a fragment of utpaladeva’s ishwar pratyabhijna vivritti - raffaele torella

8/3/2019 A Fragment of Utpaladevas Ishwar Pratyabhijna Vivritti - Raffaele Torella

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FromEAST AND WEST

IsMEOVol. 38 - Nos. 1-4 (December 1988)


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A fragment of Utpaladeva'sIsvarapratyabhijiia- vivrti

by RAFFAELE TORELLA

In m emory o f P rof K . C . Pandey

In what one imagines as being the long catalogue of the lost works of Indianphilosophical literature the ! ivarapratyabhij i ia-vivrt i or -tikti would deserve a prominentplace. It is the longest of the two commentaries that Utpaladeva devoted to his own! ivarapratyabhij i i t ikt irika, the fundamental text of the Pratyabhijfia school, wh:i:ehformedthe theoretical basis for that vast and multiform philosophical-religious movement knownas Kashmir Shaivism.

Madhava in the Saroadarsanasamgraba thus defines the Pratyabhi;iiti-ftistra, quotinga verse from Madhuraja Yogin's S'astrapartimaria (I):

sutram vrttir vivrtir laghvi brhatyubhe vimarsinyau Iprakaranavivaranapaficakam iti sastr~ pratyabhijfiayah II'Five commentaries on the Treatise [the Sivadr~tz] constitute the corpus of theauthoritative Pratyabhijfia texts and these are the siitra [lPK], the urtti , the oiurtiand the two uimariinis, the long one [lPVV] and the short one [lPVJ'

The interrelationship between these works is outlined by Abhinavagupta in theIPV and further explained by Bhaskara in his sub-commentary:

srirnan utpaladevah svagurunirmitam sivadrsryakhyam maharahasyasastrarnvyakhyaya tatpratibimbakalpam karikarnayam lsvarapratyabhijiiiikbyarp mahasastr~praniya tattatparyasya durbodhatiim asankya tanmatrapariirp.laghupratyabhijiiiikbyiirp.vrttim ca krtva tatrapi mandabuddhyanugrahartham madhyapratyabhijfiakhyamvivrtim krtavan I tatra ca sarvajanahitartham srimetabhinavaguptacaryenabrhatpraryabhijfiakhya bahuvistara tlka krta I tadvicarane ca janam asaktam jiiatvatenaiva pratyabhijfiakarikasiitresu samgraharnayi vimarsiniti prasiddha tika krta II(BhaskariI, pp. 2-3)'After having commented upon the SivadrNi , Utpaladeva wrote the IPK, which islike the reflection of it. Then, considering its import difficult to understand, he

( 1 ) Verse 4. A MS of this work, in telugu characters, is preserved in the Government Oriental MSSLibrary, Madras.[1] 137


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of the opponents' possible objections, it is fully differentiated and thus accessible tothe comprehension of all (3).

To this distinction between the planes of the doctrine corresponds the diversityof levels in the recipients of the teaching. Both the siitras and the ortti are aimed atthose who are not impregnated with the latent traces of their earlier adhesion to otherdoctrines. The study of the si i tras-urtt i as a whole prepares them for the subsequentphase which consists in the study of the siitras alone, independently of the ortti . Onthe contrary, those who are under the influence of erroneous conceptions derivingfrom the profession of different doctrines are obliged to follow the whole coursebeginning with the tiki. When the tiki has removed these errors, they can have accessto the sutras accompanied by the urtti, and subsequently to the sutras taken alone, untilthey reach the heart of the doctrine in identity with the consciousness of thesistrakira ... ( 4 ) .

The link between the sutras and the urtti is a particularly close one. Despite thefact that they are presented as being artificially differentiated, they substantiallyconstitute a single work, since - according to Abhinavagupta - they were composedat the same time (ekakilakrta) (~). Proof of this lies in the fact that the namas kdra ,present in the si i tras, is not repeated at the beginning of the urtti, whereas it is in thetiki ( 6 ) .In the subsequent history of Kashmir Shaivism the great figure of Abhinavaguptabecame so dominant that he overshadowed all the other masters, including evenUtpaladeva. The MSS tradition furnishes an obvious proof of this, as we have a largenumber of MSS of Abhinavagupta's commentaries, particularly of the IPV, comparedto the few of the urtti and none at all of the tiki. None of the few extant idradaMSSof the urtti goes beyond the kiriki 2.9 of the Agamidhikira and, in fact, the KSTSedition, which, besides, is incorrect and almost illegible in many places, stops there.

[3] 139

(3 ) IPVV I, p. 16 yathii paravaktattve vibbiigahiinyii visvarn sthitam, pasyantyam asutritabhedam,madhyamiiyiim unrnilitabhedam, vaikharyam bhinnaparamrsyamanarupataya sphutibhutabhedavabhasam,[...J tathii paravaktatrvasthane sivabhinnasastrakarasal!lvedanarp [read sarpvedanaoJ tadatmyena yatvartamanam paramarthatartvarn saratvac ca hrdayasabdavacyarn, tat parapratipadyajanavi~ayatapattiyo-gyatii.lak~a.t:lasphura.t:latmakabhedasiitrat;layii sthitam siitre, vrrtau tu [ad eva unmilitam, vivrtau tuaksepapratisernadhanadisa sphutibhutam sarvajanapratipattiyogyatii.lak~a.t:labhedaJ!l bhavatiti.

( 4 ) ib id . tasya tasya adhikarino vividhaphaladayitaya hi agFhitadarsaniintarajanitabhedavasaniigrahiil_1siitramdtrat vrttisahirad abhivinitah santo VFttyaniipek~asiitriirthamiitrapariSllanadisii paraparasiddhibhajojiiyante I tIrthiintaraparisilanotthitamithyiiclrHayas tu vivrtirupaya ~Ikayii apasarirararhavidhavimohahsiitravrttyarthavisrantahrdayah kramena surrarthabhavanaviyogavisranrya tathaiva sastrakiirasarpveda-narupaparahj:dayiivibhaktatattvataya siddhyantiti.

(') ib id . sphurananirvahas tu vr ttav iti paramiirthata aikyam anayor ekakalakr tarvat,vibhagakalpanaya tu bheda iti darsitam; ibid., p. 183 evarp ca vadan siitravrtryor ekagranthatam sphutayati.

(6 ) ibid., pp. 2-3 namaskariintariikaraJ?iitmikaiveY3l!l siitrakiirapiirvakasamanantara-tatsiitrapra-vrttigranthakaranatmika pravrttir acaryasya ekatam gamayati anyatha evambhutaikapravrttinirvaha-sambhavat I ~Ikakiirapadam adhisayanas tu sastrakiiro'vaSyarp pravrttyantarena yujyate.


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The only complete MS that I have been able to trace comes from Kerala and is inmalaya lam characters (7). Abhinavagupta's IPV ended up by eclipsing all the othercommentaries and becoming the standard one, as we can see from the fact that it wasthe only one for which sub-commentaries were composed, such as Bhaskara's vyikhyior the anonymous commentary in the Government Oriental MSS Library, Madras,and others which have only survived in fragmentary MSS, like the Ifvarapratyabhijiii-vimarfinivyikhyi (University MSS Library, Trivandrum, No. 15413 C), theIfvarapratyabhijiiikaumudiof Bhattaraka Sundara (Centre of Central Asian Studies,University of Kashmir, No. 1083) etc.

This situation is authoritatively echoed in the words of the first great modernexponent of these schools, Prof. K.C. Pandey:

'In fact the system owes the name Pratyabhijiiii to this book [the IPK]. Itsimportance, however, is due to two commentaries of Abhinava, the Vimarsini andthe Vivrti Virnarsini' (Pandey 1963: 163).

A close examination of the IPVV is already sufficient in itself to limit the validityof this statement. Despite the inevitable difficulty in reading a text like the IPVV,which is an extensive and diffuse commentary on a work that has not come downto us, it seems clear that the majority of the themes and subjects that Abhinavaguptatouches on find their direct correspondence - or at least their starting point - inUtpaladeva's tiki. In fact the IPV itself, which according to Abhinavagupta is intendedto be ( 8 ) a commentary on what the kirikis are in themselves, accomplishes it s taskthrough a carefully gauged and considered systematization of a rich speculative materialwhose early origin is to be glimpsed in the tiki. Only a direct reading of the tikiwould allow one to define the central role that Utpaladeva undoubtedly played in theelaboration of Pratyabhijfia philosophy (see Torella, forthcoming A). For instance-to mention only two points - we must trace back to Utpaladeva the acceptance ofthe legacy from Bhartrhari - of such great importance in the economy of thePratyabhijfia school-, that had been on the contrary fiercely contested by his masterSomananda, and, secondly, the acknowledgement of the need to measure oneself againstthe Buddhist doctrines, particularly those of the school of Dinnaga and Dharmakirri,who ended up by becoming both opponents and models.

At present, all that is known of the tiki - apart from what one can glean fromthe IPVV, which is both a lot and a little - are a few brief quotations scattered throughthe works of Abhinavagupta and Ksernaraja. Some passages in the footnotes of theKSTS edition of the IPV are also definitely from the tiki and they must evidentlyhave been in the margin of one of the MSS on which that edition was based. They

( 1 ) University MSS Library, Trivandrum, No. 8900 A.( 8 ) IPV I, p. 39 asmakam tu surravyakhyana eva udyamah.

140 [ 4 ]


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That edition never saw the light of day. In the hope that the MS, or at leasta transcript of it, might still be among the late Prof. K.C. Pandey's papers, I got intouch with Mrs Lila Pandey, the great scholar's widow and Honorary President ofthe Abhinavagupta Institute 'of Aesthetics and Saiva Philosophy. Mrs Pandey verykindly received me at her home in Lucknow, in March 1987, and generously allowedme to examine at length the transcript of the MS in question made by Prof. Pandeyhimself (nothing is known of the whereabouts of the original) and to photograph it,though, unfortunatly, only in part. I should, therefore, like to take this opportunityof expressing my profound gratitude to Mrs Lila Pandey and also to the Trustees ofthe Abhinavagupta Institute.

* * *The transcript contains the part of the tiki relative to IPK 1.3.6 - 1.5.3. It consists

of the text of the kirikis, followed by that of the urtti on the kirikis and by thatof the tiki on the kirikis and the ortti; in addition there are also passages fromAbhinavagupta's IPV scattered here and there.

The MS is described as follows by Prof. K.c. Pandey on the first page of thenotebook that contains his transcription in devanagari:

'Leaves 33. Size 7 1/2 x 9 1/2'. Lines per page 19 approximately. Syll. per line21. Handwriting almost recent. Written on local paper which does not seem tobe old. 31st leaf worm eaten, it is clear from the note book pages 44, 45 and 46.The Ms. begins line no. 1, top: srigaIfeSaya namah; line two samskare saty api etc.Ends abruptly as can be seen at page 49. Character Sharada.'

In his transcription Prof. Pandey has confined himself to faithfully copying thetext, without any critical intervention, if one excepts the exclusion - always dulymentioned - of the passages from IPV.

In my edition I have made a few corrections to the text; some are purely dictatedby the requirements of meaning, others are also corroborated by literal quotations orparaphrases found in the IPVV. In fact, the tiki and the IPVV - a text withouta commentary and a commentary without a text - elucidate one another: at timesit is the IPVV that allows one to improve the text of the MS, but not infrequentlyit is the MS of the tiki that points out errors in the edition of the IPVV. In anycase, obviously, a parallel reading of the two texts renders both of them far morecomprehensible. The punctuation is also mine. I have, besides, underlined all thepassages and single words that Abhinavagupta quotes literally in the IPVV and added,between square brackets, the text of the kirikis and the ortti (according to myforthcoming edition) which the last two fragments refer to. The numbers that Prof.Pandey inserted in the transcript refer to the folios of the original MS.

The parts of the transcript that I was allowed to photograph and that I ampublishing here consist in the whole text of the tiki on IPK 1.3.6-7, plus a part of142 [ 6 ]


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the tiki on IPK I.4.2 and I.4.5 (10). The main subject of these pages is the natureof cognition, understood as being self-luminous and absolutely unobjectifiable. Thisis one of the major themes running through Utpaladeva's whole work. He sets outfrom positions that for the most part coincide with Dharmakirti's, but his ultimateaim is to show that they inevitably lead to a dead end - the only way to avoid thisis by putting forward the idea of a world illuminated and dynamized by the I, as itis in Saiva conception. The demonstration of the non-objectifiability of cognition isto be seen as a stage destined to lead to this conclusion. Among other topics whichUtpaladeva deals with in these pages are some aspects of his abhasa theory; the yogi'ssuperhuman faculty to penetrate other minds, which should, in the opponent's eyes,be a proof of the objectifiability of cognition; the Buddhist conception of the anupalabdbietc. But Ihave already dwelt at length on these subjects elsewhere (Torella, forth-coming B).

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(10) They are the pages 1-8, 22-23 e 32-33 of the transcript. r have photographed these last fourpages in order [0 try [0 clarify some doubtful point of the urtti,


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TEXT

II ~: IIG 1 1 4 ' { = a c . t 1 l P = t rlElliirifl...-qft:tElt1~,,eiilq:q: tmnm4~~144"'fflJ t C f ? ot1 q6 1 '(: O I ' t T l J II" '

II ~: II~~ ~sfq 3iRt~It1: I ~ ~ ~ i il.,.t 1 tt :q $ 1 lii tt t1fCiI~4('fI~Rt qiil...-qft:tElqs"


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QC6I~ I~ q~ ql~ ~ QC6 I~ ld , ({q r iq ~ ij11i1~"4 QC6I~('f \7 $1 '9 1Ii1 If1 I'(fll" 1l(flY C f)I~ I"1 *,lfI~


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d ( ~ ~ q Y C f > I ~ I C f > ~ q r c i Y C f > I ~ d l f q ; :n;T C f> lliIa ltr : , 3 t ' t 1 ~ : q d '~q{ ~ ~ ~ c : ; , i f l C : ; " < I C f > I ~ ~ Y C f > I ~ l i f l ~ ~ : Y C f > I ~ I < f l ~J i ld li i 1 P c 4 d li i 1 C i 4 R t ~ qc: i f f i " P c 4 q 4 ~ ~ , 'Oq{ $flii 1 + t f q ~. .

(J ) MS omits na (without which the whole passage would be meaningless) and reads sualeapralediena.I have accepted the reading 11 a suaprakdiena , as cit. ibid., p. 256.(4 ) MS prakafyataiva, perhaps not impossible.( 5 ) ibid., p. 257 cit. pratyeya~.

146 [10]


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~, "

Y'ikll< ; - 4 (1~~ C 4 1i t t ! ; r f g ' i l ~ q ~ ~ C 4 g C l f ) I ~ ( 1 l r q q r ~ P i 1 q C 4 Q :{- -

~ \ j I l R l o 4 C f d : . ~ q d l C 4 R 1 & ( 5 ' i I i 1 1 ~ ~~, "~: Y C f ) I ~ I ( ' U ~ ~~~~ttl~ ~:C f ) I~ I " 'I W 1 1 qJ

. .qOflI~I"f 1 " 1

( 6 ) eva cit. and commented upon ibid. , p. 257 e ua gr ab an en a a ny on yd pe ks dm a ha I aham ity evap ra k a{ a, .h a ~ s a e v a b it i s am b an d ba b ,(1 ) The meaning of this expression is not clear to me.( 8 ) MS reads "oyatirehena, which is apparently meaningless in this context.( 9 ) MS tad.

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f*" . .: q ( ' f :st1"1*:q lq ~I,:q d ~ Y O f ) I . ~ ( ' f ' BfliRi wi{ ~i{ m&{lO ~ ~, J i f q ( ' f Y ld l C f < 1 ., . : q l t t c r : t I : q " l k " R t Y " I l d c U 5 -, - ~ ~~ ~ ~ < 1 = t " 1 I ( ' f mannttl~ ~ q ~,i j1 1 9 1 , . . ( ' f"


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~q '(OICf)I~ ~ '(ul"Iii1i1Ci1ltfi~CfYlq"'1q ~ ii1~ ...1 ' ( 1 ~ H C i K f 1" ... 0-

~q'(oIlRr~Cfffis~: ~ YCf)I~I~qeql~41 q'(Y*I~I*eq-. . .

[13] 149

~q...1CfI q~ ~: '~ y :aC f( 1I: 3t5+q0f>1~1:a1'11ii11ft:40f> '(U~ ii1gql(lqCfgCf)~I~~qC1I'1lql( ..d ffiU:q ~ ~ fcf;-

~qq'("Ilq QCilI~ ~ :q i = f ~ f 4 : 4 < \ 1;I~CfRr ~q*Cf~, ifIfq rlG4>~ ~ ~~~qV ..('f,(Ii'fcq~:," ' '" ..."~ ct~,~r:-"1~~I~~lI~ am a tT l n ~, (1*~CiI..." ,~IRt~I~~~ liICilI,,"",~q"lfq ~ ct>~"i4~Rr~ICf: ~ In:t~(=U,"Iltfl~~1if 1 \ 1 . . ."1Ist('fCfI 3t1ft~ - v C f d I ('f


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' Ie f c t f e c t W i ~ e l l o c t fqC f ) f c l t~ ~ o c t f t ( ' N ' ( f i~ tIf f i q < ? 5 $~: n ~ e l If i fc l t C { ' k e l l~:I m q '(fi~ lI~ l~ iitl~ I~ I" ''''~ ''" i1 fi~ G CI1 I~ I6IfG ~ ti(fc lt~ ft-~sfq q "'(fc ltC ll:q ~ ~C I1 I~G i 1 lc tq 4 t,(;~ ~ i 1 :4 ~G i1 ~C fIi1 q q* ,* (h 1 -, ~ ~

f . : t~


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Y'4ld;( t ~ 'J ? tf u 1 f l f fU : ~ . .~ ~q;sq~~

IIt~: IIO < t c c 6 1 { 1

(20) My conjecture for MS "aualambandya, apparently meaningless; cf. ibid. p. 270 'sudtma' itisvav i~ayaprakasatayam d tmamdt rapra led ia tdydm c a v iS r an ta ir uartamdnair e v er y a r tb a b .

( 2 1 ) Ibid. p. 270 cit. as ni~stimita~( 2 2 ) MS n a ce da pa ra m dr tb as ya ; n a ce da m cit. ibid. , p. 271.( 2 3 ) Ibid., p. 271 cit., erroneously, p ra titii ca .( 2 4 ) Ibid. , p. 272 cit. - after t a smdd and before na sydd eva - p ra tipadya te , absent in MS.( 2 ~ ) MS yujyate; the form yu;yeta, grammatically more correct, cit. ibid., p. 273, where

Abhinavagupta dwells upon the meaning to be attributed to lin in this case.( 2 6 ) eta, cit. and commented upon ibid., p. 273, is omitted in MS.( 2 7 ) After saktayaJ; , saletiyogalales anam , Dot found in MS, cit. ibid., p. 273.

[15] 151


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~ ~ < ;" '(1 :< t>(1 Ii1 " '(1 P c4 ~ ~c fl q~ ~ ~ : I~ ~u~ c r ;~ " ilG q ij1Y i1 ~ 4 ! c :::q ~ 5 i1 :t I~ q li1 1 1 ~ .~ ." II~ ,

II ~: II

II ~: II -? t~ qsl:t l~ q ~ ~'d~ci qs1(11 ' i :qq l~~&~q~ ~H~ ~ ~C f(1 c ::~ ~ 4 )c l1 '@ 1~ ""sI3 0 ~ q(1 t'Q \ i lqJ1I (1t 'Q ~:q~

&I~(1~q: YI~I: ~ ~ ~ I ~(1"" , , ~ a \ 3 Q Q l g f t J U f A~ '~'d~q"cr1a '3ffiTsra~Cf(1~4'1a ~ I ~;';'lIq\iI~CI1I'i 31 fq

( 2 8 ) MS v iSvar i ipam; I have accepted the reading prakiisari ipam, cit. and commented upon ibid. p.273, which furnishes a more satisfactory meaning.( 2 9 ) M y conjectural correction for MS atiriktatvam, which does nor fit the context.(30) MS "abbimatasuabbduajdtasya; abbimatasya cit. ibid., p. 273.PI) I accept the reading cit. ibid., p. 274, instead of MS pratipddayisyatdm,

152 [16]


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f< :4 fl1 '4 ~ < ;I~ ~f ;q(1 'iC ;Ii1 I'ifq ~ ~ " '1 ~ ~ I~ I~ I~ ~~S~ -~ A f ' 4 ~ ' i I C f P c 4 7 ) f I P . ( 1 ~ C f , 31f l tqT < e 4 C S 1 I " q i j 1 1 i 114 ' 1 lq~ fq~~C ;01 -~ ql" '(1 4 ~ ~ "d1 :C f 'i:q~ ~ C \;C f('5Y ~ ~ lijlli1Y ~ I~ lf tq tt ~ -. .Y ~~ I~ lw i 4 I1 1 ~R t q; - t j f . : 1 ~ t 4 d ~ 1 i1 1 4 1 1 i f qgCf >I~ I~ q < '1 '4 1~ eIR c raf ll'4C f~ qiijlli1 f if if lV eql~ I * q('5 g~ ~ f 6 - ~ ~"

* * *

[17] 1 5 3

II ~: II _. t1Rt~ICffifI ~ ~ ~ ~q '{ I,!~ I" '1 I~ lf i '4 ~q l;qqr qC f> I~ I(1 ~:q q'{l&tm ; : r T": ~~H t1 I~ I~ ~ ~ , ~ * q '(U lo f i l~ ~ ; : r c ; " Q R t. .

( 3 2 ) The reading tatbdpi, cit. ibid., p. 275, seems better than MS tatbdhi.


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II ~: II .. . ]

UQq;qfq~ ~(;4{_q~{1~(;4ui~sql~ftlqlri1~ft4X1lqm-

~ ~~IOf?I~lttl;a:aI'iI...q:ai5fAft"~ "il1~Of?I~'i(1I'ilqla'@:qq ~sfq q ,,{W ;{ ~ : q"{~;{ q:qi


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~1"'lr:q(1i 'H9~ "15kttq, ~~Iq,I~~Glq:q~~q 1 8 ~ ~ :- g s r ~ *,~e6f5I~~4i1J1~(1~ql~I~I*'~6tG~~q---'--=J..!.._-


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(1 1C :;1 ('t3 J'(1 . :ec fqqs '~ lIli 1i,,~ ~ ~ C 4 O ~ C 4 ~'(1...,:q i1cf ~cr;F(o"(,tlq,,~~ ,

* * *

[ i f l f l ' l i 1 , q f q " I ,: e . .d ~ m qfl;1 I" (1~ I~~~~0f)" '11i1 '~ ' ~ ~t4q~sfq qr II t~~I

(46) asam oid ap i co cit. ibid., p. 45 (the editor has not noticed it); co is omitted in MS.( 47 ) Ibid. , p. 45 cit. tam y og in o 1? l p r a ti, y o gin o 1? l being most probably a gloss.( 4 8 ) nom ; etad ap i cit. ibid., p. 45; ap i omitted in MS.156 [20]


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" ~ : II ... J~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , 3 t f t r ~a1YGfi I~I91~qRt 9 ' { 1 ' ? J * Y ~f4s~f4c;fq~ ,\lE.~ r u : f " 's* ~4


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q ~~'@

( 4 9 ) My conjectural correction for MS vyavacchinnena, which does not f it the context.( 5 0 ) I have accepted the reading of MS (but also a correction into niueiayat could be considered).(51) MS dpattyeua,( 5 2 ) My conjectural correction for MS sudtma", meaningless in this context.(SJ) r restore pramatra (strictly required by meaning), most likely dropped by the scribe because of

haplography (see the following pramdtrdntara").( 5 4 ) My conjectural correction, suggested by the requirement of meaning, for MS paramdtmauedanam,

and paramdtmauedakam cit. ibid., p. 47 (but d. also ibid. sarva;iiagrahar;Q11Jpl-agupakrantaparasa11Jvedanopakramat pardtmauedakaparydydtdm e tf ty a rt bab ). Also the MSS of the Vrttishow this fluctuation between the readings pardtma? and paramdtma".

(n) My correction for MS paramdtmatd",

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[ 2 3 ] 1 59


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TRANSLATION

'Thus the functioning of the human world - which stems precisely from theunification of cognitions, in themselves separate one from the other and incapableof knowing one another - would be destroyed .. .' IPK 1.3.6

(Vrtti) -.Cognitions are restricted to themselves only and cannot be the objectof other cognitions, being by nature [exclusively] aware of themselves. But, in thiscase, how would the dimension of human activity and behaviour - culminating inthe teaching of the highest reality -, which consists precisely in the connection withone another of the objects of cognition, be possible?

(Vivrti) - Also the illumination of an object conceived as separate constitutesthe own form of the cognition itself and not any further qualification (atiSaya~) forobject. And this form of such cognition does not become the own form of anothercognition, so that - through the identification with another cognition having a differentobject - the objects of different cognitions can combine (v#ayamelanaf !2 s yat ). Alsoa cognition thus conceived ( 1 ) would render a separate entity its object by operatingautonomously and not through the perception of another cognition. In fact, a cognitioncannot be perceived by another cognition, because it is only aware of itself(svasa1?1Vidriipatayti) .Otherwise, if illuminated [not by itself but] by something else,it would be nothing but an inert and insentient reality. This is meant by the urttiwhen it says: ' ... being by nature [exclusively] aware of themselves .. .'.

[Objection] Why say that a cognition, because it is aware of itself cannot becognized by other cognitions ( 2 ) ? There is no contradiction between these twoaspects. Though a cognition shines with its own light is ua ya m p ra ka sa te ) - becauseits essence is light - yet, if it illuminates a cognition present in another subject, thisoccurs because cognitions have the capacity to illuminate themselves and what is otherthan themselves (a tmanatmaprakasanasamar thyat) ; and just as - amidst what is otherthan themselves - an inert reality is illuminated, in the same way another cognitionmay be illuminated, even if its very essence is light. And also that cognition, whichthus becomes illuminated, is illuminated by another cognition while it in turn illuminateswhat is other than itself, for instance the colour blue etc. This is precisely the wayin which a direct perception comes to be illuminated [i.e. cognized] by that form of

(1 ) That is, as the illumination of an entity conceived as separate from it.(2 ) Here there begins a long objection to the doctrine of the non-objectifiability of cognition, an

objection expressed from the point of view of a Naiyayika.

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cognition which is memory, or in which a cognition and its object, belonging to anothersubject, is cognized by the superhuman cognition of a yogi. It is in these terms thatthe cognition is presented in its true nature, neither is it to be feared that, becauseit is the object of another cognition, the cognition ceases to be such and becomes similarto an inert reality, like a jar. In fact, in the case of the cognition, being illuminatedis something that is able in turn to illuminate, whereas the same thing may not besaid of the jar. An inert reality is not such because it is subject to being illuminatedby other, neither is consciousness such for the opposite reason. And this is becausethe object's being illuminated is not an element that intimately concerns its own form,but rather that of the cognizing subject, for in this case - as it has been said - therewould be no restriction as regards the cognizing subject. Just as the jar is manifestedthanks to a light belonging to the cognizing subject (p rama tr sambandh ina prakdiena),which is what ascertains its nature as sentient or insentient, so the cognition, too,is manifested to [another] subject not by virtue of a light of its own (na svaprak ti fena )- for that would entail its being manifested anyway, even, that is, to an insentientreality -, but through the light of another cognition. What renders the object ofillumination such is the light of cognition (3). Therefore, we can say that the objectof the perception 'jar' shines in that form of cognition which is memory precisely inas much as also the light of the perception itself is made to shine. Its light, in fact,is constituted by the light of another cognition (ta tp ra ka fa ev a h i paraprakdiab) .

Thus cognition, insofar as it is by nature light and illumination of the other, shinesitself and can illuminate the other - whether it is sentient or insentient; cognition,too, which is in its very essence illuminating of this own nature, may be illuminatedby another cognition, which in turn is able to illuminate itself and what is other thanitself. In stating this there is therefore no fault (4).

[Replyj just as the jar or the cloth can be said to be manifested in their true naturewhen, respectively, a form having a broad base and belly or a form with a certainlength and width appear, and otherwise cannot, so cognition is grasped in its ownreality if it appears as capable of illuminating the other, being at the same time self-luminous, because its form is solely this. Even if it were admitted that it may becognized by another cognition, its being self-luminous could not, in any way, beilluminated. Its being self-luminous means, in actual fact, that it is not a differentth ing from the light of the cognizer; it means being able to be the object of the notionof 'I'.

Therefore its real nature would not be respected if it were presented in terms(3 ) And when it is a cognition that is the object of illumination, what renders it such is precisely

the light of another cognition. .(4 ) The cognition - Abh. notes, developing the argumentation of the objector - does Dot lose

any of its nature when it becomes the object of another cognition, as happens when a mirror is reflectedin another mirror that is just as clear (IPVV I p. 256 yat yatra na laksanam svam apabhiidate, tat tatra[na] viruddham darpanasvacchatayam iva svacchadarpanasarnkrantih).[25 ] 161


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of objectification 'here is this cognition'; consciousness (bodho) , in fact, is illuminatedonly by itself and is able to shine, completely autonomously, as T (aham ity eva) ( 5 ) .This light of consciousness is called cognition, when it is turned outwards, towardsobjects, and is [apparently] differentiated because of them. When it is turned inwards,it is then called the cognizing subject himself.

The Buddhists say the same thing except that they consider the permanence ofthe subject as being uniquely the product of a wrongful superimposition brought aboutby discursive thought (vikalptiropitasthairyaq). Also the followers of Sarpkhya attributeto the intellect (buddhau) - which alone in effect appears in experience ( 6 ) - thisdual nature. Also in the view of those ( 7 ) who consider the cognizing subject assomething distinct from the light of cognition, cognition ends up by shining asundifferentiated from the subject, because it is indissolubly inherent in it; otherwisethere would be no cognition at all. In fact, the universal that exists separately fromthe particular is no longer such, and knowing it in these terms does not mean knowingit for what it is. Also when it is an omniscient subject who knows it, the universalcan only be manifested as that which 'colours' the single particular realities(svalak~a1'}oparaii;akatvenaiva) (8). Similarly, the true nature of cognition may be saidto shine only if it shines as having its essence in the light of the I; cognition, forits part, is nothing but the light of the I turned towards objects(v#ayonmukhaha1?1Praktifamtitrarnparrz), without any specific form of its own other thanthis. Thus an ultimate basis for the determinations of the objects of cognition mayexist thanks to the autonomy of cognition due to the fact that it does not dependon a light from outside itself. If this itself ( 9 ) does not come to light, what else wouldremain of what is manifested in it?

Therefore grasping cognition in terms of 'this' is not a direct, primary datumof our experience ( na s ti k~ ti t pratitam bhavati); on the basis of the argument alreadyexposed above, it is grasped as 'this' only through the mediation of the light of theI (aha1fJpraktisavyavadhtinena), similarly to what occurs when one thinks of the cognizer

( 5 ) Cf. Ibid. p. 257 evagrahanena ananyapeksam aha.(6 ) Cf. ib id . p. 258 mukhyaya iti na vastavam arra mukhyatvam, api tu pratibhasanusareneti.( 7 ) E.g. the Naiyayikas,( 8 ) The omniscient - Abh. notes (ibid. p. 259) - is able to contemplate the six categories - one

of which is the universal (jtiti) - individually, and therefore also the universal separately. Furthermore,during the mabdpralaya, he must be able to contemplate the universals also in the absence of the particularrealities, which at that moment have dissolved. If the omniscient subject, even in this state, managesto see the universals in what is their nature - and this cannot be doubted - this is because he cansee directly, thanks to his power, the past and future particular realities. In fact, the universals are suchinsofar as they constitute the unifying motif of the single particulars, thus producing the notion of unitywith regard to elements that are differentiated (bbinnesu abinnapratyayajanakatvam hi jater jIvitam).

( 9 ) That is, the own form of cognition as being the light of the I turned towards objects.

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'this is the self' ( 1 0 ) . Thus on the basis of the immediate experience and inconformity with that which is its peculiar form, cognition is absolutely not knowableby another cognition, precisely because it is cognition and its essence is self-awareness.

It is on these very bases that the definition of 'sentient' and 'insentient', beingthus manifested, can be settled. 'Insentient' is, therefore, that whose light dependsonother (paradhinapraktifam); its opposite, 'sentient' is that which is self-illuminating,constituted by the light of the I; or, the object of illumination, whose light dependson other, that is called 'insentient'.

[Objection] This definition of 'insentient' as 'that which is to be illuminated'doesnot concern its own form at all. Being the object of illumination does not constitutethe own form of the object; this light, in fact, belongs to the cognizing subject. And,on the other hand, a definition that does not invest the own form (svariiptisaf!Zsparfi)of what it defines is not a definition. Therefore, what is the object of illumination- and considered insentient for this reason -, though having a light that is dependenton other, would not be 'insentient' because of this. And furthermore, it would bederived from your definition that cognition, too - conceived as sentient - wouldbe characterized by having a light depending on other, as it has been acknowledgedas being the possible object of another cognition (II).

[Reply]However, the fact that the light of this cognition depends on other, involvesits shining as 'this' (idantayal and this idantd is, according to our way of conceiving(adya) ( 1 2 ) , the own form of the object separate from light, therefore opposed to theself-luminosity constituted by the light of the 1. There is, therefore, a sharp and firmlybased (suvyavasthitaq) distinction between the definitions of 'sentient' and 'insentient'.

To say that at the time of the memory there is the direct presence of what waspreviously perceived means that the memory has become one with the previousperception (anubhavaikyt ipannam). On the contrary, it is not admissible to think ofa perception separated from the memory, being situated between the object and thememory of it (antat"tiiavarti) ( 1 3 ) , because, if its nature as light is not established,

( 1 0 ) Cf. IPK I.5.17. Furthermore, all cognitions have their ultimate resting place in the I ('I amthe perceiver, constituted by the illumination of the object'); d. IPVV I, p. 261 idam itiprakasasvatanrryanipad ahambhavat prthakkrtam sat j i i an3I! l yada prakasate, tada aham jnatavisayaprakasamayah ity evambhuram paryantikim pratipattim adhisayya prakasitam bhavati).

(Il) This in the objector's eyes is another reason for criticising the definition of jaa proposed bythe author. Not only does it not touch the own form of what it intends to define, but, even admittingthat it does, the definitions of iada and ajaa are not such that they are mutually exclusive (d. ibid.,pp. 2612) na kevalam svanipasparsanat yavad abhyupagate'pi svanipasparsitve I itas cavirodhatja~jadalak~3.lfayo~ prasakrat [adam api ajadam syat),

( 1 2 ) Cf. ibid., p. 262 adya iti asmaduktayam vyavasthayam.( 1 3 ) That is to say in such a way that the recollection illuminates a perception which in turnilluminates the object.

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neither is its capacity to illuminate the other (prakasariipatvasiddhau paraprakdialeatuasydpyasiddbeb). Ineffect, in saying 'illuminates, makes the other manifest' (para J?1pra kasa yatt)it is not in the other that a further qualification (atifayaf;) is produced, but only inthe light (H). Thus, as the self-luminosity of the previous perception has not beenproved - since in order to be manifested it depends on other, appearing as 'this' -it is not possible to state that its nature is light. And thus, in the state of Isvara,things, which, appearing as 'this', are insentient, then achieve - once they come tobe in the situation of identity of substratum with the light of the I(ahatpprakasasamanadhikara1!yena) ( 1 ~ ) - their own form as light, whose essence is thecognizer. In this condition there is no addition (nadhikyaJ?1 k iJ?1ci t) to the nature ofconsciousness, just as a new configuration of a certain form does not constitute anotherentity, since it continues to have its ultimate reality in the form. When thisconfiguration lapses, this does not mean that the form lapses, since it lies in it, noteven when the new configuration occurs is there any addition to the form, since anotherentity is not produced. All that may be said is that on the various planes of the newconfigurations the form appears in various ways, insofar as it becomes endowed withfurther qualifications isdt i iayasya bhavat). But not even this may be applied to thenature of consciousness, because there is no room in it for further qualifications (n atv euam api bodbanipe kascid atisayaf; sam bbauati) ( 1 6 ) . Isvara, even if his essence isall, is not different from pure consciousness (n a cinm atra ta ya a tir icy ate ). But let uscease these argumentations.

It has therefore been proved that being conscious of itself [on the part of cognition]is pervaded by the light of the I, which is opposed to insentience - and insentience,for its part, has the nature of 'this', which pervades the property of being knowableby others. Thus it is possible to deny that the cognition is knowable by others, becausethis property is pervaded by another that is in opposition to the pervading one(vyapakaviruddhavyaptayaf;) ( 1 7 ) . Similarly, in the case of sound etc., there is thenegation of permanence, because sound possesses a causal efficiency in succession, whichis pervaded by the fact of having a multiple nature, which is in turn contrary to the

( 1 4 ) It is an allusion to the prakata tdudda of the Mimarnsakas.( 1 5 ) See IPK 1lI.1.3.( t6) The example adduced is, therefore, both a sddharmya? and a v a id b armyad rs t d n ta . The analogy

between form and consciousness is valid as regards the absence in both of any i idhikya, but it stops there,because the atisaya that is produced in the form is not admissible for consciousness.

( 1 7 ) Utpaladeva is using both an argumentation and a terminology that are peculiar to the Buddhistlogicians, to wit, the anupalabdbi as the hetu of a negative inference, here in the form ofvyi ipakaviruddhavyi ip topalabdhi . This type does not appear in any of Dharmaklrti's three classificationsof the anupalabdbi (in the Pramdnaudrt t i l ea , the Hetubindu and the Nyi iyabindu) and is mentioned forthe first time, in the extant Buddhist literature, in Durvekamisra's Dbarmot tarapradipa , included in aclassification into fourteen or sixteen forms (Kajiyama 1966: 151 ff.). The evidence of the Tikii showsthat this tradition was already current in the Buddhist circles at least inUtpaladeva's time.

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unity, that pervades permanence; also in the case of the jar there is the negation ofself-awareness, since the property of being knowable by others is perceived, and thisin turn is pervaded by a property that is in opposition to the pervading one (18).

This being the case, even if all is perceived, it becomes impossible to grasp inthe object its having been the object of another cognition, since cognitions are incapableof being aware of one another ( ji iananam anyonya sa rrwedanabhava t) , it having beenexcluded that they can be the object of other cognitions. On the other hand, takingor leaving a certain thing depends precisely on the awareness of having had a previousexperience of that thing with particular results. If one could only count on the presentcognition (vartamanaji ianamatre1JCl) ,this would be impossible and, therefore, for thosewho turn to things with particular objectives all practical activity ( vyavaha raq) - whichis based on this taking or leaving (tya gopad anam ay o) - would be impossible. Thisis meant by the urtti, when it says' ... with one another .. .'. The genitive jiiananam('0 cognitions') in the sutra requires anusamdbdna? ('unification') and in the ortti requiresv#ayasanghatanao (,connection of the objects'); however, notwithstanding this, word-composition takes place, because these words invariably show requirement(nityasapek~atvat) (19).

The same applies to the teaching of the true reality by those who have personallyexperienced it (viditavedyair) (20). The process is as follows: first there is the directexperience of that reality, then the reflective awareness of it (along with its discursivearticulation) and finally it is taught to the disciple. This would not be possible if eachcognition were limited to itself and its respective object (svatmav#ayamatraO), and thus

(18) The being knowable by others (parasa1?1vedyatal is pervaded by the notion of 'this', which isopposed to the notion of T, which in turn pervades self-awareness (d. IPVV I, p. 267). The first ofthe two examples (as Abhinavagupta develops it) 'Sound is impermanent, because its causal efficiencyis in succession' must have been the stock example, since it is the one used also by Durvekamisra,Moksakaragupta and Vidyakarasanti (Kajiyarna 1966: 152).

(19) A condition for word-composition is the absence of any external requirement (Mahabh ti~ y a v o l.I, p. .360, ad Panini II.1.1, sapeksam asamartham bhavati; d. Joshi 1968: .3.3ff.). In other words, thesingle members of a compound cannot be related with, or qualified by, an outside word. This statementis, then, questioned and lastly restricted by Pataiijali only to the subordinate member - except in somecases. One of these cases - pointed out later by Bharqhari - is represented by the so-called 'correlative'words, that is, words which by their very nature require other words to complete meaning (d. VakyapadiyaIII.14.47 sambandhisabdah sapekso nityam sarvah prayujyate I sviirthavat sa vyapeksasya vr ttav api nahiyate). Therefore, although between jiiiinanam and anusamdbdna", and tesdm ( j i iananam) and uisaya?there-is sdp eksato a - that is, a mutual requirement -, this does not prevent tbe formation of thecompounds anusa1?1dhanajanmaand vi~ayaSa11ghatantimayaf; , for in the case of both anu samdbdna and oisayathere is an inherent, constant (nitya) requirement of something else - the former being a transitive actionnoun, which implies an object, and the latter being strictly connected with jfiana as its correlative term.

( 2 0 ) This teaching, too, requires the coordination and unification of cognitions of different naturesan d belonging to diverse times.

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all cognizers would be reduced to paralysis. That is meant by the vrtti, when it says:' ... of the highest reality ... '. If the teaching of the highest reality were erroneous,then the supreme reality would not be attained; if, on the contrary, there were a definiteattainment, in spite of all, thanks to this error, then this would not be a real error,seeing that it possesses this capacity. This process of the teaching of the highest realityis not a mere causal process (kara t jamatram) ( 2 1 ) , but a cognitive activity (pratiti!;) , andif the object of the past and future cognition of the highest reality ( 2 2 ) were not thesame as these series of cognitive processes, then how could one on these grounds promotea definite activity culminating with the full attainment of such reality? Thus the worldof practical experience, that has a single well defined basis, would not be possible ifthere were no unification of cognitions.

And, on the contrary, this world of practical experience is explained if there isa single essence (e ka e va tm a j of all these cognitive acts - perceptions, recollectionsetc. - in that they are all constituted in the final analysis by pure consciousness, andif these cognitions etc. represent the various and multiform powers of this single Self,Pararnesvara, whose essence is all. This world of practical experience would otherwisenot be possible.

, ... if there were no MaheSvara which contains within himself all the infinite forms,one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the power of cognition, memory andexclusion.' IPK 1.3.7

(V rtti) - The reciprocal unification of all cognitions of things is [constituted by]the principle of consciousness whose form is all, since nothing different from it isadmissible. It has been said: 'From me derive memory, cognition, exclusion'.

(V ivr ti) - The principle of consciousness, consisting of light and creativity, isestablished from the beginning (a d is id d ham eva). If objects, presumed to be inertrealities, were different from it, that would mean that their nature is in itself non-light, and in this case they would not be able to shine [that is, be manifested). In

( 2 1 ) The implicit objection (which may be attributed to a Buddhist) to which the fika is replying,is, according to Abh. (IPVV I, pp. 270-71), the following. The various stages of the teaching processcan be understood simply as a concatenation of causes and effects (experience - reflective awarenessand conceptualization - teaching - application to bhavana - accomplishment of it - attainment ofsupreme reality) without it being necessary to pose the problem of the combination of the objects ofthe single cognitive acts, as, on the contrary, Utp. does - in order to make recourse to the unifyingdynamism of the I inevitable. A mere cause-effect relation cannot be invoked here, because it is nota question of inert realities - such as the seed and the shoot, or the clay and the jar - but of varioustypes of cognitive processes, which, if set in the framework of causal automatism, would be transformedinto self-contained things.

( 2 2 ) The experience that the master has personally had is past, the knowledge that his teaching willpermit his disciples to attain is future.

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fact, a light that is by nature non-white, cannot become white. This will bedemonstrated later. This is meant by the urtti, when it says: ' ... the principle ofconsciousness ... ' and ' ... different from it ... '.If therefore things, though they are manifested as separate, have as their singlenature consciousness, it is all the more certain that cognitions - whose object theyare- also have this nature. In effect, cognitions are not manifested separately fromtheirobjects ina hi tdni ta to b bedena p ra th an te ), nevertheless, though they are apparentlydifferentiated since they are invested with the differentiation that is peculiar to theirobject(vi$ayabhedavakalpitabhedanam api), yet they ultimately rest - despite this spatio-temporal determination - on their own nature consisting of unitary consciousness(e kac inmaya svabhava vi fr an tir e va). If it were not so, and the various cognitions didnot have as their ultimate nature the principle of consciousness, introverted, in theform of a unitary self-awareness, how could one, at the moment when the cognitionof an empty surface is produced, arrive at the statement 'there is no jar here (lit. 'thisisnot the cognition of a surface with a jar') (sagha tapradefa j iiana1!2 nas t i)? Cognitions,in fact, are each a light unto themselves and cannot therefore combine to form a singlecognition which has as its object the jar etc. (ghatadivi~ayavadekaji ianasa1flSargitvabhav-at) ( 2 3 ) . [ .. . ]

['(He who remembers) must necessarily, having a reflective awareness of theparticular entity formerly made manifest, make it manifest at the actual moment ofthe memory, either as a single manifestation or as the whole of its components.'IPK I.4.2

(V rtti) - Thanks to the power of memory the subject, when having a reflective

( 2 3 ) This subject will be dealt with in detail later (IPK 1.7.7-11). Utpaladeva is here referring tothe Buddhist theory of abbdoa and anupalabdbi , as delineated by Dharmakirti and Dharmottara (Torella,forthcoming B). The cognition of the absence of the jar, though being in itself distinct from that ofthe empty surface, is essentially connected with it, just as judgement is linked to perception and representsthe subsequent stage: the same cognitive act entails both of them (d. Nyayabindu(ika, pp. 122-23).Dharmottara here depends directly on Dharmakirti, who has extensively debated the question in severalof his works (Prama'!avart t ika and suaurtti , Pramdnauin i icaya , He tu bi ndu, N y a yab in du) . The essential pointof Dharmakirti's conception may be summarized as follows (I refer to Hetubindu, pp. 21-28). Non-perception is not a distinct pramdna connected with its own particular p ram ey a (a b ha va ), as for instanceKumar i l a maintains. It consists in a positive perception of something that exists - a perception andobject that, however, are other than the cognizer's expectation ( anyopa labdh i, any ii bhi iv a , v iva le s it opa labdbe ranyatvat) and in this way reveal an absence. From the positive perception of an 'other' thing one maypass to the cognition of the absence of the thing intended only on determinate conditions: first of all,that the two things possess an equal capacity to suscitate a certain cognition (aviSi~?ayogyata;d. tu lyayogyataat the very end of this fragment) and that therefore they are necessarily associated in a single cognitiveact (ekai i ianasa'?tsargi tva),so that, if th is cognitive act takes place and only one of the two things is perceived,this means that the other is absent. Utpaladeva will give an elaborate answer to this argument in IP K1 .7 .9 and urtti.[ 31 ] 167


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awareness as 'that' of the particular entity which had been formerly perceived, mustmake it manifest [in the present], for there could not be a reflective awareness of anobject made manifest [in the past only]; and this manifestation takes place at the verymoment of the act of remembering. Therefore it is not wrong to affirm themanifestation - at the moment of the memory - of an object which, however, isno longer present at that moment. At certain times the object presents itself in theform of a single manifestation, that is, limited to one of the many manifestations thatcompose it, such as - in the case of a jar - 'jar' 'golden' 'individual substance''existence' etc., depending on the subject's intentions. In these cases its manifestationin memory is distinct and vivid. At other times, on the contrary, the object presentsitself in its totality, since this is the subject's intention; its manifestation is equallydistinct, as in the previous case. And finally, the subject whose mind is intenselyconcentrated without interruption even directly visualizes the object formerly perceived.]

(Vivrti) - [... ] In autonomous mental elaborations (svatantravikalpe~u) ( 2 4 ) theobject, in its universal form, is manifested in a way that is devoid of vividness. Infact, many universals when combined and set in a relationship of mutual determination(anyonyavacchedena) reach a level of manifestation that is wholly vivid (sphutabhasatamasadya), and become in the end, once they are delimited by universals such as spaceand so on, particular realities (svalak~ a1'Ja ta?? Zhajan te). Treeness (vrk~atvam), whichyet is one, in its universal form - consisting exclusively of being endowed with branchesetc. -, once it is combined with a whole variety of universals of colour and shape,such as those of the dhava or the khadira trees, and differentiated by a myriad ofcombinations with the manifestations of the universals of space and time, becomesmany ( aneka tma tam dpadyat e) . Even if they themselves (svayam) are exempt from spatio-temporal differentiations, universals give rise to a multiplicity of particular realitiesby virtue of their being different one from the other and of their mutually determiningone another now in one way now in another ip ara sp aram p arya ya va cch ed af ca ) (2 ' ) .This mutual determination must respond to a criterion of compatibility (anugu1'Jyena)and therefore cannot take place, for instance, in the case of the universals 'cold' and'fire', which do not possess this compatibility.

( 2 4 ) Utp. calls 'autonomous' (svatantra) those oikalpas , such as imagination or fantasy, which do notdepend directly - like, for instance, determinate cognition (adhyavasaya) or recollection - on a previousperception (d. urtti ad IPK 1.8.2).

(2') The individual abhasas do not possess a status of aoaccbedaka or auaccbedya of their own, butthey can assume either the one or the other according to the circumstances. They are not associated- Abh. says (IPVV IT, p. 26) - remaining on the same plane, like the members of a dvandva, but ina relationship of principal-secondary, qualifying-qualified. The abhasa 'cloth', in a piece of white cloth,may appear predominant to a subject who, at that particular moment, i s interested in the object as somethingto protect himself with; on the contrary, the abhasa 'white' will appear predominant, if he is thinkingof the capacity the colour white has to confer serenity on the soul (d. Pramdnaudrttika, 1.58 and suaurtti).168 [ .32]


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Then there are certains universals which, even without entering into relationsofdetermination with others, are themselves ( sva ta eva) manifested in a clear and evidentmanner ( sphutart t bhavat i) , without this entailing their transformation into particularrealities (sva la k$ a~ta m a nd pan nam a pi), but only thanks to the multiplicity of universalsthat they - in their unity - encompass (anekasamanyamayaikasamanyatmatayal . Forexample, this is the case of the universal 'dbaua' with respect to the universal 'tree'.The former, though not being particularized as regards its own nature, contains withinitselfother universals such as tree etc. ( tadanta/Jprav#tavrk$atvadi). Thi s does not meanthat they cease to be universals (sam anyatartt na tu jahaty eva), because to become aparticular they must be determined by a spatio-ternporal differentiation. When,however, depending on the subject's requirement tarthitduasenaioa) , the object isremembered as associated with the manifestation of a previous time and place alongwith the perception of many manifestations such as 'golden' 'red' etc., then it willbe manifested as vivid and clear (s ph uta e va bh as al? ) (26). That is meant by the ortti,when it says: ' ... at other times, on the contrary .. .'. Sometimes, then, when oneis intent on remembering with an especially intense concentration(atyantaikarasavadhanodyuktasya), the object being remembered, rendered clear andlimpidby referring to it all its attributs - excluding none - (niravase$avife~1'!avabha-sasamanadhikara1'!yapatt ivi fadikrtal?), manifestly appears before one is pb uta rn p ura bsphurati), animated by a direct perception (s ak $a tk ar ama ya e va ) (27). That is meant bythe urtti, when it says: ' ... intensely ... without interruption ... '. The absence of in-terruption or distraction (nairantaryam) in the concentration is its being free fromimpurities, the absence in it of the occurrence of extraneous thoughts. And in thiscase,despite the fact that there is direct perception, the object perceived in the pastis preserved (anubhii tavi$ayasa1?1Pramo$al?) ( 2 8 ) , since one has the direct experience ofthe object [not insofar as it is present but] in that it has been previously known(pi irvadmatayaiva). Therefore it is not at all incongruous to include this type ofexperienceamong the various forms of memory (smrtibhedamadh yaga1JO .nayart tna k~ati l?).

Also when the autonomous mental elaboration ( 2 9 ) turns to the manifestation ofsomething that has been proved beyond any doubt by the various means of rightknowledge and distinguished by many attributs ( tat tatpramar;aparisuddhanekavise~a1JO.-vi f i~;arthavabhasonmukhal?), then the object becomes clear and vivid ispbutibbauatyeva). In fact it has been said: 'Since he is engaged in listening or speaking about theBrahman etc.'. We are not interested here in whether this experience is discursivethought or not. On the other hand, at no moment may we speak of the absence of

(26) Despite the fact that it occurs in the sphere of the memory.(27) It is remembered, that is, as clearly as if it were directly perceived.( 2 8 ) This is the classical definition of memory (Yogasi i t ra 1.11 anubhutavisayasampramosah smrtih),( 2 9 ) Thus the above considerations apply not only to the 'dependent' vikalpas, like memory, butalso to those called 'autonomous' (svatantra), like imagination.

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reflective awareness (paramarSasiinyata) , because this is the essence of all lights (ofcognition) ( tad ti tmya t sa rvaprakas ii nam) P O ) . Every experience, such as memory etc.,is centred on the freedom of the principle of consciousness and is not simply producedthanks to the power of its particular immediate cause (svakara1JO.samarthyat) . It is inorder to teach this that the urtti uses the causative (1JicanirdesaM in the expression'--bh-"(H) []urua asua .. ..

['The cognitions (of the others) are not manifested as the object even in thatparticular cognition which is characteristic of the yogis. The only means of knowingthem is self-awareness. What has been stated also applies if they are admitted as theobject of cognition'. IPK 1.4.5

(V rtti) - For the omniscient, too, the cognitions belonging to other subjects -which can be known only through self-awareness - must always be manifested asresting on their own self; and, therefore, what in reality happens (tat tvam) is in pointof fact the identification on the part of these yogis with the self of others. Shouldone attribute [to the cognitions of others] the nature of knowable object, such as thejar etc., they would have to be manifested each in their own form of pure consciousness,whereas that is impossible.

(V ivrti) - ... ] Then ( } 2 ) [as regards cognition] it could not be said thatawareness is exclusively peculiar to it (svaiva samoit) , nor that it [cognition] is onlyawareness of itself (svasya tat sam uid eva), but, on the contrary, that the awarenessof itself [i.e. of that cognition itself] also pertains to other cognitions [and to thecognitions of other subjects] (p ar ap y a sy a s a1?1V it) since its illumination depends onother -, and that it is also non-awareness iasamuid api ca), because this is thecharacteristic of inert reality ( 3 3 ) .

(30) This is one of the central points of Pratyabhijfia philosophy. See its classical formulation inIP K 1.5.11 and vrtti svabhavam avabhasasya vimarsam vidur anyaths / prakaso 'rrhoparakto'pisphatikadijadopamah II - prakasasya mukbya atma praryavamarsas tam vinarthabheditakarasyapy asyasvacchatamatrarn na tv ajadyam camatkrter abhavat. The indebtment to Bharrrhari's thought (d. inparticular Viikyapadiya 1.116 vagriipata ced utkramed avabhodasya sasvati Ina prakasah prakaseta sah i pratyavamarsini /J ) is evident.

(31) Utpaladeva and, after him, Abhinavagupta have dwelt at length on the pregnant meaning [0be attributed to the use of the causative form in these contexts (Torella 1987).(n) What follows is presumably what would derive from the admission of the objecrifiability of

cognition; d. also IPVV II, p. 44 caturvidbaniyamaniyantritarupavabhasas ca jiianasyajiianantaravedyatayiilJl vighatata hi.

(3}) If the objectifiability of cognition were admitted, al l four ways in whicb one may understandthe expression suasamuit used in tbe kiirikii to characterize cognition ( sv ai va s amu it , s va sy a s af ?Z vi d ev a,s vii s am o id e va , s va sy aiv a s am o it; Utp. considers them all equally acceptable) would be reversed (pariipi170 [34]


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[Objection] But then we can explain the thing simply like this: the cognitionbelonging to a certain subject, which has come to be in contact with another - thatis, a yogi -, is spontaneously (s va yam eva ) manifested to this yogi. In this way, thedefinition that has been given of cognition would not be violated ( j f ianalak~a1Jat ikramon a syat).

[Reply] Not even this explanation is valid, since the relation [of the cognition]with the other is not admissible ip ar en a s ab a s ambandha yo gat).

Furthermore, cognition may have as its basis the object (v#ayalambanam) onlybyvirtue of its conformity (sariipye~) with it and this conformity of the cognitionwiththe object - such as, for instance, the colour blue - occurs through the imitationoftheobject ( tadanukar~). This presupposes its diversity from cognition. Conformity,in fact, is admissible only if based on a combination of difference and non-difference(bhedabhedanibandhanam), and, on the contrary, between two cognitions, assumed tobesubject and object (vi~ayavi~ayi1Jor), there is only non-difference (a bh ed a e va ), sincethey are both characterized solely by consciousness (ekabodhamatralak~a1Jatvat) .Therefore there does not exist between them conformity - which is the essentialnucleus of something being an object (n a sdrupyam ala mb an arth o) -, but only unity.Theremay exist a mutual conformity between two mirrors, since they are differentiatedfrom every point of view (sarvari ipavai lak~a1JYat) ( 3 4 ) . Between two cognitions, on thecontrary, there cannot even be a differentiation caused by an intrinsic connection witha particular time and place, distinct from the consciousness which is their commonnature ibodbarupatdtirileto), Furthermore, only when a cognition conforms to a thingin that whi ch is effectively its own form ( yad ya thabh ii ta f! l t adn ipena iua jnana f! l t ada1earam)can it be said it has that as its object; conversely, it cannot be said that cognitionhas blue as its object, if this blue of which it assumes the form does not exclude non-blue. Thus another cognition could be said legitimately to have assumed conformity[with a certain cognition] (tulya ka ram eva sydt), only if that occurs with a cognitionthat has solely the nature of apprehender, that excludes that of apprehended(grahyavyavacch innagrahakai kasvabhavena j fi anena) . Infact, if a cognition applied itselfto the other only in one part [the 'apprehender' part], in this case alone the own formof the latter would be preserved. Thus there would be a subject-object relation betweenthe two cognitions (vi~ayavi~ayibhaval?) ' but only through their becoming one ( 3 5 ) .

sa ' !1v it , svasya asamoid api, sva a sa mo id a pi, p ara sy a ap i samoit), The last of these - Abh. notes (ibid.,pp. 44-45) - is the only one that is not taken into consideration, both because it is not relevant towhat one intends to prove, and because having an awareness also of the other does not constitute acharacteristic of insentience.

( J 4 ) That is to say, as regards their place, time and own form (ibid., p. 46 darpanayos tudesakdlasvarupatmakam sarvam eva vilaksanam).

(J5) In cognition two aspects are to be singled out: an 'apprehender' part and an 'apprehended'part.The former represents its intrinsic being (svatma), whereas the latter is a superimposition causedb y ignorance and discursive thought. For one to be able to say that a cognition knows another cognition

[ 35] 171


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This is meant by the urtti, when it says: ' ... as resting on their own self .. .'. The ownself of cognition is its 'apprehender' part (grahakattZsal?);on the contrary, the bodyetc. relative to another subject appear in the cognition of the omniscient in terms ofseparation, as being the 'apprehended' part (gnihyattZsa eva) . It is in this very sensethat the common formulation 'the cognition of the omniscient concerns the penetrationinto the sphere of another being' is to be understood ( 3 6 ) .

However, once the plane of authentic (vastavena) subjectivity has been reached,whose essence is solely consciousness, for the omniscient the cognition of the other'sself (paratmavedanam) is nothing but the attainment of unity with the other cognizeripramdtrantaraileydpattir eva), Nevertheless, though united with another subject, theomniscient does not find himself sharing the other's pleasure or pain, because pleasureand pain cannot enter the authentic cognizer, in which solely the I shines, characterizedonly by consciousness. It is only in the subject in the power of maya - who, identifiedas he is with the intellect, is connected with the notions of'!' and 'this' - that pleasureand pain have room; but this will be spoken of later. For this very reason those whohave transcended the role of limited apprehender (grahakabhi imikot t i rrJdnam) and risento the state of authentic cognizer (vas tavapramatrsamapannanam), even if they haveexperience of pleasure and pain brought about by their various causes, do not becomefor this pleased or pained (na sukhitvadi) , or the pleasure and pain do not arise becausetheir causes are incomplete (hetuvaikalyat) 3 7 ) . In this state innate bliss arises(saha;anandtivirbhava~). Also in the case of the direct perception of other previousbirths [ ... ] ( 3 8 ) .

rightly, it is necessary that the former grasps the latter in its true aspect, which is that of 'apprehender'.But this is manifestly impossible, because it would entail the unification of the two terms (both beinggrahaka), which, on the contrary, in the relationship u isaya-ui s ay in here examined, must necessarily bedifferentiated.

( 3 6 ) Although one cannot speak, in the absolute sense, of objectification of cognition and the caseof the yogi can be explained - as has already been hinted at and will be explicitly stated later - bythe identification of the yogi with tbe other subject, yet the common interpretation of this phenomenonis not to be simply excluded. It has a relative validity, with reference to the yogi not having yet fullyattained the highest plane, who, although identified with the cognition of the other, still feels the powerthat the body etc. of the other have to condition and limit the plane of the real subjectivity (d. ibid., p. 49).

(37) In the former case, pleasure and pain do arise, but the subject does not identify himself withtbem. In the latter, they do not arise at all, because the subject is on a plane where even the saf?Zskarasthat keep hill bound to the body, the mind and so on have been loosened, and, without the cooperationof the elements forming the limited individuality, the set of causes which gives rise to pleasure or painis no longer complete and loses all power (d. ibid., p. 49).

( 3 8 ) As Abhinavagupta sums up (ibid., p. 42), three cases of apparent objectification of cognition,all of them ascribed to the yogis, are treated in the {ikil. They can be formulated respectively as 'I knowthis in another subject', 'I had that experience while being in another body and in a previous birth'and 'I remember a thing in the same terms in which it was previously known by another'. The presentfragment of the {ika stops at the very beginning of the treatment of the second case.172 [36]


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ABBREVIATIONS

IPK l svarapratyabhii i iakarikaIPVr l svarapratyabhij i iavr tt iIP V l svarapratyabhij f iavimarf iniIPVV [svarapratyabhijnavivr tiuimariiniKSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TEXTS

Bh as ka ri.A C ommenta ry o n th e ffv ar ap ra ty ab hi jn av im a rf in i o f A bh in av ag u pta , vols. I-II, edited by K.A.S.Iyer and K.C. Pandey. The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts Nos. 70 and 83. Allahabad19381950.

Utpaladeva, [svarapratyabhij f iavrt t i (see Tore1la, forthcoming B).Abhinavagupta, [svarapratyabhij f iavimarf ini (see Bbdskari),T h e l fvarapratyabhij f iavivrt ivimarf ini by Abhinavagup ta , edited by M.K. Shastri, vols. l-fll, KSTS LX LXII

LXV, Bombay 1938-43.T h e Pramaaavarttikam o fD h arm a kir ti. T he F irs t C ha pte r w ith th e A uto co mm en ta ry , text and critical notes

by R. Gnoli. Serie Orientale Roma, XXIII. IsMEO. Roma 1960.Dharmakirti, Hetub indu (see Steinkellner 1967).Dharmo r t a r a , Nyayabindutika (see Durveka Misra's Dbarmot tarapradipat .Durveka Misra's Dbarmot taraprad ipa [being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyayab indut ika , a

commentary 00 DharmakIrti's Nyayab indu] , edited by Pandita Dalsukhbhai Malvania, KashiprasadJayaswal Research Institute, revised II Ed., Patna 1971.

VQ ky ap ad iy a of B ba rtrb ari w ith th e C omm en ta rie s Y rtti a nd P ad dh ati o f Y rsa bb ad eua , K a'!4a I, edited byK.A.S. Iyer, Deccan College, Poona 1966.

V tik ya pa diy a o f B ba rtr ba ri w ith th e P ra ki,,!a ka pr ak tis a o f H e kira ja , K a'! 4a m part II, edited by K.A.S.Iyer, Deccan College, Poona 1973.

TRANSLATIONS AND STUDIES

Gnoli, R. (1956) Karikakara and Vrttikara. EW, 6.Joshi, S.D. (1968) Patafijali 's VyakaraJ?a-Mahabha~ya. Samarthahnika (P.2.1.1.). Edited with Translation

and Explanatory Notes by .... University of Poona, Poona.Kajiyama,Y. (1966) An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhi4a

of Moksakaragupta. M em oirs o f the Faculty o f Letters . Kyo to University , 10.[ 3 7 1 1 7 3


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a fragment of utpaladeva’s ishwar pratyabhijna vivritti - raffaele torella

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