ColloquyVol.12,Fall2016,pp.52-65

ACritiqueoftheSupremeCourtHoldinginAliceCorpv.CLSBankwithNewRhetoric

AlexDejeanAbstractThispaperanalyzestheSupremeCourtopinion inAliceCorp.v.CLSBank.NewrhetoricoffersausefulapproachtocritiquetheavailablemeansofpersuasionandisusefulforunderstandingtheSupremeCourt’sreasoning.Aqualitativecritiquethrough a hermeneutic framework assists in discovering the conditions andcontextunderwhichaSupremeCourtopiniondefinesapatent-eligibleconceptand the contours of an “abstract idea.” New rhetoric is useful to evaluate aSupremeCourtopinionbecauseitreliesonhowquasi-logicreliesupondefinitionsof categories and understandings of phrases to be persuasive. This paperconcludesbydiscussinglimitationsandsuggestionsforfutureworkinanalyzinglegalissuesthroughmodernrhetoricalconcepts.

TentativePurpose,Thesis,andRationaleArhetoricalanalysisoftheSupremeCourtopinioninAliceCorp.v.CLSBank isusefulbecauseitprovidesanopportunitytocritiqueanaudience’sunderstandingofanargumentthrougharhetoricalandlegallens.Oneissueisthatpurposelyvague is the effect of software patents on patent litigation. Purposely vaguesoftwarepatentsmaybedetrimentaltopatenting,patentlitigation,intellectualproperty,andnewtechnologicalgrowth.Thesubjectofpatentlawisimportanttostudyasameansofrecognizingtheconsequencesofpatentlitigationincourtsandtothelargerlegalrealm.Thisstudycontributestothefieldofcommunicationstudiesbyadvancinganunderstandingofcommunicationwithinlegalcontexts.Furthermore, this study contributes to the theoretical, critical, and empiricalquestions related to the field of rhetorical studies, and it contributes tocommunicationtheorywithinlegalcontexts.

AqualitativeanalysisusingPerelmanandOlbrechts-Tyteca’stheoryofnewrhetoricasatheoreticalfoundationillustratesdiscussionofalegalissuethroughcommunicationtheory.Researchregardingpatentsinthefieldofcommunicationengagesindividualstolearnaboutlawinademocraticsociety.Researcherslearnabout the function of law and its operation in legal institutions, the ideal ofjustice,andtherelationshipoflawtojustice.Individualsusethelawtoactasan

SSuupprreemmeeCCoouurrttHHoollddiinnggiinnAAlliicceeCCoorrppssvv..CCLLSSBBaannkk53

instrumentforsocialchangebylearningabouttheidealofjusticeasanagentforaction.

Thispaperfirstdescribesconceptsofnewrhetoricanditstenetstoanalyzearguments.Second,itprovidesasummaryofliteraturerelatedtothenarrativesofpartiesinpatentcases.Theliteratureintroducesthecontroversialcomplexityof patents, law, and litigation. Third, the paper analyzes the Supreme Court’sdecisioninAliceCorp.v.CLSBankemployingthetenetsofnewrhetoric.Lastly,the paper provides observations and speculations on the appropriateness ofPerelmanandOlbrecht-Tyteca’stheoryforanalyzinglegalrhetoric,tounderscorethecontribution(s)ofthestudyforstudentsofrhetoric.Sotobegin,whatisnewrhetoric?BreakdownofNewRhetoricForanyonewhowantsaquickrun-throughofnewrhetoric,theYouTubevideoChaim Perelman: 2Minute Thinker provides a brief overview of Perelman’sphilosophy(MaryB.,2016).PhilosopherChaimPerelmanadvocatedpersuasionas quasi-logical. A rhetor uses different definitions and categories ofunderstandings to relate to the audience’s values,which he calls communion.Persuasionisasharedunderstandingbetweenthespeakerandaudienceasbotha product and prerequisite for rhetoric. Perelman outlined two types ofaudiences, the universal audience and the particular audience. A universalaudiencerepresentsallrationalbeingsandhumanity.Therhetorimagineswhatconstitutestheuniversalaudiencewhencraftinghisorhermessage.Normally,arhetor would use deductive reasoning with logic and facts to appeal to theaudience.Aparticularaudience,ontheotherhand,isaspecificgroupwithsharedvalues. A rhetor’s argument must agree with those values or establish aconnectionbetweentherhetor’swarrant(s)andtheparticularaudience’sbeliefs.Becausevaluesarealwaysevolving,soistherelationshipbetweentherhetorandtheaudience.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define argumentation as a series oftechniquestoinduceorgoadthemindtoadheretoathesis(1969).Aclassicalnotionofrhetoricisthatpersuasionistherhetor’sabilitytoconvincehisorheraudience.Persuasionisnotalivingentity,birthedthrougharhetor.Newrhetoricpresentsthetheorythatpersuasionreliesonanargument’sabilitytoconvinceitsaudience of validity. While it is always a rhetor’s job to create a persuasiveargument, themerit(s) of the argument exist in anymedium presented (oral,written, or ideographic). The audience decides when something has beensufficiently persuaded when they either accept or reject an argument. This

54A.Dejean

assertion follows the same rationale for conviction and persuasion that Kantproposed in his Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant, rational beingsmake validjudgementsgroundedinobjectivity(1998).Kant’sphilosophysupportsthecorenotioninnewrhetoricthatpersuasionisnotaboutlogicallyprovingafact,butrather,aboutacceptingtheprobabilityoftruth.

PerelmanandOlbrechts-Tyteca’snewrhetoric,aswellasKant’srationaleforpersuasion,isreminiscentofanAristotelianversionoftruth,asopposedtothesophisticdivisionof“bigTtruth”and“little-ttruth.”Thebettertheprobabilityofsomethingbeingtrue,themorelikelyitistobeacceptedastrue.Anargumentfromarhetormustcontaina logicalargument that reliesupontheaudience’sknowledge.Thiseitheroccursexplicitlythroughdeductiveorinductivereasoningasa consequenceof thesyllogism,or itoccurs implicitlythroughoneormoreenthymemes,impliedpremisesacceptedbytheaudience’sbeliefs.Asyllogismisa formal structure of reasoning that creates an argument by developing aconclusion based on established premises. A classic example of a syllogismfollows that if all people aremortal, and you are a person, then youmust bemortal.Allpeoplebeingmortalandyoubeingapersonarepremises;youbeingmortal is a conclusion based on the premises given. Syllogisms are useful increating logical arguments. Enthymemesarearguments inwhichpremisesareimplied.Forexample, ifyouareaU.S.citizen,youareentitledtodueprocess.This implies thatallU.S. citizensareentitled todueprocess. Enthymemesareuseful in crafting arguments because they rely on shared truths between therhetorandtheaudience.

AsRichardLongstates,therhetormustfocustheideasoftheaudienceintoa singular mind (1983). Judges’ rulings occur within stare decisis (i.e., legalprecedent) and a judge’s beliefs on the best course based on the argumentspresented. Part of knowing the audience—in this case, the Supreme CourtJustices—isaprioriofthegeneralcharacteristicsandbeliefsofeachJusticebasedontheirpreviousopinions.Toalargerextent,thisisacoreprincipleincreatingargumentsforfuturecases.AsidefromtheJusticedeliveringthecourtopinion,SupremeCourtJusticesmaypresentconcurrencesordissentsthatmayhelpformlegalargumentsforfuturecases.

Thereareseveraltenetsofnewrhetoric.Thefirsttenetofnewrhetoricisthesolidityofclaims.Claimsmustbejudgedasreasonable,ratherthanabsolute.Anyissue worth disputing in court lacks absolute certainty, and before courtprocedures occur there must be an agreement that each party’s claim hasreasonable worth to be disputed. Ambiguity will always exist because of thenatureof language,whichhasmultiple interpretations.Wordsas symbolsand

SSuupprreemmeeCCoouurrttHHoollddiinnggiinnAAlliicceeCCoorrppssvv..CCLLSSBBaannkk55

their syntax in a language structure do not have precise meaning and theirmultiplemeaningscanbeusedindifferentways.Language’sambiguousqualitymay have several interpretations or connotations. Ambiguity occurs in fourcontexts:(1)nopreviousapplicablerulebecausethecaseisthefirsttodiscusstheissue;(2)apreviousrulingissubjecttomorethanonemeaning;(3)whenapreviousrulingisclaimedtobeinvalid[thismaybebecauseapreviousrulingisin contradiction with another ruling]; and (4) conflict exists between twopotentially applicable rules. Each syllogism must contain real and preferablepremises.Claimsmustbegroundedinarealityacceptablebytheaudience,forwhichanoriginof reasonablediscoursemayoccur (Long).Asexplained in theToulmin model of argumentation, a claim is the thesis a rhetor wants theaudiencetobelieve,thegroundsarethesupportfortheclaim,andthewarrantisthereasoningthatcreatesanassociationbetweentheclaimanditsgrounds(Toulmin, 1997).A rhetorusingpractical argumentationencodes anargumentrelyingonasolidrelationshipbetweenclaim,grounds,andwarrants.Anaudiencemustbeabletodecodetheinformationthroughaninverseprocess.

Liaison is another tenet of new rhetoric. Liaison engenders techniques ofassociationanddissociationamongpremises. Three techniquesused tocreateassociationare:(1)quasi-logical(i.e.,abductive)reasoning;(2)argumentsbasedonthestructureofreality;and(3)argumentsbasedonestablishingastructureofreality.AsKurtSaundersexplains,inferencecreatesliaisonbetweenfactsandconclusions of law (2006). For example, imagine that two parties are in courtregardingacaraccident.TheplaintiffassertsthatheorshesawthedefendantwiththeircellphoneplayingPokémonGoinfrontoftheir facejustbeforethecollision.Throughliaison,theplaintiff’slawyercaninferthatthedefendantwasnegligentbynotobservingtheroadandarguethatthecollisionisthedefendant’sfault by means of cause-and-effect. Furthermore, the association implies therelationship between the act of looking away from the road as negligent.Dissociation,conversely,createsaseparationbetweentwovalues.Forexample,it is a generally known rule that it is illegal for a car to drive on a sidewalk,presumablyforpedestriansafety. Imaginethatapersondrivingdownastreetveeredontothesidewalktoavoidcollidingwithapedestrianonthestreet.Whilethedriverviolatedthelaw,heorshedidsotoavoidharmingapedestrian,thuspreservingthespiritofthelaw.AccordingtoSaunders,theargument“makesadissociationbetweenthe letterandthespiritofthe lawinordertourgeafairrepresentationofthestatuteandtojustifyafindingofnoliability”(p.174).

Thethirdtenetofnewrhetoricispresence.Presencedetermineshowtogivesignificancetothepremisesandrelationshipsexpressedintheargument.Thisis

56A.Dejean

similar to the concept of arrangement from the canons of rhetoric, but theemphasishereisthecontentofanargumentanditsrelationshipbetweenrhetorandaudience.Fansofclassicalrhetoricmayrecognizepresenceasatypeofkairosoutlinedbytheclassical rhetoriciansPlato,Aristotle,andCicero.KinneavyandEskin (2000)notethatAristotle’sRhetoricmentionedthewordkairos16timesfor its utility to discovermeans of persuasion. Although the use of kairos inrhetoric shifted fromGreek toRoman scholarship, bothphilosophiesofkairosoutlineitseffectivenessinargumentation,synthesizedintonewrhetoric’stenetofpresence.Inthiscase,understandingthetimingreliesonabetterpictureonpatentsandtheirsocialsignificanceincourt.ContextualInformationonPatentsRobertaKevelson’sdefinitionofpropertyissuccinctlyanalogoustowhatapatentis. Kevelson, drawing on several philosophical and legal authors, equatesproperty,eitheracorporealorincorporealobject,withaninstrumentortollthatisevaluatedbyothersinsociety(1992).Patentsprotectinnovatorswho,throughhumaningenuity,worktocreateorimprovesomethingbeneficialforhumankind.Patentsareeconomicallybeneficialforentitiesthatworkonpracticingtheuseofthepatent.Inventionscreateindustrytosatisfythepublic’sneeds.

KatherineT.Duracksummarizesthepatentsystemas“thesystemthroughwhich the legal ownership of innovations is asserted, contested, granted, andbounded”(2006,p.316).Therearetwofundamentalissuesrelatingpatentsandpatent law. First, innovation is characterized by a novel creation or someremarkable advancement of an already existing artifact or concept. Second,characterizing innovation either by novelty or remarkable advancement isrelativetothingsthatexistintheetherofhumanproduction.Furthermore,onlya limitednumberof individualspossess the requiredknowledge tomakesuchdistinctions, and seldom are those individuals specialized in the same field.KennethW.Damhasnotedthatthenatureofpatentlawcreatesdifficultiesinhowpatentlawdoctrinesaddresstheissue(1994).

Because of the vague nature of patent law, there have been timeswhenindividuals or groups have taken advantage of the system for personal gain.Plaintiffswhohave(arguably)takenadvantageofthelegalsystemareknownas“patent trolls.” Robert P.Merges states that patent trolls do not help societybecause they do not contribute to technological innovation (2010).While thelegalsystemexiststoupholdjusticeasaspaceofdeterminingfairnessthroughdiscourse,anunintendedconsequencehasemerged.Legalgames(intherealm

SSuupprreemmeeCCoouurrttHHoollddiinnggiinnAAlliicceeCCoorrppssvv..CCLLSSBBaannkk57

of patent disputes)make little to no substantial innovation, and are generallyunproductivewithnosocialbenefit.Narratives&TribulationsofPatentDisputesChristopherA.Cotropiadistinguishestwonarratives inthefieldofpatentsandpatent law: the narrative of the inventor and the troll. An inventor toils withingenuityandperseverestocreatesomethingamazing,beneficialtosociety.Thetroll, on the other hand, is a hoarder of patents with no intention ofcommercializing them, and instead seeks royalties from others who havecommercializedpatentssimilartothetroll’s(2009).Inacourtoflawitwouldplayoutasapatenttroll(plaintiff)seekingrestitutionfromtheinventor(defendant),onthenotionthattheinventoreitherstoletheideaorlostincomebecausetheinventorcommercializedthepatent.Cotropiaexplainsthatadefendantusuallycannot retaliate on the same grounds because trolls do not sell products orservicesthatcouldbeinfringed.Inotherwords,adefendantcannotcountersueforthesamereasonthattheyarebeingsuedasadeterrentagainsttrolls.JamesF.McDonough IIIelaboratesonthedescriptionofapatenttrollasapartywhoowns a patent without intending to use it to produce a product (2006). Byacquiring ownership of a patent and not commercializing on the product orservice,apatenttroll(formallyknownasanon-practicingentityor“NPE”)createsa rational legal argument when they sue a person or entity that alreadyincorporatedthetechnologywithoutpermission.

Somescholarshavearguedthatpatenttrollssueasabusinessstrategy,sincethecostoflitigatingpatentdisputescanbeexpensive.ColleenChiennotedcasesinwhich$1-25millionisatstake,andthecostoflitigationisbetween$2and$3million (2008). Defendants may be more inclined to settle because, from thestandpoint of a cost-benefit analysis, the cost of litigation may be excessive;settlingmaybe considerably cheaper. Regardless of how the suit is resolved,defendingtheuseofapatentcanalso“damageadefendant’screditrating, itsrelationshipwithcustomers,anditsreputationwithinvestors”(p.1588).Trollsasplaintiffs can predatorilyuse litigation to upset and threaten the survival of acompetingfirm.AsJeanO.LanjouwandJoshLernerstate,adefendantunabletoafford litigationmaybe forced to settle, regardless of themerits of the case(2001).

JamesBessenandMichael J.Meurerhave explained thatU.S. patents areunnecessarilyexpensivebecausepatentsandtheirclaimsaretoovague(2010).TheUnitedStatesPatentandTrademarkOffice (USPTO)permitvaguepatentsthat, due to their abstract nature, increase the likelihood of litigation of a

58A.Dejean

patented invention. In fact, some patent claims are grounded on an abstractpatent itself. The litigation process through the court system creates adetermination if the scope of a patented invention—whether corporeal orincorporeal—hasbeen infringedupon,basedon themost coherentargument.With substantial activity disputing the legitimacy and enforcement of patentclaimsinlowercourts(districtcourtsandfederalcircuitappellatecourts),severalparties have petitioned awrit of certiorari, a formal request for the SupremeCourttohearthecase,totheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(SCOTUS),ofwhichsomecasesinparticularfollowthedescribedpatenttrollscenario.Withabasicunderstandingonthecomplexityofpatents,patentlaw,andcasescenarios,itisatthispointimportanttonotehowcasesreachtheSupremeCourt,aswellastoclarifysomelegaljargon.HowDoesCourtProcedureWork?In the video “Supreme Court of the United States Procedures: Crash CourseGovernmentandPolitics#20,”CraigBenzineexplains thecourtprocedure forSCOTUS,fromhowpartiespetitiontohavetheircaseheardtohowSCOTUSissuesopinionsoncases.First,acasemustexhibitcontroversy.Thecasemusthavebeenheardinlowercourtsandappealed,oftenmorethanonce.Ifapartystillbelievesthattheissueisworththecourt’sattention,apartymustpetitionforawritofcertiorari.Thefederalgovernment’schieflawyer,theSolicitorGeneral,screensoutpetitionsiftheissueisnotcontroversialenoughorifitiseasilydecidedbystaredecisis,orstandinglegalprecedent.Outofallthewritsaccepted,JusticesgrantcertiorariwhenfourofthenineJusticesdecidetohearaparticularcase.

Once certiorari is granted, each side presents one or more legal briefsexplainingwhythelawfavorstheirposition.Thepetitioneristhepartyseekingto overturn the lower court’s decision,while the respondent is theparty thatwantstoupholdoraffirmthelowercourt’sdecision.Afteroralarguments,theJusticesmeetinanotherconferencetomakeadecision.InorderfortheSupremeCourttorenderanofficialdecision,atleastfiveoutofnineJusticesmustagreeonatleastoneofthelegalargumentsthateitheraffirmsoroverturnsthelowercourt’sdecision.ThedecisionoftheSupremeCourtiscalledaholding.Thecourtmayalsoremandthecase,whichsendsthecasebackdowntobedecidedbythelowercourts.Amajorityopinionisbindingonlowercourts,soanydecisionthatthe Supreme Courtmakesmust be upheld. Cases that do reach the SupremeCourthavesignificantmerittobeexamined,basedontheprocessforacasetoreachtheCourtinthefirstplace.Thenextsectionwilldescribethelegalbattle

SSuupprreemmeeCCoouurrttHHoollddiinnggiinnAAlliicceeCCoorrppssvv..CCLLSSBBaannkk59

between Alice Corp. and CLS Bank, and apply the tenets of new rhetoric tocritiquethereasoningoftheCourt.AnalysisofAliceCorpv.CLSBankPetitionerAliceCorp.suedCLSBankin2007,claimingthatCLSBank’scomputersystemforfinancialobligationtransactionsinfringedupononeormoreofAliceCorp.’spatents(AliceCorp.v.CLSBank,2014).RespondentCLSBankcountersuedandclaimedthatthepatentswereinvalid,unenforceable,ornotinfringed.TheDistrictCourtheld thatallof theclaimsarepatent ineligiblebecause theyaredirected to the abstract idea of using a computerized intermediary to handlefinancialexchangeofobligationstominimizerisk.TheDistrictCourtandFederalCircuitaffirmedthatAliceCorp.’spatentswere ineligible forpatentprotectionunder35U.S.C.§101becausetheyweredirectedtoanabstractidea.Thus,AliceCorp.’s claims of infringementwere invalid. For reference, Section 101 of thePatent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter as “Whoever invents ordiscoversanynewandusefulprocess,machine,manufacture,orcompositionofmatter, or naynew and useful improvement thereof” (35 U.S.C. § 101). AliceCorp. then filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit Court. The Appeals CourtreversedtheDistrictCourt’sdecisionbecauseitwasnot“manifestlyevident”thatAliceCorp’s patents representedan abstract idea. TheCircuit Court grantedarehearingenbanc(i.e.,toalljudgesinacourtinsteadofapanel),whoaffirmedtheDistrictCourt’sjudgement.TheSupremeCourtgrantedcertioraribecausetheCircuitCourt’sjudgementincludedadissentthatexplainedthepatentinvolvedusingcomputerhardwarespecificallyprogrammedtosolveacomplexproblem.SeveralquestionsarosefortheSupremeCourttoanswer:Whatconstitutesanabstractidea,andwhatcomputer-implementedsubjectsarepatent-eligible?

FollowingOlbrechts-Tyteca’sconcept,presenceisindicatedbythefactthatthe case reached the Supreme Court. Technological applications in the 21stCenturyhaveincreasinglychangedstandardpracticestofitnormativebehaviorwithin a virtual realm. Shopping has been expedited from in-store to online;advertisinghasgone fromartistic guessworkmanipulating themasses to fine-tunedsuggestionsonanindividuallevel;customerservicehasgonefromskillsofinterpersonalcommunicationtomechanicallyspeakingtoacomputerprogramwithautomatedresponses.Withtechnologicalcapabilitiestoachieveaparticulargoal, distinguishing the innovative from themundane is a complex issue thatrequiresseverallayersofanalysis.Thecourtsystemprovidesavettingprocesstodeconstructbig issues intospecificsectionsandexamine ifavalidargument issound.

60A.Dejean

Theclaimsthatwerepresentedbythepetitionerandtherespondentwerereasonable.AliceCorp.hadareasonableclaimagainstCLSBankonthegroundsofpatentinfringementbecauseAliceCorp.doesinfacthaveapatentthatusesasystemsimilartoCLSBank.FromtheCircuitCourt’sperspective,itwasirrelevantifAliceCorp.didnotpracticeitspatent.CLSBankhadareasonableclaimtorefuteAliceCorp.onthegroundsthatitspatentwasunenforceableornoteligibleasapatent.BoththeDistrictCourtandCircuitCourt(inanenbancsession)believedthatthepatentwasinvalidbecauseitrelatedtoanabstractidea.TheSupremeCourt granting certiorari indicates that the issuedemonstrated controversy. Ifoneclaimwasnot reasonablywithin theabilityof lowercourts todecide, theSupremeCourtwouldnothaveacceptedthecase.

Ambiguity was a distinct factor for The Supreme Court. Section 101’sprovisionclearlyindicatesthat“Whoeverinventsordiscoversanynewandusefulprocess…”JusticeThomasnotedthattheCourtheldthatlawsofnature,naturalphenomena,andabstractideaswereimplicitlyexemptedfrombeingpatented.Abstract ideas cannotbepatentedbecausepermittingapatent toanabstractidea“wouldeffectivelygrantamonopolyoveranabstractidea”(§101,pp.5-6).Includingnaturallawsandnaturalphenomena,abstractideascomposethebasicelementsneededforanytechnologicalworkorscientificprogress.Monopolizinganabstract ideacould impede innovation insteadofpromote it, renderingthepurposeofpatentinguseless.

TheCourt’sopinionthatclarifiedtheexclusionaryprincipledoesnotincludeabstractconceptsthatcontributetoanewandusefulend.Inapplyingthe§101exception, theCourthadtodistinguishbetweenpatents thatare fundamentaltoolstohumaningenuityandpatentsthatimproveuponthosetools.TheCourthad to clarify the ambiguity along previous rulings as well as address theambiguityofapatent-ineligibleconcept.TheCourtconcludedthatthepatentsdidrepresentanabstractideaofintermediatedsettlement.Havingaddressedtheissue previously (Bilski v. Kappos, 2010), an intermediated settlement using athirdpartytomitigateriskisafundamentaleconomicpracticeinthesystemofcommerce.

Drawing upon Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concept, petitioner Alice Corp. wasineffective at using liaison. Alice Corp. attempted to use dissociation when itacknowledgedthat itsclaimsdescribed intermediatedsettlement,butrejecteditspatentasabstract.AliceCorp.counteredtheCourt’sprecedentsofabstractideas, which “exist in principle apart from any human action” (p. 10). Thedissociationhereisthatathird-partysystemtofacilitateobligatedtransactionsisnotanaturallaworsomeuniversaltruth.Acomputerautomatedsystemused

SSuupprreemmeeCCoouurrttHHoollddiinnggiinnAAlliicceeCCoorrppssvv..CCLLSSBBaannkk61

to conduct transactions is a human-made system, and therefore eligible forpatentability. The Supreme Court reasoned that there was no meaningfuldistinctionbetweenintermediatedsettlementandtheconceptofriskhedginginBilskiv.Kappos;bothcountasanabstractidea.

The second aspect of liaison was whether the elements of claim weresufficienttoassociatethepatent’sconceptasapatent-eligibleapplication.TheCourtreferencedpastopinionstoestablishhowtheydeterminetheassociationofaconcept’sinnovationaspatent-eligible.WhileAliceCorp’spatentdidhavetechnicalspecificationstocreateadistinctionbetweenitselfandsimilardevicesor processes, themechanisms and process were too generic to qualify as aninnovativeconcept.Thepatentdidnotimproveuponanexistingtechnologyortechnologicalprocess.Thepatentdoesnothingmorethantoprovideinstructionto apply an abstract idea of intermediated settlement through a genericcomputer.TherewasnoassociationwithregardtoAliceCorp’spatentclaimasinnovative.Discussion&LimitationsThere may be a limited use of new rhetoric for legal analysis. In thecommunication studies field, new rhetoric presented a novel approach toevaluating the availablemeansofpersuasion. This analysis takes amajor turnfrom usingnew rhetoric as amethodological framework, usingnew rhetoric’stenets to critique the rhetor’s effectiveness through the audience’s opinioninsteadofarhetor’schoices.Thevalues,beliefs,andreasoningoftheSupremeCourtinthiscasestemsfrompreviouscases,aconceptthatnewrhetoricdoesnotdiscuss(tomyknowledge).TheCourt’sreferencestopastopinionslimithowwell theparties created anadherence toa sharedunderstandingof values. Inaddition, the analysis uses the opinion of the Court as an artifact to analyzeargumentation,withouthavingseentheoriginalparty’sarguments.

IhopetousePerelmanandOlbrechts-Tyteca’snewrhetorictoprovideanewapproach to analyzing argumentation. Argumentation is generally critiquedaccording to the choices of a speaker, to determine if the choices wereappropriatetobeusedonanaudience,andtowhateffect.Instead,Iinvertedthisideabycritiquingtheaudience’sresponsetohoweffectivethelawyers’choicesforargumentationwere.Ultimately, it istheaudiencewhodecideshowwellaspeakerpersuadesandhowstronganargumentis.

62A.Dejean

Conclusion&FutureDirectionsThispaperanalyzedtheSupremeCourtopinioninAliceCorp.v.CLSBankusingPerelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s new rhetoric. New rhetoric provides atheoretical framework for examining the effectiveness of an argument. Thetenets of new rhetoric are audience, claims, presence, ambiguity, and liaison.New rhetoric is useful for examining a Supreme Court decision because theCourt’s opinion is communicated in away that can be illustrated through thetenetsofnewrhetoric.Inthiscase,theCourtdecisionexaminedwasrelatedtoapatent-relatedcase,AliceCorp.v.CLSBank. IusedAliceCorp.v.CLSBankasacasestudy,notonlyforitsnotorietyinthefieldofpatentlaw,butbecauseitisironicthat innovationcanbestifledwithaninnovativebusinesstactic.Patentsarenotnew,butthewayinwhichtheyarebeingutilizedasabusinessstrategyisasomewhatnovelpractice.

Apatentisagovernmentdocumentthatgivestheownertherighttomake,use, or sell an invention. Patents also exclude others from the rights listedpreviously. Inventions are patented because they protect the intellectualproperty,design,or service for theowner.An inventioncanbepatented if itsinnovation is novel or substantially advances something that already exists. Acurrent problem in patent law is that some entities accumulate a number ofpatentswithouttheintenttoactuponthem;thesegroupsarecalledNPEs.NPEshoardpatentssothatifanothergroupmakesorsellsaninventionsimilartothepatent,theNPEcansuetheotherpartyonthegroundsofpatentinfringement.NPEswhoconductbusinessinthismannerarereferredtoaspatenttrolls.Patenttrollscanseriouslydisruptinnovationandclogupthelegalsystem.Inventorsorbusinessesarewaryofcreatingorapplyingnewtechnologyforfearofthecostofbeingsued.Evenifsomeoneissued,andarulingisinfavorofthedefendant,hisorherbusinesscanbedestroyedbecauseofaruinedreputationstemmingfromaninfringementaccusation.Thelegalsystembecomesslowedbecauseitmustprocessthenumberofcasespatenttrollsfile.Thereisnowaytoknowifacaseisfrivolous without following legal procedure, which costs time, money, andmanpower.

TheCourt’sopinionillustratednewrhetoric’sconceptsofreasonablenessandrealness of presence, claims, ambiguity, and liaison through association anddissociation.ThedisputebetweenAliceCorp.andCLSBankestablishedpresencethroughitsjourneyinthelegalsystem.AdistrictcourtruledinfavorofAliceCorp.because it had a patent that CLS Bank (unintentionally) infringed upon.Afterward,anappellatecourtruledinfavorofCLSBankbydeterminingthatAliceCorp.’spatentwasineligibletobeso.AliceCorp.successfullypetitionedandwas

SSuupprreemmeeCCoouurrttHHoollddiinnggiinnAAlliicceeCCoorrppssvv..CCLLSSBBaannkk63

given certiorari by the Supreme Court to hear the case. The Supreme CourtaffirmedtheappealscourtdecisionthatAliceCorp.’spatentwasineligibletobea patent because it explained an abstract process, third-party financialtransactions.

Intermsofeachparty’sclaim,eachonewasreasonable.AliceCorp.arguedthatCLSBankwasinfringinguponitspatent,regardlessifitwasintentionalorunintentional.Atthetimeofthedispute,AliceCorp.didinfacthaveapatentthatexplainedaprocessthatCLSBankwasusingforsecurethird-partyescrowtransactions.Theclaimisreasonablebecauseitisfactuallytrue.CLSBankarguedthatitwasnotinfringinguponAliceCorp.’spatentbecauseitnevershouldhavehadthepatentinthefirstplace.Thepatentshouldbepatent-ineligiblebecauseall it really does is explain a process for secure, electronic third-partytransactions.Theconceptisfundamentalforanyfinancialinstitutionorpartytoconductbusinessinthisnature.

Thenatureofthedisputefallswithinthefundamentalambiguityoflanguageand its application in law. What counts as innovation? What separatesinnovationfromcommonplace?Whatisanaturallaworauniversaltruth?Howdowe distinguish natural law and universal truth from human ingenuity andhumandevelopmentofinventions?TheSupremeCourtusedlegalprecedenttohelp determine these issues. From previous court decisions and otherdocuments of legal reasoning, the court, as the highest institution in law,determined that the patent in questionwas not innovative. The patent is nomoreinventivethanadocumentdescribingtheprocessofhowacombustion-fueledcarengineworks.

Fromanargumentstandpoint,usingliaisontoassociateordissociateideasisanuancedtactic.AliceCorp.triedtodissociateitspatentfromanaturallaw.Itspatentfocusedonintermediatedsettlementusingcomputers.Computersarenotnatural;theyarehumanartifacts.Therearealsootheravenuesforsettlingfinancialagreementsusingathirdparty.TheSupremeCourtinsteadstucktotheassociationbetweenthecoreofwhatthepatentachieveswiththefundamentalideaofsettlingtransactions.Thefactthatthepatentcompletedtransactionsbycomputerisnotastrongenoughjustificationforittobepatent-eligible.

Hopefully,futureworkwillfocusonsignificantlegalcasesaddressedbytheSupremeCourt.FurtherresearchintheJustices’holdingswillprovideagreaterunderstanding ofhow the top court in theUnited Statesmakes its choices. AbetterunderstandingoftheJusticesmayimprovethequalityoflegalargumentsin thefuture.AnalyzingSupremeCourtdecisionsmaybeuseful for individualswhoareunfamiliarwithorhavesomeinterestinlawandargumentation.Inthe

64A.Dejean

field of Communication Studies, there is an inextricable link between law,argumentation,rhetoric,andpublicneed.Learningaboutimportantsocialissues,andthestakeholdersaffected,isbeneficialtosociety.Knowledgeregardingtheproblemofunscrupulouslegaldisputesmayonedayhelpustoslaythepatenttroll.References

AliceCorp.v.CLSBankInternational,573U.S.134S.Ct.2347(2014).Benzine, C. (2015, 12 June). Supreme Court of the United States procedures:

Crashcoursegovernmentandpolitics#20.Onlinevideoclip.YouTube.Web.09Feb.2016.

Chien,C.V.(2008).OfTrolls,Davids,Goliaths,andKings:Narrativesandevidenceinthelitigationofhigh-techpatents.NCLReview,87,1571.

Cotropia,C.A.(2009).heindividualinventormotifintheageofthepatenttroll.YaleJournalofLaw&Technology,12,52.

Dam,K.W. (1994). Theeconomicunderpinnings ofpatent law.The JournalofLegalStudies,23(1),247-271.

Durack, K. T. (2006). Technology transfer and patents: Implications for theproduction of scientific knowledge. Technical Communication Quarterly,15(3),315-328.

eBayInc.v.MercExchange,L.L.C.,547U.S.388(2006).InventionsPatentable,35U.S.C.§101.

Kant, I.,&Guyer,P.(1998).Critiqueofpurereason.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Kevelson,R.(1992).Propertyasrhetoricinlaw.Law&Literature,4(2),189-206.Kinneavy, J. L., & Eskin, C. R. (2000). Kairos in Aristotle's rhetoric. Written

Communication,17(3),432-444.Mary B. (2016, Mar. 15). Chaim Perelman: 2Minute thinker. Retrieved from

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxNoA-ogy1EMcDonough,J.F.(2006).Themythofthepatenttroll:Analternativeviewofthe

functionofpatentdealersinanideaeconomy.EmoryLawJournal,56,189.Lanjouw, J. O., & Lerner, J. (2001). Tilting the table? The use of preliminary

injunctions.JournalofLawandEconomics,44(2),573-603.Long,R.(1983).TheroleofaudienceinChaimPerelman'snewrhetoric.Journal

ofAdvancedComposition,4,107-117.

SSuupprreemmeeCCoouurrttHHoollddiinnggiinnAAlliicceeCCoorrppssvv..CCLLSSBBaannkk65

Merges,R.P.(2010).Thetroublewithtrolls:innovation,rent-seeking,andpatentlawreform.BerkeleyTechnologyLawJournal,24,1583.

Moschini,G. (2010). Patent failure:How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers putinnovatorsatrisk.ReviewofPolicyResearch,27(2),200-202.

Olbrechts-Tyteca,L.(1969).Thenewrhetoric:atreatiseonargumentation.Trans.JohnWilkinsonandPurcelWeaver.NotreDameand London:University ofNotreDame.

Perelman,C.(1979).Thenewrhetoric:Atheoryofpracticalreasoning.InThenewrhetoricandthehumanities(pp.1-42).SpringerNetherlands.

Saunders, K.M. (2006). Law as rhetoric, rhetoric as argument. Journal of theAssociationofLegalWritingDirectors,3,166.

Toulmin,S.,Rieke,R.D.,andJanik,A.(1997).Introductiontoreasoning.2ndEd.Amsterdam:PearsonEducation.