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A Feminist Perspective on the CriminalJustice System Response to DomesticViolence

Shannon B. Harper and Angela R. Gover

ContentsIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Historical Backdrop and Feminist Response to Intimate Partner Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Feminist Perspectives on IPV and the Criminal Justice System Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Criminal Justice System Response to Intimate Partner Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Coordinated Community Response to Intimate Partner Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Key Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Cross-References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

AbstractThe feminist movement’s work during the 1960s and 1970s shaped how thecriminal justice system currently responds to intimate partner violence (IPV).Feminist perspectives continue to alter social perceptions of IPV and drivecriminal justice reform. Grassroots efforts are credited for mobilizing the criminaljustice system to implement improved responses by law enforcement, judicialsystems, correctional systems, and policymakers to address IPV. This chapterfocuses on how the criminal justice system’s response to IPV developed overtime. Specifically, it discusses how mandatory and preferred arrest laws haveshaped law enforcement practices in cases of IPV. Additionally, domestic

S. B. HarperDepartment of Sociology, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USAe-mail: [email protected]

A. R. Gover (*)School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USAe-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s) 2020R. Geffner et al. (eds.), Handbook of Interpersonal Violence Across the Lifespan,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62122-7_203-1

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violence courts and no-drop prosecution policies are discussed as the judiciary’sresponse to IPV. Batterer intervention treatment standards are reviewed as theoverarching framework for a correctional and rehabilitative program foroffenders. Finally, the chapter examines how such efforts have generatedunintended consequences for victims and highlights innovative criminal justiceinitiatives that target violence between intimate partners.

KeywordsIntimate partner violence · Domestic violence · Feminist · Criminal justice systemresponse to IPV

Introduction

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a problem of significant concern in the UnitedStates that affects 37.3% of women throughout their lifetime (Smith et al. 2017). IPVis a pattern of controlling and threatening behaviors that can include physicalviolence, emotional/psychological maltreatment, sexual violence, economic abuse,stalking, intimidation, isolation, and/or coercion. When disaggregated by sexualorientation, lifetime prevalence rates of IPV are 35% for heterosexual women,43.8% for lesbian women, and 61.1% for bisexual women (Walters et al. 2013).While men also experience IPV, the effects on women are more severe due to ahigher risk of injury and death (Petrosky et al. 2017). Additionally, women of colorare disproportionately affected by IPV due to structural deprivation, oppression, andsocial and institutional racism and discrimination (Richie 2012).

Research indicates that victims of IPV experience numerous far-reaching anddevastating physical, psychological, and social consequences (Black 2011; Cokeret al. 2002). Survivors regularly face isolation from social networks and difficultyaccessing limited community resources (Dugan et al. 1999). They also experiencestrained relationships with employers and healthcare providers as they often cannotdisclose their abuse due to the danger of retaliatory violence (Warshaw et al. 2009).The pervasive social effects of IPV also include an increased likelihood of poverty,homelessness, and risk of substance use/abuse among victims (Hetling and Zhang2010).

This chapter provides an overview of the criminal justice system’s response toIPV with an emphasis on the role feminist activism has played in the evolution ofthis response. First, we provide a historical review of the development and imple-mentation of criminal justice interventions targeting IPV, resulting in part fromfeminist activism. Then we explore law enforcement policies targeting IPV, with aspecific examination of mandatory and preferred arrest. This is followed by anoverview of the courts’ adjudicatory management of IPV cases, including no-dropprosecution policies and domestic violence courts. Next, correctional responses toIPV are discussed, including offender treatment standards and Global PositioningSystems (GPS) programs as a form of pretrial supervision. Finally, we examine

2 S. B. Harper and A. R. Gover

coordinated community response mechanisms put in place to address IPV that workin conjunction and/or collaboration with components of the criminal justice system.

This chapter focuses specifically on IPV in heterosexual relationships whereinviolence is perpetrated by men against women because feminist advocacy targetingthe criminal justice system’s response to IPV has primarily focused on opposite-sexrelationships. However, it is important to note that women andmen can be victims ofIPV.

Historical Backdrop and Feminist Response to Intimate PartnerViolence

Over the past 50 years, the criminal justice response to IPV has evolved frompatriarchal and apathetic to increasingly punitive due in large part to the efforts ofbattered women’s advocates and feminist activists (Houston 2014). The focus ofthese efforts was to correct historical, legal, and ethical disparities in legal pro-tections provided to abused women (Fagan 1996; see also chapter on ▶ “Trends andDebates”). Throughout the nineteenth century, common law did not sanction hus-bands who physically victimized their wives (Pleck 1987; Robbins 1999). Similarly,early rape laws included marital exemptions because women’s bodies were legallyconsidered the property of their husbands (Wilson and Daly 1992). Alabama andMassachusetts were the first states to criminalize domestic violence in 1871, and by1920, statutes prohibiting “wife beating” were passed in every state (Asmus et al.1991).

After wife battering was made illegal across the United States, the criminal justicesystem dealt with the implementation of these laws. Levels of enforcement ofdomestic violence statutes varied across states. Moreover, when statutes wereenforced, the criminal justice response was lackluster at best (Houston 2014). Duringthe 1960s and 1970s, many police departments had policies in place to address“domestic disputes” between married couples (Truninger 1971). The majority ofthese policies actively discouraged arrest and instead favored officers providingcrisis intervention or counseling for abusers (Bard and Zacker 1971). For instance,in 1975, Oakland, California, law enforcement officers were trained to respond todomestic disputes as “peacemakers” rather than “enforcers of the law” (Zorza 1992).Additionally, officer reluctance to make an arrest in IPV cases is documented byearly IPV research (Truninger 1971). As Fagan (1996) explained:

Spouse abuse was viewed by the police and the courts as an intractable interpersonal conflictunsuited for police attention and inappropriate for prosecution and substantive punishment[Parnas 1967]. In fact, many police departments had “hands off” policies prior to the 1970’s,and police training manuals actually specified that arrest was to be avoided wheneverpossible in responding to domestic disputes [IACP 1967]. (p. 8)

During this time period, few arrests were made due to specific statutory require-ments (Houston 2014; Fagan 1996; Parnas 1967). For example, some state laws

A Feminist Perspective on the Criminal Justice System Response to Domestic. . . 3

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required police officers to witness a man perpetrating violence before they couldarrest him without a warrant (this changed post-implementation of mandatory arrestlaws, described later in the chapter; Houston 2014; Martin 1976)). Complicating thecriminal justice system response further, many IPV victims refused to testify in courtdue to legitimate concerns about retaliatory violence and the welfare of themselvesand their children without the income of their spouses (Guzik 2007). These concernsled to increased rates of dropped charges and prosecutors dismissing IPV cases moreoften than other violent crime cases (Fagan 1996). Additionally, throughout the1970s, most state IPV laws only applied to married women (Fagan 1996).

The battered women’s movement and feminist activism during the 1960s and1970s worked to respond to these system-wide weaknesses through framing solu-tions for IPV within a legal context (Zorza 1992). Their efforts focused on strength-ening criminal justice responses to IPV, creating new laws and enhancing legalprotections for abused women, and imposing more severe sentencing of offenders(Zorza 1992). Advocates specifically worked toward increasing social recognition ofIPV as a public health issue rather than a private family matter and mobilized toprovide protections for victims and punish offenders (Fagan 1996).

In the midst of late 1970s activism, several courts ruled that police departmentswere liable for damages if they failed to arrest IPV offenders due to violations ofvictims’ equal protection and due process rights (see, e.g., Scott v. Hart 1977, andThurman v. City of Torrington 1985, and Champagne 2015). Additionally, resultsfrom the landmark Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE) revealedthat IPV nonintervention police practices were considerably less effective than arrestin reducing reoffending (Sherman and Berk 1984). These efforts (combined withfeminist and battered women’s activism detailed throughout this chapter) promptedthe US Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence (in 1984) to recommendthat states pass and implement legislation allowing for warrantless arrest of IPVoffenders when probable cause could be determined (Xie et al. 2012).

Feminist Perspectives on IPV and the Criminal Justice SystemResponse

Feminists consider the social divide between public and private life as dangerous forIPV victims because violence that occurs behind closed doors is excluded frompublic attention (Hall 2014). According to radical feminist Catharine MacKinnon(1983), this paradigm offered “no recourse to women for whom the private sphere isnot a haven of freedom, but is instead a space wherein they are beaten, raped, andoppressed” (Hall 2014, n.p.). Thus, the family serves as both “a mirror and an agentof patriarchal society” (Houston 2014, p. 238). Feminists strived to disrupt this falsebinary, demanding state interventions to address what was previously considered aprivate matter (Hall 2014).

Feminists view IPV as a “patriarchal force” that reflects and reinforces maledomination at the individual and systemic levels (Houston 2014). While early anti-IPV activism sought to maintain the nuclear family and the associated patriarchal


ideals, activism in the late 1960s and 1970s worked to foster recognition of IPVas aproblem specific to the inequality, oppression, and male dominance inherent topatriarchy (Ake and Arnold 2017). Feminists have argued that the criminal justicesystem’s lax response to IPV bolstered patriarchy and female subordination withinthe home and society, necessitating a punitive legal response reflective of women’sexperiences (Ruttenberg 1994). At the same time, feminists have remained skepticalabout the efficacy of a traditionally male-centered, oppressive criminal justicesystem in addressing violence against women (Houston 2014). Many of theunforeseen consequences and challenges associated with criminal justice IPV inter-ventions discussed throughout this chapter speak to these concerns and issues.

The combined results of this activism, the impact of research findings, andlawsuits brought by abused women against police departments led the majority ofpolice departments to change the way they responded to IPV (Fagan 1996). By 1980,the majority of states had passed some form of IPV legislation (Horton et al. 1987),including mandatory IPV training for police officers and an increase in the severityof punishment for IPVoffending (Leisenring 2008). Also during this time period, 47states passed IPV legal protections requiring changes to protection orders, enablingarrests without a warrant for misdemeanor assaults, and recognizing abuse history aspart of a self-defense legal defense for women who killed their abusers (Fagan 1996).Today, spousal rape is criminalized in all 50 states, although 20 state statutes makedistinctions between sexual violence between married couples and those who are notmarried (Levine 2018).

Criminal Justice System Response to Intimate Partner Violence

Law Enforcement

Mandatory/Preferred ArrestMandatory arrest policies require law enforcement officers to make an arrest ifprobable cause can be established and are the most common IPV arrest policiesnationwide (Hirschel 2008; Messing et al. 2015; Mills 2003). These policies weredesigned to remove officer discretion in arrest decisions (Ammar et al. 2012;Hirschel 2008). Alternatives to mandatory arrest include preferred (arrest is encour-aged) or discretionary (allows officers complete discretion, although the extent ofdiscretion varies across departments) arrest policies; however, warrantless arrest isauthorized in all states when probable cause has been established (Hirschel et al.2007; Zeoli et al. 2011). Indicators of probable cause include the presence ofwitnesses, weapons, visible injuries, and property damage (Ferraro 1989). Thedistinction between mandatory and preferred arrest is that mandatory arrest requiresan arrest to be made if probable cause has been established while preferred arrestrecommends arrest as the best option, but allows officers a degree of discretion inmaking that decision. Discretionary arrest policies on the other hand allow officersfull discretion in making arrest decisions at the scene.


The MDVE (Sherman and Berk 1984) was the first large-scale study to investi-gate mandatory arrest policies and IPV reoffending. The study evaluated cases ofmisdemeanor assault (N = 314) over a 6-month period and found that when policearrested IPV perpetrators, recidivism rates were 50% lower than when police usedother responses such as attempting to mediate the conflict or ordering one party toleave the home (Sherman and Berk 1984). The Spouse Assault Replication Program(SARP) included six comparable replications to test the reliability of the MDVEresults (see “Mandatory/Preferred Arrest and Recidivism” section for a descriptionof the studies’ findings; e.g., Hirschel and Hutchinson 1992; Pate and Hamilton1992; Sherman et al. 1992; see also Maxwell et al. 2002). Findings from thesestudies combined with legal pressure from the aforementioned lawsuits againstpolice departments and feminist/battered women’s advocate activism led to theestablishment of mandatory arrest and preferred arrest policies across many policedepartments nationwide. Hirschel et al. (2007) examined arrest statutes among the19 states that contributed data to the National Incident-Based Reporting System(NIBRS) in 2000. Eight of these states (42%) had policies mandating arrest, pre-ferred arrest laws were utilized in four states (21%), and the remaining seven states(37%) had discretionary arrest laws.

Battered women’s advocates and many feminists embraced mandatory and pre-ferred arrest policies because it was thought that these interventions would deterperpetrators from reoffending, thereby reducing victimization and improving victimsafety (Zorza 1994). Additionally, many advocates supported a mandatory and/orpreferred arrest response because they thought that by removing the victim from theprocess, the abuser would be less likely to inflict retaliatory violence (Goodmark2009). In alignment with feminist objectives, mandatory and preferred arrest bringsIPVoutside the home into the social realm, communicating the message that the statewill not tolerate IPV (Houston 2014). As a result, mandatory/preferred arrest helps todisrupt historical, socially entrenched power imbalances between men and womenand creates a space for women’s interests within the patriarchal criminal justicesystem (Nichols 2014). At the same time, some feminist scholars such as Zorza andWoods (1994) did not view the results from the MDVE as providing support for thedeterrent effects of arrest. Arresting offenders and being punitive seemed to accom-plish the goals of everyone in the 1980s, assuming that the criminal justice systemand victims had similar goals. However, as explored below, this may have been afaulty assumption.

Mandatory/Preferred Arrest and RecidivismShortly after the MDVE study (Sherman and Berk 1984) was conducted, theDepartment of Justice funded replication studies in the following jurisdictions:Omaha, Milwaukee, Colorado Springs, Metro-Dade, and Charlotte to examine thedeterrent impact of arrest (i.e., the SARP described above). Results across the studieswere mixed revealing only modest effects of mandatory arrest on reoffending rates(Maxwell et al. 2002); showing that reductions in offending vary across settings(Garner et al. 1995); and demonstrating that IPV offenders with high stakes inconformity (e.g., were married or employed) were less likely to recidivate when


compared to offenders with low stakes in conformity (Sherman and Smith 1992).Conversely, two replication studies found that arrest actually increased reoffendingamong IPV perpetrators (Maxwell et al. 2002; Schmidt and Sherman 1993).

Research has revealed mixed results specific to the effectiveness of mandatoryarrest in increasing rates of arrest. Prior to the widespread implementation ofmandatory and preferred arrest policies across jurisdictions nationwide, arrest ratesfor IPV were between 7% and 15% (Durfee 2012). However, post arrest policyimplementation, arrest rates increased to 30% or greater (Eitle 2005). Studies havealso found that arrest rates significantly increased in states with mandatory andpreferred arrest policies compared to states with discretionary arrest policies(Hirschel et al. 2007). Yet, while studies suggest the likelihood of arrest hasincreased, research also indicates that arrest occurs in only 50% of IPV cases(Eitle 2005). One study based on self-reports found that while victim reports ofIPV increased after mandatory arrest policies were introduced, arrests only increasedslightly (Ho 2000). Other studies have found that arrests actually decreased post-adoption of mandatory arrest policies (Balos and Trotzky 1988; Ferraro 1995;Lanza-Kaduce et al. 1995), while some research suggests no significant differencesin arrests post-implementation of the policies (Ho 2000).

Maxwell et al. (2002) compared the IPV assault records of men arrested under amandatory arrest intervention (n = 1733) and men not arrested (n = 2298) andconducted interviews with victims to assess whether arrest deterred IPV recidivism.The study found that 75% of arrested batterers did not recidivate and that 60% ofvictims reported no new victimizations during the study period (6 months to 2 yearsafter the initial arrest); however, the size of this effect was modest. Multiple otherstudies have found similar results (Feld and Straus 1989; Langan and Innes 1986;Quigley and Leonard 1996). Conversely, some research suggests that mandatoryarrest does not reduce IPV recidivism because reductions in IPV reporting and arrestmay just reflect reductions in victims reporting their victimization rather than actualdecreases in abuse perpetration (Novisky and Peralta 2015). Another study revealedthat mandatory arrest laws are not a significant predictor of IPV victimization (Xie etal. 2012). Abused women have indicated that while mandatory arrest may reduceviolence in the short term, it fails to have the same effect long term (Barata andSchneider 2004). While some research suggests that mandatory arrest is associatedwith reductions in recidivism, it is important to note that reductions in arrest andreporting of IPV incidents do not necessarily indicate that abuse is not occurring.Survivors often do not want to engage the criminal justice system and thereforechoose to not call the police (Novisky and Peralta 2015). According to one study, thefive most common reasons victims do not call the police after a victimizationincident include the following: (1) they do not think the incident was serious enoughto involve the police; (2) they have a negative opinion of the police due to a priorexperience; (3) they do not want to “deal” with the courts; (4) they do not want theirpartner to go to jail; and (5) they are afraid of legal consequences for themselves(Gover et al. 2013).


Unforeseen ConsequencesIt was originally thought that putting the arrest decision in the hands of the statewould protect victims from retaliatory abuse (Goolkasian 1986). Yet, mandatoryarrest policies have created a myriad of unforeseen, negative consequences that aredetrimental to victims (Miller 2005). For example, victims may feel disempoweredbecause mandatory arrest removes their influence over whether an arrest is made.Barata and Senn (2003) argue that mandatory and preferred arrest may silencevictims’ voices, which contradicts the original feminist-based empowering inten-tions of the policies. Other negative consequences include disproportionate increasesin the arrests of women (Crager et al. 2003; Durfee 2012; Martin 1997; Miller 2001;Simpson et al. 2006; Strack 2000) and dual arrests wherein both the victim andoffender are arrested (DeLeon-Granados et al. 2006; Frye et al. 2007).

For example, between 1991 and 1996 in California, arrests of women for IPVincreased 156% compared to the 21% increase in arrests among men (Strack 2000),and similar increases in rates were seen in five other states. These findings show thatwhile arrest rates increased among men post mandatory arrest policies, these ratesare considerably lower than the increased arrest rates for women (Durfee 2012).While some research suggests women perpetrate IPV at rates similar to men (seeArcher 2000), extensive research has found that females are more likely to perpetrateIPV to defend themselves against male violence and/or are often incorrectly identi-fied as the primary aggressor (see below for a discussion of primary aggressorguidelines for law enforcement; Chesney-Lind 2002; Hamberger and Potente1994; Henning et al. 2006; Miller 2001; Pollack et al. 2005; Rajan and McCloskey2007). Although in general, compared to men, women’s use of IPV appears to bemore in reaction to men’s use of violence, the use of violence for self-defense is morecomplex than originally thought. However, a review of this literature is beyond thescope of this chapter (for further discussion on this topic, see Hamberger and Larsen2015).

Additionally, police officers often respond to IPV calls that are “situationallyambiguous” wherein both parties appear to be both victim and offender (Durfee2012). Police officers may choose to arrest both partners when they cannot establishwhich partner initiated the assault or caused the most harm. Research suggests that instates with mandatory arrest policies, police officers are significantly more likely toarrest both the victim and perpetrator in comparison to states with discretionaryarrest policies (Hirschel et al. 2007). Among women who have been arrested for IPV,the likelihood of dual arrest is four times higher than men arrested for IPV (Henningand Renauer 2005).

The complex issue of dual arrests was addressed in the 2005 reauthorization ofthe Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The VAWA provided grant fundingopportunities to states for police departments to implement new arrest policies tominimize dual arrest. The majority of law enforcement agencies created andimplemented primary aggressor policies to reduce rates of dual arrest (Hirscheland Buzawa 2012). These policies were intended to help police officers identifythe offending party prior to making an arrest decision. Several studies have foundthat primary aggressor laws have significantly reduced dual arrest by up to 33% (see


Hirschel and Deveau 2017), while other studies have found an increase in dualarrests (Henning et al. 2006). These problems associated with mandatory andpreferred arrest policies may be exacerbated by ineffective implementation ofpolicies among law enforcement (Ferraro 1995; Lanza-Kaduce et al. 1995). Henninget al. (2006) found that among women convicted of IPV, only a small number couldbe defined as the primary aggressor in the relationship, yet this does not necessarilymean that they could be classified as the victim either.

Final Thoughts on Law Enforcement/Mandatory ArrestAlthough feminists have cautiously acknowledged the necessity of criminal justicesystem intervention in IPV, they also argue that the law struggles to alter socialized,systemic sexist perceptions of women’s inferiority (Griffiths 1988). Some researchsuggests that sexism among police officers is widespread (Huisman et al. 2005) inpart because of the prevalence of sexism in the larger culture combined with thepersistence of hegemonic masculinity in police departments (Prokos and Padavic2002). It is suggested that these perceptions guide arrest decision-making and thetrajectory of the criminal justice response to IPV within a male-controlled system(Huisman et al. 2005).

Some feminists argue that although mandatory and preferred arrest initiates aresponse by the criminal justice system, it also takes away women’s freedom to makedecisions about the involvement of the criminal justice system in their personalrelationships, which fails to address inequality between the sexes (Goodmark 2009).For instance, many victims call the police to stop the violence but do not want theirpartner arrested because often, they fear their abusers will inflict retaliatory harmonce they are released from jail (Phillips and Sobol 2010). As Goodmark (2009)remarked, “The problem with policies like mandatory arrest is that they reify twogoals-safety and perpetrator accountability-and marginalize autonomy, servingwomen who share the goals of the system but disenfranchising those with divergentgoals” (p. 4).

Many feminist scholars contend that the solution to IPV lies in violence preven-tion programs rather than arrest policy (Houston 2014). After nearly four decades ofmandatory arrest, we know that the goals of IPV victims and the criminal justicesystem are not always the same. Survivors often feel that police overlook thecomplex context of IPV when making arrest decisions (Smith 2000). For example,while the system initiates mandatory interventions, a survivor may feel that recon-ciling with her partner and keeping their family together is the best choice for her ifshe still loves her partner, is economically dependent on him, and/or has childrenwith him. As a result, the criminal justice system may sometimes disempowervictims when making decisions about what is best for their lives, safety, and well-being.


Courts

Following the implementation of mandatory arrest policies, the judicial systemexperienced an increase in IPVoffenders for further processing through the criminaljustice system. As a result, many courts implemented aggressive prosecutionmethods, such as “no-drop” policies, to increase the likelihood that cases would beadjudicated and punishment rendered, as well as to address issues associated withvictims refusing to participate in the prosecution of their partners (Hanna 1996). Onecould argue that holding offenders accountable requires the criminal justice systemto both arrest and prosecute. As discussed above, prior to the implementation ofmandatory interventions to address IPV, police were often resistant to arrest IPVoffenders due to prevailing sexist attitudes and stereotypes about abused women aswell as statutory limitations. Mandatory arrest was in part intended to address theseissues. A secondary goal of the criminal justice system was to address the lack ofprosecution of offenders and victim unwillingness to participate in the prosecutionprocess so as to enhance victim safety (although mandatory interventions such asarrest and no-drop prosecution may increase the likelihood of retaliatory violence,Guzik 2007). Feminists viewed no-drop policies as a method to stop abusive menfrom using intimidation to control victims’ decisions to pursue prosecution (Miccio2005).

However, similar to mandatory and preferred arrest, no-drop prosecution policiestake discretion from victims and place it in the hands of the state while simulta-neously communicating that IPV is a serious crime requiring offender accountabilityand state control. Ford and Regoli (1992) randomly assigned IPV victims to either acondition where they could choose to drop the case against their abuser or one wherethey were not given a choice, and results indicated that the latter had higher rates ofviolence pretrial and post-conviction than the former. However, no-drop policiesmay create a disconnect between feminist goals of removing male control ofwomen’s decision-making and empowering victims to make decisions for them-selves regarding their cases. That is, these policies often fail to consider the victim’sopinions and eliminate their role in the process (Hanna 1996). Some victims may notbe ready to leave their relationships and want to stay with their partners and thereforenot want their abuser prosecuted (Phillips and Sobol 2010). Victims in this positionmay not be willing to cooperate with the criminal justice system’s efforts to imposepunitive sanctions against their partners and may be less likely to fully cooperatewith the prosecution of their abusers.

Specialized domestic violence courts are an intervention that addresses theseissues by integrating offender punishment and treatment with victim safety andconsideration for victim perspectives about appropriate trial dispositions. The nextsection discusses two judicial responses to IPV: no-drop prosecution policies andspecialized domestic violence courts.

No-Drop ProsecutionNo-drop prosecution policies became popular in the late 1980s and were widelyutilized by the 1990s (Nichols 2014). Available but dated research indicates that 66%


of prosecutors’ offices were using no-drop prosecution policies after the interventionbecame popular (Davis et al. 2001) and that percentage has likely increased acrosstime (more research is definitively needed). Generally defined, a no-drop policydenies the IPV victim the option to freely withdraw a complaint once formal chargeshave been filed. In turn, the policy limits the prosecutor’s discretion to drop a casesolely because the victim is unwilling to cooperate (Corsilles 1994). As withmandatory and preferred arrest policies, no-drop policies were also implementedwith the intention that victims would be protected from retaliation because thedecision to prosecute was being made by the state. No-drop policies can lead tovictims being subpoenaed to testify if they do not willingly cooperate (DeCarlo2016). Additionally, victims can be held in contempt of court and further criminallysanctioned if they fail to provide testimony in court (DeCarlo 2016).

The use of coercion by the state requiring victims’ participation in the prosecutionprocess as a policy response is intended to protect victims and improve prosecutionrates (Ford 2003). Prior to the use of no-drop policies, victim testimony during trialwas critical to the prosecution’s case, and therefore the victim’s cooperation wasparamount (DeCarlo 2016). This reliance was often frustrating to prosecutorsbecause many victims would change their minds about filing charges and then failto assist prosecutors in the prosecution process, which oftentimes led to chargesbeing dropped (DeCarlo 2016). No-drop prosecution policies often eliminate thevictim’s participation, including the need for their testimony during trial if theinvestigation was thoroughly conducted to include well-written reports, thoroughevidence collection, and comprehensive interviews. Consequently, evidence in a“no-drop” prosecution policy may include 911 recordings, victim statements andinterviews, witness interviews, photos of injuries currently visible and several dayslater to show progression, and other pictures from the location of the incident.

There are two types of no-drop policies: “hard” or “soft.” With the standard“hard” no-drop policy, victims have no discretion over dropping charges in their case(Davis et al. 2001). If a prosecutor has ample evidence to move forward, they will doso despite victims’ wishes. However, some jurisdictions follow “soft” no-droppolicies, which allow victims to withdraw from participating in the prosecutionprocess if doing so compromises their safety. Finally, a third direct prosecutionstrategy for the system’s response to IPV is to take an “evidence-based” prosecutionapproach by identifying cases that have the highest likelihood of conviction (i.e.,evidence-based) without the participation of the victim.

Research examining the effectiveness of no-drop prosecution policies have foundmixed results. Some studies have revealed that no-drop prosecution reduces recid-ivism (Ford 2003), while other studies have found the opposite (Finn 2013). Fordand Regoli (1993) used an experimental design in the Indianapolis Domestic Vio-lence Prosecution Experiment to examine the impact of prosecution policy type onshort-term recidivism. They found that allowing victims to have control overdropping charges improved their levels of safety. Specifically, victims’ riskof experiencing subsequent violence was reduced after offenders were arrested onvictim-initiated warrants. The researchers concluded that these findings supported a


prosecution policy that permits the victim to be in control of the charges (Ford andRegoli 1993).

Feminists have debated the issue of “individual choice” in no-drop prosecutionpolicies with some feminists arguing that increased prosecution of offenders isnecessary to stop the sociocultural normalization of IPV (Hanna 1996), whileother feminists posit that rigid no-drop prosecution policies are harmful becausethey are not survivor-defined and deny women agency (Dempsey 2007). While thestate’s goal is to secure a prosecution of the defendant, some victims may wish torepair their relationships, secure treatment for their partners, and keep their familiestogether. Policies that disempower victims who do not want to prosecute areantithetical to the domestic violence movement. The incompatibility of the “greatergood” vs. “individual choice” feminist debate highlights the conflict in addressingthe needs of victims while also attending to the system’s justice goals (Dempsey2007).

Domestic Violence Courts.Since 1999, specialized courts focused on IPV (referred to as domestic violencecourts) have been implemented in 208 jurisdictions (Labriola et al. 2009). Firstdeveloped in the United States, other countries such as Canada, Australia, and theUnited Kingdom quickly followed suit (Gover 2009). Domestic violence courtsincrease coordination among criminal justice and social services agencies to improvethe judicial response to criminal cases of IPV by addressing victims’ needs andholding offenders accountable. Domestic violence courts are intended to affectpositive social outcomes such as reducing reoffending, improving victim services,and addressing community needs (Porter et al. 2010).

Domestic violence courts were introduced during a time when “problem-solvingcourts” were emerging to address crime problems of serious social concern (e.g.,drug courts, prostitution courts, mental health courts, and community courts). Thereis wide variation among problem-solving courts in operational methods, program-matic emphases, offender processing procedures, and ultimate objectives. Onedifference between domestic violence courts and other problem-solving courts isthe non-voluntary nature of the court. While many problem-solving courts arevoluntary diversion programs that do not necessarily sanction or mandate offendersto the court, many jurisdictions with domestic violence courts process every offenderwho is arrested for IPV. Indeed, domestic violence courts employ a variety ofprograms and practices. For example, domestic violence court processing mayinclude a specialized judge, specialized prosecutor, specialized calendar for IPVcases, and coordination in court for victim resources and needs and offendertreatment needs such as mental health services or substance abuse treatment. Overall,domestic violence court practices vary from court to court.

Domestic violence courts are based on the theoretical framework of a therapeuticjurisprudence philosophy of justice (TPJ) (Ostrom 2003). Mental health courts werethe first to use the TPJ, however the concept was later adopted by domestic violenceand other specialized courts (Tsai 2000). Therapeutic jurisprudence is guided by aprimary principle that law is socially powerful and affects the mental health and


psychological functioning of those subject to it (Winick 1997). As such, TPJprioritizes positive therapeutic effects within the framework of the law. Whileevaluating the potential benefits and effects of their decisions, the approach requirescriminal justice decision-makers to first focus on victim safety and second onoffender accountability.

The Domestic Violence Court in Lexington County, South Carolina (SCDVC),provides a demonstrative case study of a problem-solving court for jurisdictionsconsidering the development and implementation of a specialized domestic violencecourt. The SCDVC processes all individuals within its jurisdiction (the county) whoare arrested for IPV. The majority of offenders processed by the court are placed onno-contact orders in bond court after arrest, a unique component of the courtintended to improve victim safety and offender accountability (Gover et al. 2007).No-contact orders remain valid until the offender completes court-ordered treatment,there is a disposition in the case, or the no-contact order is dismissed by the court.

The underlying theoretical foundation of the SCDVC is a TPJ. This rehabilitativeframework allows the SCDVC to focus on the presenting incident while putting thevictim’s safety as the court’s number one priority. The TPJ has a procedural justiceaspect wherein fair, respectful, and just processing and treatment leads to positiveoutcomes for victims, defendants, and the community. It is possible for the court toemphasize TPJ because of the SCDVC’s specialized court staff, which includesjudges trained in IPV, a specialized prosecutor, victim advocate, court administrator,and IPV law enforcement investigators. A representative from the Department ofMental Health also works with the court to assess the offender’s treatment needs.Additionally, the court staff includes a legal advocate who is present in court toconnect the victim with shelter and legal resources. A representative from the state’sdomestic violence treatment program is also present to coordinate the offender’streatment, as all offenders are required to complete a 26-week domestic abusetreatment program.

Process evaluation results from interviews with victims and defendants whosecases were processed in the SCDVC indicated that the vast majority thought theywere treated with respect and dignity by the court, and results suggest that theirexperiences support the efficacy of TPJ components within domestic violencecourts. Overall, Gover et al. (2007) reported that 90% of victims and 68% ofdefendants felt like the court gave them adequate time to explain their side of thestory; 77% of victims and 68% of defendants thought the outcome in their case wasfair and just; and 77% of victims and 68% of defendants felt like they were treatedwith respect and dignity by the court.

Other evaluation research has looked at the relationship between recidivism ratesbefore and after the implementation of domestic violence courts to examine theireffectiveness (Gover et al. 2003). In addition to the process evaluation ofthe SCDVC, researchers conducted an outcome evaluation to examine the relation-ship between the implementation of the specialized court and recidivism. A com-parison of recidivism rates for a historical random sample of IPVoffenders processedin traditional magistrate court prior to the implementation of the SCDVC to arandom sample of IPV offenders who were processed in the SCDVC indicated that


offenders processed in the SCDVC had significantly lower recidivism rates. Specif-ically, being processed in the specialized court as an IPV offender compared to thetraditional magistrate court decreased the odds of recidivism by 40% (Gover et al.2003). For IPV offenders who were processed in the SCDVC, the coordinationamong the courtroom workgroup and the successful implementation of the TPJmay have been the key to positive outcome evaluation findings (Gover et al. 2007).

Final Thoughts on CourtsFeminists have argued that patriarchy is the core of IPVand that the state’s traditionalresponse to IPV perpetuates rather than ameliorates systemic patriarchy as well aspatriarchy that occurs within the home between intimate partners. Prior to domesticviolence courts, IPV prosecution goals were often geared toward preserving thefamily and its intrinsic patriarchal structure and nature, rather than to improving thehealth and safety of abused women. Feminists may argue that such preservationreinforces the patriarchal government bureaucratically “managing” women. Domes-tic violence courts allow the state to respond to IPV while incorporating a feministperspective about abuse being embedded in social conceptions of masculinity. Thatis, domestic violence courts do not attribute blame to women for provoking theirabusers, but rather focus on being attentive to victim needs and holding maleoffenders accountable through community service, counseling, multiple reviewsessions, etc. conducted by dedicated judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, coun-selors, and even clerks.

Corrections

Following the passage of mandatory and preferred arrest and judicial interventions,the correctional component of the criminal justice system responded to the increasein IPV offenders entering the system through batterer intervention programs (BIPs;for more information, see the two chapters in this volume about BIPs). Theseprograms were intended to increase offender accountability and victim safety. Themajority of today’s BIPs use a feminist educational model (i.e., the Duluth Model)that requires abusers to take accountability for the abuse they perpetrate against theirintimate partners. The next section of this chapter discusses formal standards thatguide today’s BIP requirements and regulations. Then, Global Positioning System(GPS) technology will be discussed as a correctional intervention used by correc-tional departments to monitor IPV offenders’ movement and activities so as tominimize the likelihood that they will re-abuse their partners.

Domestic Violence Offender Treatment Standards and BIPsThe Duluth Model (Pence and Paymar 1993) is a power and control interventionfocused on addressing male abusive behavior as the consequence of men feelingentitled to control and dominate their intimate partners (i.e., patriarchy). It is thedomestic violence offender treatment program most widely used today (Paymar andBarnes 2007). This approach is intended to dismantle power imbalances in male-


female relationships and in society as the model seeks to shift the responsibility forthe abuse from women to the men responsible for committing it, alter men’s powerand control ideologies that influence their abusive behavior, and encourage equalitywithin intimate relationships. Within this model, men meet in groups led by a trainedfacilitator who moderates discussion about IPV as a consequence of the groupmembers’ socialized power and control behaviors that function to subjugatewomen. Within this context, men’s violence is intentional and the result of individualchoice, and the Duluth Model holds men completely accountable for their violence.This is accomplished through deconstructing the power and control motives of IPVincidents and replacing them with a model for relationships based on equality.

Additionally, a central component of Pence and Paymar’s (1993) BIP approachis a coordinated community response (as grounded in the Domestic Abuse Interven-tion Program’s [DAIP] Duluth Model) wherein BIPs work with law enforcement andthe criminal courts to hold offenders accountable and enhance victim safety. WhilePaymar and Barnes (2007) note that the Duluth Model has been referred to as the“pre-eminent model internationally,” other researchers such as Dutton and Corvo(2006) have criticized the model and have called for the abandonment of its use.Although the model has been widely accepted, research suggests it has been largelyineffective at reducing men’s IPVoffending behavior. Some researchers have arguedthat the effectiveness of these programs could be increased if they incorporated waysto address the perpetrators past trauma histories related to witnessing parentalviolence growing up in families with drug and alcohol issues and experiencingprior abuse (Wagers et al. 2019). However, past trauma histories cannot explainwhy these programs are ineffective at dismantling men’s sense of entitlement,increasingmen’s adoption of a pro-feminist masculinity, and focusingmen’s attentionon their relationships and violence (e.g., Gondolf 2000; Herman et al. 2014). Somefeminists argue that these factors may be explained by the socially engrained natureof patriarchy that supports hegemonic masculinity and the resultant expression ofmale violence and the failure of systems embedded in this ideology to effect changein abusive behavior (Ruttenberg 1994).

Domestic violence offender treatment, also referred to as batterer intervention, isguided in 47 states by formal overarching standards that articulate principles andoversight processes for offenders while in treatment (Ferraro 2017). This refers tocourt-ordered domestic violence treatment, provided by BIPs. There is no accurateestimate of the number of BIPs in the United States today (Ferraro 2017), although asomewhat recent estimate was over 2,500 (Boal and Mankowski 2014).

The administrative entity responsible for implementing IPV offender standardsvaries across states; they may be overseen by a social or health agency, a judicialboard, or other criminal justice body. While standards vary in scope, IPV offendertreatment standards address similar issues such as intake protocols and the use of riskassessment instruments, treatment content, acceptable modalities for treatment pro-grams (psychoeducational, cognitive behavioral, or psychodynamic), requirementsand certification processes for treatment providers, and competency attainment fortreatment completion. Many states have formalized their standards into statutory


language, while others are used as guiding principles for programs that are recipientsof certain funding (Maiuri and Eberle 2008).

Over a decade ago, state IPV offender treatment standards began to incorporateevidence-based research and practices into treatment models and practices (Maiuriand Eberle 2008). For example, lethality/danger assessments have been developed tomanage IPVoffenders’ reoffending risk and needs, which influence standards acrossthe nation. Many states’ standards require programs to collect standardized data andparticipate in evaluation research to continually monitor and improve the treatmentand accountability of those convicted of committing IPV. While prior states’ stan-dards narrowly focused on power and control specifically, standards in most statestoday are multifaceted and interdisciplinary in content (Maiuri and Eberle 2008).

Colorado as a Case StudyAll convicted IPV offenders in Colorado are required by statute to complete IPVtreatment – ordering treatment is not a discretionary option for judges. Thus,Colorado continuously has high numbers of offenders seeking IPV treatment andpractitioners providing treatment.

Colorado’s standards for IPV treatment emphasize evidence-based research andinformed the development and use of an assessment instrument called the DomesticViolence Risk and Needs Assessment (DVRNA; Gover et al. 2015). The DVRNA isone of the most unique aspects of Colorado’s treatment model and has a differenti-ated and non-time-driven treatment focus. The DVRNA is made up of 14 static anddynamic risk factors for IPVand non-IPVoffending, given that IPVoffenders are nota homogeneous population. The DVRNA is administered at intake by a treatmentprovider, and the overall score informs offenders’ placement into one of three treat-ment intensity levels: A (least), B (moderate), and C (high) (Gover et al. 2015).Treatment is managed by a team of three individuals called the MultidisciplinaryTreatment Team (MTT): the treatment provider, the probation officer, and a treat-ment victim advocate. The victim advocate addresses the victim’s safety concernsshould she want to be in touch with the treatment-providing agency, which is madeoptional for safety planning purposes.

This is a unique case study of statewide IPVoffender treatment standards that areevidence-based, promote research and evaluation, and are multifaceted in scope(Gover et al. 2015). This evidence-based program not only provides treatment tooffenders that is specialized to address an offender’s level of reoffending risk,but also allows victims to have a voice in the process, obtain services they need toenhance safety and well-being, and follows up with the victim advocate should re-victimization occur so as to coordinate more effective treatment for IPVoffenders.

Global Positioning System (GPS) ProgramsWhen victims attempt to protect themselves from IPV by calling the police and/orpursuing prosecution of their abusers, their intimate partners often violently retaliateand escalate the frequency and severity of violence, which sometimes leads to female-victim intimate partner homicide (IPH; Dugan et al. 1999). Protecting IPV victims iscomplex given that offenders know not only where their intimate partners live but


where their families and friends live, as well as where they work, like to go to have fun,daily routines, location of childcare and school, and phone and email contacts.

Over the past 30 years, the criminal justice system has steadily increased its use ofelectronic monitoring (EM) programs for offenders. GPS is an EM technology cur-rently used in at least 25 states that have passed GPS legislation (Gur et al. 2015).GPS is typically used in place of incarceration as an intermediate sanction (e.g.,intensive probation) or to supervise offenders during pretrial. GPS technologyoperates to monitor the movement and activities of IPVoffenders so as to minimizethe likelihood that they will re-abuse their partners. Among IPV offenders, thetechnology allows for 24/7 real-time surveillance, restricts contact with victims,improves the likelihood offenders will appear in court, and helps to increase publicsafety (Erez et al. 2012a; Ibarra et al. 2014). Typically, GPS technology is placed onthe IPVoffender during the pretrial period after they have been arrested and duringthe bond setting stage as a condition of their release from jail, and then thetechnology is removed upon court disposition (conviction, acquittal, or dismissalof charges; Bales et al. 2010).

Research suggests that IPVoffenders typically attempt to persuade their intimatepartners to withdraw their participation in the criminal justice process throughincreased use of abuse, harassment, and intimidation during the pretrial period(Erez et al. 2012b). During the pretrial phase, criminal protection orders (POs) arethe first form of criminal justice intervention usually employed to address theseproblems, and GPS helps to bolster their strength (“gives them teeth”) and minimizepre-trial misconduct (Erez et al. 2012a, b, p. 4). GPS usually consist of a one- or two-piece tracking device attached to the ankle of the defendant (e.g., the two-piecedevice consists of an ankle monitor and a portable tracking device that the offendermust carry with them at all times).

Upon being placed on GPS, defendants must move out of the residence that theyshared with the victim (if applicable) through the duration of their sentence on thetechnology. The defendant must report to a pretrial supervising officer who isassigned to their case (Erez et al. 2012a, b). Survivors typically work with thesupervising officer to establish exclusion zones around their residence, place ofwork, and/or locations they frequent. If the defendant goes within these exclusionzones while on GPS, the supervising officer is notified by cell phone, email, andcomputer (although technology varies across jurisdictions). The supervising officermust then respond to the alert either by calling the defendant or by audible “pings” tothe GPS device or by requesting police to do welfare checks and make arrests ifnecessary. To a lesser extent, some agencies send alerts to the victim through textmessage or pager when the defendant violates the zone restrictions (Erez et al.2012a, b). However, sometimes the supervising officer fails to respond to exclusionzone violation notifications (or notify victims), which does not help to mitigate orreduce the victim’s risk of harm. Research suggests that victims often feel a falsesense of security while their abusers are on GPS, so agencies may inform victims thatGPS technology is just an information-gathering device and incapable of ensuringtheir safety (Erez et al. 2012a, b).


Like probation and parole, while on GPS, IPV defendants must abide by numer-ous liberty restrictions such as curfew and/or only being allowed outside theirresidence for a few hours a day to conduct personal business (excluding workhours). The level of restriction and intensity of supervision varies as does theagency’s level of communication with victims, which ranges from none to extensivebased on the number of staff dedicated to this task (Erez et al. 2012a, b). Defendantsare typically on GPS anywhere from a few days to almost 2 years, depending on theamount of time it takes for the case to be processed through the system and theduration of time spent on the technology varies across jurisdictions (Erez et al.2012a, b). Some research suggests that the technology has resulted in decreased IPVrecidivism in the short term and reduced incidence of IPV arrest in the long term(Erez et al. 2012a, b), but minimal research exists in this area.

Research conducted by Erez and colleagues (2012a, b) found that IPV victimsreported many benefits of GPS, including relief from ongoing abuse, control, andharassment; increased feelings of freedom associated with being able to visit locationsthey had not been able to before due to threatening behavior from their abusers; peaceof mind associated with beliefs that the technology would stop their abusers fromviolating the PO; and the ability to technologically validate experiences of harassment.The technology also reduced victims’ fear and anxiety about being re-victimized duringthe pretrial phase, and victims appreciated contact from police or other agency staffabout case issues or problems with the technology, as well as 24/7 assistance avail-ability (in the three jurisdictions being analyzed). Survivors also liked that GPS pro-grams allowed them to select the areas that became exclusion zones for their abusersand the option to have unknown exclusion zones (e.g., new residence for the victimthat is not revealed to the abuser), which made them feel safer. As discussed in the“No-Drop Prosecution” section, victims may want to avoid participating in the prose-cution process because they and their children are dependent on the perpetrator’sincome to survive and GPS allows for the defendant to work while on the technology.

However, the same study revealed that some victims expressed dissatisfactionwith GPS programs due to a lack of explanation from agency staff as to how GPSworks and its weaknesses in providing protection, and disliked that supervisingagencies were understaffed and that staff did not understand their abuser’s manip-ulative and controlling behavior in the same way that they did. For example, someIPVoffenders used their current girlfriends, friends, or family members to contact thevictim, a form of harassment the technology could not address. Similarly, victimsalso reported that they became hyper-vigilant while their abusers were on GPS,fearing retaliatory abuse from offenders becoming enraged by the restrictions. Thisanxiety was amplified by narrow exclusion zones where victims felt uncomfortablebecause their abusers could be nearby. Some victims felt that GPS effectively gavetheir abusers a map of where they would be located or were upset that sometimes thetechnology was removed with no forewarning. Additionally, some victims receivedcalls from agency staff that they felt were not specific to any real danger, whichcreated additional stress and made them lose trust in the GPS program. Theseweaknesses emphasize that although GPS has great potential to increase safety forvictims, it appears these programs lack victim-centric features (Erez et al. 2012a, b).


Final Thoughts on Corrections/GPSThe success of domestic violence courts in attending to victim needs and reducingrecidivism through an integrated approach to addressing IPV implies that othercomponents of the criminal justice system may need to coordinate their responseto IPV so as to truly effect change. Additionally, GPS technology may enhanceprosecution of IPV offenders through tracking their locations and recording exclu-sion zone breaches, which aligns with some feminist goals to increase the punitivenature of criminal justice response to IPV. However, “the supervising officer’s roleentails neither proactively catching defendants in the act, nor rehabilitating defen-dants” (Erez et al. 2012a, p. 143), which raises questions as to whether the feministmovement has truly been effective at communicating the level of seriousnessassociated with IPV and the detrimental effects for victims up to and includinghomicide (especially during periods of separation – i.e., the pretrial phase). Consid-ering the majority of IPV convictions are misdemeanors (Ferraro 2017) with limitedjail/prison time, one could argue that GPS technology is just another short-termsolution to a tremendous social concern with long-term, pervasive effects forwomen, children, and families.

Coordinated Community Response to Intimate Partner Violence

Coordinated community response (CCR) programs spread rapidly throughout theUnited States in the 1990s (Spohn 2008) and can be found in cities such as ColoradoSprings, Portland, Oregon, Baltimore, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Omaha.CCR is an intervention strategy designed to improve victim safety, expand victimservices, and reduce recidivism through the collaboration and coordination ofservices from various agencies and programs addressing the needs of IPV victimsand perpetrators. CCR programs facilitate local justice responses to target preven-tion, intervention, and treatment efforts in the community, with an aim to usefinancial and programmatic resources as effectively as possible. CCR programsalso work to provide protection to victims, hold offenders accountable, coordinateand evaluate existing IPV resources, develop new resources, and change perspec-tives oriented around social tolerance of IPV.

The most common CCR-involved agencies include law enforcement, courts,social services, healthcare providers, and educational/vocational systems (Sullivan2006). The purpose of the coordination is for service providers and justice practi-tioners to form networks of support that work collaboratively. CCRs differdepending on the community and justice agencies that are involved in each responsegroup. For example, some CCRs may be far-reaching and involve the media, clergy,and local businesses; some CCRs have utilized media campaigns involving televi-sion, newspaper ads, and community flyers to inform the public about the dangersand prevalence of IPV (e.g., Oliver 2000). Police officers and shelter workers havealso visited local schools and discussed the detrimental physical and psychologicalconsequences of IPV and where victims could go to seek assistance (Oliver 2000).


Additionally, CCRs may be victim or offender-focused; they were initiallydeveloped in response to efforts to coordinate agencies and resources in the com-munity for offender services and then followed suit for victims. An example of apopular approach to CCR (created in 1983) known as the Minneapolis InterventionProject (MIP) is described below. The MIP worked to coordinate the activities ofcriminal justice system components and various community agencies involved insanctioning, processing, and treating IPVoffenders at the community level:

The criminal justice agencies involved in this project included the police, who were respon-sible for arresting all domestic violence offenders where probable cause existed, as well as theprosecutors who were tasked with aggressively prosecuting all domestic violence cases. Inaddition, judges were responsible for ordering presentence investigations and offered stays onall incarceration sentences where the offender successfully completed a batterer interventiontreatment program. Finally, probation officers were responsible for compiling informationused in the pre-sentence reports and forwarding these reports to the judges [Syers and Edleson1992]. Other agencies involved in the MIP included volunteer advocates who were responsiblefor contacting the victim immediately after the arrest of the offender and treatment providerswho provided information to probation officers regarding offenders’ participation in treatment[Syers and Edleson 1992]. (Bouffard and Muftic 2007, p. 355)

Some research has found an increase in arrests, successful prosecutions, andsentences to treatment post-implementation of CCRs (Gamache et al. 1988). Severalstudies indicate that CCRs are effective in reducing recidivism within the jurisdic-tions where they are utilized (Babcock and Steiner 1999; Murphy et al. 1998;Steinman 1991; Syers and Edleson 1992; Tolman and Weisz 1995), while otherresearch reveals the opposite (Klevens et al. 2008; Post et al. 2010; Visher et al.2008). Most of the limited research evaluating the effectiveness of CCRs in reducingrecidivism does not compare coordinated with uncoordinated interventions, whichminimizes its potential to test for a crime-control effect of coordinated response(Garner and Maxwell 2008).

CCRs have helped to provide a victim-specific approach to the increase in dualarrests after mandatory arrest policies were implemented by law enforcement agen-cies nationwide. By bringing together practitioners, law enforcement, communityresources, and educational information from numerous sources, this initiative rep-resents an intervention that allows a coordinated effort for IPV response. Someresearch indicates a high incidence of victim-blaming among police officersresponding to IPV, attitudes which may contribute to the dual arrest rate. Particularlyas they become more victim-centric, strong CCRs may become mandatory toeffectively addressing the complexities of IPV.

Key Points

• Historically, IPV was viewed as a private matter, one not appropriate for criminaljustice system intervention. Patriarchal and outdated perspectives and stereotypesabout abused women, women’s gender roles, and IPV among law enforcement


and the courts served to perpetuate and normalize IPV in society and severdesperately needed protections for victims. However, due to feminist and advo-cate activism, extensive research on IPV arrest policies, and lawsuits broughtagainst police departments by abused women over the past 50 years, the criminaljustice system has implemented a more punitive approach to addressing IPV.While this shift in approach is definitively positive, it is also situated within amale-centered, sexist criminal justice system that is embedded in a culture thatnormalizes and accepts violence against women.

• Today, the majority of police departments in the United States have implementedmandatory arrest policies based on the contention that these policies would deterrecidivism. However, results about the effectiveness of the policies in increasingarrest are mixed. The implementation of mandatory arrest practices demonstratesthat the criminal justice system is concerned about and dedicated to addressingIPV, which aligns with feminist goals for the policies. At the same time,unforeseen negative consequences such as victims having no control overwhether an arrest is made and a substantial increase in the arrest of womencontradict feminist intentions for mandatory arrest. Additionally, mandatoryarrest has not necessarily altered sexist perspectives among law enforcement,which, one could argue, affects the extent to which officers are willing to enforcemandatory arrest policies and demonstrate concern for victim needs. As a result,some feminists have argued that violence prevention must be a key focus of futureIPV deterrence efforts.

• Post-implementation of mandatory arrest policies, the courts implemented “no-drop” prosecution policies to address victim unwillingness to prosecute andenhance the likelihood of adjudication and punishment. Feminists believedthese policies would stop abusive men from intimidating victims to withdrawfrom the prosecution process. Yet, like mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecutionplaces the power to control case processing in the hands of the state. As thischapter has shown, victims may not want their abusers prosecuted for a variety ofvalid reasons. Thus, it is not surprising that feminist support for the policies ismixed with some arguing they help to de-normalize IPV in society and otherscontending they deny women the agency they deserve. Specialized domesticviolence courts are an innovative and feminist-focused approach to IPV prosecu-tion as they take victim concerns into account – emphasizing victim safety overoffender accountability –when making decisions about the processing of casesand offender punishment and treatment. The success of domestic violence courtsdemonstrates that IPV and victim safety may be more effectively addressedthrough better coordination among law enforcement, the courts, and corrections.New prosecution approaches may be necessary to simultaneously address theneeds of victims and the punitive goals of the criminal justice system.

• As part of the correctional apparatus of the criminal justice system, BIPs wereintroduced to provide treatment to convicted offenders upon sentencing. TheseBIPs are based on the feminist-focused Duluth Model that targets men’s falsesense of entitlement in their relationships dismantling power imbalances betweenpartners that lead to male violence. While this model remains the most widely


used in the United States, it has been criticized for being ineffective in reducingmen’s violence in abusive relationships. Feminists contend that this is likelybecause patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity are socially embedded, and theDuluth Model cannot dismantle these ideologies on its own. Evidence-based IPVoffender treatment standards have also been realized in lethality/risk assessmentsthat work to prevent offenders’ IPV reoffending risk. Additionally, Colorado’sstatewide IPVoffender treatment program is an excellent example of an evidence-based approach to IPV offender treatment. It not only provides specializedtreatment to address offenders’ level of reoffending risk but allows victims toprovide feedback as treatment progresses (which improves treatment effective-ness) and obtain resources to enhance personal safety and well-being. GPS pro-grams have also been introduced as an alternative to incarceration that provide 24/7 monitoring of offenders to minimize the risk of re-abuse. While researchsuggests these programs have made victims feel safer during the pretrial phase,some feminists have argued that they are only a short-term solution as they areintended only to gather information on offenders rather than influence behaviorchange. Long-term solutions to address IPV may be realized as part of CCRs thatcan identify how criminal justice agencies and community IPV resources canimprove response to IPV and implement improvements to actualize suchimprovement so as to effectively coordinate prevention, intervention, and treat-ment efforts.

• Feminist activism has effectuated extensive positive change to the criminal justicesystem response to IPV sending the message that IPV is a socially and personallydisastrous problem requiring a dedicated response from the criminal justicesystem. However, this chapter has demonstrated that while well-intentioned,changes to this response have had some negative effects on victims. Future effortsto address IPV must include not only a punitive response from the criminal justicesystem, but enhanced resource availability for victims, widespread and improvededucation about IPV, and ongoing community-level dismantling of sociocultur-ally entrenched patriarchy, sexism, misogyny, and stereotypes about abusedwomen.

Conclusion

Across time, feminists and battered women’s advocates have worked to develop,implement, and improve the criminal justice response to IPV. Advocates and fem-inists are credited for their work to motivate policymakers to recognize that IPV is aserious public health issue that should no longer remain behind closed doors. Notonly have feminists and advocates been successful in fostering and shaping thecriminal justice response, but they have also provided hundreds of shelters and otherdirect services for IPV victims and their children within communities across theUnited States.

Mandatory/preferred arrest and no-drop policies are interventions that operate asa direct criminal justice system response to IPV. These are interventions that, when


compared to criminal justice practices during the 1960s, indicate tremendous changein how the criminal justice system addresses IPV. Specifically, an apathetic criminaljustice response to IPV has been transformed into a mandatory and aggressiveresponse. The criminal justice system has experienced an increase in the numberof offenders processed through the system, all the way through sentencing andtreatment phases.

Higher numbers of arrested offenders require evidence-based IPV treatmentstandards at the state level for purposes of oversight and “quality control” over thetype and content of treatment court-ordered offenders are/will be receiving. Inaddition to the need for oversight of IPV offender treatment statewide, failures ofthe criminal justice system to reduce the incidence of IPV on its own suggest thatmore holistic, coordinated criminal justice and community responses may be a betterapproach to addressing the social problem of IPV. Victims indicate that they are notentirely satisfied with the criminal justice response to IPV, and this may affect theirwillingness to report violence in the future and cooperate with the criminal justicesystem in prosecuting their abusers. A separate chapter in this volume examinesprotection orders as a civil remedy that not only allows women to protect themselvesfrom IPV harm (as well as decide whether to pursue and execute the order) withouthaving to go through the criminal justice system, but also provides them the system’sprotection. One could argue that when victims feel their IPV needs are beingaddressed by the criminal justice system, they are better able to protect themselvesfrom harm and find alternatives to remaining in their abusive relationships. Whilemore work is necessary to improve the criminal justice response to IPV, progressmade over the past 40 years is a promising step forward.

Cross-References

▶A Feminist Perspective on the Criminal Justice System Response to DomesticViolence

▶Batterer Intervention Programs Efficacy▶Coordinated Community Response to Intimate Partner Violence▶ Feminist Theories and Perspectives of Intimate Partner Violence and Abuse [IPV/A]

▶ Perspectives on System Responses to Interpersonal Violence▶Relationship Violence Perpetrator Intervention Programs: History and Models

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