Blake Thompson PS493A Sample

A Critical Analysis of Intelligence Failure (Writing Sample)

Question 1: Can there be a single theory of intelligence failure? Why or why not? Which theory comes closest, and why is that theory the most complete theory? Which theory is the worst theory?

I struggled with this question all semester. Is there a single theory of intelligence failure? I don’t

believe so. As the essay prompt itself states, I believe that there are only ‘more complete theories’. In

the relationship between intelligence and policy-making, theories and predictions are really as good as it

gets. There are no ‘right’ answers; there are choices and probabilities based on limited or incomplete

intelligence. Similarly there are a multitude of educated theories that can best be applied to any

particular intelligence ‘failure’. Even when you believe you have found a theory that completely ‘fits’, a

little bit of pessimism mixed with some critical thinking can usually poke holes in even the most

‘complete’ theories. The theory of intelligence failure can be endlessly complex, as we have seen this

semester. In part, because often intelligence failures are a product of failed institutional relationships,

whether it is between an institution and an individual, an institution and itself, or an institution and

another institution. These failed relationships lead to issues such as psychological problems, ideological

problems, the misunderstanding of intentions or capabilities, non-receptive policy makers, inept

intelligence organizations, disjointed militaries, etc.

So, naturally, when I was asked to decide what I felt was the ‘most complete’ theory, I hesitated.

I first thought about our class theory, which is that there is a distinction between intelligence failure,

policy failure, and implementation/military failure. So if there is a distinction, it isn’t too unorthodox to

also propose that there is a relationship, a certain cause and effect between the three. However, and

this is where the theory of intelligence failure gets complex, that ‘cause and effect’ relationship is

reciprocal. For example, it could be claimed that in a particular failure that an intelligence failure caused

a policy failure. In another particular failure it could be claimed that a policy failure caused an

intelligence failure. It is this constant which-is-what question that prevents a single theory of

intelligence from reigning supreme. It is almost as if you have to analyze the failure from the bottom up,

and as you’re doing that also understand what happened from the top down to create the events from

the bottom up.

Blake Thompson PS493A Sample

In any case, I combined three theories to form my ‘most complete theory’. I mentioned the

hybrid theory our class has been discussing because it was the inspiration for where I pulled my three

theories. The first theory I chose to incorporate was Betts. His ideas about inevitable intelligence

failures and shared ideology need to be addressed within a ‘most complete theory’. Shared ideology,

while not always the sole explanation for failure, has come up in relation to many case studies this

semester. For example, both in the American Navy’s inability to foresee Pearl Harbor as a possible

target and in MacArthur/Washington’s inability to foresee China’s backing of Korea once UN forces

pushed north to the 38th. Secondly, I think it is important to note in a theory of failure that intelligence

failures are inevitable. You just can’t account for everything, especially if you are actively being

deceived. This is important not only to understanding the nature of failure, but also in maintaining

morale on an individual level throughout the different institutions involved (policy, intelligence, and

military).

The largest reason I believe that intelligence failures are inevitable is because of Wohlstetter’s

signal to noise ratio theory. Wohlstetter is the second addition to my ‘most complete theory’. While

her signal-to-noise ratio theory may be perceived as basic, it seems to overwhelmingly describe, at least

in part, a major reason for intelligence failures. He claims that sometimes there are as many ‘noises’ as

there are ‘significant sounds’ (Wohlstetter, pg 278). What she means is that sometimes failures are

caused because the ‘significant sounds’ are not always separated from the ‘noise’. The abundance of

information increases the probability that they will slip by an analyst unnoticed. Wohlstetter also

discusses another important idea that is important to intelligence failure, and that is the idea that there

is a distinction between intelligence failures and bureaucratic/policy failures. She understood that

sometimes what theorists are perceiving as intelligence failures were actually coming about because of

problems/failures at the policy level, such as non-receptive politicians and miscommunication of

intelligence, intentions, or capabilities. She believed that this was largely brought about because no

single agency or individual has access to the total mass of information. There is no ‘distribution center’

for American intelligence, so sometimes relevant intelligence does not get from where it is introduced to

where it needs to be. This is an example of the failed institutional relationships I was talking about in

the opening paragraphs. It can lead to a multitude of in-house miscommunications and misconceptions.

These, obviously, can account for all three of the type of failures I have been discussing:

implementation/military, intelligence, and/or policy.

Blake Thompson PS493A Sample

Deception is increasingly complex, as we learned from the Holt reading. It is the third and final

theory that I chose to incorporate into my ‘most complete theory’. Proving deception is another task

entirely. Nonetheless, deception deserves to be in any ‘complete’ theory of failure. The idea that our

failures were the cause of another’s actions may seem like a cop-out, but it has undoubtedly been the

case in at least some circumstances. However, the problem is in determining which circumstances

resulted as a product of another’s actions. The very nature of deception shields the individual from

being able to determine whether or not they are being deceived. Are they being deceived, or are they

being deceived into thinking that they have been deceived? I believe it was best summed up by Holt

himself, “Deception is like insurance. If your house did not burn down last year, you ‘wasted’ the money

you spent on premiums, but you don’t know that until the end of the year” (Holt, pg 97). Even so, did

you really ‘waste’ money on those premiums? What if your house burned down and you didn’t have

insurance? As with the majority of intelligence theory, deception is equally (if not more) complex.

I chose to combine Holt, Wohlstetter, and Betts because I believed that together they combined

to create the ‘most complete theory’. They cover implementation, military activity, bureaucratic

relationships, psychological barriers, and a number of other important variables that can help to

explain/predict failures of all three types (policy, intelligence, and implementation/military). I intend to

use those three theorists in the second part of this exam so I can further test my claim that they

combine to form the ‘most complete theory’. As a side note, if I had to mention another theory I

wanted to include it would be Rovner’s domestic politics. It is important to briefly note that I do believe

domestic politics can influence failure at all three levels, among many other things. Rovner would be

the ‘missing piece’ to the hybrid theory I have proposed above.

If I had to choose what I would consider to be the ‘least complete theory’ it would probably be

Kam. His focus on psychological factors was important, but it really only laid the groundwork for

explaining failure. At the beginning of my paper I stated that, “it is almost as if you have to analyze the

failure from the bottom up, and as you’re doing that also understand what happened from the top down

to create the events from the bottom up.” Kam gives us a large part of the psychological reasons for

failure, which I believe is a large part of the ‘bottom-up’ theory for understanding failure. However, it

was my feeling that Betts took those psychological factors and more effectively theorized them at the

institutional level. His idea of shared ideology incorporated the most important of Kam’s ideas but also

introduced another ‘level’ to the problem of failure: the idea that bureaucratic/policy failures are

related to but distinct from intelligence failures.

Blake Thompson PS493A Sample

Works Cited

Betts, Richard. 2007. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. NY, NY: Columbia University Press. Chapter 2 (“Permanent Enemies: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable”)

Cohen, Eliot and Gooch, John. 1990. Military Misfortune: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York, NY: The Free Press. Chapter 7 (“Aggregate Failure: The Defeat of the American Eighth Army in Korea, November – December 1950”)

Dahl, Erik. 2013. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. Chapter 2 (“Pearl Harbor: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom”).

Dahl, Erik. 2013. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. Chapter 7 (“The 9/11 Attacks: A New Explanation”)

Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Skyhorse Publishing: NY, NY. Chapter 2 (“The Art of Deception”, pg. 52 – 98).

Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Skyhorse Publishing: NY, NY. Chapter 13 (“Quicksilver,” pg. 521 – 591)

May, Ernest (Editor). 1986. Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. Princeton University Press; Princeton, NJ. Chapter 10 (“French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1938 – 1939” by Young)

Rovner, Joshua. 2011. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapter 7 (“Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”).

Wohlstetter, Roberta. 1962. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapter 1 (“Signals for Honolulu”), Chapter 4 (“Signals and Noise at Home”)

9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report. US Government Document. 8 (“The System was Blinking Red”).