69*** –4.76* 6.99**

ns ns ns

Area % sown with MV Row transplanted area (%) Area % sown with 25 to

30-d-old seedlings lntercultivated area (%) Water management area

Manure applied (t/ha) Urea applied (kg/ha) Pest-protected area (%) Area per extension worker

Number of staff trained during the year

Farmers' training (high level)

Farmers' training (medium level)

Voluntary labor (high level) Voluntary labor

(medium level) Program life Harvested area (%)

(%)

(ha)

Constant (kg/ha) R2 value Standard error

4.46*** 8.06*** 5.63**

ns ns

7.72* ns

ns ns

ns ns

5.44** ns

97.58*** 4.26*** 4.15***

–0.13*

97.10** 3.94*

-0.30*** ns

ns

ns ns

5.92* ns ns

ns –64.29**

–1.59**

0.19*

ns

ns

1.71* –17.49* –10.90* ns ns

379.56*** –611.40*** ns ns ns

249.44** ns 449.13*** 243.73* ns

119.27* ns

ns ns –341.57**

ns ns ns

375.08*** ns

465.16* ns

1,113.55 0.85

260.98

231.74

2,484.70 0.76

199.75

ns 582.80*** ns

ns ns 1,758.63 2,017.75

0.81 0.86 150.42 272.24

a *** = significant at .1% level. ** = significant at 1% level. * = significant at 5% level. ns = not significant.

–312.33** 7.21**

1,448.79 0.53

450.93


X 11

variables at the 5% level) with an 85% coefficient of determination. The yield in the deltas was contributed mainly by:

area sown with MV, area sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlings, manure and chemical fertilizer applied, pest-protected area, training of staff and farmers, voluntary labor, and experience accumulated through program life.

Area per extension worker (X 11 ) showed a negative sign. The delta had a mean value of 1603 ha per extension worker—a relatively large ratio for effective technology transfer. As in the national model, MV, seedling age, plant protection, training, voluntary labor, and program life had a positive influence on yield. The analysis pointed out that proper management of these factors was important in raising yield. It was also apparent that as area for MV expanded, training of extension staff and farmers became more crucial.

The factors that contributed to rice yield in the coastal environment were area sown with MV and experience during the program period. In view of the high rainfall in this area, the other variables remained less important as far as contribution to yield was concerned. Variable X 8 (% pest-protected area) in the zone meant a pest-infested area of 1-2%, which was well below the average level of 10% in other zones. Being equivalent to a pest-infested area, it showed a negative sign. Training of extension staff and farmers did not contribute to yield; they even had a negative effect. This can be explained, perhaps, by the fact that during the training period, the extension staff were away from their duty stations and the farmers were away from their fields. Transportation problems in the coastal regions resulted in longer periods of absence from the field. Under such a situation, the training curriculum and course duration must be carefully considered.

The factors that contributed to rice yield in the dry zone environment were more inconsistent, especially under the dry zone rainfed condition. Under this condition, 11 variables significantly contributed to yield; but 7 variables carried positive signs and 4 had negative signs, with a 53% coefficient of determination. The seven variables with positive sign—X 1 , X 3 , X 4 , X 6 , X 7 , X 15 , and X 24 —followed the same pattern and exhibited the same phenomenon as did the variables in the delta environment. An exception was X 4 , which was significant only under the dry zone condition. Intercultivation in this environment led to weeding and changing the soil physical condition, and constituted an important impact point on which to raise yield. Controlling weeds by flooding was not possible under the limited-rainfall Condition. A better explanation is needed for variables that carried a negative sign—X 2 , X 11 , X 17 , and X 23 .

Rice production in this region fell short of demand, and deficit forced farmers to use marginal areas. The production of rice was so dependent on


weather that it influenced rice production more than technological factors did. This was the only environment where the variable X 23 (program life) had a negative sign. With the pervading weather adversity in this environment, rice yield started to decline in the later part of the program period, resulting in the negative effects of X 17 and X 23 . As to X 11 (area per extension worker), the dry zone rainfed had a mean value of 710 ha, which was considered large under the existing infrastructure. Negative X 2 (row transplanted area %) was also pre- sumed to be weather-related. This environment has to be studied more carefully before final program plans are made. Unless a breakthrough in research to contain adverse conditions is achieved (through new MVs or new technology), continuation of the WTRPP in this area is not recommended.

Unlike the rainfed dry zone environment, the dry zone irrigated environment had only 3 significant variables with an 81% coefficient of determination. Intercultivation was again an important impact point, underscoring the importance of weeding under the dry zone environment. Two other variables—X 7 (urea fertilizer application) and X 23 (program experience)- brought about change in rice yield. Other variables showed no significant change like area sown to MV (this variable previously exhibited an effect in other environments). This is probably because the dry zone irrigated environment had already reached the maximum level of MV production, and further increases would have necessitated introduction of newer techniques. In the meantime, intercultivation, urea application, and improvement in management efficiency should be done to further induce yield.

The northeastern environment was slow in adopting the new technology due to lack of accessibility and the very favorable man-to-land ratio. There were fewer infrastructure facilities and less population pressure. However, as the population began to increase, Shan and Karen States became rice-deficit areas and relied on other divisions for supply. Moreover, most areas were situated on hills and in valleys, representing a completely different environment. The results in the table indicate that eight variables were statistically significant (86% coefficient of determination), with two variables having a negative sign. The factors that positively influenced yield per hectare were:

area sown with MV, row transplanted area, area sown with 25- to 30-day-old-seedlings, area per extension worker, farmers’ training, and voluntary labor contribution.

These variables were expected to have an impact on yield in an environment relatively slow in adopting new technology. The reasons given for other environments still hold. In most environments, the MVs should possess cold tolerance. The existing area sown to MVs included irrigated rice and varieties cultivated early to escape the cold spell. Such a practice was not possible in all


places. Areas with late rainfall had to rely on traditional varieties that were known to tolerate low temperatures. Many areas used upland rice cultivation because of the hilly nature and physical conditions of the sites.

Two variables with negative signs were X 7 (urea application) and X 13 (staff training). One would not expect fertilizer to have a negative effect on rice yield. But it appeared that fertilizer availability became limited in the final phase of the program when demand far exceeded supply. A closer look at the fertilizer supply in the area revealed a decrease from 100 kg/ha before 1980 to 75 kg/ ha as the program expanded in other areas. Though the effect of X 7 continuously decreased during the program years, other factors such as X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , and X 15 had a positive influence; all combined had a positive effect on yield and offset the possible loss due to the lower rate of fertilizer use. This resulted in a gradual yield increase in this area. The negative sign in X 13 (the number of staff trained during the year) indicated that the extension workers in the coastal areas should not be away too long from their duty stations.

Altogether, the independent variables chosen for the analysis indicated a strong impact on rice yield—many with positive and a few with negative effects. These variables differed in the magnitude of their effects in different environments. The most important variable that greatly contributed to yield change was area sown with MVs. Undoubtedly, the effect due to MVs included the effect due to fertilizers since they could not be estimated separately.

Another variable that substantially contributed to change in rice yield was program life. This meant that the rich experience gained by extension personnel was quite instrumental in affecting yield. This finding emphasizes the importance of management efficiency and of motivating responsible administrators in effective technology transfer.

The results also yielded information that may be useful in mapping future research and extension strategies in different regions of the country. These results, if examined in the light of the level of adoption of the independent variables, would certainly reveal gaps that have to be filled in future programs. Inasmuch as rice production was mainly rainfed, weather consciousness would remain an important factor. A technological approach in consonance with weather behavior would maximize effects. Table 54 indicates the present level of technological adoption of the various variables used in this analysis. It shows the potential of each variable with the existing technology under different environments.

Adoption of various technologies varied with environment (Table 54). The reasons for nonadoption could be 1) farmers were not properly convinced of their usefulness, and 2) that the technology was simply not suitable to their situation.

The most important variable, use of MVs, played a central role in the adoption process. It required the use of manure and fertilizers along with correct seedling age and correct plant population.


Table 54. Present level of technological adoption under different environments (1984).

Mean value in different environments

Symbol Delta Coastal Dry zone Dry zone North- rainfed Irrigated eastern

Variable

Area % sown with MV Row transplanted area (%) Area % sown with correct seedling age Area % sown with 20- x 15-cm spacing lntercultivated area (%) Water management area (%) Manure applied (t/ha) Urea applied (kg/ha) TSP a applied (kg/ha) MOP b applied (kg/ha) Pest-protected area % Area per extension worker (ha) No. of staff trained during the year Farmers’ training (high level) Farmers’ training (medium level) Voluntary labor (high level) Voluntary labor (medium level) Program life Harvested area % (weather) Rice yield (t/ha)

67.3 83.2 56.9 77.3 56.7 58.3

1.9 65.1 23.0 17.1 34.9

1,063 16

0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 2.1

98.3 3.84

59.5 19.6 65.4 66.4

0.8 0.8 0.8

47.5 17.0

5.0

806 2.9

6 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.4 2.0

99.4 3.43

95.1 74.4 78.5 90.5 38.5 73.7

3.2 101.5

43.6 5.7

79.8 710 11

0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 2.7

83.4 3.02

96.5 99.5 62.9 89.5 63.2 90.7

2.5 95.6 55.5

7.8 37.9

373 11

0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 2.7

88.1 4.48

25.1 57.5 38.3 71.2 36.5 38.6

0.6 76.3 25.7

5.1 6.6

581 5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 2.0

96.0 3.19

a TSP = Triple superphosphate. b MOP = muriate of potash.

Area planted to MVs rose from 10 to about 53% during the program years. This increase in area resulted in a greater demand for chemical fertilizers. Since urea constituted the bulk of fertilizers used, its availability and use in the program area reflected MV expansion.

The higher rice yields and production resulted from two essential aspects of the WTRPP-technology development and technology transfer. The func- tional steps involved in technology development and transfer are shown in Figure 10. The system is so designed that research results are first examined (in terms of soundness and location adaptability) before a technical message is formulated. The development of the message involves researchers, extension workers, administration personnel, and farmers alike (Fig. 10).

Production camps played an important role in the proper functioning of the WTRPP. The camps brought about a closer relationship between extension workers and farmers. Usually, an extension worker would spend most of his time in the office, waiting for farmers to consult him. But it did not happen that way. Farmers rarely visited the extension office for two reasons. First, they assumed that these offices offered trouble rather than benefits. And, having identified these offices with courts, they tried their best to avoid them. The second reason is even more discouraging. They believed that the extension staff would not be able to solve their problems as the technicians were


X 1 X 2 X 3 X 3

1

X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 7

1

X 7 11

X 8 X 11 X 13 X 14 X 15 X 16 X 17 X 23 X 24 Y

“ignorant” of farm conditions. Farmers were simply too busy to visit the extension office, especially when the outcome was uncertain.

Farmers themselves realized that MVs occupied a central position in the WTRPP. They organized and improved their capabilities to adopt MVs. But MVs required more care and investment and involved more risks and labor. Moreover, farmers needed to gain access to required inputs and extension services. The introduction of production camps in the existing extension setup proved appropriate. Production camps right in the middle of ricefields contributed to effective dissemination of agricultural information.

Having been provided with technology and the appropriate institutional and infrastructure support, the Burmese farmers could no longer be considered resistant to change. They were as responsive as anyone could expect in any society. The program’s success could thus be attributed to the inclusion of production camps in the WTRPP.

Another factor that indirectly contributed to the WTRPP was the competition component. Farmers in the program townships were encouraged to compete with each other in such activities as transplanting and harvesting, and in achieving the highest yield. The objective was to increase the efficiency in these labor- and time-limiting operations. The criteria used in the evaluation included not only speed in operation but also accuracy and exact methodical finish in line with the given impact points.

Competition among villages or townships led to greater efficiency in these operations. For example, row planting was usually done with the aid of guide strings. After gaining experience, the farm hands were able to transplant in rows accurately without using guide strings. The competition was much keener in the yield contests. Fields not smaller than 0.4 ha (1 acre) would be nominated and included in the contest at harvest time; authorities from other townships would do the harvesting to avoid bias. The first prize was usually given to farmers who produced more than 9 t/ha. In addition, AC awarded prizes to farmers who produced more than 5 t/ha (this was three times the national average yield at that time). During the first year of the program, 1599 farmers won prizes. In the second year, the number of winners increased almost tenfold. Later, the limit was raised to 7.5 t/ha, and many were still able to reach it. The AC finally decided to award prizes not to the individuals but to the township as a whole. Performance was evaluated in terms of yield target, percentage of harvested area, and continuous achievement for the past 3 yr; this would be a measure of the growth rate of the township.

When prizes were awarded to individuals, it was found that most winners came from favorable areas having fertile soils, good drainage, and very rare weather disturbances. In addition, the farmers who won possessed the necessary drive and initiative.

Sixty-four percent of the winners belonged to the delta environment; 24%, dry irrigated; 9%, coastal; 2%, northeastern; and 1%, dry zone rainfed. As to the


size of holdings, 40% of the prize winners had 3-4 ha, about 30% worked in farms less than 2 ha, and another 30% cultivated more than 5 ha. This observation turned out to be contrary to expectation. It was originally thought that farmers with small landholdings had better chances of winning, since these were more manageable than larger farms. And as for age, 61% of the prize winners were old (more than 50 yr), while only 39% were young. With respect to magnitude of yield, 8% won by producing more than 9 t/ha; 92% had yields between 7 and 9 t/ha. These observations point to the possibility of the present technology achieving yields of 7 t/ha with good management and favorable environments.

Evaluation of the program The successful implementation of the WTRPP created a definite impact on the economic and social life of the population. Economic progress could be measured by the increased value of production of the country and also that of the agricultural sector during the program years. Since the agricultural sector constituted a major sector of the country's economy, and since crop production was the main subsector in the agricultural sector (with rice as principal crop), the value of production of the crop subsector, the agricultural sector, and the total sector would provide a good indicator of the economic impact of the program.

Table 55 shows the value of production of the said sectors and subsectors from 1961 to 1986. The crop production subsector accounted for more than 70% of the agricultural sector share, representing more than 40% in the total value of all sectors. The annual increase in value of the crop subsector was due mainly to rice. The agricultural sector’s annual growth rate of 3-5% during the

Table 55. Value of production of the agricultural sector at 1969-70 base price (million kyats), 1961-85. a

Agricultural sector Year Total % of

total crop sectors sector Crop Livestock Forestry Sector % all agricultural

and fishery

1961-62 1969-70 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86

2,510.9 3,276.3 4,081.0 4,346.0 4,515.8 5,059.7 5,500.3 5,805.2 6,089.8 6,302.1 6,466.7

565.9 945.9

1,152.1 1,220.0 1,298.7 1,414.6 1,506.1 1,550.5 1,658.4 1,819.5 1,854.8

341.8 398.5 446.5 511.3 521.3 530.9 560.3 582.5 573.4 612.4 635.7

3,418.6 4,620.7 5,679.6 6,077.8 6,335.8 7,005.2 7,566.7 7,938.2 8,321.6 8,374.0 8,957.2

73 71 72 72 71 72 73 73 73 75 72

8,617.7 11,009.2 13,281.2 14,072.5 14,765.5 16,155.6 17,347.0 18,289.2 19,085.2 20,270.7 20,831.2

40 42 43 43 43 43 44 43 44 41 43

a Sources: For 1961-62. 196470, and 1977-80 data, SRUB 1984; for 1981-85, SRUB 1987.


preprogram years increased to about 10% in 1980; it then declined slowly to 7% in 1981, 5% in 1982, 4% in 1983, 6% in 1984, and 3% in 1985. The value of the crop subsector—2.5 billion kyats in 1961—rose to 6.5 billion kyats in 1985, an increase of more than 100%. The rate of increase was especially rapid during the WTRPP years.

These data clearly reflected the effect of the program on the country’s economy at the national level. At the divisional level, the effect of the program differed with environment. Calculation of average production and additional costs under different environments resulted in various benefit-cost (B/C) ratios (Table 56).

Economic returns due to the new technology were reasonably attractive for all environments except the dry zone rainfed (Table 56). Operations in the delta, coastal, and dry zone irrigated areas resulted in a profit of 280 kyats/ha, while the northeastern zone obtained 170 kyats. There was a B/C value of 2 for the 3 environments while the northeastern zone obtained a value of only 1.7. Although the northeastern zone enjoyed less profit and a lower B/C, the prospects of the new technology could still be considered encouraging. The dry zone rainfed did not respond well to the existing technology, indicating the need for a new technology appropriate to the location. The profits and B/C ratios would change with the changing prices of rice and inputs, both of which are presently fixed and controlled. The price of rice did not reflect the international market price or the cost of production, because major inputs like fertilizers were heavily subsidized. The recent decontrol of the rice trade would influence the profit and B/C which could very well have an impact on the adoption of new technology.

On a national scale, the benefits needed no special explanation, but benefits to individual farmers were often questioned. It is true that the new technology demanded higher labor and inputs than did traditional practices, but the higher returns fully compensated for the additional cost, leaving a reasonable profit margin. The cost and return analysis for new and traditional technologies indicated favorable returns with the new technology. The average cost of production before the program amounted to 816.15 kyats/ha (119.62 kyats/ha were input costs and 696.53 kyats/ha were other costs). The

Table 56. Average additional yield and cost under different environments, 1983.

Increased Production Additional

Environment production of rice cost before cost Net B/C the program (kyats/ha) benefit

t/ha kyats/ha (kyats/ha)

Delta 1.28 552 783 273 279 2.02 Coastal 1.32 569 755 290 279 1.96 Dry zone irrigated 1.19 513 1003 239 274 2.15 Dry zone rainfed 0.59 254 785 240 14 1.06 Northeastern zone 0.92 397 1050 228 169 1.74


average yield at that time was 2.20 t/ha (984.08 kyats/ha), leaving a profit of 167.93 kyats/ha. The average production cost increased to 1140 kyats/ha after the program, requiring an additional cost of 323.85 kyats/ha. This cost included 190.71 kyats/ha for inputs and 949.29 kyats/ha for other costs. Since the average yield was 3.52 t/ha with a value of 1517.37 kyats, the profit amounted to 377.37 kyats/ha. This figure compared favorably with 167.93 kyats/ha profit obtained using traditional practices.

These cost and return figures agreed closely with the figures computed by Jayasuriya (1984) for 1980-81. He obtained a profit of 142 and 377 kyats/ha for traditional and new technology, respectively (Table 57).

The new technology required more expenditures than did traditional practices, but returns from it were higher. Jayasuriya (1984) found that the average cost of the new technology was 1152 kyats/ha as against 804 kyats/ ha for the traditional practice. The new technology obtained a yield of 3556 kg/ ha and achieved a gross return of 1529 kyats/ha; the traditional practice had a yield of 2200 kg/ha and a gross return of 946 kyats/ha. The profit from using the new technology was computed to be 377 kyats/ha as against 142 kyats/ha from using traditional practice. These calculations include total labor costs (both family and hired labor). An average family generally provided 65% of

Table 57. Costs and returns of rice production (kyats/ha) using traditional and new technologies, 1981 (Jayasuriya 1984).

Particular Traditional technology New technology

costs Material cost

Seeds Fertilizer Manure Pesticide

Subtotal

Land preparation Uprooting of seedlings and

transplanting Weeding Crop maintenance Harvesting and threshing

Labor cost

Subtotal

Animal hired labor Total cost

Returns Average yield (kg/ha) Gross returns (kyats/ha) Gross margin (kyats/ha)

30 20 26 1

77

218 150

16 32

167

583

145 805

2200 946 142

44 76 67 7

194

273 183

30 89

201

776

182 1152

3556 1529

377


the labor requirement from the household, while only 35% constituted hired labor. The profit had to be added to the earnings of family labor to estimate family income.

The social impact of the program would be hard to determine quantitatively, but many have concluded that the WTRPP changed the social conditions of the population. The farmers were recognized for their part in rebuilding the country's economy. For the first time, they were given an important role in the community and their services received public appreciation.

Multiplier effect The effect of WTRPP extended beyond the farmer population. In a country like Burma where the majority of the people directly or indirectly relied on agriculture, any progress achieved in the production of a major crop in the country had a definite impact. The success of the program at the township level had a great influence on the whole population, as income generated from the higher rice production was used to buy more goods and services in the same township.

This multiplier effect of the WTRPP was clearly demonstrated in a survey done in Okpo, a township 177 km north of Rangoon, which joined the program in 1978-79. The survey used data from four agencies operated by the State—the Okpo Railway Station of the Burma Railway Corporation, the Okpo Small Loan Department of the Burma Economic Bank, the Okpo Liquor Shop of the Restaurant and Beverage Trade Corporation, and the Okpo Police Station. In addition, data were also collected from private, medium-sized businesses.

Table 58 shows the average monthly income of the Okpo Railway Station for a 4-yr period, starting the year before the township joined the WTRPP. As rice production increased, the people earned more and became more mobile. There was no increase in frequency of rail services. The higher income of the railway station was due to the influx of more people traveling by train. The data showed that the average monthly income of the railway station increased nearly 300%. Farmers usually visited Rangoon and other places after the rice harvest.

Table 58. Monthly income of the Okpo Railway Station, 1978-81. a

Period Monthly income (kyats)

Lowest Highest Average

1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81

8,730 10,377 20,500 26,586

17,915 21,109 35,900 39,802

12,144 14,762 27,567 32,190



Table 59. Monthly transactions of the Okpo Small Loan Department, 1978-81. a

Number of customers Amount of money loaned (kyats)

Lowest Highest Average Lowest Highest Average Period

1978-79 1979-80 1980-81

301 136 168

803 604 289

596 357 208

56,240 22,555 30,545

99,795 98,725 45,985

83,300 62,100 39,420

a Sources: Department reports. Agricultural Corporation (various yeras).

Table 59 shows monthly transactions of the Small Loan Department of the Okpo township going down to half their usual volume in the 2 yr that WTRPP became successful. The number of customers also diminished, indicating that private moneylenders also suffered the same fate. There was less volume of business as the income of the rural masses increased. (The Small Loan De- partment needed surety, while the private moneylenders transacted loans based on personal connection, without surety, but at higher interest rates.) There was a substantial reduction of the private moneylending business, which, in the first place, was not officially allowed.

Statistics were also taken from the Restaurant and Beverage Trade Corpo- ration, a government agency that operated in Okpo. Sale of liquors by the corporation increased appreciably after the program. Table 60 shows the corporation’s sale proceeds for 3 yr. Liquor sales increased by 60%. It was common practice for many farmers to enjoy liquor after selling their rice. It is safe to assume that many illegal liquor shops operated by private traders also had increased sales.

A survey taken of private businesses like restaurants, general stores, tailors, tricycle operators, pony cart operators, and passenger and freight buses clearly showed higher returns from their businesses after the program. Moreover, police officials reported that the crime rate in the township had been drastically reduced. The WTRPP definitely had a positive influence on the economic and social conditions of the townships involved in the program.

The survey enumerators also looked into how farmers with large holdings and who enjoyed good harvests spent their additional income. Their findings pointed to four distinct groups of farmers: the first group used their newly found wealth to repay loans; the second group bought or changed cattle; the third group bought sewing machines, radios, cassettes, bicycles, or gold; and

Table 60. Monthly sale proceeds of liquor (kyats), 1978-81. a

Period Lowest Highest Average

52,956 74,128 61,313

1978-79 1979-80 1980-81

25,819 40,339 50,242

34,044 52,558 55,810



the fourth group, exercising a common Burmese belief, offered alms to ensure a better future.

Irrigation Water is a major constraint in Burmese agriculture. Unlike the previous two periods, when irrigation work remained almost static, this period witnessed a substantial increase in irrigation facilities. The government invested large sums of money in irrigation work—constructing new dams, improving embankments and drainage, and repairing and maintaining the existing networks.

During the same period, three large irrigation dams were constructed, one in Pegu Division using the country’s own resources and two in Mandalay Division supported by World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans. The latter two are multipurpose dams with a capacity for irrigating 0.12 million ha. In addition to these large irrigation dams, there were four other small constructions.

Farmers also constructed small-village diversion weirs on seasonal and perennial streams on a communal basis. The government financed one-third of the expenditures on these constructions. Flood protection and drainage improvement works were necessary in high-rainfall areas in Lower Burma, where rice dominated other crops. Such projects in Lower Burma, with assistance from the World Bank, made more land suitable for MV expansion.

Irrigation with lift pumps was also extended in Lower Burma, using water from small creeks and rivers that crisscross the delta. A tube-well irrigation project was also initiated in the Sagaing Division with the World Bank loan.

New irrigation work took time to construct. Furthermore, a longer period was required to convince the farmers to change from rainfed to irrigated systems. There was, therefore, a time lag before any irrigation project could yield any substantial benefit.

Cotton in Upper Burma and jute in Lower Burma enjoyed the new irrigation facilities and satisfied the growing demand of the newly built textile and jute mills. They played a relatively minor role in the drive for increased rice production. The resulting rice production growth came mainly from the shift to MVs, the use of fertilizers, and the implementation of the extension strategy.

The expansion of irrigation facilities during the period is reflected in Table 61. The irrigated area of 569,000 ha in 1961 increased to more than 1 million ha in 1985. Area under irrigated rice also nearly doubled—from about 0.5 million to nearly 1 million ha—while area devoted to other crops (especially industrial crops) rose almost fourfold. In the beginning of the period, rice enjoyed a more than 80% share in irrigation facilities, but this was reduced to about 70% in 1985.


Table 61. Irrigated areas for rice, 1961-85. a

lrrigated area b

Year Net % % share sown area Rice Other Total irrigated of rice

crops

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

7162 7690 7968 7941 7900 7798 7695 7795 7778 7896 7962 7884 8064 8103 8130 8028 8110 8251 8057 8317 8413 8230 8270 8359 8372

472 499 663 683 633 663 691 741 722 736 752 732 826 872 875 832 857 896 832 873 865 805 839 861 858

97 126 162 167 180 176 177 177 205 210 259 281 272 249 253 241 260 303 292 321 319 352 369 419 376

569 625 825 850 813 839 868 918 927 946

1011 1013 1098 1121 1128 1073 1117 1199 1124 1194 1184 1157 1208 1280 1234

8 8

10 11 10 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 14 13 14 15 14 14 14 14 15 15 15

83 80 80 80 78 79 80 81 78 78 74 72 75 78 78 78 77 75 74 73 73 70 69 67 70

a Sources: For 1961-67 data, RGUB 1970; for 1968-73, SRUE 1974; for 1974-78, SRUE 1979; for 1979-82, SRUB 1984; and for 1983-85, SRUB 1987. b lrrigated area includes double-cropped area.

Crop cultivation in irrigated areas received supplementary water and so during years of scanty rainfall the effect of irrigation was more pronounced. The contribution of irrigation to the rice production program was minimal, but MV area expansion was beneficial only in the irrigated areas in Upper Burma. It also enhanced cropping intensity.

Mechanization The government organized the Agricultural Mechanization Department (AMD) to introduce mechanization to Burmese agriculture. It bought more tractors to supplement draft animals. But AMD played a limited role and provided tractors only for tillage operations. There was practically no mechanization in the other aspects of production.

Tractors proved more useful in the dry upland zone than in the small ricefields. But with the expansion of MVs, farmers cultivated a second crop after rice, utilizing the residual soil moisture. The draft animals were completely


exhausted after one season of rice cultivation and were not able to carry out tillage operations for the second crop. Tractors served well under these situations when tillage operations had to be done in a limited time before loss of soil moisture (Fig. 17). Farmers used AMD tractors for tillage, and the draft animals were harnessed only in the final operations.

This system helped relieve the burden on draft cattle to a great extent. Tractor-operated tillage involved plowing and harrowing. AMD gave the machines to farmers at a subsidized rate, but fuel, spare parts, and repair and maintenance costs inhibited their extensive use. Table 62 shows tillage operations undertaken by tractors in selected years.

AMD reported work in acre-turn which means a tractor plowing or harrowing on one acre. Farmers used tractors for one plowing or one harrowing or, at times, two harrowings, depending on the soil's physical conditions and the crops to be cultivated. There is no way to calculate the area covered by the tractors, but it may be assumed that every farmer paid for one tractor run only. (AMD converted acre-turn to hectare-turn to indicate area coverage mentioned in Table 62.) Evidently, the data are overestimated in view of the usual practice of employing one tractor plowing followed by one harrowing, which would record two instead of one hectare-turn. But even with these data, the area coverage of 2% in 1962 increased to only 9% in 1985. Actual area coverage may have been in the range of half a million ha or around 5% of the net sown area in 1985.

Though coverage was not impressive, the work done by the tractors substantially reduced the load factor of draft animals. Furthermore, tillage operations were done in a short time before great loss of soil moisture. Tractors thus indirectly contributed to the rice production program by providing an opportunity to exploit the short growth duration characteristics of MVs. Farmers appreciated the utility of tractors; demand always exceeded supply

17. Tractor tillage operation for second crop.


Table 62. Tillage operation by tractors in selected years, 1962-85. a

Net Areas under % Year sown area tractor-operated

(000 ha) tillage b (000 ha) area

coverage

1962 1974 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

7690 8103 8057 8317 8413 8230 8270 8359 8372

145 305 603 689 783 773 704 739 769

2 4 8 8 9 9 9 9 9

a Sources: For 1962-74 data, SRUB 1977; for 1979-81, SRUB 1984; for 1982-85, SRUB 1987. b Acre-turn converted to hectare-turn.

because of the limited number of tractors, compounded by repair and maintenance problems. Although tractor-operated tillage was particularly popular for the dry zone crops in Upper Burma (Fig. 17), its contribution in Lower Burma, though minimal, greatly enhanced cropping intensity when used with short growth duration MVs.

Cropping intensity The turn of events during this period resulted in higher cropping intensity. The agricultural sector plan emphasized double cropping wherever possible. The most notable events that helped increase cropping intensity were 1) expansion of MVs with short growth duration; 2) increased tractor tillage facilities; 3) higher prices of crops, especially edible oil-bearing crops; and 4) farmer's ability to invest the extra income earned from the higher rice yield.

The role of MVs in promoting higher cropping intensity was often over- looked. Farmers timed the sowing of MVs so they could harvest in late October or early November, immediately after the monsoon. Enough moisture would then be left in the soil to sustain the second crop. Double cropping was both labor- and management-intensive. Rice in the field was quickly harvested and piled on the threshing floor while land preparation for the second crop was promptly being undertaken. Tractor tillage operation could be found in many places, but in some areas, farmers used a new pair of draft animal to do the work.

If AMD could provide rice threshers and dryers, cropping intensity might increase even more. The prices of crops—especially edible oil-bearing crops like groundnut, sesamum, or sunflower—had risen, making double cropping very profitable. In places where there was low waterholding capacity of the soil, pulses were planted after rice. The expenses incurred for the second crop generally came from their extra income supplemented with MAB loans. What


raised cropping intensity was therefore, not increased irrigation facilities but use of MVs.

Table 63 shows the cropping intensity used in Burma during the period, distinguishing between multiple-cropped areas with irrigation and those without. The multiple-cropped area of half a million ha in 1961 rose to 2 million ha in 1985. Ninety percent of this increment did not have irrigation. The multiple-cropped area in the irrigated tract had an increase of only 140,000 ha as compared with an increase of more than a million ha in nonirrigated areas. Cropping intensity in the country rose from 107 to 124% during the period. There remained a great potential for further increases in the irrigated tract. Rice - groundnut, rice - sesamum, rice - sunflower, rice - pulses, and jute - rice constituted common cropping patterns in Lower Burma, while the cropping patterns in Upper Burma with irrigation were cotton - rice, sesamum - rice, rice - pulses, and rice - rice.

Rice trading Rice trade was handled by traders, millers, and the SAMB until 1963. The government took over the entire rice trade in 1964 and entrusted the business to Trade Corporation No. 1, (this was later called the Agriculture and Farm Produce Trade Corporation [AFPTC] in 1976) under the Ministry of Trade. The

Table 63. Cropping intensity, 1961-85 (SRUB 1987).

Multiple-cropped area (000 ha) Net Cropping sown intensity

Year With Without Total area (%) irrigation irrigation

1961 1964 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

33 65

102 109 107 121 123 127 145 143 135 136 158 125 122 140 146 144 194 175

499 755 901 920

1037 1104 1099 1228 1251 1169 1211 1296 1452 1249 1599 1614 1534 1744 1962 1838

532 820

1003 1029 1144 1225 1222 1355 1396 1312 1346 1432 1610 1374 1721 1754 1680 1888 2156 2013

7162 7941 7795 7778 7896 6862 7884 8065 8103 8130 8028 8111 8252 8057 8317 8413 8230 8270 8359 8372

107 110 113 113 115 115 116 117 117 116 117 118 120 117 121 121 120 123 126 124


18. AFPTC rice procurement center.

AFPTC was tasked with rice procurement and processing. The Myanma Export and Import Corporation (MEIC), under the same Ministry, was in charge of export. AFPTC and MEIC replaced SAMB in supervising the whole rice trade.

Rice was procured by many agents in many places. When procured by traders, rice was carried to the rice mills or storage places in or near the rice mill compound. In the case of AFPTC, many temporary procurement centers were opened. From these centers, rice was transported to the mills by the State- operated Burma Railway Corporation, Inland Water Transport Corporation, or Road Transport Corporation (Fig.18). Private transport facilities were likewise utilized.

Before the annual rice harvest, the Ministry of Trade would announce the procurement prices of different types and grades of rice. Prices were fixed for 100 baskets (or 2100 kg) in January and February, increasing by 10 kyats from March to June, and again by 5 kyats from July to December. The prices changed six times during the period (Table 64).

Table 64. Prices of different types of rice (kyats per 100 baskets), 1962-85 . a

Year Type of grain

A B C D

1962-63 b to 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 to 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 to 1985-86

330 360 378 448 634 955

325 355 373 442 625 940

330 340 358 425 600 900

385 415 433 514 726

1090

a Sources: For 1962-83 data, SRUB 1984; for 1984-85, SRUB 1987. b Refers to period 1 Apr 1962 to 31 Mar 1963.


The price variation was due to the differences in quality. It started with an average of 340 kyats per 100 baskets in 1962-63, increasing to 370 kyats in 1966- 67, and then to 388 kyats in 1967-68. The average price remained constant until it rose again to 460 kyats in 1972-73. There was another increase in 1973-74, bringing the average price to 650 kyats. The final increase was most pronounced, with the average price pegged at 970 kyats.

Grain type D, a popular grade in the urban markets, fetched a higher price than did other types. Grain type A, popular for both local consumption and export, came next. Grain types B and C were readily acceptable in the urban and rural areas, respectively. In recent years, with the expansion of MVs (mostly type A grain), production of type A grains exceeded those of other types. More than 60% of AFPTC-procured rice belonged to type A; type C comprised only about 25%.

In the beginning, AFPTC based its procurement target on the production estimates of the DSLR. The rice procured was then milled in AFPTC-owned or -contracted mills. (All rice mills in the country had to be registered wh AFPTC.) Milled rice was distributed through consumers’ cooperatives in urban and rice-deficit areas. The surplus was then exported by MEIC. The government placed great emphasis on internal rice distribution, which expanded annually because of population growth and the low price. Rice was sold at a uniform price throughout the country, which led to increased internal consumption, leaving only a small portion for export. In some years when AFPTC procurement went down, public hoarding affected both internal and external rice trade. AFPTC procurement in selected years is shown in Table 65.

Government monopoly of the rice trade increased the volume fourfold in rice procurement alone—from 1 million to 4 million t (Table 65). Annual procurement volume fluctuated between2 million and 4 million t (representing 30-40% of production). In years of good weather, about 35-40% of production was bought by AFPTC; but in years when weather abnormalities occurred, the quantity went down abruptly. In 1966, when the monsoon departed earlier than usual, rice production was drastically reduced to about 6.5 million t. Correspondingly, the AFPTC procured only 2 million t, much below the procurement target.

Since rice was distributed by cooperatives from the AFPTC stock, the public tended to panic during low-procurement years. The price of rice in the free market went up, resulting in a large price disparity between that offered by cooperatives and that given in the free market. This price disparity was even larger for higher grain quality rice. The public resorted to hoarding, which brought the threat of a rice shortage. Retailers similarly hoarded rice and handed out cash to farmers as some form of advanced payment for available stock for the coming harvest. Farmers were reluctant to sell their stock to AFPTC, and the government suspended rice trade control temporarily for one year to relieve public anxiety. The farmers who still possessed surplus stock enjoyed a higher price for rice during that year.


Table 65. Annual rice procurement (million t), 1960-85. a

Rice Rice % Year procurement production procurement b

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

0.733 0.721 0.568 0.908 4.014 3.240 2.007 2.159 3.003 2.965 2.957 2.204 1.219 1.485 2.664 3.184 2.889 2.199 3.368 3.570 4.212 4.306 4.060 4.086 3.669 4.086

7.085 6.798 7.550 7.667 8.373 7.929 6.531 7.646 7.896 7.859 8.033 8.046 7.240 8.466 8.448 9.062 9.172 9.313

10.362 10.283 13.107 13.923 14.146 14.165 14.255 14.317

10 11

8 12 50 41 31 28 38 38 37 27 17 18 32 35 32 24 33 35 32 31 29 29 26 29

a Sources: For 1960-64, RGUB 1966; for 1965-70, SRUB 1972; for 1971-72, SRUB 1974; for

SRUB 1987. b Procurement by State Agricultural Marketing Board; private procurement not 1973-74, SRUB 1977; for 1976-78, SRUB 1979; for 1979-82, SRUB 1984; and for 1983-85,

Included.

In 1967, the weather was normal and rice production rose again to the normal level but farmers were slow in disposing of their surplus stock. They were hoping for a higher price in the succeeding months. The government increased the price, but farmers did not fully respond to it. This also reversed the pricing structure. In the hope of getting a bigger turnout at the beginning of the procurement season, the government offered higher prices for rice sold in January-February, and reduced the price in March-April and again in April- May. The 1967 procurement volume did not increase appreciably (Table 65). Since the government gave priority to internal distribution, exports diminished during these years.

The Party and the People’s Council organized the farmers to have their surplus stock disposed. The results were discouraging. At the end of the procurement season, the government announced that it would not procure old stocks of rice in the coming year. Since then, rice procurement suffered various drawbacks that affected the annual procurement volume of AFPTC. Farmers questioned the accuracy of the production estimates made by the DSLR, which


were used by AFPTC to set procurement targets. The first production estimate was done even before farmers had finished transplanting. Although the forecast was later revised through a survey conducted by the DSLR a few months after, AFPTC still based its procurement targets on the first forecast.

The AFPTC introduced a ready reckoner system for determining saleable surplus from data on yield and harvested area. In that table, yield was on the top horizontal column and harvested area was on the side vertical column. Values of saleable surplus in the table were higher as size of holdings and yield became larger. The ready reckoner system was a tool for assessing saleable surplus, but was not readily accepted by farmers because they felt that the table was too complicated and ambiguous.

The AFPTC again initiated an individual family recording system that listed the following information: number of family members, rice sown and harvested area, land fertility, variety used, inputs used, yield, production, family consumption, seed requirement, labor and cattle charges paid in kind, and social needs. The objective was to deduct all the needs of the family from production to determine saleable surplus. This system again proved unsatisfactory. The government then adopted an advanced purchase system but suspended it 4 yr after. The low production in 1972 and 1973 due to the late departure of the monsoon again adversely affected the procurement target. Rice procurement went down to a little more than a million t (representing 18% of production).

Despite these problems, rice procurement by AFPTC rose again in later years, especially during WTRPP implementation. Because of higher production, procurement once more exceeded 4 million t during these years, but not without raising controversial issues in the process. Though rice area planted and harvested were generally accepted, there never was complete agreement on yield.

With collaboration from farmers, the AC staff conducted a crop cutting exercise in 1 plot for every 40 ha (100 acres) harvested, threshed, and weighed in 1 d. The DSLR and the AC staff relied on results from the crop cutting plots for their yield estimates; these were refined occasionally with information collected from farmers during their crop cutting exercise. Many disputes arose on the issue of representativeness of the plot selected and the estimation of moisture correction for dry weight. Naturally, the DSLR and AC estimates tended to be higher, while farmer estimates tended to be lower (for them to get a lower sale quota). People’s Council members who were farmers themselves decided on the yield and production levels upon which selling quota to the AFPTC was finally based. Farmers were eager to sell their surplus rice in the free market where they could get higher prices—about two to two-and-a-half times that offered by AFPTC.

At procurement time, farmers who were not able to fulfill the quota were arraigned. To escape arrest, some sold the rice left for family consumption and


for seeds; still others sold their assets (like draft animals) to buy rice from others to fulfill the AFPTC quota. Some were eventually arrested. These cases caused antagonism between the farmers and the government. The farmers claimed that, although the AFPTC purchase price had risen substantially in 1974, the real price of rice had gone down. They pointed out that the prices of other crops and basic commodities had spiralled. The government explained the large amount of subsidy for fertilizers, tractor plowing, irrigation, and other social activities, but the effects of these services were not apparent. The quantity of rice retained by the farmers for the free market was hard to determine although some estimated that might be about 10-15% of production.

Saddled with problems, the annual rice procurement program dragged on through the years until 1987, when the government lifted the control on the internal rice trade. The price of rice more than doubled, but it was not clear how this move would influence the economy of the country.

Rice milling During the period, the rice milling industry was composed of 3400 rice mills of varying sizes with a milling capacity of 2000 t/h or more than 48,000 t/d. These rice mills were grouped into three categories—AFPTC-owned mills, AFPTC-contracted mills, and small mills and hullers. (All rice mills in the country needed to be registered with AFPTC.)

AFPTC-owned mills were constructed recently with assistance from ADB and the Overseas Economic Development Fund of Japan. Representing only 5% of total milling capacity, these modern mills, equipped with rubber rollers and run by electric motors, have a capacity of 100 t/d.

AFPTC-contracted mills were old, constructed more than 50 yr ago by private citizens. They were operated by husk-fired boilers. Hulling was done by using stone discs coated on both surfaces with emery and cement. On the other hand, small mills and hullers were those owned by the private sector or by cooperatives that had sprouted recently in many parts of the country. Rice for internal consumption and export came from AFPTC-owned and -contracted mills, while rice for farmer families and the free market came from small mills and hullers.

Table 66 shows the number of different mills operating in the country and their milling capacity. More than 50% of the rice was being processed by AFPTC-contracted mills, followed by privately owned small mills. Coopera- tive mills were expanded, but their share in the milling industry amounted to only 4%.

Except for the modern rice mills owned by AFPTC, most mills, because they were obsolete, had a milling recovery of around 60%. Rice millers did not want to renovate their mills. Poor milling recovery was further compounded by poor postharvest practices. Untimely harvesting led to more immature grains (in the case of early harvest) or overripened grains (in the case of late


Table 66. Rice mills and their milling capacity, 1983 (ADB 1985).

Mill type

Nominal Numbers milling of mills capacity

(t/h)

AFPTC-owned a

AFPTC-contracted Private (for family consumption) Cooperative mills and hullers Registered hullers

Total registered

44 943

1034 264

1198 3438

102 1166

591 77

151 2087

a AFPTC = Agriculture and Farm Produce Trade Corporation.

harvest). Both cases led to reduced milling recovery. In addition, there was high breakage during milling caused by weak grains. The factors that contributed to weak grains were animal trodding during threshing, cracking caused by overexposure to the sun, and the large difference between day and night temperatures to which the grain was exposed while on the threshing floor.

AFPTC supplied the spare parts for mills registered with it, but the private millers did not fully cooperate, resulting in minimal maintenance of the old mills.

Because of the shortage in milling capacity, there was a proliferation of hullers—some registered and some illegal-in many rural areas. The government banned hullers in the Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions because of their low milling recovery. The People’s Council, through milling permits, also controlled milling of rice retained for consumption by farmers. These milling permits were issued partially (two to three installments) until the AFPTC procurement target was achieved. The idea was to force the farmers to sell their quota on time if they wanted to mill their rice for home consumption. Even after fulfilling their quota and obtaining the milling permit, farmers found it difficult to make two or three trips to the mills to have the rice milled for family use. The average distance between the village and the rice mills ranged from 7 to 10 km, and making 2 or 3 trips with a row boat or cart proved impractical.

Distance was not the only factor; the waiting time in the mill often lasted for one or two nights, discouraging the farmers even more. This offered an opportunity for traders and millers to come in and exchange rice for the milling permit (ten baskets of unhusked rice exchanged for four baskets of milled rice), charging the farmers in kind for transportation and milling. Farmers were thankful that they did not have to make several trips to the mill and wait in the mill compound. This margin, taken in kind by traders in cooperation with millers, became the source of supply of rice for the free market. Although issuance of the rice milling permit by the People's Council was intended


primarily to help achieve the AFPTC procurement target and to check the free market trade, it failed to accomplish these objectives.

On the whole, the rice milling industry needed to be expanded either by constructing new mills or renovating existing ones. A lot more was needed to increase milling recovery. Aside from the issue of milling, there were problems of storage and transport. Deficiencies in these aspects led to both quantitative and qualitative losses. In the Okpo Township, the annual procurement of 35,000 t in preprogram years increased to 72,000 t after the WTRPP. This doubling of rice procurement far exceeded the storage and milling capacity of the township. Since rice was procured in the open season and was piled in the open field, there was a need to store in a shed when the monsoon set in. The township had 11 rice mills that began operation at the same time as the rice procurement program. When the monsoon set in, storage facilities in the mill compound could accommodate whatever amount was left. But when procurement doubled that year, storage facilities were insufficient, making it necessary to store rice temporarily in public places like monasteries and temples. Large losses were incurred during transport and storage.

It was thus necessary to improve rice milling, storage, and transport facilities to cope with the expected production growth on an area-to-area basis. Every grain saved was an extra grain produced. Efforts to increase rice production would never be successful if the necessary facilities for storage, transportation, and milling were not improved accordingly.

Rice consumption Average per capita consumption per year had increased substantially during the period due to special emphasis given to internal distribution of rice by the government. Rice was cheap and a constant price was set throughout the country. Higher consumption was noted in rice-deficit areas. Given a choice, people preferred rice to other cereals. As calculated in the previous periods, average per capita consumption was 148 kg in 1985 compared with 107 in 1960. This figure varied widely from region to region. The Burmese, in addition to two hearty meals, ate a lot of rice products and delicacies as snacks. Urban dwellers ate relatively less rice inasmuch as they could enjoy a diversified diet. Many wheat preparations were used as an alternative.

Average per capita rice production was 407 kg/yr. This exceeded per capita consumption and enabled the country to export surplus rice after deducting requirements for seed and giving allowance for waste. This surplus came from the increased yield, which reached a national average of 3000 kg/ ha. Many planners had predicted that the country might have to import rice if production continued to be as slow as it was in the beginning of the era. The successful introduction of MVs, supported by a reasonable amount of inputs and adequate extension services, accelerated growth and disproved the pre-


diction. The question of sustaining this growth and further accelerating rice production now came up. Per capita consumption would not likely decrease, and, at the same time, population would grow at the regular pace of 2% per annum.

Rice exports Private traders no longer handled rice export since 1965 when MEIC was made solely responsible for that duty. After internal distribution, surplus AFPTC- procured rice was exported by MEIC. Four selling practices were followed: government-to-government sale, direct sale, tender sale, and barter sale. Government-to-government sale fetched a price lower than the international market price, but goodwill and other reciprocatory measures were considered in such transactions. Direct sale to private firms with a long business association with the country was also practiced. Part of the export was also made under the international tender system, while some followed the barter system.

Exports during the period declined gradually in the beginning but decreased abruptly after 1966, when the country experienced serious droughts. This reduced the rice output. The volume of AFPTC-procured rice went down, leaving a small amount available for export after internal distribution. Since then, the AFPTC rice procurement system has been modified many times but there has been no appreciable result.

The annual rice production and export data are presented in Table 67 (each financial year starts 1 Apr and ends 31 Mar). There might be some overlap in the sense that export for a particular year does not really relate to the production for that year. Some might have come from stocks from the previous year and some from the present year, depending on the time of shipment. However, in a continuous course, the data reflect the export trend in relation to production trend.

The period started with nearly 2 million t of export, representing 40% of production. In 1966, it slowly decreased to a little more than 1 million t, representing only 30% of production. Export abruptly went down from then on, reaching a low of 100,000 in 1973. It slowly increased again at the end of the period, reaching only 750,000 t.

Several factors may explain this decline in export in spite of the steady production growth. Population growth required more rice for internal distribution. More losses accompanied higher production. Compounding these factors was the unfavorable international rice market. Regular client countries like India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka bought much lesser amounts as they gained momentum in their drive for self-sufficiency. Prices also went down significantly in the international market, thereby reducing the foreign exchange earnings of the country.

The need to improve quality in such a competitive market and to establish regular customers with good trade standing was apparent. It was simply


Table 67. Annual rice production and export (million t), 1960-85.

Year Unhusked Milled rice Export b % of export to rice equivalent a production

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

7.085 6.798 7.550 7.667 8.373 7.929 6.531 7.646 7.896 7.859 8.033 8.046 7.240 8.446 8.448 9.062 9.172 9.313

10.362 10.283 13.107 13.923 14.146 14.165 14.255 14.317

4.251 4.079 4.530 4.600 5.024 4.757 3.919 4.588 4.738 4.715 4.820 4.828 4.344 5.068 5.069 5.437 5.503 5.588 6.217 6.170 7.864 8.354 8.488 8.499 8.553 8.590

1.749 1.591 1.718 1.712 1.413 1.335 1.128 0.540 0.352 0.549 0.640 0.811 0.524 0.146 0.214 0.291 0.628 0.669 0.351 0.591 0.653 0.674 0.701 0.858 0.721 0.750

41 39 38 37 28 28 29 12

7 12 13 17 12

3 4 5

11 12

6 10

8 8 8

10 8 9

a Milled rice equivalent calculated with 50% rice recovery. b Export figures for 1960-84 were taken from IRRI 1986; 1985 data from SRUB 1987.

impossible to raise the quality of rice under a struggling rice milling industry consisting of old and obsolete mills and with a continuously changing purchasing system. The rice purchasing system also lacked incentives to ensure pure and high-quality rice. Even the small price differential given for quality was not seriously applied by the AFPTC procurement center staff.

Despite these impediments, the country should continue to strengthen and promote the rice industry. Rice export earnings would remain the controlling factor in the successful implementation of the national economic development plan. Although the outlook for rice export appeared dim at the moment—only 3% of world production enters the international market—the growing populations in Asia, Africa, South America, and the Middle East will increase the demand for rice. This should improve Burma’s standing in international trade. Rice will remain the staple for a large segment of the world population.


Beneficiaries of production The period covering 1960-85 witnessed steady rice production growth in the beginning, followed by rapid growth after the successful introduction of MVs and the use of fertilizers. The stability of production was less encouraging. The weather factor that caused growth instability was further compounded by unavailability of inputs in sufficient amounts. There were also flaws in the procurement system that caused misunderstandings in the allocation of the sale quota.

Stability and sustainability The steady production growth stopped in 1966 because of the early departure of the monsoon. Production went down by 20% during the year, creating flaws in the procurement, processing, distribution, and marketing systems. It took a few years to bring the situation back to normal, but bad weather struck again in 1972, reducing the yield by 10%. Rice production covered a wide area and depended mainly on rainfall; either flood or drought occurred in some parts of the country. This adversely affected production and it was hard to conclude whether “good” weather enhanced rice production in a particular year. When many areas received enough rainfall during the growing period, that year was taken as a good-weather year.

Again, as rice production began to use increasing amounts of fertilizer, the availability of this input in sufficient amount at the right time would determine that year's output. It often happened that use of less fertilizers slowed down production and led to lower foreign exchange earnings. Less foreign exchange earnings meant less importation of fertilizer, leading again to low production— a vicious cycle. Thus, production growth brought about by yield increases during the period may be considered less stable.

Maintaining a high growth rate posed many problems. The price of rice during the period changed six times, but it was hard to determine how these changes promoted stability and sustainability of production. The government did not directly manipulate the price mechanism, but it stimulated production through low-interest agricultural loans, distribution of fertilizers at subsidized rates, and investments in irrigation, mechanization, research, and extension.

Equity The new technology that increased rice production required more expenditures but also offered higher profits. The allocation of paid-out costs for both traditional and new technologies is given in Table 68. A farmer spent 84% of his output as paid-out cost in the first period, leaving him only 16% as his share. The situation improved in the second period, with the farmer spending only 57% of his output as paid-out cost while enjoying 43% as his share. In the third


Table 68. Comparison of paid-out cost of traditional and new technology (percent of production).

1981

Traditional New Particular 1932 1960

Paid-out cost Hired labor Hired animal labor Seed Fertilizer Manure Land rent

84 46 10 4

40

57 53 13 5

28

32 62 12 9 6 8 3

30 51 10 9

15 13 2

Sources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years).

period, a farmer needed to pay only 30% of his output as paid-out cost, enabling him to retain 70% as his share.

With traditional technology, 62% of these paid-out costs were used for hired labor, 6% for fertilizers, and 8% for manure; 3% covered the nominal land tax levied by the government. The corresponding figures for the new technology were 51, 15, 13, and 2%, respectively. (Land rent was greatly reduced in the third period because of the abolition of the landlord class.)

In this period, farmers undoubtedly benefited from the new technology. A high percentage of produce enjoyed by hired labor showed a favorable distribution of output among the landless farmers. The new technology needed more labor than did the traditional practice and subsequently, provided more opportunities for rural employment. The increasing labor input generated greater rice output, which was then distributed reasonably well to the landless workers. Aside from farmers, the laborers were likewise benefited by the new technology

Impact Science generated rapid rice production growth during the period, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s when WTRPP gained momentum. But limitations in foreign exchange and the existing infrastructure—which forced an annual increasing demand for fertilizer—lessened the impact. MVs replaced local varieties in almost all favorable areas; the adverse environments required newer MVs adaptable to the situation.

The role of farmers in the country’s drive for higher agricultural production was widely appreciated. Unity among farmers organized under the Farmers’ Assiayones helped elevate their status in society. Many rural projects on water supply, health and sanitation education, cooperatives, and other infrastructure affirmed public recognition of their services. Introduction of the health and accident insurance system for draft cattle purchased under MAB loans encouraged farmers to take more risks. There were some plans to


- -

- -

introduce a crop insurance scheme to support rainfed agricultural systems. The farmers’ emergence from an exploited to a respectable class in society was, by itself, clear proof of the impact of rapid rice production growth. But farmers were somewhat resentful of the slow increase in the price of rice in relation to changes in prices of other crops, which were not under government control.

During the period, the impact of rice production was less than expected. It would be unimaginable to experience rice scarcity in a country that was once a premier exporter. The public anxiously needed to be assured of a continued supply of rice, since it lacked confidence in the AFPTC and the consumers’ cooperatives. The supply of good-quality rice from cooperatives was uncertain; meanwhile, one could buy any amount in the open market at higher prices. Mismanagement and manipulation by some dishonest people of the procurement, processing, storage, and distribution of rice created “scarcity amidst plenty.” Many of the problems were self-created.

In 1987, the government lifted control of the rice trade. It would be interesting to assess its impact on the economic and social conditions of the country.


CHAPTER V

Implications for the future

Analysis of production growth covering 100 yr reveals both rising and stagnating growth periods. Rice plays such an important role in the economic and social life of the people of Burma that successive governments, at different times, controlled rice production to achieve their objectives. These manipula- tions were mainly responsible for the rising and stagnating pattern of production.

Rice production in Burma depends on many factors within and outside the control of the government. Weather determines average rice production in a particular year. Other factors like land tenure, loan assistance, draft cattle availability, and support services such as procurement, processing, marketing, transportation, research, and extension also influence rice production. Control of these factors to attain government objectives defines the pattern of rice production growth.

The annual rice production data were grouped into three arbitrarily classified periods in accordance with significant historical events. These three classes were further delineated based on the changing attitudes of farmers and government. Farmers play an important role since they are the ones heavily involved in production. Government policies determine how farmers work and how support services are provided.

The first period, which was under the British colonial government, witnessed increased rice production brought about by cultivating swamplands. Certain legislation and incentives in many forms contributed to this achievement. The primary concerns of government at the time were to maintain law and order, collect revenues, and produce more rice for export. A government structure to help attain these objectives was devised and installed. Rice production growth during the period was characterized by the frustration of a majority of farmers who gave up their lands to moneylenders because they were not able to repay their loans at the stipulated time. Economic inequality led to social inequality, and this finally brought about civil unrest.

During the second period, the country gained independence from the British government and the new government introduced corrective legislation

to improve the plight of farmers. Rice production was again pushed upward by restoring the lands abandoned during World War II. But rural insecurity and the civil war impeded further growth, and the period ended without achieving the targets set forth by the government. This was the period when people entertained hopes for a better future, but the newly independent government only managed to partially fulfill such expectations.

During the third period, the government succeeded in abolishing the structure put in place by the colonial government. Science induced rapid production growth by increasing yields. Strong support services and highly motivated farmers made this rapid growth possible. After some time, growth slowed down when the institutional framework and infrastructure were unable to cope with the demands of a rapidly expanding rice production program. Production growth had far-reaching impacts. In addition to its economic and social impacts on the population, the new technology made the country progressive.

There remains a great potential for further growth. But the selective and concentrative strategy employed in this period needs to be revised. The yield in physically adverse environments needs to be improved. Also, resource- poor farmers cannot utilize existing technology because it is not appropriate to their situation. These two issues deserve the attention of researchers.

The involvement of researchers and extension workers in the WTRPP offers them valuable experience which is useful in developing future research programs. They gain practical knowledge of how the new technology works under favorable environments. This experience will be extremely helpful in developing technology appropriate for adverse environments and for resource- poor farmers-concerns which were somehow ignored during this period. The new technology must have beneficial impacts in terms of productivity and equity. As research aims to raise yield by exploiting the remaining growth potential, it is necessary that equity considerations be incorporated in it. This will be possible only if farmers are involved in the process of developing and transferring technology right from the start.

The farmers certainly have the inherent capability to develop new technologies appropriate to their conditions. By simultaneously harnessing this capability and using recent advances in agricultural science, appropriate solutions to their field problems can be easily found. One proof of this is the Shwe-ta-soke, a modern variety developed by farmers without any assistance from research scientists.

Investment alternatives In a situation where investment is restricted, it is necessary to prioritize the problems to be addressed. Investments in such programs as irrigation, land parceling, and land leveling take time to recover. Several years are needed before returns are realized. Considerable economic and social benefits from


agricultural research can be brought about quickly with comparatively less investment if its direction and application are clearly defined. The benefit-cost ratio can exceed other forms of investment. The country has sufficient manpower and facilities to conduct user-oriented research, while many international research institutes, with their latest scientific advances, are ready to help.

The participation of farmers in planning, implementing, and evaluating agricultural sector plans are now well in place; what is needed is technology suited to previously neglected areas. At present, the location-specific nature of agricultural technology is widely recognized, and area-based research recommendations are common. Identification and characterization of problem areas are usually done.

As important as the area-based concept is the human-based approach to raise rice production and guarantee sustainability and equity. The need for beneficiaries to participate has not been disputed, but the means of accom- plishing this has always been a source of disagreement among policymakers.

Future research direction in the country should comprise at least two components: 1) maintenance research to sustain progress already made, and 2) farmer participatory research to overcome barriers in the present-day situation. Resources for research should be allocated efficiently to take advantage of the existing institutional setup while allotting a reasonable amount for the farmer participatory research component. This requirement is well within the capability of the government.

Farmer participatory research and extension Agriculture is the largest and most productive sector of Burma’s economy, and it will remain so in the future. Investment in agricultural research is essential, since it can transform the economy. Experience has proven that the client participatory approach to agricultural development planning, implementation, and evaluation results in remarkable success. The present situation offers a good opportunity to initiate a farmer participatory research and extension program to substantially improve the quality of life of the rural poor. It is premised on the farmers’ ability to help themselves.

Selectivity and concentration have proven effective in diffusing technologies from experimental stations to resource-rich or not-so-poor farmers who work in environments that closely resemble those in the research stations. The not- so-poor farmers in both favorable and unfavorable environments have already enjoyed the fruits of the new technology. Resource-poor farmers miss out on the new technology because it is not appropriate to their conditions. It is imperative that a technology adapted to the circumstances of resource-poor farmers be developed. Involving them in the process right from the beginning ensures productivity, stability, sustainability, and equity in such a rice production system.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 131

Farmer participatory research is often mistaken as “on-farm trials” but the two differ completely. On-farm trials are designed by researchers who apply treatments that they think are necessary. Though the experiment is conducted in farmers’ fields, farmers are not involved in its design. The farmer participatory research and extension approach has farmers working with scientists in analyzing the biological, social, and economic conditions on the farms.

Poor farmers always seek technology that will increase their income and improve their lives while keeping their risks within a reasonable limit. They are so poor that they cannot afford to take great risks; when technology fails, they have nothing to fall back on. They have to face a long period of indebtedness once the technology proves inappropriate.

Farmer participatory research and extension will develop technology that will enable resource-poor farmers to secure better livelihood from agriculture by putting science to practice with a minimum of risks. This proposal will focus on farmers for whom such research and extension programs are made. This approach should be tried on rice in view of the experience gained with the WTRPP. If it succeeds, it should cover other crops. The subsequent discussion will focus on the proposed methodology to accomplish this goal.

Formulation and implementation of the farmer participatory approach should be done in five steps: selection of scientists, motivation of scientists, preprogram activities, drawing of a detailed research program, and transfer of technology.

Selection of scientists The first step involves choosing skilled scientists with the right attitude for the work. Most scientists come from urban areas, but a few come from rural areas. Some scientists from the rural areas belong to families of resource-rich farmers. They usually do not understand the conditions surrounding resource-poor farmers. Some, after returning from postgraduate studies, try to keep away from the realities of rural life. They tend to restrict themselves to experimental stations and to continue research initiated during their postgraduate studies, irrespective of local needs. Their reluctance to work in the villages and share in the discomfort of village life underscores the need to instill in them the right attitudes and values.

Moreover, they have a low opinion of farmers. After specializing in a particular discipline, their regard for other disciplines also declines. The need for multidisciplinary approach is evident, and motivating scientists to interact with others from other disciplines becomes necessary. Researchers rarely visit the villages; when they do, they stay only for a very short time. Such short visits do not benefit either farmers or scientists. During these brief visits, it is probable that scientists meet only the resource-rich farmers or adoptors of technology. Feedback information comes from technology adoptors who are more concerned with improvement of a given technology. It is unlikely that resource-poor farmers are given the chance to present their views.


Motivation of scientists Under these circumstances, the most one can do is to select scientists with some bias toward the rural poor. They are then motivated to participate effectively in the program. Most scientists tend to be individualistic, independent, stub- born, and self-centered, but they respond positively if properly motivated.

Such motivation should include ways to induce them to interact with people from different disciplines so as to create a good working atmosphere. Specialists from various disciplines use their own language, and it is thus important to find a common language that everybody will understand and that will enable them to agree on what practical action to take. This process requires a delicate approach, since a specialist in one discipline, usually proud of his own knowledge, will not likely listen to another. A postgraduate degree in this case serves as a professional blinder.

Greater coordination and understanding among researchers are essential for effective implementation of the farmer participatory research and extension program. The institutionalized knowledge that researchers have acquired from the university enables them to show how things should be done. They are not usually good listeners, and their relationship with farmers can be characterized as the type existing between a teacher and a student.

Such an attitude will not work with this approach. The relationship between researchers and farmers should be one where they are seen as ”partners in progress.” The researchers’ usual negative attitude toward the poor farmers needs to be changed. Scientists need not be in the habitual role of a teacher; they can also be learners. Teamwork constitutes a pivotal part of the whole approach. The solutions to the farmers’ problems can neither be found in a single discipline nor offered by a single individual. Effective collaboration among various disciplines is a prerequisite.

Preprogram activities Preprogram activities should focus on two aspects-identification of the area and identification of the target groups. These should start 2 mo before actual rice cultivation (May in Lower Burma and June in Upper Burma). Since the township serves as the smallest administrative unit, it should be used as the starting point in area identification.

The township should be at the center of a well-defined rice environment. Using national statisticsand relying on the judgment of experienced researchers, it should not be difficult to locate such a township. Once the township has been identified, the researchers should collect all the statistical data available and integrate the results of research in their own discipline.

With the aid of a township map, the scientists can identify village tracts and villages that are situated far from railways and highways; these will certainly have many resource-poor farmers. The assistance of the Township People’s Council will be valuable in selecting the villages. Using statistics


collected from township headquarters as a guide, the target group can be easily identified. The resource-poor farmers usually have holdings less than the average size and own fields that are usually infertile and situated far from the village. Their dwellings, clothes, and utensils indicate their poverty. Their main productive asset is their labor.

The first move is to meet with village leaders and representatives, explain to them the objectives of the program, and secure their cooperation. These discussions should identify the resource-poor farmers, describe what they are doing, and show how they are coping. Afterward, all resource-poor farmers are assembled. The township statistics are confirmed and compared with the average to ensure that those assembled really represent the resource-poor farmers of the area. Through free-wheeling and frank discussions, their physical, biological, economic, and social conditions are determined. The researchers now select from among those present, five farmers to represent the whole group by participating in the project.

Resource-poor farmers possess knowledge that is different from “institutionalized” knowledge. Their knowledge is considered inferior by many and has generally never been properly utilized. They have accumulated and refined this indigenous knowledge over time from one generation to another. The idea is to blend the institutionalized knowledge system with the farmers' indigenous knowledge system, and thus produce technology that is appropriate to the area and to the people. This is when researchers exchange roles with farmers-when they visualize what they would do if they were tilling the land themselves. The farmers are, in reality, agronomists, economists, and soci- ologists all rolled into one. They solve a particular problem based on their previous experiences in the agronomic and socioeconomic spheres.

These discussions may point to the need to develop technology adapted to the area and to conduct new research. The first involves verification work, while the second implies designing a new research project using a new set of treatments. Both aspects will serve as bases for drawing a detailed working program.

A detailed working program Researchers and farmers are now ready to draw up a detailed working program that will cover both aspects, starting from tillage operations to harvest and disposal of the produce. The necessary data and observations will be recorded at different stages of the operation. Then ten impact points generated from research may serve as a springboard for discussion. Depending on the circumstances, farmers may add or delete some of these impact points.

Farmers, who are usually timid, have to be encouraged to participate in such discussions. In these meetings, the responsibilities of both farmers and researchers are defined. This division of responsibilities and the work determine the nature of the researchers' succeeding visits—either in small groups


or as individuals. Research is to be evaluated jointly at different stages until the end.

In this approach, the usual statistical analyses may be dispensed with, but researchers may want to discuss with farmers the need to replicate. Final evaluation may not be restricted only to yield or other yield components; farmers may propose other criteria to evaluate experiments based on their resources and environments. Hopefully, results from such experiments will yield new technology that will ensure productivity, stability, sustainability, and equity. More fine-tuning of the technology thus developed may be done to suit diverse environments.

Farmer participatory extension Technology developed using this approach will have no problem getting disseminated. Since users are involved right from the beginning, acceptance of the technology is assured. Technology transfer, however, may follow different paths. The transfer may beaccomplished through friend-to-friend or neighbor- to-neighbor encounters. One can expect that the technology will be diffused widely and rapidly.

With this approach, farmers’ attitudes are expected to change. They will learn to appreciate researchers for giving them special attention. They will feel important and will consequently lose their feelings of inferiority. At the same time, farmers will become more conscious of their weaknesses and will be more organized in asking for more services.

This approach establishes a congenial relationship among farmers, extension workers, and researchers. Involving researchers in the process of technology development erases their “too theoretical” image. Moreover, it enables them to understand the rural poor better, the processes that made them poor, and the factors that perpetuate their situation.

In 1983-84, this extension approach was tried in three places in the country, covering 1062 ha and involving 856 farmers. The main crop used was long staple cotton. Details were reported at an ADB regional seminar in 1984 (Khin Win et al 1984).

Farmer participatory research and extension requires huge manpower inputs in terms of skilled scientists. The available manpower in the country is not adequately tapped to implement such an approach in view of the large area and the large majority of farmers involved. The idea is to develop a methodology that will harness the underutilized manpower available in the country through proper motivation and effective mass participation.

Once the methodology has been developed, a wider application is possible with fewer manpower and skillrequirements. It will complement the country’s development programs, which aim to raise the population’s standard of living. The collaborative approach will surely provide great satisfaction to all participants, because technology development will enable families of re-


source-poor farmers to secure better means of livelihood from rice cultivation. A new technology that will give sufficient rice yield for consumption plus a profitable surplus will always be welcome. If the farmer participatory approach is applied to various sites over time, the local economy will be enhanced, and this will have a direct impact on the country’s rural development.


CHAPTER VI

Conclusions

Burma’s economy will continue to rely on the agricultural sector in the foreseeable future. Rice, which occupies a prominent position in that sector, will certainly shape the economic viability, political stability, and social status of the country. Internal rice consumption will rise with increasing population. Other cereals are not expected to assume a significant share of the dietary staple. The demand for rice in the international market will also grow because of increasing populations in the rice-consuming countries of Asia, Africa, and South America. It is therefore imperative that rice production in the country be increased.

Science, which induced rice production growth in the last period, can spur another wave of growth if technology appropriate to the situation can be developed and installed. Science has already exploited the areas with “immediate growth potential,” and it is crucial to extend this to areas with “future growth potential.” These are the areas where rice production growth is achievable once the correct strategy is employed. The 50% area coverage of MVs in the last period indicates that 50% of the area has “immediate growth potential,” while the remaining 50% represents areas with “future growth potential.”

It is also possible that some parts of the future-growth-potential region may consist of areas with low growth potential, where topography is too rough, the soils too poor, or water too scanty or too deep to encourage an economically feasible and technologically applicable rice production system. Elimination of such marginal lands with low growth potential must be made an integral part of the new production campaign. It will be an important component in the process of changing from a subsistence agriculture system to a commercial one.

The new approach should include steps to identify and eliminate low- growth-potential areas, although people living in these places also merit

attention. It would be wasteful to devote scarce resources to ventures where success is virtually impossible. Major technological changes are necessary for this situation, but breakthroughs in science cannot be foreseen. Thus, developmental efforts in these areas must consider nonagricultural production activities or crops other than rice that are appropriate to the environment.

The program must ensure a regular supply of rice. Areas with low growth potential are estimated to be around 10% of the present rice area in the country. With this assumption, the remaining 40% of the area is considered to have future growth potential. A new strategy appropriate to this kind of area is required to induce another wave of production growth. In this case, the strategy that proved successful in areas with immediate growth potential will not work. The farmer participatory research and extension approach will be the one most suitable.

A carefully designed approach for technology development and transfer can bring about economic growth and can help attain key national objectives. The country now has the facilities and the experience to launch a new rice production program to take care of the remaining areas. Both financial and political commitments are essential to achieve results in a short time. The technologies developed under this approach will be immediately applicable, highly equitable, and socially acceptable.

Resources for research should be divided into two components. The first one should utilize existing technology within the current institutional framework and infrastructure through adaptive research conducted in close collaboration with international research institutes. These second component should initiate a new technology development program for areas with future growth potential. The human-based concept must be integrated with the area-based concept.

The development program should also include steps to promote progress in other aspects (e.g., credit, availability of farm animals, milling) that are known to influence rice production. Such a program will certainly have economic, political, and social implications for the whole population of the country. If successful, the program will earn more foreign exchange for greater investments in irrigation, embankments, drainage, and land consolidation.

The impact of modern agricultural science has to be seriously evaluated. Scientific advances should be utilized in the design of a low-energy, sustainable agricultural development system. This system should also conform to the agroecosystem and the socioeconomic conditions under which farmers live. Farmer participation, in this regard, will certainly lead to development without having any adverse effects on the existing socioeconomic system.

While increasing crop yield would be an important aspect of this program, experience has emphasized the need to improve the resource base and to use these resources more efficiently.


References cited

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report. Manila, Philippines. AC—Agricultural Corporation (various years) Report of the Whole Township Rice

Production Program. For the years 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83,1984-85, and 1985-86. Rangoon, Burma.

Barker R A, Herdt R W, Rose B (1985) The rice economy of Asia. Resources for the Future, Inc. in cooperation with The International Rice Research Institute, P.O. Box 933, Manila, Philippines.

Beale R A (1927) A scheme of classification of the varieties of rice found in Burma. Pusa Agricultural Research Institute Bulletin No. 167. Pusa, India.

Binns BO (1948) Agricultural economy in Burma. Superintendent Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, Burma.

Cheng Siok-Hwa (1968) The rice industry of Burma, 1852-1940. University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur.

DA—Department of Agriculture (Burma) (1958) Rice. Market Section Survey No. 9. Superintendent Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, Burma.

DSLR—Department of Settlement and Land Records (various years) Season and crop reports. From 1902 to 1985. Rangoon, Burma.

Grant J W (1939) The rice crop in Burma. Superintendent Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, Burma.

Government of Burma (1948) Two-year plan of economic development. Superintendent Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon.

Harvey G E (1946) British ruler in Burma, 1824-1942. Faber and Faber, London. Herdt R W, Mandac A M (1979) Overview, findings and implications of constraints

research, 1975-1978. Paper presented at the Workshop on Rice Yield Constraints, 30 Apr-3 May 1979, Kandy, Sri Lanka.

Hill J, Jayasuriya S (1986) An inward-looking economy in transition. Occasional Paper No. 80. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

IRRI—International Rice Research Institute (1986) World rice statistics 1985. P. O. Box 933, Manila, Philippines.

Jayasuriya S K (1984) Technical change and revival of the Burmese rice industry. Dev. Econ. 22(2):137-154.

Khin Win, Kyaw-Shin, Htin Aung (1975) Fertilizer responses of some important crops of Burma. Radioisotope Laboratory Paper No. 17. Agricultural Research Institute, Gyogon, Rangoon, Burma.

Khin Win, Nyi Nyi (1979) Rainfed farming systems and practices in relation to agroecological zones. Agricultural Corporation, Rangoon, Burma.

Khin Win, Nyi Nyi, Price E C (1981) The impact of a special high-yielding rice program. International Rice Research Institute, P. O. Box 933, Manila, Philippines.

Khin Win, Sein Win, Ko Lay (1984) Technology transfer in Burma. Paper presented at the Asian Development Bank Seminar on Rural Development in Asia and the Pacific, 15-23 Oct 1984, Manila, Philippines.

Khush G S (1984) Terminology for rice growing environments. International Rice Research Institute, P. O. Box 933, Manila, Philippines.

MI-Ministry of Information (Burma) (1952) Pyidawtha conference. Rangoon. RGUB—The Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma (1964) Agricultural

statistics for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64. Central Press, Rangoon. RGUB—The Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma (1966) Agricultural

statistics for the years 1964-65 and 1965-66. Central Press, Rangoon. SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1969) Agricultural statistics for

the years 1966-67 and 1967-68. Central Press, Rangoon. SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1970) Agricultural statistics for

the years 1967-68 and 1968-69. Central Press, Rangoon. SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1973) Agricultural statistics for

the years 1969-70,1970-71, and 1971-72. Central Press, Rangoon. SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1975) Agricultural statistics for

the years 1971-72, 1972-73, and 1973-74. Printing and Publishing Corporation, Rangoon.

SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1978) Agricultural statistics for the years 1974-75, 1975-76, and 1976-77. Printing and Publishing Corporation, Rangoon.

SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Ministry of Planning and Finance (1970-72) Report to the people on the financial, economic and social conditions of the Union of Burma, for the years 1979-71 and 1972-73. Burmese ed. Rangoon.

SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the union of Burma, Ministry of Planning and Finance (1974) Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw on the financial, economic and social conditions of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, for the year 1974-75. Burmese ed. Rangoon.

SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Ministry of Planning and Finance (1977) Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw on the financial, economic and social conditions of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, for the year 1977-78. Burmese ed. Rangoon.

SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Ministry of Planning and Finance (1979) Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw on the financial, economic and socialconditions of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, for the year 1979-80. Burmese ed. Rangoon.

SRUB—The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Ministry of Planning and Finance (1984) Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw on the financial, economic, and social conditions of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, for the year 1984-85. Burmese ed. Rangoon.


SRUB—The socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Ministry of Planning and Finance (1987) Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw on the financial, economic and social conditions of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, for the year 1987-88. English ed. Rangoon.

Steinberg DI (1981) Burma’s road toward development, growth and ideology under military rule. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

Swanson BE, Roling N, Jiggins N (1984) Extension strategies for technology utilization. Agricultural Extension, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.

U Chit Lwin (1949) Myanma thweke. Zabumeikswe Press, Rangoon. Walinsky L J (1962) Economic development in Burma, 1951-1960. The Twentieth

Century Fund, New York. 292 p. Winkelmann D, Moscardi E (1979) Aiming agricultural research at the needs of farmers.

Paper presented at the seminar on Socioeconomic Aspects of Agricultural Research in Developing Countries, May 1979, Santiago, Chile.

Ye Goung, Khin Win, Win Htin (1978) Rice soils of Burma. Pages 57-71 in Soils and rice. International Rice Research Institute, P. O. Box 933, Manila, Philippines.

REFERENCES CITED 141

Appendices

Appendix I. Sown area and production of rice, 1830-1985.

Sown area Production Sown area Production Year (million ha) (million t) Year (million ha) (million t)

1830 1835

1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895

1845

1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907

1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

1908

0.027 0.095 0.143 0.402 0.539

0.702 0.963 1.255 1.497 2.329 2.633 3.460 3.342 3.357 3.766 3.749 3.756 3.721 3.776 3.934 4.047 4.026 3.976 4.136

4.259 4.210

4.333 4.202 4.241

0.582

4.181

4.278

0.044 0.154 0.231 0.649

0.940 1.133 1.555

0.870

1.989 2.418

5.588

6.082

3.761 4.252

5.397 5.422

6.054 6.061 6.010

6.354 6.536 6.502 6.421 6.679 7.124 6.457

6.098

5.867 5.778 7.093 7.275 6.028

1937

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

1938

1958

1968

5.053 5.011 5.031 5.066 4.988 4.329 3.090 2.631 2.629 3.201 3.479 3.965 3.649 3.703

4.016 4.034 3.975 4.051 4.077

3.828

3.986 4.087 4.200 4.217 4.597

5.049 5.109 5.014 4.989 4.934 5.019

4.837

6.892 6.744 7.942 6.894 7.738 5.752 3.053 2.545 2.677

5.440 5.164

5.403 5.601

5.579 5.651 6.025

5.423

3.844

4.581

5.842

6.282

6.882 7.183 7.085 6.798 7.550 7.667 8.373 7.929 6.531 7.646 7.896

continued on next page

Appendix 1 continued

Sown area Production Sown area Production Year (million ha) (million t) Year (million ha) (million t)

1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936

4.172 4.331 4.437 4.548 4.627 4.677 4.774 4.735 4.879 4.941 5.006 4.802 4.877 4.954 4.897 4.805 4.927

6.008 6.129 6.357 6.357 5.781 6.500 6.843 7.557 7.024 7.138 7.295 7.508 6.101 7.187 7.562 7.589 7.322

1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

7.859 8.033 8.046 7.240 8.466 8.448 9.062 9.172 9.313

10.362 10.283 13.107 13.923 14.146 14.165 14.255 14.317

4.955 4.975 4.977 4.862 5.089 5.177 5.204 5.077 5.136 5.243 5.026 5.127 4.921 4.882 4.831 4.917 4.902

Sources: 1. Sown area, 1830-1930, Grant 1939. 2. Sown area, 1931-40. Cheng 1968. 3. Sown area, 1941-54, DSLR, various years. 4. Sown area, 1955-63. RGUB 1966. 5. Sown area, 1964-

Sown area, 1983-85, SRUB 1987. 9. Production, 1913-54, DSLR, various years. 11. Production, 70, RGUB 1973. 6. Sown area, 1971-75, RGUB 1978, 7. Sown area, 1976-82. SRUB 1984. 8.

1955-63, RGUB 1966. 12. Production, 1964-70, SRUB 1973. 13. Production. 1971-75, SRUB 1978. 14. Production, 1976-82, SRUB 1984. 15. Production. 1982-85. SRUB 1987.

Appendix II. Government agricultural loans (000 kyats), 1900-85.

Share Rice a All crop a of rice

(%) Remark

1900 1905 1910 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928

111 680 929

1,304 1,270

937 1,290 1,159 3,199 1,903 1,581 2,542 2,443

na na na na

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Total loans advanced under the Land Improvement Loan Act of 1884 and under the Agricul- turists’ Loan Act of 1884 for rice area expansion

111 680 920

1,304 1,270

937 1,290 1,159 3,199 1,903 1,581 2,542 2,443

na na na na



- - - -

Appendix II continued

Share Rice a All crops a of rice

(%) Remark

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

na 961

4,605 1,596

856 395 365 480 na

2 2

na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na

83,767 na

89,108 103,444 122,700 124,694 109,937

7,520

1,135 na

1,399

na 961

4,605 1,596

856 395 365 480 na

2 2

na na na na na na na na na na na na na

54,300 52,100 42,700 48,300 46,000 56,100 42,900 57,400 72.600 69,100

215,100 284,300 229,200 102,876 106,138 125,185 146,422 151,381 151,057

30,257 na

3,281 43,860

100 100 100 100 100 100 100

100 100

81 84 83 84 82 73 25

35 3

Tenants of government estates, agricultural credit societles, and state agricultural bank. Total loans advanced under the agriculturists' Loan Act and State Agricultural Bank. Loan issued under credit society discontinued.

Loans only for rice-deficit areas. Advanced purchase system practiced by rice procurement agency, 1974-77.


APPENDICES 145

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

–

–

Appendix II continued

Share Rice a All crops a of rice

(%) Remark

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

1,737 9,790

693,430 720,755 701,427

1,040,763 1,063,696 1,040,409 1,055,119 1,033,388

65,400 115,398 809,597 845,455 826,461

1,176,438 1,210,111 1,190,680 1,218,703 1,197,585

3 9

86 85 85 88 88 87 87 86

Sources: 1. From 1900 to 1939, Cheng 1968.2. From 1953 to 1957, RGUB 1964. From 1957 to 1968, SRUB 1970.4. From 1968 to 1969, RGUB 1970.5. From 1970 to 1972, SRUB, 1974. 6. For 1974, SRUB 1977. 7. From 1975 to 1978, SRUB 1979.8. From 1979 to 1982. SRUB 1984. 9. From 1983 to 1985, SRUB 1987. a na = not available.

Appendix III. Draft cattle and load factor, 1901-85.

Gross Cattle Workload Period sown area population per Remark

(000 ha) (000 head) pair a

1901 1904 1909 1914 1919 1924 1929 1934 1939 1936 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966

4,798 5,249 5,720 5,987 6,294 6,711 7,104 7,311 7,568 7,561 6,541 6,422 6,550 6,556 6,456 6,676 6,881 6,953 7,694 8,376 8,716 8,756 8,775 8,650

1,763 1,920 2,297 2,437 2,745 2,849 2,996

na 3,148 3.067 2,814 2,904 2,939 2.974 3,021 3,089 3,185 3,284 3,390 3,419 3,729 4,233 4,242 4,075

5.44 5.46 4.98 4.91 4.59 4.71 4.74

4.81 4.93 4.65 4.42 4.46 4.39 4.27 4.32 4.32 4.23 4.54 4.90 4.67 4.14 4.14 4.26

AV 1936-41



-

Appendix III continued

Gross Cattle Workload Period sown area population

(000 ha) (000 head) pair a per Remark

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

1985 1984

8,647 8,798 8,807 9,040 9,187 9,107 9,420 9,500 9,442 9.374 9,542

9,431 10,038 10,167

9,910 10,158 10,516 10,385

9,862

4,213 4,026 4,067

4,051 4,238 4,266 4,944 5,018 5,087 5,180 5,333 5,564 5,734 5,950 6.137 6,259 6,366 6,516

4,118

4.10 4.37 4.33 4.39 4.54 4.30 4.42 3.84 3.76 3.69

3.70 3.39 3.50 3.42 3.23 3.25 3.30 3.19

3.68

a Workload means area in ha undertaken by a pair of cattle. na = not applicable. Sources: 1. DSLR, various years. 2. RGUB 1964. 3. RGUB 1966. 4. RGUB 1973. 5. RGUB 1978. 6. SRUB 1984.7. SRUB 1987.

Appendix IV. Annual rice exports, 1860-1985.

Year Exports Year Exports Year Exports (000 t) (000 t) (000 t)

1860 1870 1880 1890 1900-01 1901-02 1902-03 1903-04 1904-05 1905-06 1906-07 1907-08 1908-09 1909-10 1910-11 1911-12 1912-13

126 381 807

1208 2097

2284 1754 2194 2032 2205 2389 2164 2402 2381 2192 2353

2830

1923-24 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 1937-38 1938-39 1933-40

2352 2481 3148 2533 3010 2847 2993 2839 3209 2584 3202 3428 2829 2807 2827 2979 3104

1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77

1722 1591 1744 1712 1413 1335 1128

540 352 541 640

511 144 208 286 628

811


APPENDICES 147

Appendix IV continued

Year Exports Year Exports Year Exports (000 t) (000 t) (000 t)

1913-14

1915-16 1914-15

1916-17 1917-18 1918-19 1919-20 1920-21 1921-22 1922-23

1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60

1184 1268 1260

970 1461 1639

1753 1410 1692

1864

2701

1646

1982 2999 2359 2107 2300 2610

2286

1718

1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86

669 351 591 653 674 701

721 520

858

Sources: 1. For the years 1860 to 1928-29, Grant 1939. 2. For the years 1929-40. Lwin Chit 1949. 3. For the years 1950-61 to 1984-85, IRRI 1985. 4. For 1985-86. SRUB 1987.

Appendix V. Prices of rice per 100 baskets or 2100 kg (1845-1985). a

1845 b

1860 1855

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915

8 45 45 50 70 65

100 95 95 95 95 95

100 110

95

Year Price Year Price Year Price

105 120 130 110 130 160 130 120 125

1916 1917

1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927

1929 1930 1931 c

1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937

1939

1918

1928

1938

110 105 100 140

190 195 180 195 195 190

165 160 130

75

180

180

80 80 84

114 109 117 114 117

1940 1945 1946 d

1947

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957

1959 1960 1961

1966

1972 1973

1948

1958

1962 e -65

1967-71

1974-85

106 271 381 329 322 326 349 331 314 317 335 325 326 340 350 361

400 330 340 358 425 600 900

384

a Sources: 1. Prices for 1845-1930. Grant 1939. 2. Prices for 1831-39. Cheng 1968. 3. Prices for 1940-61, SRUB, various years. 4. Prices for 1962-85. SRUB 1987. b Prices for 1845-1930 quoted in rupee which had the same monetary value as kyat. These are average prices in Rangoon. c Prices for 1931-39 are average prices in Rangoon, quoted in rupees. d Prices for 1946-1961 paid by private traders in Rangoon and large cities, quoted in kyats. SAMB -government organization price is 300 kyats for type C. e Prices for 1962-85 are fixed by government for C-type grains.


Appendix VI. Changes in variable means over the program period (based on 17 towships for the years 1977/78-1983/84).

Variable Symbol 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84

Area (%) sown with MV a

Row transplanted area (%)

Area (%) sown with 25- to 30-day- old seedlings

Area (%) sown with 20- x 15-cm spacing

lntercultivated area (%)

Water management area (%)

Manure applied (t/ha

Urea applied (kg/ha)

TSP a applied (kg/ha)

MOP a applied (kg/ha)

Pest-protected area (%)

Pest-infested area (%)

Total labor used (d/10 ha)

Area per extension worker (ha)

No. of production camps in the township

No. of staff trained during the crop year

Farmer training (high level)

Farmer training (medium level)

Voluntary labor (high level)

Voluntary labor (medium level)

Rice environment (delta)

Rice environment (coastal)

X 1

X 2

X 3

X 3 1

X 4

X 5

X 6

X 7

X 7 1

X 7 11

X 8

X 9

X 10

X 11

X 12

X 13

X 14

X 15

X 16

X 17

X 18

X 19

26.1 (23.9) 13.8

(18.3) 31.1

(28.7)

20.9 (20.6)

5.8 (11.0) 29.6

(33.5) 1.10

(1.20) 33.0

(19.2) 9.6

(10.6) 1.8

(3.7) 13.1

(26.3) 2.1

(2.9) 657

1426 (1049)

(128)

1.5 (1.5)

18 (32)

0.12 (0.33) 0.24

(0.44) 0.06

(0.29) 0.12

(0.33) 0.53

(0.51) 0.00

(0.00

39.9 (27.6) 46.4

(33.9) 56.6

(25.4)

53.2 (27.7)

27.3 (26.4) 62.1

(29.2) 1.53

(1.13) 63.0

(32.7) 28.8

(18.2) 5.4

20.5

3.6

(7.1)

(30.8)

(4.0) 778

(140)

(248) 533

6.5 (3.9)

82 (55)

0.24 (0.44) 0.47

(0.51) 6.18

(0.39) 0.35

(0.49) 0.53

(0.51) 0.00

(0.00)

56.0 68.6 (27.7) (28.4) 68.9 74.1

(32.5) (30.9) 63.8 74.1

(22.1) (24.4)

72.0 82.5 (21.9) (19.9)

30.2 40.9 (26.8) (25.3) 60.3 65.2

(33.2) (34.3) 1.53 1.83

(0.98) (1.36) 67.2 62.2

29.8 27.9 (13.2) (12.7)

4.6 3.0 (6.1) (3.3)

21.7 30.9 (33.3) (39.5)

3.6 3.4 (3.9) (3.7)

(16.8) (21.4)

867 897 (143) (159) 556 599

(255) (275) 6.8 6.9

(3.7) (3.4)

124 188 (144) (244)

0.41 0.59 (0.51) (0.51) 0.29 0.18

(0.47) (0.39) 0.29 0.47

(0.47) (0.51) 0.47 0.24

(0.51) (0.44) 0.53 0.53

(0.51) (0.51) 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00)

71.3 72.3 (28.6) (28.3) 72.0 78.7

(30.6) (30.6) 77.7 72.8

(24.6) (23.3)

82.3 84.4 (20.8) (20.2)

52.3 47.2 (34.2) (34.2) 68.8 70.1

(30.5) (29.8) 2.11 2.23

(1.66) (1.83) 63.8 75.6

(19.8) (21.1) 24.7 30.2

(13.9) (13.9) 3.1 6.3

(3.0) (5.0) 33.2 33.2

(41.1) (44.9) 1.5 1.1

(2.6) (2.1) 932 944

(103) (105) 686 652

(297) (299) 6.7 6.7

(2.7) (2.7)

191 134 (280) (173)

0.53 0.65 (0.51) (0.49) 0.29 0.18

(0.47) (0.39) 0.24 0.29

(0.11) (0.47) 0.24 0.29

(0.47) (0.49) 0.53 0.53

(0.51) (0.51) 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00)

75.2 (27.9) 75.4

(29.1) 66.1

(26.1)

85.7 (19.3)

50.0 (32.6) 67.5

(30.6) 2.11

(1.61) 84.8

(23.8) 33.4

(17.4)

(6.7) 37.9

(43.7) 2.8

(4.6)

8.9

946 (106) 639

(300) 6.7

(2.7)

122 (175)

0.59 (0.51)

0.18 (0.39)

0.35 (0.49)

0.35 (0.49)

0.53 (0.51)

0.00 (0.00)


APPENDICES 149

Appendix VI continued

Variable Symbol 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84

Rice environment (irrigated)

Rice environment (dry zone)

Rainfall relative to normal

Program life (year)

Rice yield (t/ha)

X 20

X 21

X 22

X 23

Y

0.24 (0.44) 0.18

(0.39) 1.46

(0.76) 1.00

(0.00) 2.28

(0.39)

0.24 (0.44) 0.18

(0.39) 1.48

(0.77) 1.141

2.88 (0.48)

(0.00)

0.24 (0.44) 0.18

(0.39) 1.50

(0.78) 1.73

(0.00) 3.17

(0.62)

0.24 (0.44) 0.18

(0.39) 1.52

(0.79) 2.00

(0.00) 3.55

(0.82)

0.24 (0.44) 0.18

(0.39) 1.54

(80.80) 2.24

(0.00) 3.64

(0.72)

0.24 (0.44) 0.18

(0.39) 1.56

(0.81) 2.45

(0.00) 3.74

(0.74)

0.24 (0.44)

0.18 (0.39)

1.58 (0.82)

2.65 (0.00)

3.52 (0.65)

a TSP = Triple superphosphate, MOP = muriate potash, MV = modern variety; figure in () = Standard deviation,


Appendix VII. Means and standard deviations of variables (52 program townships).

All combined

Variable Symbol (308 obs) (17 obs) (31 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs)

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

1977-84 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1982-84

Area (%) sown X 1

Row trans- X 2

with MV

planted

Area (%) sown X 3

area (%)

with 25 to 30-day-old

Area (%) sown X 3 ' seedlings

with 20- x 15-cm spacing

area (%)

ment area (%)

(t/ha)

lntercultivated X 4

Water manage- X 5

Manure applied X 6

Urea applied X 7

TSP applied (kg/ha)

MOP applied

Pest-protected

Pest-infested area (%)

Total labor used area (%)

(d/10 ha)

(kg/ha)

(kg/ha)

X 7 '

X 7 "

X 8

X 9

X 10

55.7

58.1

59.1

64.9

35.9

50.4

27.8

37.3

29.3

33.1

32.8

36.6

26.1 23.9

13.8 18.3

31.1 20.7

20.9 20.6

5.8 11.0

29.6 33.5

33.2 25.0

30.9 31.6

43.8 27.2

36.5 30.3

19.8 25.0

44.5 35.1

41.6

51.2

50.9

56.6

24.1

41.4

25.2 58.9 23.9 63.9

39.1 64.6 35.2 66.9

23.6 67.5 23.3 69.5 23.9

33.6 70.4 33.7 68.2 33.3

28.9 64.3 28.0 69.5 27.7 66.7 25.6 63.2 27.7

32.3 74.4 28.1 74.2 28.9 75.8 28.7 74.5 28.9

28.3 40.0 30.6 45.6

36.4 55.2 36.7 55.2

33.9 42.5 33.2 46.9 34.6

36.3 55.7 35.7 54.6 37.2

1.32

55.0

22.5

4.0

19.6

2.5

1.37

24.9

15.1

4.9

32.5

6.6

1.09 1.20

33.0 19.2

9.7 10.7

1.8 3.7

13.1 26.3

2.1 2.9

858 131 658 128

1.18 1.07

51.1 24.9

20.9 17.1

3.8 6.2

18.4 32.4

2.0 3.4

753 131

0.99

45.4

19.9

2.8

11.4

1.6

799

1.02 1.37 1.36 1.43

26.0 49.6 20.6 53.2

15.5 20.9 12.3 20.9

4.3 2.5 3.0 2.4

24.6 18.9 32.6 24.3

2.8 3.8 10.9 2.7

130 868 116 913

1.66 1.49 1.48 1.5 1.4

19.8 65.9 22.5 70.6 24.3

13.3 27.9 15.2 27.9 15.5

2.6 6.0 5.9 7.0 5.3

34.7 25.6 36.9 20.9 33.8

7.4 2.6 7.2 2.4 3.6

87 917 89 918 90

All combined 1977-84 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1982-84



Area per extension worker (ha)

No. of production camps in township:

No. of staff trained during crop year

Farmer training (high level)

Farmer training (medium

Voluntary labor level)

Voluntary labor (high level)

(medium level)

Rice environment (delta)

Rice environment (coastal)

Rice environment (irrigated)

Rice environment (dry zone)

X 11

X 12

X 13

X 14

X 15

X 16

X 17

X 18

X 19

X 20

X 21

847 635 1426 1050 1019 945 1011 7 50 761 539 764 448 713 377 692 381

5.1 3.0 1.5 1.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 3.5 5.7 2.8 5.8 2.4 5.8 2.4 5.8 2.4

96 148 18 32 49 57 66 97 121 168 123 190 115 157 109 157

0.44 0.50

0.32 0.47

0.16 0.37

0.27 0.44

0.58 0.49

0.09 0.28

0.15 0.36

0.09 0.28

0.12

0.24

0.06

0.12

0.53

0.00

0.24

0.18

0.33

0.44

0.24

0.33

0.51

0.00

0.44

0.39

0.19

0.32

0.10

0.23

0.52

0.06

0.23

0.13

0.40

0.48

0.30

0.43

0.51

0.25

0.43

0.34

0.38

0.38

0.15

0.25

0.60

0.10

0.13

0.08

0.49

0.49

0.36

0.44

0.50

0.30

0.34

0.27

0.54

0.29

0.21

0.29

0.60

0.10

0.13

0.08

0.50

0.46

0.41

0.46

0.50

0.30

0.34

0.27

0.46

0.37

0.15

0.21

0.60

0.10

0.13

0.08

0.50

0.48

0.36

0.41

0.50

0.30

0.34

0.27

0.54

0.29

0.17

0.29

0.60

0.10

0.13

0.08

0.50

0.46

0.38

0.46

0.50

0.30

0.34

0.27

0.52

0.33

0.19

0.38

0.60

0.10

0.13

0.08

0.50

0.47

0.40

0.49

0.50

0.30

0.34

0.27

All combined



1977-84 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1982-84

Rainfall rela- X 22 1.26 0.70 1.46 0.76 1.38 0.76 1.21 0.68 tive to normal

Program life (yr) X 23 1.81 0.51 1.00 0.00 1.23 0.21 1.35 0.32

Rice yield Y 3.19 0.68 2.28 0.39 2.58 0.53 2.75 0.58 (t/ha)

1.22

1.69 3.31

0.68

0.25 0.58

1.97 3.47

0.22 0.51

1.2 0.69 1.25

2.21 3.61

0.70

0.19 0.58

1.27

2.43 3.47

0.71

0.18 0.47

Appendix VIII. Correlation coefficients between variables.

Varia- Y X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 8 X 9 X 10 X 11 X 12 X 13 X 14 X 15 X 16 X 17 X 18 X 19 X 20 X 21 X 22 X 23 ble

Y 0.49 0.40 -0.05 0.37 -0.21 0.51 0.41 0.56 0.04 0.28 -0.23 0.30 1.00 0.40 0.14 0.31 -0.42 0.30

0.05 0.19 -0.07 0.39 0.10 0.21 0.06 0.19 -0.07 0.39 0.36 0.00 0.15 -0.18 0.27 0.36 -0.05 0.15 -0.21 0.28 1.00 0.03 0.23 -0.40 0.24

0.02 0.14 0.16 0.20 1.00 0.07 -0.12 -0.02

1.00 -0.33 0.24 1.00 -0.20

1.00

1.00 0.61 1.00

0.47 0.41 0.43 0.28 0.54 0.49 1.00 0.58

1.00

0.39 0.37 0.52

0.58 0.13

1.00

0.32 0.41 0.37 0.21 0.13 1.19 1.00

0.24 0.32 0.21 0.06 0.05 0.28 0.41 0.25 1.00

0.17 0.04 0.10

0.10 0.17

0.12 0.00

-0.05 0.13

-0.02

-0.10 0.04

0.27 1.00

0.29 0.27

-0.03 0.22

0.17 0.23 0.12 0.07 -0.09 0.09

-0.02 0.05

0.24 0.28 1.00

-0.11 0.01

-0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03

-0.10 0.01

0.61 1.00

0.10 0.12 0.09

0.10 0.01

0.14 0.09 0.15

-0.08 0.18

-0.01 0.04

0.32 0.31

-0.06 0.14

1.00

0.16 0.24 0.05

0.01 0.23

0.07 0.11 0.14 0.02 0.10

-0.14 0.08

0.15 0.04 0.07 0.05

-0.27 1.00

-0.07 0.24

-0.22 0.04

0.23 0.02 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 -0.11 -0.38 0.25 0.35 0.20 0.00 0.20

-0.01 0.16

1.00

-0.11 0.06 -0.23 -0.11 -0.25 0.14 0.34 0.22 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.10

-0.22 0.09 0.04 -0.36 0.25 0.04 -0.04 0.27 0.16 -0.28 0 39 0.06 -0.18 0.12 0.22 -0.04 -0.01 0.17 0.26 0.14 0.07 0.11 -0.25 -0.09

-0.17 -0.12 -0.07 -0.16 0.06 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.10 -0.47

-0.14 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 0 03 -0.01 -0.37 -0.50 -0.37 1.00 -0.13 -0.10

1.00 -0.13 1.00

-0.04 0.21 0.36 0.03

-0.01 0.33 0.26 0.39 0.21 0.09

-0.33 0.20

-0.21 -0.04

-0.21 0.05

-0.02 0.01

-0.33 -0.65

0.71 0.42 1.00

0.63

0.42 0.55

0.34 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.57 0.23 0.06

-0.37 0.56

0.46 0.23 0.21

-0.05 0.18 0.13

-0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 1.00

x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 9 x 10

x 12

x 11

x 13 x 14 x 15 x 16 x 17 x 18 x 19 x 20 x 21 x 22 x 23

Conversion factors

1 kilogram (kg) 1 kilometer (km) 1 metric ton (mt) 1 hectare (ha) 1 acre (ac) 1 basket of rice 1 kyat (1985) 1 US$ (1980) Exchange rate (1948-71) 1US$

Plan periods First Four-Year Plan: Second Four-Year Plan: Third Four-Year Plan: Fourth Four-Year Plan: Twenty-Year Plan:

= 2.205 pounds (lb) = 0.621 mile (mi) = 0.98 ton (t) = 2.471 acres (ac) = 0.8361 square meter (m2) = 20.86 kg or 46 lb = US$0.125 = K8 = K4.76

1971 /72 (1 Apr 1972 - 31 Mar 1982) -Mar 1974 1974/75 - 1977/78 1978/79 - 1981/82 l982/83 - 1985/86 1974/75 -1993/94

APPENDICES 155

Index

Adas, M 6 Africa 125, 137 Agricultural and Rural

Development Corporation 41, 44-45, 68, 72, 83

Agricultural and Rural Development Five-Year Plan 37, 39, 44

Agricultural Corporation 2, 63, 67, 70-74, 81, 83-85, 87-88, 91-94, 96, 106, 110-111, 120, 127

agricultural development 9, 27,

agricultural loans 7-8, 18, 23-24, 40-41, 45, 55-56, 63, 78, 131, 138

33, 39, 41-44, 48-49, 56, 71, 75-78, 111-112, 126, 129

Agricultural Mechanization Department 113-115

agricultural research 27, 40, 44-

Agricultural Research Committee

Agricultural Research Institute

Agricultural research programs

Agricultural Science Research

agricultural sector 14, 44-46, 60,

45, 64, 79-83, 126, 129, 131

81

40, 45, 67, 70, 80-82

80

Division 81

78-80, 87-88, 107,137

agricultural sector plan 8, 39-40, 44, 47, 50-53, 56-57, 63, 78, 80- 81, 83-84, 95, 115, 131

agriculture 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 14, 24, 28, 43-45, 56, 67, 72, 77, 84-85, 88, 110, 112, 131-132

Agriculture and Farm Produce Trade Corporation 76, 116- 125,128

agriculturists 25 Agriculturists' Loan Act 24, 42 agrochemicals 23, 40, 73-75, 91,

agroecological zone 2, 10 Akyab 27 Alaungsithu 46 Applied Research Division 80,

Arakan 6, 15, 17, 58-59, 65, 94 area 7-10, 17-21, 26-27, 30, 33-34,

93

81

38, 41, 43-44, 46-47, 57-58, 60, 65-67, 77, 80, 84-85, 88, 94-97, 98-105, 112-114, 116, 120, 126, 137-138

Asia 1, 30-31, 70, 125, 137 Asian Development Bank 56, 70,

73, 76, 112, 121, 135 awareness 84

INDEX 157

Bangladesh 1, 70 Barker, R A 31, 34, 35 barter 9, 51, 124 Bay of Bengal 1, 4 Beale, R A 21, 66 BIMAS 61 Binns, B O 31 bran 23, 26, 30, 78 British 6, 7, 8, 17, 30, 32, 37 British Colonial Government 6,

buffalo 26 bullock 26, 28 Burma Railway Corporation 110,

Burma Socialist Program Party 56, 87

Burmese Independent Government 6, 37

byat 21, 22

17, 37, 48, 129

117

C4-63 65, 66 capital 7, 17-18, 23, 29, 34, 41, 47,

Cheng, S H 6, 17, 24, 29, 30 Chettyar 24, 25, 38 Chin 15, 59, 65 China 1, 51 Chinese 24, 25, 30 civil war 130 competition 86, 88, 92, 106, 124 cooperatives 41, 42, 57, 118, 121,

costs and returns 10, 34-35, 52,

cotton - rice 116 credit 9, 38, 41-43, 48, 52, 75-76,

cropping intensity 27-29, 37, 47,

cropping pattern 28, 47 cut worms 73 Czechoslovakia 51

57

122, 127

108-109, 126, 127

82, 138

73, 78, 113, 115-116

delta 2, 7, 14, 17, 19, 25, 27, 28-29,

demonstration 40, 45-46, 82-84,

Department of Agriculture 21-

33, 35, 58-60, 94-106, 108, 112

86, 88

23, 27-29, 35, 40-41, 44-46, 52, 59, 66, 83

Land Records 20, 21, 27, 32,

Divisional People's Council 55,

draft cattle 10-12, 19, 23-27, 29,

Department of Settlement and

39-40, 43, 51, 65, 118-120

78, 119

30, 39, 43, 44, 47, 76-78, 90, 111, 113-115, 120, 127, 129

ear-cutting caterpillar 23 eastern and northeastern zone

Emata 21-22, 117-118 environment 7, 58-60, 66, 86, 94-

59-60, 94-96, 191, 103, 105, 108

100, 104-106, 108, 127, 130-131, 135, 138 rainfed 33, 58-59, 65, 94-97,

dry zone 3, 28, 31, 59-60, 94-

irrigated 97, 100-101, 105, 106, 108 coastal 2, 14, 19, 27, 29, 33,

101, 105-106, 108

97, 102-103, 105, 106, 108, 115

59-60, 94-99, 102, 104-106, 108 Escuro, P B 65 evaluation 63-66, 84, 93, 106-107,

131, 135 experimental stations 27, 40, 63-

export 3, 6-9, 17, 29, 31-32, 48-51, 64, 67, 70, 80-81, 83, 131-132

58, 63, 96, 117, 121, 123-125, 128-129

extension 10, 22-23, 28-29, 40, 44, 45, 57, 67, 72, 79-80, 82-83, 85, 87, 89, 95, 97, 99, 105-106, 123, 126, 129

European 7, 30, 32, 66


farmers 6-9, 13, 18, 23, 25-26, 29, 34, 39, 40, 52, 56, 60, 63-65, 67, 73, 77, 82-87, 89, 97-98, 102, 105- 107, 110-111, 121, 127-131, 134- 135

Farmers’ Assiayones 56, 85, 87,

farmer participatory research and 127

extension approach 131-133, 135-136, 138

farmers’ seminar 56 farmers’ training 97-103, 105 fertilizer 8, 10, 23, 28, 40-41, 44-

45, 60, 67-73, 78, 82-83, 86-87, 91-93, 95, 98-99, 102, 104-105, 109, 112, 121, 126-127 ammonium phosphate 40, 69 ammonium sulfate 40, 69 muriate of potash 69-72, 93,

triple superphosphate 40-41,

urea 40-41, 69-72, 93, 97-98,

97-98,100-101,105

69-72, 97-98, 100-101, 105

100-101, 103-105 fishery 56, 107 fish meal 23 Food and Agriculture Organization

forestry 45, 56, 79, 107

General Administration

General Administration loans

German Democratic Republic 51 Grant, J W 18-19, 21, 32, 34-35, 52 gross domestic product 2, 3, 79 groundnut cake 26 guano 23 Gulf of Martaban 1, 4

Harvey, G E 14 Herdt, R W 31, 35, 100

1, 2, 56, 80

Department 75

41, 43

Hill, J 2 Hmawbi 27, 90 Hungary 51

immigration 7, 17 impact 6, 8-9, 14-15, 20, 34, 43,

46, 51-53, 79, 87, 96, 99-100, 102- 104, 106-108, 110, 127-128, 130, 134,138

Imperial Japanese Army 37, 38 independence 6, 8, 37, 39, 48, 52,

India 17, 32-33, 50, 66, 24 Indians 7, 17-18, 24, 30 Indonesia 50, 61-62, 66, 70, 124 industrial sector 80, 87 Inland Water Transport

Corporation 117 inputs 10, 63-64, 67, 75, 82-84, 87,

80

91, 95, 106, 108-109, 120, 123, 126

interest 8, 24, 35, 41, 43-44, 52, 75, 78, 84, 111

International Rice Research Institute 9, 56, 61, 63, 82

investment 17, 23, 25, 27, 44, 49, 53, 57, 79-80, 87, 106, 126, 130- 131

investment plan 51 IR5 63, 65, 66 IR5 mutant 65, 66 IR8 63 IR42 66 Irrawaddy 7, 14, 15, 17-19, 58,

irrigation 3, 14, 28, 44-46, 58, 60, 65-66, 94, 122

63, 79-80, 87, 91, 97, 112-113, 116, 121, 126, 130, 138

Japan 50-51, 121 Jayasuriya S 3, 109 jute - rice 116

INDEX 159

Kachin 15, 59, 65, 94 kanzo 19 kaing 19 Karen 15, 59, 65, 94, 103 kaukkyi 14, 22 kauklat 14, 22 kaukyin 14 Kayah 15, 59, 65, 94 Khush, G S 59 Kyaukse 63

labor 7, 10-11, 25, 29-30, 34-35,

106, 108-110, 120, 127, 134 land 7-8, 18-19, 24-26, 29, 34, 37,

47, 52, 75, 87-88, 90, 97-103, 105-

44, 52, 90, 112, 115, 127, 129-130, 137-138

Land and Rural Development Corporation 44

land improvement 45, 80 Land Improvement Loan Act 24,

landlord 8, 25, 29, 30, 34-35, 56,

Land Nationalization Act 8, 44 land productivity 25 Letywezin 21-22, 117-118 livestock 30, 45, 56, 79, 107 Lower Burma 7, 17, 19, 23, 25-26,

41, 42

127

28-30, 45, 47, 65-66, 80, 93, 112, 115-116, 133

Lwin Chit 32, 51

Magwe 5, 15, 58-59, 94 Malaysia 30, 65 Mandac, A M 100 Mandalay 5, 15, 27, 58-59, 65, 94,

manure 23, 28, 34, 78, 86-87, 97,

market 10, 25, 29, 32, 49, 50, 72,

Martaban 6

112

100-102, 104-105, 109, 127

124, 126, 128-129, 137

Masagana 99 61 Mashnri 65, 66 mass participation 55, 57, 86, 88,

97, 135 mayin rice 13 mechanization 28, 44, 46-47, 79,

113, 126 Middle Burma 65 Middle East 125 Midon 21-22, 117-118 millers 21, 29-30, 48-49, 66, 116,

milling industry 29-30, 32, 121,

milling outturn 22, 23, 66, 121-

Ministry of Trade 116, 117 Mon 15, 58-59, 65, 94 moneylenders 7-8, 18, 24-25, 33-

monsoon 1-2, 13, 25, 28, 33, 95,

Moscardi, E 82 motivation 81, 97, 99, 104, 130,

Mudon 27 Myanma Agricultural Bank 75-

Myanma (Burma) Economic Bank

Myanma Export and Import

Myaungmya 27

National Research Institute 85 Ngasein 21-22, 117-118 Ngwetoe 65 Nyi Nyi 2

121-122

123, 125

123

34, 38, 41, 43, 52, 75, 111, 129

115, 118, 120, 123, 126

132-133, 135

76, 78, 92, 115, 127

110

Corporation 117-118, 124

Okpo 110-111, 123 Okpo Liquor Shop 110 Okpo Police Station 110 Okpo Railway Station 110


Okpo Small Loan Department

Overseas Economic Development 110, 111

Fund (Japan) 121

Pegu 6, 14-15, 58, 65-66, 94, 112, 122

Phalon 92 Philippines 9, 56, 61-63, 70 precipitation 1, 2 procurement 10, 45, 48-49, 52, 71-

procurement prices 48, 52, 117 production camp 89-92, 95, 97-

production equity 6, 8-10, 34, 52,

production stability 6-7, 9-10, 33-

production sustainability 6-7, 9-

profit 6, 52, 73, 108-110, 126 Pyidawtha Plan 37, 56 Pyithu Hluttaw 57, 71

Rainfall 4, 19, 33, 46, 51, 95, 97-

Rangoon 5, 14-15, 33, 40, 48, 58,

research congress 81 Research Policy Direction Board

81 resource-poor farmers 130-134,

136 Restaurant and Beverage Trade

Corporation 110-111 Revolutionary Council 6 Revolutionary Government 55 rice caseworm 23,73 rice classification 13-14, 21 rice consumption 31, 49, 118,

rice cultivation 3, 7, 10, 17, 19, 25,

73, 76, 91, 117-126, 128-129

100, 105-106

126, 130-131, 135

34, 51-55, 126, 131, 135

10, 33-34, 51-52, 126, 131, 135

100, 102, 104, 113, 126

65-66, 71, 80, 92, 94, 110, 122

120-121, 123, 137

40, 88, 114

rice - groundnut 29, 47, 116 rice hispa 23, 74 rice mills 29-30, 48 rice production 3, 6-10, 20-21, 23,

25-26, 29, 31-34, 37-40, 49, 51-52, 55, 57, 62-63, 77, 95-97,102-103, 119, 123-126, 129-130, 137

rice - pulse 28, 47, 116 rice - sesamum 28, 47, 116 rice storage 9-10, 25, 29, 49, 50,

66, 91, 117, 123,128 rice - sunflower 116 Road Transport Corporation 117

S 1 - Fluvisols, Gleysols 1, 5 S 2 - Lithosols, Regosols, Andosols

S 3 - Vertisols 1, 5 S 4 - Luvisols, Nitrosols 5 S 5 - Aerisols, Terralsols 5 Sagaing 15, 59, 65, 94, 112 Security and administrative council

seed 6, 22-23, 25, 27-29, 34, 40,

5

55, 75

52, 63, 67-68, 91, 109, 120-121, 123, 127

seed distribution 22, 40, 45, 66-67 Selective concentrative extension

strategy 10, 85-87, 94, 96, 112,130-131

Shan 15, 59, 65, 94, 103 Shwebo 93 Shwe-ta-soke 65-66,130 Simla Plan 37, 48 small mills 30, 48-49, 121-122 Socialist Republic of the Union of

Burma 6, 14, 55, 57, 61-62, 65, 68, 70, 74, 76, 79, 97, 107, 113, 116-117,119

soils 1, 3, 7, 29 soil distribution 1, 4 South America 125, 137 South Indians 24-25 spike-harrow 12

INDEX 161

Sri Lanka 32-33, 50, 66, 124 State Agricultural Bank 41-43,75 State Agricultural Marketing Board

Steinberg, D I 49 Suez Canal 7 Swanson, B E 84

Taikkyi 65, 92-93 Taungpulu 46 technology 6, 10, 27, 60, 63-65,

48-49, 52, 116-117, 119

80, 82-88, 92, 96, 105-106,126- 127, 130-132, 134-138

temperature 2, 59, 122 Tenancy Act 25 tenants 25, 30 Tenasserim 1, 6, 15, 17, 59, 65, 94 Thailand 32 threshing 11-12, 25, 29, 34, 66-67,

tillage 11-12, 25, 77, 86-87, 90,

Tin Myint 65 Township People's Council 55,

77, 90, 109, 115, 122

113-115, 134

78, 85, 87-88, 90, 93, 99, 120, 122, 133

121

51, 73, 108, 116, 118, 121, 123-

tractors 28, 45-47, 78, 113-115,

trade 27, 29-30, 32-33, 35, 37, 48-

125,128 Trade Corporation See Agriculture

and Farm Produce Trade Corporation

traders 29, 48, 52, 116-117,122 transplanting 11, 13, 30, 34, 88,

transportation 10, 25, 48-50, 71, 93, 106, 109

77, 84, 91, 102, 122-123, 129

trial adoption 63, 65, 84 Two-Year Economic Plan 37

United Kingdom 30 United Nations Development

Programme 56, 80 Upper Burma 7, 17, 19, 26, 28, 30,

45-47, 63, 65, 80, 93, 112-113, 115-116, 133

U Thein Aung 65

variables 97-98, 100-102, 104 varieties 20-23, 27-28, 33, 40, 56,

63, 65-66, 68, 70, 75, 81, 83, 86- 87, 93-95, 104-106, 112, 114-116, 120, 123, 126-127

Veterinary Department 26, 27 Village Extension Manager 83-

voluntary labor 88-89, 91

Walinsky, L J 41-42, 45 Whole Township Rice Production

85, 87, 89, 93

Program 61, 63, 69-70, 75, 82,

111, 120, 127, 130, 132 Winkelmann, D 82 Win Khin 2, 72, 93, 135 winnowing 11, 34 World Bank 56, 67, 85, 112 World War II 8-9, 25, 29, 48, 130

Ye Goung 1 yield 7, 10, 18-23, 28, 33-34, 38-

85-87, 89, 92-96, 105-107, 110-

39, 49, 57-58, 60-62, 65, 73, 86, 93, 95-100, 102-107, 109, 115, 120, 123, 130, 135-136, 138

yield per hectare 19-20, 39, 60-62, 93, 95-97, 105-107, 109, 123


a century of rice improvement in burma

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