A Comparative Study: Cross Border and Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions on

Acquirers’ Shareholder Wealth Effects in Malaysia

LEONG YEN LEE

Faculty of Business and Accountancy University Malaya

June 2009

A Comparative Study: Cross Border and Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions on

Acquirers’ Shareholder Wealth Effects in Malaysia

LEONG YEN LEE Bachelor of Electrical and Electronic Engineering

University Tenaga Nasional Malaysia

2004

Submitted to the Graduate School of Business Faculty of Business and Accountancy University Malaya, in partial fulfilment Of the requirements for the Degree of

Master of Business Administration

June 2009

A Comparative Study: Cross Border and Domestic Mergers and

Acquisitions on Acquirers’ Shareholder Wealth Effects in Malaysia

i

Abstract

In parallel with the global trends, cross border M&As have increased

dramatically in Asia Pacific economies since the mid 1990s. Take-over activities

were actively transacted by corporations to expand their business in order to tap

the opportunities posted in the fast growing market. The increasing investment

and trade liberalisation and deregulation in Asia encouraged cross border

activities. Malaysia accounted for 41 percent of the total deals and 38 percent of

the M&A transaction value of target firms in ASEAN from 1990 to 2000. The

cross border M&A activities would speed up corporate restructuring, gaining

market shares, business portfolio diversification and economic recovery during

economic downturn.

In the recent empirical show that cross border M&As perform even worst

than those within borders. On average, acquiring firm shareholders experience

significant wealth losses in domestic acquisitions, but not in international

acquisitions. The research objective of the study is to identify:

1) The cross border or domestic M&A attained a better return to the

acquirer’s shareholder wealth.

2) The determinants or factors that increase the return in acquirer’s

shareholder wealth in M&A activities.

In this study, the Market Model method is used to estimate the Beta of the

acquirers’ shareholder. The CAR method is used to measure the post merger

shareholders’ return. This research examines the magnitude and determinants of

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acquiring shareholder returns using 252 samples of domestic and foreign

acquisitions of Malaysia firms during the period 2004-2008 by running OLS on

the CAR with the determinants In this paper, estimation on the long term wealth

effects for a paired sample of acquiring and target firms base on the event

window of 60, 120 and 180 days after the announcement date.

The regression result shows that the cross border M&A in Malaysia

attained higher return to the acquirers’ wealth. The determinants of the direction

of merger, method of payment and firm size show an impact to the acquirers’

shareholders’ return. However, the market climate is insignificant to the CAR

which means there is no impact of the market climate towards the return.

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Acknowledgement

The writing of this dissertation has been one of the most significant

academic challenges I have ever had face. Without the support, patience and

guidance of my supervisor Dr. Edward Wong Sek Khin, this study would not have

been completed. Despite his may other academic and professional

commitments, his wisdom, knowledge and commitment to the highest standards

inspired and motivated me. It is to my supervisor that I owe my deepest gratitude.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview of Mergers & Acquistion 1 1.2 Research Problems 10 1.3 Research Objectives 13 1.4 Research Questions 13 1.5 Significant of Study 13 1.6 Scope of Study 14 1.7 Organization of the Report 15 1.8 Conclusion 16 Chapter 2 Literature Review 2.1 Overview of M&A 18 2.2 Motivations for M&As 20 2.2.1 Growth 20 2.2.2 Synergy 21 2.2.3 Diversifications 23 2.2.4 Market Power 24 2.2.5 Under-valuation/over-valuation Companies 25 2.2.6 Redistribution 25 2.2.7 Policy and Regulatory 26 2.3 Key Success Factors 27 2.3.1 Direction of Merger 27 2.3.1.1 Horizontal M&A 28 2.3.1.2 Vertical M&A 29 2.3.1.3 Conglomerate M&A 31 2.3.2 Method of Payment 32 2.3.3 Firm Size 35 2.3.4 Economic and Market Efficiency 36 2.4 Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions 37 2.5 Conclusion 39

Chapter 3 Hypothesis Development and Theoretical Framework

3.1 Research Framework 40

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3.2 Hyphothesis Development 42 3.2.1 Cross border and Domestic Acquisition 42 3.2.2 Direction of Merger 43 3.2.3 Method of Payment 44 3.2.4 Market Climate 45 3.2.5 Firm Size 46 3.3 Data Collection and Methodology 47 3.3.1Sample selection and data sources 47 3.3.2 Methodology 47 3.3.2.1 Market Model Method 47 3.3.2.2 CAR Method 49 3.3.2.3 Bauman’s Methodology 50 3.3.3 Data Analysis Techniques 51 3.4 Conclusion 52 Chapter 4 Empirical Results and Analysis 4.1 α and β coefficients computations under SPSS 53

4.2 Results of CARs computations individually for each Acquirer Company 55

4.3 Regression Results 55 4.3.1 Cross border and Domestic Acquisition 58 4.3.2 Direction of Merger 60 4.3.3 Method of Payment 62 4.3.4 Firm Size 64 4.3.5 Market Climate 65 4.4 Conclusion 67 Chapter 5 Summary and Conclusion 5.1 Overview of the Study 68 5.2 Summary of Research Results 70 5.2.1 A Review of Research Objectives 71 5.2.2 A Review of Research Questions 72

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5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 74 References 76 Appendix Appendix A 88 Appendix B 113 Appendix C 138 Appendix D 171 Appendix E 171 Appendix F 172 Appendix G 172

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List of Figures

Figure Title Page

1.1.1 An increase in deals between developed and developing countries. 5

1.1.2 China, India and Malaysia are at the forefront of M&A activity 6

1.1.3

South, East and South-East Asia: top 10 recipients of FDI inflows, 2006–2007 7

1.1.4

South, East and South-East Asia: cross-border M&As, by sector/industry, 2005–2007 8

1.1.5 Firms from both developed and developing countries target the same industries 9

1.2.1 Cross Border Merger and Acquisition Overview, 1990-2007 11

1.7.1 Organization of the Report 17

3.1.1 Research Framework 40

3.3.2.2.1 Event Window for CAR Evaluation 50

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List of Tables

Table Title Page

4.1.1 Regression Analysis Results for Proton Holdings Berhad 53

4.3.1 Regression Analysis Results for T+60 days Post Announcement Window 56

4.3.2 Regression Analysis Results for T+120 days Post Announcement Window 57

4.3.3 Regression Analysis Results for T+180 days Post Announcement Window 57

4.3.4 Regression Analysis Results for T+180 days Post Announcement Window without GDP Growth 58

4.3.5.1 Number of M&A Deals from Year 2004 to 2008 in Malaysia 66

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1

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The introduction chapter comprised the background information on M&A

activities, the definition of the research problem and the purpose of the study.

This chapter also presents the significance and scope of the study is also

discussed. Finally, the organization of the report gives reader an overview

structure of the thesis.

1.1 Overview of Mergers and Acquisitions

Increased level of business combinations is a norm in a free open market.

The terms such as take-over, mergers, and acquisitions (M&A) mean business

combinations of acquired firm and acquirer (Ruhani & Pillay, 2000). Mergers and

acquisitions (M&As) are transaction where two or more companies are combined

to become one (Weston & Copeland, 1992). These activities represent massive

reallocation of resources within an economy. The objective is to channel the

corporate assets towards their best possible use. M&As are popular means

through which companies achieve economies of scale, remove inefficient

management or respond to economic shocks (Rachel, Armando, Kathleen and

Markus, 2004). International mergers and acquisitions are among the key

corporate strategies multinational corporations (MNCs) use to expand and

diversify. It also enables firms to grow in a short period in order to cope with the

rapid globalization of trade and services and competitive market forces (Larsen,

2

2007). These popular forms of business investments gained popularity in the

business world with Malaysia being no exception since the 1990s (Ruhani &

Pillay, 2000).

The prime objective of a firm is to grow profitably. The growth can be

achieved either through the process of introducing or developing new products or

by expanding or enlarging the capacity of existing products. External growth can

be achieved by acquisition of existing business firm Ghosh and Das (2003). The

acquirers usually pursue a merger to cut costs, create growth opportunities,

gaining access to production and new technology. The acquirers will be able to

establish or broaden their presence in high-growth markets and also focus on

low-cost environments for manufacturing and sourcing. Well aware of the

growing threat from emerging rivals, they want to strengthen their competitive

positions. This strategy pushes expansion plans by broadening the customer

base and increasing market share. Core strengths such as technological

leadership and superior quality must be maintained despite the challenges posed

by emerging competitors. Companies can preserve these advantages by

launching new innovations targeted to meet specific market requirements. For

established firms, this means expanding the scope of their activities to assure

that existing intellectual property rights (IPRs) include features such as

proprietary solutions, pricing models and product upgrades. As emerging firms

acquire state-of-the-art products and technology, they are diminishing

established companies’ advantages in innovation and threatening their global

market superiority.

3

The difference between domestic and cross border is that in a cross

border acquisition, the control of assets and operations is transferred from a local

to a foreign company and a mode of entry for foreign direct investors (FDI).

Cross border M&As are defined as any transactions in assets of two firms

belonging to two different economies. Cross border mergers and acquisitions

(M&As) are a main vehicle for foreign direct investment (Evenett, S.J., 2004)

Cross border M&As involve capital transfer that can increase the total investible

funds available to the host economies and may introduce innovative

management practices in the host economies (PECC, 2002).

In parallel with the global trends, cross border M&As have increased

dramatically in Asia Pacific economies especially since the mid 1990s. This wave

was driven by globalization, technological changes, and market deregulation and

liberalization. Almost all industries are going through reorganization and

consolidation. In 1998, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) attracted a

huge amount of capital inflow which contributed to economic growth and

economic recovery of the East and Southeast Asian economies from the

economy crisis in the late 1990s (PECC, 2002). In the 1990s, the economy of

Malaysia enjoyed a spectacular average growth of about eight percent per year

before the crisis (Malaysia, 1999). Take-over activities were actively transacted

by corporations to expand their business in order to tap the opportunities posted

in the fast growing market. Using the SDC Platinum of Thomson Financial

Securities data of Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions Database, Malaysia

accounted for 41 percent of the total deals and 38 percent of the M&A

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transaction value of target firms in ASEAN from 1990 to 2000 (Metwalli and Tang,

2002).

Cross border M&As increase dramatically since the mid-1990s in Asia

Pacific developing economies, particularly in the five countries most affected by

the financial crisis including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Korea and

Thailand. Policy and regulations were amended expecting that the cross border

M&As would speed up corporate restructuring and economic recovery. The

increasing investment and trade liberalisation and deregulation in Asia

encouraged cross border activities. On M&A prospects in the Asia Pacific region,

the KPMG Global M&A Predictor (dated 21 January 2008) reported that outside

of the region’s mature markets, the majority of Asia Pacific’s national economies

are buoyant, enjoying a minimum of five percent GDP growth. Largely untapped

potential of regional and sector consolidation can therefore be expected to

continue to drive healthy corporate deal-flow, particularly in financial and

consumer services, and in industrials where several medium sized as well as

some mega-deals are expected to be done.

In the study of A.T. Kearney (2008) found that companies from developing

countries such as China, India, Malaysia, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and

South Africa are snapping up established firms at an astonishing rate. Refer to

Figure 1.1.1, of the 2,168 majority acquisitions between developed and

developing countries in 2007, almost 20 percent—a total of 421—were driven by

companies from developing countries. In Figure 1.1.2 Companies from India,

Malaysia and China accounted for 56 percent of the deals that took place from

5

2002 to 2007. Malaysia is a surprising second—primarily due to the government

providing substantial tax incentives to engage in high-tech business deals and

promote exports.

Figure 1.1.1: An increase in deals between developed and developing

countries.

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Figure 1.1.2: China, India and Malaysia are at the forefront of M&A activity

Base on the UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008, FDI flows to South-

East Asia increased by 18% in 2007, to $61 billion (Figure 1.1.3) – resulting in

yet another year of robust FDI growth there. Nearly all ASEAN countries received

higher inflows. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, in that

order, were the largest FDI recipients. While FDI growth in favourable regional

economic growth, an improved investment environment, higher intraregional

investments, and strengthened regional integration were key contributory factors.

Reinvested earnings were particularly strong, highlighting the importance of

existing investors as a source of FDI.

7

Figure 1.1.3: South, East and South-East Asia: top 10 recipients of FDI

inflows, 2006–2007(Billions of dollars)

FDI inflows in 2007, as highlighted by M&A activities, rose in all three

sectors – primary, manufacturing and services. Cross-border M&A sales

contributed to the increase in FDI inflows to all three sectors (Figure 1.1.4).

8

Figure 1.1.4: South, East and South-East Asia: cross-border M&As, by

sector/industry, 2005–2007 (Millions of dollars)

In consistent with the FDI in Figure 1.1.4, in the analysis of .T. Kearney

(2008) both developed and developing countries are targeting many of the same

industries. From Figure 1.1.5 the majority of deals (51 percent) are in mining,

consumer and retail, financial institutions, real estate, communications and

process industries. The targeted industries exhibit strong rates of growth, with

mining (41 percent) and real estate and construction (40 percent) at the forefront.

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Figure 1.1.5: Firms from both developed and developing countries target

the same industries

The rate of M&A activity between developing and developed countries is

growing by 19 percent per year. Consequently, established leaders should move

quickly and more broadly into emerging markets to curb up and coming

competitors. This can be achieved either by acquiring emerging firms or teaming

up with other incumbents to conquer developing markets jointly. For example,

when Vodafone purchased Hutchinson Essar in India last year, it secured its

position as a global market leader and gained a foothold in the fastest-growing

and second-biggest mobile market in the world, A.T. Kearney (2008). The

synergistic gains by M&A activity may accrue from more efficient management,

economies of scale and scope, improved production techniques, combination of

complementary resources, redeployment of assets to more profitable uses, the

exploitation of market power or any number of value enhancing mechanisms,

Bradley (1980).

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In the report of A.T. Kearney (2008) sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—

state-owned investment funds that manage mainly foreign currency assets are

growing rapidly in number worldwide. Malaysia, both oil and exporting country

have gained huge current account surpluses in the last decades. Traditionally,

countries turned these surpluses into risk-averse financial assets to reduce

currency volatility and stabilize their economies by investing in importing

countries with a current account deficit. In the modern market, sovereign wealth

funds are favoring equity-type investments either through state-owned

investment funds or companies—thus gaining exposure to strategic companies

with more capabilities and know-how in industries that are crucial to their own

economies. The developing countries are expected to make a giant leap forward

in the acquisitions market once their funds reach the anticipated potential.

Although the SWFs will have a dramatic effect on financial markets, with the

rapid increase of their assets, these funds will under growing pressure to invest,

which may lead to overpaying for acquisition targets.

1.2 Research Problem

There has been a significant growth of worldwide M&A sales recently. This

can be documented in Figure 1.2.1, the total value of worldwide M&As sales in

2005 rose from US$929 billion to US$1637 billion in 2007. Malaysia accounted

for 0.28% of the world total value of cross border M&As sales and for 0.34% of

the world total value. Malaysia’s FDI outflow expanded from RM15.9 billion in

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2004 to RM38 billion last year. Petronas came in second in terms of total foreign

assets after Hong Kong’s Hutchison Whampoa Ltd, in a compilation of the top

100 non-financial transnational companies in developing countries. Other

Malaysian non-financial companies that made the list for having sizeable

investments abroad are YTL Corp Bhd, Genting Bhd, Telekom Malaysia Bhd,

Sime Darby Bhd and Maxis Communications Bhd. Asian M&A activities continue

to soar from last year to 2008 despite the US credit crisis and the weakness in

the Asian stock markets. According to Thomson Financial, total Asian mergers

and acquisitions (M&As) excluding Japan deals done last year were worth

USD310bil. The first quarter of 2008 recorded over USD70bil of deals completed

with over USD120bil of deals announced.

Figure 1.2.1: Cross Border Merger and Acquisition Overview, 1990-2007

A large shift of ownership of important enterprises from domestic to

foreign hands maybe seen as eroding national sovereignty and may reduce

competitions in domestic market and lead to market dominance of foreign

acquirers. Though M&As basically aim at enhancing the shareholders value or

12

wealth, the results of several empirical studies reveal that on average, M&As

consistently benefit the target company shareholders but not the acquirer

company shareholders. Target company shareholders experience large,

abnormal positive returns, whereas buyer shareholders experience little sor no

positive abnormal returns (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Eun, Kolodny and

Scheraga, 1996; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Klaus, Mueller, Yortoglu, and

Zulehner, 2003; Kuipers, Miller and Patel, 2003; Seth, Song and Petit, 2000).

Recent empirical studies show that cross border M&As perform even worst than

those within borders, the fact that up to 83 percent of these transactions are

unsuccessful (Angwin and Savill, 1997; KPMG, 1999, Moeller and

Schlingemann, 2005). A study based on sample of 4430 cross border M&A by

US firm comparing the stock returns and operating performance are significantly

lower performance than the domestic transactions (Moeller and Schlingemann,

2005). An empirical evidence suggests that 61 percent of European executives

believed cross border M&As involve more obstacles, problems and risks than

domestic acquisitions and therefore were less likely not be successful (Angwin

and Savill, 1997).

Based on the empirical studies, companies employ M&A transactions

experience lower operating and stock performance and cross border M&A is

unlikely to be successful. However, this contradicts with the growing trends of

M&A transactions in Malaysia.

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1.3 Research Objectives

On average, acquiring firm shareholders experience significant wealth

losses in domestic acquisitions, but not in international acquisitions. It is

important to know the key success factors that causing the wealth gained in M&A

transactions. The research objective of the study is to identify:

1) The cross border or domestic M&A attained a better return to the

acquirer’s shareholder wealth.

2) The determinants or factors that increase the return in acquirer’s

shareholder wealth in M&A activities.

1.4 Research Questions

This study attempts to answer the following questions:

1) What are the key success factors of a successful M&A transaction?

2) Cross border or domestic M&As yield a better shareholders’ wealth?

3) What key factors determine the shareholders’ wealth effects in

M&A?

1.5 Significant of Study

There has been a significant amount of studies that examine the domestic

and cross border mergers and acquisition on shareholders’ wealth effect and the

determinants of a successful M&A transaction. However, most of the studies

were conducted in the Western countries such as United States of America,

United Kingdom and Europe countries and the studies are mainly focus on the

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effect of post merger factors on shareholder return. Most of the studies present

the post merger integration factors such as the corporate culture, the

communication plan between stakeholders, the functional integration and new

corporate culture. Thus, this study will give the academicians an extension of

knowledge about pre mergers strategy that will effects the acquirer’s

shareholders’ wealth in domestic and cross border M&A in Malaysia.

This study attempt to know the comparative result of domestic and cross

border M&A on acquirer’s shareholders wealth and also the factors that effect the

shareholder’s wealth. This study will highlight the important attributes for the

M&A planning process and help to crave a strategy to achieve a successful M&A

which increases the shareholders’ wealth.

1.6 Scope of study

This paper presents the wealth effects for acquire shareholders in term of

corporate share returns from cross border versus domestic transactions on the

performance of the public listed acquiring firms in Malaysia. Base on 252

samples, we will look into the determinants that have impact on the shareholders

wealth. In this paper, estimation on the wealth effects for a paired sample of

acquiring and target firms based on data from 1997 to 2007. The role of bid

characteristics and more target specific features in determining changes in

acquiring shareholders wealth will be examine as well.

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1.7 Organization of the report

This report consists of five chapters. It is organizes as below:

Chapter 1: The introduction chapter comprised the background information on

M&A activities, the definition of the research problem and the purpose of the

study. This chapter also presents the significance and scope of the study is also

discussed. Finally, the organization of the report gives reader an overview

structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2: The chapter explains about the M&A activities. The chapter starts with

the overview of mergers and acquisitions. The motivations of a company employ

M&A for the company expansion and development. It is then followed by a

discussion on the key success factors of increasing shareholders’ wealth through

M&A. Finally, the literature review discussed the impact of the M&A transactions

towards a company.

Chapter 3: This chapter presents the methodology employed in the study. The

chapter starts with the review of the research framework. Then it provides

discussed the hypothesis developed to assess the shareholders’ wealth effects in

this study and the data collection procedure will be discussed. Finally, the

methodology employed to measure the post merger shareholders return.

16

Chapter 4: This chapter presents the empirical results and discuss all the findings

of this study. First of all, the results for the coefficients computations under the

software SPSS of individual beta will be shown. Then discuss about the results of

the individual Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of every M&A activity in the

sample.

Chapter 5: The final chapter presents the conclusion of this research. Firstly, an

overview of the study will be provided. Thereafter, the summary of the research

results and review of research objectives are discussed. Finally, the chapter ends

with suggestions for further research.

1.8 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the introduction of the study. The introduction

presented the research problem, research objectives, research questions,

significant of study and scope of study. Lastly, organization of the report is

included. In the following Chapter, the literature review related to M&A will be

presented.

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Figure 1.7.1: Organization of the Report

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Overview of Mergers & Acquisitions

1.2 Research Problem 1.3 Research Objectives 1.4 Research Questions 1.5 Significant of Study 1.6 Scope of Study 1.7 Organization of the Report 1.8 Conclusion

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Chapter 3

Hypothesis Development and

Theoretical Framework

Chapter 4

Empirical Results and Analysis

Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusion

2.1 Overview of M&A 2.2 Motivations of M&A 2.3 Key Success Factors 2.4 Impact of M&A 2.5 Conclusion

3.1 Research Framework 3.2 Hypothesis Development 3.3 Data Collection and

Methodology 3.4 Conclusion

4.1 α and β coefficients computations under SPSS

4.2 Results of CARs Computations Individually for Each Acquirer Company

4.3 Regression Results 4.4 Conclusion

5.1 Overview of the study 5.2 Summary of the Research

Results 5.3 Suggestions for Future Research

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CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

In chapter 2, the literature review explains about the M&A activities. The

chapter starts with the overview of mergers and acquisitions. The motivations of

a company employ M&A for the company expansion and development. It is then

followed by a discussion on the key success factors of increasing shareholders’

wealth through M&A. Finally, the literature review discussed the impact of the

M&A transactions towards a company.

2.1 Overview of M&A

A merger or acquisition is a transaction where two or more companies are

combined to become one (Weston & Copeland, 2002). Merger, the assets and

operations of two firms are combined to establish a new legal entity (PECC,

2002). There are two forms of merger, merger by absorption and merger by

establishment. A merger by absorption is the act by means of which one or more

companies limited by shares (absorbed), which are dissolved without liquidation,

transfer to another existing company limited by shares (absorbing) the entirety of

their property (assets and liabilities) (Panagiotis, 2003). Merger by establishment

is when two or more companies merged into a newly created company (PECC,

2002).

Acquisition is where the control of assets and operations is transferred

from the target company to the acquired company. The term acquisition means

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essentially the same as merger, but is usually reserved for conglomerates buying

other corporations (Panagiotis, 2003). Acquisition can be taken in two forms,

asset acquisition and share acquisition. Asset acquisition when the acquiring

company purchases part or all the assets of the target which will remain legally in

existence after the transaction. Share acquisition occurs when the acquiring firm

company buys shares in the target company from individual shareholders

(PECC, 2002).

Cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a main vehicle for

foreign direct investment (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004. Yet despite its

quantitative importance, the determinants of cross-border M&As are still not well-

understood. Following Neary (2007) various motives for M&As can be

distinguished in general. There are two basic motives stand out: an efficiency

motive and a strategic motive. Efficiency gains arise because M&As increase

synergy between firms through increased use of economies of scale or scope.

Furthermore, from a strategic perspective M&As might change the market

structure and as such have an impact on firm profits, which might even be

reduced to zero (Salant et al., 1983).

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2.2 Motivations for M&A

2.2.1 Growth

Nowadays, business systems are undergoing a dramatic transformation in

response to the continual changes that have become the only constant in the

business environment and companies are constantly adapting to these changes.

M&A is one of the most important means by which companies respond to

changing conditions (Bruner, 2004). A company involves in two form of growth,

internally and externally. Internal growth can be slow and ineffective if a firm is

seeking opportunity in short-term advantage over its competitors (Patrick A.

Gaughman, 2001). Mergers and acquisitions as a source of growth in order to

reach strategic and financial advantages are becoming increasingly an

instrument of macroeconomic renewal (Bruner, 2004). A firm that is seeking to

grow aggressively will often view acquisitions and internal growth as

complementary strategies (Hay and Liu, 1998).

M&As is the fastest way for a firm to expand its production, market,

strategic (intangible) assets and achieving the competitive goal. M&As allow a

latecomer in an industry to attain new technology and catch up rapidly (PECC,

2000). M&As with an existing company involve less cost for growth. The

acquisition of targets with good growth prospects but limited cash by companies

with plenty of financial slack but limited investment opportunities may be value-

enhancing Myers and Majluf (1984). Even though bidding firms will pay a

premium to acquire resources through mergers, this total cost is not necessarily

more expensive than internal growth (Patrick A. Gaughman, 2002).

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2.2.2 Synergy

Synergy benefits refer to the ability of a corporate combination to be more

profitable than the individual firms that are combining (Patrick A. Gaughman,

2001). Synergy is the enhanced competitive capacity and attained greater

cashflows in excess of what an individual company will gain (Sirower, 1997). A

study concluded that in a post merger phase, there are significant improvements

in the cashflows compared to the competitors in the same industry (Healy, Peapu

& Ruback, 1992). The combination of two firms will yield a more valuable entity

than the value of the sum of the two firms if they were to stay independent:

Value (A + B) > Value (A) + Value (B)

Synergy can be derived from cost economies which two companies will eliminate

the duplicated cost factors which in turn lower the per-unit cost. Due to the

pooling of management resources, sharing marketing and distribution networks,

purchasing synergies production cost reductions and duplication of production

(PECC, 2000). Synergy can be derived from revenue enhancement in which

combination of different capability of the two companies to increase the revenue

(Patrick A. Gaughman, 2001).

The matching of complementary resources and skills to enhance firm’s

innovatory capabilities in long term positive effects on sales, market shares and

profits (PECC, 2000). For example, one company’s capability, such as research

prowess, is combined with another company’s capability, such as marketing

skills, to significantly increase the combined revenues. Efficiency gains arise

because M&As increase synergy between firms through increased use of

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economies of scale or scope. A merger is worthwhile when the synergy (surplus

value) exceeds the incurred merger costs including the takeover premium

(Sirower, 1997). If synergy exists, M&As make economic sense if the whole is

worth more than the sum of its parts (Ruud, Vincent and Huib, 2000).

There are three types of synergy benefits: operating, financial and

managerial synergies (Trautwein, 1990). Operating synergy assumes that

economies of scale exist in an industry and that prior to their M&A, firms are

operating at levels of activity that fall short of achieving the potential for

economies of scale (Weston et al., 2001). Expansion through a merger or

acquisition increases the size of the company and hence may lower per-unit

costs. Financial synergy refers to the impact of a merger or acquisition on the

combined firm’s cost of capital. This can be achieved by lowering the systematic

risk of the firm’s investment portfolio. Alternatively, increasing firm size may

improve company access to cheaper financing and/or create an internal market

where capital can be allocated more efficiently. Finally, managerial synergies

may arise from combining firms of unequal managerial capabilities (Luypert and

Huyghebaert, 2006).

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2.2.3 Diversifications

Most of the companies are risk averse which trying to lower their risk and

exposure to certain volatile industry segments by adding other sectors to their

business portfolios (Patrick A. Gaughman, 2001). Firms may make cross border

M&As on the basis that industry returns across economies maybe less correlated

than within an economy (Vasconcellos and Kish, 1998). Geographical

diversification may serve to enhance acquirers returns especially for those

without a prior presence in the target’s country as it opens up a whole new

market and network for them, (Fatemi and Furtado, 1988; Corhay & Rad, 2000;

Kiymaz &Mukherjee, 2000).As intensified global competition and rapid

technology development have led firms to focus on their core activities, the need

for product diversification has become less important (Morck and Yeung, 1999).

Research studies show that unrelated diversifications tend to yield poor results,

related diversifications, mergers, and acquisitions into a field that is close to the

acquiring firm’s main line of business tend to have better performance (Berger

and Ofek, 1995). Research tells us that staying with what a company knows best

may yield positive results, but straying into businesses that it does not know is an

uphill battle that only a select few companies can manage successfully (Patrick

A. Gaughman, 2001).

24

2.2.4 Market Power

Some mergers may result in market power which redounds to the benefit

of the merging firms. George Stigler (1950) argued that such an effect might

have been a primary motivation for many of the mergers and acquisitions during

the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first half of the 20th century. He

called the 1887-1904 merger wave "mergers for monopoly" and the 1916-1929

wave "mergers for oligopoly." Regardless of whether market power was, or was

not, a major motivation for mergers in the first-half of the century it is doubtful that

the bulk of more recent merger activity could be attributed to an effort to secure

market power. There seems to be a number of reasons given to merge/acquire a

company, many of which involving the market is to acquire more efficient

distribution, to strengthen the company’s position towards its distributors, to

strengthen the market position, to acquire attractive resources and/or brand

names (both of which in turn to attract customers) and to achieve market power,

Öberg & Anderson, (2002). The market power as well as efficiency and

effectiveness are seen as ways of creating values following a horizontal

acquisition. An acquisition could be a means to get hold on new marketing

resources, or to redeploy the acquiring firms marketing resources. Brands, sales

forces and general marketing expertise all could be viewed as assets possible to

redeploy, Capron & Hulland (1999). In highly concentrated industries, firms tend

to recognize the impact of their actions and policies on one another. This may

25

influence firm reactions to changes in competitive behaviour, like price reductions,

and possibly result in tacit collusion (Weston et al., 2001).

2.2.5 Under-valuation/over-valuation Companies

If stock prices are sufficiently depressed, the takeover of a listed company

may constitute a bargain relative to investing in new facilities from scratch (Golbe

and White, 1988). Managers are more likely to issue new shares when their

company is over-valued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). A research on the behaviour

of acquiring mangers concluded that managers in overvalued firms have an

incentive to engage in stock acquisitions (Sheilfer and Vishny, 2003). Target

shareholders will accept these stock offers because they tend to overestimate

the value of synergy benefits in overvalued market (Rhodes-Kropf and

Viswanathan, 2004). Imperfections in the capital market and major exchange rate

rearrangements may provide short-term capital gains through acquiring an

undervalued firm. This is a drive in cross border M&As as those host economies

have poorly developed capital markets or in financial crisis (PECC, 2000).

2.2.6 Redistribution

A person with a strongly developed power motive strives to experience the

opportunity to exert control over others or to experience control itself and aims at

increasing their source of power (Schmalt, 1987). The agency theory states that

the interests of the shareholders or owners are not parallel to the interests of

management (Ruud, Vincent and Huib, 2000). A reason for M&A maybe ‘Empire

26

Building’, where manager strive to expand the size of the company (Mueller,

1989).

In the other hand, the hubris theory states that management strives for

synergy having the goal to maximize profits for shareholders (Ruud, Vincent and

Huib, 2000). Synergies occurred in these mergers but the pre-calculation of the

synergy is too high to justify (Roll, 1986).

The game theory where the moment a competitor decides to merge, one

has to decide whether to counter the attack on the current market position by

similar move. The management does not know the driving forces of the

competitors M&A activities and whether this decision was financially sensible

(Ruud, Vincent and Huib, 2000). A company will make the move that minimizes

regret. “It is better for reputation to fail conventionally than succeed

unconventionally” (Keynes 1936). Due to fierce competition in M&As and limited

time for preparation, the strategic trajectory of synergies is shorten causing lower

chance of success (Roll, 1986).

2.2.7 Policy and Regulatory

Industry deregulations drive the M&A activity across industries (Mitchell

and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade et al.). In cross border

M&AS, most economies are trying to attract FDI, not only by removing

restrictions but also trhoguh active promotion and by providing high standards of

treatment, legal protection and guarantees. The international regulatory

framework has been strengthened such as bilateral investement protection and

27

double taxation treaties such as WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures

(TRIMS) Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)

(PECC, 2000). However, the governments may reserve the right to approve

some proposed investment projects and reject or modify others to preserve

particular public interests (APECC, 1999).

2.3 Key Success Factors

2.3.1 Direction of Merger

The M&As relationship between the acquiring and target firms can be

categorized as horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. Horizontal mergers are

those involving companies in the same market segment (for example, two retail

banks merging). Vertical mergers involve companies at different stages of the

production process in a given market (for example, an electricity generator

merging with an electricity-distribution company). The horizontal, vertical and

conglomerate mergers may cause different competitive problems. By reducing

the number of competitors in a market, horizontal mergers may create or

strengthen market power. Non-horizontal mergers are generally less likely to

engender competition concerns than horizontal mergers because they do not

result in the loss of direct competition between merging firms in the same

relevant market (Neven, D. and Albaek, S., 2008).The threats to competition from

vertical and conglomerate mergers are less obvious, and can in principle be

viewed as unilateral actions with the potential to harm rivals.

28

2.3.1.1 Horizontal M&A

Horizontal M&As deals in which competitors are combined (Patrick A.

Gaughan, 2001). The 1998 $77.2 billion merger between Exxon and Mobil is an

example of a successful horizontal deal. Horizontal mergers benefits in

economies scale of production and distribution, access to new markets, removal

of inefficient management, greater financial possibilities and combined intangible

assets such as trademarks, patents and license (Rauud, Vincent, Huib, 2000).

Horizontal mergers tend to be motivated by the drive for economies of scale:

spreading fixed costs (such as information technology or marketing) across a

larger output, (Jenkinson, 1999). The horizontal mergers create market power

(Eckbo and Stillman, 1983). In any case, large horizontal mergers tend to attract

the attention of competition authorities that would be expected to block such

deals if effective competition was seriously reduced significant barrier to entry.

For entry to be considered a sufficient competitive constraint on the merging

parties, it must be shown that entry is likely to occur if prices move above

competitive levels. This depends substantially on the associated sunk costs of

market entry. Entry may be constrained by barriers such as technical advantages

or the experience and reputation of a firm. Moreover, entry would be more likely

to occur in a market that is expected to grow (Commission of the European

Communities, 2004). A horizontal merger may also limit competition in a relevant

market by removing one of the merging parties as a potential entrant into that

relevant market. Potential market entry may also constrain the behaviour of the

merging parties (Pilsbury and Meany, 2009).

29

2.3.1.2 Vertical M&A

Vertical M&As occurs between firms in client-supplier or buyer-seller

relationship (PECC2002). In 1993, $6.6 billion merger between Merck, a

pharmaceutical manufacturer and Medco, a pharmaceutical distributor as the

vertical transaction (Patrick A. Gaughan, 2001). Vertical mergers describe a

situation where firms operating at different levels in the supply chain merge

(Jenkinson, 1999).Vertical mergers attained shorter industrial chain, procurement

cost reduction, more efficient communication and focus on market development

(Rauud, Vincent, Huib, 2000). Vertical mergers are often justified on the grounds

of internalizing contracting problems, and when the upstream market is less than

fully competitive such mergers can result in both higher profits and lower prices.

However, vertical mergers can produce situations of "complex monopoly" where

vertical integration acts as a significant barrier to entry (Jenkinson, 1999). In term

of market power, the greater the market power at one level of the supply chain,

the more attention should be devoted to vertical issues. The threat of switching to

alternative firms would limit the ability of a vertically merged firm to increase

prices or reduce the level of service quality. In the absence of competing

upstream competitors, vertical effects might lead to foreclosure of all downstream

rivals and monopoly prices (Motta, 2004). An upstream monopolist may not want

to set higher prices for its downstream competitors due to the double

marginalisation problem. The monopolist could extract all its revenue at the

upstream level without leveraging its market power into the downstream level

(Pilsbury and Meany, 2009). Another issue raised in competitive assessments is

30

to what extent the merged parties have the incentive and ability to foreclose third

parties from entering the market. A vertically integrated firm may raise its rivals’

costs by supplying the inputs at higher prices to its competitors than to its own

downstream units (Pilsbury and Meany, 2009). The assessment of buyer power

would establish whether competitors at the downstream market have sufficient

bargaining power to constrain the ability of the merging party operating at the

upstream level to increase prices, deny access or reduce service quality

(Pilsbury and Meany, 2009). The most common benefit of vertical integration is

that companies may create a more cost efficient organisation. For example, such

benefits may arise from technological economies, (the integration of

technological processes, such as the integration of iron- and steelmaking).

Another benefit could be the lowering of transaction costs, the main source of

which are the costs involved in bringing buyers and sellers together (Harrington,

J.E. Jr. and Vernon, 2005). By aligning the incentives of firms operating at

different levels of the supply chain, vertical mergers may also reduce the double-

marginalisation problem, which describes a situation where every firm in the

supply chain wants to maximise its profits. When the supplier or retailer has a

certain degree of market power, it would set its prices above marginal costs.

Without vertical integration, the price of the input would therefore be marked up

twice: by both the upstream and downstream firms. Vertical integration allows a

firm to control for the problem by internalising the profits made at other levels of

the supply chain. When two firms are managed by the same company, the end-

31

user price may be lower, as this price would be chosen so as to maximise profits

for the whole entity (Pilsbury and Meany, 2009).

2.3.1.3 Conglomerate M&A

A merger may be of a conglomerate nature when the involved firms are

not operating in the same market and are not in a buyer–seller relationship. Such

mergers are neither horizontal nor vertical (Pilsbury and Meany, 2009).

Conglomerate mergers involve companies in distinct markets. Companies

acquire firms that are in totally different industries known as conglomerate

mergers. Daimler Benz’s acquisitions in sectors such as the aerospace industry

help convert the premium automobile manufacturer into a conglomerate and

Europe’s largest industrial company (Patrick A. Gaughqn, 2001). Typically, a

diversified firm is defined as one that has sales in two or more market segments

(according to two-digit SIC codes) along with a requirement that the most

important segment does not account for more than a particular proportion (often

90%) of total sales.The target company in conglomerate M&As seek to diversify

risk and attain economy scope (PECC, 2000). The results from these studies are

quite clear: diversified companies tend to be valued less highly than focused

companies. An example of the results obtained by such studies is found in Lins

and Serveas, who use data for publicly traded firms from the U.K., Germany and

Japan for the period 1994-96 (excluding financial businesses). They find that

international differences in the institutional environment of firms have an effect on

the value of diversification. The evidence for Japan and the U.K. points to

32

diversification discounts of approximately 10-15% (measured in terms of market

value to sales ratios) while in Germany the effect is neutral for the whole sample

but significant for firms where insider ownership is under 5% (these are typically

larger firms) (Jenkinson, 1999). A study on Berger and Ofek10study the 1980s

boom in diversification activity in the U.S. and find diversification discounts of

around 14%. In the study at cross-subsidies, over-investment (due to easier

availability of large cash flows) and informational asymmetries with divisional

managers as the possible causes (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Some benefits from

diversification are also identified, although the most important, by some margin,

appears to be possible tax benefits. The value loss associated with diversification

generates large profit opportunities for outsiders. Hence, there have been a

number of studies of spin-offs, equity carve-outs and other ways of increasing

corporate "focus" and efficiency. The results tend to suggest (see, for example,

Berger and Ofek11) that firms with the lowest valuations (relative to comparable

undiversified firms) are more likely to be taken over and broken up, and that such

transactions can yield good returns for those that break up the firms (Berger and

Ofek, 1995).

2.3.2 Method of Payment

In the study of Loughran and Vijh (1997), measure how well companies

that had merged performed relative to comparable companies (matched by size

and market-to-book ratios) that had not merged. Their focus is on 5-year holding

periods after the merger. Interestingly, the post-acquisition returns are found to

33

be related to both the mode of acquisition and the form of payment. Mergers

under-perform matching companies by 16% over 5-year horizons, while hostile

tender offers outperform comparable firms by 43%. Similarly, companies that pay

for acquisitions using their own shares under-perform by 24%, whilst cash

bidders out-perform by around 19%. The asymmetry information models which

allow to explain the choice of the payment method in mergers and acquisitions

have been initially developed by Hansen (1987) and by Fishman (1989) and are

based on Myers and Maljuf’s work (1984) explained that both the target and the

bidder have private information on their own value. According to these

informational models, the abnormal returns are significantly negative when the

operation is financed with stocks but do not show that the performance of the

investment is low, since the choice of the payment method reveals private

information of the bidder concerning the value or the synergies of both firms.

According to Ross (1977), managers who can have an informational

advantage are incited to signal their private information through the choice of

their debt level. For firms that have low cash flows, it is costly to have high debt

levels, because the probability of bankruptcy is higher than for firms whose cash

flows are high. In Leland and Pyle (1977), under certain conditions, managers of

valuable firms signal their quality by retaining a large stake in the firm and so will

use more debt than managers of firm of low value. Debt financing allows the

manager to retain a large part of the ownership of the firm, but holding a large

stake in the firm is costly for risk adverse managers. This large stake is less

costly to a manager of a high quality firm than to a manager of a low quality firm,

34

and therefore the proportion of stocks held by insiders is a signal concerning the

firm’s quality. The question of the capital structure is also bound to the

phenomena of signals. As Blazenko (1987) shows, high quality projects are

signalled by the use of debt or cash. Indeed, risk adverse managers will not use

cash if they are compelled to issue debt in order to obtain cash, unless they are

sure that the quality of the stocks to be acquired justifies the personal risk of

loosing their job. In other words, since managers are not in favour of the use of

cash as a payment method, the fact that they use it nevertheless can be a signal

concerning the potential of the stocks that will be acquired.

Myers and Maljuf (1984) show that, in a world of asymmetry information,

the choice of the payment method by the bidding firms in acquisitions can reveal

information concerning the bidder. The managers who own information and want

to act in the interest of their actual shareholders will use stocks if they are

overvalued. They will put some positive net present value investments aside if

the stocks that would be used to finance the operation are undervalued by the

market. So, the decision to finance an investment by stocks will be interpreted by

the market as bad news, so that the stock price of the firm will decrease at the

announcement of the acquisition. Moreover, investors are incited to decrease

their valuation of a stock offer, for fear of acquiring overvalued stocks.

Conversely, when a cash offer is announced, the assets of the bidder will be

considered as being undervalued, which constitutes a positive signal for

investors.

35

So the more the financing is risky, the more the effect on the stocks will be

negative, that is why managers use first internal financings, then debt and finally

they issue stocks (Myers, 1984). In accordance with this hypothesis, Nayar and

Switzer (1998) show that the more the debt used in the acquisition is risky, the

less the effects for the bidder’s shareholders will be favorable.

2.3.3 Firm Size

Large firms are better positioned to serve multi-establishment clients

(Public Accounting Report, 1994; Spurr, 1987) and also get premium fees

(Barefield, Gaver and O'Keefe, 1993; Firth, 1993; Francis and Simon, 1987).

Large firms may be better able to realize efficiencies from, for example, the

internalisation of talent or technologies from a target firm because they can apply

these assets on a sufficiently large scale. Large firms often have the financial

resources needed to acquire other companies. Hence, combining with a

financially constrained target may create an internal capital market, where capital

is available at lower costs (Luypert and Huyghebaert, 2006). Furthermore, larger

firms command more resources, enjoy superior economies of scope and scale,

and should therefore face a better post-acquisition process. Through growth,

they signal success and accumulation of goodwill. Firm size is significantly

positively related to the decision to engage in a merger or acquisition (Luypert

and Huyghebaert, 2006). Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) suggest that the gains

obtained are highly diluted when the size of the acquiring firm is relatively large

compared to the target firm.

36

Lambrecht (2004) derives the size and hysteresis effects in the presence

of economies of scale. The fact that after a merger, there are fewer small and

large firms in the industry and a huge merged entity emerges. Hence, both the

market structure and the competitive landscape of the industry change. In

addition, the huge merged firm combines the assets of the two merging firms,

thereby reducing production costs. The percentage gain differs for a small and a

large merging firm as it depends the firm’s size and its relative contribution to the

merger benefits.

2.3.4 Economic and Market Efficiency

The desire for firm growth through M&A might be caused by bad business

conditions. There is a positive relationship between GDP and M&A activity

(Steiner, 1975 and Guerard, 1989). Other studies have found a negative relation

between GDP growth and M&A activity (Beckenstein, 1979 and Becketti, 1986).

The study on relation between industrial production, business failures, stock

prices, interest rates and M&A activity in the USA between 1947 and 1977 shows

that a weakly positive relation between economic conditions and M&As

(Melicher, 1983).

The role of the exchange rates has been well documented in the

international literature with acquirers said to gain the stronger their currency vis a

vis their target resulting in lower financing costs for them, (Froot & Stein, 1991,

Kang, 1993; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Conn et al., 2005). Alternatively acquirers

37

may lose as the stronger their currency, the value of future repatriated profits will

be lower (Cakici, 1996).

The yield spread between corporate and government bonds and the term

spread between the yield on long term government bonds and the yield on

Treasury will influence the financing and investment decisions. The higher the

yield spread, the more expensive it will be for a firm to borrow money. Relatively

high yields on long term bonds can be attributed to expectations of future

increases of interest rate (Luypert and Huyghebaert, 2006).

2.4 Impact of M&A

In the finance literature, corporate performance is measured by comparing

the returns earned by an acquiring firm compared to some risk adjusted

benchmark portfolio returns (Cooper and Gregory, 2000). M&A do not add value

to the acquiring firm and will detrimental to shareholder wealth in long term

(Carper, 1990). In management literature, there are three main determinants of

M&A on a corporate performance which are the strategic fit, process literature

and organizational fit (Schoenberg, 2000). The stream of literature has its origins

in the human resource, organizational behaviour and strategic management

disciplines (PECC, 2000). Poor management of the strategic fit, the process or

the organizational fit account for many M&A failures (Cooper and Gregory, 2000).

The finance and management literature in most M&A deals have a negative

impact on corporate performance in term of acquiring firm’s share prices and

profitability (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987;

38

Magenheim and Mueller, 1988; Mueller, 1996; Sirower, 1997; Bild, 1998; Markids

and Oyon, 1998; Schenk, 2000).

The poor corporate performance of the acquiring firms after M&As maybe

be due to incompatible culture, inability to manage targets, inability to implement

change, clash of management style and incompatible marketing system

(Schmidt, 1999). Poor strategic rationale, hubris of acquirer manager leading to

excessive premium, faulty financial evaluation might also contribute to M&A

failure (Sudarsanam, 2000). However, there are studies found that the target firm

shareholders experience signification positive returns from M&As (Datta, Pinches

and Narayanan, 1992; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Lubatkin, Srinivasan and

Merchant, 1997; Schweiger and Goulet, 2000).

There are studies found that M&As have a positive impact on the

productivity of the acquired firms (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987; Lichtenberg,

1992). Comparing with both the industry average and with the acquired firms in

domestic takeovers, foreign acquisitions developed more favourably in terms of

productivity, employment and market shares. Acquired firms reported stronger

organizational and technological improvements (PECC, 2000).

Cross border M&As bring foreign financial resources to a host economy,

the inflows become and investible resources in the hands of local owners. Under

economic or financial crisis, firms are usually undervalued against their long term

value; foreign investors can acquire local firms at cheap prices. M&As during

financial crisis is that excessive exchange rate depreciation, forced domestic

firms to sell assets to pay off short term debts. Foreign firms had enough liquidity

39

purchased the domestics firms (PECC, 2000). The possibility of undervaluation

increase if the negotiating position of the host economy is weak or the hose

economy does not make potential investors compete through bidding (Samonis,

2000). M&A will increase market concentration and simulates and improves

efficiency and the employment rate as new production capacity is created.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the literature review presented an overview of M&A. The

motivation of M&A discussed the factors which are company growth, synergy,

diversifications, market power, undervalued or overvalued companies,

redistribution and policy and regulatory that encourages companies to employ

M&A. This chapter also presented the pre merger key success factors of M&A

which are the direction of merger, method of payment, firm size and economic

and market efficiency that later developed the research framework and as the

hypothesis in Chapter 3. The chapter ended with a discussion on the impact of

M&A to the firm and the shareholders.

40

CHAPTER 3

Hypothesis Development and Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the methodology employed in the study. The

chapter starts with the review of the research framework. Then it provides

discussed the hypothesis developed to assess the shareholders’ wealth effects in

this study and the data collection procedure will be discussed. Finally, the

methodology employed to measure the post merger shareholders return.

3.1 Research Framework

Based on the literature review presented in chapter 2, a framework has

been developed to investigate the relationship among cross border and domestic

M&A, M&A key success factors and acquirer’s shareholder wealth (refer figure

3.1.1).

Figure 3.1.1: Research Framework

Shareholder Wealth

Type of M&A • Cross Border • Domestic

Direction of Mergers • Horizontal • Vertical/Conglomerate

Method of Payment • Cash • Stock • Cash & Stock

Market Climate

Firm Size

41

A regression analysis is used to identify the interaction effects between

the type of M&A and shareholder wealth. The analysis will also examine the

relationships between the key success factors and shareholder wealth.

Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5

Where Y = Shareholder Wealth

X1 = International or Domestic Mergers

X2 = Direction of Mergers

X3 = Method of Payment

X4 = Firm Size

X5 = Market Climate

Independent Variables:

• Type of M&A

• Direcetion of Mergers

• Method of Payment

• Firm Size

• Market Climate

Dependent Variables:

• Shareholder Wealth

Based on the above discussion, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H1: The returns to cross border acquisition exceed the returns to domestic

acquirer.

42

H2: Horizontal mergers attained better performance than vertical and

conglomerate mergers.

H3: Payment in cash has an effect on the returns of the acquisition.

H4: GDP growth has a negative effect on the returns of the acquisition.

H5: Firm size has an impact on the shareholders wealth in M&A activites.

3.2 Hypothesis Development

3.2.1 Cross border and Domestic Acquisition

Returns to acquirers in foreign markets may vary to those generated in the

domestic market due to the benefits/costs of geographical diversification that

arises from cross border deals. Cross border mergers enables the firms to

expand its boundary (Connet al., 2005). If this form of diversification is of value to

acquiring firms we would expect their announcement returns to exceed those of

domestic acquirers, lending support for the multinational network theory. Recent

empirical studies show that cross border M&As perform even worst than those

within borders, the fact that up to 83 percent of these transactions are

unsuccessful (Angwin and Savill, 1997; KPMG, 1999, Moeller and Schlingemann,

2005). A study based on sample of 4430 cross border M&A by US firm

comparing the stock returns and operating performance are significantly lower

performance than the domestic transactions (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).

An empirical evidence suggests that 61 percent of European executives believed

cross border M&As involve more obstacles, problems and risks than domestic

acquisitions and therefore were less likely not be successful (Angwin and Savill,

43

1997). However, in the study of Chakrabarti, Jayaraman and Mukherjee, 2006

shows that M&A deals involving culturally distant firms perform better in the long

run. This result can be interpreted as indicating the role of cultural distance as a

source of value to the firms or due to stricter selection criteria applied in choosing

target firms from culturally distant countries.

H0: The returns to cross border acquisition less than the returns to domestic

acquirer.

HA: The returns to cross border acquisition exceed the returns to domestic

acquirer.

3.2.2 Direction of Merger

A positive market reaction is expected to the horizontal M&As due to

apparent possibilities of synergies. The synergies steams from managerial and

operational improvements (Erikson, Hogfeldt en Spens, 1998). The market

theory (De Jong, 1998) considers horizontal mergers as a process to save costs

and for entering new markets to make use of overcapacity and reduce

competition. Empirical studies show that both the CAR of the bidder and the

target are positive for horizontal mergers (Bosveld, Meyer and Vorst, 1997).

Although vertical acquisition involves lower costs of procurement and

higher margines, synergies effects are unlikely due to lack of economies of scale

and the problems of integration (Morck, 1990). The motive of conglomerate

mergers is primarily diversification. The agency motive plays an important role in

44

conglomerate mergers which provide lowest returns since thare no virtually no

synergetic benefits to be achieved (Morck, 1990).

H0: Horizontal mergers do not attain better performance than vertical and

conglomerate mergers.

HA: Horizontal mergers attained better performance than vertical and

conglomerate mergers.

3.2.3 Method of Payment

Acquirers may use a variety of payment forms including cash, shares or a

mixed payment form. The advantages of payment using shares are the creation

of additional equity by issuing new shares and do not endanger the firm’s

liquidity. The chance of a too high takeover premium is limited with the payment

in shares since the shareholders of the target are also at risk with a high

premium. Bidders will opt for payment in shares only if they find their shares are

overvalued, the value of cash is easy to establish (Myers & Maljuf, 1984;

Berkovitch &Nrayanan, 1990). However, empirical evidences suggest acquirers

lose from share exchanges because it signals over valuation of acquirers stock

or uncertainty over the true value of the target, (Conn & Nielsen, 1977; Bradley,

1980; Dodd, 1980; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Franks & Harris, 1989; Loughran &

Vinjh, 1997; Walker 2000). However foreign bids primarily are all cash, partly due

to target shareholders reluctance to accept foreign equity (Gaughan, 2002).

Travlos (1987) reports negative abnormal returns when the operation is financed

with stocks but positive abnormal returns when it is financed with cash. In

45

addition, Antoniou and Zhao (2004) show that bidders’ returns are lower when

the operation is financed in stocks than in case of alternative, combined and cash

offers, confirming that the choice of payment method has an impact on the

profitability of a takeover. Form of payment is often cited for the presence of a

positive cross border effect for target shareholders.

H0: Payment in cash has no effect on the returns of the acquisition.

HA: Payment in cash has an effect on the returns of the acquisition.

3.2.4 Market Climate

The desire for firm growth through M&A might be caused by bad business

conditions. GDP index is a measure of national income and output for a give

country’s Economy. There is a positive relationship between GDP and M&A

activity (Steiner, 1975 and Guerard, 1989). Other studies have found a negative

relation between GDP growth and M&A activity (Beckenstein, 1979 and Becketti,

1986). The study on relation between industrial production, business failures,

stock prices, interest rates and M&A activity in the USA between 1947 and 1977

shows that a weakly positive relation between economic conditions and M&As

(Melicher, 1983).

H0: GDP growth has a positive effect on the returns of the acquisition.

HA: GDP growth has a negative effect on the returns of the acquisition.

46

3.2.5 Firm Size

Large firms maybe better able to realize efficiencies in term of talent and

technologies from target firm because they can apply these intangible assets

more sufficiently (Luypert and Huyghebaert, 2006). An increasing firm size may

improve company access to cheaper financing and create an internal market

where capital can be allocated more efficiently. Greater gains have been found to

accrue to acquirers the larger their target (Asquith et al, 1983; Jarrell & Poulsen,

1989; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Danbolt, 1995). The assertion is that large

combinations facilitate the exploitation of selling company resources, consistent

with the synergy motive for takeovers. Such amalgamations result in revenue

enhancement and cost savings via greater economies of scale in production,

marketing and distribution. Alternatively, large acquirers may overpay for smaller

targets due to insignificant wealth effects for them (Loderner & Martin, 1990).

H0: Firm size do not has an impact on shareholders wealth in M&A activites.

HA: Firm size has an impact on the shareholders wealth in M&A activites.

47

3.3 Data Collection and Methodology

3.3.1 Sample selection and data sources

Data collected will be based on secondary data. The sampling frame

consists of bids by domestic and foreign firms for Malaysia companies between

1st January 2004 and August 2008. Acquiring firms are publicly quoted

companies. For inclusion in the sample transactions are required to fit the

following criteria:

• The M&A deal is announced and completed within the 1st January 2004

and August 2008.

• Buyers are listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange or listed

elsewhere. Targets are registered company in Malaysia or other countries.

• Accounting information, number of shares, capital changes, share prices

and returns

• Data for each company along with are available.

In this study, we will look into the GDP index of the host economies which

is Malaysia. The GDP index from 2004 to 2008 will be obtained from National

Summary Data Page for Malaysia provided by Bank Negara Malaysia.

3.3.2 Methodology

Event studies analyze the normalized share prices of the bidder and the

target around the time of announcement. The abnormal return is the return

exceeding the return expected if there were no merger announcement. The

48

actual return after the public bid should first be corrected and interpreted. The

Market Model Method is used to measure the abnormal return (Brown & Warner,

1980).

3.3.2.1 Market Model Method

An event study is employed to assess share price reaction around the

time of a M&A activities. Event studies have been extensively employed to

analyse domestic and international acquisitions, (Servaes & Zenner (1994),

Eckbo & Thornburn (2000), Corhay & Rad (2000), Goergen & Renneboog

(2004)). The market model has been used to compare the actual returns on a

security against that expected if there had been no bid. Under the assumption of

multivariate normality, abnormal returns (prediction error) to security j on day t :

ARjt = Rjt – (α +β jRmt)

Where ARjt = abnormal return to firm j on day t

Rjt = actual or realised return to security j on event day t

α + β jRmt = expected returns to security j on event day t

α = alpha and β = beta, the market model parameter estimates and

Rmt = market return on event day t.

Estimates for α and β are calculated over the estimation period using

OLS. Values of α and β are estimated by regressing Rjt on Rmt. The assumption

is that the intercept and slope terms, α and β, are constant over the time period

during which the model is fitted to the available data. These coefficients

49

represent the intercept and slope respectively of the market model regression.

This is run over a 200 day estimation period, from 250 trading days to 50 trading

days prior to the initial event date t, the first date of the official bid announcement.

Mikkelson & Partch (1988) and Mc Willliams et al, (1999) adopt a similar

estimation period. The regression analysis to compute the α and β coefficients

was finally performed on the period from t – 50 to t – 250 (200 days), assuming

that the stock return may be affected during the 200 days before the public

announcement of an agreement (as defined earlier) by any announcement or

event that relate to the acquisition. Furthermore, the fact of performing the linear

regression on 200 days affords us to get enough data entries to ensure the

statistical validity of our study.

3.3.2.2 CAR Method

The abnormal return of the combined merger partners TCARt at time t is

served as a measure of the total wealth effects of a takeover bid for each

participating firm. TCARt derive CARs based on a short window of (-5,+5) days,

similar to the US domestic study of Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988) and the

international study of Eun et al (1996). In the findings by Higson and Elliott

(1998), the performance computation was performed on 36 months, assuming

that it would set-up a long enough period to capture the post-takeover

performance of companies which reflected a high sensitivity of the post-bid

performance to the observation period. In this study, the performance

computations were done on the period from t +6, t+120 and t +180 days that will

50

allow observation for the actual performance of the new created entity. Such a

long period shows both the first excitement and then the disappointment of

investors that usually follow the acquisition event. Tests of the statistical

significance of abnormal returns for time t are carried out with a T test.

Figure 3.3.2.2.1: Event Window for CAR Evaluation

3.3.2.3 Bauman’s Methodology

In this studies, observation on acquire firms’ size. Referring to the

procedure used by Luypert and Huyghebaert (2006) to calculate firm size, using

the natural logarithm of total assets by replacing the log of total assets by the log

of total sales and by the log of the number of employees. A company is regarded

as small if not more than one of the following criteria is exceeded: an average

annual workforce of 50 employees, an annual turnover (excluding VAT) of €

7,300,000 and total assets of € 3,650,000. If the average annual workforce

exceeds 100 employees, a company is always considered as large. In another

study by Baumann (2003), the firm size measure by the natural log of the number

51

of employees. Upon the availability of data, the firm size is developed by

Bauman’s methodology in this study.

3.3.3 Data Analysis Techniques

In this paper, analysis will be done on SPSS or Eviews. Linear regression

will be done on the model to examine the effect of the determinants on the wealth

of shareholders. Stepwise regression models were fit for each of the format

choice using a minimum inclusion alpha of .05. Significance tests and beta

estimates were used to evaluate the magnitude and direction of the effect(s) of

the determinants

Regression Model:

Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5

Where Y = Total Cummulative Abnormal Return

X1 = International or Domestic Mergers

X2 = Direction of Mergers

X3 = Method of Payment

X4 = Firm Size

X5 = Market Climate

52

Summary of the process:

1. Selection of sample

2. Identification of selected securities and collection of stock prices and

market indexes data for the requested periods.

3. Importation of the collected data under Excel

4. Computing the coefficients to get individual Beta for every single security

by using the linear regression

5. Computation of the expected returns

6. Calculation of CARs for t+60, t+120 and t+180 days

7. Analysis of results

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented an overview of the research framework and

hypothesis developed for the study. This chapter also discussed the data

collection procedure, and the methodology, market model used to computing the

coefficients of individual beta for each company and CAR method to estimate the

measure the post merger shareholders’ wealth and method use to estimate the

firm size. Following that, Chapter 4 will discuss the empirical results and analysis

on each of the hypotheses as stated in this chapter.

53

Chapter 4

Empirical Results and Analysis

This chapter presents the empirical results and discusses all the findings

of this study. First of all, the results for the coefficients computations under the

software SPSS of individual beta will be shown. Then discuss about the results of

the individual Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of every M&A activity in the

sample.

4.1 α and β coefficients computations under SPSS Appendix 1 present the estimates for the α and β coefficients that were

mandatory in order to calculate the expected returns of the acquiring companies

under the Market Model. The coefficients are calculated under the software

SPSS by using a linear regression function across a 200 days period.

Coefficients(a)

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

1 (Constant) .114 .046 2.477 .014

Rm .060 .015 .256 3.925 .000Dependent Variable: Re

Table 4.1.1: Regression Analysis Results for Proton Holdings Berhad

Tables 4.1.1 presents the estimate for the α and β coefficients for Proton

Holdings Berhad. The accurate analysis for the aquirer can be done according to

the following example: Proton Holdings Berhad. The first column B-coefficient

54

indicates the y-intercept of the line and the column next to it named “Sig.”

defines the level of significance. In the case of Proton Holdings Berhad, the

significance 0.000 for the value 0.060 indicates that the β coefficient is

significantly different from zero, and that this value is 0.060. The Beta coefficient

informs about the correlation of the two variables, which means the level of

dependence of the security return (dependent variable) against the return of the

market index (independent variable). For Proton Holding, the value 0.256 shows

a positive level of dependence; when the market goes up, the Proton Holdings

Berhad security generally goes up as well.

In the specific case of Allianz – Proton Holding Berhad, the regression line may

be written as follows:

Re = 0.075 + 0.051 * Rm

Where:

- Re is the expected return on Proton Holding Berhad security at time t

- Rm is the return on the market index at time t

The analysis we have just performed is the same for every single acquirer

companies of the sample.

55

4.2 Results of CARs computations individually for each Acquirer Company

Appendix 2 presents the individual Cumulative Abnormal Return for every

acquirer of the 252 samples, the CAR and the median CAR for the periods t+60,

t+120,t+180, “t + 60” meaning 60 days after the public announcement date.

Furthermore it is critical to notice that, as previously stated,The CAR for the

acquirer company at time t+60 is the aggregated abnormal returns from time t +0

to t +60 (60days).

4.3 Regression Results

In the regression analysis, the cumulative abnormal returns of merger

announcements are analyzed using five independent variables. These

independent variables are used to explain the CAR of the acquirer for the period

of t+60, t+120 and t+180 days after the announcement date.

In Table 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 shows the T-test results for the three post

announcement windows. Of the three post announcement windows, the 60 days

and 120 days windows immediately after the announcement date, only the firm

size and type of payment show significance to CAR. However, the 180 days

window all the independent variables show significant to CAR except for the GDP

Growth which shows no effect to the CAR. Table 4.3.4 shows the regression

result of T+180 days with only for independent variables which are Firm Size,

Type of Payment, Type of Merger and Location. From Table 4.3.4, the

regression equation is formed:

56

Y = -35.445 + 8.571 X1 + 18.268X2 - 17.870X3 +5.039X4 …Eqn (1)

Where Y = Total Cummulative Abnormal Return X1 = International or Domestic Mergers X2 = Type of Mergers X3 = Method of Payment X4 = Firm size

Coefficients(a)

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

1 (Constant) -37.205 25.393 -1.465 .144 FirmSizeLog 6.136 2.523 .154 2.432 .016 TypeofPaym

ent -18.062 4.311 -.263 -4.190 .000

TypeofMerger 9.281 4.803 .122 1.932 .055

GDPGrowth 2.285 3.649 .038 .626 .532 Location 6.028 4.319 .088 1.396 .164

a Dependent Variable: CAR

Table 4.3.1: Regression Analysis Results for T+60 days Post

Announcement Window

57

Coefficients(a)

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

1 (Constant) -34.086 21.051 -1.619 .107 FirmSizeLog 3.853 2.049 .122 1.880 .061 TypeofPaym

ent -10.451 3.502 -.191 -2.984 .003

TypeofMerger 5.923 3.874 .098 1.529 .128

Location 4.003 3.528 .073 1.135 .258 GDPGrowth 2.999 2.981 .063 1.006 .315

a Dependent Variable: CAR_120

Table 4.3.2: Regression Analysis Results for T+120 days Post

Announcement Window

Coefficients(a)

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

1 (Constant) -53.589 24.791 -2.162 .032 FirmSizeLog 5.090 2.413 .131 2.109 .036 TypeofPaym

ent -17.584 4.124 -.261 -4.263 .000

TypeofMerger 18.551 4.563 .251 4.066 .000

Location 8.674 4.154 .129 2.088 .038 GDPGrowth 2.862 3.511 .049 .815 .416

a Dependent Variable: CAR_180

Table 4.3.3: Regression Analysis Results for T+180 days Post

Announcement Window

58

Coefficients(a)

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

1 (Constant) -35.445 10.904 -3.251 .001 FirmSizeLog 5.039 2.411 .129 2.090 .038 TypeofPaym

ent -17.870 4.107 -.266 -4.352 .000

TypeofMerger 18.268 4.546 .247 4.018 .000

Location 8.571 4.150 .127 2.065 .040a Dependent Variable: CAR_180

Table 4.3.4: Regression Analysis Results for T+180 days Post

Announcement Window without GDP Growth

4.3.1 Cross border and Domestic Acquisition

From the regression equation, cross border M&A activities increase 8.571

times of return to the investors compare to the domestic M&A. The cross border

M&A activities in Malaysia actually increased the wealth of the acquirer

shareholders. The finding in this study is in consistent with Aw and Chatterjee,

2004 who only deal with acquirers from UK market that UK companies acquiring

domestic firms get better results than UK companies acquiring foreign companies

from U.S. In consistent with the multinational network theory, the geographically

diversification is of value to acquiring firms we would expect their announcement

returns to exceed those of domestic acquirers. In consistent with the study of

Chakrabarti, Jayaraman and Mukherjee, 2004, the result can be interpreted as

indicating the role of cultural distance as a source of value to the firms or due to

59

stricter selection criteria applied in choosing target firms from culturally distant

countries.

The cross border M&A activities act as vehicles to bridge imperfections in

factor, product and capital markets and can in the process result in value gains

for acquirers. Investment in industries or countries whose economic cycles are

not highly correlated may lower the overall volatility and risk in their earnings and

cash flows. Foreign exposure entails benefits and drawbacks in the form of

different economic rents and risks. There are studies show that diversified

international firms often exhibit a lower cost of capital than firms whose

investments are not well diversified (Chan, Karolyi and Stulz, 1992; Stulz, 1995a,

1995b and Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995). Value creation will ensue for

acquirers from gaining access to a new market and to a different stream of cash

flows. By shifting the production or operation units to overseas will reduce

operating expenses. Firms attracted to emerging markets as they provide low

labor costs, inexpensive raw materials and low level of regulations (Dunning,

2000). M&A allows firm to leverage its intangible assets such as expertise,

brands, patents and proprietary technologies which will increase firm’s

competitive advantage in the market.

60

4.3.2 Direction of Merger

The regression result shows that the horizontal mergers attained better

performance than vertical and conglomerate mergers. The return from horizontal

merger is 18.268 times higher compare to the vertical and conglomerate

mergers. This result proves to be consistent with findings from previous event

studies that also illustrated that a significant part of potential synergies are

captured by the target firm. This is consistent with the empirical study of Bosveld,

Meyer and Vorst, 1997 that the CAR of the bidder is positive for horizontal

mergers.

Based on the theory of oligopoly, a horizontal merger can reduce the

monitoring costs by reducing the number of independent producers in the

industry (Stigler, 1964). The merging of the horizontal rivals will reduce the

competitors in the industry. Contrary with the monopoly theory horizontal

acquisitions are carried out in order to increase market power. Due to the high

fragmentation of the market and the global competitions the attainment of a

dominant market position by one single player seems highly questionable. A

horizontal merger will reduce the monitoring costs (by reducing the number of

independent firms in the industry) to the point where a collusive agreement

becomes profitable. The fewer the firms in the industry, the more visible are each

producer’s actions.

The horizontal merger aimed to achieve Economies of Scale in production

by eliminating duplication of facilities and operations and broadening the product

line, reducing investment in working capital, eliminating competition through

61

product concentration, reducing advertising costs, increasing market segments

and exercising better control over the market. It is also an indirect route to

achieving technical economies of large scale. The mergers will only profitable to

when the cost savings are sufficiently large.The result suggests that horizontal

M&A tend to lower integration costs and facilitate the realization of potential

synergies steaming from product strategies which will increase the wealth of the

acquirers’ shareholders.

The horizontal cross-border M&A is to establish a market presence

abroad. The horizontal cross-border M&As tend to raise industry concentration,

thereby potentially hurting consumers and benefiting local competitors. The

efficiency advantages realized include the avoidance of setup costs and of the

fixed costs of operating a production facility arising in the case of Greenfield FDI,

and the avoidance of transportation costs and trade barriers associated with

exporting.

However, the horizontal mergers will likely trigger an antitrust complaint on

the basis of large market shares and industry concentration which lead to an

anticompetitive problem. The horizontal mergers raise industry concentration,

and hence potentially lead to higher prices for consumers or, in the case of

intermediate goods, for downstream industries. The rivals identified their market

position is threaten by anticompetitive merger. Eckbo (1983) examines intra-

industry wealth effects of 191 horizontal mergers in the U.S. between 1963 and

1978, 65 of which were challenged by either the Department of Justice or the

Federal Trade Commission with violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

62

4.3.3 Method of Payment

The method of payment significantly influences the cumulated abnormal

returns to the shareholders of the acquirers. For three event windows the

cumulated abnormal returns are statistically significant. The method of payment

can thus be regarded as a determinant with significant impact on the success of

an M&A transaction. The method of payment has turned out to be a very

significant driver of the acquirers’ wealth. Consistent to our expectations target

returns are higher through payment in cash. The results are consistent to prior

research findings.

In the study of Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) develop an

asymmetric information model, the acquirer’s shareholders return is increasing

and convex in the fraction of the total offer that consists of cash. Cash

compensation is more favourable because it reflects the very good liquidity

situation enjoyed by the company. In addition, the relatively low valuation of

many companies on the stock market reduces the attractiveness of stocks as a

means of payment.

Prior research (Travlos (1987), shows that target shareholders prefer cash

payments. According to the hypothesis by Myers and Majluf (1984), bidders

prefer cash payments if they believe that their stocks are undervalued and vice

versa. The choice of the method of payment thus reveals private information of

the bidder management about the valuation of the bidder's stock und thereby

affects stock prices.With the method of payment the bidder sends a signal to the

63

capital market. The acquirer may uncover private information (about how the

bidder perceives the value of his stocks) that may not be reflected in the stock

price so far. If an acquirer pays for with stock he perceives the stock to be

cheaper than cash thus signaling the stock to be overvalued and vice versa.

Therefore, in the eyes of investors, the firm’s decision to use cash to finance the

deal constitutes a positive signal about the firm’s stock value, and the firm’s

decision to use stock financing conveys a negative signal about the firm’s stock

value and its future prospects.

The major risk of stock payment comes from the value-added

expectation, the stock exchange expand the shareholder’s base, leading to the

decline of earnings per share, when investors doubt the target firm’s ability of

getting back earnings per share, the stock price of acquirers will decline because

of dilution of earnings per share.

Loughran and Vijh (1997) conclude that the cash payment method has a

positive impact on the value of acquiring firms. One interpretation the result that

the method of payment is negatively related to the shareholders’ return is that the

capital markets in Malaysia are inefficient and do not consider the valuation

signal sent by the acquiring firms correctly in the stock price or do not believe in

an overvaluation of the acquirer’s stocks.

64

4.3.4 Firm Size

The regression analysis shows that the firm size has an impact on the

shareholders wealth in M&A activities. The increasing of firm size attained a

higher return compare to smaller firm. The result is consistent with the previous

studies. A firm performance increased with its size. The wealth gains to acquired

firm shareholders on announcement of a merger are positively influenced by the

firm size. A larger firm command more resources, enjoy superior economies of

scope and scale, and should therefore face a better post-acquisition process.

The result indicates that large firms have a better potential of realizing

synergies and managerial hubris and empire-building have a greater impact on

acquisitions by large firms. Larger firms command more resources, enjoy

superior economies of scope and scale, and should therefore face a better post-

acquisition process. The increasing firm size may improve company access to

cheaper financing and/or create an internal market where capital can be

allocated more efficiently. Large firms may be better able to realize efficiencies

from, for example, the internalization of talent or technologies from a target firm

because they can apply these assets on a sufficiently large scale. Furthermore,

large firms often have the financial resources needed to acquire other

companies. Hence, combining with a financially constrained target may create an

internal capital market, where capital is available at lower costs. Furthermore,

large firms to engage especially in diversifying M&A as there may be fewer

opportunities for further growth in their own industry.

65

4.3.5 Market Climate

The GDP growth does not affect the return of the shareholders. The

finding is contrast with the previous findings. However, the number of M&A

activities increased as the GDP growth index increase. The market conditions

are an importance influence in the volume of M&A activity. In Malaysia, good

market climate encourages M&A activities. Whether the acquirers will sustains

the M&A momentum depends on the economic climate.

An economic downturn will inevitably reduce the M&A deals due to firm

downsizing and cost reduction. The combination of low unemployment, record

stock prices, moderating consumer confidence, stable consumer prices, and

slumping housing market offers a mixed picture of the economy’s health. The

already slow industrial core, high gas prices, and sluggish housing market have

dampened consumer spending and hiring levels, suggesting that these factors

are beginning to take their toll. Firms will keep available cash flow for internal

development to survive through the rainy days instead of investing in the market.

The growth of Malaysia economy is accelerating, boosted by a dynamic,

knowledge based service sector and expanding manufacturing base. Noted that

2008 has a lower M&A deals due to the data had been collected until August

2008.

66

GDPGrowth6.7836.3275.9345.0004.997

Freque

ncy

125

100

75

50

25

0

GDPGrowth

Table 4.3.5.1: Number of M&A Deals from Year 2004 to 2008 in Malaysia

GDPGrowth YEAR Frequency Percent

2004 4.997 7 2.349 2005 5 48 16.107 2006 5.934 46 15.436 2007 6.327 139 46.644 2008 6.783 10 3.356

Total 250 83.893 System 48 16.107 298 100.000

67

4.4 Conclusion

Based on the results, the cross border M&A increased more of acquirer’s

shareholders’ return and the direction of merger, type of payment and firm size

have an impact on the acquirer shareholders’ wealth. The only variable that is

insignificant to the shareholders’ return is the GDP growth. The GDP growth

does not show any impact on the return of the shareholders. However, the

number of M&A activities increased as the GDP growth index increase. From the

research, it can conclude that cross border M&A with an effective post merger

strategy are more favorable to acquirers’ the shareholders’ wealth. Following by

Chapter 6, the last chapter of this study will present the summary and future

suggestions of this study.

68

Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusion

The final chapter presents the conclusion of this research. Firstly, an

overview of the study will be provided. Thereafter, the summary of the research

results and review of research objectives are discussed. Finally, the chapter ends

with suggestions for further research.

5.1 Overview of the study

M&As are popular means through which companies achieve economies of

scale, remove inefficient management or respond to economic shocks. In parallel

with the global trends, Malaysia accounted for 0.28% of the world total value of

cross border M&As sales and for 0.34% of the world’s M&A transaction total

value. Malaysia’s FDI outflow expanded from RM15.9 billion in 2004 to RM38

billion last year.

The prime objective of a firm is to grow profitably which can be achieved

through introducing or developing new products or by expanding or enlarging the

capacity of existing products. The motives of the acquirers are to cut costs,

create growth opportunities, gaining access to production and new technology.

The acquirers will be able to establish or broaden their presence in high-growth

markets and focus on low-cost environments for manufacturing and sourcing.

The acquirers will want to strengthen their competitive positions to resolve the

growing threat from emerging rivals by broadening and increasing its market

share. In cross border M&A, the geographical diversification will enhance

69

acquirers returns by opening up a whole new market and network for them.

Firms may make cross border M&As on the basis that industry returns across

economies maybe less correlated than within an economy which will lower their

risk and exposure to certain volatile industry segments to its portfolios. When

stock prices are sufficiently depressed, the takeover of a listed company may

constitute a bargain relative to investing in new facilities from scratch. .). In cross

border M&AS, government removes restrictions through active promotion and by

providing high standards of treatment, legal protection and guarantees to actract

FDI.

The successfulness of an M&A transaction is determined by a few factors.

The industry involved by the acquirers and targets which categorized to

horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. Horizontal mergers benefits in economies

scale of production and distribution, access to new markets, removal of inefficient

management, greater financial possibilities and combined intangible assets and

to limit the industry market by removing one of the merging parties as a potential

entrant into that relevant market. Vertical mergers attained shorter industrial

chain, procurement cost reduction, more efficient communication and focus on

market development which form a more cost efficient organization. The target for

conglomerate M&A is to diversify risk and attain economy scope. The value loss

associated with diversification generates large profit opportunities for outsiders.

The post-acquisition returns are found to be related to both the mode of

acquisition and the form of payment. The asymmetry information models which

explaining the choice of the payment method reveals private information of the

70

bidder concerning the value or the synergies of both firms. The decision to

finance an investment by stocks will be interpreted by the market as bad news,

so that the stock price of the firm will decrease at the announcement of the

acquisition and investors fear of acquiring overvalued stocks. In contrast, when

cash is offered, the assets of the bidder will be considered as being undervalued,

which constitutes a positive signal for investors.

The probability of gaining high return is when the size of the acquiring firm

is relatively large compared to the target firm. Large firms may be better able to

realize efficiencies from great talent or advance technologies from a target firm

because they can apply these assets on a sufficiently large scale. Large firms will

also have sufficient financial resources acquire other companies.

5.2 Summary of the Research Results

This study is to investigate the acquirers’ shareholder wealth effects for

domestic and international acquirers. The research was base on 252 samples

that engaged in takeovers in the Malaysia from year 2000 to 2007. Hypothesis is

developed base on cross border or domestic M&A, direction of merger, type of

payment, firm size and GDP growth. In the study, the Market Model used to

estimate the Beta of each acquirer and the post- merger shareholders’ return is

calculated using CAR.

71

5.2.1 A Review of the Research Objectives

In regards of the first objective in chapter 1, the cross border M&A

activities increase 8.571 times of return to the investors compare to the domestic

M&A. The cross border M&A activities in Malaysia actually increased the wealth

of the acquirer shareholders. The cross border merger as vehicles to bridge

imperfections in factor, product and capital markets and due to stricter selection

criteria applied in choosing target firms from culturally distant countries result in

value gains for acquirers. Value creation will ensue for acquirers from gaining

access to a new market and to a different stream of cash flows.

In regards of the second research objective, the direction of merger, type

of payment and firm size are the determinants that increase the return in

acquirer’s shareholder wealth in M&A activities and have an impact on the

acquirer shareholders’ wealth. This result of horizontal M&A proves to be

consistent with findings from previous event studies that also illustrated that a

significant part of potential synergies are captured by the target firm. The return

attained from horizontal merger is higher compare to the vertical and

conglomerate mergers. The method of payment significantly influences the

cumulated abnormal returns to the shareholders of the acquirers. Consistent to

our expectations target returns are higher through payment in cash. The wealth

gains to acquired firm shareholders on announcement of a merger are positively

influenced by the firm size. The result is consistent with the previous studies. A

firm performance increased with its size.

72

5.2.2 A Review of the Research Questions

What are the key success factors of a successful M&A transaction? The

result shows that the direction of merger, type of payment and firm size are the

key success factors and have an impact on the acquirer shareholders’ wealth.

The only variable that is insignificant to the shareholders’ return is the GDP

growth. The GDP growth does not show any impact on the return of the

shareholders. However, the number of M&A activities increased as the GDP

growth index increase.

Cross border or domestic M&As yield a better shareholders’ wealth? The

cross border M&A activities increase 8.571 times of return to the investors

compare to the domestic M&A. Investment in industries or countries whose

economic cycles are not highly correlated may lower the overall volatility and risk

in their earnings and cash flows. Cross border M&A enable firm gaining access

to a new market, a different stream of cash flows and leverage its intangible

assets. By shifting the production or operation units to overseas will reduce

operating expenses with the exposure low labor costs, inexpensive raw materials

and low level of regulations.

What key factors determine the shareholders’ wealth effects in M&A? The

return from horizontal merger is 18.268 times higher compare to the vertical

and conglomerate mergers. The horizontal merger will only profitable to when the

73

cost savings are sufficiently large by achieving Economies of Scale in production

by eliminating duplication of facilities and operations and broadening the product

line, reducing investment in working capital, eliminating competition through

product concentration, reducing advertising costs, increasing market segments

and exercising better control over the market.

The method of payment significantly influences the cumulated abnormal returns

to the shareholders of the acquirers. The method reveals private information of

the bidder management about the valuation of the bidder's stock. The method of

payment is negatively related to the shareholders’ return is that the capital

markets in Malaysia are inefficient and do not consider the valuation signal sent

by the acquiring firms correctly in the stock price or do not believe in an

overvaluation of the acquirer’s stocks.

The increasing of firm size attained a higher return compare to smaller firm. The

result indicates that large firms have a better potential of realizing synergies and

managerial hubris and empire-building have a greater impact on acquisitions by

large firms. Larger firms command more resources, enjoy superior economies of

scope and scale, access to cheaper financing which develop a better potential of

realizing synergies and managerial hubris and empire-building have a greater

impact on acquisitions by large firms.

74

The market conditions are important influence in the volume of M&A activity but

do not affect the return of the shareholders.

5.3 Suggestions for Future Research

This study only covers the pre-merger strategies that will increase

shareholders wealth. As such, several line of subsequent investigation on the

post merger strategies remains. The post merger strategy is mainly dealing with

the “people” issues and aligning the employees and the leadership with the new

culture which come the integration and implementation plans. The integration

plan is to run smoothly in order for the merger to take place and reap the benefits

from the synergy. The implementation plan which a task form need to be formed

in key functional areas to speed communication and speed decision making for

the momentum to be maintained to prevent any distraction from the workforce.

Further studies can be done on evaluating the effectiveness of the integration

and implementation plan for the synergy to take place. This may be done by

interviews or case studies to complement the findings and a longitudinal study

may help to further improve the results.

Lastly, it is also important to evaluate the post merger effect on

shareholders’ wealth from a different perspective. Although the pre mergers key

success factors play an important role in increasing the shareholders’ wealth, the

post merger integrations factors can not be neglected. Other factors such as the

stakeholders’ response towards the transaction, the top-down communications,

75

and different management culture may also become the important factors of

effecting the shareholders’ wealth.

76

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APPENDIX

88

Appendix A The coefficients obtained OLS by SPSS for Beta calculation of Acquirers’ Company Announced/Initial Filing Date Target/Issuer Buyers/Investors Alpha(Constant)

BETA (Target Company)

02/09/2004 Jin Lin Wood Industries Bhd

Gefung Holdings Bhd (KLSE:GEFUNG)

0.075 0.051

03/09/2004 Asta Elektrodraht Gmbh & Co.

Metrod Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:METROD)

0.095 0.840

03/30/2004 Ayamas Food Corp. Bhd

QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

0.108 0.088

04/05/2004 Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Bhd

Proton Holdings Bhd. (KLSE:PROTON)

0.114 0.060

05/31/2004 PT Jawa Power YTL Power International Bhd (KLSE:YTLPOWR)

0.156 0.087

06/22/2004 SMC Wheels BSA International Bhd (KLSE:BSA)

0.113 0.091

07/06/2004 Kumpulan Bertam Plantations Bhd

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

0.098 0.110

11/01/2004 Cergas Kenari Sdn Bhd

Priceworth Wood Products Bhd (KLSE:PWORTH)

0.032 0.097

11/01/2004 Teras Selasih Priceworth Wood Products Bhd (KLSE:PWORTH)

0.032 0.097

89

11/20/2004 PT Satu Sembilan Delapan

Batu Kawan Bhd (KLSE:BKAWAN)

0.045 0.131

04/22/2005 London Clubs International plc

Genting Berhad (KLSE:GENTING)

0.006 0.193

04/27/2005 PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk (JKSE:BNGA)

Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

0.034 0.258

05/05/2005 Pelikan Holding AG (SWX:PEL)

Pelikan International Corporation Berhad (KLSE:PELIKAN)

-0.006 -0.029

06/02/2005 Infoscreen Networks Plc (AIM:INFO)

YTL E-Solutions Bhd (KLSE:YTLE)

0.058 0.011

06/20/2005 QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

0.170 0.096

08/11/2005 HP Scitex Hewlett-Packard Company (NYSE:HPQ)

0.048 0.121

10/07/2005 ASE Test Ltd., Camera Module Assembly Operation

Flextronics International Ltd. (NasdaqGS:FLEX)

0.063 0.290

02/13/2006 Southern Bank Bhd

Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

-0.020 0.146

02/24/2006 Amtek Marketing Services Pte. Ltd.

Pensonic Holdings Bhd (KLSE:PENSONI)

-0.011 0.041

90

03/03/2006 American Express (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., Charge Card Operations and Merchant Acquiring Services

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

-0.010 0.256

03/10/2006 Spice Communications Limited (BSE:532863)

Telekom Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TM)

0.009 0.221

03/31/2006 Productos Pelikan, S.A. of C.V.

Pelikan International Corporation Berhad (KLSE:PELIKAN)

0.009 0.062

04/03/2006 MBF Carpenters Ltd.

MBF Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MBFHLDG)

0.011 0.013

04/25/2006 PT. Surya Sawit Sejati

United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

0.055 0.201

04/25/2006 PT. Mirza Pratama Putra

United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

0.055 0.055

05/17/2006 Malakoff Bhd MMC Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MMCCORP)

0.073 0.008

07/27/2006 Linshanhao Plywood (Sarawak) Sdn Bhd

WTK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:WTK)

0.016 0.052

07/28/2006 Sucasa Sdn Bhd. The Nomad Group Bhd

0.014 0.026

91

(KLSE:NOMAD)

08/04/2006 Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd.

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

-0.004 0.108

08/08/2006 Alor Setar Holiday Villa Sdn Bhd

Advance Synergy Bhd (KLSE:ASB)

0.000 0.027

08/29/2006 Malaysia Smelting Corp. Bhd (KLSE:MSC)

Straits Trading Co. Ltd. (SGX:S20)

0.170 0.550

08/31/2006 Anticor Chimie SA Scomi Group Bhd (KLSE:SCOMI)

-0.002 0.075

09/12/2006 KFC Holdings Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KFC)

QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

0.008 0.038

09/18/2006 Hicomobil Sdn Bhd.

General Motors Corporation (NYSE:GM)

0.034 0.055

09/20/2006 Empire Deluxe Sdn Bhd

JAKS Resources Berhad (KLSE:JAKS)

0.015 0.037

09/27/2006 Bright Steel Sdn Bhd

Lion Corp. Bhd (KLSE:LIONCOR)

-0.005 0.036

09/29/2006 United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

United International Enterprises Ltd. (CPSE/CPH:UIE)

-0.007 0.202

10/16/2006 Nestle S.A., Certain Canned Liquid Milk Businesses in South East Asia

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

0.004 0.078

92

10/16/2006 Premier Milk (Malaya) Sdn Bhd

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

0.004 0.078

10/16/2006 Nestle (Thailand) Ltd., Canned Liquid Milk Production Assets

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

0.004 0.078

10/16/2006 Nestle Dairy (Thailand) Limited, Chilled Dairy and Juice Production Assets

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

0.004 0.078

10/18/2006 Road Builder (M) Holdings Bhd.

IJM Corp. Bhd (KLSE:IJM)

-0.002 0.096

11/06/2006 PT Asuransi Aegis Indonesia

Kurnia Asia Bhd (KLSE:KURASIA)

0.022 0.118

11/13/2006 Bcom Holdings Sdn. Bhd.

Bolton Bhd (KLSE:BOLTON)

0.035 0.039

11/27/2006 Prosper Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd

Far East Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FAREAST); Winners Acres Sdn Bhd

0.015 0.108

11/27/2006 OSK Wealth Planners Sdn. Bhd.

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

0.025 0.045

11/27/2006 Sime Darby Bhd, Prior to Merger with Synergy Drive Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

93

11/27/2006 Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

11/27/2006 Golden Hope Plantations Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

11/27/2006 Highlands & Lowlands Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

11/27/2006 Sime UEP Properties Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

11/27/2006 Sime Engineering Services Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

11/27/2006 Guthrie Ropel Bhd Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

11/27/2006 Mentakab Rubber Co. Malaya Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.036 0.198

11/30/2006 The Right Channel Sdn Bhd

Media Prima Bhd (KLSE:MEDIA)

0.027 0.077

12/01/2006 E-CTAsia Technology Sdn. Bhd.

RCG Holdings Limited. (AIM:RCG)

0.030 0.030

12/01/2006 UCH Technology Sdn. Bhd.

RCG Holdings Limited. (AIM:RCG)

0.030 0.030

12/05/2006 The Palace Ventures Sdn. Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

0.084 0.049

12/07/2006 IQ Card Services Sdn Bhd

Rhythm Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:RHYTHM)

0.035 0.027

12/18/2006 Dr. W. Kolb AG Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

0.019 0.128

94

12/28/2006 Engtex Ductile Iron Pipe Industry Sdn Bhd

Engtex Group Bhd (KLSE:ENGTEX)

0.045 0.038

12/29/2006 Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd.

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

0.040 0.150

12/29/2006 Electronic Media Airtime Services Sdn Bhd

Heitech Padu Bhd (KLSE:HTPADU)

0.040 0.044

01/03/2007 NBG Communications Sdn Bhd

Keppel Telecommunications & Transportation Ltd. (SGX:K11)

0.068 0.065

01/10/2007 E&O Property Development Bhd

Eastern & Oriental Bhd (KLSE:E&O)

0.046 0.047

01/12/2007 Big Tree Outdoor Sdn Bhd

Media Prima Bhd (KLSE:MEDIA)

0.044 0.086

01/16/2007 P.T. Sarana Prima Multi Niaga

TSH Resources Bhd (KLSE:TSH)

0.054 0.059

01/18/2007 Everest Point Sdn. Bhd.

PJI Holdings Bhd (KLSE:PJI)

0.052 0.028

01/22/2007 Wintip Sdn. Bhd. Fitters Diversified Berhad (KLSE:FITTERS)

0.053 0.007

01/24/2007 Malaysia Transformer Manufacturing Sdn Bhd

Tenaga Nasional Bhd (KLSE:TENAGA)

0.064 0.075

01/29/2007 Alamjad Sdn Bhd. Aturmaju Resources Bhd

0.085 0.054

95

(KLSE:ATURMJU)

01/30/2007 PT Proton Tracoma Motors

Proton Holdings Bhd. (KLSE:PROTON)

0.068 0.079

01/31/2007 PHN Industry Sdn Bhd

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

0.061 0.087

02/02/2007 PT Karya Makmur Abadi

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

-0.727 0.077

02/02/2007 PT Menteng Jaya Sawit Perdana

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

-0.727 0.077

02/13/2007 GRE Energy Co Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

0.069 0.065

02/26/2007 FEDERAL Auto Holdings Bhd

MBM Resources Bhd (KLSE:MBMR)

0.073 0.091

03/01/2007 PT Penta Valent Apex Healthcare Bhd (KLSE:AHEALTH)

0.070 0.119

03/02/2007 Excelle Timber Sdn. Bhd.

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

0.061 0.045

03/06/2007 E&O - PIE Sdn Bhd

Eastern & Oriental Bhd (KLSE:E&O)

0.059 0.055

03/06/2007 Seal Polymer Industries Bhd

Supermax Corp. Bhd (KLSE:SUPERMX)

0.072 0.126

03/12/2007 Inorex Valve (M) Sdn Bhd

Unimech Group Bhd (KLSE:UNIMECH)

0.076 0.161

96

03/14/2007 Eurospiraal B.V. SAAG Consolidated (M) Bhd. (KLSE:SAAG)

0.084 0.041

03/16/2007 Wong Engineering Automation Sdn Bhd

Wong Engineering Corp. Bhd (KLSE:WONG)

0.095 0.023

03/19/2007 IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

IJM Corp. Bhd (KLSE:IJM)

0.010 0.082

03/22/2007 Jadeford International Limited

Lion Forest Industries Berhad (KLSE:LIONFIB)

0.047 0.036

03/23/2007 Ina Gail Pte Ltd Esthetics International Group Bhd (KLSE:EIG)

0.111 0.066

03/30/2007 PT Indoexchange Tbk

Integrax Bhd (KLSE:INTEGRA)

0.085 0.066

03/30/2007 Better Prospects Sdn Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

0.108 0.036

03/30/2007 Miracle Display Sdn Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

0.108 0.036

04/02/2007 Natuream Enviro-Services Sdn Bhd

Eastern Pacific Industrial Corp.Bhd (KLSE:EPIC)

0.116 0.101

04/02/2007 Hopematic International Sdn. Bhd.

INS Bioscience Bhd (KLSE:INSBIO)

0.108 0.023

04/02/2007 OSK Asia Capital Limited

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

0.082 0.116

04/04/2007 GTS Power Ltd. SAAG Consolidated (M) Bhd.

0.105 0.055

97

(KLSE:SAAG)

04/05/2007 MTD Walkers PLC (COSE:KAPI-N-0000)

MTD Capital Bhd (KLSE:MTD)

0.113 0.068

04/12/2007 Ann Joo Steel Berhad

Ann Joo Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANNJOO)

0.050 0.162

04/16/2007 IDS Sebor (Sarawak) Holdings Sdn. Bhd.

Integrated Distribution Services Group Ltd. (SEHK:2387)

0.079 0.132

04/16/2007 Sebor (Sabah) Sdn Bhd

Integrated Distribution Services Group Ltd. (SEHK:2387)

0.079 0.132

04/20/2007 Advanced Interconnect Technologies, Inc.

Unisem M Bhd (KLSE:UNISEM)

0.132 0.060

04/24/2007 MIHR Sdn. Bhd. The Nomad Group Bhd (KLSE:NOMAD)

0.122 0.088

04/27/2007 Circle Ring Network Sdn Bhd

EP Manufacturing Bhd (KLSE:EPMB)

0.146 0.048

04/30/2007 Mieco Smallholders Sdn Bhd

Mieco Chipboard Bhd (KLSE:MIECO)

0.131 0.075

04/30/2007 TNB Coal International Ltd

Tenaga Nasional Bhd (KLSE:TENAGA)

0.097 0.239

98

05/03/2007 Park May Bhd Konsortium Transnasional Bhd (KLSE:KTB)

0.141 0.006

05/03/2007 Borneo Lumber Industries Sdn Bhd

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

0.138 0.040

05/08/2007 AMJ Properties Sdn Bhd.

A&M Realty Bhd (KLSE:A&M)

0.110 0.068

05/08/2007 UAC Bhd (KLSE:UAC)

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

0.106 0.133

05/09/2007 Latitude Tree International Limited

Latitude Tree Holdings Bhd (KLSE:LATITUD)

0.111 0.078

05/16/2007 Abric Micromechanics Sdn. Bhd

Abric Bhd (KLSE:ABRIC)

0.098 0.066

05/16/2007 Central Mercantile Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd

WTK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:WTK)

0.062 0.155

05/17/2007 RHB Bank Berhad RHB Capital Bhd (KLSE:RHBCAP)

0.068 0.133

05/23/2007 Meganet Communications Sdn. Bhd.

VADS Bhd (KLSE:VADS)

0.160 0.080

05/31/2007 AIC Technology Sdn. Bhd.

AIC Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AIC)

0.131 0.042

06/01/2007 Expressway Lingkaran Tengah Sdn Bhd

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

0.122 0.395

99

06/01/2007 Linkedua (Malaysia) Berhad

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

0.122 0.395

06/04/2007 Extiva Communications Sdn. Bhd.

YTL E-Solutions Bhd (KLSE:YTLE)

0.109 0.035

06/05/2007 Ace Edible Oil Industries Sdn Bhd

Online One Corporation Bhd (KLSE:ONLINE)

0.140 0.065

06/05/2007 UOB Trustee (Malaysia) Bhd.

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

0.083 0.173

06/07/2007 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (M) Bhd

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

0.118 0.231

06/08/2007 Spectacular Potential Sdn Bhd

Far East Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FAREAST)

0.089 0.323

06/08/2007 Mitrajaya Development Lanka (Private) Limited

Mitrajaya Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MITRA)

0.117 0.140

06/08/2007 Summer Lodge Sdn Bhd

Sunrise Bhd (KLSE:SUNRISE)

0.098 0.216

06/11/2007 Sering Cemerlang Sdn. Bhd

KSL Holdings Bhd (KLSE:KSL)

0.128 0.113

06/15/2007 ECO Generation Co. Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

0.134 0.142

06/19/2007 AmInvestment Bank Group

AMMB Holdings Bhd (KLSE:AMMB)

0.111 0.265

06/19/2007 PT Farinda TSH Resources Bhd 0.114 0.162

100

Bersaudara (KLSE:TSH)

06/27/2007 ASTA International Pte. Ltd.

Metrod Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:METROD)

0.175 0.117

07/16/2007 Unisoft Holdings Limited

Silverlake Axis Ltd. (SGX:5CP)

0.111 0.150

07/25/2007 IJM Properties Sdn Bhd

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

0.045 0.102

07/25/2007 RB Land Sdn. Bhd.

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

0.191 0.060

07/25/2007 Bukit Bendera Resort Sdn. Bhd.

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

0.191 0.060

07/25/2007 RB Development Sdn. Bhd.

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

0.191 0.060

07/31/2007 Myanmar Mamee-Double Decker Ltd

Mamee-Double Decker M Bhd (KLSE:MAMEE)

0.164 0.219

07/31/2007 Mamee-Double Decker Foods (Suzhou) Co., Ltd

Mamee-Double Decker M Bhd (KLSE:MAMEE)

0.164 0.219

08/03/2007 Metrojaya Bhd Malayan United Industries Bhd (KLSE:MUIIND)

0.151 0.059

08/07/2007 H2 Energy Corporation Sdn Bhd

Ho Hup Construction Co. Bhd (KLSE:HOHUP)

0.174 0.079

08/09/2007 Ares Green Technology Corp (GTSM:3414)

Frontken Corporation Berhad (KLSE:FRONTKN)

0.148 0.078

101

08/14/2007 Central Offices Pte Ltd.

The Nomad Group Bhd (KLSE:NOMAD)

0.169 0.190

08/23/2007 Siam Fibreboard Co., Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

0.137 0.097

08/24/2007 Tamanaco Limited Genting Berhad (KLSE:GENTING)

0.120 0.223

08/27/2007 Phoenix Track Sdn Bhd

Resorts World Bhd (KLSE:RESORTS)

0.157 0.175

08/28/2007 Zhejiang Lin'an Jin Yuan Cement Co., Ltd.

YTL Cement Bhd (KLSE:YTLCMT)

0.083 0.229

08/30/2007 PMT Industries Sdn. Bhd.

Wah Seong Corporation Berhad (KLSE:WASEONG)

0.149 0.163

08/31/2007 Harvest E&I Engineering Sdn Bhd

Rotary Engineering Ltd. (SGX:R07)

0.130 0.127

09/03/2007 Everay Agritech Sdn. Bhd.

PW Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:PW)

0.184 0.059

09/07/2007 Berjaya Jet Charter Sdn Bhd.

Berjaya Land Bhd (KLSE:BJLAND)

0.103 0.128

09/11/2007 Advance Boilers Sdn. Bhd.

CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

0.124 0.179

09/11/2007 Ranhill Power Bhd Ranhill Bhd (KLSE:RANHILL)

0.157 0.053

09/12/2007 Hirotako Kein Hing Sdn. Bhd

Hirotako Holdings Bhd (KLSE:HIRO)

0.167 0.130

102

09/13/2007 Sunrise DCS Sdn Bhd

Sunrise Bhd (KLSE:SUNRISE)

0.087 0.171

09/14/2007 Pan Malaysia Holdings Bhd, 15 storey office building at No. 2, Jalan Changkat Ceylon, Kuala Lumpur

Pan Malaysian Industries Bhd (KLSE:PMIND)

0.157 0.019

09/17/2007 JF Apex Securities Bhd.

Apex Equity Holdings Bhd (KLSE:APEX)

0.137 0.132

09/18/2007 Ansa Teknik (Melaka) Sdn. Bhd.

Sunway Holdings Berhad (KLSE:SUNWAY)

0.073 0.190

09/19/2007 Prodelcon Sdn. Bhd.

AIC Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AIC)

0.172 0.047

09/19/2007 AIC Inspirasi Sdn Bhd, Brimal Holdings Sdn Bhd and Autovisor Plastics Sdn Bhd

AV Ventures Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AVENTUR)

0.154 0.088

09/21/2007 Rangkai Positif Sdn Bhd

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

0.146 0.169

09/24/2007 QSP Chemie (M) Sdn. Bhd

Analabs Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANALABS)

0.157 0.081

09/24/2007 Herizen Investments Pte Ltd.

Baneng Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BANENG)

0.152 0.062

103

09/25/2007 Seashore Publishing (M) Sdn Bhd

Popular Holdings Ltd. (SGX:P29)

0.183 0.064

09/27/2007 Jasarim Bina Sdn Bhd

Paramount Corp. Bhd (KLSE:PARAMON)

0.128 0.261

10/01/2007 CCM Agriculture (Sabah) Sdn Bhd

Chemical Co. of Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:CCM)

0.183 0.178

10/01/2007 Highline Shipping Sdn Bhd

Hubline Bhd (KLSE:HUBLINE)

0.136 0.089

10/01/2007 Negara Properties M Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

0.118 0.220

10/01/2007 FairPoint Packaging Sdn. Bhd.

Versatile Creative Bhd (KLSE:VERSATL)

0.178 0.049

10/02/2007 Concorde Hotel Hongkong Land Holdings Ltd. (SGX:H78)

0.159 0.231

10/02/2007 Green Energy and Technology Sdn Bhd

Octagon Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:OCTAGON)

0.165 0.060

10/03/2007 Fauzi Lim Plantation Sdn Bhd

MWE Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MWE)

0.137 0.128

10/05/2007 WorldCard International Ltd., Three Companies

Genting International plc (SGX:G13)

0.120 0.070

10/09/2007 Maho Engineering & Trading

Jurong Technologies

0.177 0.174

104

Industrial Corp. Ltd. (SGX:J09)

10/11/2007 HLG Credit Sdn Bhd

HLG Capital Bhd (KLSE:HLCAP)

0.101 0.142

10/11/2007 Pansprint Consolidated Sdn. Bhd.

Milux Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MILUX)

0.155 0.044

10/12/2007 Sing Guan Silk Screen (Cambodia) Co. Ltd.

Astral Supreme Bhd (KLSE:ASUPREM)

0.153 0.047

10/19/2007 OSK REIT Management Sdn Bhd

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

0.079 0.205

10/24/2007 Trc Development Sdn. Bhd.

TRC Synergy Bhd (KLSE:TRC)

0.076 0.115

10/24/2007 TRC Land Sdn Bhd

TRC Synergy Bhd (KLSE:TRC)

0.127 0.095

10/25/2007 Kin Yip Wood Industries Sdn. Bhd.

Maxtral Industry Bhd (KLSE:MAXTRAL)

0.114 0.128

10/30/2007 Sinmah Poultry Farm Sdn. Bhd.

Farm's Best Bhd (KLSE:FARMBES)

0.125 0.050

11/01/2007 Kemuncak Raya Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

0.114 0.128

11/01/2007 Binaik Yubina Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

0.114 0.128

11/01/2007 Maharani Properties Sdn. Bhd

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

0.114 0.128

105

11/01/2007 Johline Realty Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

0.114 0.128

11/09/2007 Nepline Zenergy Sdn Bhd.

Nepline Bhd (KLSE:NEPLINE)

0.116 0.070

11/12/2007 J. Gadsden (South Pacific) Limited

MBF Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MBFHLDG)

0.107 0.130

11/13/2007 Sindora Bhd (KLSE:SINDORA)

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

0.117 0.222

11/14/2007 Empresa (M) Sendirian Berhad

CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

0.114 0.231

11/15/2007 Shanghai Jinshan Jinwei Chemical Company Ltd.

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

0.134 0.182

11/16/2007 Cosmo-Jupiter Berhad

Asiatic Development Bhd (KLSE:ASIATIC)

0.075 0.275

11/16/2007 Suzhou Goodway Rubber Products Co., Ltd.

Goodway Integrated Industries Bhd (KLSE:GOODWAY)

0.123 0.040

11/22/2007 CMS Steel Berhad Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd (KLSE:CMSB)

0.065 0.130

11/22/2007 K-One Resources Sdn Bhd

K-One Technology Bhd (KLSE:K1)

0.121 0.031

11/22/2007 Ampangship Marine Sdn. Bhd.

Petra Perdana Bhd (KLSE:PETRA)

0.035 0.219

11/23/2007 Global Pacific Petroleum Sdn.

Analabs Resources Bhd

0.111 0.057

106

Bhd. (KLSE:ANALABS)

12/03/2007 Cleanway Disposal Services Pte. Ltd.

Analabs Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANALABS)

0.111 0.057

12/05/2007 KUB Singgahsana Sdn. Bhd.

Eden Inc. Berhad (KLSE:EDEN)

0.089 0.118

12/05/2007 KlienTec International Sdn. Bhd.

Esthetics International Group Bhd (KLSE:EIG)

0.113 0.170

12/07/2007 Esteem Packaging Pte Ltd.

Century Bond Bhd (KLSE:CENBOND)

0.116 0.151

12/10/2007 Vimas Joint Venture Company Limited

Berjaya Land Bhd (KLSE:BJLAND)

0.004 0.129

12/14/2007 Mesiniaga Scs Sdn. Bhd.

Mesiniaga Bhd (KLSE:MSNIAGA)

0.148 0.164

12/14/2007 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

0.102 0.073

12/18/2007 Konsortium Lebuhraya Butterworth-Kulim (KLBK) Sdn. Bhd.

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

0.077 0.487

12/19/2007 633 Media Sdn. Bhd.

Health Management International Ltd. (SGX:588)

0.099 0.099

12/24/2007 PT Khaleda Agroprima Malindo

Metro Kajang Holdings Bhd (KLSE:METROK)

0.087 0.217

107

12/31/2007 Zagro Chemicals Sdn Bhd

Zagro Asia Ltd. (SGX:Z01)

0.095 0.070

01/03/2008 Muhibbah Engineering (Cambodia) Co., Ltd.

Muhibbah Engineering M Bhd (KLSE:MUHIBAH)

0.030 0.207

01/04/2008 PacificMas Bhd (KLSE:PACMAS)

Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. (SGX:O39)

0.064 0.711

01/11/2008 Victoria International College

Asia Pacific Land Bhd (KLSE:APLAND)

0.119 0.169

01/14/2008 Mahkota Medical Centre Sdn Bhd

Health Management International Ltd. (SGX:588)

0.104 0.119

01/16/2008 Fiamma Development Sdn Bhd

Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

0.133 0.150

01/17/2008 Jurus Positif Sdn. Bhd.

Mutiara Goodyear Development Bhd (KLSE:MUTIARA)

0.111 0.150

01/17/2008 CNX Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

REDtone International Bhd (KLSE:REDTONE)

0.144 0.096

01/30/2008 IPanel Pte. Ltd. Metronic Global Bhd (KLSE:MTRONIC)

0.159 0.095

02/06/2008 Oaksvilla Sdn Bhd Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

0.094 0.148

02/06/2008 Uniphoenix Jaya Fiamma Holdings 0.094 0.148

108

Sdn Bhd Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

02/25/2008 Godrej Gokarna Oil Palm Limited

IJM Plantations Bhd (KLSE:IJMPLNT)

0.006 0.330

02/25/2008 Maju Warisanmas Sdn. Bhd.

Weida M Bhd (KLSE:WEIDA)

0.094 0.319

02/26/2008 TCB Reinsurance Sdn Bhd.

Tradewinds Corp. Bhd (KLSE:TWSCORP)

0.062 0.184

03/26/2008 PT Bank Internasional Indonesia (JKSE:BNII)

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

0.149 0.324

03/26/2008 JPH Logging Sdn. Bhd.

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

0.177 0.238

03/31/2008 AMBC Controls Sdn. Bhd.

AMDB Bhd. (KLSE:AMDB)

0.075 0.113

04/01/2008 Seremban Engineering Sdn Bhd

Success Transformer Corp Bhd (KLSE:SUCCESS)

0.055 0.315

04/11/2008 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

0.140 0.212

04/18/2008 Sepangar Chemical Industry Sdn Bhd

Lingui Developments Bhd. (KLSE:LINGUI)

0.220 0.314

04/23/2008 Raikon Building Management Co.

GuocoLand (Malaysia) Berhad

0.050 0.155

109

Sdn Bhd (KLSE:GUOCO)

04/23/2008 Khee San Bhd (KLSE:KHEESAN)

London Biscuits Bhd (KLSE:LONBISC)

0.167 0.262

04/24/2008 Milan Resources Sdn Bhd

Ekovest Bhd (KLSE:EKOVEST)

0.169 0.332

04/28/2008 Faber Medi-Serve Sdn Bhd

Faber Group Bhd (KLSE:FABER)

0.093 0.271

05/05/2008 Tradewinds Hotels & Resorts Sdn Bhd

Tradewinds Corp. Bhd (KLSE:TWSCORP)

0.090 0.196

05/06/2008 KKB Industries (Sabah) Sdn. Bhd.

KKB Engineering Bhd (KLSE:KKB)

0.060 0.203

05/14/2008 PMB Carbon Sdn Bhd

PMB Technology Bhd (KLSE:PMBTECH)

0.027 0.134

05/16/2008 Transmission Technology Sdn Bhd

Malaysian Resources Corp. Bhd (KLSE:MRCB)

0.036 0.326

05/22/2008 Asia Pacific Trade and Expo City Sdn. Bhd.

Malaysia Pacific Corporation Berhad (KLSE:MPCORP)

-0.040 0.122

05/30/2008 PT Bank Lippo Tbk

PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk (JKSE:BNGA)

0.013 0.294

06/02/2008 PT Bank Lippo Tbk

Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

0.036 0.469

06/04/2008 Manulife Asset Management

Manulife Holdings Berhad

-0.022 0.425

110

(Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.

(KLSE:MANULFE)

06/06/2008 Ranhill Utilities Bhd

Ranhill Bhd (KLSE:RANHILL); Lambang Optima Sdn Bhd

-0.006 0.215

06/16/2008 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

0.027 0.201

06/18/2008 Universal Building Products Sdn. Bhd.

MTD ACPI Engineering Berhad (KLSE:MTDACPI)

0.101 0.330

06/19/2008 Kurnia Insurance (Thailand) Company Limited

Kurnia Asia Bhd (KLSE:KURASIA)

0.077 0.465

06/27/2008 Malaysian Re (Dubai) Ltd.

MNRB Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MNRB)

0.011 0.522

06/30/2008 Spice Communications Limited (BSE:532863)

Green Acre Agro Services Private Limited; Idea Cellular Limited (BSE/NSE:532822); Telekom Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TM)

-0.001 0.363

07/01/2008 Enex-Dynamic Sdn. Bhd.

Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

0.010 0.181

07/01/2008 Anzpac Services (Australia) Pty. Limited

Tien Wah Press Holdings Bhd (KLSE:TIENWAH);

-0.007 0.062

111

New Toyo International Holdings Ltd. (SGX:N08)

07/04/2008 PT. CB Polaindo CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

0.048 0.409

07/18/2008 KDU College Sdn Bhd

Paramount Corp. Bhd (KLSE:PARAMON)

0.049 0.475

08/01/2008 Sunshine Amanjaya Sdn Bhd.

Suiwah Corp. Bhd (KLSE:SUIWAH)

0.027 0.212

08/04/2008 Aliran Ihsan Resources Berhad (KLSE:AIRB)

MMC Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MMCCORP)

0.065 0.179

08/05/2008 Motosikal Dan Enjin Nasional Sdn. Bhd.

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

0.107 0.394

08/06/2008 MEG Management Sdn. Bhd.

Magnus Energy Group Ltd. (SGX:576)

-0.039 0.054

08/07/2008 Beribu Ukiran Sdn. Bhd.

Karambunai Corp. Bhd (KLSE:KBUNAI)

0.056 0.241

08/08/2008 MCB Bank Ltd. (KASE:MCB)

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

0.076 0.264

08/12/2008 Mushtari Engineering &

Eastern Pacific Industrial Corp.Bhd

0.085 0.453

112

Trading Sdn Bhd (KLSE:EPIC)

113

Appendix B The CAR calculations of the Acquirers. Announced/Initial Filing Date Target/Issuer Buyers/Investors CAR (T+60) CAR(T+120) CAR(T+180) 02/09/2004 Jin Lin Wood

Industries Bhd Gefung Holdings Bhd (KLSE:GEFUNG)

-39.145 -41.360 -420.529

03/09/2004 Asta Elektrodraht Gmbh & Co.

Metrod Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:METROD)

-5.937 -9.301 -110.641

03/30/2004 Ayamas Food Corp. Bhd

QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

-5.767 -18.441 -17.035

04/05/2004 Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Bhd

Proton Holdings Bhd. (KLSE:PROTON)

-28.217 -32.197 -18.273

05/31/2004 PT Jawa Power YTL Power International Bhd (KLSE:YTLPOWR)

-57.627 -61.850 -37.091

06/22/2004 SMC Wheels BSA International Bhd (KLSE:BSA)

-9.875 -17.291 -11.280

07/06/2004 Kumpulan Bertam Plantations Bhd

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

-9.854 -8.599 -2.573

11/01/2004 Cergas Kenari Sdn Bhd

Priceworth Wood Products Bhd (KLSE:PWORTH)

37.630 -4.500 -102.001

11/01/2004 Teras Selasih Priceworth Wood Products Bhd (KLSE:PWORTH)

37.630 -4.500 -102.001

114

11/20/2004 PT Satu Sembilan Delapan

Batu Kawan Bhd (KLSE:BKAWAN)

3.527 -0.360 -0.628

04/22/2005 London Clubs International plc

Genting Berhad (KLSE:GENTING)

0.855 4.314 9.412

04/27/2005 PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk (JKSE:BNGA)

Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

3.459 10.492 14.089

05/05/2005 Pelikan Holding AG (SWX:PEL)

Pelikan International Corporation Berhad (KLSE:PELIKAN)

-19.789 22.631 11.220

06/02/2005 Infoscreen Networks Plc (AIM:INFO)

YTL E-Solutions Bhd (KLSE:YTLE)

14.117 1.439 0.090

06/20/2005 QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

-7.079 -13.867 -23.577

08/11/2005 HP Scitex Hewlett-Packard Company (NYSE:HPQ)

7.662 16.045 15.783

10/07/2005 ASE Test Ltd., Camera Module Assembly Operation

Flextronics International Ltd. (NasdaqGS:FLEX)

-6.499 -13.799 -10.559

02/13/2006 Southern Bank Bhd

Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

7.536 5.938 7.285

02/24/2006 Amtek Marketing Services Pte. Ltd.

Pensonic Holdings Bhd (KLSE:PENSONI)

6.626 -1.411 -2.397

115

03/03/2006 American Express (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., Charge Card Operations and Merchant Acquiring Services

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

2.544 5.938 4.452

03/10/2006 Spice Communications Limited (BSE:532863)

Telekom Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TM)

3.286 -4.749 -5.499

03/31/2006 Productos Pelikan, S.A. of C.V.

Pelikan International Corporation Berhad (KLSE:PELIKAN)

19.167 -4.749 18.612

04/03/2006 MBF Carpenters Ltd.

MBF Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MBFHLDG)

33.839 33.561 69.237

04/25/2006 PT. Surya Sawit Sejati

United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

-5.468 1.901 -1.872

04/25/2006 PT. Mirza Pratama Putra

United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

-5.468 1.901 -1.872

05/17/2006 Malakoff Bhd MMC Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MMCCORP)

-21.241 -24.060 -11.174

07/27/2006 Linshanhao Plywood (Sarawak) Sdn Bhd

WTK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:WTK)

37.469 63.095 68.957

07/28/2006 Sucasa Sdn Bhd. The Nomad Group Bhd

0.984 1.878 4.962

116

(KLSE:NOMAD)

08/04/2006 Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd.

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

2.676 6.681 4.682

08/08/2006 Alor Setar Holiday Villa Sdn Bhd

Advance Synergy Bhd (KLSE:ASB)

-1.495 27.350 47.135

08/29/2006 Malaysia Smelting Corp. Bhd (KLSE:MSC)

Straits Trading Co. Ltd. (SGX:S20)

-3.305 -5.317 -1.896

08/31/2006 Anticor Chimie SA Scomi Group Bhd (KLSE:SCOMI)

0.839 17.583 39.585

09/12/2006 KFC Holdings Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KFC)

QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

5.863 0.607 12.490

09/18/2006 Hicomobil Sdn Bhd.

General Motors Corporation (NYSE:GM)

10.712 -3.326 -9.320

09/20/2006 Empire Deluxe Sdn Bhd

JAKS Resources Berhad (KLSE:JAKS)

15.681 18.190 13.243

09/27/2006 Bright Steel Sdn Bhd

Lion Corp. Bhd (KLSE:LIONCOR)

14.664 37.894 58.390

09/29/2006 United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

United International Enterprises Ltd. (CPSE/CPH:UIE)

9.544 20.517 19.689

10/16/2006 Nestle S.A., Certain Canned Liquid Milk Businesses in South East Asia

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

13.118 13.795 11.997

117

10/16/2006 Premier Milk (Malaya) Sdn Bhd

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

13.118 13.795 11.997

10/16/2006 Nestle (Thailand) Ltd., Canned Liquid Milk Production Assets

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

13.118 13.795 11.997

10/16/2006 Nestle Dairy (Thailand) Limited, Chilled Dairy and Juice Production Assets

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

13.118 13.795 11.997

10/18/2006 Road Builder (M) Holdings Bhd.

IJM Corp. Bhd (KLSE:IJM)

11.734 35.576 32.947

11/06/2006 PT Asuransi Aegis Indonesia

Kurnia Asia Bhd (KLSE:KURASIA)

-7.496 -8.997 -6.441

11/13/2006 Bcom Holdings Sdn. Bhd.

Bolton Bhd (KLSE:BOLTON)

18.420 27.940 35.092

11/27/2006 Prosper Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd

Far East Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FAREAST); Winners Acres Sdn Bhd

16.904 14.602 18.893

11/27/2006 OSK Wealth Planners Sdn. Bhd.

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

13.391 42.102 50.618

11/27/2006 Sime Darby Bhd, Prior to Merger with Synergy Drive Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

118

11/27/2006 Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

11/27/2006 Golden Hope Plantations Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

11/27/2006 Highlands & Lowlands Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

11/27/2006 Sime UEP Properties Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

11/27/2006 Sime Engineering Services Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

11/27/2006 Guthrie Ropel Bhd Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

11/27/2006 Mentakab Rubber Co. Malaya Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

24.471 21.812 37.789

11/30/2006 The Right Channel Sdn Bhd

Media Prima Bhd (KLSE:MEDIA)

-6.622 -8.579 -7.883

12/01/2006 E-CTAsia Technology Sdn. Bhd.

RCG Holdings Limited. (AIM:RCG)

36.266 53.796 24.712

12/01/2006 UCH Technology Sdn. Bhd.

RCG Holdings Limited. (AIM:RCG)

36.266 53.796 24.712

12/05/2006 The Palace Ventures Sdn. Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

-7.003 10.183 9.538

12/07/2006 IQ Card Services Sdn Bhd

Rhythm Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:RHYTHM)

-23.355 -35.099 -51.206

12/18/2006 Dr. W. Kolb AG Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

20.201 10.423 7.565

119

12/28/2006 Engtex Ductile Iron Pipe Industry Sdn Bhd

Engtex Group Bhd (KLSE:ENGTEX)

39.051 36.694 43.043

12/29/2006 Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd.

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

15.506 23.735 34.746

12/29/2006 Electronic Media Airtime Services Sdn Bhd

Heitech Padu Bhd (KLSE:HTPADU)

12.335 -7.474 -2.746

01/03/2007 NBG Communications Sdn Bhd

Keppel Telecommunications & Transportation Ltd. (SGX:K11)

23.284 27.672 57.063

01/10/2007 E&O Property Development Bhd

Eastern & Oriental Bhd (KLSE:E&O)

9.941 46.310 43.080

01/12/2007 Big Tree Outdoor Sdn Bhd

Media Prima Bhd (KLSE:MEDIA)

-1.521 5.529 11.549

01/16/2007 P.T. Sarana Prima Multi Niaga

TSH Resources Bhd (KLSE:TSH)

40.886 53.885 56.651

01/18/2007 Everest Point Sdn. Bhd.

PJI Holdings Bhd (KLSE:PJI)

36.166 39.100 34.750

01/22/2007 Wintip Sdn. Bhd. Fitters Diversified Berhad (KLSE:FITTERS)

-5.165 -7.333 2.454

01/24/2007 Malaysia Transformer Manufacturing Sdn Bhd

Tenaga Nasional Bhd (KLSE:TENAGA)

-7.813 -7.932 -14.865

01/29/2007 Alamjad Sdn Bhd. Aturmaju Resources Bhd

-25.084 -13.367 -15.629

120

(KLSE:ATURMJU)

01/30/2007 PT Proton Tracoma Motors

Proton Holdings Bhd. (KLSE:PROTON)

-8.552 -35.078 -28.852

01/31/2007 PHN Industry Sdn Bhd

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

-2.207 -12.947 4.266

02/02/2007 PT Karya Makmur Abadi

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

15.316 60.386 85.623

02/02/2007 PT Menteng Jaya Sawit Perdana

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

23.284 60.386 85.623

02/13/2007 GRE Energy Co Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

9.986 43.276 22.671

02/26/2007 FEDERAL Auto Holdings Bhd

MBM Resources Bhd (KLSE:MBMR)

-11.281 -2.008 -10.945

03/01/2007 PT Penta Valent Apex Healthcare Bhd (KLSE:AHEALTH)

-2.718 -8.918 -7.116

03/02/2007 Excelle Timber Sdn. Bhd.

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

4.501 -2.067 -25.435

03/06/2007 E&O - PIE Sdn Bhd

Eastern & Oriental Bhd (KLSE:E&O)

41.907 36.918 37.739

03/06/2007 Seal Polymer Industries Bhd

Supermax Corp. Bhd (KLSE:SUPERMX)

-36.950 -35.182 -46.277

03/12/2007 Inorex Valve (M) Sdn Bhd

Unimech Group Bhd (KLSE:UNIMECH)

-2.648 4.775 1.318

121

03/14/2007 Eurospiraal B.V. SAAG Consolidated (M) Bhd. (KLSE:SAAG)

49.880 108.778 95.167

03/16/2007 Wong Engineering Automation Sdn Bhd

Wong Engineering Corp. Bhd (KLSE:WONG)

0.162 13.475 -10.604

03/19/2007 IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

IJM Corp. Bhd (KLSE:IJM)

3.250 0.803 -7.934

03/22/2007 Jadeford International Limited

Lion Forest Industries Berhad (KLSE:LIONFIB)

-6.724 -49.378 -67.709

03/23/2007 Ina Gail Pte Ltd Esthetics International Group Bhd (KLSE:EIG)

0.349 12.668 -9.930

03/30/2007 PT Indoexchange Tbk

Integrax Bhd (KLSE:INTEGRA)

2.474 11.169 13.561

03/30/2007 Better Prospects Sdn Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

12.522 19.540 10.637

03/30/2007 Miracle Display Sdn Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

23.284 19.540 10.637

04/02/2007 Natuream Enviro-Services Sdn Bhd

Eastern Pacific Industrial Corp.Bhd (KLSE:EPIC)

19.214 45.733 29.481

04/02/2007 Hopematic International Sdn. Bhd.

INS Bioscience Bhd (KLSE:INSBIO)

-3.292 39.749 6.791

04/02/2007 OSK Asia Capital Limited

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

3.162 1.040 -18.849

04/04/2007 GTS Power Ltd. SAAG Consolidated (M) Bhd.

48.272 44.278 36.096

122

(KLSE:SAAG)

04/05/2007 MTD Walkers PLC (COSE:KAPI-N-0000)

MTD Capital Bhd (KLSE:MTD)

-4.342 6.701 22.694

04/12/2007 Ann Joo Steel Berhad

Ann Joo Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANNJOO)

27.318 19.166 24.678

04/16/2007 IDS Sebor (Sarawak) Holdings Sdn. Bhd.

Integrated Distribution Services Group Ltd. (SEHK:2387)

10.875 5.780 27.330

04/16/2007 Sebor (Sabah) Sdn Bhd

Integrated Distribution Services Group Ltd. (SEHK:2387)

23.284 5.780 27.330

04/20/2007 Advanced Interconnect Technologies, Inc.

Unisem M Bhd (KLSE:UNISEM)

-21.876 -52.813 -31.079

04/24/2007 MIHR Sdn. Bhd. The Nomad Group Bhd (KLSE:NOMAD)

-0.250 -16.112 -16.877

04/27/2007 Circle Ring Network Sdn Bhd

EP Manufacturing Bhd (KLSE:EPMB)

1.553 -8.297 -15.887

04/30/2007 Mieco Smallholders Sdn Bhd

Mieco Chipboard Bhd (KLSE:MIECO)

-19.602 -35.169 -42.482

04/30/2007 TNB Coal International Ltd

Tenaga Nasional Bhd (KLSE:TENAGA)

-3.909 -15.246 -27.159

123

05/03/2007 Park May Bhd Konsortium Transnasional Bhd (KLSE:KTB)

35.173 35.209 25.094

05/03/2007 Borneo Lumber Industries Sdn Bhd

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

-6.982 -35.315 -49.386

05/08/2007 AMJ Properties Sdn Bhd.

A&M Realty Bhd (KLSE:A&M)

17.073 -27.062 -9.055

05/08/2007 UAC Bhd (KLSE:UAC)

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

18.576 53.693 77.338

05/09/2007 Latitude Tree International Limited

Latitude Tree Holdings Bhd (KLSE:LATITUD)

-9.774 -35.543 -40.002

05/16/2007 Abric Micromechanics Sdn. Bhd

Abric Bhd (KLSE:ABRIC)

13.334 -8.450 -5.969

05/16/2007 Central Mercantile Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd

WTK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:WTK)

-11.493 -67.161 -65.441

05/17/2007 RHB Bank Berhad RHB Capital Bhd (KLSE:RHBCAP)

7.359 12.262 13.677

05/23/2007 Meganet Communications Sdn. Bhd.

VADS Bhd (KLSE:VADS)

-5.178 16.687 -19.224

05/31/2007 AIC Technology Sdn. Bhd.

AIC Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AIC)

22.069 6.525 12.507

06/01/2007 Expressway Lingkaran Tengah Sdn Bhd

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

-1.362 -8.859 -12.074

124

06/01/2007 Linkedua (Malaysia) Berhad

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

-19.602 -8.859 -12.074

06/04/2007 Extiva Communications Sdn. Bhd.

YTL E-Solutions Bhd (KLSE:YTLE)

12.514 -5.624 2.198

06/05/2007 Ace Edible Oil Industries Sdn Bhd

Online One Corporation Bhd (KLSE:ONLINE)

-7.280 0.691 8.678

06/05/2007 UOB Trustee (Malaysia) Bhd.

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

-11.283 -14.079 -22.741

06/07/2007 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (M) Bhd

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

34.694 45.624 52.290

06/08/2007 Spectacular Potential Sdn Bhd

Far East Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FAREAST)

-19.602 -4.305 -0.733

06/08/2007 Mitrajaya Development Lanka (Private) Limited

Mitrajaya Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MITRA)

16.928 8.482 -9.596

06/08/2007 Summer Lodge Sdn Bhd

Sunrise Bhd (KLSE:SUNRISE)

-15.498 -9.736 -18.107

06/11/2007 Sering Cemerlang Sdn. Bhd

KSL Holdings Bhd (KLSE:KSL)

-5.967 -32.754 -63.745

06/15/2007 ECO Generation Co. Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

-22.057 -2.846 -24.868

06/19/2007 AmInvestment Bank Group

AMMB Holdings Bhd (KLSE:AMMB)

-14.273 -11.498 -24.790

06/19/2007 PT Farinda TSH Resources Bhd -18.102 -8.906 0.778

125

Bersaudara (KLSE:TSH)

06/27/2007 ASTA International Pte. Ltd.

Metrod Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:METROD)

-8.314 -12.052 -16.924

07/16/2007 Unisoft Holdings Limited

Silverlake Axis Ltd. (SGX:5CP)

-36.454 -38.573 -50.479

07/25/2007 IJM Properties Sdn Bhd

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

11.751 0.359 1.922

07/25/2007 RB Land Sdn. Bhd.

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

-19.602 0.359 1.922

07/25/2007 Bukit Bendera Resort Sdn. Bhd.

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

-19.602 0.359 1.922

07/25/2007 RB Development Sdn. Bhd.

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

-19.602 0.359 1.922

07/31/2007 Myanmar Mamee-Double Decker Ltd

Mamee-Double Decker M Bhd (KLSE:MAMEE)

-17.889 -25.556 -36.867

07/31/2007 Mamee-Double Decker Foods (Suzhou) Co., Ltd

Mamee-Double Decker M Bhd (KLSE:MAMEE)

-17.889 -25.556 -36.867

08/03/2007 Metrojaya Bhd Malayan United Industries Bhd (KLSE:MUIIND)

0.774 5.493 -5.566

08/07/2007 H2 Energy Corporation Sdn Bhd

Ho Hup Construction Co. Bhd (KLSE:HOHUP)

21.468 -26.775 -42.473

08/09/2007 Ares Green Technology Corp (GTSM:3414)

Frontken Corporation Berhad (KLSE:FRONTKN)

-9.050 -18.707 -35.002

126

08/14/2007 Central Offices Pte Ltd.

The Nomad Group Bhd (KLSE:NOMAD)

-6.459 -15.890 -22.764

08/23/2007 Siam Fibreboard Co., Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

5.661 -13.455 -35.494

08/24/2007 Tamanaco Limited Genting Berhad (KLSE:GENTING)

-3.034 -8.096 -14.186

08/27/2007 Phoenix Track Sdn Bhd

Resorts World Bhd (KLSE:RESORTS)

-5.745 -12.339 -16.524

08/28/2007 Zhejiang Lin'an Jin Yuan Cement Co., Ltd.

YTL Cement Bhd (KLSE:YTLCMT)

-1.487 -4.788 -10.935

08/30/2007 PMT Industries Sdn. Bhd.

Wah Seong Corporation Berhad (KLSE:WASEONG)

-2.527 -5.957 -53.425

08/31/2007 Harvest E&I Engineering Sdn Bhd

Rotary Engineering Ltd. (SGX:R07)

6.393 -10.081 -33.952

09/03/2007 Everay Agritech Sdn. Bhd.

PW Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:PW)

-22.984 -36.984 -50.870

09/07/2007 Berjaya Jet Charter Sdn Bhd.

Berjaya Land Bhd (KLSE:BJLAND)

74.558 107.880 95.412

09/11/2007 Advance Boilers Sdn. Bhd.

CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

14.752 19.055 -12.100

09/11/2007 Ranhill Power Bhd Ranhill Bhd (KLSE:RANHILL)

-25.397 -36.269 -78.230

09/12/2007 Hirotako Kein Hing Sdn. Bhd

Hirotako Holdings Bhd (KLSE:HIRO)

-7.608 -10.121 -26.602

127

09/13/2007 Sunrise DCS Sdn Bhd

Sunrise Bhd (KLSE:SUNRISE)

-7.705 -10.986 -55.085

09/14/2007 Pan Malaysia Holdings Bhd, 15 storey office building at No. 2, Jalan Changkat Ceylon, Kuala Lumpur

Pan Malaysian Industries Bhd (KLSE:PMIND)

31.509 25.726 -33.316

09/17/2007 JF Apex Securities Bhd.

Apex Equity Holdings Bhd (KLSE:APEX)

-3.858 -3.592 -7.352

09/18/2007 Ansa Teknik (Melaka) Sdn. Bhd.

Sunway Holdings Berhad (KLSE:SUNWAY)

0.161 -13.090 -56.552

09/19/2007 Prodelcon Sdn. Bhd.

AIC Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AIC)

-1.069 6.049 -18.281

09/19/2007 AIC Inspirasi Sdn Bhd, Brimal Holdings Sdn Bhd and Autovisor Plastics Sdn Bhd

AV Ventures Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AVENTUR)

-19.434 -53.705 -65.369

09/21/2007 Rangkai Positif Sdn Bhd

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

-4.071 -24.544 -52.123

09/24/2007 QSP Chemie (M) Sdn. Bhd

Analabs Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANALABS)

-0.194 -4.251 -16.490

09/24/2007 Herizen Investments Pte Ltd.

Baneng Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BANENG)

-14.169 -40.483 -20.110

128

09/25/2007 Seashore Publishing (M) Sdn Bhd

Popular Holdings Ltd. (SGX:P29)

-16.015 -32.524 -45.950

09/27/2007 Jasarim Bina Sdn Bhd

Paramount Corp. Bhd (KLSE:PARAMON)

-6.962 13.669 -23.621

10/01/2007 CCM Agriculture (Sabah) Sdn Bhd

Chemical Co. of Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:CCM)

-12.797 -19.195 -31.230

10/01/2007 Highline Shipping Sdn Bhd

Hubline Bhd (KLSE:HUBLINE)

-28.065 -57.525 -59.257

10/01/2007 Negara Properties M Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1.743 1.944 -19.276

10/01/2007 FairPoint Packaging Sdn. Bhd.

Versatile Creative Bhd (KLSE:VERSATL)

-19.730 19.086 60.986

10/02/2007 Concorde Hotel Hongkong Land Holdings Ltd. (SGX:H78)

-0.189 -11.134 -25.112

10/02/2007 Green Energy and Technology Sdn Bhd

Octagon Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:OCTAGON)

0.245 -16.889 -17.634

10/03/2007 Fauzi Lim Plantation Sdn Bhd

MWE Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MWE)

-2.829 -6.600 -19.777

10/05/2007 WorldCard International Ltd., Three Companies

Genting International plc (SGX:G13)

-3.165 -20.416 -26.736

10/09/2007 Maho Engineering & Trading

Jurong Technologies

-42.090 -63.114 -87.400

129

Industrial Corp. Ltd. (SGX:J09)

10/11/2007 HLG Credit Sdn Bhd

HLG Capital Bhd (KLSE:HLCAP)

-4.275 -12.342 -27.071

10/11/2007 Pansprint Consolidated Sdn. Bhd.

Milux Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MILUX)

3.305 -9.034 -4.514

10/12/2007 Sing Guan Silk Screen (Cambodia) Co. Ltd.

Astral Supreme Bhd (KLSE:ASUPREM)

-9.159 -22.093 -16.821

10/19/2007 OSK REIT Management Sdn Bhd

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

-12.179 -25.188 -34.272

10/24/2007 Trc Development Sdn. Bhd.

TRC Synergy Bhd (KLSE:TRC)

15.193 3.873 -10.357

10/24/2007 TRC Land Sdn Bhd

TRC Synergy Bhd (KLSE:TRC)

15.193 3.873 -10.357

10/25/2007 Kin Yip Wood Industries Sdn. Bhd.

Maxtral Industry Bhd (KLSE:MAXTRAL)

-14.755 -27.772 -41.479

10/30/2007 Sinmah Poultry Farm Sdn. Bhd.

Farm's Best Bhd (KLSE:FARMBES)

-48.424 -64.360 -74.741

11/01/2007 Kemuncak Raya Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

-10.959 -37.470 -35.997

11/01/2007 Binaik Yubina Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

-10.959 -37.470 -35.997

11/01/2007 Maharani Properties Sdn. Bhd

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

-10.959 -37.470 -35.997

130

11/01/2007 Johline Realty Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

-10.959 -37.470 -35.997

11/09/2007 Nepline Zenergy Sdn Bhd.

Nepline Bhd (KLSE:NEPLINE)

8.355 22.798 22.655

11/12/2007 J. Gadsden (South Pacific) Limited

MBF Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MBFHLDG)

11.762 -12.112 -12.341

11/13/2007 Sindora Bhd (KLSE:SINDORA)

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

12.926 -3.616 -7.870

11/14/2007 Empresa (M) Sendirian Berhad

CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

-1.590 -34.492 -35.423

11/15/2007 Shanghai Jinshan Jinwei Chemical Company Ltd.

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

2.192 -16.098 -11.936

11/16/2007 Cosmo-Jupiter Berhad

Asiatic Development Bhd (KLSE:ASIATIC)

13.277 1.152 3.241

11/16/2007 Suzhou Goodway Rubber Products Co., Ltd.

Goodway Integrated Industries Bhd (KLSE:GOODWAY)

-7.987 -12.628 -1.738

11/22/2007 CMS Steel Berhad Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd (KLSE:CMSB)

-7.076 -14.014 -9.412

11/22/2007 K-One Resources Sdn Bhd

K-One Technology Bhd (KLSE:K1)

4.060 -59.767 -62.239

11/22/2007 Ampangship Marine Sdn. Bhd.

Petra Perdana Bhd (KLSE:PETRA)

-6.834 -30.640 -12.335

11/23/2007 Global Pacific Petroleum Sdn.

Analabs Resources Bhd

-2.259 -12.964 -11.100

131

Bhd. (KLSE:ANALABS)

12/03/2007 Cleanway Disposal Services Pte. Ltd.

Analabs Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANALABS)

-2.259 -11.773 -11.100

12/05/2007 KUB Singgahsana Sdn. Bhd.

Eden Inc. Berhad (KLSE:EDEN)

-14.305 -46.611 -50.860

12/05/2007 KlienTec International Sdn. Bhd.

Esthetics International Group Bhd (KLSE:EIG)

-9.330 -8.761 -14.621

12/07/2007 Esteem Packaging Pte Ltd.

Century Bond Bhd (KLSE:CENBOND)

-5.616 5.016 -3.818

12/10/2007 Vimas Joint Venture Company Limited

Berjaya Land Bhd (KLSE:BJLAND)

7.250 9.391 -14.573

12/14/2007 Mesiniaga Scs Sdn. Bhd.

Mesiniaga Bhd (KLSE:MSNIAGA)

-17.843 -21.930 -5.678

12/14/2007 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

-8.244 -18.645 -12.564

12/18/2007 Konsortium Lebuhraya Butterworth-Kulim (KLBK) Sdn. Bhd.

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

-1.596 -5.406 -11.565

12/19/2007 633 Media Sdn. Bhd.

Health Management International Ltd. (SGX:588)

-0.511 -14.009 11.753

12/24/2007 PT Khaleda Agroprima Malindo

Metro Kajang Holdings Bhd (KLSE:METROK)

-2.681 -3.708 -18.330

132

12/31/2007 Zagro Chemicals Sdn Bhd

Zagro Asia Ltd. (SGX:Z01)

10.409 -24.890 13.660

01/03/2008 Muhibbah Engineering (Cambodia) Co., Ltd.

Muhibbah Engineering M Bhd (KLSE:MUHIBAH)

-0.823 -18.294 -37.578

01/04/2008 PacificMas Bhd (KLSE:PACMAS)

Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. (SGX:O39)

-0.141 -2.779 -8.210

01/11/2008 Victoria International College

Asia Pacific Land Bhd (KLSE:APLAND)

-47.075 -35.929 -39.445

01/14/2008 Mahkota Medical Centre Sdn Bhd

Health Management International Ltd. (SGX:588)

-11.837 15.599 11.100

01/16/2008 Fiamma Development Sdn Bhd

Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

-16.552 0.534 0.814

01/17/2008 Jurus Positif Sdn. Bhd.

Mutiara Goodyear Development Bhd (KLSE:MUTIARA)

-7.822 10.500 9.350

01/17/2008 CNX Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

REDtone International Bhd (KLSE:REDTONE)

-30.732 -34.217 -50.362

01/30/2008 IPanel Pte. Ltd. Metronic Global Bhd (KLSE:MTRONIC)

-38.723 -36.287 -14.660

02/06/2008 Oaksvilla Sdn Bhd Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

-16.552 0.534 0.814

02/06/2008 Uniphoenix Jaya Fiamma Holdings -16.552 15.599 0.814

133

Sdn Bhd Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

02/25/2008 Godrej Gokarna Oil Palm Limited

IJM Plantations Bhd (KLSE:IJMPLNT)

-0.053 1.156 -32.599

02/25/2008 Maju Warisanmas Sdn. Bhd.

Weida M Bhd (KLSE:WEIDA)

-8.679 -12.567 -12.677

02/26/2008 TCB Reinsurance Sdn Bhd.

Tradewinds Corp. Bhd (KLSE:TWSCORP)

-8.679 -50.008 -57.963

03/26/2008 PT Bank Internasional Indonesia (JKSE:BNII)

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

-12.288 -10.939 -18.708

03/26/2008 JPH Logging Sdn. Bhd.

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

-3.750 -0.317 -17.991

03/31/2008 AMBC Controls Sdn. Bhd.

AMDB Bhd. (KLSE:AMDB)

-12.570 -21.596 -41.282

04/01/2008 Seremban Engineering Sdn Bhd

Success Transformer Corp Bhd (KLSE:SUCCESS)

15.883 4.556 0.199

04/11/2008 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

3.177 -2.829 -11.141

04/18/2008 Sepangar Chemical Industry Sdn Bhd

Lingui Developments Bhd. (KLSE:LINGUI)

-8.859 -25.142 -49.046

04/23/2008 Raikon Building Management Co.

GuocoLand (Malaysia) Berhad

-13.052 -15.775 -40.471

134

Sdn Bhd (KLSE:GUOCO)

04/23/2008 Khee San Bhd (KLSE:KHEESAN)

London Biscuits Bhd (KLSE:LONBISC)

-14.899 -18.963 -34.526

04/24/2008 Milan Resources Sdn Bhd

Ekovest Bhd (KLSE:EKOVEST)

-18.800 -19.379 -27.163

04/28/2008 Faber Medi-Serve Sdn Bhd

Faber Group Bhd (KLSE:FABER)

-6.576 -5.813 -58.055

05/05/2008 Tradewinds Hotels & Resorts Sdn Bhd

Tradewinds Corp. Bhd (KLSE:TWSCORP)

-31.647 -26.516 -92.796

05/06/2008 KKB Industries (Sabah) Sdn. Bhd.

KKB Engineering Bhd (KLSE:KKB)

-8.517 -15.121 -31.502

05/14/2008 PMB Carbon Sdn Bhd

PMB Technology Bhd (KLSE:PMBTECH)

-22.162 -26.253 -5.292

05/16/2008 Transmission Technology Sdn Bhd

Malaysian Resources Corp. Bhd (KLSE:MRCB)

-34.208 -79.045 -48.131

05/22/2008 Asia Pacific Trade and Expo City Sdn. Bhd.

Malaysia Pacific Corporation Berhad (KLSE:MPCORP)

-27.771 9.080 9.980

05/30/2008 PT Bank Lippo Tbk

PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk (JKSE:BNGA)

-0.110 -22.583 -73.060

06/02/2008 PT Bank Lippo Tbk

Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

-4.885 -12.666 -26.542

06/04/2008 Manulife Asset Management

Manulife Holdings Berhad

-1.186 4.958 -26.811

135

(Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.

(KLSE:MANULFE)

06/06/2008 Ranhill Utilities Bhd

Ranhill Bhd (KLSE:RANHILL); Lambang Optima Sdn Bhd

12.079 -24.133 -34.627

06/16/2008 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

-8.500 -16.292 -37.386

06/18/2008 Universal Building Products Sdn. Bhd.

MTD ACPI Engineering Berhad (KLSE:MTDACPI)

-30.925 -37.487 58.274

06/19/2008 Kurnia Insurance (Thailand) Company Limited

Kurnia Asia Bhd (KLSE:KURASIA)

-10.313 -53.119 -34.948

06/27/2008 Malaysian Re (Dubai) Ltd.

MNRB Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MNRB)

-2.990 -20.003 -22.232

06/30/2008 Spice Communications Limited (BSE:532863)

Green Acre Agro Services Private Limited; Idea Cellular Limited (BSE/NSE:532822); Telekom Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TM)

7.791 1.843 -1.271

07/01/2008 Enex-Dynamic Sdn. Bhd.

Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

2.915 -25.931 4.005

07/01/2008 Anzpac Services (Australia) Pty. Limited

Tien Wah Press Holdings Bhd (KLSE:TIENWAH);

17.763 -14.934 43.089

136

New Toyo International Holdings Ltd. (SGX:N08)

07/04/2008 PT. CB Polaindo CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

2.490 -25.299 -47.330

07/18/2008 KDU College Sdn Bhd

Paramount Corp. Bhd (KLSE:PARAMON)

-2.540 -7.630 -9.398

08/01/2008 Sunshine Amanjaya Sdn Bhd.

Suiwah Corp. Bhd (KLSE:SUIWAH)

-5.007 -10.289 -11.378

08/04/2008 Aliran Ihsan Resources Berhad (KLSE:AIRB)

MMC Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MMCCORP)

1.623 -41.360 -39.884

08/05/2008 Motosikal Dan Enjin Nasional Sdn. Bhd.

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

-15.505 -29.944 -31.980

08/06/2008 MEG Management Sdn. Bhd.

Magnus Energy Group Ltd. (SGX:576)

33.132 20.619 6.296

08/07/2008 Beribu Ukiran Sdn. Bhd.

Karambunai Corp. Bhd (KLSE:KBUNAI)

20.405 7.697 10.797

08/08/2008 MCB Bank Ltd. (KASE:MCB)

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

-14.786 -31.826 -32.493

08/12/2008 Mushtari Engineering &

Eastern Pacific Industrial Corp.Bhd

-21.704 -31.429 -24.038

137

Trading Sdn Bhd (KLSE:EPIC)

138

Appendix C The data collection of the independent variable for each acquirer company. Announced/Initial Filing Date

Target/Issuer Buyers/Investors

1) Domestic 2) Cross Border

1)CASH Merger 2)Stock Merger3)Cash & Stock Merger

Firm Size (Log of Number of Employees

1) Horizontal2) Vertical/ Conglomerate

Annual GDP Growth

02/09/2004 Jin Lin Wood Industries Bhd

Gefung Holdings Bhd (KLSE:GEFUNG)

1 2 2.507855872

1 6.783

03/09/2004 Asta Elektrodraht Gmbh & Co.

Metrod Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:METROD)

2 1 2.736396502

1 6.783

03/30/2004 Ayamas Food Corp. Bhd

QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

1 2 4.342422681

2 6.783

04/05/2004 Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Bhd

Proton Holdings Bhd. (KLSE:PROTON)

1 2 3.978864984

1 6.783

05/31/2004 PT Jawa Power YTL Power International Bhd (KLSE:YTLPOWR)

2 2 3.312600439

1 6.783

06/22/2004 SMC Wheels BSA 2 2 3.04296907 1 6.783

139

International Bhd (KLSE:BSA)

3

07/06/2004 Kumpulan Bertam Plantations Bhd

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

1 1 4.071108422

1 6.783

11/01/2004 Cergas Kenari Sdn Bhd

Priceworth Wood Products Bhd (KLSE:PWORTH)

1 1 3.425208051

1 6.783

11/01/2004 Teras Selasih Priceworth Wood Products Bhd (KLSE:PWORTH)

1 1 3.425208051

1 6.783

11/20/2004 PT Satu Sembilan Delapan

Batu Kawan Bhd (KLSE:BKAWAN)

2 2 2.72916479 1 6.783

04/22/2005 London Clubs International plc

Genting Berhad (KLSE:GENTING)

2 1 4.431363764

1 4.997

04/27/2005 PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk (JKSE:BNGA)

Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

2 1 4.408477405

1 4.997

05/05/2005 Pelikan Holding AG (SWX:PEL)

Pelikan International Corporation Berhad

2 2 2.633468456

1 4.997

140

(KLSE:PELIKAN)

06/02/2005 Infoscreen Networks Plc (AIM:INFO)

YTL E-Solutions Bhd (KLSE:YTLE)

2 1 1.903089987

1 4.997

06/20/2005 QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

1 2 4.071108422

2 4.997

08/11/2005 HP Scitex Hewlett-Packard Company (NYSE:HPQ)

2 1 5.506505032

1 4.997

10/07/2005 ASE Test Ltd., Camera Module Assembly Operation

Flextronics International Ltd. (NasdaqGS:FLEX)

2 1 5.209515015

1 4.997

02/13/2006 Southern Bank Bhd Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

1 1 4.408477405

1 5.934

02/24/2006 Amtek Marketing Services Pte. Ltd.

Pensonic Holdings Bhd (KLSE:PENSONI)

2 1 2.80140371 2 5.934

03/03/2006 American Express (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., Charge Card Operations and Merchant Acquiring Services

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

1 1 4.380211242

1 5.934

141

03/10/2006 Spice Communications Limited (BSE:532863)

Telekom Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TM)

2 2 4.559212156

1 5.934

03/31/2006 Productos Pelikan, S.A. of C.V.

Pelikan International Corporation Berhad (KLSE:PELIKAN)

2 1 2.633468456

1 5.934

04/03/2006 MBF Carpenters Ltd.

MBF Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MBFHLDG)

2 1 3.985965078

1 5.934

04/25/2006 PT. Surya Sawit Sejati

United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

2 1 3.829239428

1 5.934

04/25/2006 PT. Mirza Pratama Putra

United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

2 1 3.829239428

1 5.934

05/17/2006 Malakoff Bhd MMC Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MMCCORP)

1 1 3.460145817

2 5.934

07/27/2006 Linshanhao Plywood (Sarawak) Sdn Bhd

WTK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:WTK)

1 1 3.601190533

1 5.934

07/28/2006 Sucasa Sdn Bhd. The Nomad Group Bhd (KLSE:NOMAD)

1 1 2.485721426

1 5.934

142

08/04/2006 Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd.

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

1 1 4.149680882

2 5.934

08/08/2006 Alor Setar Holiday Villa Sdn Bhd

Advance Synergy Bhd (KLSE:ASB)

1 1 3.23325001 2 5.934

08/29/2006 Malaysia Smelting Corp. Bhd (KLSE:MSC)

Straits Trading Co. Ltd. (SGX:S20)

2 2 2.638489257

1 5.934

08/31/2006 Anticor Chimie SA Scomi Group Bhd (KLSE:SCOMI)

2 1 3.212720154

1 5.934

09/12/2006 KFC Holdings Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KFC)

QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR)

1 1 4.342422681

2 5.934

09/18/2006 Hicomobil Sdn Bhd. General Motors Corporation (NYSE:GM)

2 2 5.424881637

1 5.934

09/20/2006 Empire Deluxe Sdn Bhd

JAKS Resources Berhad (KLSE:JAKS)

1 1 2.50242712 1 5.934

09/27/2006 Bright Steel Sdn Bhd

Lion Corp. Bhd (KLSE:LIONCOR)

1 1 3.41763774 1 5.934

09/29/2006 United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT)

United International Enterprises Ltd. (CPSE/CPH:UIE)

2 1 3.409764104

1 5.934

143

10/16/2006 Nestle S.A., Certain Canned Liquid Milk Businesses in South East Asia

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

2 1 3.698970004

1 5.934

10/16/2006 Premier Milk (Malaya) Sdn Bhd

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

1 1 3.698970004

1 5.934

10/16/2006 Nestle (Thailand) Ltd., Canned Liquid Milk Production Assets

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

2 1 3.698970004

1 5.934

10/16/2006 Nestle Dairy (Thailand) Limited, Chilled Dairy and Juice Production Assets

Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N)

2 1 3.698970004

1 5.934

10/18/2006 Road Builder (M) Holdings Bhd.

IJM Corp. Bhd (KLSE:IJM)

1 2 3.634880141

1 5.934

11/06/2006 PT Asuransi Aegis Indonesia

Kurnia Asia Bhd (KLSE:KURASIA)

2 2 3.268811904

1 5.934

11/13/2006 Bcom Holdings Sdn. Bhd.

Bolton Bhd (KLSE:BOLTON)

1 1 2.484299839

1 5.934

11/27/2006 Prosper Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd

Far East Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FAREAST); Winners Acres Sdn Bhd

1 1 2.053078443

1 5.934

144

11/27/2006 OSK Wealth Planners Sdn. Bhd.

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

1 1 3.147676324

1 5.934

11/27/2006 Sime Darby Bhd, Prior to Merger with Synergy Drive Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/27/2006 Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/27/2006 Golden Hope Plantations Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/27/2006 Highlands & Lowlands Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/27/2006 Sime UEP Properties Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/27/2006 Sime Engineering Services Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/27/2006 Guthrie Ropel Bhd Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/27/2006 Mentakab Rubber Co. Malaya Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 2 4.980793932

2 5.934

11/30/2006 The Right Channel Sdn Bhd

Media Prima Bhd (KLSE:MEDIA)

1 1 3.258397804

1 5.934

145

12/01/2006 E-CTAsia Technology Sdn. Bhd.

RCG Holdings Limited. (AIM:RCG)

2 1 2.526339277

1 5.934

12/01/2006 UCH Technology Sdn. Bhd.

RCG Holdings Limited. (AIM:RCG)

2 1 2.526339277

1 5.934

12/05/2006 The Palace Ventures Sdn. Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

1 1 3.110926242

1 5.934

12/07/2006 IQ Card Services Sdn Bhd

Rhythm Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:RHYTHM)

1 2 2.322219295

1 5.934

12/18/2006 Dr. W. Kolb AG Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

2 1 4.397940009

2 5.934

12/28/2006 Engtex Ductile Iron Pipe Industry Sdn Bhd

Engtex Group Bhd (KLSE:ENGTEX)

1 1 2.655138435

2 5.934

12/29/2006 Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd.

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

1 1 4.149680882

2 5.934

12/29/2006 Electronic Media Airtime Services Sdn Bhd

Heitech Padu Bhd (KLSE:HTPADU)

1 1 2.903089987

1 5.934

146

01/03/2007 NBG Communications Sdn Bhd

Keppel Telecommunications & Transportation Ltd. (SGX:K11)

2 1 3.0923697 1 6.327

01/10/2007 E&O Property Development Bhd

Eastern & Oriental Bhd (KLSE:E&O)

1 1 2.572871602

1 6.327

01/12/2007 Big Tree Outdoor Sdn Bhd

Media Prima Bhd (KLSE:MEDIA)

1 1 3.258397804

1 6.327

01/16/2007 P.T. Sarana Prima Multi Niaga

TSH Resources Bhd (KLSE:TSH)

2 1 3.301029996

1 6.327

01/18/2007 Everest Point Sdn. Bhd.

PJI Holdings Bhd (KLSE:PJI)

1 1 2.397940009

1 6.327

01/22/2007 Wintip Sdn. Bhd. Fitters Diversified Berhad (KLSE:FITTERS)

1 1 2.463892989

2 6.327

01/24/2007 Malaysia Transformer Manufacturing Sdn Bhd

Tenaga Nasional Bhd (KLSE:TENAGA)

1 1 4.465531557

2 6.327

01/29/2007 Alamjad Sdn Bhd. Aturmaju Resources Bhd (KLSE:ATURMJU)

1 1 2.146128036

1 6.327

147

01/30/2007 PT Proton Tracoma Motors

Proton Holdings Bhd. (KLSE:PROTON)

2 1 3.978864984

1 6.327

01/31/2007 PHN Industry Sdn Bhd

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

1 1 4.236209654

1 6.327

02/02/2007 PT Karya Makmur Abadi

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

2 1 4.397940009

1 6.327

02/02/2007 PT Menteng Jaya Sawit Perdana

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

2 1 4.397940009

1 6.327

02/13/2007 GRE Energy Co Ltd. Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

2 1 3.317227349

1 6.327

02/26/2007 FEDERAL Auto Holdings Bhd

MBM Resources Bhd (KLSE:MBMR)

1 2 3.134177108

1 6.327

03/01/2007 PT Penta Valent Apex Healthcare Bhd (KLSE:AHEALTH)

2 2 2.684845362

1 6.327

03/02/2007 Excelle Timber Sdn. Bhd.

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

1 1 3.338655666

1 6.327

03/06/2007 E&O - PIE Sdn Bhd Eastern & Oriental Bhd

1 1 2.572871602

2 6.327

148

(KLSE:E&O)

03/06/2007 Seal Polymer Industries Bhd

Supermax Corp. Bhd (KLSE:SUPERMX)

1 2 2.826074803

1 6.327

03/12/2007 Inorex Valve (M) Sdn Bhd

Unimech Group Bhd (KLSE:UNIMECH)

1 1 2.609594409

1 6.327

03/14/2007 Eurospiraal B.V. SAAG Consolidated (M) Bhd. (KLSE:SAAG)

2 1 2.255272505

1 6.327

03/16/2007 Wong Engineering Automation Sdn Bhd

Wong Engineering Corp. Bhd (KLSE:WONG)

1 1 2.571708832

1 6.327

03/19/2007 IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

IJM Corp. Bhd (KLSE:IJM)

1 2 3.634880141

2 6.327

03/22/2007 Jadeford International Limited

Lion Forest Industries Berhad (KLSE:LIONFIB)

2 1 3.377124042

1 6.327

03/23/2007 Ina Gail Pte Ltd Esthetics International Group Bhd (KLSE:EIG)

2 1 2.507855872

1 6.327

03/30/2007 PT Indoexchange Tbk

Integrax Bhd (KLSE:INTEGRA)

2 1 1.041392685

2 6.327

149

03/30/2007 Better Prospects Sdn Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

1 1 3.110926242

2 6.327

03/30/2007 Miracle Display Sdn Bhd.

NPC Resources Bhd (KLSE:NPC)

1 1 3.110926242

1 6.327

04/02/2007 Natuream Enviro-Services Sdn Bhd

Eastern Pacific Industrial Corp.Bhd (KLSE:EPIC)

1 1 2.46834733 1 6.327

04/02/2007 Hopematic International Sdn. Bhd.

INS Bioscience Bhd (KLSE:INSBIO)

1 1 1.892094603

1 6.327

04/02/2007 OSK Asia Capital Limited

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

2 1 3.147676324

1 6.327

04/04/2007 GTS Power Ltd. SAAG Consolidated (M) Bhd. (KLSE:SAAG)

2 1 2.255272505

1 6.327

04/05/2007 MTD Walkers PLC (COSE:KAPI-N-0000)

MTD Capital Bhd (KLSE:MTD)

2 1 2.702430536

1 6.327

04/12/2007 Ann Joo Steel Berhad

Ann Joo Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANNJOO)

1 1 2.77815125 1 6.327

04/16/2007 IDS Sebor (Sarawak) Holdings Sdn. Bhd.

Integrated Distribution Services Group

2 1 3.812913357

1 6.327

150

Ltd. (SEHK:2387)

04/16/2007 Sebor (Sabah) Sdn Bhd

Integrated Distribution Services Group Ltd. (SEHK:2387)

2 1 3.812913357

1 6.327

04/20/2007 Advanced Interconnect Technologies, Inc.

Unisem M Bhd (KLSE:UNISEM)

2 1 3.633872263

1 6.327

04/24/2007 MIHR Sdn. Bhd. The Nomad Group Bhd (KLSE:NOMAD)

1 1 2.485721426

1 6.327

04/27/2007 Circle Ring Network Sdn Bhd

EP Manufacturing Bhd (KLSE:EPMB)

1 1 2.698970004

1 6.327

04/30/2007 Mieco Smallholders Sdn Bhd

Mieco Chipboard Bhd (KLSE:MIECO)

1 1 2.964730921

1 6.327

04/30/2007 TNB Coal International Ltd

Tenaga Nasional Bhd (KLSE:TENAGA)

2 1 4.465531557

2 6.327

05/03/2007 Park May Bhd Konsortium Transnasional Bhd (KLSE:KTB)

1 2 3.435047641

1 6.327

05/03/2007 Borneo Lumber Industries Sdn Bhd

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd

1 1 3.338655666

1 6.327

151

(KLSE:SUBUR)

05/08/2007 AMJ Properties Sdn Bhd.

A&M Realty Bhd (KLSE:A&M)

1 1 2.88592634 1 6.327

05/08/2007 UAC Bhd (KLSE:UAC)

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

1 1 4.149680882

2 6.327

05/09/2007 Latitude Tree International Limited

Latitude Tree Holdings Bhd (KLSE:LATITUD)

2 1 3.710878618

1 6.327

05/16/2007 Abric Micromechanics Sdn. Bhd

Abric Bhd (KLSE:ABRIC)

1 2 2.376576957

1 6.327

05/16/2007 Central Mercantile Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd

WTK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:WTK)

1 1 3.601190533

1 6.327

05/17/2007 RHB Bank Berhad RHB Capital Bhd (KLSE:RHBCAP)

1 1 4.005866602

1 6.327

05/23/2007 Meganet Communications Sdn. Bhd.

VADS Bhd (KLSE:VADS)

1 1 2.477121255

1 6.327

05/31/2007 AIC Technology Sdn. Bhd.

AIC Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AIC)

1 1 2.970346876

1 6.327

06/01/2007 Expressway Lingkaran Tengah Sdn Bhd

Plus Expressways Bhd

1 1 3.519302849

1 6.327

152

(KLSE:PLUS)

06/01/2007 Linkedua (Malaysia) Berhad

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

1 1 3.519302849

1 6.327

06/04/2007 Extiva Communications Sdn. Bhd.

YTL E-Solutions Bhd (KLSE:YTLE)

1 1 1.903089987

2 6.327

06/05/2007 Ace Edible Oil Industries Sdn Bhd

Online One Corporation Bhd (KLSE:ONLINE)

1 1 1.72427587 2 6.327

06/05/2007 UOB Trustee (Malaysia) Bhd.

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

1 1 3.147676324

1 6.327

06/07/2007 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (M) Bhd

Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD)

1 1 4.149680882

2 6.327

06/08/2007 Spectacular Potential Sdn Bhd

Far East Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FAREAST)

1 1 2.053078443

2 6.327

06/08/2007 Mitrajaya Development Lanka (Private) Limited

Mitrajaya Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MITRA)

2 1 2.549003262

1 6.327

06/08/2007 Summer Lodge Sdn Bhd

Sunrise Bhd (KLSE:SUNRISE)

1 1 2.600972896

1 6.327

06/11/2007 Sering Cemerlang Sdn. Bhd

KSL Holdings Bhd (KLSE:KSL)

1 1 2.167317335

1 6.327

153

06/15/2007 ECO Generation Co. Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

2 2 3.317227349

1 6.327

06/19/2007 AmInvestment Bank Group

AMMB Holdings Bhd (KLSE:AMMB)

1 1 3.952937668

1 6.327

06/19/2007 PT Farinda Bersaudara

TSH Resources Bhd (KLSE:TSH)

2 1 3.301029996

1 6.327

06/27/2007 ASTA International Pte. Ltd.

Metrod Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:METROD)

2 2 2.736396502

1 6.327

07/16/2007 Unisoft Holdings Limited

Silverlake Axis Ltd. (SGX:5CP)

2 2 2.187520721

1 6.327

07/25/2007 IJM Properties Sdn Bhd

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

1 2 2.745074792

2 6.327

07/25/2007 RB Land Sdn. Bhd. IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

1 2 2.745074792

2 6.327

07/25/2007 Bukit Bendera Resort Sdn. Bhd.

IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

1 1 2.745074792

1 6.327

07/25/2007 RB Development IJM Land 1 1 2.74507479 2 6.327

154

Sdn. Bhd. Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND)

2

07/31/2007 Myanmar Mamee-Double Decker Ltd

Mamee-Double Decker M Bhd (KLSE:MAMEE)

2 1 3.285332228

1 6.327

07/31/2007 Mamee-Double Decker Foods (Suzhou) Co., Ltd

Mamee-Double Decker M Bhd (KLSE:MAMEE)

2 1 3.285332228

1 6.327

08/03/2007 Metrojaya Bhd Malayan United Industries Bhd (KLSE:MUIIND)

1 1 4.021189299

1 6.327

08/07/2007 H2 Energy Corporation Sdn Bhd

Ho Hup Construction Co. Bhd (KLSE:HOHUP)

1 1 2.730782276

1 6.327

08/09/2007 Ares Green Technology Corp (GTSM:3414)

Frontken Corporation Berhad (KLSE:FRONTKN)

2 2 2.536558443

2 6.327

08/14/2007 Central Offices Pte Ltd.

The Nomad Group Bhd (KLSE:NOMAD)

2 1 2.485721426

1 6.327

155

08/23/2007 Siam Fibreboard Co., Ltd.

Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd (KLSE:EVERGRN)

2 1 3.317227349

1 6.327

08/24/2007 Tamanaco Limited Genting Berhad (KLSE:GENTING)

2 1 4.431363764

1 6.327

08/27/2007 Phoenix Track Sdn Bhd

Resorts World Bhd (KLSE:RESORTS)

1 1 4.127104798

1 6.327

08/28/2007 Zhejiang Lin'an Jin Yuan Cement Co., Ltd.

YTL Cement Bhd (KLSE:YTLCMT)

2 1 3.061829307

1 6.327

08/30/2007 PMT Industries Sdn. Bhd.

Wah Seong Corporation Berhad (KLSE:WASEONG)

1 1 3.021602716

1 6.327

08/31/2007 Harvest E&I Engineering Sdn Bhd

Rotary Engineering Ltd. (SGX:R07)

2 2 3.62324929 1 6.327

09/03/2007 Everay Agritech Sdn. Bhd.

PW Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:PW)

1 1 2.684845362

1 6.327

09/07/2007 Berjaya Jet Charter Sdn Bhd.

Berjaya Land Bhd (KLSE:BJLAND)

1 1 3.658202253

1 6.327

156

09/11/2007 Advance Boilers Sdn. Bhd.

CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

1 1 2.555094449

1 6.327

09/11/2007 Ranhill Power Bhd Ranhill Bhd (KLSE:RANHILL)

1 1 3.598899887

1 6.327

09/12/2007 Hirotako Kein Hing Sdn. Bhd

Hirotako Holdings Bhd (KLSE:HIRO)

1 1 2.680335513

1 6.327

09/13/2007 Sunrise DCS Sdn Bhd

Sunrise Bhd (KLSE:SUNRISE)

1 1 2.600972896

1 6.327

09/14/2007 Pan Malaysia Holdings Bhd, 15 storey office building at No. 2, Jalan Changkat Ceylon, Kuala Lumpur

Pan Malaysian Industries Bhd (KLSE:PMIND)

1 1 3.147676324

1 6.327

157

09/17/2007 JF Apex Securities Bhd.

Apex Equity Holdings Bhd (KLSE:APEX)

1 1 2.245512668

1 6.327

09/18/2007 Ansa Teknik (Melaka) Sdn. Bhd.

Sunway Holdings Berhad (KLSE:SUNWAY)

1 1 3.525563058

1 6.327

09/19/2007 Prodelcon Sdn. Bhd.

AIC Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AIC)

1 3 2.970346876

1 6.327

09/19/2007 AIC Inspirasi Sdn Bhd, Brimal Holdings Sdn Bhd and Autovisor Plastics Sdn Bhd

AV Ventures Corp. Bhd (KLSE:AVENTUR)

1 2 2.403120521

1 6.327

09/21/2007 Rangkai Positif Sdn Bhd

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

1 2 4.236209654

1 6.327

09/24/2007 QSP Chemie (M) Sdn. Bhd

Analabs Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANALABS)

1 1 2.037426498

2 6.327

09/24/2007 Herizen Investments Pte Ltd.

Baneng Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BANENG)

2 1 3.301029996

2 6.327

09/25/2007 Seashore Publishing (M) Sdn Bhd

Popular Holdings Ltd. (SGX:P29)

2 2 3.363047595

1 6.327

158

09/27/2007 Jasarim Bina Sdn Bhd

Paramount Corp. Bhd (KLSE:PARAMON)

1 1 2.992995098

1 6.327

10/01/2007 CCM Agriculture (Sabah) Sdn Bhd

Chemical Co. of Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:CCM)

1 1 3.19368103 1 6.327

10/01/2007 Highline Shipping Sdn Bhd

Hubline Bhd (KLSE:HUBLINE)

1 2 2.758154622

1 6.327

10/01/2007 Negara Properties M Bhd

Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME)

1 3 4.980793932

2 6.327

10/01/2007 FairPoint Packaging Sdn. Bhd.

Versatile Creative Bhd (KLSE:VERSATL)

1 1 2.669316881

2 6.327

10/02/2007 Concorde Hotel Hongkong Land Holdings Ltd. (SGX:H78)

2 2 3.022428371

2 6.327

10/02/2007 Green Energy and Technology Sdn Bhd

Octagon Consolidated Bhd (KLSE:OCTAGON)

1 1 2.586587305

1 6.327

10/03/2007 Fauzi Lim Plantation Sdn Bhd

MWE Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MWE)

1 1 3.944877306

1 6.327

159

10/05/2007 WorldCard International Ltd., Three Companies

Genting International plc (SGX:G13)

2 1 3.687172105

1 6.327

10/09/2007 Maho Engineering & Trading

Jurong Technologies Industrial Corp. Ltd. (SGX:J09)

2 2 3.380211242

1 6.327

10/11/2007 HLG Credit Sdn Bhd HLG Capital Bhd (KLSE:HLCAP)

1 1 2.394451681

1 6.327

10/11/2007 Pansprint Consolidated Sdn. Bhd.

Milux Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MILUX)

1 1 2.678518379

2 6.327

10/12/2007 Sing Guan Silk Screen (Cambodia) Co. Ltd.

Astral Supreme Bhd (KLSE:ASUPREM)

2 2 2.550228353

1 6.327

10/19/2007 OSK REIT Management Sdn Bhd

OSK Holdings Bhd (KLSE:OSK)

1 1 3.147676324

2 6.327

10/24/2007 Trc Development Sdn. Bhd.

TRC Synergy Bhd (KLSE:TRC)

1 1 2.707570176

1 6.327

10/24/2007 TRC Land Sdn Bhd TRC Synergy Bhd (KLSE:TRC)

1 1 2.707570176

1 6.327

160

10/25/2007 Kin Yip Wood Industries Sdn. Bhd.

Maxtral Industry Bhd (KLSE:MAXTRAL)

1 1 2.522444234

1 6.327

10/30/2007 Sinmah Poultry Farm Sdn. Bhd.

Farm's Best Bhd (KLSE:FARMBES)

1 1 4.193375081

1 6.327

11/01/2007 Kemuncak Raya Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

1 2 1.69019608 1 6.327

11/01/2007 Binaik Yubina Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

1 1 1.69019608 1 6.327

11/01/2007 Maharani Properties Sdn. Bhd

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

1 1 1.69019608 1 6.327

11/01/2007 Johline Realty Sdn. Bhd.

Binaik Equity Bhd (KLSE:BINAIK)

1 1 1.69019608 1 6.327

161

11/09/2007 Nepline Zenergy Sdn Bhd.

Nepline Bhd (KLSE:NEPLINE)

1 1 1.995635195

1 6.327

11/12/2007 J. Gadsden (South Pacific) Limited

MBF Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MBFHLDG)

2 1 3.985965078

2 6.327

11/13/2007 Sindora Bhd (KLSE:SINDORA)

Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM)

1 2 4.071108422

2 6.327

11/14/2007 Empresa (M) Sendirian Berhad

CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

1 1 2.555094449

1 6.327

11/15/2007 Shanghai Jinshan Jinwei Chemical Company Ltd.

Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK)

2 1 4.397940009

2 6.327

11/16/2007 Cosmo-Jupiter Berhad

Asiatic Development Bhd (KLSE:ASIATIC)

1 1 3.755493728

2 6.327

11/16/2007 Suzhou Goodway Rubber Products Co., Ltd.

Goodway Integrated Industries Bhd (KLSE:GOODWAY)

2 1 2.619093331

1 6.327

162

11/22/2007 CMS Steel Berhad Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd (KLSE:CMSB)

1 1 3.322219295

1 6.327

11/22/2007 K-One Resources Sdn Bhd

K-One Technology Bhd (KLSE:K1)

1 1 2.408239965

1 6.327

11/22/2007 Ampangship Marine Sdn. Bhd.

Petra Perdana Bhd (KLSE:PETRA)

1 1 3.395675785

1 6.327

11/23/2007 Global Pacific Petroleum Sdn. Bhd.

Analabs Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANALABS)

1 1 2.037426498

2 6.327

12/03/2007 Cleanway Disposal Services Pte. Ltd.

Analabs Resources Bhd (KLSE:ANALABS)

2 1 2.037426498

1 6.327

12/05/2007 KUB Singgahsana Sdn. Bhd.

Eden Inc. Berhad (KLSE:EDEN)

1 1 2.737192643

1 6.327

12/05/2007 KlienTec International Sdn. Bhd.

Esthetics International Group Bhd (KLSE:EIG)

1 1 2.507855872

1 6.327

12/07/2007 Esteem Packaging Pte Ltd.

Century Bond Bhd (KLSE:CENBON

2 2 2.73479983 1 6.327

163

D)

12/10/2007 Vimas Joint Venture Company Limited

Berjaya Land Bhd (KLSE:BJLAND)

2 2 3.658202253

1 6.327

12/14/2007 Mesiniaga Scs Sdn. Bhd.

Mesiniaga Bhd (KLSE:MSNIAGA)

1 1 2.824776462

2 6.327

12/14/2007 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

1 3 2.399673721

1 6.327

12/18/2007 Konsortium Lebuhraya Butterworth-Kulim (KLBK) Sdn. Bhd.

Plus Expressways Bhd (KLSE:PLUS)

1 1 3.519302849

1 6.327

12/19/2007 633 Media Sdn. Bhd.

Health Management International Ltd. (SGX:588)

2 1 2.765668555

1 6.327

12/24/2007 PT Khaleda Agroprima Malindo

Metro Kajang Holdings Bhd (KLSE:METROK)

2 2 2.812244697

2 6.327

12/31/2007 Zagro Chemicals Sdn Bhd

Zagro Asia Ltd. (SGX:Z01)

2 1 1.812913357

2 6.327

164

01/03/2008 Muhibbah Engineering (Cambodia) Co., Ltd.

Muhibbah Engineering M Bhd (KLSE:MUHIBAH)

2 2 2.875061263

1 5.000

01/04/2008 PacificMas Bhd (KLSE:PACMAS)

Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. (SGX:O39)

2 2 4.298656617

1 5.000

01/11/2008 Victoria International College

Asia Pacific Land Bhd (KLSE:APLAND)

1 2 2.903089987

2 5.000

01/14/2008 Mahkota Medical Centre Sdn Bhd

Health Management International Ltd. (SGX:588)

2 1 2.773054693

1 5.000

01/16/2008 Fiamma Development Sdn Bhd

Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

1 1 2.356025857

2 5.000

01/17/2008 Jurus Positif Sdn. Bhd.

Mutiara Goodyear Development Bhd (KLSE:MUTIARA)

1 1 2 1 5.000

01/17/2008 CNX Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

REDtone International Bhd (KLSE:REDTONE)

1 1 2.552668216

1 5.000

165

01/30/2008 IPanel Pte. Ltd. Metronic Global Bhd (KLSE:MTRONIC)

2 2 2.330413773

1 5.000

02/06/2008 Oaksvilla Sdn Bhd Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

1 1 2.356025857

2 5.000

02/06/2008 Uniphoenix Jaya Sdn Bhd

Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

1 1 2.356025857

2 5.000

02/25/2008 Godrej Gokarna Oil Palm Limited

IJM Plantations Bhd (KLSE:IJMPLNT)

2 2 3.64738297 1 5.000

02/25/2008 Maju Warisanmas Sdn. Bhd.

Weida M Bhd (KLSE:WEIDA)

1 1 2.670245853

2 5.000

02/26/2008 TCB Reinsurance Sdn Bhd.

Tradewinds Corp. Bhd (KLSE:TWSCORP)

1 1 3.966939163

2 5.000

03/26/2008 PT Bank Internasional Indonesia (JKSE:BNII)

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

2 2 4.380211242

1 5.000

03/26/2008 JPH Logging Sdn. Bhd.

Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd (KLSE:SUBUR)

1 1 3.338655666

1 5.000

166

03/31/2008 AMBC Controls Sdn. Bhd.

AMDB Bhd. (KLSE:AMDB)

1 1 3 1 5.000

04/01/2008 Seremban Engineering Sdn Bhd

Success Transformer Corp Bhd (KLSE:SUCCESS)

1 1 2.51054501 1 5.000

04/11/2008 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

1 2 2.399673721

1 5.000

04/18/2008 Sepangar Chemical Industry Sdn Bhd

Lingui Developments Bhd. (KLSE:LINGUI)

1 2 3.77815125 2 5.000

04/23/2008 Raikon Building Management Co. Sdn Bhd

GuocoLand (Malaysia) Berhad (KLSE:GUOCO)

1 1 2.744292983

1 5.000

04/23/2008 Khee San Bhd (KLSE:KHEESAN)

London Biscuits Bhd (KLSE:LONBISC)

1 2 2.672097858

1 5.000

04/24/2008 Milan Resources Sdn Bhd

Ekovest Bhd (KLSE:EKOVEST)

1 1 1.897627091

1 5.000

167

04/28/2008 Faber Medi-Serve Sdn Bhd

Faber Group Bhd (KLSE:FABER)

1 2 3.870228279

1 5.000

05/05/2008 Tradewinds Hotels & Resorts Sdn Bhd

Tradewinds Corp. Bhd (KLSE:TWSCORP)

1 2 3.966939163

1 5.000

05/06/2008 KKB Industries (Sabah) Sdn. Bhd.

KKB Engineering Bhd (KLSE:KKB)

1 1 2.635483747

1 5.000

05/14/2008 PMB Carbon Sdn Bhd

PMB Technology Bhd (KLSE:PMBTECH)

1 1 2.301029996

1 5.000

05/16/2008 Transmission Technology Sdn Bhd

Malaysian Resources Corp. Bhd (KLSE:MRCB)

1 1 2.968015714

1 5.000

05/22/2008 Asia Pacific Trade and Expo City Sdn. Bhd.

Malaysia Pacific Corporation Berhad (KLSE:MPCORP)

1 1 1.819543936

2 5.000

05/30/2008 PT Bank Lippo Tbk PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk (JKSE:BNGA)

2 2 3.797752129

1 5.000

168

06/02/2008 PT Bank Lippo Tbk Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad (KLSE:COMMERZ)

2 2 4.408477405

1 5.000

06/04/2008 Manulife Asset Management (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.

Manulife Holdings Berhad (KLSE:MANULFE)

1 1 2.439332694

1 5.000

06/06/2008 Ranhill Utilities Bhd Ranhill Bhd (KLSE:RANHILL); Lambang Optima Sdn Bhd

1 1 3.598899887

1 5.000

06/16/2008 Symphony BPO Solutions Sdn. Bhd.

Symphony House Bhd (KLSE:SYMPHNY)

1 2 2.399673721

1 5.000

06/18/2008 Universal Building Products Sdn. Bhd.

MTD ACPI Engineering Berhad (KLSE:MTDACPI)

1 1 3.007320953

2 5.000

06/19/2008 Kurnia Insurance (Thailand) Company Limited

Kurnia Asia Bhd (KLSE:KURASIA)

2 2 3.268811904

1 5.000

06/27/2008 Malaysian Re (Dubai) Ltd.

MNRB Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MNRB)

2 1 2.773054693

1 5.000

169

06/30/2008 Spice Communications Limited (BSE:532863)

Green Acre Agro Services Private Limited; Idea Cellular Limited (BSE/NSE:532822); Telekom Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TM)

2 2 4.559212156

1 5.000

07/01/2008 Enex-Dynamic Sdn. Bhd.

Fiamma Holdings Bhd (KLSE:FIAMMA)

1 1 2.356025857

1 5.000

07/01/2008 Anzpac Services (Australia) Pty. Limited

Tien Wah Press Holdings Bhd (KLSE:TIENWAH); New Toyo International Holdings Ltd. (SGX:N08)

2 1 2.56937391 2 5.000

07/04/2008 PT. CB Polaindo CB Industrial Product Holding Bhd (KLSE:CBIP)

2 2 2.555094449

1 5.000

07/18/2008 KDU College Sdn Bhd

Paramount Corp. Bhd (KLSE:PARAMON)

1 1 2.992995098

2 5.000

08/01/2008 Sunshine Amanjaya Sdn Bhd.

Suiwah Corp. Bhd (KLSE:SUIWAH)

1 1 3.114944416

2 5.000

170

08/04/2008 Aliran Ihsan Resources Berhad (KLSE:AIRB)

MMC Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MMCCORP)

1 1 3.460145817

2 5.000

08/05/2008 Motosikal Dan Enjin Nasional Sdn. Bhd.

DRB-HICOM Bhd (KLSE:DRBHCOM)

1 2 4.236209654

2 5.000

08/06/2008 MEG Management Sdn. Bhd.

Magnus Energy Group Ltd. (SGX:576)

2 1 2.630427875

2 5.000

08/07/2008 Beribu Ukiran Sdn. Bhd.

Karambunai Corp. Bhd (KLSE:KBUNAI)

1 1 2.978180517

1 5.000

08/08/2008 MCB Bank Ltd. (KASE:MCB)

Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK)

2 2 4.380211242

1 5.000

08/12/2008 Mushtari Engineering & Trading Sdn Bhd

Eastern Pacific Industrial Corp.Bhd (KLSE:EPIC)

1 2 2.46834733 1 5.000

171

Appendix D

Regression Analysis Results for T+60 days Post Announcement Window

Coefficients(a)

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients t Sig. Model B

Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

(Constant) -37.205 25.393 -1.465 .144FirmSizeLog 6.136 2.523 .154 2.432 .016TypeofPayment -18.062 4.311 -.263 -4.190 .000

TypeofMerger 9.281 4.803 .122 1.932 .055

GDPGrowth 2.285 3.649 .038 .626 .532

1

Location 6.028 4.319 .088 1.396 .164a Dependent Variable: CAR Appendix E Regression Analysis Results for T+120 days Post Announcement Window

Coefficients(a)

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients t Sig. Model B

Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

(Constant) -34.086 21.051 -1.619 .107FirmSizeLog 3.853 2.049 .122 1.880 .061TypeofPayment -10.451 3.502 -.191 -2.984 .003

TypeofMerger 5.923 3.874 .098 1.529 .128

Location 4.003 3.528 .073 1.135 .258

1

GDPGrowth 2.999 2.981 .063 1.006 .315a Dependent Variable: CAR_120

172

Appendix F Regression Analysis Results for T+180 days Post Announcement Window

Coefficients(a)

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

1 (Constant) -53.589 24.791 -2.162 .032 FirmSizeLog 5.090 2.413 .131 2.109 .036 TypeofPaym

ent -17.584 4.124 -.261 -4.263 .000

TypeofMerger 18.551 4.563 .251 4.066 .000

Location 8.674 4.154 .129 2.088 .038 GDPGrowth 2.862 3.511 .049 .815 .416

a Dependent Variable: CAR_180 Appendix G Regression Analysis Results for T+180 days Post Announcement Window without GDP Growth

Coefficients(a)

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta B

Std. Error

1 (Constant) -35.445 10.904 -3.251 .001 FirmSizeLog 5.039 2.411 .129 2.090 .038 TypeofPaym

ent -17.870 4.107 -.266 -4.352 .000

TypeofMerger 18.268 4.546 .247 4.018 .000

Location 8.571 4.150 .127 2.065 .040a Dependent Variable: CAR_180