a critique of the kantian theory

7/31/2019 A Critique of the Kantian Theory

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A Critique of the Kantian Theory ofIndirect Moral Duties to Animals

Jeff Sebo

Much has been made of the seemingincompatibility of Kantian ethics and animal rights.Kant argues that we have no direct moral duties toanimals as beings with inherent value; we have onlyindirect duties to them insofar as our treatment ofthem affects the interests of other human beings. Forexample, in Duties to Animals and Spirits Kantwrites, [So] far as animals are concerned, we have nodirect duties. Animals are not self-conscious and arethere merely as the means to an end. That end is

man. He reiterates this point later by writing: Ourduties towards animals are merely indirect dutiestowards humanity (ibid).

In contrast, animal rights advocates argue thatanimals are beings with inherent value, and so wehave direct duties to them whether or not our actionstoward them promote the interests of other humanbeings. To cite just one example, Tom Regan (1985)argues that animals have inherent rights for the samereason that we do: We are each of us theexperiencing subject of a life, a conscious creaturehaving an individual welfare that has importance to uswhatever our usefulness to others (487). We mayconsider this argument a direct, or intrinsic, accountof duties to animals, as opposed to the indirect, orinstrumental, account that Kant offers.i

The Kantian indirect-duties view has been veryinfluential in the development of moral, political andsocial theory. In fact, we can still see its impact today.In the United States, for example, many state andnational laws continue to regard animal ethicsissues not as duties that humans hold towards

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Jeff Sebo is an undergraduate philosophy and sociology studentat Texas Christian University. He is currently planning to pursue agraduate education in philosophy with an emphasis on ethics,philosophy of law, and political philosophy. His recently publishedarticles include Are Human Beings Ends In Themselves? ExNihilo V (Fall 2004) and The Socratic Dialectic. DIALOGUE47:2-3 (Fall 2004).

Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume II, Issue2, 2004, pp. 1-19. Jeff Sebo.


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animals, but as rules that govern conflicts overproperty, the formal legal status of animals. Forexample, the Texas Animal Cruelty Laws, ostensiblyintended to protect animals from cruel and inhumanetreatment, apply only to domesticated animals under

the custody of human beings. As a result, theyexclude birds, deer, rabbits, squirrels, and all otheranimals who have the misfortune not to be owned,and they protect domesticated animals only in theinterest of the humans who own them. Similarly, theAnimal Welfare Act, the national law on animaltreatment, excludes pet stores, state and countryfairs, livestock shows, rodeos, purebred dog and catshows, and any other fairs or exhibitions intended toadvance agricultural arts and sciences.ii The U. S.Department of Agriculture, moreover, interprets the

Animal Welfare Act as also excluding cold-bloodedanimals, warm-blooded animals not used forresearch, teaching, testing, experimentation, exhibition purposes, or as a pet, [and] farm animalsused for food, fiber, or production purposes.iii Thus, inthe eyes of the law, animals have no intrinsic value atall; they are important solely as property to be boughtand sold, as resources for human benefit.Unfortunately, animals will never gain the moral andlegal status they deserve if we continue to operatewithin the parameters of the indirect-duties view.

Therefore, if we are to progress toward the goal ofanimal liberation, we must first amend the principleson which the animal cruelty laws are based. To thisend, I will challenge the validity of the indirect-dutiesview by arguing that Kantian ethics not only permitsbut entails the inclusion of animal rights. I recognizethat this approach will put me at odds with Kant, but Ican live with that. Kant is not always the bestinterpreter of his own theory, as his questionable fourexamples in Groundwork II demonstrate (G 222 [4:421]).iv Furthermore, he is infamous for his sexism in

The Metaphysics of Morals and his racism inObservations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and theSublime, yet we do not thereby conclude that hisethical theory is sexist or racist. Rather, we simplyaccept that we should distinguish Kant the manfrom Kantianism the theory. In the same way, I willnow examine whether Kant is right to exclude animalsfrom the sphere of direct moral concern. Does his



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view follow from a proper application of his owntheory, or is it simply the inconsistent result ofuncritical prejudice?

Many have challenged Kant by pointing out thathis argument rests on the assumption that animals

are nonrational, whereas we now know that manyanimals possess significant rational capacities.v Forexample, recent studies in cognitive ethology indicatethat chimpanzees and bonobos have intellectualabilities similar to, if not greater than, those of anormal human child: they can form mentalrepresentations of themselves and other minds,communicate through language and symbols, discerncause-and-effect relationships, solve simple logicaland mathematical problems and much more (Wise179-237). Furthermore, even though not all animals

are able to perform higher cognitive functions, theyare nonetheless able to set ends based on inclinationand pursue the necessary means for achieving them,often creatively. This research suggests that anyargument for the universal moral superiority of humanbeings will be unsuccessful, because no matter whatcriteria we select, some animals will alwaysoutperform some humans.vi Therefore, we have goodreason to reject the simplistic view of the animal mindthat Kant describes in his books, and to blur the moralline he forges between humans on one hand and all

other animals on the other.While this response has merit, I do not presently

intend to side with it, nor do I intend to develop thisline of reasoning any further, as it is an empiricalargument that tries to fit animals into the Kantianview, not an analysis of the view itself. Instead, for thesake of the argument I wish to lay out, I will actuallypresuppose that all animals are nonrational (grantingthat this point encounters substantial empiricalresistance) in order to argue that the low moral valueKant extends to animals poses significant problems

for his ethical theory. Specifically, I will argue that thehumanity formula of the Categorical Imperative(CI),vii as presently understood, commits Kant toclaiming that human beings have indirect moralstatus, even though he asserts that they are ends inthemselves. I will then show that the humanityformula, because of this problem, clashes not onlywith the other formulas of the CI, but also with the



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very sensibilities on which the moral law is based. Iwill conclude by suggesting that we can solve thisproblem only by extending the moral radar, and thatour only means for doing so will incorporate animalsinto it. In short, I will argue that Kantian ethics, in

order to protect the vulnerabilities of human beings,must protect animals as well.

The Kantian Argument against Animal RightsI begin by outlining exactly why Kant believes

animals do not have direct moral status.viii First, whatdoes it mean for something to have direct moralstatus? It means that one must regard that thing anend in itself, or rather, as a being whose valuecommands the respect of all rational agents. Incontrast, if something has indirect moral status, one

must regard that thing not for its own sake, but tocomply with a duty one has towards something else.In this sense we have indirect moral duties concerninginanimate objects. For instance, we are obliged not toburn down houses, smudge paintings with ourfingertips, or rip the heads off teddy bears notbecause these things have rights, but because theyhave value to people who do. Of course, the fact thatpeople care for these things is contingent. The sameinanimate object can move in and out of moralstanding based entirely on external factors: for

example, whether a human being values it, orwhether it continues to benefit humans in general.This is why Kant considers inanimate objects to berelative ends (ends whose value is dependent onour desires) rather than objective ends (ends inthemselves) (G 228 [427]).

Kant argues that animals are relative ends inmuch the same way: we must treat them kindly notbecause they have rights we should consider, butbecause they have value to people who do haverights. In this sense, ripping the head off a kitten is no

worse than ripping the head off a teddy bear: it iswrong not because it harms the kitten, but because itharms a person who cares about the kitten.ix Granted,Kant says that harming animals is wrong for anadditional reason: though not wrong in itself, it mighthabituate us to become more violent towards otherhuman beings (as humans and nonhumans havesimilar behavioral responses to pain). But this reason



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presence of humanity. Thus, Kant believes that eventhough animals are sentient beings capable ofpleasure, pain and happiness, they are not objectiveends: their value is dependent solely on the desires ofhumans.xi

The Problem with the Humanity FormulaImportantly, under this interpretation of the

humanity formula, rational nature is both necessaryand sufficientxii for direct moral status: we areobjective ends because we are rational, and animalsare relative ends because they are not. Perhaps Kantinterprets the humanity formula this way because hewants to avoid suggesting that humanity is limited tohuman beings. As Thomas Hill, Jr. discusses in hisedition of the Groundwork, Kant intends for the moral

radar to include any being with a capacity for reason,such as angels or rational aliens (269). But while heaccomplishes this goal through the humanity formula,I believe that he does so at a great price: by claimingthat humanity is necessaryfor direct moral status, heimposes serious constraints on the duties we canderive from the CI. Specifically, he allows for a verylimited set of duties that simply do not account for oursubstantial vulnerabilities as humans. In what follows,I will explain why I believe this is an importantproblem for Kant, and I will conclude that we can solve

it only by considering humanity to be sufficient, butnot necessary, for direct moral status. The implicationwill be that animals might just have direct moralstatus after all.

If, as Kant suggests, humanity is necessary fordirect moral status, then our value as ends isdependant on the fact that we possess a capacity forreason. As Hill notes in his article Humanity as anEnd in Itself (1980), Kant repeatedly uses the phrasehumanity in a person in The Metaphysics of Morals,suggesting that humanity is not a description of a

particular species, but rather a property found in allpeople, whether or not they happen to be biologicallyhuman (Hill 85). Kant also supports this interpretationwhen he introduces the humanity formula inGroundwork II, writing, Rational nature exists as anend in itself, and, The practical imperative willtherefore be the following: Act in such a way that youtreat humanity, whether in your own person or in any



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other person,always at the same time as an end,never merely as a means (G 229-230 [4: 429],emphasis mine). This passage implies that our moralduties refer not to us, nor to those around us, noreven to the communities in which we live; rather, they

refer to nothing other than reason itselfthe rationalnature that permeates us and allows us to act out ofreverence for the moral law. And since humanity,which affords us dignity instead of mere price, iscoextensive with, if not identical to, rational nature, itis the rational nature in humans that possessesdignity, not the humans themselves.

Further passages in the Groundworksupportthis analysis. For example, in Groundwork I, Kantargues:

Now if an action done out of duty is supposed toexclude totally the influence of inclination, and,along with inclination, every object of volition,then nothing remains that could determine thewill except objectively the law and subjectivelypure respect for this practical law. Thatpreeminent good which we call moral consiststherefore in nothing but the idea of the law initself, which certainly is present only in arational beingso far as that idea, and not anexpected result, is the determining ground of

the will. (G 202 [4: 400]; 203 [4: 402])

Moreover, in Groundwork II Kant claims,Autonomy is thus the basis of the dignity of humannature and of every rational nature (G 236 [4: 436]).Kant believes that this argument grounds the claimthat human beings have direct moral status yetanimals do not, because only humans are connectedto rational nature. However, I am not sure that thisdistinction holdsnot because I believe that animalshave direct moral status under this interpretation of

the humanity formula, but because I believe thathumans might not.Consider Groundwork III, where Kant discusses ourrational nature.

He writes:



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[A rational being] has two perspectives fromwhich he can consider himself and from whichhe can acknowledge the laws governing the useof his powers and consequently governing all hisactions. He can consider himself first so far as

he belongs to the world of sense, under laws ofnature (heteronomy); and secondlyso far ashe belongs to the intelligible worldunder lawsthat are not empirical but, being independent ofnature, are founded on reason alone. (G 252 [4:452])

Kant distinguishes autonomy from heteronomyto support the argument that we must imagineourselves as transcendentally free (autonomous), forotherwise we would not be subject to the moral law.

However, he grants that we must also imagineourselves as part of the causal order (heteronomous),and that the perspective from which we are free is nomore compelling than that from which we are not. It isthis point that presents a problem for the notion thatour moral status is based on our humanity, for if it istrue that we must imagine ourselves as bothautonomous and heteronomous, and if it is also truethat moral duty refers directly (and exclusively) torational nature, then it follows that we have directmoral duties only to our autonomy. In other words,

whereas we have a direct moral duty to cultivate andpreserve our rational nature, we have, at best, anindirect moral duty to care for our physical bodies.After all, they reside in the world of sense, and sothey, along with all the inclination-based ends theypursue, are subject only to the laws of physicalcausation. Thus, considered in themselves (apart frombeing empirically necessary for our agency), theyhave mere price, not dignity.

Accordingly, all our negative moral dutiesxiii

must fall under two main categories: the duty to avoid

maxims that insult or frustrate the process of reason,and the duty to avoid maxims that hinder the physicalprocesses required for rational behavior. For example,it is always wrong to tell a lie or make a false promise,because such behavior misrepresents the world toother rational beings and thereby insults the dignity ofrational nature. Kant argues for this conclusionthrough the false promising example in Groundwork II,



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as well as through arguments elsewhere condemninglying, mockery, and servility. As Hill notes, Kant isunusual, at least compared to moral philosopherstoday, in stressing the moral importance of attitudeand gesture aside from their consequences. Mockery

is opposed, whether or not it is effective for thepurpose of reform or deterrent, because it reflects adisrespectful attitude toward the humanity of others(Hill 97). Additionally, under this view, it is alwayswrong to consume drugs and alcohol, because theyseem to negatively impact our capacity to performhigher cognitive functions. Kant argues for thisconclusion in many passages as well, claiming, forexample, that one should never consume opiates oralcohol because they cause one to be temporarilyirrational, with a weakened capacity to use his

powers purposively (MM 180 [427]).On the other hand, we have no negative duties

to avoid maxims that do not hinder rational agency.For example, while I have a duty not to chop off yourhead (because the proper functioning of your brain isrequired for your agency), I have no similar duty notto chop off your arm, because such an act would nothinder your capacity for reason in the least. Of course,it might hinder your ability to pursue specific moralends (as might losing your car, job or any othermaterial possession), but it would not hinder your

capacity to pursue moral ends in general; you wouldsimply have to set new ends based on your newfoundphysical limitations. In fact, the amputation of certainbody parts would lead to a decline of the temptationsassociated with inclination, thereby allowing reason tohold a firmer grasp on your motives.xiv Granted, onecould argue that our physical nature has moral valuebecause of its connection to our autonomy; but whyshould an inclination have directmoral status simplybecause it resides in a body that also happens tohouse a capacity for reason? This would be

tantamount to arguing that a dog has direct moralstatus simply because he lives in a building that alsohappens to house a human. In other words, theconnection between our autonomy and our physicalnature is every bit as contingent and indirect as theconnection between rational agents, nonrationalanimals, and inanimate objects. Consequently, thehumanity formula reduces all duties not directly



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concerned with reason to indirect moral status.xv It isin this respect that the humanity formula clashes withthe other formulas of the CI, as well as with our moralsensibilities, for it commits us to an untenabledemarcation of direct and indirect moral duties. For

example, we have a direct moral duty not toanesthetize patients prior to surgery, yet we have amere indirect moral duty not to rape.

This consequence, aside from being plainlyridiculous, is inconsistent with the universal lawformula of the CI, from which we derive a direct moralduty not to rape. Since rape is an interpersonal actpredicated on unwilling submission, it is impossible forone to rape another without failing the contradictionin conception test; for by universalizing rape, onenecessarily wills to be an unwilling participant in the

act. Thus, one cannot coherently imagine rape as auniversal law, and so the maxim fails under the CI.xvi

This presents a problem for Kant, because he drawsan equivalence between the humanity and universallaw formulas in Groundwork II, implying that onecould, in principle, use them interchangeably:

[The] principle So act in relation to everyrational being (both yourself and others) thatthis being may at the same time count in yourmaxim as an end in itself isbasically the same

as the principle, Act on a maxim which at thesame time embodies in itself its own universalvalidity for every rational being. (238 [4: 438])

Thus, we cannot argue that inclination has nodirect moral status while maintaining that we have adirect moral duty not to rape. Not only would thisargument render the CI incoherent, but it wouldundercut the force of the rape prohibition in the firstplace. After all, the desire for rape (as well as theaversion to it) is a physical and psychological drive

that has no direct impact on our capacity for reason.Of course, one could argue that in the case of rape,the pain and trauma incurred renders the victim lesscapable of acting rationally, but this consequence iscontingent and not unequivocally true. For example,people often claim that traumatic events serve ascatalysts for rational behavior, helping them toreprioritize their lives and focus on what is important.



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Moreover, some philosophers even claim that painand suffering is an important channel for rationaldevelopment. Aristotle, for example, argues thattrauma is a cathartic experience that allows us toovercome emotive impulses in the future, while

Nietzsche argues that masters of morality flourish inlife only by overcoming severe physical andpsychological challenges.

Therefore, if we are to deem rape immoral withthe humanity formula, or at least preserve the moralweight of the rape prohibition derived from theuniversal law formula, we need to do so based ongrounds other than that it has the potential to hinderour rational agency. This demonstrates that whilerational nature may be the source of the duty not torape, it cannot be the object. The object of this duty

must be an inclination-based end not to be raped, orperhaps more generally, not to be abused andexploited. But if this is the case, then rational natureis not a necessary property ofall the ends we endorse(e.g. the end to not be raped); rather, it is the toolthat determines whether we should endorse them inthe first place. Then, once an end meets therequirements of the moral law, it commands ourrespect wherever it may be foundbe it in a rationalagent or in a nonrational animal. Therefore, we cannotmaintain the duty not to rape unless we extend its

scope to animals as well, since they also desire not tobe abused and exploited. And since we cannot applythe moral law arbitrarily, endorsing the end not to beraped wherever we may find it obliges us to extendthe same courtesy to other inclination-based ends:how we treat one determines how we treat the rest.

We are thus faced with a dilemma: either weuphold rational nature as both necessary andsufficient for direct moral status, thereby acceptingthe permissibility of all acts that do not directly hinderit, or we uphold rational nature as sufficient for direct

moral status but not necessary, thereby acceptingthat it need not be present in the objects of ourduties. Our decision regarding this dilemma will bebased on whether or not we choose to reconsider themoral status of inclination. On one hand, if we decidethat all inclination-governed beings have the samelow status ascribed to animals, then we must extendthis low status to the perspective from which we view



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ourselves as heteronomous. On the other hand, if werevaluate inclination such that we provide a bindingproscription of acts such as rape, then we mustextend similar consideration to all inclination-basedends, whether or not they happen to reside in a

creature with a capacity for reason. We must, in otherwords, establish Kantian grounds for distinguishingmoral agents (those with rights and duties) frommoral patients (those with rights but no duties). Ibelieve that this second option is not only the moreplausible of the two, but also the more consistent withthe primary text and the secondary literature, as wellas the better means for resolving other issuesassociated with the Kantian scheme. In what follows Iwill support these claims, and in doing so I will fleshout precisely what I mean when I say that animals

have direct moral status.

The Kantian Argument for Animal RightsThe Primary Text

The animal rights position fits well with TheMetaphysics of Morals, where Kant claims that wehave a moral obligation to pursue the happiness ofothers. Kant writes, When it comes to my promotinghappiness as an end that is also a duty, this musttherefore be the happiness ofotherhuman beings,whose (permitted) end I thus make my own end as

well (MM 151 [6:388]). Kant even specifies that thistype of happiness is inclination-based happiness, or inhis words, natural happiness (which consists insatisfaction with what nature bestows, and so withwhat one enjoys as a gift from without) (ibid). Thus,according to Kant, we have a moral duty to promotethe permissible inclination-based ends of humanbeings. And given that inclination-based ends reside inanimals as well as humans, the following question israised: is the duty to pursue the permissible ends ofothers limited to the community of moral agents, or

does it extend to all sentient beings?The answer to this question hinges on what is

required for an end to be permissible in the relevantsense. Interestingly, several sections in theGroundworksuggest that an end can be permissibleeven if its possessor is not a moral agent. Forexample, Kant states in the Groundwork II that for anend to be permissible, it must be pursued not out of



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reverence for the CI, but only in accordance with it:an action that is compatible with the autonomy ofthe will ispermitted; one that does not harmonizewith it is forbidden (G 240 [4:439]). In other words,an end is permissible if and only if one can measure it

against the moral law without exposing a fatalcontradiction, either in conception or in will. Thisrequirement, however, does not imply that the beingwhose end is in question must engage in suchmeasurement, or that the end must be pursued out ofrespect for, or even in recognition of, the moral law.xvii

One does not render an end impermissible, after all,merely by pursuing it out of inclination. For if this werethe case, then we would have a moral duty to denyourselves and others ofall ends based on inclinationup to and including happiness itself. In other words,

we would have to ensure that everyone in thekingdom of ends lives the life of an ascetic. Andclearly, when Kant argues that we have a duty topursue the permissible ends of others, he does notmean that we have a duty to prevent others frombeing happy. Rather, he means that when the ends ofothers are consistent with the requirements of reason,we have a duty to pursue them.xviii Therefore, Kantianethics does allow for animals to have permissible endsin the relevant sense.

The Secondary LiteratureThe argument that moral agency is not

necessary for direct moral status also has roots incontemporary Kant scholarship, especially regardingthe purpose of the CI. For example, Barbara Herman(1984) writes, I view the CI procedure as beingdesigned to draw our attention to those features ofour conditionas rational agents in this world and asmembers of a community of personsthat serve asthe conditions of our willings (584). Here, it issignificant that Herman sets rational agents in this

world apart from members of a community ofpersons, as it suggests that the two categories arenot necessarily identical. And if Kantianism allows foran individual to be a member of a community ofpersons without also being a rational agent, thenwe might have Kantian grounds for distinguishingmoral agents from moral patientswhich is necessaryif we are to assert that animals are objective ends.xix



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Herman hints at this possibility when she arguesthat angels do not have a positive duty of beneficencetowards human beings because they are notvulnerable and dependent, and so the argument forbeneficence could not require them to reject a maxim

of nonbeneficence (590). In other words, since angelsdo not require help from others, they may choose notto lend aid to others without fear of contradiction. Incontrast, Herman argues, since human beings areboth autonomous and heteronomous, they must rejectthe maxim of nonbeneficence in order to pass thecontradiction of will test. She writes, The CIprocedure is to show that, for any of us [humanbeings], the availability of the help of others is notsomething it can be rational to forgo, and that,[The] argument that defeats the maxim of

nonbeneficence leads, positively, to a duty of mutualaid (584, 592).

Interestingly, this passage implies that if angelswere vulnerable and dependent, they would have apositive duty of beneficence towards human beings.For even though they (presumably) have a superiorcapacity for reason, they would still be obliged to usbecause of our shared need for help. Let me spell outthis point by emphasizing what it is not asserting.First, it is not suggesting that human ends wouldtranslate to angel duties only if the angels valued

them too. Even if the angels had no respiratorysystems, for example, they would still not bepermitted to rid the universe of oxygen. Simply put,the angels would be obliged to help us not becausetheyvalued our ends, but because we did. Second,this point is not implying that the angels would holdduties to us only if they were dependant on us. Even ifthey were not in the position to benefit from us at all,they would still not be permitted to ignore our needs,or to exploit us for personal gain. This is because forthem, the grounding of the duty of beneficence would

not be a contractualist desire for reciprocity; it wouldbe a logical consequence of the value they place onhelp in general.xx In other words, they would beobliged to help us because they would be dependenton others, not because they would be dependent onus. As Herman argues:



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[It] is the fact of our dependencythat we are,equally, dependent (again: not that we areequally dependent)that is the ground of theduty to help. I may not be indifferent to othersnot because I would thereby risk the loss of

needed help (this is not a duty of fairness orreciprocity) but because I cannot escape ourshared condition of dependency. (592)

This argument carries with it importantimplications regarding animals, because therelationship between vulnerable and dependentangels and humans is analogous to that betweenhumans and animals: humans have a superiorcapacity for reason compared to animals, but we arenevertheless bound to them by virtue of our shared

needsthose features of our conditionthat serveas the conditions of our willing. Thus, even thoughanimals might never be able to return the favor, so tospeak, they still have ends to which we hold directmoral duties. In this respect, Herman provides us witha Kantian precedent, or at least the beginnings of aKantian rationale, for the claim that a being can havemoral rights without having moral duties. Specifically,while heteronomy alone isnot sufficient for one to bea moral agent, it is sufficient for one to be a moralpatient, or to have ends that a moral agent must

consider.xxi

So are animals objective ends? That depends onhow we interpret the term. Kant writes that anobjective end must provide universal principles, principles valid and necessary for all rational beingsand for every act of will (G 228 [4: 427]). Animals donot seem to satisfy this criterion, because not everyrational being has principles valid and necessary fortreating them as ends in themselves. For example,God, angels, and other purely rational beings are notobliged to endorse inclination because they have

none: the only objective end for them is rationalnature itself. On the other hand, God, angels, andother purely rational beings are not moral agents.Kant writes in Groundwork II that since pure autonomyis not tempted by inclination and pure heteronomydoes not have transcendental freedom, bothautonomy and heteronomy are necessary for moralagency (G 245 [4: 445]; G 240 [4: 440]).xxii Therefore,



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even though a strict interpretation of objective endexcludes animals, perhaps so strict an interpretationis unnecessary when our discussion is about the scopeof the moral radar. For not only is the moralperspective of non-moral agents beside the point, but

it can be disastrous as well, especially if we use it todetermine what deserves moral consideration. (Theduty not to rape, for example, simply cannot be ascontingent and indirect as the duty not to rip the headoff a teddy bearat least not if we want to remaincharitable to Kant.) So for our present purposes, Isubmit that we should consider objective end asextending to all ends that provide principles validand necessary for every moral agent, not everyrational being. In this case, the world of objective endsincludes not only rational nature, but also our physical

nature, animals, and everything else that wenecessarily endorse through our willings.

The Kantian Problem of Exceptional HumanBeings

Finally, extending the moral radar to includeanimals provides a solution to the Kantian problem ofexceptional human beings such as infants, theelderly, and the severely mentally retarded. As Hillnotes, a serious worry about the humanity formulais that it places a comparatively higher value on

rational capacity, development, control, and honorthan most morally conscientious and reasonablepeople are prepared to grant (Hill 98). Indeed,Kantians who wish to ascribe moral status toexceptional human beings are forced to confront aserious overemphasis on rationality in the text, andany solution that preserves moral worth only for therational is destined to fail. For example, Herman triesto resolve the issue by arguing that infants have thepotential to develop a capacity for rationality,claiming, We might regard an infant as one whose

present inability to help will be overcome in thepassage of time (Herman 593). But this claim is nottrue in all cases, and it is not applicable to the elderlyand severely mentally retarded. Besides, we havegood reason to reject the argument that we canattribute rights to beings based on rights they mayone day have. After all, we do not allow law studentsto convict criminals in the courtroom, nor do we



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permit medical interns to perform open-heart surgery.As Peter Singer puts it, a prince, by virtue of being apotential king (and having a high probability ofactualizing this potential), does not have the rights ofa king. Given this, how can we maintain that

nonrational humans have moral rights if rationality isa necessary condition?

Laurence Thomas (2003) recognizes thisproblem, writing:

Could individuals [who have severe mentalretardation] see themselves as Legislators ofuniversal moral law or as members of theKingdom of Ends? Would it be reasonable toexpect them to see themselves in this way?

Could they be expected to have self-respect onthe basis of reasoning? Just what does it meanfor others to have Kantian respect for SMRpersons? (Thomas 9-10)

However, Thomas offers a solution that alsopreserves the logocentric nature of the humanityformula. He argues: [In the case of SMR persons] thementally deficient is a person for whom somethingwent terribly wrong. There is something that he oughtto have (or should have had) but lacks, which is very

different from merely lacking something (22). Thus,Thomas sets apart rational and nonrational sentientbeings by referencing teleologyas the relevantdistinction: the severely mentally retarded might havethe same intellectual capacities as animals, but theywere meantto be rational, and so we should treatthem as if they are. However, this argument is evenworse than the previous one, for not only doesThomas neglect to explain the nature of this teleology,but he also refuses to explain why it is morallyrelevant. After all, if I were to inject a rock with a

rationality serum, would it then have direct moralstatus even ifmy experiment failed and it nevergained the capacity for rationality?xxiii Surely not. It isnot a dormant or stunted capacity for rationality thatgives exceptional humans value; it is the fact thatthey are sentient creatures with the capacity for pain,pleasure, and happiness.



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The Challenge AheadIn this paper, I have argued that if rational

nature is a necessary condition for direct moral status,then we must accept that our physical nature, and allthe inclination-based ends we pursue, have indirect

moral status. The duties we hold towards one anotherbased on maxims unrelated to reason are no morebinding than the ones we hold towards animals.Therefore, either our physical nature has the samelow status we attribute to animals, or animals havethe same high status we attribute to our physicalnature. In response to this dilemma, I have arguedthat the second option is not only the more plausibleof the two, but also the more consistent with theprimary text and the secondary literature, as well asthe better means for resolving the Kantian issue of

exceptional human beings.Thus, we need to view the humanity formula as

representing not a necessary condition for moralstatus but a sufficient one: rather than establish thathumanity is the onlyend in itself, it establishes onlythat humanity is an end in itself (thus preservingspace on the moral radar for nonrational beings).Consequently, while autonomy may be the source ofmoral obligation, it cannot be its sole object, becausethrough our acts of willing we endorse and pledge topreserve all permissible inclination-based ends,

whether we find them in other humans or in animals.This obligation is a logical consequence of the valuewe place on inclination in general, and it is vital to ourexperience as dependent beings in a world of limitedresources and unlimited dangers. So are animalsobjective ends? To the extent that we are, yes. Thedomain of ends extends beyond the community ofmoral agents: we have a duty to promote thepermissible ends ofall creatures influenced byinclination and capable of pleasure, pain, andhappiness.

In closing, I would like to add a word about thepractical implications of my argument. I understandthat a theoretical discussion about Kantian ethics doesnot lend itself to immediate social reform, and that noone will race to Congress with a new policy proposalupon reading it. But as I mentioned at the outset, mypurpose in this argument is not to be the last word onthe discussion. Rather, it is to begin the discussion



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anew. By addressing a foundational principle foranimal-rights opponents and showing that it in factentails animal rights, I have demonstrated theunsoundness of a position that presently defines thelegal status of animals. But more needs to be said.

Since my focus has been on the fact that we oweanimals obligations in general, I have not yetdiscussed what those obligations might be, nor have Iconsidered what legal consequences they might have.To remedy this, I will now suggest a few practicalimplications of my view, granting that the subjectdeserves a much more comprehensive treatment thanI can offer here.

We know that if we are to regard animals asexalted above all price, then we cannot also regardthem as our property. But how far does that extend?

We presently buy and sell animals for food, clothing,entertainment, experimentation and more; we usethem merely as means not only for economicsustenance, but also for the practices and traditionsthat shape our cultural identity. So, if animals havedirect moral status, does that mean we should stopusing them altogether? Some will argue that it doesnot, because we can always reform our institutions toaccommodate the permissible ends of the animals weuse (and thus treat them as ends in themselves aswell as means to our own ends, which is permissible

under the Kantian view). This solution seemsreasonable in principle. But in practice, extending dueconsideration to animals would render most, if not all,of these institutions impossible, or at the very leasteconomically unfeasible.xxiv Therefore, by acceptingthat animals have direct moral status, we seemobligated to remove them from the sphere of humancommerce entirely. For that reason, even thoughspeculation at this point might be premature, Isuspect that when the theoretical dust settles (andthis may not happen for quite some time), Kantians

will emerge as dedicated proponents for the animalliberation movement.



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i I presented versions of this paper at the Texas Undergraduate Philosophy Conference and the FirstAnnual Animal Liberation Student Association Conference. I would like to thank everyone there fortheir excellent questions and comments, particularly Julie Hunter, Jeff Casey, Anthony Nocella, II,Steve Best and Karen Davis. In addition, I am grateful to Mark Bernstein, Thomas Hill, Jr. andespecially Richard Galvin for providing me with extensive and helpful notes. Finally, I would like tothank the editors and reviewers ofAnimal Liberation Philosophy & Public Policyand Ex Nihilo, inwhich a previous version of this paper (entitled Are Human Beings Ends In Themselves?) waspublished.

iiAnimal Welfare Act as Amended (7 USC, 2131-2156). National Agricultural Library, AgriculturalResearch Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture.

iii Crawford, Richard. Animal Welfare Act Interpretive Summaries. National Agricultural Library,Agricultural Research Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture.

iv After Kant introduces the supreme moral law in Groundwork II, he applies it to four moraldilemmas, deriving the following conclusions: (1) We have a duty not to commit suicide. (2) We havea duty not to make false promises. (3) We have a duty to cultivate our talents. (4) We have a duty tohelp others. Scholars have challenged his arguments, particularly the first and third, and many havedeveloped new ways of applying his theory that contradict him.

v Here and throughout the rest of the paper, I will use animal as shorthand for nonhumananimal.

vi I owe this argument to Peter Singer (2002), who argues that we should reject speciesism for thesame reason we reject racism and sexism: The white racist claims that whites are superior toblacks, but this is false; although there are differences among individuals, some blacks are superiorto some whites in all of the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be relevant (3).

vii Kant considers the CI the supreme principle of morality. He presents several versions, or formulas,of the CI in Groundwork II: the universal law formula, the universal law of nature formula, theautonomy formula, the humanity formula and the kingdom of ends formula. Kant believes that eachformula expresses the same supreme principle (though whether this is true is an open question thatscholars continue to debate). In this paper I will focus primarily on the humanity formula, as it ismost relevant to this discussion, but I will briefly touch on the universal law formula later on.

viii Here, I take direct moral status to be defined in terms of direct moral duty. That is, a person towhom we owe a direct moral duty can be said to have direct moral status. I take indirect moralstatus to have the same relationship with indirect moral duty.

ix Note that the person does not need to care forthe kitten. For example, the rancher whose cattledie prematurely may suffer only economically, but he suffers nonetheless.x Kant distinguishes between dignity and price as follows: In the kingdom of ends everything haseither aprice or a dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as equivalent.Whatever by contrast is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent has dignity (G 235[4: 434]).

xi Barbara Herman (1984) represents this view, arguing that objects and animals cannot respond toneed as such, nor can they take my ends as their own, and, animals are not, strictly speaking,capable of providing help, although they may of course do things that are helpful to us (Herman588, 593). As a result, Herman concludes (based on Kantian grounds, no less) that the positive dutyof beneficence does not apply to nonrational beings.

Other philosophers who have supported this position include Henry J. McCloskey (1979), whoargues that either actual or potential moral agency is a necessary condition for moral status, andCarl Wellman (1995), who believes that the freedom to control oneself in a possible confrontation isa requirement for moral status. Neither McCloskey nor Wellman believes that nonhuman animalshave moral status.


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xii By necessary for direct status, I mean that if one is not rational, then one will not have directstatus. In contrast, by sufficient for direct status, I mean that if one is rational, then one will havedirect status, but one can also have direct status without being rational. Thus, sufficiency withoutnecessity preserves room on the moral radar for nonrational beings. My argument here is that weare correct in interpreting rational nature as sufficient for direct status, but not in interpreting it asnecessary.

xiii Negative duties are duties notto perform certain actions, whereas positive duties are duties toperform certain actions.

xiv Consider, for example, some arguments posed for forcible castration of pathological sexoffenders.

xv I owe a debt to Tom Regan here, because my argument that the humanity formula reduces humanbeings to mere receptacles of rational nature is similar to his argument that utilitarianism reduceshuman beings to mere receptacles of pleasure. In fact, Regan and I even draw the same conclusion:people should have moral value because they are the subjects of lives that are important to them,not because their bodies are vehicles for that which does have moral value.

xvi My implementation of the universal law formula here is based the interpretation Richard Galvin(1991) offers regarding the contradiction in conception test. Supporting a position previously arguedfor by Marcus Singer in Generalization in Ethics (New York, 1961), Galvin criticizes three generalviews of the contradiction in conception test, including the Causal Law Versions, the TeleologicalLaw Versions and the Inconsistency of Intentions Views. He then defends as an alternative theStrict Logical Impossibility View, which derives the immorality of an act from the form of itsmaxim, not from the synthetic circumstances which surround it. Finally, Galvin illustrates thesuperiority of the SLI interpretation by applying it to the cases of false promising, lying, rape,slavery and stealing.xvii All an end needs to be permissible is this: it, along withall its necessary means, must incompliance with the CI.

xviii Note that this argument does not preclude the possibility of there being degrees of patienthood.

xix Of course, I am not suggesting here that Herman agrees with my application of her view, becauseshe most certainly does not (see fn. vi for a brief summary of her view on animals). Instead, I amsuggesting that her view is consistent with, perhaps even committed to, the inclusion of animals onthe moral radar.

xx One might argue that we ought to pursue the happiness of others not because happiness ismorally valuable, but because our beneficence will influence others to be beneficent as well. Thus,the argument might go, the duty to pursue the happiness of others does not extend to nonrationalanimals, because they are not capable of understanding beneficence as such. But my response tothis challenge is the same: the duty of beneficence is not grounded in a contractualist desire forreciprocity; it is a logical consequence of the value we place on help in general.

xxiFor further (non-Kantian) arguments regarding this point, refer to MacCormick (1976) andFeinberg (1980). MacCormick argues that to have a right is to have an interest that should beprotected by the duties of others, and Feinberg contends that to have a right is to be a claimant, orto have interests on behalf of which others can speak. This interest theory of rights is compatible notonly with animal rights, but also with the rights of human infants and groups of people. I shouldnote, however, that Feinberg qualifies this claim by arguing that species of animals cannot have anyrightsnot even the right to survivebecause they do not have collective interests. This is animportant point, especially when our discussion enters the realm of endangered speciespreservation. For my purposes in this paper, though, I will limit our discussion to the rights ofindividual animals.


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xxii In support of the claim that the purely heteronomous are not subject to duty, Kant writes:[Autonomy] of the will is unavoidably bound up with [morality] or rather is its foundation (245 [4:445]). Arguing that the same is true of the purely autonomous, he writes:

A will whose maxims necessarily agree with the laws of autonomy is a holy, absolutely goodwill. The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (that is, moralnecessitation) is obligation. Obligation can thus not apply to a holy being. (240 [4: 439])

xxiii This argument owes a significant debt to Michael Tooley, who develops a similar line of reasoningin his article, In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide. He writes:

Suppose at some future time a chemical were to be discovered which when injected into thebrain of a kitten would cause the kitten to develop into a cat possessing a brain of the sortpossessed by humans, and consequently into a cat having all the psychological capabilitiescharacteristic of normal adult humans. Such cats would be able to think, to use language, and so on.Now it would surely be morally indefensible in such a situation to hold that it is seriously wrong tokill an adult member of the species Homo sapiens without also holding that it is wrong to kill any catthat has undergone such a process of

development: there would be no difference. (205)With this foundation in place, Tooley introduces a series of thought experiments in support of

the thesis that killing an injected kitten would be morally equivalent to killing a normal kitten; and so

potential agencyproduced naturally or otherwiseis morally irrelevant. To this effect he argues:It perhaps needs to be emphasized here that the moral symmetry principle does not imply thatneither action is morally wrong. Perhaps both actions are wrong, even seriously so. The moralsymmetry principle implies only that if they are wrong, they are so to precisely the same degree(ibid). Even though Tooley develops this argument as a means for addressing abortion andeuthanasia, it is relevant for this discussion as well, as he grounds it on the premise that teleology isnot an adequate surrogate for direct moral status.

xxiv As James Rachels notes, Cruel methods are used in the meat-production industry because suchmethods are economical; they enable the producers to market a product that people can afford(503).

REFERENCES

Feinberg, Joel. Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress. 1980.

Frankfurt, Harry. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Journal of Philosophy68.1971: 5-20.

Galvin, Richard. Ethical Formalism: The Contradiction in Conception Test. History ofPhilosophy Quarterly8. 1991: pp. 387-408.

Gewirth, Alan. Reason and Morality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 1978.

Herman, Barbara. Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons. Ethics. 1984: 577-602.

Hill, Thomas. Humanity as an End in Itself. Ethics. 1980: 84-89.

Kant, Immanuel. Duties to Animals and Spirits. Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield. NewYork, NY: Harper and Row. 1963: 239-241.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Arnulf Zweig. Oxford:Oxford University Press. 2002.

Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. 1996.


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MacCormick, Neil. Childrens Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right.ARSP 62. 1976: 305-317.

McCloskey, Henry J. Moral Rights and Animals. Inquiry22. 1979: 23-54.

Rachels, James. Vegetarianism and the Other Weight Problem. World Hunger and MoralObligation.. Aiken/Lafollette. 1977. Rpt. in Contemporary Moral Problems. James E. White, Ed..

California: Wadsworth. 2003: 496-505.

Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. In Defence of Animals. Blackwell. 1985. Rpt. inContemporary Moral Problems. James E. White, Ed.. California: Wadsworth. 2003: 481-489.

Singer, Peter.Animal Liberation. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers. 2002.

Thomas, Laurence. Kant on Equality. Cognitive Sciences Eprint Archives. Article 3176.October 4, 2003.

Tooley, Michael, In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide. The Problem of Abortion.Wadsworth, 1984. Rpt. in The Abortion Controversy. Louis Pojman and Francis Beckwith, Eds.Boston, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers. 1994: 186-211.

Wellman, Carl. Real Rights. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995.

Wise, Steven. Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals. Cambridge: PerseusPublishing. 2000.

a critique of the kantian theory

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