A Companion toMetaphysics

Second Edition

Edited by

JAEGWON KIM,ERNEST SOSA,

and

GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:01 PM Page iii

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:01 PM Page iv

A Companion to Metaphysics

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:01 PM Page i

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy

This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy asa whole. Written by today’s leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of thekey figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis forcourse use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike.

21. A Companion to GenethicsEdited by Justine Burley and John Harris

22. A Companion to Philosophical LogicEdited by Dale Jacquette

23. A Companion to Early Modern PhilosophyEdited by Steven Nadler

24. A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle AgesEdited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone

25. A Companion to African-American PhilosophyEdited by Tommy L. Lott and John P. Pittman

26. A Companion to Applied EthicsEdited by R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman

27. A Companion to the Philosophy of EducationEdited by Randall Curren

28. A Companion to African PhilosophyEdited by Kwasi Wiredu

29. A Companion to HeideggerEdited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall

30. A Companion to RationalismEdited by Alan Nelson

31. A Companion to Ancient PhilosophyEdited by Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin

32. A Companion to PragmatismEdited by John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis

33. A Companion to NietzscheEdited by Keith Ansell Pearson

34. A Companion to SocratesEdited by Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar

35. A Companion to Phenomenology andExistentialismEdited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall

36. A Companion to KantEdited by Graham Bird

37. A Companion to PlatoEdited by Hugh H. Benson

38. A Companion to DescartesEdited by Janet Broughton and John Carriero

39. A Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyEdited by Sahotra Sarkar and Anya Plutynski

40. A Companion to HumeEdited by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

41. A Companion to the Philosophy of History andHistoriographyEdited by Aviezer Tucker

42. A Companion to AristotleEdited by Georgios Anagnostopoulos

Already published in the series:

1. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Second EditionEdited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric Tsui-James

2. A Companion to EthicsEdited by Peter Singer

3. A Companion to Aesthetics, Second EditionEdited by Stephen Davies, Kathleen Higgins, RobertHopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper

4. A Companion to EpistemologyEdited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa

5. A Companion to Contemporary PoliticalPhilosophy (two-volume set), Second EditionEdited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit

6. A Companion to Philosophy of MindEdited by Samuel Guttenplan

7. A Companion to Metaphysics, Second EditionEdited by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and Gary S.Rosenkrantz

8. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and LegalTheoryEdited by Dennis Patterson

9. A Companion to Philosophy of ReligionEdited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro

10. A Companion to the Philosophy of LanguageEdited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright

11. A Companion to World PhilosophiesEdited by Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe

12. A Companion to Continental PhilosophyEdited by Simon Critchley and William Schroeder

13. A Companion to Feminist PhilosophyEdited by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young

14. A Companion to Cognitive ScienceEdited by William Bechtel and George Graham

15. A Companion to BioethicsEdited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer

16. A Companion to the PhilosophersEdited by Robert L. Arrington

17. A Companion to Business EthicsEdited by Robert E. Frederick

18. A Companion to the Philosophy of ScienceEdited by W. H. Newton-Smith

19. A Companion to Environmental PhilosophyEdited by Dale Jamieson

20. A Companion to Analytic PhilosophyEdited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:01 PM Page ii

A Companion toMetaphysics

Second Edition

Edited by

JAEGWON KIM,ERNEST SOSA,

and

GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:01 PM Page iii

This second edition first published 2009© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltdexcept for editorial material and organization © 2009 by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and Gary S.Rosenkrantz

Edition history: Blackwell Publishers Ltd (1e, 1996)

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell’s publishingprogram has been merged with Wiley’s global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

Registered OfficeJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom

Editorial Offices350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UKThe Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website atwww.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.

The right of Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and Gary S. Rosenkrantz to be identified as the author of theeditorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission ofthe publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print maynot be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brandnames and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registeredtrademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendormentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information inregard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged inrendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services ofa competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A companion to metaphysics / edited by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. – 2nd ed.p. cm. – (Blackwell companions to philosophy)

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-1-4051-5298-3 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. Metaphysics–Dictionaries. I. Kim, Jaegwon.

II. Sosa, Ernest. III. Rosenkrantz, Gary S.BD111.C626 2009110′.3–dc22

2008032199

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Set in 10/12.5pt Photina by Graphicraft Limited, Hong KongPrinted in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd

1 2009

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:01 PM Page iv

v

Contents

List of Contributors vii

Introduction xiii

Part I Extended Essays 1

Part II Metaphysics From A to Z 95

Index 637

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:02 PM Page v

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:02 PM Page vi

vii

Contributors

John BigelowMonash University, Australia

Akeel BilgramiColumbia University

John BiroUniversity of Florida

Simon BlackburnUniversity of Cambridge and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Ned BlockNew York University

Paul A. BoghossianNew York University

M.B. BoltonRutgers University

Michael E. BratmanStanford University

Harold I. BrownNorthern Illinois University

Douglas BrowningUniversity of Texas at Austin

Panayot ButchvarovUniversity of Iowa

Robert E. Butts†

Alex ByrneMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Felicia AckermanBrown University

Robert AckermannUniversity of Massachusetts, Amherst

Marilyn McCord AdamsChrist Church, Oxford

Robert Merrihew AdamsYale University and Mansfield College, Oxford

Jan A. AertsenThomas-Institut at the University of Cologne,Germany

C. Anthony AndersonUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

Richard E. AquilaUniversity of Tennessee

D.M. ArmstrongUniversity of Sydney, Australia

Keith ArnoldUniversity of Ottawa, Canada

Bruce AuneUniversity of Massachusetts, Amherst

Thomas BaldwinUniversity of York

George BealerYale University

Frederick BeiserSyracuse University

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page vii

contributors

viii

Steven M. CahnCity University of New York, GraduateSchool

Keith CampbellUniversity of Sydney, Australia

Albert CasulloUniversity of Nebraska, Lincoln

Peter CawsGeorge Washington University

Arindam ChakrabartiUniversity of Hawaii at Manoa

John J. ComptonVanderbilt University, Tennessee

John CorcoranState University of New York at Buffalo

John CottinghamUniversity of Reading

Edwin CurleyUniversity of Michigan

Helen DalyUniversity of Arizona

Harry DeutschIllinois State University

Cora DiamondUniversity of Virginia

Alan Donagan†

Rolf A. EberleUniversity of Rochester, New York

Catherine Z. ElginHarvard University

Fred FeldmanUniversity of Massachusetts, Amherst

Dagfinn FøllesdalStanford University and University of Oslo, Norway

Matthew DavidsonCalifornia State University, Bernardino

Graeme ForbesUniversity of Colarado at Boulder

Richard FumertonUniversity of Iowa

Richard M. GaleUniversity of Pittsburgh

Richard GallimoreUniversity of North Carolina at Greensboro

Patrick Gardiner†

Brian GarrettAustralian National University

Don GarrettNew York University

Rolf GeorgeUniversity of Waterloo, Canada

Roger F. GibsonWashington University in Saint Louis

Carl GinetCornell University

Peter Godfrey-SmithHarvard University

Thomas A. Goudge†

Jorge J.E. GraciaState University of New York at Buffalo

John GrecoSaint Louis University

Reinhardt GrossmannIndiana University

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page viii

contributors

ix

Rick GrushUniversity of California, San Diego

Charles GuignonUniversity of South Florida

Bob HaleUniversity of Sheffield

Michael HallettMcGill University, Montreal

Chad D. HansenUniversity of Hong Kong

Ross HarrisonKing’s College, Cambridge

W.D. HartUniversity of Illinois, Chicago

John HeilWashington University in Saint Louis

Mark HellerSyracuse University

Risto HilpinenUniversity of Miami

Eli HirschBrandeis University, Massachusetts

Herbert HochbergUniversity of Texas at Austin

Joshua HoffmanUniversity of North Carolina at Greensboro

Christopher HookwayUniversity of Sheffield

James HopkinsKing’s College, London

Terence E. HorganUniversity of Arizona

Paul HorwichNew York University

Paul HovdaReed College, Oregon

M.J. InwoodTrinity College, Oxford

Frank JacksonAustralian National University

Janine JonesUniversity of North Carolina at Greensboro

Lynn S. JoyUniversity of Notre Dame

Robert KaneUniversity of Texas at Austin

Christopher KirwanExeter College, Oxford

Arnold KoslowBrooklyn College

John LachsVanderbilt University, Tennessee

Karel LambertUniversity of California, Irvine

Stephen LeedsUniversity of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Keith LehrerUniversity of Arizona and University of Miami

Ramon M. Lemos†

Jarrett LeplinUniversity of North Carolina at Greensboro

Ernest LePoreRutgers University

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page ix

contributors

x

John LeslieUniversity of Guelph

Barry LoewerRutgers University

Lawrence B. LombardWayne State University, Michigan

Douglas C. LongUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

E.J. LoweDurham University

William LyonsTrinity College, Dublin

Charles J. McCrackenMichigan State University

Neil McKinnonMonash University, Australia

Brian P. McLaughlinRutgers University

Ernan McMullinUniversity of Notre Dame

Joseph MargolisTemple University, Pennsylvania

Ned MarkosianWestern Washington University, Washington

Gareth B. MatthewsUniversity of Massachusetts, Amherst

Anthonie MeijersDelft University of Technology, Netherlands

Alfred R. MeleFlorida State University

Joseph MendolaUniversity of Nebraska at Lincoln

Trenton MerricksUniversity of Virginia

Phillip MitsisNew York University

J.M. MoravcsikStanford University

Alexander P.D. MourelatosUniversity of Texas at Austin

Kevin MulliganUniversity of Geneva, Switzerland

Daniel NolanUniversity of Nottingham

Martha C. NussbaumUniversity of Chicago

David S. OderbergUniversity of Reading

Anthony O’HearUniversity of Buckingham

Dominic J. O’MearaUniversity of Fribourg, Switzerland

Walter R. Ott, Jr.Virginia Polytechnic Institute and StateUniversity

George S. PappasOhio State University

Terence ParsonsUniversity of California Los Angeles andUniversity of California, Irvine

David PearsChrist Church, Oxford

Terence PenelhumUniversity of Calgary, Canada

Alvin PlantingaUniversity of Notre Dame

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page x

contributors

xi

Ruth Anna PutnamWellesley College, Massachusetts

Diana RaffmanUniversity of Toronto

Peter RailtonUniversity of Michigan

Andrew J. ReckTulane University, Louisiana

Nicholas RescherUniversity of Pittsburgh

Thomas RickettsUniversity of Pittsburgh

Richard RobinMount Holyoke College, Massachusetts

Gideon RosenPrinceton University

Jay F. Rosenberg†

Gary S. RosenkrantzUniversity of North Carolina at Greensboro

David M. RosenthalCity University of New York, Graduate School

David-Hillel RubenBirbeck College, London and New YorkUniversity in London

Paul RusnockUniversity of Ottawa, Canada

Nils-Eric SahlinLund University, Sweden

R.M. SainsburyUniversity of Texas at Austin and King’sCollege, London

Nathan SalmonUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

Wesley C. Salmon†

David H. SanfordDuke University

Geoffrey Sayre-McCordUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Richard SchachtUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Frederick F. SchmittIndiana University

Richard SchmittBrown University

George SchummOhio State University

Jorge SecadaUniversity of Virginia

Charlene Haddock SeigfriedPurdue University

David ShatzYeshiva University, New York

Fadlou ShehadiRutgers University

Donald W. SherburneVanderbilt University

Sydney ShoemakerCornell University

Peter SimonsUniversity of Leeds

Lawrence SklarUniversity of Michigan

John SkorupskiUniversity of St Andrews

Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.University of Massachusetts, Amherst

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page xi

contributors

xii

Barry SmithState University of New York at Buffalo

Quentin SmithWestern Michigan University

Elliott SoberUniversity of Wisconsin, Madison

Roy A. SorensenDartmouth College

Robert StalnakerMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Howard SteinUniversity of Chicago

Guy StockUniversity of Dundee

Richard SwinburneUniversity of Oxford

Paul TellerUniversity of California, Davis

Neil TennantOhio State University

Amie L. ThomassonUniversity of Miami

James E. Tomberlin†

Martin M. TweedaleUniversity of Alberta, Canada

Michael TyeUniversity of Texas at Austin

James Van CleveUniversity of Southern California

J. David VellemanNew York University

Georgia WarnkeUniversity of California, Riverside

Joan WeinerIndiana University

Nicholas WhiteUniversity of Utah

S.G. WilliamsWorcester College, Oxford

Kenneth P. WinklerYale University

Kwasi WireduUniversity of South Florida

Allen W. WoodStanford University

Larry WrightUniversity of California, Riverside

Edward N. ZaltaStanford University

Dean ZimmermanRutgers University

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page xii

xiii

Introductionjaegwon kim, ernest sosa, and gary rosenkrantz

Because it is the most central and general subdivision of philosophy, and because it is amongthe oldest and most persistently cultivated parts of the field, metaphysics raises special difficul-ties of selection for a companion such as this. The difficulties are compounded, moreover,by two further facts. First, metaphysics is not only particularly old among fields of phi-losophy; it is also particularly widespread among cultures and regions of the world. And,second, metaphysics has provoked levels of skepticism unmatched elsewhere in philosophy;including skepticism as to whether the whole subject is nothing but a welter of pseudo-questions and pseudo-problems.

In light of this a project such as ours needs to delimit its approach. In accomplishing this,we had to bear in mind the space limitations established by the series, and also the fact thatother volumes in the series would be sure to cover some questions traditionally viewed asmetaphysical. These considerations led to our including some such questions, which wethought would be covered more extensively in Samuel Guttenplan’s A Companion to thePhilosophy of Mind, for example, or in Peter Singer’s A Companion to Ethics, but which should be treated in this Companion, if only briefly and for the sake of a more complete and self-contained Companion to Metaphysics. In addition, we tried to give a good sense of the sortsof skeptical objections that have been raised to our field as a whole. As for the spread ofmetaphysics across cultures, traditions, and regions of the world, we opted again to includesome coverage of the non-western, while at the same time keeping our focus firmly on thewestern tradition from the Greeks to the present. What is more, even within the westerntradition we needed to be selective, especially once we came to the present century.Philosophy in the present century has grown explosively, especially in the so-called ana-lytic traditions common to North America and the British Commonwealth countries, alongwith Scandinavia and some enclaves in the rest of Europe and on other continents. Ourfocus has been for the most part on these traditions, although, again, as with non-westerntraditions, we have paid some attention to the schools and traditions that have flourishedbest in Continental Europe.

We had to be selective also in our treatment of contributors to metaphysics. The accountof the work of a philosopher included in our Companion will most often reflect the contri-butions of that philosopher to metaphysics. A certain artificiality is therefore inevitable, andreaders should bear this in mind. Other companions in our series will, therefore, provide,at least sometimes, a helpful supplement to the discussions of individual figures found inthese pages.

In this second edition of the Companion, many of the first edition articles have been updated;additions include more than thirty new entries on important contemporary contributors tometaphysics and a new section of ten extended essays on major topics in metaphysics.

Cross-references will be made by the use of small capitals, both in the text and at the endof each article.

Brown University, Rutgers University, and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page xiii

9780631199991_1_pre.qxd 1/12/09 3:03 PM Page xiv

Part I

Extended Essays

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 1

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 2

Causes and effects are often not contiguous.A switch on the wall is distant from theelectric light overhead that it controls.Pulling a button on an alarm clock makes it ring six hours later. The New York per-formance of three musicians in 1937 con-tributes causally to what one hears on thePerth radio in 2007. Although intervals of space, time, or space–time separate thecauses and effects in these examples, spatio-temporally continuous causal paths connectthem. The path has no spatial or temporalgaps or breaks. (A rigorous definition ofcontinuity requires the notion of a limitfound in calculus textbooks.) The path iscausal because for any two positions, a andc, on the path, there is an intermediate position b on the path such that eithersomething at a causes something at b thatcauses something at c, or the causation runsin the other direction, cba. An explanation ofwhat constitutes a causal path that doesnot use the notion of causation would serveas a reductive definition of causation. Theexplanation above, which uses the notion of causation explicitly, serves only to state a spatio-temporal necessary condition ofcausation.

Causes and effects are events. This is amajority view (see Davidson, 1980). Idiom-atic speech often mentions something otherthan a change, or non-change, or occur-rence, as a cause or effect, as in “Richardmakes me furious.” The question is whetheran available paraphrase such as “Readingwhat Richard writes makes me becomefurious” brings events back into the pictureas causes and effects. If both causes andeffects are always of the same kind, thencausal paths can continue indefinitely bothfrom the past and into the future. On the other hand, the strategy of reducing all causalstatements by paraphrase to statementsabout events does not convince philo-sophers who hold that sometimes facts, pro-perties, or aspects of events are irreduciblerelata of causal relations (see Sanford, 1985).Some philosophers who concentrate onquestions of agency and freedom entertainviews of agent causation: in human action a person is an irreducible cause (see action

theory). Although Lucy’s putting on her

3

Causation

Making something happen, allowing orenabling something to happen, or prevent-ing something from happening. Mental andextra-mental occurrences, of all spatial andtemporal dimensions, great and small, havecauses and are causes. Our awareness ofthe world and our action within the worlddepends at every stage on causal processes.Although not all explanations are causal,anything that can be explained in any waycan be explained causally. Like other meta-physical concepts, the concept of causationapplies very broadly. Yet this fundamentalconcept continues to elude metaphysicalunderstanding. While there is some generalphilosophic agreement about causation, thereis also considerable disagreement. Causaltheories of knowledge, perception, memory,the mind, action, inference, meaning, refer-ence, time, and identity through time, takea notion as fundamental that philosophersunderstand only incompletely.

HUME is the dominant philosopher ofcause and effect. A running commentaryon Hume’s views and arguments, pro andcon, could cover most contemporary philo-sophical concerns with causation (Hume,1739, esp. Bk. I, Pt. III; Hume, 1748, esp.sects. IV, V, VII). According to Hume, it is not the experience of an individual causaltransaction, but experience of other trans-actions, relevantly similar, that provides whatcausation involves in addition to priorityand contiguity. Experiences of regularities orconstant conjunctions condition our expec-tations. We project our conditioned feelingsof inevitability on external objects as a kindof necessity that resides in the objects them-selves (see Hume, 1748, sect. VII). Limitationsof space preclude extensive quotation and dis-cussion of these and other primary texts.

A number of paragraphs in this entrybegin with the statement of a view about causation. The next sentence then classifiesthe view as prevailing, majority, controversial,or minority. Some of these classifications maythemselves be controversial. Their purpose is only to help organize the entry.

Continuous causal paths connect causeswith their effects. This is a prevailing view.

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 3

causation

4

shoes involves many instances of eventcausation, the ultimate cause of Lucy’s shoesbeing put on is Lucy herself.

Causation is the transfer of somethingfrom cause to effect. This is a controversialview. In one version of this view, causationtransfers some quantity subject to a conser-vation law of physics. Hans reichenbach

propounded and Wesley salmon developedanother version in terms the mark trans-mission of a “mark”, a modification thatsatisfies certain requirements. The trans-mission of a mark between processes is atransmission of structure. There are clearpositive instances of this view. One contro-versy involves the generalization of theseinstances. Another questions whether theapplication of a notion such as “mark”requires some prior causal commitment.

There is no element of genuine a priori reasoning in causal inference. This is amajority view. Most philosophers believethat Hume refuted the rationalists (seerationalism) before him (such as Spinoza,Descartes and, on this issue, Hobbes) and theidealists after him (such as McTaggart

and Blanshard) who hold that causation is intrinsically intelligible. Given a determin-ate event, according to Hume, anythingmight happen next, so far as reason andlogic are concerned. “The contrary of everymatter of fact is still possible; because it cannever imply a contradiction” (Hume, 1748,p. 25). Cause and effect are distinct exist-ences, and “the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences”(Hume, 1739, p. 636). Reason by itself can-not predict what will happen next after onebilliard ball bumps into another. But fromwhat should one attempt to make such pre-dictions, from descriptions of the events inquestion? If so, which logical relations do ordo not obtain will depend on the nature of the description. Any event has logicallyindependent descriptions, and any two eventshave descriptions that are not logicallyindependent (see Davidson, 1980, essay 1).The view that there is at least sometimes anintelligible connection between cause andeffect does not rely on inventing cleverdescriptions. Rather, it concedes a lot toHume without conceding everything. Just

from observing its sensible qualities, wecannot figure out a thing’s causal capacities.And when we do come to believe, from amuch broader experience, what they are,our evidence does not entail our conclu-sion. It is still logically possible that any-thing will happen next. Our beliefs aboutthe physical properties of belts and pulleys arefallible and based on more than an initialvisual impression. Still, given the physicalproperties of the belt and pulley, the spatialrelations between them, and the assump-tion that the belt moves in a certain direc-tion, one can figure out which way thepulley rotates. Although one can draw onexperience of similar set-ups that involvebelts and pulleys when closing the final gap of causal inference, it is unnecessary to do so. Reason can bridge the gap un-aided by additional experience (see Sanford,1994).

By the very nature of causation, effects arenever earlier than their causes. This is amajority view. Mackie (1974, ch. 7) dis-cusses the conceptual possibility of “backwardcausation” and provides further references.There are also serious philosophical discus-sions of the conceptual possibility of “timetravel” in which in there are closed causalloops (see Lewis, 1986).

By the very nature of causation, causes are always earlier than their effects. This isa controversial view. Other requirements ofcausal connection are symmetric in form;they do not distinguish effects from causes.Defining causal priority in terms of tem-poral priority thus has theoretical appeal.But there is also a theoretical drawback: the equally appealing account of temporal priority by reference to causation will becircular if the explanation of causal priorityis to be temporal. Moreover, simultaneouscausation appears not only to be possible, butactual. Physics assures us that much of this appearance is illusion. Since nothingtransmits motion faster than the speed oflight, the motion of one’s fingers, that gripthe handle of a teaspoon, does not, strictlyspeaking, cause the simultaneous motion ofthe bowl of the spoon. Other cases of appar-ent simultaneous causation, however, donot involve bridging a spatial gap, as when

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 4

causation

5

a moving belt turns a pulley with which itis in direct contact.

We cannot directly perceive causal rela-tions. This is a majority view that Humeinfluences greatly with his example of theimpact of billiard balls. We can see motionsand changes in motion in the balls. We cansee that one ball touches the other immedi-ately before the second begins to move. Wecannot see that there is a causal relationbetween the two motions. Nor can we tell,just by observing the sensible qualities of athing, what are its causal capacities anddispositions.

Our sense of touch and our perceptions ofthe positions and movements of our limbsenable our direct perception of causal rela-tions (see von Wright, 1971, pp. 66–74).This is a minority view. The causal rela-tions between one’s arm movement and themovement of a cue stick one grasps is amore promising candidate for an object ofdirect perception than the impact of billiardballs that is merely seen. The conceptual fal-lacy (here so named) may be tempt onehere. This is a mistaken inference of theform that since we cannot conceive of Awithout having the concept of B, thereforethe existence of A requires the existence of B. It views ontological dependence as following from conceptual dependence.Granted the minority view that our concep-tion of causation depends on our conceptionsof ourselves as agents who make thingshappen in the physical world, and as patientsaffected by occurrences in the physical world,it does not follow that the existence of cau-sation requires the occurrence of suchinteractions.

Manipulations are causes. This is a pre-vailing view. Many languages have manyverbs for specific manipulations such ascook, shake, turn, and hold that we understandas causal relations. The view is not strictlya truism since it is inconsistent with seriouslyheld positions such as the following. (a)There really is no physical world; its ap-pearance is an illusion; and from this it follows that there really are no genuinemanipulations or physical causal relations.(b) Although there really are physical events,those we commonly but wrongly take as

cause–effect pairs are really coincident jointeffects of a common cause, such as God.Current discussions of causation disregardsuch views and take it for granted thatmanipulations are causes.

Causation depends on manipulation; acorrect general account of causation is interms of manipulation. This is a minorityview. Just because one might reach thisview by means of the conceptual fallacy dis-cussed above, that does nothing to prove it false. When distinguished from a viewabout relations between concepts, however,the theory must deal, by appeal to analogyor imagination, with causal instances inwhich humans do not and sometimes can-not actually participate, such as those thatinvolve clusters of galaxies.

A correct general account of causation isin terms of intervention. This is a contro-versial view, which is currently the center ofa robust research program (see Woodward,2003). This program is careful to dis-tinguish its technical term “intervention”from the ordinary term “manipulation”.Manipulations are performed by agents.While agents also intervene, some naturalprocesses that involve no agents, directly orindirectly, are also called interventions. Onthe other hand, the notion of an interventionis explicitly causal. Its descriptions use the notion of a causal path. Not all of thedescriptions in the literature are equivalent.Here is one description:

INT is an intervention between two vari-ables X and Y on the same causal path ifand only if INT completely determinesthe value of X; every causal path betweenINT (or any cause of INT) and Y goesthrough X; and if there is a causal pathbetween Z and Y that neither includesnor is included by the path between Xand Y, INT does not affect Z.

Adding fertilizer does not affect the amountsof water and light, which are relevant variables on causal paths that include thegrowth of tomatoes. According to thisdefinition of intervention, does the additionof fertilizer then intervene on the causalpath between nitrogen level and tomatogrowth? Weeds complicate the answer to

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 5

causation

6

this question. When fertilizer stimulates weedgrowth, a better tomato crop requires pullingsome weeds and bringing the addition offertilizer under the general description ofintervention may also require it.

Since intervention is a thoroughly causalnotion, an interventionist account of aspecific causal connection is not reductive in the sense of using only non-causal con-cepts. This need not render such accounts cir-cular. The use of the notion of interventionto support the presence of a specific connec-tion, such as between nitrogen and growthrate, need not assume its presence to beginwith. This accords with the function ofexperiments. Experiment is a thoroughlycausal notion, yet we use experiments toconfirm and to disconfirm causal hypotheses.

Theorems about interventions have awide scope in understanding the roles ofexperiments in various sciences. This is acontroversial view. From a precise definitionof intervention and some strong assump-tions about probabilistic relations betweenvariables, theorists prove theorems aboutdirected causal graphs. (There is no attempthere to summarize these results.) While the theorems themselves are neither trivialnor controversial, there is not a consensusabout the manner and scope for their usefulapplication to actual causal processes.

Some generalizations that have no excep-tions, and some statements of conditionalprobability, are causal laws. This is a pre-vailing view. Some universal laws are notcausal because they are mathematical orlogical laws. Some universal truths are notlaws because they are mere “accidental”regularities. If all swimming birds eat fish, this does not imply that there is a law-likeconnection between birds” swimming andtheir eating fish. Finding evidence against an accidental regularity, whether quite sur-prising, or not at all surprising, does notupset our general theories about the world.Providing a general account of the differ-ence between laws and accidental general-ization is a major theoretical see law of

nature undertaking. There are many com-peting theories about the character of phys-ical laws, for example, the view that laws arerelations between properties or universals.

All physical laws are causal laws. This isa majority view. Some philosophers denythat all laws of nature, for example Newton’sfirst law of motion, are causal laws. Considera body traveling in a straight line, notchanging direction or speeding up or slow-ing down. Where is the causation? Opinionsdivide on the adequacy of responses such as “Its motion from B to C is caused by itsimmediately prior motion from A to B.”

Events related as cause and effect, whenappropriately described, instantiate a phys-ical law. This is a majority view. Theseappropriate descriptions typically use con-cepts different from the ones we ordinarily use in describing the causal transaction.Causation in the everyday world superveneson causal relations that the fundamentallaws of nature directly cover. If such super-

venience is universal, there are no causal dif-ferences without differences of fundamentalproperties and spatio-temporal arrangements.A singular causal statement need not entaila law, but it does entail that there is a lawthat covers, probably as described differ-ently, the events mentioned (see Davidson,1980, essay 7).

Causal attribution and the acceptance ofcorresponding conditional statements areclosely related. This is a prevailing view.Hume connects causation with conditionalsin this famous passage:

Similar objects are always conjoined withsimilar. Of this we have experience.Suitable to this experience, therefore, wemay define a cause to be an object, fol-lowed by another, and where all the objectssimilar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. (Hume, 1748, p. 76)

What Hume puts “in other words” is scarcelya restatement of what goes before. It never-theless expresses an important and influen-tial claim, that a cause is necessary for itseffect.

Kate turned the key, and the enginestarted. But if the engine would havestarted at that very moment anyway,without Kate’s key turn, then Kate’sturning the key did not start the engine.

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 6

causation

7

If-then statements about what would havehappened if something else had occurredare called counterfactuals, contrary-to-factor subjunctive conditionals. A conditional of the form “If a had not happened, then bwould not have occurred” says that a isnecessary for b: it is impossible for b to occurwithout a. If it is impossible for ato occur without b, then a is sufficient for b.For example, the downward movement of a lever of the first kind is sufficient for the upward movement of its other end. Thenecessity of a for b is often separate from thesufficiency for a for b; the thesis that a causeis both necessary and sufficient for its effectis quite strong. Events or conditions we sin-gle out as causes often are neither necessarynor sufficient for their effects. Adding Bob’sSuper-Grow fertilizer speeded up the growthof the tomato plants, but it was not really necessary. Other brands would have hadthe same effect. Just by itself, moreover, it also was not sufficient; for other factors,independent of adding the fertilizer, such as light, water and the absence of largeamounts of concentrated sulfuric acid, werealso necessary for the quick growth of theplants. We can still use the notions of neces-sity and sufficiency to spell out the causalrelevance of adding Bob’s Super-Grow tothe plant’s rapid growth. It is presumably an inus condition of the growth; that is, it isan insufficient but non-redundant part of anunnecessary but sufficient condition of rapidgrowth (Mackie, 1974, p. 62). Inus condi-tions involve somewhat complicated coun-terfactual conditionals. The pair of simplerconditionals that express necessity and suf-ficiency, “If a had not happened, neitherwould b” and “If a had happened, then sowould b” together express counterfactualdependence.

Causation can be defined in terms ofcounterfactual dependence (Lewis, 1986,essays 17 and 21). This is a controversialview. Counterexamples provide one sourceof controversy. Counterexamples to a claimof the form A=B are in general examples ofA that are not B or examples of B that are notA. Lucy threw a stone that broke a bottle. If Lucy had not thrown the stone, however,a stone would have broken the bottle

anyway. Dorothy was standing by, ready tothrow a stone toward the bottle if Lucy didnot. Standby causes, over-determination,prevention, and other examples serve ascounterexamples to simple formulations ofcounterfactual conditional accounts. Thisleads to formulations that are less simple,which in turn stimulates the invention ofexamples of increasing complexity, and so on,back and forth. (See essays in Collins et al.,2004.) Opinions are divided about wherethis process is leading.

Replacing the notion of counterfactualdependence with the notion of influenceresults in a counterfactual account that runsmore smoothly. This is a minority view.One event influences another when eachbelongs to a range of similar events andthere is a range of true counterfactuals of the form if event c (in the first range) hadoccurred, then event e (in the other range)would have occurred. A mass hanging on aspring influences its length, which variessystematically with the mass. (Within a cer-tain range of values, the relation betweenmass and length is invariant. Invariance andintervention both figure in causal graphtheory.) Adding acid to a base exemplifiescausal influence. As more acid is added, morebase is neutralized. There is, however, acausal relation in this process that seemsnot to fit the definition of influence. As moreacid is added, it is not until all the base is neu-tralized that the next drop of acid causes asudden, large increase in acidity (decrease inpH). It remains to be seen how the influenceview accommodates this and similar “tippingpoint” examples in which a small event pro-duces large effect by upsetting an equilibrium.

Questions of causation, inductive support,laws of nature, and counterfactual condi-tionals are bound closely together. This is aprevailing view. The following distinctions are closely associated, and any one can ex-plain the others: acceptable vs. unacceptablecounterfactual conditionals; laws of naturevs. accidental generalizations; a particularobservation’s inductively confirming vs. notconfirming a hypothesis. Acceptable coun-terfactual conditionals, but not unaccept-able ones, fall under laws (as Chisholm andGoodman have argued). On the other hand,

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 7

causation

8

laws, but not accidental generalizations, sup-port acceptable counterfactuals. Laws, unlikeaccidental generalizations, are hypothesesthat their instances confirm. These inter-connections, although mutually explana-tory, are arranged in a tight circle and thusevoke a sense of theoretical uneasiness.Philosophers who aspire to develop a theoryof causation attempt to break out of the circle by explaining one distinction in the family without appeal to additional distinc-tions in the same family. Different theoriesattempt to break out in different places andalso differ in their assignments of explanatorypriority. For example, one theory holds thata relation between particulars is causalwhen it falls under a law, while anotherholds that a generalization is a law when particular causal relations fall under it. Noviews prevail about the best way to achieveequilibrium in these theoretical mattersconcerning causation.

An adequate theory of causation should be in terms of Probability. This is a controversial view. When an event causesanother, the occurrence of the cause oftenincreases the probability of the occurrence ofthe other. However this is not always so.Attempts of formulate universal generaliza-tions connecting probability with causationrun up against examples such as the fol-lowing (an earlier example with more details):Lucy aims a stone at a bottle. She throws it,and the stone breaks the bottle. Wheneverthey engage in the sport of throwing stonesto break bottles, Dorothy throws a stone ifLucy doesn’t. Although Lucy often misses,Dorothy almost never misses. Lucy didn’tmiss this time, however. Her throw broke thebottle. The probability that the bottle wouldbreak if she did not throw (and dead-eyeDorothy threw instead) is nevertheless higherthan if she did throw. Qualifications of a pro-babilistic account can accommodate partic-ular examples such as this one, but then, following a pattern of dialectic common intechnical philosophy generally, and speci-fically with the associated counterfactualaccounts of causation, new ingenuouscounterexamples are not far behind.

a is necessary for b if, and only if, b issufficient for a. This is a prevailing view that

follows from the above standard explana-tions of necessary for and sufficient for. Thisview does not entail the stronger view thata is a necessary condition of b if, and only if, bis a sufficient condition of a. Causal examples,among others, show that “condition of” is nota symmetric relation. The presence of light,for example, is a causally necessary con-dition of the growth of tomatoes, which is not in turn a causally sufficient condition for the presence of light. No one attempts to produce light by growing tomatoes. Atheory of the direction of conditionship canhelp account for the direction of causation(Sanford, 1975).

A totality of conditions necessary for anoccurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a controversial view, and not a logicaltruth, in the technical sense of sufficientspelt out above. There is an ordinary senseof sufficient, however, namely “enough,lacks nothing”. When everything necessaryfor b obtains, the aggregate is collectivelysufficient for b’s occurrence, because jointlythe members of the aggregate are enough– nothing necessary for b is missing (seeAnscombe, 1981, p. 135). It is not a logicalcontradiction to maintain that an event didnot occur even though nothing necessary forits occurrence was missing. This contentionruns against the grain of the following controversial view:

Something necessitates every event. Thisis a controversial view. Although what wecall a “cause” often falls far short of beingsufficient for its effect, it is common toassume that every effect has some, usuallymore complicated, sufficient cause. The mainissue is not whether some occurrences are totally without causal antecedents, but whether, in the technical sense of suf-ficient, every event has a sufficient cause. If every event has a sufficient cause, andevery cause is an event, then a classic ver-sion of Determinism is true. Every event is a link on a branching chain of causalnecessitation that runs from the beginningto the end of the universe. The occurrenceof any event is causally consistent withexactly one set of events causally con-nectible with it, whether these events are earlier or later.

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 8

causation

9

Modern physics, for example in its treat-ment of atomic decay, discourages belief in determinism. Definitions that resembleMackie’s definition of an inus condition pro-vide for the possibility of causation withoutsufficiency: a is a suni condition of b, forexample, if there is something x such that thedisjunction a or x is a necessary condition ofb, and x is not a necessary condition of b(Sanford, 1984, p. 58).

Accounts of specific causal connectionsoften refer to causal mechanism. This is a pre-vailing view. One of the early truly effectivedrugs was aspirin. As everyone knows, itrelieves pain. What scientists did not know,but for years hoped to find, was the mecha-nism of aspirin’s effect. This goal is differentfrom discovering a more general or morefundamental law. Many scientists try tounderstand mechanisms rather that findgeneral laws that cover certain phenom-ena, and this is true not just in medicine, biology, and chemistry, but in many otherspecial sciences.

A general account of causation shouldrefer to causal mechanisms rather than to causal laws. This is a minority view.Although operations of mechanisms, ofwhatever size, seem generally to involvethree-dimensional motions, a general theoryof causation as mechanism would want amore detailed account of what a mecha-nism is. Also, some causal connections areso direct that there seems to be no room for a mediating mechanism. Lucy threw arock that hit a tree before it reached thewall. The tree interrupted the flight path of the rock. Where should one look for themechanism of this causal interaction?

In Plato’s dialogue “The Euthyphro” Socr-ates and Euthyphro reach a point wherethey agree that everything all the gods loveis pious and that everything pious all the godslove. Socrates goes on to ask whether all thegods love pious things because they arepious, or whether things are pious becauseall the gods love them. We may call probingquestions of this form Euthyphro Questions andproceed to ask them about treatments ofcausation that aspire to provide reductiveaccounts. Suppose that some theory is suf-ficiently refined that both conditionals of

these corresponding forms are true: when C causes E, a suitably situated relation Robtains; and when a suitably situated rela-tions R obtains, C causes E. (This formula-tion is due to L. Paul.) The EuthyphroQuestion is whether (a) C causes E becauseR obtains or (b) R obtains because C causesE. A philosophical reductive definition, acc-ount, or analysis of causation should hopeto give an answer of form (a). Some popularaccounts appear to favor answers of form (b).Consider a counterfactual statements and acorresponding causal statement:

If Kate had not turned the key, the enginewould not have started.Kate’s turning the key caused the engineto start.

It is more natural to say that the condi-tional is true because turning the keycaused the engine to start rather than thatturning the key caused the engine to start because the conditional is true. Someconditionals are true because of causal connections; causal connections do notobtain because conditionals are true (seeSanford, 2003, chs. 11–14). Similarly,causal connections explain the effectivenessof manipulation rather than the other wayaround. Causal connections also explainthe effectiveness of interventions, althoughinterventionist theory does not representitself as reductive. Theories in terms of thetransfer of something, or in terms of under-lying mechanism, whatever their difficulties,promise to give appropriate answers to theEuthyphro Question.

In Book II of the Physics, Aristotle dis-cusses four kinds of aitia or causes. The pre-sent article deals only with efficient causes.In the “Second Analogy” of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant argues that all changes conform to the law of cause and effect. In “Of Induction”, Book III of A System of Logic (1843), J. S. Mill presentsexperimental methods for establishing causalrelevance. In his 1912 lecture, “On theNotion of Cause”, Russell claims that the lawof causation “is a relic of a bygone age”; butRussell’s own theoretical constructions insome later writings depend heavily on causalnotions.

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 9

fictional entities

10

bibliography

Anscombe, G.E.M.: Metaphysics and thePhilosophy of Mind, Collected PhilosophicalPapers, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1981).

Beauchamp, T. and Rosenberg, A.: Humeand the Problem of Causation (New York andOxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Collins, J., Paul, L., and Hall, N., ed.: Coun-terfactuals and Causation (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 2004)

Davidson, D.: Essays on Actions and Events(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 980).

Dowe, P.: “Causal Process,” in the StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy.

Faye, J.: “Backward Causation,” in the Stan-ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Hausman, D.M.: Causal Asymmetries (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Hitchcock, C. “Probabilistic Causation,” in theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Hume, D.: Enquiry Concerning Human Under-standing (London, 1748): ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1894); 3rd edn. rev. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1975).

Hume, D.: A Treatise of Human Nature, BookI (London, 1739); ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888);2nd edn. rev. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1978).

Lewis, D.K.: Philosophical Papers, vol. II(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Mackie, J.L.: The Cement of the Universe, 2ndedn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1980; originally published 1974).

Menzies, P.: “Counterfactual Theories ofCausation,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy.

Psillos, S.: Causation and Explanation(Chesham, Bucks.: Acumen; Montreal:McGill-Queens University Press, 2002).

Salmon, W.C.: Scientific Explanation and theCausal Structure of the World, (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Sanford, D.H.: “Causal Relata,” in E. LePoreand B. McLaughlin, ed., Actions and Events(Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1985),282–93.

Sanford, D.H.: “Causation and Intelligibility,”Philosophy 69 (1994), 55–67.

Sanford, D.H.: “The Direction of Causationand the Direction of Conditionship,” Journalof Philosophy 73 (1975), 193–207.

Sanford, D.H.: “The Direction of Causationand the Direction of Time,” Midwest Studiesin Philosophy 9 (1984), 53–75.

Sanford, D.H.: If P, then Q: Conditionals andthe Foundations of Reasoning, 2nd edn.(London: Routledge, 2003; originallypublished 1989).

Schaffer, J.: “The Metaphysics of Causation,”in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(http://plato.stanford.edu) is an onlineresource of substantial entries that typic-ally have helpful bibliographies. Entriesundergo periodic revision.

Strawson, G.: The Secret Connexion: Cau-sation, Realism and David Hume (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1989).

Woodward, J.F.: “Causation and Manipul-ability,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy.

Woodward, J.F.: Making Things Happen: ATheory of Causal Explanation (New York:Oxford University Press, 2003).

Wright, G.H. von: Explanation and Under-standing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1971).

david h. sanford

Fictional EntitiesThe first question to be addressed aboutfictional entities is: are there any? The usualgrounds given for accepting or rejecting theview that there are fictional entities comefrom linguistic considerations. We makemany different sorts of claims about fictionalcharacters in our literary discussions. Howcan we account for their apparent truth?Does doing so require that we allow thatthere are fictional characters we can refer to, or can we offer equally good analyseswhile denying that there are any fictionalentities?

While some have argued that we canoffer a better analysis of fictional discourse ifwe accept that there are fictional charac-ters, others have held that even if that’strue, we have metaphysical reasons to deny

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 10

fictional entities

11

the existence of fictional entities. Some havesupposed that accepting such entities wouldinvolve us in contradictions and so must beavoided at all costs, while others have heldthat, even if contradiction can be averted, weshould refrain from positing fictional entitiesif at all possible since they would be utterlymysterious, involve us in positing unex-plained differences in “kinds of being”, orviolate reasonable calls to parsimony.

1. Linguistic Considerations

At least four sorts of fictional discourse maybe distinguished:

(1) Fictionalizing discourse (discourse withinworks of fiction), e.g., “[Holmes was]the most perfect reasoning and observ-ing machine that the world has seen” in“A Scandal in Bohemia”.

(2) Non-existence claims, e.g., “SherlockHolmes does not exist”.

(3) Internal discourse by readers about thecontent of works of fiction. This may be either intra-fictional (reporting thecontent of a single work of fiction, e.g.,“Holmes solved his first mystery in hiscollege years”,) or cross-fictional (com-paring the contents of two works offiction, e.g., “Anna Karenina is smarterthan Emma Bovary”).

(4) External discourse by readers and criticsabout the characters as fictional char-acters, e.g., “Holmes is a fictional character”, “Hamlet was created byShakespeare”, “The Holmes characterwas modeled on an actual medical doctor Doyle knew”, “Holmes appears in dozens of stories”, “Holmes is veryfamous”.

The puzzles for fictional discourse arisebecause many of the things we want to sayabout fictional characters seem in conflictwith each other: How, for example, couldHolmes solve a mystery if he doesn”t exist?How could Hamlet be born to Gertrude if he was created by Shakespeare? Any theoryof fiction is obliged to say something abouthow we can understand these four kinds of claim in ways that resolve their apparentinconsistencies. And any theory of fictional

discourse will have import for whether or notwe should accept that there are fictionalentities we sometimes refer to, and if so,what sorts of thing they are and what is literally true of them.

Given these very different types of fictionaldiscourse, many different approaches havebeen developed, some of which accept andsome of which deny that there are fictionalentities. Many of the differences amongthem may be seen as products of differencesin which of the four types of discourse eachtakes as its primary case and central motiv-ator – though of course all are ultimatelyobliged to say how we should understandeach type of discourse.

Perhaps the most popular approach tofictional discourse has been to deny thatthere are any fictional entities, and to handle the linguistic evidence by adopting apretense theory. It is plausible that authorsin writing works of fiction (and so writing sen-tences of type (1)) are not making genuineassertions at all, but rather simply pretend-ing to assert things about real people andplaces (Searle, 1979, p. 65). (Though seeMartinich and Stroll, 2007, ch. 2, for chal-lenges to this.) Inspired by this observationabout discourse of type (1), full-blown pre-tense theories of fictional discourse (such asthat developed by Kendall Walton) treat allfour forms of fictional discourse as involvingpretense and so as making no genuine ref-erence to fictional entities. Discourse of type(3), on these views, involves readers “play-ing along” with the pretense “authorized” bythe work of fiction, and so pretending thatwhat is stated in works of fiction is true.Claims like “Holmes solved his first mysteryin his college years” are “authorized” moves inthe game of pretense licenced by the work,which is why we find them more acceptablethan parallel claims like “Holmes drove awhite Plymouth”.

While that extension of the pretense viewseems plausible enough, more difficultiesarise for handling external discourse andnon-existence claims. Walton takes exter-nal claims of type (4) to invoke new “adhoc” “unofficial” games of pretense otherthan those authorized by the story, where,e.g., we pretend that “there are two kinds

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 11

fictional entities

12

of people: “real” people and “fictional char-acters” (1990, p. 423), or pretend thatauthors are like gods in being capable ofcreation, etc. Even apparently straightfor-ward non-existence claims (type 2) aretreated as involving pretense: first invokinga pretense that there is such a character torefer to (using the name “Sherlock Holmes”),and then in the same breath betraying that as mere pretense, with the addition of“doesn’t exist” (1990, p. 422). The full-blownpretense approach thus seems to implausiblytake as pretenseful precisely the (type 2 andtype 4) talk about fiction that is designed to step outside of the pretense and speakfrom the real-world perspective. It also offerscontorted and ad hoc readings of what seemto be straightforward literal claims (cf.Thomasson, 2003). So while pretense theo-ries do well at addressing internal andfictionalizing discourse, they are much lessplausible adopted as across the boardapproaches – but if we can’t adopt themacross the board, they can’t be used toavoid positing fictional entities.

Various other approaches to fictional dis-course have been proposed which don’t rely on taking pretense to be ubiquitous infictional discourse, yet still avoid acceptingthat there are fictional entities. The bestdeveloped of these is Mark Sainsbury’s(2005) negative free logic approach, whichtakes as its central motivation the truth of claims of type (2): non-existence claimsinvolving fictional names. On the negativefree logic view, fictional names are non-referring terms, and all simple sentencesusing non-referring terms are false. Thus“Holmes exists” is false (as “Holmes” doesn’trefer), and so its negation “Holmes doesn’texist” is true (Sainsbury, 2005, p. 195),leaving us with a far simpler and moreplausible account of the truth of non-existence claims than pretense views pro-vide. Internal discourse by readers can stillbe held to be true even though it involvesnon-referring names, since these claims areplausibly held to be implicitly prefixed witha fiction operator, where “According to thefiction, Holmes solved his first mystery inhis college years” may be true even if the simple claim “Holmes solved his first mystery

in his college years” would be false. Cross-fictional statements can be handled simi-larly by taking them to fall in the context of an “agglomerative” story operator thatappeals to the total content of the relevantstories, taken together, e.g., “According to(Anna Karenina and Madame Bovary [takenagglomeratively] ), Anna Karenina was moreintelligent than Emma Bovary” (Sainsbury,forthcoming).

But like the pretense view, the negative freelogic view has more difficulties accounting for the apparent truth of external claims of type (4), since their truth cannot beaccounted for by taking them as implicitlyreporting what is true according to thefiction. Various ad hoc ways of interpretingthese claims have been tried, e.g., “Holmesis a fictional character”, may be read asreporting that, according to some fiction,Holmes exists (Sainsbury, forthcoming). Butgiven the variety of external claims thatmust be rewritten in different ways, theseremain the biggest thorn in the side of neg-ative free logic theories.

On the other side of the debate are thosewho argue that we can only or best handlefictional discourse by allowing that thereare fictional entities and that at least some-times our discourse refers to them. But evenamong those who accept that there arefictional entities there are widespread dis-agreements about what we should considerthem to be and what is literally true of them.

Some realist views about fiction areinspired by the apparent truth of internalclaims of type (3), and so take fictional enti-ties to be beings that (in some sense) have theproperties the characters of the story aresaid to have, so that claims like “Holmessolved his first mystery in his college years”is true because there is a fictional entity,Holmes, who in some sense has this property.These views have taken many forms – withsome taking the fictional entities to be possible people, others taking them to beMeinongian non-existent objects, and othersstill taking them to be pure abstract entitiessuch as kinds.

One natural approach inspired by thedesire to accommodate the truth of type (3)internal claims is to take fictional characters

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 12

fictional entities

13

to be merely possible people described bythe stories. Kripke expressed this idea whenhe wrote “Holmes does not exist, but inother states of affairs, he would have existed”(1963/1971, p. 65). But Kripke himselflater (1972, p. 158) rejected this answer, andhis rejection of it has generally been takenon board. His grounds for rejecting it comefrom considerations about reference: thename “Sherlock Holmes” is not a description(which could be fulfilled by various possibleindividuals); instead, if it refers at all, it picksout the individual to whom the speaker’suse of the name bears a historical connection,and it refers to that very individual across all possible worlds. So if there happened to be someone in the actual world whocoincidentally was just as Holmes is said tobe in the novels, that would not show thathe was Holmes. Similarly, if there are indi-viduals in other possible worlds who fulfill the descriptions in the books, that does notshow that any of them is Holmes. Moreover,since there will be a great many different pos-sible individuals who fulfill the descriptions,it seems there would be no non-arbitraryway of saying which of these is Holmes(Kripke, 1972, pp. 157–8).

Given the problems with possibilist views,the most popular realist treatments offictional entities have been not possibilistbut Meinongian and abstractist views.Meinong himself was not interested infiction per se, but rather sought to develop ageneral theory of the objects of speech andcognition (1904/1960). If there is knowledge,Meinong thought, there must be somethingknown, if there is a judgment, there must be something judged, and so on. So, forexample, if we know that the round squareis round, there must be something (theround square) of which we know that it isround. Some of these objects of knowledge,however (like the round square) do notexist. Meinongian views thus take seriouslythe truth of internal (type (3)) sentenceslike “Holmes solved his first mystery in hiscollege years”, and take fictional entities tobe the non-existent objects truly describedin such sentences – so on these views afictional entity is the object that (in somesense) has all of the properties ascribed to

the character in the relevant work (or works)of fiction.

The simple version of this approach en-counters difficulties of the kind that led to Russell’s (1905/1990) criticisms ofMeinong. For the stories ascribe to Holmesnot only properties like being a person andsolving mysteries, but also properties likeexisting, in conflict with the apparent truth that Holmes doesn”t exist. IndeedMeinongian theories take non-existenceclaims of type (2) to be straightforwardlytrue since, although there are the relevantfictional entities, they do not exist. So theMeinongian is in danger of contradiction bytaking Holmes and the like both to exist(since Meinongian objects are supposed to have all of the properties ascribed tothem) and not to exist (since they are non-existent objects).

The central achievement of neo-Meinongians such as Terence Parsons(1980) and Edward Zalta (1983) has beento show how these contradictions may beavoided. Parsons avoids them by distin-guishing two kinds of properties: nuclearproperties (like being a man, being a detec-tive, etc.) and extra-nuclear properties (likeexisting, being possible, etc.). He then holdsthat only the nuclear properties ascribed to the character in the story are actuallypossessed by the corresponding objects, so we do not have to conclude that Holmesexists. Nonetheless, we do need some way to mark the fact that there may be objects(arguably, like Macbeth’s dagger) that don’texist according to the stories, as well asobjects that (like Macbeth) are said to exist.To mark this, Parsons suggests that there are“watered down” nuclear properties corre-sponding to each extra-nuclear property, sothat Holmes does not exist (extra-nuclear) but does have watered-down (nuclear) existence. Zalta (1983), following ErnstMally, avoids contradiction by a differentroute: distinguishing two modes of predica-tion: encoding and exemplifying. Fictionalentities encode all of those properties theyare said to have in the stories, but that does not mean that they exemplify them. SoHolmes encodes existence but exemplifiesnon-existence, and contradiction is avoided.

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 13

fictional entities

14

A third view along similar lines takesfictional entities to be existing abstractobjects of some sort rather than to beMeinongian non-existent objects. NicholasWolterstorff develops one such view, acc-ording to which fictional characters are“not persons of a certain kind, but person-kinds” which do exist (1980, p. 144). On this view, authors do not refer to anyonewhen they write fictional stories; instead,they delineate a certain kind of person bydescribing certain sets of characteristics.The fictional character Holmes is not a person, but a certain kind of person, or “person-kind’, that has essentially within itthose properties the work attributes to thecharacter, e.g., being a man, being clever,being a detective. . . . As abstracta, of coursekinds can’t literally have such properties asbeing clever or solving mysteries – but theycan be defined by the properties essentialwithin them. So on this view, type (3)claims such as “Holmes solved his first mys-tery in his college years” are true just incase the properties expressed by the predicate(solving one’s first mystery during one’scollege years) are essential within the person-kind Holmes (1980, p. 159). Many (but notall – see below) of the properties attributedto characters in external discourse, e.g.,being famous, appearing in stories, may beproperties these abstract person-kinds gen-uinely have rather than properties essentialwithin the kind.

But neither of these strategies helps Wolter-storff cope with (type 2) non-existence claims,for existence is ascribed to Holmes in thestories, and so is essential to that person-kind,and the abstract entity that is that person-kind also exists. Wolterstorff suggests twoalternative ways of understanding non-existence claims: either as saying that the relevant person-kind has never been exem-plified, or (acknowledging Kripke’s point)that the author was not referring to anyonewhen he used the name in writing the story(1980, p. 161).

Despite their differences, possibilist, neo-Meinongian, and abstractist views are alikein taking most seriously internal (type 3)claims about fictional characters, and as aresult they face similar difficulties accounting

for the truth of at least some type (4)external claims. Whether fictional entities aretaken to be unactualized possibilia, non-existent objects, or abstract kinds, itseems that in any of these cases the work of authors writing stories is completelyirrelevant to whether or not there are thesefictional entities: the relevant possibilia,non-existent objects, and abstract kindswere “around” just as much before as afteracts of authoring, and so we can’t take seri-ously the idea that authors create fictionalcharacters on any of these views. The bestthese views can do to account for the appar-ent truth of claims such as “Hamlet wascreated by Shakespeare” is to say that it is at least true that Shakespeare describedor selected Hamlet from among all the available possibilia, non-existent objects, orabstract kinds and, by writing about thatobject, made it fictional. (Below I will returnto discuss some metaphysical difficultiesthese views also face.)

All of the views canvassed thus far –whether or not they accept that there arefictional entities – face difficulties accountingfor the apparent truth of certain external(type 4) sentences. This has inspired severalrecent theorists to begin by taking this sortof discourse as the focal case – a view thatrequires accepting that there are fictionalcharacters and that these are created byauthors in the process of writing works offiction. Since they take fictional charactersto be products of the creative activities ofauthors, call these “artifactual” views offiction.

The phenomenologist Roman Ingarden

suggested something like an artifactual viewof fiction in his (1931) The Literary Work of Art, where he treats fictional characters(and the literary works in which they appear)as purely intentional objects – objects owingtheir existence and essence to consciousness.Saul Kripke (apparently independently)suggests that fictional entities are humancreations in his unpublished 1973 JohnLocke lectures. He argues that fictionalcharacters exist in the ordinary concreteworld (not another possible world), butthey do not exist “automatically” as pureabstracta do. Instead, although they are

9780631199991_4_P1001.qxd 1/12/09 3:04 PM Page 14