A Critical AnalysisDr. Walter DornCanadian Forces College3 December 2007

OriginsGeneral Charles Krulak Marine Corps Commandant (1995-99)We are faced with a world in transition. Seemingly overnight, once stable nation states are imploding, ripped by internal struggle, confronted by long suppressed animositiesTo fight and win the three-block war will demand men and women who are not only experts in their craft, but uncompromising in judgment and character. We, therefore developed the cradle to grave process we call transformation. National Press Club, Washington, DC, 10 October 1997

Gen. Charles Krulakaddress to the National Press Club, Washington D.C. 10 October 1997 (emphasis added) In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart -- conducting peacekeeping operations -- and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle -- all on the same day ... all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war.

Marines Magazine The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block WarSomalia-like Scenario Corporal Hernandez provides security to Int. Relief Org (IRO) Militia leaders Nedeed and Mubasa fighting RPG downs helicopter

The Corps has described such amorphous conflicts as the three block war contingencies in which marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the space of a few hours and within the space of three continuous city blocks. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, Marines Magazine, January 1999. [emphasis added]

General Krulaks ConceptMarine Corps environment, roles & capabilities Littoral regions Urban warfare future Somalia-like situations Worst-case tactical scenarioNational approachPrimacy of combatSuperpowers roleHelicopter over Mogadishu on 3 October 1993.

3BW in the US MilitaryNever became part of US doctrineIncluding Marine CorpsMainly referred to by Marine CorpsMarine Corp Warfighting LaboratoryGeneral James Mattis: Hybrid War (2005)Add block for psychological or info operationsCol. John Boggs: within three blocks, they expect to act as diplomats, soldiers, and policemen. (2004)Col. John AgogliaDirector, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute Adds Stabilization and reconstruction line of operation Three Block War was not meant to be a concept for strategic direction.

3BW Comes to CanadaGeneral Rick HillierDeputy Commander, III Corps, Ft Hood (1998-00)Chief of Land Staff (2003-05)Chief of Defence Staff (2005-)

The three block war concept will significantly alter how we structure, how we prepare, how we command, how we train, how we operate and how we sustain ourselves. Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, 2005

Canadian InterpretationUS Marines Cdn Army Cdn military3 City Blocks 3 tasks/missionsTactical description Strategic direction Central operating conceptArmy Training Poster AT 7

Canadian Adoption: CLS/CDS Rick HillierIt all comes down to the three block war. You are fighting in Block One, while simultaneously helping secure, stabilize and nation-build in Block Two, and all the while, you are also helping people through disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping in Block Three.

The important part is that you are doing all three simultaneously using complex training in the centres of population.

We have not put sufficient intellectual energy, and resources, and work toward the other two blocks specifically, and then all three blocks together. - LGen. Rick Hillier, Quoted by Chris Maclean, Experience is Shaping Army Transformation; Interview with Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Frontline, Jan/Feb 2005, http://www.frontline-canada.com/Defence/pdfs/0201Hillier_CLS.pdf

Politicians come on board (cautiously)Collectively, the military calls these efforts peace support operations. Some military analysts have also referred to it as a three block war in order to fully capture the overlapping missions that modern peacekeepers must be prepared to undertake at any one time. Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence,Annual Conference of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, Montreal18 February 2005 (emphasis added)

International Policy Statement (IPS) OverviewThe image that captures todays operational environment for the Canadian Forces is a three-block-war. Increasingly, there is overlap in the tasks our personnel are asked to carry out at any one time. Our military could be engaged in combat against well-armed militia in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block, and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over. Transition from one type of task to the other can happen in the blink of an eye. This ability of the Canadian Forces to wage three-block wars has been amply demonstrated in diverse theatres from Bosnia to Afghanistan.(emphasis added)DFAIT

Defence Policy Statement (DPS)At the same time, our naval forces in adjacent coastal areas might be supporting troops ashore while enforcing a maritime exclusion zone, and our air forces could be flying in supplies and humanitarian aid, while standing by to directly engage a determined opponent

They call for a wide variety of tools, from negotiation, compromise and cultural sensitivity to precision weapons. The aim is always to produce focused effects that put a premium, even in conflict situations, on the sanctity of human life.

Consequently, the Canadian Forces will seek to maintain the right mix of military capability to ensure that they can carry out all potential aspects of a three-block war. They will remain, above all, combat-capable in order to deter aggression, defend themselves and civilian populations against conventional and asymmetric attacks, and fight and defeat opposing forces with the ultimate goal of restoring peace and stability. (emphasis added)

Army Transformation: 3BW

Army Transformation Poster

Combat

Stability

Humanitarian

Preliminary ProblemsMid-intensity to high intensity

Definition of mid/high

Blocks City blocks (urban warfare)? Other environments? What mission types?

All

Which block is which?Krulak: Humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, mid-intensity battle within three city blocks. Army transformation site: I We will deliver humanitarian aid or assist others in doing itII conduct stabilization or peace support opsIII engage in a high-intensity fight Source: www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/5_4_1.asp, Updated: 2005-06-23 Army poster and Hillier interview: I High-intensity combat; II Stabilization and nation-building; III Humanitarian (and peacekeeping?)Peacekeeping in Block II or III?

PSO Types (NATO doctrine)Source: adapted from PSTC, EO 401.02Increasing Violence Potential+ Conflict prevention

How Many Blocks / Mission Types?PSO (NATO)PeacemakingPeacebuildingHumanitarian reliefPeacekeepingPeace EnforcementConflict Prevention3BW

Humanitarian Stability/peacekeepingCombat3D+C (Whole of Government)Diplomacy, Development, Commerce Defence

Preliminary Problems (contd)Ambiguities CDS Seminar Hotwash, 18 February 2005:Uncertainty with regards to detail of operational concept (three block war)Ambiguity in the implications of 3BW for all CF environments

Lack of a primary (keystone) documentA few PPT bullets, a few lines in speeches, Army posterDiffering interpretationsFight against whom? Combat or stability-centred?

Lack of in-depth analysisPros and cons; Case studies

Prepare these

Critical AnalysisProsCons

CasesConclusions

ProsSimple conceptualization Beauty in simplicityNCM appeal

Begins to convey the multidimensional nature of modern international military missionsPotential tactical situations in tough missionsAfghanistan exampleModel fits the case or case fits model?

Highlights need for expanded skills Larger toolkit Adaptable Complex thinkingGeneral Hillier: The vast majority of our command support work has previously all been focussed on block one, and now we have to take into account the complexities of blocks one, two and three all done simultaneously.

Major Cons1) TOO SIMPLE Maybe > 3 three lines of operation/activitiesNATO: several typesOne size fits all? Operations are operations

2) LACK OF MISSION CLARITYDanger of mixing mandatesConfusionFight war or keep peace?Looses distinction between operation typesCompare with US doctrine: War or MOOTWDefine success in 3BW?

3) LACKS WIDER ACEPTANCEBuy-in from other CF elements? Army (ground)-centric Equally applicable to air and naval assets, MGen Leslie in CMJ Joint & integrated strategy

Not adopted by DFAIT or CIDANot referred to in IPS Diplomacy or Development Stmts For military circles

Not accepted by the population at largeNever become a household expressionWarfighting mandate requires special consideration For military circles

Not used by other militaries CF usage

4) IMPOSES EMPHASIS ON WARFIGHTING (3B War)Reinforces pre-disposition to offensive operationsLessons of Somaliaoffensive vs defensive?Enemy-mentality predominates (war/peace blurred)Danger of self-fulfilling prophesyMaking enemiesUnnecessary collateral damageMission creep easierWar or peace as the end-state? Loose sight of goal: sustainable peaceStability is superficial (e.g., Haiti)Peace is deeperWhy is it called war

OOTW/War in the Spectrum of ConflictCanadian Forces Operations, Figure 1-1.

B-GG-005-004/AF-000. 2000-12-18Also in http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/300-009/b-gl-394/002/fp-001/B-GL-394-002-FP-001.pdf

The Public MindWar entered into only in extremis Needs special consideration Routine 3B War unacceptable

Peacekeeping wont disappear Fundamental peacekeeping principles (the trinity)Consent for deploymentImpartiality Minimum use of force

Cases

CASE: IRAQ

Three Block War?

IraqGoal: a stable, democratic, peaceful countryThree +++ Block War: Combat / stabilization-peacekeeping / reconstructionUnworkable?Over-estimated ease post-invasionMarine Gen (retd) Joseph Hoar, former head US Central Command:"The utility of going house-to-house in an environment like this is very questionable. There is no way you can create a peaceful environment by shooting at people.No military solution; only a political one that may not be helped by aggressive military action. Marines surprised in fight for Falluja, Peter Spiegel,Financial Times,London (UK), Apr 16, 2004, p.15.

Test: Attack Trends Attacks On IGO Attacks On Infrastructure Attacks On ISF Attacks On Civilians Attacks On MNF-IRamadan2003NajafFallujah1 NOV 03 28 JAN 05 LTG Metz

Attack Trends in Iraq (pre and post Falluja Offensive)April UpsurgeRamadan2003NajafFallujahIII Corps TOAEnemy Capacity1 NOV 03 28 JAN 05 LTG Metz

CASE: AFGHANISTAN

Three Block War?

Mr. Khan says the Canadian troops are more humane than the Americans who preceded them. But he sees how the guerrilla fighting has forced the Canadians into a heavily armed posture that alienates the people.- Geoffrey York, Globe and Mail, 27 May 2006

Case: AfghanistanDefeat an insurgency militarily?Requires political solutionCritical distinction:Counter-insurgency with nation-building Nation-building with counterinsurgency elementMixing mandatesMilitary in humanitarian spaceHumanitarian actors become soft targetsWithdrawal of MSF and other NGOs from KandaharThree Block War is not easy. It is a winnable strategy?

CONCLUSIONS

Useful simplification with flaws Simple on the surface Ambiguous in application

Accurate description of some tactical situations Combat may occur Preparation needed

MAJOR CONS

1) TOO SIMPLE

2) LACK OF MISSION CLARITY

3) LACKS WIDER ACEPTANCE

4) IMPOSES EMPHASIS ON WARFIGHTING

Simple Criticism: Inaccuracy

Not Three usually more lines of operations

Not Blocks regions, villages, buildings

Not War usually less than war

Questionable transition: tactical to strategicMoving from defensive to offensive Needs attention!Mixing mandatesConflicting and counterproductive3BW fosters grey zone operationsCombat is a method not a mission

RecommendationsKeep mandates clearDistinguish between offensive and defensiveCombat if necessary but not necessarily combatGoal of peace vs defeat enemy

Always be combat-prepared but do not force combat into peace support and humanitarian operations unless necessary ?

Develop the non-combat blocks Navigating cultural and human terrain (Max Boot) Language, anthropology Humanizing aspects "I want these people to see me as a person, not a uniform. Be aware of risks to humanitarian space

Fill the Intellectual VacuumThere is a cloud of unknowing about this [3BW]: a lot of righteousness but little thought. Dr. Peter Foot, 16 May 2006Lack of studies of 3BWCases of success and failureDoctrineModifications to existing doctrine?Peacekeeping, PSO and stability/stabilization missionsAvoid of exaggerations

More conceptual development and refinement, more codification to fill the vacuum

Beyond the 3BW

Operations in the Last Ten yearsUNAngolaBurundiCentral Afr. Rep. Cte dIvoireCyprusDR CongoGeorgiaHaitiLiberiaMacedonia Sierra LeoneSudan (North-South)Sudan (Darfur)TajikistanTimor LesteWestern Sahara

UN Interstate:Ethiopia-Eritrea Golan Heights Kashmir Lebanon

NATOAfghanistanBosniaMacedonia Kosovo

US Coalitions (OEF)Afghanistan Iraq

AlternativesMultidimensional ops 3BW MDOs

Full spectrum ops

EBO, JIMP,

Critique of the CritiqueToo simple vs too much mixing? More than three lines of operation Keep mandates clear

Mixing combat with other activities will always be difficult but MUST be done

Counter-insurgency must involve several dimensions (incl. all three blocks)

Details needed

Spreading Democracy is Hell

THE END

of the Beginning

Krulak: In this environment, conventional doctrine and organizations may mean very little. It is an environment born of change. Born of technology and weapons that are readily available to friend and for alike.

The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level

Charles C. Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas," presented at National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, p. 139.

The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level

Krulaks full paragraph on 3BW in The Strategic Corporal: Modern crisis responses are exceedingly complex endeavors. In Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia the unique challenges of military operations other-than-war (MOOTW) were combined with the disparate challenges of mid-intensity conflict. The Corps has described such amorphous conflicts as -- the three block war -- contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks. The tragic experience of U.S. forces in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope illustrates well the volatile nature of these contemporary operations. Author Mark Bowden's superb account of The Battle of Mogadishu, Blackhawk Down, is a riveting, cautionary tale and grim reminder of the unpredictability of so-called operations other-than-war. It is essential reading for all Marines.3 Blocks: combat, stability and support, and humanitarian relief operations

Mattis:

- Lt. Gen. Mattis: "You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years because they didn't wear a veil," Mattis said. "You know, guys like that ain't got no manhood left anyway. So it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them.- General: It's 'fun to shoot some people Commandant gives counsel, acknowledges wrong word choice Friday, February 4, 2005 Posted: 11:02 AM EST (1602 GMT) , http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/general.shoot/Boggs quote can be found at:http://www.cfr.org/publication/7673/iraq.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dbackgrounder%26page%3D28

Australian general: It is my conviction that we have moved beyond the three block war into an era that can usefully bedefined by the term Complex War Fighting. If you like, Complex War Fighting is a three block war on steroids -more intense, more diverse and more compressed spatially and temporally. - ADDRESS BY THE CHIEF OF ARMYLIEUTENANT GENERAL P.F LEAHY, AO TO LAND WARFARE CONFERENCE28 OCTOBER 2003, http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/PUBS/CAspeeches/20031028.pdf

Further quotes: The vast majority of our command support work has previously all been focussed on block one, and now we have to take into account the complexities of blocks one, two and three all done simultaneously.Simultaneous performance of the three blocks is fundamental to this new vision. In preparing to execute a fighting operation you must also deal with the other two blocks at the same time or the sustainment may be interrupted, he says. You are dealing with police, you may be involved with crowd or riot control, you may have NGOs added to the equation, all these are going to be a factor.

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-home-en.aspThe Marine Corps approach to the challenges our country faces in the Pacific comes in the form of a theatre wide three-block war, said Lt. Gen. John F. Goodman, the commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. First, the Marine Corps is working with Pacific Command to win the hearts and minds of the uncommitted, said Lt. Gen. Goodman. Secondly, its to build the capability and capacity of our partner nations by training with them in their countries and bringing them back here to train on American soil as well. Thirdly, were supporting our partner nations to effectively govern themselves. - U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC, CAMP H. M. SMITH, Hawaii(May 11, 2006)http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/0/B165C8BD161987578525716B007440E8?opendocument

- Supporting & other roles for navy/air force

Misleading in its simplicity

No intellectual buy-in Need whole of government approach

Ref: Andrew Leslie, Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future of the Canadian Forces, Canadian Military Journal, , Spring 2005, p.17, accessed at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol6/no1/PDF/06-Visions_e.pdfGen Richard Myers, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, indicated on a visit to Baghdad yesterday that the murders of the contractors had decided the course taken by American troops. "In Falluja we know what started the event out there, but Falluja was an issue that was going to have to be dealt with sooner or later in any case, in my military opinion."

the relationship between combat troops and CIMIC borders on hostile. "Sometimes they like me, sometimes they don't," says Capt. Franois Provencher, the robust and soft-spoken commander of a CIMIC team arriving at the patrol house in the village of Gumbad, the home base for Operation Peacemaker. "These guys are trained to kill Taliban. I'm trained to build relationships. Sometimes we clash, but we have to remember that this is a learning process." - http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/world/article.jsp?content=20060424_125758_125758