a classicist under constraint justus lipsius and the revival of stoic
TRANSCRIPT
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A Classicist under Constraint
Justus Lipsius and the Revival of Stoic Determinism in the De Constantia
Peter I. Osorio
Honors Thesis
Margaret Graver, Advisor
Department of Classics
Dartmouth College
May 2012
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Verum quid Seneca, quid Epictetus, quibus te inhaerere video, nobis ad salutem conferunt?
-L. Torrentius I. Lipsio (1584 04 05)
Spirat nescio quis calor in Senecae aut Epicteti scriptis, qui ad lectorem quoque pervenit, nec disserere
illi magis de virtute videntur, quam inserere et inculcare.
-I. Lipsius L. Torrentio (1584 05 06)
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Table of Contents
Abbreviations 1
Preface 3
Chapter 1: Justus Lipsius and the De Constantia 5
Chapter 2: Senecas De Providentia 27
Chapter 3: Stoic Determinism 41
Chapter 4: Lipsian Determinism 76
Chapter 5: The Physiologia 126
Chapter 6: The De Constantia Reconsidered 150
Summary of Conclusions 182
Appendix: Seneca, Epistulae Morales 65.2-14 184
Bibliography 188
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Abbreviations
Apul. Pl. Apuleius De platone
August. CD. Augustine De civitate dei
Calc. Tim. Calcidius Timaeus, commentary
Cic. Fat. Cicero De fato
Cic. Fin. Cicero De finibus
Cic. Parad. Cicero Paradoxa Stoicorum
Cic. Phil. Cicero Orationes Phillipicae
De con. Iusti Lipsi De Constantia Libri Duo
Div. Hal. Iusti Lipsi Diva Virgo Hallensis
DL Diogenes Laertius Lives
Ep. ad Belg. Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuriae ad Belgas
Ep. ad Germ Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuria Singularis ad Germanos
Ep. ad Ital. Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuria Singularis ad Italos et
Hispanos
Ep. Misc. Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuriae Miscellaneae
Ep. Quaest. Iusti Lipsi Epistolicarum Quaestionum Libri V
Epic. Diss. Epictetus Dissertationes
Eusebius Praep. ev. Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica
Gel. Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae
ILE Iusti Lipsi Epistolae
Isid. Orig. Isidore Origines
Jerome De vir. ill. Jerome De viris illustribus
Lactantius Div. Inst. Lactantius Divinae Institutiones
LS Long and Sedley 1987
Luc. Lucan Bellum Civile
Man. Iusti Lipsi Manuductionis ad Stoicum Philosophiam Libri Tres
Nem. Nat. Hom Nemesius De hominis natura
Origen Cels. Origen Contra Celsum
Pol. Iusti Lipsi Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex
PS Iusti Lipsi Physiologiae Stoicorum Libri Tres
Quint. Inst. Quintilian Institutio Oratoria
Sen. Ben. Seneca De Beneficiis
Sen. Clem. Seneca De Clementia
Sen. Con. Seneca De Constantia Sapientis
Sen. Cons. ad Hel. Seneca De Consolatione ad Helviam
Sen. Ep. Seneca Epistulae Morales
Sen. Nat. Seneca Naturales Quaestiones
Sen. Prov. Seneca De Providentia
Stob. Ecl. Phys. Stobaeus Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae
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SVF von Armin, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
Thom. Aq. SCG Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles
Thom. Aq. ST Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica
Tim. Plato Timaeus
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Preface
In the summer before my freshman fall, I attended a classics summer program at
Dartmouth. There, I enrolled in Professor Gravers seminar on Marcus Porcius Cato. Incidental
to reading Livys biography of Cato and Lucans Pharsalia, I was introduced to Senecan
philosophy. Over the past four years, I have returned to Seneca and his dialogues, the De
providentia in particular, for his talent to calm and to keep me in appreciation of life. While I
read Seneca for my benefit, I did not consider my faith threatened by a study of Stoicism.
Personal interest of compatibilism between Christianity and Stoicism led to my introduction to
Justus Lipsius, and this thesis is the product of the past year of study. I have made a conscious
effort to separate personal opinion from my examination of Justus Lipsius and the De constantia,
and it is everywhere my intention to present an unbiased and critical evaluation of Lipsian
determinism. I have inevitably come to feel a close kinship with Lipsius, and I am pleased to
contribute to the literature on this imperfect but endearing classicist.
I am immensely grateful to Margaret Graver. Her insights on Stoic philosophy were
necessary to the development of this thesis; her demanding precision of language and reasoning
has corrected my faults; she has improved my Latin and edited my translations; she has given me
an appreciation for the intricacies of Stoic physics; but most importantly, she has kindled in me a
deeper resolution to study classics. I am honored to end my undergraduate studies under the
guidance of Professor Graver, who first introduced me to Stoicism almost four years ago. I thank
Professor Ariane Schwartz for agreeing to act as a reader for this thesis and for her help in the
early phases of this study. Her knowledge of resources for Renaissance texts saved me much
trouble and hassle. I am also grateful to Professor James Murphy of the government department,
for his insights early in the development of this thesis. I especially thank Professor Pramit
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Chaudhuri. Without his lectures in Epics of Greece and Rome during my freshman fall, I
would not have studied classics further. His subsequent instruction in Senecan drama, Valerius
Flaccus, and neo-Latin tragedy has refined my appreciation for the Latin language. For his
sincere concern for my intellectual and stylistic development, I owe him my regard. I thank my
other professors of the Classics departmentProfessors Stewart, Ulrich, Kretler, Tell, and
Farofor their dedication to teaching. They have made Reed hall an easy place for learning. I
also thank my high school Latin teachers, Mr. Lou Latina, may he rest in peace, and Sister
Lorraine Forester; they prepared me well. I thank my friends, especially Thomas, Andy, Henry
and Kelsey, for their fellowship. Finally, I thank my father, mother, sister and brother. They have
been exceedingly patient as I, perhaps too often, dismissed their calls and emails while writing in
the library. Above all, I thank my parents for their twenty-two years of sacrifice and support that
have allowed me to study classics at DartmouthI love you.
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Chapter 1: Justus Lipsius and the De Constantia
1.1. Introduction
Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) was a Flemish classicist of the Northern Renaissance. Along
with Erasmus and Hugo Grotius, Justus Lipsius is among the foremost names of Dutch
humanism. He is considered the father of Neostoicism, a philosophical movement in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that sought to syncretize ancient Stoicism with contemporary
Christianity.1 Guillame Du Vair drew directly from the Stoic ideas Lipsius promoted and made
similar efforts to combine Stoicism with Christian teaching. Du Vairs Philosophie morale des
Stoques (1594) expressed his hope that his audience would derive comfort from a combination
of Stoic doctrine and Christian teaching.2 In a similar fashion, Francisco de Quevedo drew upon
Lipsius Manuductio for the Nombre, origen, inteno, recomendacin y decencia de la doctrina
estoica (1635).3 Others who took direct influence from Lipsius include: Montesquieu, Bishop
Bossuet and Pierry Bayle in France; Francis Bacon and Joseph Hall in England; and Juan de
Vera y Figueroa and Francisco Sanchez in Spain.4 Lipsius work on Stoicism would later inform
the philosophical systems of Spinoza and Descartes, while Leibniz and Locke used Lipsius as a
source for information about Stoic philosophy.5
Lipsius, however, was not the first Renaissance scholar to write on the similarity between
the philosophy of the Stoa and Christianity. The revival of Stoicism in the Renaissance began
with Petrarch (1304-74) and his endorsement of Stoic moral philosophy in De remediis utriusque
fortunae (1366). Nevertheless, Petrarch firmly rejected Stoic doctrines that are in conflict with
1 Papy 2011.
2 This work appeared as preface to his edition of Epictetus Enchiridion. See Kraye 1988, 371-2.
3 Kraye 1988, 372-3.
4 Papy 2011.
5 Kraye 1996, 152; Schrijvers 1986, 279; Papy 2011. J.B. Schneewind also links Lipsius and Du Vair with the
perfectionist ethical theories of Descartes and Leibniz (Cooper 2004, 26). See Schneewind, The Invention of
Autonomy (1998) chapters 9 and 12.
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Christianitye.g., that suicide is tolerable.6 Petrarch, in his Secretum, and Rabelais (d. 1553),
in his Gargantua, Le Tiers Livre and Le Quart Livre, played with the idea of combining the two
ethical systems of Stoicism and Christianity, yet both always remained firm in their
subordination of philosophy to religion.7 Meanwhile, other writers of the Renaissance purposely
called to mind conflicts between Stoic and Christian moral teachings. Lorenzo Valla (d. 1457)
criticized the Stoic position that virtue was its own reward, and Montaigne (1533-92) regarded
the model of the Stoic sage as not only impractical, but presumptuous as well.8 Salutati remarked
that not even Christ met the Stoics demand for apatheia, and Calvin likewise rejected the Stoic
claim that pity was a vice, arguing that Christ wept for others.9 Among theologians like Valla or
Calvin, who saw rising appreciation for Stoicism as a threat to religion, one figure stands out for
his unconventional relationship with Stoicism. Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) endorses Stoic
metaphysics in his De fato (which he dared not publish in his lifetime), even though he believed
that doing so was at odds with Catholic teaching.10
In the final book of the work, Pomponazzi
discloses his preference for Stoic determinism and subjects all events to natural and astral laws.
Nevertheless he considered himself to be a devout Christian. Pomponazzi exemplifies the
principle that religion and philosophy may be diametrically opposed yet still coexist in the mind
of the thinker.11
In general, Stoic moral philosophy is harmonious at many points with Christian ethics.
Early Christian writers were themselves informed by Stoic ethical doctrines (see 1.4). Although
writers like Petrarch had already sought to harmonize Christian ethics with Stoic moral
6 Kraye 2007, 100.
7 Kraye 1988, 368.
8 Kraye 1988, 363, 366-7.
9 Kraye 1988, 368-9. Calvin rejects Stoic ethical doctrines regarding virtue and vice in his preface to his
commentary of Senecas De clementia and in his Intitutio religionis Christianae (III. 7.2, 8.9). 10
Poppi 1988, 656-7. 11
Poppi 1988, 660.
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philosophy, there was little effort by Lipsius time to make Stoic physics compatible with
Christian natural philosophy. Pomponazzi wrote privately about Stoic physics, but he did not
attempt to harmonize them. What, then, did Lipsius Neostoicism entail: an adaption of Stoic
ethical doctrines that others had already attempted or an incorporation of Stoic physics as well?
In this thesis, I examine how Lipsius revives Stoic thought. I am interested in both the
extent to which Stoicism informs Lipsius philosophy and the manner in which Lipsius presents
Stoicism. I limit my examination to Lipsius seminal Neostoic work, De Constantia Libri Duo
(1584).12
The De constantia was Lipsius first major philosophical work and the only one that is
explicitly devoted to promulgating a philosophical program.13
R.V. Young has called the De
constantia arguably the most significant, influential, and characteristic work of northern
humanism.14
The De constantia is concerned with an ethical problem, and Lipsius employs
determinism to inform his solution. Since determinism is central to the main arguments of the De
constantia, I narrow the focus of my study to the set of topics involving determinism: causation,
providence, fate, chance, moral responsibility, and agency. In particular, I am interested in the
problematic position Lipsius places himself when he speaks on determinism. Namely, I find that
deterministic (and characteristically Stoic) thought is more pervasive than what Lipsius explicitly
states about providence and fate. I conclude my study by considering the factors that likely
caused Lipsius to restrain the presence of Stoic determinism in the De constantia. Lipsius
natural philosophy is now beginning to receive scholarly interest (see Hirai 2011), but no modern
scholarsas far as I am aware have spent significant effort evaluating Lipsius determinism as
presented in the De constantia.
12
The earliest publication of the De constantia was August 2, 1583 (ILE I, 83 08 02), but by convention it is usually
dated to 1584. 13
Lipsius two later treatises on Stoicism are written with the explicit goal of aiding in the study of Senecas prose
works by outlining the philosophical system to which he subscribed. 14
Young 2011, xvii.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I introduce Justus Lipsius and outline important details
of his life. I then provide a sketch of the De constantia, its constituent parts, and important
arguments. I end this chapter by discussing the important role Seneca plays in Lipsius thought
and the reception of Seneca that Lipsius inherits. Seneca was a well-received writer of Stoic
ethics, and a personal favorite of Lipsius, and so I use Seneca as a starting point for my study. In
chapter two, my intent is to evaluate how well Senecas moral philosophy can explain any Stoic
influence in Lipsius determinism. In his ethical treatise, De providentia, Seneca has much to say
about determinism that would be useful for Lipsius. Therefore, I compare Senecas De
providentia to the De constantia. I find considerable Senecan influence on Lipsius method of
using determinism as a consolation against public evils. Lipsius arguments, however, go beyond
the scope that Seneca covers in his De providentia. Apart from his comforting words to the
reader, Lipsius details a deterministic system of thought that leads to the main arguments of the
De constantia. In order to evaluate whether Lipsius is drawing upon works of Stoic physics in
addition to moral philosophy, I specify in chapter three an account of Stoic determinism that is
accessible and known to Lipsius. In chapter four, I analyze Lipsian determinism as presented in
the De constantia and judge it against the narrative of Stoic determinism outlined in the previous
chapter. I find that Lipsian determinism is largely informed by Stoic sources, although there are
some issues. On several occasions, Lipsius misrepresents Stoicism and threatens the consistency
of his own determinism by making contradictory claims. In chapter five, I more fully consider
these issues by examining Lipsius later treatise on Stoic physics, the Physiologia. I end the
thesis with a consideration of the circumstantial factors that would have caused Lipsius to
disown the presence of Stoic deterministic thought in his treatise.
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1.2. A Brief Biography
Joost Lips (Latinized as Justus Lipsius) was born in the province of Brabant, Belgium in
1547. Overijse, the village where he was born, lies just outside of Brussels and Leuven. He
studied first with the Jesuits in Cologne and later matriculated at the Catholic university of
Leuven. After compiling three books of textual emendations of Cicero, Propertius, Varro, et al.
in 1566, he went to Rome as secretary to Cardinal Granvelle and stayed for two years in order to
study classical literature.15
After his sojourn in Rome, Lipsius returned to Leuven in 1570 to
continue his education in law. Soon after, Lipsius was driven by the massacres committed under
Duke lvarez of Alba, Spanish general and governor of the Netherlands, to the Viennese court
of Maximillian II and later to the Lutheran university of Jena.16
With his property sacked by
Spanish troops, Lipsius spent two years as chair of History at Jena, before returning to Leuven in
1574.
In 1577, Janus Dousa, a friend from the time of his study at Leuven, invited Lipsius to the
newly founded Calvinist university at Leiden, which lies midway between Rotterdam and
Amsterdam. Around the same time, Don Juan, the new Spanish governor of the Netherlands, was
preparing a campaign to pacify the Low Countries. In anticipation of the oncoming conflict,
Lipsius accepted Dousas invitation and left Leuven in early 1578.17
Lipsius remained in Leiden
for twelve years (1578-1591) where he was chair of History and Latin literature. Due to
controversy over one of his publications, Lipsius left Leiden and returned to Leuven, where he
taught at the Catholic university until his death in 1606.
Lipsius began his scholarly career as a philologist, publishing various works of textual
criticism on such Latin authors as Plautus, Cicero, Tacitus, Livy, Suetonius, both Senecas,
15
His Variae Lectiones Libri Tres were later published at Antwerp in 1569. 16
Gerlo, A. et al. 1978, Introduction. 17
Gerlo, A. et al. 1978, Introduction.
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Statius, Apuleius, Persius, and others.18
His edition of Tacitus (1574) first secured his reputation
as a scholar of critical excellence. At Leiden, Lipsius published his most popular and influential
works, his De constantia (1584) and Politica (1589). The former is a philosophical work for the
benefit of the individual, while the latter is a treatise on proper governance that relies most
heavily on Tacitus. His other major works are his two treatises on Stoicism, the Manuductio and
the Physiologia (1604), followed by his edition of Senecas prose works (1605). Lipsius also
wrote a textbook of epistolary writing, numerous works on Roman history, and a Menippean
satire on classical scholarship. Finally, there is Lipsius lifetime of letter-writing. There exist
over four thousand letters from or to Lipsius that spread over the course of his entire life,
beginning with his early career and ending ten days before his death.19
Lipsius published about
800 of these letters during his lifetime by groups of hundreds (in so-called centuriae). There
remain over a thousand unpublished letters of Lipsius that still remain unstudied.
Lipsius religious life is a matter of some controversy and uncertainty. Born a Catholic,
Lipsius studied in his youth with the Jesuits in Cologne. In order to hold the chair at Lutheran
Jena, Lipsius made an affirmation of Lutheranism. While at Jena, Lipsius made three speeches
that were particularly critical of the church and the Spanish crown. Lipsius compares the Duke of
Alba to Tiberius, calling him a furiosus tyrannus20
and calls the church the scarlet beast and
the Roman whore in reference to the St. Bartholomews Day Massacre of 1572.21
In his later
years, Lipsius disclaimed authorship of such speeches when polemical works against him began
to appear in 1600.22
Similarly, Lipsius made some affirmation of Calvinism in order to teach at
Leiden, although Dousa never pressed Lipsius regarding his religious allegiance. His return to
18
See, for example, Lipsius Electorum Libri. 19
Gerlo, A. et al. 1978, Introduction. 20
Morford 1991, 130. 21
Morford 1991, 128-9. 22
Morford 1991, 126.
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Brabant in 1591 required reconciliation with the Jesuits and a re-affirmation of his Catholic faith.
His unexpected decision to leave Leiden led Protestant colleagues such as Joesph Scaliger and
Isaac Causabon to defame and criticize him even up until his death.23
When he was encouraged
to remember his Stoic consolations on his death-bed, it is said that Lipsius rejected them and
made a final re-affirmation of his faith, saying, those things are vain...this [pointing to the
crucifix] is true constancy.24
On Lispius allegiances and personal beliefs, Morford concludes:
[The] man still eludes us. His inconstancy in religion, the histrionics of his death (at least as
described by his Catholic friends), and the editing, suppression, and amplification of his
correspondence and published work indicate a character whose instinct for self-preservation
was stronger than adherence to the high Stoic principles of his best writing or to one faith at
the price of martyrdom.25
1.3. The De Constantia Libri Duo
The primary text I use for the De constantia is the first (1584) edition. Lipsius released
several more editions during his lifetime, with the second edition published just a year after the
first. Lipsius made no dramatic changes in these later editions, but I do consider these changes in
chapter six. The De constantia was translated into all major European languages shortly after its
initial publication, including English in 1594 by John Stradling.26
R.V. Young has aided my
study greatly with his 2011 translation with notes, which is the only modern English edition that
does not rely on Stradlings translation. I use Young (2011) for my translation of the De
23
Morford 1991, 132. 24
illa sunt vana... haec est vera patientia. The account is from Joannes Woverius, Lipsius pupil and executor (Iusti
Lipsi Opera omnia 1: 185). See Morford 1991, 133n148. 25
Morford 1991, 133. 26
Young 2011, xxviii.
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constantia unless otherwise noted.27
The text I use is from the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in
Munich, which has been digitized by Google.28
For the setting of his treatise, Lipsius fictionalizes his 1571 journey to Vienna. In the first
chapter of book one, Lipsius says that as he was fleeing the disturbances of his native land
(patriae meae turbas), he stopped by Lige to visit some friends, the most important of whom
was Charles Languis. Like Lipsius, Languis (ca. 1521-1573) was himself a noted philologist who
published editions of Ciceros philosophical works and Plautus comedies.29
Within the De
constantia, Languis takes the role of the philosophical teacher in dialogue with the young
Lipsius, the pupil.30
Through the voice of Languis, Lipsius introduces the philosophical aim of
the work:
Itaque non patria fugienda, Lipsi: sed Adfectus sunt: et firmandus ita formandusque hic
animus, ut quies nobis in turbis sit et pax inter media arma.31
And so you must not flee your country, Lipsius, but your emotions. The mind must be so
strengthened and shaped that quiet may be yours amidst tumults and peace amid warfare.
Languis will advance a series of four arguments for the purpose of treating the young Lipsius
present mental infirmity. The De constantia is, above all, a work of ethical discourse between the
philosopher and his student.
Before Languis sets out his four arguments in support of constancy (constantia), he
explains to the young Lipsius why the mind becomes afflicted and why constantia is required to
treat it. Languis explains that the afflicted mind is depressed by itself, not by external wars or
27
Young uses a 1605 edition as the basis for his text and translation, with only a few places where my 1584 text
conflicts. I also deviate from Young at times when I wish to be particularly precise in translating certain
philosophical terms and concepts. 28
The URL is
. 29
Young 2011, 17n2. 30
To distinguish between Lipsius the author and Lipsius the character, I will refer to the former simply as Lipsius
and the latter as Lipsius the pupil or the young Lipsius (Lipsius would have been around 25 when his
fictionalized conversation with Languis took place). 31
De con. 1.1.
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suffering, and thus constantia, defined as an upright and unmoved vigor of the mind that is
neither uplifted nor cast down by outward or chance occurrences,32
is the means by which the
mind can free itself from anxiety and turmoil. The mind that is plagued by opinion, defined as
false judgment (iudicium...fallax), is overtaken by volatile emotions, while the mind that is
fortified through right reason, defined as correct judgment regarding human and divine affairs
(de rebus humanis divinisque...verum iudicium), is always in a stable, tranquil state.33
Languis
thus expounds a theory of the mind in which the interplay between reason and opinion explains
emotive states.
After introducing his theory of the psyche, Lipsius explores how the unhealthy mind
judges things as either good or evil. Because the unhealthy mind is guided by opinion, it makes
false judgments regarding external objects as either beneficial or harmful. External objects are
falsely considered good or evil because they are not in us but around us, and strictly speaking
they neither help nor harm the inner man, that is, the mind.34
Among false goods are wealth,
commendations, power, and health; among false evils are poverty, disgrace, weakness, illness
and death. Lipsius further dissects these false evils into private (privata mala) and public evils
(publica mala). Since the pupil Lipsius is fleeing from Spanish troops, Lipsius focuses on public
evils, which include war, plague, famine, tyranny and massacres. Lipsius says that because
public evils afflict us en masse, and not individually, we are more likely to succumb to sorrow
when faced by them.
Due to the shared experience of adversity, we are more likely to grieve over public evils
even though they are falsely regarded as harmful. In 1.7-12, Lipsius describes three states of
32
De con. 1.4: [Constantiam hic appello,] rectum et immotum animi robur, non elati externis aut fortuitis non
depressi. 33
De con. 1.4. 34
De con. 1.7: [Utraque sic appello,] quae non in nobis, sed circa nos, quaeque interiorem hunc hominem, id est
animum, proprie non iuvant aut laedunt.
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mind (adfecti) that inhibit resistance to public evils. They are: deception (simulatio), nationalism
(pietas), and pity (miseratio). Due to deception, we are able to mask our self-interest as concern
for others. He uses the following example: if there was war in the Indies no one would care, but
if in the Low Countries, everyone weeps and wails. To the pupils reply that the Indies is not his
native country, Languis replies, Fool. Are they not also men of the same stock and seed as
you?35
This leads Lipsius to the second of these mental states, pietas. Lipsius acknowledges that
piety is a virtue when it is defined as the lawful and owed honor and love for God and parents
(legitimum debitumque honorem et amorem in Deum ac parentes), but people often twist this
into an excessive love for country. Love for country does not come from nature, but arises out of
human custom and convention for the protection of property and the safety it provides.36
Lipsius
accepts that we owe respect, service, and sometimes our lives to our country, but no one should
grieve for a contrived institution.37
Lipsius distinguishes the third adfectus, pity (miseratio), from
mercy (misericordia). Lipsius defines pity as the vice of despondency at the sight of anothers
evil (vitium...ad speciem alieni mali collabentis) while mercy is an inclination of the mind
towards relieving anothers suffering (inclinationem animi ad alienam...luctum sublevandum).38
If one sees another in need, the virtuous response is aid, not wallowing in sorrow. These three
states of mind are obstacles to the recognition that public evils are not harmful and inhibit the
cultivation of constancy.
With the three passions out of the way, Lipsius spends the remained of the treatise on
four arguments for why public evils are not worth grieving over. The first argument (1.13-14) is
35
De con. 1.9: Stulte. An non et illi homines, eadem stirpe tecum et satu? 36
De con. 1.11: A natura enim esse vis: reversa autam est a more quodam et instituto (You wish to maintain that
[the origin of countries] comes from nature, but the truth of the matter is, it comes from custom and education). 37
De con. 1.11: Quam si iure amari a civibus vis; fatebor. Defendi; agnoscam. Mortem pro ea suscipi; permittam.
Non illud, ut etiam doleat quis, iaceat, lamentetur (If you wish that [country] be loved by its citizens as a matter of
right, I admit it; that they should defend it, I acknowledge; that they should die for it, I allow it. I do not concede that
anyone should grieve for it, lie prostrate, or bewail it). Translation altered. 38
De con. 1.12.
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that all events are directed by Gods providence, and thus there is no cause for anxiety. In fact, to
complain or weep over them is irreverent to God, who makes provision for all natural and human
affairs. The second argument (1.15-22) is that public evils are necessary in two ways and, again,
are not worth worrying about. First, public evils are necessary in that countries inevitably end at
some point in ruin and destruction; nations and civilizations are as prone to destruction as the
mortals who comprise them. Since we necessarily die, the institutions of men also necessarily
die. Second, public evils are necessary by fate. Lipsius is careful to distinguish his theory of fate
from others, most notably from that of the Stoics. In a similar way to the first argument, Lipsius
argues that all events are fated by God and thus there is no reason to lament suffering. Lipsius
also clarifies that fate does not limit Gods freedom, nor does it interfere with our own wills.
This concludes book one, and book two begins with a discussion about the proper use of
gardens: they are meant to be places for serious reflection, not places of vanity or sloth. Lipsius
then makes an exhortation to virtue and encourages young men to incorporate philosophy into
their studies. After this brief interlude on gardens and wisdom, Lipsius sets out his third
argument (2.6-17): that public evils are actually beneficial because they come from God. Even if
they are brought about by evil men, adversities have four useful purposes. First, adversity
strengthens good men and makes then an example for others (2.8). Second, adversity corrects
those who on the way to virtue (2.9). Vice thrives easily in prosperity and lack of want, and so
adversity humbles us and keeps our faults from growing. Third, adversity is a useful punishment
for those who have sinned (2.10). Fourth, public evils serve purposes that are beyond human
comprehension (2.11). Lipsius hesitates to guess what these could be: they prevent
overpopulation or contribute to later human development. To the objection that the innocent are
often unjustly punished by God, Lipsius responds that humans are in no place to question Gods
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justice (2.12). Further, not only are we all guilty of some fault, but it is also incorrect to presume
that anyone except God can judge who is more innocent or more deserving of punishment
(2.1539
).
The remainder of the treatise (2.17-26) comprises the fourth and final argument: that the
ongoing turmoil of the Low Countries is a trifle compared to countless sufferings of human
history. Lipsius uses the exempla of Roman, Greek and Jewish history, in addition to the more
recent miseries imposed on the native populations of the Americas. After Languis finishes his
arguments and makes one last exhortation for the young Lipsius to grow in virtue, they promptly
rise and head out in the midday sun for lunch.40
The pupil Lipsius leaves with Languis in a
joyous mood, crying out I have escaped evil and found the good.41
Some of Lipsius statements may be shocking or unsavory to modern readers (e.g., that
everyone deserves punishment or that wars may be ordained by God to reduce overpopulation),
but Lipsius does not make these claims callously. When recalling European domination of the
Americas, Languis says:
Ostende etiam te paullum tu, Peruana, tu Mexicana ora. Heu mira miseramque faciem!
immensus ille tractus et vere alter Orbis, vastus attritusque apparet, non aliter quam si
caelesti quodam igne deflagrisset. Mens et lingua mihi cadit, Lipsi, dum haec memoro: et
video nostra omnia prae istis non aliud quam paleatum cassa esse, ut Comicus ait, aut
gurguliunculos minutos.42
Show yourself also for a while, Peruvian land, and you, the Mexican. Alas, what an
amazing and miserable aspect! That immense expanse, truly another world, appears
desolate and wiped out, not otherwise than if it had been consumed by some fire from
heaven. Mind and tongue fail me, Lipsius, as I recall these things; and I see all our
troubles beside them as nothing but clouds of chaff, as the Comic poet says, or tiny little
weevils.
39
In editions after 1584, Lipsius separated chapter 2.14 into two chapters, increasing the total number of chapters in
book two from 26 to 27. The convention I use is that of the first edition, so that 2.15 refers to 2.16 in later editions. 40
De con. 2.26. 41
De con. 2.26: Effugi malum, repperi bonum. Young (2011, 205n161) notes that Lipsius is quoting from
Demosthenes (On the Crown 313). 42
De con. 2.21. Translation altered. The Comicus refers to Plautus, Rudens, 1325 (Young 2011, 187n119).
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17
When Lipsius justifies why bad things happen to good people, he admits that he is not speaking
from a position of authority.43
Although Lipsius is aware that his explanations are not always
palatable, he tries to make sense of calamity according to his understanding of the universe.
Setting aside judgment of Lipsius justification of public evils, his humanism can still interest
todays students of classics. Lipsius believed that Greek and Latin literature was valuable not
only to the academic, but to the general reader. With the De constantia, he calls upon his
classical learning to address the pressing issues of rebellion and war that afflicted the Low
Countries. If nothing else, this humanist program makes the De constantia deserving of our
attention.
1.4. The Role of Seneca
Now that we have an outline of the contents of the De constantia, I introduce a Stoic
writer who is foundational to my study. Some information about Seneca the Younger is
necessary to contextualize Lipsius own appreciation for the man. Senecas prose philosophy
was the most important vehicle for the transmission of Stoic ideas through the medieval period
and into the Renaissance. Due to his ubiquitous presence and reputation as a proto-Christian by
the sixteenth century, Seneca was a natural source of attraction to Lipsius and other humanists of
the age. In chapter two, I pay careful attention to Lipsius use or disuse of Seneca because from
this we can learn something about Stoicisms place in the De constantia. Namely, we may learn
how deeply Lipsius draws from Stoic sources: does he draw only from Senecas moral
philosophy, or does he incorporate a richer collection of Stoic texts?
43
When prodded for the reasons for divine punishments, Lipsius first says, tutissime dicam, me nescire (the safest
thing for me to say is, I dont know) (De con. 2.12).
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18
Even in his own day, Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BCE 65 CE) was a man of incredible
influence. Born to the famous statesman and rhetorician of the same name, Seneca the Younger
was a Roman senator, playwright, and Stoic philosopher. Senecas literary oeuvre encompasses
Latin tragedy, Menippean satire, and philosophy. His extant philosophical works include 124
moral epistles, a collection of essays on various ethical topics, and an idiosyncratic work on
natural science. His Epistulae morales were written to his friend Lucilius and function as
vehicles for Senecas ethics rather than strictly personal correspondence. Twelve treatises on
moral subjects survive, though approximately twenty more have not.44
The surviving treatises
are: Ad Helviam de Consolatione, Ad Marciam de Consolatione, Ad Polybium de Consolatione,
De Beata Vita, De Brevitate Vitae, De Constantia Sapientis, De Ira, De Otio, De Providentia, De
Tranquillitate Animi, De Beneficiis, and De Clementia. The first three are consolatory letters
written to parents, including Senecas own mother, regarding their children. The remaining nine
treatises cover a range of philosophical topics falling within the realm of ethics, though De
Providentia tangentially covers some metaphysics. Finally, the Naturales Quaestiones seeks to
rationally explain a range of natural phenomena and includes epistemology and theology. On the
content of Senecas philosophical corpus, Brad Inwood has cautioned against expecting to find a
unified philosophical program.45
Rather, Seneca engages with Stoicism in a particularistic
manner as he reflects on issues that interest him most. While Senecas philosophy is unique in its
sensitivity to first-hand experience and his attention to the proficiens, he is conservative in
relation to the earlier Athenian Stoa.46
Nevertheless, Seneca is a serious philosophical presence
in the Western tradition, worth the time and energy demanded.47
44
Colish 1985, 15. 45
Inwood 2005, 2. 46
Inwood 2005, 352. 47
Inwood 2005, 5.
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19
Christian apologists and Fathers of the early Church received Seneca well despite a tepid
reputation inherited from Quintilian. The Roman rhetorician came out strongly against Senecas
style, calling it corrupt and exceedingly dangerous for the style it promotes.48
Even worse,
Quintilian characterized Senecas philosophy as parum diligens (lacking thoughtfulness).49
However, as Stoic ethics would largely become assimilated into the Christian tradition, Christian
writers unsurprisingly lauded Senecas prose for its moral emphasis.50
Lactantius (4th
century)
credits Seneca as omnium Stoicorum acutissimus (the keenest of all Stoics) and we even have
fragments from three lost works of Seneca that Lactantius quoted.51
Tertullian (born c.160)
famously wrote that Seneca was saepe noster (frequently ours)52
and while Augustine (354-
430) charges him with hypocrisy, he does admit there is some truth in Senecas writing.53
Jerome
(c. 347-420) includes Seneca in his catalogue of illustrious men.54
In fact, Jerome writes:
I would not have placed him in my catalogue of the holy, had I not been moved by those
letters of Paul to Seneca and of Seneca to Paul, which many have read. In these, when he
was the teacher of Nero and the most powerful man of that time, he says that he wishes to
occupy the position among his own that Paul occupies with the Christians. Two years
before Peter and Paul were crowned with martyrdom, he was killed by Nero.55
This excerpt contains the earliest recorded mention of the Paul-Seneca correspondence, which
Jerome unquestioningly accepts as genuine. The Paul-Seneca correspondence was often included
with the Epistulae Morales from the early Middle Ages, and Jeromes biography served as an
48
Quint. Inst. 10.1.29: sed in eloquendo [sententiae] corrupta pleraque, atque eo perniciosissima quod abundant
dulcibus vitiis. 49
Quint. Inst. 10.1.29: In philosophia parum diligens, egregarius tamen vitiorum insectatur fuit. 50
Long 2003, 8. Long views this as detrimental to a later revival of Stoicism as true Stoic doctrines would become
indistinguishable from their Christian counterparts. 51
Lactantius Div. Inst. 2.8.23. The three lost works are: the Exhortationes, De immatura morte, and Moralis
philosophiae libri. We also have quotes from other lost works; Jerome quotes from De matrimonio, Augustine from
the De superstitione. Cassiodorus quotes from De forma mundi (Reynolds 1983, 358). 52
Tertullian De anima 20. 53
August. CD. 6.10: [verum] adfuit enim scribenti, viventi defuit. 54
Jerome De vir. ill. 12 55
I use Kers (2009, 182-3) translation here.
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20
introduction in editions of Seneca from at least the 11th
century.56
Jeromes Vita Senecae,
however, does not mention Neros motivewhich we know to be his alleged involvement in the
Pisonian conspiracyfor ordering the death of Seneca. With the rediscovery of Tacitus Annals
not occurring until 1370, medieval scholars filled in the gaps of missing information by likening
Senecas suicide to Christian martyrdom.57
At first, the rediscovery of Tacitus did little to prevent a Christianization of Seneca. In
1374, Boccaccio uses the newly found Tacitean account to argue that Seneca not only received a
baptism of the spirit, but that Seneca baptized himself at the time of his death by consecrating
water to Jove the Liberator, whom Boccaccio argues is to be understood as Jesus Christ.58
It was
not until the 16th
century that Erasmus properly secularized Seneca. Erasmus admired Seneca,
calling him the one ancient writer who deserves to be read by Christians.59
Still, his 1525 edition
of Seneca definitively proves the Paul-Seneca correspondence a forgery and clarifies the
biography of Seneca against those who were virtually embracing him as orthodox.60
Due in part to his reputation as a proto-Christian, Senecas prose works enjoyed a healthy
transmission from the early Middle Ages to the Italian Renaissance. Most of the main units that
comprise the manuscript tradition follow a general pattern of brief appearance in the 9th
through
11th
centuries followed by a great resurgence in 12th
and 13th
centuries.61
In the 12th
century,
Senecan texts begin to be joined together into a corpus, and most of his major works are bound
under a single cover beginning in the 14th
century.62
Of course other factors beside his content
56
Reynolds 1983, 360. Also, Ker 2009, 188. 57
Ker 2009, 187. One 9th
century pseudo-Senecan manuscript fabricates the story that Seneca objected to Neros
Great Fire of 64CE. Senecas death is then compared to the contemporaneous deaths of Peter and Paul. 58
Ker 2009, 201-2. This account is found in Boccaccios Commento Di Dante (c. 1374) as a response to Dantes
placing of Seneca in Limbo. 59
Kraye 2001/2002, 31. 60
Ker 2009, 210. 61
Reynolds 1983, 359. 62
Reynolds 1983, 360.
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21
aided his reception. As already mentioned, Seneca wrote in a pithy, sententious style
characteristic of silver Latin, and this style lends itself well to quotations and excerpting. In the
early Middle Ages, florilegia (gathering of flowers, compilations of quotations) contain
abundant extracts from (sometimes pseudo-)Seneca. Florilegium Gallicum, Proverbia Senecae,
Senecae Monita, and the Liber de moribus are just a few of those that contain quotes attributed to
Seneca. Collections of short maxims by Seneca also became popular in the 16th
century.63
These
compendia allowed publishers to censor Senecas philosophy so that only the most palatable
sayings are published.64
Imitating Senecan style and content, forgeries and pseudo-Senecan
works also abound, including the aforementioned Proverbia Senecae and Liber de moribus. The
most cited plagiarist, however, was Martin Braga of the 6th
century who wrote De ira, Formula
vitae honestae, and De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus.65
Finally, remember that Seneca is the
sole ancient Stoic philosopher who wrote in Latin. Translations of Greek sources such as
Epictetus remained lacking until the 15th
century.66
For a Medieval Latin reader, Seneca and
Cicero were the primary source for information about Stoicism.67
As a philologist Lipsius himself contributed to the study of Senecan texts. In his
Electorum Libri (1582) Lipsius first made the conclusive distinction between the Elder and the
Younger Seneca, and Lipsius worked with Andreas Schott to publish the Declamationes (1603)
under the heading of the correct Seneca. Most importantly, Lipsius published a new edition of
Senecas prose works (1605) that greatly aided in the establishment of an authoritative text. He
63
Kraye 2001/2002, 37-8. 64
Incidentally, Seneca himself condemned reading a Stoic author in this manner. While in his Epistulae Seneca
initially provides Lucilius with short maxims drawn usually from Epicurus beginning with Ep. 4, Seneca later stops
the practice. In Ep. 33.2, he states that the writings of his Stoic forebears have an interwoven logical structure that is
not suited to excerption. Even more, Seneca views snatching at flowerets (Ep. 33.7) to be shameful for one trying
to make real moral progress. I thank Margaret Graver for introducing me to this point. See Graver (forthcoming). 65
Colish 1985, 16. 66
Verbeke 1983, 7. 67
Verbeke 1983, 7.
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22
claimed to have been the first to establish the correct punctuation and division of words and
phrases, and his profound knowledge of Senecas style and vocabulary allowed him to be
extraordinarily accurate in his corrections (Morford 1991, 173).
Like others before him, Lipsius greatly admired Seneca. In a 1585 letter written to
Laevinus Torrentius, friend and vicar general of the archbishop of Lige, Lipsius writes A kind
of fervor lies in the writings of Seneca or Epictetus, which also comes upon the reader, and they
do not seem so much to discuss virtue as to sow and cultivate it within him.68
And in his
dedication to Pope Paul V of his edition of Seneca, Lipsius calls him the most praiseworthy
writer among all the ancients (laudatissimum inter omnes veteres scriptorem) and nearly
Christian (paene Christianus).69
Lipsius admiration, however, extended beyond respect for the
moralizing quality of his philosophy. In the introduction to his edition of Seneca, Lipsius defends
the philosopher against the judgment of Quintilian. Whereas Quintilian saw Senecas style as
antithetical to proper Roman rhetoric, Lipsius counters that:
Proprium aliquod et suum genus habuit: ut solent ista vel cum aetatibus mutari, vel
pro ingenio atque animo cuiusque formari. Quis Ciceronem Gracco aut Catoni
similem dicat, aut velit?
He [Seneca] had his own particular and characteristic style: as such things habitually
change with the passing ages or are shaped in accordance with the intellect and spirit
of each. Who would say that Cicero is like Gracchus or Cato? And who would want
him to be?
Lipsius also aimed to reverse the earlier judgment of humanists like Erasmus who approved of
the moral content of his writing, but whonot unlike Quintiliancriticized his writing as flat.70
68
ILE, II, 84 05 06 (no. 342): Spirat nescio quis calor in Senecae aut Epicteti scriptis, qui ad lectorem quoque
pervenit: nec disserere illi magis de virtute videntur, quam inserere et inculare. 69
Opera Omnia Senecae, Epistola Dedicatoria: En Annaeum Senecam, laudatissimum inter omnes veteres
scriptorem et virtutis studio paene Christianum (ita nostri censuerunt), emendatum varie et illustratam damus et
deponimus ad sacros tuos pedes (Behold, I give and place at your holy feet Annaeus Seneca, the most praiseworthy
writer among all the ancients and often Christian (so our writers have judged) in the study of virtue, variously
emended and illustrated). Also see Papy 2004, 50. 70
Kraye 1999, 458.
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23
Regarding Senecas sententiousness, Lipsius regards it as complementary to moral instruction
and to Stoicism in particular:
neque abnuo, crebras et minutas istas sententias intervenire. Sed pondera etiam
rerum frangere?hoc nego, in istis quidem philosophicis libris, qui exstant. Augent
magis, et intendunt. Stoicorum hoc proprium fuit, non gladiis, sed pugiunculis, rem
gerere: et brevi et accincto sermone esse.71
Nor do I deny that those frequent, short sentences crop up. But that they break the
balance of things? I deny this, certainly in those philosophical works which are
extant. Rather they enrich and direct. This was characteristic of the Stoics, to carry
out war not with swords but with little knives: and to be of concise and well-girdled
speech.
Senecan brevity and pith is characteristic of Lipsius own writing, filled with forceful, terse
sentences.72
For example, Lipsius describes those infected by the Dutch tulip craze as follows:
Hi sunt, quorum litterae in Thraciam, Graeciam, Indiam discurrunt: idque seminis exigui
aut bulbuli caussa. Hi, quibus aegrius sit florem aliquem novum mori, quam veterem
amicum.73
These are the men whose letters run to and fro into Thrace, Greece, and India, and that
for the sake of a few seeds or bulbs. These are the men for whom it would be more
distressing should some new flower die, than an old friend.
Here we see Lipsius abbreviating his already compact sentences and ending with a quick punch-
line that stabs at his targets dehumanizing behavior. Note the contrast between the new bulbs
and the old friend; the tulip craze distracts priorities from the long-standing to the fickle. Finally,
Lipsius objects to Quintilians criticism of Seneca as a philosopher lacking critical power, and
instead makes an attack on Quintilians own perspicacity:
At culpat etiam Fabius, ut in Philosophia parum diligentem. Quid hoc est? aut de
qua parte loqui eum putem?...Sed Fabii mentem ego hanc arbitror, non inquisisse
nimis aut penetrasse in interiora Philosophiae; externa hac populari, et velut
medicante, contentum. 71
For characterization of Stoic rhetoric as small and sharp-pointed, see Cic. Fin. 4.7: Pungunt quasi aculeis
interrogatiunculis angustis; also Cic. Parad., Prooemium 2: sed minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis quod
proposuit efficit. 72
Lipsius Senecan style would later influence a group of rationalistic thinkers of the late 16th
century, including
Montaigne, du Vair, Richelieu, Montesquieu, Fancis Bacon, Joseph Hall, etc. (Saunders 1955, 15-16). 73
De con. 2.3.
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24
But Fabius [i.e., Marcus Fabius Quintilian] still censures that there is little insight in
his philosophy. What is this? And about what part should I think him to speak of? ...
But I judge that this is the mind of Fabius, that he has not inquired enough or
penetrated into the innermost of philosophy; that he was content with the outer,
popular, and, as it were, medicating part of this philosophy.
Lipsius clearly had a high opinion of both Senecas stylistic and philosophical contributions, and
was willing to make a forceful attack on perhaps the most respected authority on Latin rhetoric.
Before we can look to Lipsius De constantia in detail for Senecan influence, we must
first verify that Lipsius was familiar with Seneca when writing his treatise. During his three years
in Rome from 1568 to 1570 as secretary to Cardinal Granvelle, the young Lipsius gained the
friendship of the French scholar Marc-Antoine Muret. It was under the guidance of Muret that
Lipsius was formally introduced to Seneca, and their discussions about Seneca would later
become a source of contention between the two.74
It appears the first mention Lipsius makes of
Seneca is in a letter addressed to Gerhard Falkenberg from August 1575.75
Lipsius lists Socrates,
Seneca, Helvidius Priscus and Thrasea Paetus as exemplars of constancy in the face of tyranny.76
It is interesting that Lipsius only mentions Seneca within a catalogue of notable sapientes, and it
would appear that Lipsius particular appreciation for Seneca has not yet blossomed. A year
later, in 1576, Muret writes to Lipsius accusing him of plagiarizing his emendations to Seneca
which they discussed during their time in Rome.77
Muret is referring to two of Lipsius lectures
74
Morford 1991, 157. Kraye 1988, 371. 75
Falkenberg was a Protestant, secretary to Thomas Rehdinger, to whom Lipsius devoted Antiquae Lectiones late in
1574. Falkenberg had indirectly criticized Lipsius return to the Spanish Netherlands (Morford 1991, 152). 76
ILE, I, 75 08 01 (Ep. Misc. 1.4): Quis servus est, perire modo qui non timet?Hoc enim firmum adversus externa
omnia telum, non timere propter quod timentur. Sic Socrates adfectus, qui Athenas non deservit, insessas non uno
sed triginta tyrannis; sic Seneca, qui sub Nerone, imo cum Nerone vixit; sic Helvidius, sic Thrasea, et magna illa
sapientum manus (Who is a slave who does not fear to die? For this weapon is firm against all external affairs, to
not fear them on account of that they are feared. Thus Socrates possessed it, who did not desert Athens, occupied not
by a single but by thirty tyrants; so did Seneca, who lived under, nay, rather with Nero; Thus Helvidius and Thrasea
and that great band of wise men). 77
ILE, I, 76 09 05 (no. 74): Et negas te a me quidquam accepisse praeter unum aut alterum locum, in quibus etiam
vis facta a te mentionem mei (And you deny that you have taken anything from me besides one or another point, in
which also you wish that my mention came about from you ).
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25
in which he recommended 29 emendations to Senecas prose works.78
After Christophe Plantin,
a mutual friend and Lipsius publisher, reunited the two scholars in 1579, Lipsius writes to Muret
to preserve their failing friendship:
Electorum librum iam nunc vulgavi. paro Saturnalium sermonum, et De vita ac scriptis
Annaei Senecae. quem nec invitus ad te miserim, quasi vadem amicitiae coeuntis et
sanescentis.79
I have already published Electorum Librum. I am preparing Saturnalium sermonum [a
book on gladiators] and a work on the life and writings of Annaeus Seneca which I may
have sent to you not begrudgingly, but in earnest of a friendship that is coming together
and beginning to recover.
Lipsius never published the work on Senecas life and writings, but it appears as one of the many
introductory portions of his 1605 edition of Seneca.
Within the next few years, evidence for Lipsius appreciation for Seneca and Stoicism
becomes more substantial. In a letter written on New Years Eve 1580 to Janus Lernutius, a
fellow Belgian humanist, Lipsius says he is digging deeply into Stoic philosophy and reading
Seneca, Epictetus and Arrian.80
A year later Lipsius writes a charming letter in which we learn
that he has recommended Seneca to Alexander Ratlo, and Lipsius is glad to hear that his friend
enjoys the Stoics as much as he. He writes:
Senecam nostrum tibi placere ex animo gaudeo. Scio non alios e priscis magis consentire
cum Christiana pietate, quam eos qui e Stoica domo. In quo numero etiam Arrianus est,
qui digessit Graece dissertationes Epicteti, mihi valde probatas. Quaere, moneo, et
lege.81
I rejoice from my heart that our Seneca is pleasing to you. I know of none among the
great ancients that agree more with Christian piety than those of the Stoic school. And in
whose number is also Arrian, who distributed in Greek the Discourses of Epictetus,
which are very much in agreement to me. Look for and, I urge you, read them.
78
Morford 1991, 157. 79
Ep. Misc. 1.53. 80
ILE, I, 80 12 31 (Ep. ad Belg. 2.1): nec medicina ulla nisi a litteris: non istis amoenioribus sed ab illis
robustoribus. Philosophiam dico, in quam me penetro: et quidem Stoicam (Reading is my only comfortnot those
more pleasant works, but stronger medicine. Philosophy, I meanStoic Philosophyinto which I am digging
deeply). I use Morfords (1991, 158) translation. 81
ILE, I, 82 01 23 R (Ep. misc. 1.33).
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26
Six months later, Lipsius writes to Andreas Schott, a friend from his time at university, that I
approve that you are preparing to publish Seneca the Elder, but the wisdom in the Younger
uniquely pleases me.82
In the ensuing years, Lipsius began writing his De Constantia, with the
first copy sent to the Treasurer and Advocate of Antwerp on October 15, 1583 before it was
formally published in 1584.83
Prior to writing the De Constantia, then, Lipsius was both familiar
with Senecan manuscripts as well as personally vested in the philosophical content of Senecas
prose.
82
ILE, I, 82 07 07 (Ep. misc. 1.45): Senecam patrem quod paras, approbo. Unice me sapientia in filio delectat. 83
ILE, I, 83 10 15 P (Ep. misc. 1.59). See Morford 1991, 103.
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27
Chapter 2: Senecas De Providentia
Works like the De constantia that betrayed a Stoic ethical influence were quite
uncontroversial in 16th
century Europe. In the case of the De constantia, the influence of
Senecas De providentia stands out. In this chapter I will show that the De providentiaand by
extension Stoic ethicsis essential to Lipsius concerns with determinism. Nevertheless, it is
also an insufficient model to satisfactorily explain determinism in the De constantia. The result
of this analysis is a preliminary indication of the degree to which Lipsius revives Stoicism. While
the De providentia provides some glimpses into Stoic physics, it is wholly a work of ethics.
Since I find that the De providentia is insufficient for explaining the full breadth of Lipsius
concerns with determinism, I may continue my investigation as to whether Lipsisus metaphysics
features a revival of Stoic causal determinism. I clarify that I do not seek to merely show that
Lipsius draws upon the De providentia; that much is obvious from Lipsius own excerpting from
the work. Rather, I seek to reveal to what extent the De providentia is a guide for the De
Constantia.
The De providentia is an incomplete essay in six sections that seeks to answer this
question posed by Lucilius: why, if the world is governed by providence, it is still the case that
good men suffer from many misfortunes?84
The crux of the De providentia is to resolve the
apparent problem of human suffering despite a provident and beneficent God. Specifically,
Seneca is concerned about the perceived inappropriateness of hardship and discomfort in the
lives of good men. In addition, Seneca assumes that God is provident when he frames the
question; he does not set out to prove that providence does preside over all of us and that God
84
Sen. Prov. 1.1: [Quaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ita,] si providentia mundus agetur, multa bonis viris mala acciderent.
I refer to John Davies (2007) translation unless otherwise noted.
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28
concerns himself with us.85
At the beginning of the next section, Seneca states his central thesis:
nothing bad can happen to a good man: opposites do not mix.86
Clarifying this proposition,
Seneca notes the difference between experiencing hardships and judging them to be evil:
ita adversarum impetus rerum viri fortis non vertit animum: manet in statu et quidquid
evenit in suum colorem trahit; est enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc dico, non
sentit illa, sed vincit87
so adversitys onslaughts are powerless to affect the spirit of a brave man: it remains
unshaken and makes all events assume its own color; for it is stronger than all external
forces. I do not mean that he is insensible to those forces but that he conquers them...
Seneca later repeats this sentiment:
Pro ipsis ergo bonis uiris est ferre quae non sunt mala nisi male sustinenti...88
Accordingly it is expedient even for good men to endure with a patient mind things
that are bad only to the one who bears them badly...
Good men do not feel harmed by misfortune because they perceive that external objects are not
truly evil, defined as that which is unconditionally harmful. Seneca next explains that adversity is
properly judged to be training for virtuous living. After using Cato the Younger as an exemplum
of a good man unaffected by misfortune, Seneca outlines the rest of his treatise as follows: first,
that adversity benefits the individual and the human race; second, that good men are eager for
adversity; third, that good men are fated to face adversity; finally, that one should not pity a good
man for he is never wretched.89
Seneca finishes the remainder of the third section with the
analogy of adversity as medicine or surgery, followed by the exempla of Mucius Scaevola,
Fabricius Luscinus, Rutilius Rufus, Atilius Regulus, Socrates, and, for the second time, Cato.
Surely we dont count these men as miserable, Seneca argues, and they were beset with
85
Sen. Prov. 1.1: [Hoc commodius in contextu operis redderetur,] cum praeesse universis providentiam probaremus
et interesse nobis deum. 86
Sen. Prov. 2.1: Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest: non miscentur contraria. 87
Sen. Prov. 2.1-2. 88
Sen. Prov. 4.16. 89
Sen. Prov. 3.1.
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29
adversity. In the next section, he says that not only are the good left unharmed by misfortune, but
that those with good fortune will experience unhappiness eventually.90
That good men
experience adversity is also educational to the rest of humanity as they teach us what is truly
good and evil.91
Consolation also lies in the understanding that God directs all things according
to his will.92
After succinctly clarifying what truly harmssin and crimethe treatise abruptly
ends with an argument in favor of suicide should life become unbearable.93
The central argument of the De providentia, that adversity is beneficial as a form of
mental training, reappears in Languis third argument for achieving constantia:
Utilia enim sunt, haec quae patimur Publica mala: et cum interno nostro fructu
commodisque coniuncta. Mala autem? imo Bona verius, si remoto hoc Opinionum velo,
oculos ad Ortum eorum referes et ad Finem.94
For they are useful, these public evils that we suffer, joined with our fruit and profit. Yet
are they evils? They are rather more truly goods, if, having removed this veil of opinion,
you will take a look at their origin and end.
The publica mala of Lipsius are harmful only due to a false judgment of the mind. Although I do
not consider in depth Lipsius use of Stoic psychic theory in this thesis, Lipsius is evidently
familiar with the idea that external objects are not in reality good or evil. A few lines later,
Lipsius illustrates how adversity can be beneficial by means of a medical analogy similar to
Senecas: these hardships are like medications: severe to the sense, healthful in substance
and outcome.95
While we immediately see a parallel structure to Seneca, the third argument for
constancy considers the role of adversity more systematically than the De providentia. Whereas
90
Sen. Prov. 4.7: Erratis enim si quem iudicatis exceptum... quisquis uidetur dimissus esse dilatus est (You are
wrong if you think anyone has been exempted from ill... Whoever seems to have been set free from this has only
been granted a delay). 91
Sen. Prov. 5.1. 92
Sen. Prov. 5.6-8. 93
Sen. Prov. 6. 94
De con. 2.6. 95
De con. 2.6: velut medicamenta sunt: sensu tristia, re salubria et eventu. Cf. Sen. Prov. 3.1: miraberis quosdam
ferro et igne curare.
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Lucilius only laments good men suffering misfortune, Lipsius holistically considers adversity in
relation to the good, the bad, and those in between. De con. 2.6-7 introduces the thesis that
adversity is beneficial and begins by considering its source (i.e., God). The next chapter
introduces three purposes for adversity: it exercises the good (2.8), corrects the imperfect
proficiens (2.9), and punishes the wicked (2.10). Lipsius conjectures a fourth purpose in 2.11:
that publica mala protect the world against overpopulation and enable future human
development. Lipsius the pupil raises objections in 2.12 that Languis addresses in the four
subsequent chapters. First, wicked men never go unpunished; rather punishment is delayed or
internalized (2.13-14). Second, no one is innocent and all deserve some degree of punishment
(2.16). Finally, punishments are sometimes transferred to ones descendants, but only in the form
of external misfortune and not internal guilt or fault (2.17).
Senecas De providentia plays the most important role in De const. 2.8 where Lipsius
explains adversity as it concerns good men. Lipsius fills nearly the entire chapter with Senecan
analogies, ideas, and a quotation that is directly lifted from the De providentia. Languis begins to
explain adversity as exercise with the simile like a gymnasium where God trains His own to
endurance and virtue.96
Within this gymnasium we see athletes exercised by harsh routines
(Athletas per multa aspera exerceri videmus), and these training athletes first appeared before
our eyes (Athletas videmus) in Seneca.97
Taking Seneca further, Lipsius makes God a harsher
exercitor (trainer) of wise men, requiring suffering that extends beyond sweat; he requires
blood. Compare:
Seneca: Itaque cum uideris bonos uiros acceptosque dis laborare sudare...98
And so, when you see good men of whom the gods approve toiling and
sweating...
96
De con. 2.8: velut gymnasium est, in quo deus suos ad robur instituit et virtutem. 97
De con. 2.8; cf. Sen. Prov. 2.3 98
Sen. Prov. 1.6.
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Lipsius: Laboris patientiaeque exactor, non ad sudorem tantum, sed ad cruorem.99
He demands exertion and endurance of us not only until we sweat but until we
bleed.
Immediately after the gymnasium, Lipsius transitions to a parental metaphor that appears twice
in the De providentia.100
Unlike mothers who excessively pamper their children to their own
detriment, God loves us truly and severely (De con. 2.8: vere nos diligit et severe) and rears with
severity, just as harsh fathers do (Sen. Prov. 1.5: sicut severi patres, durius educat). Next,
Lipsius argues that afflictions are necessary for becoming a mature individual:
Si nautam te esse velis, per tempestates doceare; si militem, per pericula; si vere virum;
cur recusas adflictiones? non enim alia ad robur via.101
If you wish to be a sailor, you may be instructed by storms; if a soldier, by dangers. If
you wish truly to be a man, why do you object to afflictions? There is no other way to
strength.
In this passage Lipsius borrows both philosophical content and literary device from Seneca.
First, there is the Stoic idea that a healthy mind is the necessary element to virtuous living and,
99
De con. 2.8 100
Sen. Prov. 1.5: immo etiam necessitudo et similitudo, quoniam quidem bonus tempore tantum a deo differt,
discipulus eius aemulatorque et uera progenies, quam parens ille magnificus, uirtutum non lenis exactor, sicut
seueri patres, durius educat (No, rather it is a bond of relationship and similarity, since undoubtedly a good man
differs from God only in the sphere of time; he is Gods pupil and imitator, his true offspring whom that illustrious
parent, no gentle trainer in virtue, rears with severity, as strict fathers do). Sen. Prov. 2.5: Non uides quanto aliter
patres, aliter matres indulgeant? illi excitari iubent liberos ad studia obeunda mature, feriatis quoque diebus non
patiuntur esse otiosos, et sudorem illis et interdum lacrimas excutiunt; at matres fouere in sinu, continere in umbra
uolunt, numquam contristari, numquam flere, numquam laborare. 6. Patrium deus habet aduersus bonos uiros
animum et illos fortiter amat (Do you not see how differently fathers and mothers show their love? The father
orders his children to be roused early to pursue their studies, not allowing them to be idle even on a holiday, and
wrings from them sweat and sometimes tears; but the mother wants to cherish them in her embrace and keep them
out of the suns glare, and wishes them never to know sadness, never to shed tears, never to toil. It is a fathers heart
that God shows to good men; he loves them in a manly way). Cf. De con. 2.8: Molliter eum habere suos censes?
Deliciis fovere aut luxu? non facit. Matres sunt, quae plerumque specie dulcium corrumpunt, et enervant liberos:
patres, qui tristium specie servant. Pater autem ille nobis est: ideoque vere nos diligit et severe (Do you think that
he should treat his own more gently and fondle them with delights and excess? He doesnt do that. Mothers are
generally the ones who corrupt their children with the semblance of living-kindness and enfeeble them. It is fathers
who preserve them with the appearance of sternness. God is our Father, however, and so He loves us truly and
severely). 101
De con. 2.8. Another sailor analogy that carries an equivalent meaning is made later in this paragraph: Vela
gubernatori ventus semper a puppi impleat: artem nusquam explicabit (Let the wind always fill the sails for the
helmsman from the sternhe will never develop his skill).
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further, that adversity makes the mind healthy. In Prov. 4, Seneca mentions twice that the part of
the body that is in constant use is the strongest and encourages the reader to continually endure
adversity for the sake of strengthening his mind.102
As we find in Lipsius, Seneca couples this
idea with comparisons to sailors and soldiers: gubernatorem in tempestate, in acie militem
intellegas (you would come to know a ships pilot in a storm and a soldier in the line of battle)
and sunt nauticis corpora ferendo mari duraad excutienda tela militares lacerti valent (the
bodies of mariners are tough from the buffeting of the sea the muscles of soldiers enable them
to hurl the javelin).103
Lipsius, following Seneca, then juxtaposes the athletes, sailors and
soldiers against those with good fortune:
Seneca: Languent per inertiam saginata nec labore tantum sed motu et ipso sui onere
deficiunt.Non fert ullum ictum inlaesa felicitas.104
Bodies that have become fat grow sluggish through lack of use, and not effort
alone but even movement and their very own weight cause them to fail. Prosperity
that is undiminished cannot withstand a single blow.
Lipsius: Videsne languida illa et umbratica corpora, quae rarus sol vidit, ventus non
strinxit, aura tristior non libavit? tales mollium istorum et perpetim felicium
animi sunt, quos deiiciet et resoluet minima adversantis Fortunae aura.105
Dont you see those languid pallid bodies that the sun has rarely seen, the wind
has not grazed, and a harsher gale has not touched? Such are the minds of these
flabby, perpetually lucky types, whom the least gust of adverse Fortune reduces to
dejection and dismay.
Those with weak characters but good fortune are so unaccustomed to adversity that they feel
harmed at the slightest discomfort. Finally, Lipsius ends the paragraph with another analogy for
the good man drawn from the De providentia: ut arbores ventis agitatae, altius radices agunt:
102
Sen. Prov. 4.12: saepius adierimus, fortiores erimus: solidissima corporis pars est quam frequens usus agitauit
(the more often we engage in it, the stronger our hearts will be: the sturdiest part of the body is the one that is kept
in constant use); Prov. 4.13: id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit (in each case the part of the body
exercised is the strongest). 103
Sen. Prov. 4.5,13. 104
Sen. Prov. 2.6. 105
De con. 2.8.
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sic boni in virtute magis comprehendunt (as trees buffeted by the wind put down deeper roots,
even so the good lay hold of virtue more firmly). Compare this with Senecas: non est arbor
solida nec fortis nisi in quam frequens uentus incursat; ipsa enim uexatione constringitur et
radices certius figit (No tree is sturdy or firm-rooted without enduring many an assault from the
wind; for the battering itself makes it tighten its grip and fix its roots more securely).106
As a
whole, this single paragraph reiterates an impressive amount of Senecas material. As for style,
every sentence is concise, colorful, and forceful; it is entirely Senecan.
The remainder of chapter 2.8 contains a few other hints to the De providentia. Lipsius
compares God to a general who only chooses the best men to join his ranks, and he uses a
quotation attributed to Demetrius that Seneca provides in Prov. 3.8: Nihil mihi videtur infelicius
eo, cui nihil evenit adversi (Nothing seems more unhappy to me than someone who has never
experienced adversity).107
The chapter ends with a rephrasing of Senecas argument that good
men suffer misfortune in order to help the rest of humanity know what is truly good. Lipsius
does not identify true evils as in Seneca and instead emphasizes a characterization of good men
as beacons of virtue.108
Lipsius characterizes the good man as a light in the dark world (lumen in
tenebroso mundo) and that torch (ista face).
106
Sen. Prov. 4.16. 107
De con. 2.8: Non enim parcit Imperator noster talibus, sed diffidit; nec indulget, sed abiicit et contemnit.
Expungit, inquam, eos e legionum suarum numeris, ut ignavos quosdam et imbelles (For our Commander does not
spare such men [who have not endured], but suspects them; he does not indulge them, but degrades and dismisses
them. He removes them, I say, from the tally of his legions, as malingerers and cowards). Cf. Sen. Prov. 4.8: Quare
deus optimum quemque aut mala ualetudine aut luctu aut aliis incommodis adficit? quia in castris quoque
periculosa fortissimis imperantur (Why does God afflict the best men with bad health, or grief, or other
misfortunes? Because in the army the bravest men are ordered to carry out dangerous missions). 108
Sen. Prov. 5.1: Adice nunc quod pro omnibus est optimum quemque, ut ita dicam, militare et edere operas. Hoc
est propositum deo quod sapienti uiro, ostendere haec quae uulgus adpetit, quae reformidat, nec bona esse nec
mala; apparebit autem bona esse, si illa non nisi bonis uiris tribuerit, et mala esse, si tantum malis inrogauerit
(Take into account the further fact that it is to everyones benefit that all the best men become soldiers, so to speak,
and do service. Gods purpose, and the wise mans, too, is to show that what ordinary men desire, and what they
fear, are not either goods or evils; but it will appear that there are goods, if these are granted only to good men, and
that there are evils, if these penalize only bad men).
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Other components of Languis third argument for constancy show indebtedness to the De
providentia as well. While Seneca is only interested in adversity affecting good men, the De
providentia contributes to Lipsius dialogue regarding the other two groups of individuals: the
venially sinful (2.9) and the genuinely wicked (2.10). For those experiencing temporary
difficulty in exercising virtue, adversity serves as a means of correction. For the sake of moral
improvement, God may harm our bodies, our fields, our wealth, and all external things but
does not affect our integral selves.109
This distinctly Stoic separation between our proper selves
and our external goods appears in Prov. 5, but it is by no means unique to the work or Seneca.
Finally, Seneca assures Lucilius in Prov. 4.7 that the wicked, while now happy with good
fortune, will eventually experience misfortune:
Erratis enim si quem iudicatis exceptum: ueniet ad illum diu felicem sua portio;
quisquis uidetur dimissus esse dilatus est.
You are wrong if you think anyone has been exempted from ill; the man who has known
happiness for many a year will receive his share some day; whoever seems to have been
set free from this has only been granted a delay.
Lipsius shares this sentiment in chapters 2.13-14. First, Lipsius restates the general proposition
that ones share of unhappiness, or punishment, has only been postponed:
Malos, ais, divina ultio male praeterit. Itane praeterit? imo, ut ego sentio, differtAtqui
idem facit magnus ille deus, cui cum poenam improbi omnes debeant, ab istis eam statim
exigit, in aliis differt, sed cum faenore solvendam.110
Divine vengeance, you say, badly misses the bad. But does it miss them? Rather, I
imagine, it delayssince all the wicked owe Him a penalty, He demands it from some
immediately, for others He delays, but it must be paid with interest.
Lipsius separates himself from Seneca and Stoicism, however, by stressing divine retribution.
Whereas Seneca only mentions some share (portio) of unhappiness that necessarily accompanies
men of weak character, Lipsius introduces divine vengeance (divino ultio) and punishment
109
De con. 2.9: sed corpus, agros, opes, et omnia externa. 110
De con. 2.14.
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(poenam). Lipsius enumerates three possible forms of punishment: external misfortunes of the
body, internal sufferings of the mind, and posthumous torment. While wicked men may
sometimes have good fortune, they will always experience the mental suffering and everlasting
punishment after death.111
Although Lipsius and Seneca both acknowledge the harm felt by
wicked men resulting from imperfect rationality, Stoicism does not posit that souls retain any
individuating qualitieslet alone are capable of sufferingafter death.
Until now, I have examined the De providentia as contributing to Lipsius third
argument: public evils are beneficial. Accordingly, this discussion has largely focused on the De
providentia as an ethical discourse on the proper attitude one should adopt towards misfortunes
like war, poverty, and sickness. It is undeniable that the De providentia serves as a guide for
Lipsius on this topic. He takes over the ethical axiology that underpins Senecas De providentia
to conclude that public evils are not actually evil; rather, good men have the mental clarity to
properly value external objects as indifferent. It is not the misfortune that causes unhappiness,
but the imperfectly rational mind that falsely believes itself harmed. As a result, good men are
able to exercise virtue amidst the threat of bodily pain. In fact, adversity actually makes it easier
for the good man to be virtuous. This argument resolves the complaint of Lucilius in De
providentia, but Lipsius expands upon this reasoning to include how public evils benefit all
individuals, not just the wise men. Still, this all occurs only in the second book of De constantia
and three further arguments remain. In the first and second arguments, Lipsius deals with the
metaphysical issues of providence, necessity and fate.112
In Lipsius letter to Lernutius (dated
December 31, 1580), he says he is penetrating (penetro) into Stoicism. Recall that Lipsius also
111
De con. 2.14: Et est quidem plerumque, ut eae omnes iusto quodam dei iudicio in impios convenient: certe
quidem priores duae semper (And for the most part it is the case that all these by some just judgment of God
converge upon the wickedassuredly the first two always). 112
The fourth argument is essentially a catalogue of historical wars and does not contain much philosophical matter.
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makes the charge against Quintilian that he has not penetrated into the innermost of Philosophy
(non penetrasse in interiora Philosophiae) in his Opera Omnia Senecae (1605). Does such a
deeper knowledge of Stoicisma knowledge that extends beyond ethical thoughtfind a
presence in the De constantia?
As its title suggests, providence lies at the core of the De providentia. However, Seneca
himself says in Prov. 1.1 that he will not set out to systematically explain providence or prove it
exists:
Quaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ita, si prouidentia mundus ageretur, multa bonis uiris mala
acciderent. Hoc commodius in contextu operis redderetur, cum praeesse uniuersis
prouidentiam probaremus et interesse nobis deum.
You have asked me Lucilius, why, if the world is governed by providence, it is still the
case that good men suffer from many misfortunes. This question would receive a more
fitting answer in a coherent work that set out to prove that providence does preside over
us all and that God concerns himself with us.
Seneca limits himself in this treatise to the reconciliation between providence and adversity.
Through this reconciliation, Lucilius and the reader may improve themselves by responding
properly to adversity. Seneca tells us immediately that the physics fundamental to Lucilius
question will be left out. Nevertheless, we should proceed cautiously and consider the De
providentia as a possible vehicle for Stoic physics before we search for other works that may
have influenced Lipsius. Despite Senecas warning that he will not prove providence, there are
traces of Stoic determinism in parts one and five of the De providentia that demand attention.
In the opening segments of the De providentia, Seneca briefly introduces an important
principle of Stoic physics before settling into the main argument of the work. While Seneca is
sure Lucilius already knows all this (Supervacuum est in praesentia ostendere), he sets out a
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critical property of the Stoic cosmos: it is regulated by some rational and non-random power.113
Providing clarification, Seneca explains that there exist fixed laws that provide the stars and
planets with orderly, predictable movement.114
Further, it is evident that this system is not
characteristic of matter that moves randomly (non esse materiae errantis hunc ordinem).115
The
term materiae errantis refers to Epicurean randomness of atoms; Seneca means that the observed
patterns of the universe are not characteristic of randomly moving bodies. Further:
nec quae temere coierunt tanta arte pendere ut terrarum grauissimum pondus sedeat
inmotum et circa se properantis caeli fugam spectet, ut infusa uallibus maria molliant
terras nec ullum incrementum fluminum sentiant, ut ex minimis seminibus nascantur
ingentia.116
[It is superfluous to show] that such combinations as do result from chance are not
dependent on the great artistry that makes the earth with all its mighty weight remain
stationary, observing the swift passage of the heavens as they whirl around it, that makes
the seas, flooding the valleys, soften the land, and feel no increase from the rivers, and
makes enormous growths arise from the smallest seeds.
Seneca makes reference again to a designing principle (arte) that is responsible for the physical
laws that govern the earth. This design codes the seminal principles in all living things, guiding
their biological functions and growth. Natural events like thunderstorms, volcanoes, and
earthquakes are all likewise determined according to this design.117
This designs influence
extends to phenomena which are taken to be miraculous because the setting in which w