a historical appreciation of the contribution of naval air power

7/27/2019 A Historical Appreciation of the Contribution of Naval Air Power

1/123

No. 26

Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs

SEA POWER CENTRE - AUSTRALIA

Andrew T Ross and James M Sandison

with an introduction by Jack McCaffrie

A HistoricalAppreciation of theContribution ofNaval Air Power


2/123

A HISTORICALAPPRECIATION OF

THE CONTRIBUTION

OF NAVAL AIR POWER


3/123

Copyright Commonwealth o Australia 2008

This work is copyright. Apart rom any air dealing or the purpose o study, research,criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, and with standard sourcecredit included, no part may be reproduced without written permission. Enquiriesshould be addressed to the Director, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Department oDeence, CANBERRA ACT 2600.

National Library o Australian Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Ross, A.T. 1948-

Sandison, J.M. 1932-

McCarie, J. 1948-

A historical appreciation o the contribution o naval air power

ISSN 1327-5658

ISBN 978-0-642-2965-5


4/123

b

Andrew T. Ross and James M. Sandison

with an introduction b Jack McCaffrie


THE CONTRIBUTION

OF NAVAL AIR POWER


5/123

Disclaimer

The views expressed are the authors and do not necessarily reect the ofcial policyor position o the Government o Australia, the Department o Deence and the RoyalAustralian Navy. The Commonwealth o Australia will not be legally responsible incontract, tort or otherwise or any statement made in this publication.

Sea Power Centre Australia

The Sea Power Centre Australia (SPC-A), was established to undertake activitiesto promote the study, discussion and awareness o maritime issues and strategywithin the RAN and the Deence and civil communities at large. The mission o theSPC-A is:

topromoteunderstandingofseapoweranditsapplication to thesecurityof

Australias national interests

tomanagethedevelopmentofRANdoctrineandfacilitateitsincorporationinto

ADF joint doctrine

tocontributetoregionalengagement

withinthehigherDefenceorganisation,contributetothedevelopmentofmaritime

strategic concepts and strategic and operational level doctrine, and acilitateinormed orce structure decisions

topreserve,develop,andpromoteAustraliannavalhistory.

Comment on this Paper or any enquiry related to the activities o the Sea PowerCentre Australia should be directed to:

Director Sea Power Centre - Australia

Department o Deence Telephone: +61 2 6127 6512

Canberra ACT 2600 Facsimile: +61 2 6127 6519Australia Email: [email protected]

Internet: www.navy.gov.au/spc

iv


6/123

Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs

The Papers in Australian Maritime Aairs series is a vehicle or the distribution osubstantial work by members o the Royal Australian Navy as well as members o theAustralian and international community undertaking original research into regionalmaritime issues. The series is designed to oster debate and discussion on maritimeissues o relevance to the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Deence Force, Australiaand the region more generally.

Other volumes in the series are:

No. 1 From Empire Deence to the Long Haul: Post-war Deence Policy and itsImpact on Naval Force Structure Planning 19451955by Hector Donohue

No. 2 No Easy Answers: The Development o the Navies o India, Pakistan,Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 19451996 by James Goldrick

No. 3 Coastal Shipping: The Vital Linkby Mary Ganter

No. 4 Australian Carrier Decisions: The Decisions to Procure HMA ShipsAlbatross, Sydney andMelbourne by Anthony Wright

No. 5 Issues in Regional Maritime Strategy: Papers by Foreign Visiting MilitaryFellows with the Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program 1998

edited by David Wilson

No. 6 Australias Naval Inheritance: Imperial Maritime Strategy and the AustraliaStation 18801909by Nicholas A. Lambert

No. 7 Maritime Aviation: Prospects or the 21st Centuryedited by David Stevens

No. 8 Maritime War in the 21st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspectiveedited by David Wilson

No. 9 HMASSydney II: The Cruiser and the Controversy in the Archives o the

United Kingdom edited by Captain Peter Hore, RN

No. 10 The Strategic Importance o Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A CommonInterest o Asia Pacicedited by Andrew Forbes

No. 11 Protecting Maritime Resources: Boundary Delimitation, Resource Confictsand Constabulary Responsibilities edited by Barry Snushall and RachaelHeath

No. 12 Australian Maritime Issues 2004: SPC-A Annualedited by Glenn Kerr

No. 13 Future Environmental Policy Trends to 2020 by the Centre or MaritimePolicy, University o Wollongong, edited by Glenn Kerr and Barry Snushall

v


7/123

No. 14 Peter Mitchell Essays 2003 edited by Glenn Kerr

No. 15 A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact o the Submarine Threat on AustraliasMaritime Deence 19151954 by David Stevens

No. 16 Australian Maritime Issues: SPC-A Annual 2005edited by Gregory P. Gilbertand Robert J. Davitt

No. 17 Australian Naval Personalities edited by Gregory P. Gilbert

No. 18 ADF Training in Australias Maritime Environmentedited by Chris Rahmanand Robert J. Davitt

No. 19 Australian Maritime Issues 2006: SPC-A Annualedited by Andrew Forbesand Michelle Lovi

No. 20 The Russian Pacifc Fleet: From the Crimean War to Perestroika by AlexeyD. Muraviev

No. 21 Australian Maritime Issues 2007: SPC-A Annualedited by Andrew Forbes

No. 22 Freedom o Navigation in the Indo-Pacic Region by Stuart Kaye

No. 23 Asian Energy Securityedited by Andrew Forbes

No. 24 The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications or the RoyalAustralian Navyby Chris Rahman

No. 25Missing Pieces : The Intelligence Jigsaw and RAN Operations 1939-71 byIan Pennigwerth

No. 26A Historical Appreciation o the Contribution o Naval Air Powerby AndrewT. Ross and James M. Sandison

vi


8/123

vii

Contents

Disclaimer iv

Sea Power Centre Australia iv

Papers in Australian Maritime Aairs v

Abbreviations and Acronyms ix

Introduction 1

General Introduction to the Historical Appreciation 19

Chapter 1: Aircraft Carrier Roles in Peacetime 21

Introduction 21

Peacetime Roles in Comparison to Other Means 28

Chapter 2: Aircraft Carrier Roles in Wartime 55

Wartime Use o Force 55

Wartime Roles in Comparison to Other Means 58

Chapter 3: Conclusions 79

Tables 89

Figures 108

Bibliography 111


9/123

viii

Abbreviations and Acronms

AAR Air-to-Air Reuelling

ADF Australian Deence Force

AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control

ASW Anti-submarine Warare

C3 Command, Control and Communications

CSE Central Studies Establishment

ECM Electronic Counter Measures

FEBA Forward Edge o the Battle Area

HMAS His/Her Majestys Australian Ship

HMS His/Her Majestys Ship

HNLMS His/Her Netherlands Majestys Ship

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

LCH Landing Crat HeavyLHA Amphibious Assault Ship General purpose

LHD Amphibious Assault Ship Multi-purpose

LPA Amphibious Transport Ship

LPD Amphibious Transport Dock

LPH Amphibious Assault Ship Helicopter

LSL Landing Ship - Logistic

MAC Merchant Aircrat Carrier

NAP/TAWS Naval Air Power/Tactical Air Warare System

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

RAN Royal Australian Navy

RN Royal Navy

SACSG Seaborne Air Capabilities Special Group

STOVL Short Take O and Vertical Landing

UAE Unit Aircrat Establishment


10/123

i

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNITAF United Task Force

US United StatesUSAF United States Air Force

USN United States Navy

USS United States Ship

USSR Union o Soviet Socialist Republics


11/123


12/123

Introduction

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was deeplyengaged in trying to ensure the uture o its carrier-based naval aviation orce. Theaircrat carrier, HMASMelbourne, launched in 1943 and in RAN service since 1955,would need to be replaced sooner rather than later. As well, whether a replacementcarrier was to be capable o operating conventional fxed wing aircrat, or only ooperating short take o and vertical landing (STOVL) aircrat, would determine theoperational lives o the A-4 Skyhawk and S-2 Tracker aircrat acquired in the mid-1960s.

Arguments or and against the continuation o fxed wing naval aviation were put in

a variety o orums over the years, including Deence Committees, media, Parliamentand, eventually (ater the government decided to buy HMS Invincible), the JointParliamentary Committee on Foreign Aairs and Deence. As part o this process manypapers and studies were prepared within the Department o Deence. One source othese writings was the Central Studies Establishment (CSE) a Deence analyticalagency established in 1969, which no longer exists. CSE produced one o the mostimportant studies in this saga: the Naval Air Power/Tactical Air Warare System (NAP/TAWS) Study, which began in 1970 and dragged on or some years.1

While the NAP/TAWS Study did not look avourably on the value o the capability

provided by naval aviation, its fndings were subsequently discredited by the Navy butonly ater damage had been done to its case.2 By contrast, a later CSE paper, HistoricalAppreciation o Naval Air Power, provided some strong arguments in avour o navalaviation by reerence to a slew o historical case studies. This paper was preparedin January 1978 or consideration by the Navy-sponsored Seaborne Air CapabilitiesSpecial Group (SACSG) and it is reproduced here with some editing.3

The purpose o publishing the paper now is to provide to a wider audience someappreciation o a specifc and (or Australia) very relevant use o aircrat carrier-

confgured ships and embarked aviation. In 2007 the government decided to purchasetwo very capable amphibious assault ships (LHD), comparable in size and generalight deck layout toMelbourne. They were to provide the Australian Deence Force(ADF) with the capacity to transport a battalion group and put it ashore, with landingcrat operating rom the ships well decks and with helicopters operating rom theight decks.

The CSE paper examines the ull range o uses to which carriers and their aircrathave been and can be put some o these are beyond the capability o the selectedLHDs. The CSE paper also catalogues and explains peacetime and wartime instances

in which the use o an aircrat carrier or an amphibious ship with a ull length ightdeck was either the preerred or only way o getting troops to their area o operations


13/123

2 A HISTORICAL APPRECIATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION TO NAVAL AIR POWER

and supporting them in theatre. These, together with a listing below o more recentinstances, provide a very useul illustration o the utility o the LHDs.

Much o this introduction will be devoted to the recent evolution o the ADFs

amphibious (or expeditionary) capability, and provides urther examples o aircratcarrier-like amphibious ships use in the years since the CSE paper was written. First,however, to provide a context or the CSE paper, there will be a brie description osome o the major events associated with the RANs quest in the 1970s and early 1980sto maintain its carrier aviation orce.

The Aircraft Carrier Replacement Saga

The aircrat carrier and Australian naval aviation had been living on borrowed time

almost since the ormation o the Fleet Air Arm in 1948. The establishment o theFleet Air Arm itsel occurred despite Department o Deence opposition and RoyalAustralian Air Force (RAAF) eorts to establish unifed control o ship-borne and land-based aircrat, to guarantee air superiority.4 Furthermore, despite HMAS Sydneysverysuccessul Korean War duty and the introduction to service oMelbourne in 1955, thegovernment had decided by 1959 that it could no longer support carrier-based navalaviation. That decision was made primarily on fnancial grounds, but there had beenquestions as to the need or two air orces or some years previously.5In 1960, however,the government decided to retainMelbourne as an anti-submarine helicopter carrier.6Changing strategic circumstances then led to the 1964 reversal o the initial decisionand the purchase o A-4 fghter-bombers and S-2 anti-submarine aircrat.

At that stageMelbourne,with her A-4s, S-2s, Wessex and later Sea King helicopters,seemed set to operate at least into the 1980s. Nevertheless, work needed to be doneto ensure the uture o what was undoubtedly Australias most contentious militarycapability. An early example o this work was the 1970 CSE study into fnding areplacement or HMAS Sydneyin the troop transport role. By then, Sydneyhad longceased to embark fxed wing aircrat, but could still operate helicopters. This workwas overtaken in 1971 by the same organisations NAP/TAWS Study, which extended

over our years7 and was authorised by the Chies o Sta Committee.8 The NAP/TAWSStudy concluded essentially that carrier-based naval aviation was not cost-eectivein the scenarios studied.

For the RAN this was a damaging result, not least because parts o the studys resultswere leaked to the media. Ultimately, the Navy was able to reute the conclusions on thebasis o inappropriate premises, and the Department o Deence itsel also concludedthat the study results were invalid.9 Subsequently the Navy ormed the Seaborne AirCapabilities Special Group, an entirely Navy body, to conduct urther studies. The nextmajor event in the attempt to secure the uture o naval aviation was the appointment o

Vice Admiral Anthony Synnot as Chie o Naval Sta in December 1976. Within a month


14/123

3INTRODUCTION

he had established the Aircrat Carrier Project Directorate and appeared determined toorce a decision in the ace o signifcant opposition within Deence and the media.Despite this opposition, by September 1980 the government had determined that itwould acquire an aircrat carrier (STOVL aircrat or helicopter capable) but would deera decision on uture fxed wing aircrat until 1983.10 The decision to go ahead with thecarrier apparently only spurred opponents on to greater things.11

By this time the examination o contenders to replace Melbourne had been narrowed tothree: theIwo Jima class LPH, a US designed sea control ship, and the Italian Garibaldiclass STOVL carrier. TheInvincible class was rejected because o cost. Over subsequentmonths the decision was made to acquire a suitably modifed version o the UnitedStates Navy (USN)Iwo Jima class LPH (a helicopter capable amphibious ship) and inFebruary 1981 a design contract was let with the US builder.12 A project ofce was

established in the US in March 1981 and the construction contract was near to beingawarded in June 1981, when the British Government announced that it would sell oneInvincible class ship.13 The price would, o course, be very competitive.

Ater deliberation within the Department, in September 1981 the Minister or Deenceannounced that theInvincible class ship was to be included in the evaluation process.The RAN made a case or theInvincible, perhaps driven by the opportunity o havingthe ship available or delivery in late 1983 and by the attractive price a total projectcost o $478 million in August 1981 prices.14 In doing so, however, it opened itsel tocriticism which was not slow in appearing that it was aiming to provide a very

expensive platorm or a mere our or fve helicopters. This was probably indicativeo the Navys ailure throughout to develop and articulate consistent and coherentarguments to support its case.15

Nevertheless, on 25 February 1982, the Minister or Deence announced that Australiawould buy HMSInvincible. This marked the beginning o the Australian Labor Partysmajor attack on the carrier capability, which was to culminate shortly ater its gainingpower in the March 1983 ederal election. Possibly because o this opposition and thatexpressed in the media, the government consented on 25 March 1982 to reer thedecision to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Aairs and Deence (theKatter Committee).16

Beore the committee reported, however, the outbreak o the Falklands War causedPrime Minister Fraser to oer the British Government the opportunity to withdrawrom theInvincible sale, an oer that was accepted. Consequently, on 13 July 1982, justtwo weeks aterMelbourne and her fxed wing squadrons were decommissioned, theAustralian Government announced that the Royal Navy (RN) would retain the ship.17Subsequently, the Katter Committee gave lukewarm support or the acquisition o anaircrat carrier but was especially concerned as to the cost implications o doing so

relative to its assessment o the capability a carrier would oer in the anti-submarinewarare role.18


15/123


Further eort was made to examine available carrier options including purchasingHMSHermes but nothing had been achieved beore the March 1983 ederal election.This resulted in the election o the Hawke Labor Government, which very quickly putpaid to the RANs carrier ambitions.

Aircraft Carriers in the Amphibious Role: Recent Eperience

The CSE Study deals comprehensively with the peacetime and wartime uses o aircratcarriers up to 1976. Many o the instances quoted involved aircrat carriers in theirstandard orm ships with ull length ight decks and capable o operating a range ofxed wing aircrat and helicopters. Many instances also involved ships modifed or orspecifcally designed to carry out amphibious operations ships o the type now beingacquired or the ADF. These are oten designated amphibious assault ships general

purpose or amphibious assault ships multi-purpose (LHA or LHD), although smallerones may be designated amphibious transports dock (LPD). Many o these ships alsohave ull length ight decks but most are only capable o operating helicopters. Someo these amphibious ships now also operate STOVL fxed wing aircrat, principallythe Sea Harrier STOVL fghter aircrat (introduced in 1979) and its US Marine Corpsderivative, the AV-8.

These amphibious ships have been used by their navies requently since 1976, in bothpeacetime and wartime operations throughout the world. Although the ollowing listingis not exhaustive, it shows that such use has been especially requent since the end othe Cold War. The examples included relate essentially to the USN and the RN, mainlybecause they have operated the largest number o such ships.19

Peacetime Uses

a. 1980: During October, USS Guadalcanalamong others assisted earthquake victimsin the Algerian city o Al Asnam.

b. 1989: During October, USS Peleliu provided ood and shelter to victims o anearthquake in northern Caliornia.

c. 1990: In the latter months o that year, USS Saipan and other amphibious shipsevacuated non-combatants rom Liberia.

d. 1991: During May, USS Tarawa and other ships provided large scale disaster relieater cyclone damage in Bangladesh.

e. 1992: During September, USS Tarawa and others provided relie against starvationin Somalia.

. 1993: In April, the USS Tripolitask group returned to Hawaii rom Somalia. While

in Somali waters the task group had recovered 30,000 pieces o ordnance, 100,000


16/123

5INTRODUCTION

pounds o explosives, and launched over 2000 helicopter sorties, delivering over175,000 meals and 25,000 gallons o water.

g. 1994: In July and August, the USSInchon and Wasp Amphibious Ready Groups

upheld UN Security Council sanctions against Haiti.h. 1998: USS Tarawa evacuated US citizens rom Eritrea.20

i. 1998: HMS Ocean, while still on trials, joined a multinational disaster relieoperation in Honduras and Nicaragua in the wake o Hurricane Mitch.

j. 1999: HMS Ocean conducted humanitarian relie operations in Turkey ater a majorearthquake centred on Duzce.

k. 2000: In September, the USS Tarawa Amphibious Ready Group brought building

materials and ood to East Timor.21

l. 2000: HMS Ocean demonstrated ongoing support or the Sierra Leone Government.

m. 2005: In August and September, US ShipsIwo Jima andBataan amongst othersprovided humanitarian assistance to the people o Louisiana and Mississippi inthe wake o Hurricane Katrina.22

Wartime or Warlike Eamples

a. 1979: In October, USN amphibious ships among other warships provided a show

o orce o Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they landed 1800 Marines in responseto manoeuvres by Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

b. 1987: USS Guadalcanals helicopters conducted minesweeping operations in thePersian Gul during July.

c. 1991: A large orce o USN amphibious ships participated in Operation DESERTSTORM, the war against Iraq beginning in January.

d. 1992: US Ships Wasp and Saipan took part in Operation RESTORE HOPEhumanitarian relie activities in the Adriatic during the violent disintegration o

Yugoslavia.

e. 1994: The USS Tripoligroup deployed with 2000 Marines to the Persian Gul inresponse to Iraqi troop movements on the Kuwaiti border.

. 1995: The USS Wasp group joined other ships in the Adriatic during December orthe Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR peacekeeping mission.

g. 1999: During the latter months o the year, US ShipsBelleau Woodand Peleliuprovided helicopter support or Operation STABILISE in East Timor.23

h. 2000: HMS Ocean conducted a conspicuous amphibious demonstration, landing600 Royal Marines to rescue the ailing UN peacekeeping orce in Sierra Leone.


17/123


i. 2001-02: Several USN amphibious ships were involved in launching attacks duringOperation ENDURING FREEDOM late in 2001.24

j. 2001-02: HMS Ocean was part o the UK Amphibious Task Group poised to support

Royal Marines in Aghanistan.k. 2003: Several USN amphibious ships were involved in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

in the early months o the year.25

l. 2003: HM Ships Ocean andArk Royal(the latter also operating as an LPH) conductedan airborne Royal Marine assault on the Al Faw coast in Iraq.

Although the USN is the predominant operator o LHAs, LHDs and LPDs, it is by nomeans the only operator o these types o ships. Countries that have the capability orhave plans to develop it include:26

a. China: construction o an LHD apparently began in 2006. The ship was launchedin December 2006 but it does not have a ull length ight deck.

b. France: two Mistralclass LHDs are being built, with the frst commissioning inDecember 2006 and the second entering service during 2007.

c. India: In January 2007 the Indian Navy took over the ex-USS Trenton, an Austinclass LPD.

d. Italy: three San Giorgio class LPDs were commissioned between 1988 and 1994,

and initial studies have begun or an LHD displacing up to 20,000 tonnes.

e. Japan: three LPDs were commissioned between 1998 and 2003.

. Netherlands: aJohan de Wittclass LPD was launched in May 2006 and will enterservice in 2007. It has a ight deck at and will carry up to six NH-90 helicopters.There is also another LPD already in service.

g. Portugal: there is a plan to have one LPD in service by 2013.

h. Republic o Korea: one LPD was commissioned in July 2007.

j. Russia: there is one LPD in service.

k. Spain: one LHD is slated to commission in December 2008 and two Galicia classLPDs are already in service. The Spanish LHD design has been selected or theRAN.

l. Turkey: there are plans or an LPD displacing up to 15,000 tonnes.

m. UK: there are two Albion class LPDs and an amphibious assault ship-helicopter(LPH) in service.


18/123

7INTRODUCTION

n. US: our amphibious assault ships multi-purpose (LHA) commissioned between1976 and 1980 with eight more commissioned between 1989 and 2008.

These developments demonstrate that the capability provided by these ships remains

relevant and is becoming relevant to more and more nations.

Amphibious Assault Ships for Australia

Australias drive to acquire amphibious assault ships can be traced back to 1987. TheDeence White Paper produced in that year, The Deence o Australia made it clearthat in maintaining a sel-reliant deence posture Australia would see that priorityis given to those capabilities which are needed or the deence o Australia and itsdirect interests.27 At that time the deence o Australia was the major orce structure

determinant and there was an expectation that this would enable the ADF to undertakeother operations in support o regional allies and riends.28 Very little capacity existedor any kind o expeditionary operation and such operations were not anticipated.

Nevertheless, in response to the frst Fiji coup, a decision was made on 14 May 1987 toembark a company group o the Operational Deployment Force, to enable any necessaryevacuation o Australian nationals rom Fiji. No such evacuation was needed, but theoperation highlighted the ADFs orce structure limitations. The troops were airlitedrom Townsville to Norolk Island and then helicopter-lited oshore to HMAS Tobruk,a landing ship-logistic (LSL) and the RANs only troop carrying ship. Liting the troops

and their equipment rom Norolk Island required 58 helicopter sorties. A urther 61sorties and some jackstay transers were then used to distribute the troops among theships o the orce assembled or Operation MORRIS DANCE.

Despite the untidiness o the ADFs response to the demands o the Fiji operation, therewas no immediate orce structure outcome. For many analysts it was a one-o event.Nevertheless, within a year the Army had stated a requirement or a simultaneouscompany group helicopter lit rom ship to shore. Such a lit would require a minimumo six helicopters, each capable o carrying twenty troops and their equipment. It wouldalso require a ight deck large enough to provide six helicopter spots or a combinationo smaller ight decks to provide the six spots.

But Operation MORRIS DANCE was not a one-o event and over the next ten yearsthe Navys amphibious and sealit ships (HMA Ships TobrukandJervis Bay) and otherunits were involved in fve operations:

a. 1988 SAILCLOTH: on standby to evacuate Australian nationals rom Vanuatuand ultimately not needed29

b. 1990 DEFERENCE: on standby to evacuate Australian nationals rom

Bougainville30


19/123


c. 1992-93 SOLACE: support or the UNITAF peacekeeping and humanitarian relieeort in Somalia

d. 1994 LAGOON: support or the Bougainville peace conerence, and

e. 1997-98 BEL ISI I: support o the truce monitoring group in Bougainville.

Additionally the Strategic Review 1993, while maintaining the deence o Australia asits main ocus, acknowledged the possible need or Deence supported evacuationo Australian nationals in the region, while cautioning that such tasks would notnecessarily require additional specifc purpose capabilities.31 In a roundabout way,however, additional capabilities were already planned. The 1991 Force StructureReview had accepted the need to replace Jervis Baywith a training and helicoptersupport ship.32 Funding was eventually cancelled in the 1993-94 budget and a cheaper

alternative sought. This cheaper alternative materialised in the orm o two ex-USNNewportclass amphibious transport ships (LPA) at a purchase cost o $61 million.Modifcations and repairs to the ships cost about $400 million, against the expected$70 million, and took a considerable time.33

Despite the delayed introduction into service and the huge cost overrun the twoships, commissioned asKanimbla andManoora, now provide the RAN and the ADFwith a substantial and increasingly important capability. Each ship has capacity totransport and land 450 troops and can operate either three Sea King or our BlackHawk helicopters. The embarked helicopters enable the simultaneous landing o

platoon sized groups in a single lit.34 This remains ar short o the Armys stated goalo a company group lit. Each ship also has comprehensive command and controlacilities and extensive medical acilities. Since completion o their modifcation andrepair they have participated in operations in East Timor (subsequent to OperationSTABILISE), the Solomons, Iraq, and more recently in the tsunami and earthquakerelie operations in Indonesia.35

Operation MORRIS DANCE and subsequent expeditionary operations demonstratedthat Australias capacity or evacuation operations was limited, and that our regionalgeography actually encouraged the use o sea transport or the movement o troopsand heavy equipment. Even i these operations did not cause Deence to think moreseriously about a need or an ADF expeditionary capability, the peace enorcementoperation in East Timor, Operation STABILISE, certainly did.

Australias response to the escalating violence in East Timor, ollowing the plebisciteon independence, showed that its amphibious and sealit capabilities were inadequateand that without the earlier lease o the ast catamaran, commissioned asJervis Bay,the position would have been even worse. Tobrukwas used very heavily in the earlystages o the operation or bringing troops and equipment rom Darwin to Dili and,

despite being long overdue or reft, perormed admirably. The smaller heavy landing


20/123

9INTRODUCTION

crat (LCH) also perormed a vital role in resupplying land orces throughout East Timor a task that simply could not have been completed in any other way.

Confrmation o a change in Deence thinking came with the publication oDeence

2000: Our Future Deence Force. It pointed out that Australia would, i attacked, seekto engage enemy orces as ar rom our shores as possible. It also argued that theADF should be prepared to contribute to regional peacekeeping and humanitarianoperations, sometimes undertaking simultaneous operations.36 In making these pointsDeence 2000 also accepted that our deployment capabilities could be hard pressed.Signifcantly too, it highlighted the need or the ADF to be able to undertake coalitionoperations, even beyond our immediate neighbourhood, while acknowledging thatsuch operations could involve relatively high intensity conict.37

Australias answer to the terrorist attacks o September 2001 and since has included

expeditionary operations in the Persian Gul, and has involved the now very wellregarded and valuable LPAs mainly in command and control and combat supportroles.38 The national response has also confrmed Australias willingness to participatein coalition operations and there has been an acknowledgement that they are in uturemore likely to include operations urther afeld.39

As previously noted, Australias response to humanitarian emergencies in the regionhas also involved the LPAs, most notably or the December 2004 tsunami in Aceh, andthen in March 2005 or the earthquake in Sumatra.

One signifcant result o the recent commitment to expeditionary operations, especiallythose urther afeld, is that the Strategic Review 1993 statement to the eect that ourorces were sufciently versatile to carry out international security commitmentswithout signifcant structural change is no longer valid. In airness, however, thestrategic situation and our assessment o where we may need to project military orcein deence o our interests have changed dramatically.

These changes have resulted in the emergence o an Army requirement or the transportby sea o a battalion group o up to 1800 troops and their equipment. Specifcally, thestated requirement amounts to:

a. the capacity to land some 1200 troops

b. space, deck strength or and the capacity to unload more than 100 armouredvehicles, including some Abrams tanks and about 260 wheeled vehicles

c. hangar space and landing spots or at least 12 helicopters

d. the capacity to support orces deployed ashore or up to 10 days at a time

e. command and control acilities or a joint orce commander, and


21/123


. the ability to mount air and watercrat operations in weather conditions up to seastate our.40

The ability to transport, land and support a battalion group ashore will represent a

huge capability leap or the ADF. The governments preerred method o achievingthe capability is to build locally two medium-size LHDs, which are planned to enterservice between 2012 and 2014.41 The selected design is the Spanish strategic projectionship o 27,000 tonnes displacement. Each o these ships will have well decks and sixhelicopter landing spots. The two ships will cost about A$3 billion.

The decision to acquire ships o this type has drawn criticism on two main grounds.Critics argue frstly that two such large ships will oer less exibility than would alarger number o smaller ships.42 This criticism is valid to the extent that with bothships needed to achieve the battalion group lit, this level o lit will not always be

easible because o the ships maintenance cycles. A recent paper on the subjectestimated that both ships would be available or 60 per cent o the time, while one shipwould be available or the remaining 40 per cent.43 The same paper noted that threeships o the size selected would provide the required battalion group lit at all times.Government has apparently determined that the cost o achieving that guarantee istoo great in current circumstances.

Those critics who avour a larger number o smaller ships also argue that three orour smaller ships would be cheaper and more versatile than two larger ships. In

a general sense, the versatility argument is valid. Four ships would guarantee theconstant availability o two ships; thus, or example, enabling responses to twoseparate commitments. Unortunately, our smaller ships (say 10,000 tonnes) wouldnot guarantee the battalion group lit because o their limited troop carrying capacityand helicopter operating spots.44 Thus the greater exibility provided by the oursmaller ships would apply only to much more limited operational scenarios than thoseunderpinning the amphibious ship acquisition.

Arguments in avour o the smaller ships also suggest that they would be cheaper toacquire and operate than their larger counterparts. On two measures, however, the

fgures are revealing. According to McLennan and Gilbert, the acquisition cost penaltyo a 25,000 tonne ship over one o 15,000 tonnes is about 25 per cent not a hugeincrease, especially when the additional size and cost provides a 70 per cent increasein internal ship volume.45 The cost penalty o generating a similar capacity increasewith the smaller ships would be in the order o 60 per cent. Size is not the major actorin the cost o ship acquisition. Rather, cost is determined more by weapons, sensors,command and control systems, propulsion, electrical power and auxiliary systems.46These all have to be present in smaller ships just as they do in the larger ones.

Personnel are also a signifcant actor in selecting warships, both because o the costo training and employing people in uniorm and because o the continuing difculty


22/123

11INTRODUCTION

in attracting and retaining capable people. Again, however, ship size is not the majordeterminant o crew numbers. Most o the systems ound in larger ships will also beound in smaller versions such as weapons, sensors, command and control systemsand machinery. Consequently, the typical complement or an amphibious ship o about9000 tonnes is rom 135 to 170 people, while that or a ship o about 20,000 tonnes isrom 160 to 285 people depending on the extent o automation and other measuresassociated with minimum crewing.47 As a result, up to 680 people would be neededto crew our smaller amphibious ships, while a maximum o 570 would be needed tocrew the two larger ships.Janes Fighting Ships lists the complement o the strategicprojection ship as 243 personnel, which does not include members o the embarkedair group.48

The second line o criticism o the larger amphibious ships is that they represent part

o a Navy agenda to regain its status as an operator o aircrat carriers.49

The ar moreprosaic reality is that the plan to acquire two large amphibious ships is a response toan Army generated and government approved requirement or the transport, landingand support ashore o a battalion group and their equipment.

This writer is aware o no Navy agenda to re-introduce an aircrat carrier capability,yet there are elements o the accusation that merit some reection. The acquisition othe amphibious ships recognises the need or an expeditionary capability in the ADF.To dominate the maritime battlespace and to project power in deence o Australia andits interests, the ADF must be able to conduct sustained operations at considerable

distances rom home bases. Even operations in the waters to the near north o Australiacan be categorised as being at considerable distance rom home bases and so theterm expeditionary does not apply only to operations in distant parts o the regionand beyond.

Wherever they are deployed, but depending on the potential threat, however, theamphibious ships would expect to be escorted by Aegis-ftted air warare destroyersand other surace combatants to provide protection against submarine, surace or airthreats during transit and in the area o operations. The surace combatants would alsobe able to provide air deence and naval gunfre support to ground orces, especially inthe early part o an operation and while they remained relatively close to shore.

Depending on the threat type and level, the air deence capability could also includesupport rom airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircrat and tacticalfghters which might also conduct ground support operations. The presence o theseaircrat could depend on the availability o air-to-air reuelling (AAR) and o riendlyairfelds near the area o operations. The fve AAR aircrat being acquired underproject AIR 5402, depending on the nature and location o operations, could be bothreliant on the availability o riendly airfelds and hard-pressed to support intensive

air operations.


23/123


Those who see the amphibious ships as an answer to years o suspected silent butintense Navy prayer might be granted one point. I Australia is to embark on a genuinelyexpeditionary approach to the use o military orce it must surely be prepared toconsider a tactical air capability in its deployments. RAAF tactical aircrat, such asthe F/A-18 or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in uture, will not always be needed,either because the threat level or type will not demand their presence, or because theywill be provided by another Service in our case this would most likely be one o theUS Services i we are part o a coalition orce.

Nevertheless, in cases where tactical aircrat are needed and will not be provided byanother countrys orces, RAAF aircrat must be a part o the expeditionary orce. Theycould be needed as part o the air deence shield or the deploying ships and or theships and ground orces in the area o operations. They could also be tasked or attack

missions in support o the ground orces. I air support o this kind is needed, theRAAF would in present circumstances need access to one or more overseas air bases,depending on the location o the area o operations. This kind o access can be difcultto arrange and in some cases may not be achievable. It would also depend on a verysignifcant logistics support eort, which might itsel depend on sea transport.

An alternative solution to the provision o tactical aircrat or expeditionary operationscould involve the operation o STOVL JSF aircrat rom one or both o the largeamphibious ships. For this to be a viable option, the amphibious ships would need tobe capable o operating the aircrat. The Spanish design meets this requirement and the

ship is ftted with a ski jump. Additionally, the ships would need to be able to embarkand operate the JSFs as well as the helicopters embarked or troop lit. Clearly, only alimited number o JSFs could be embarked and thus the air deence or attack capabilityprovided would also be limited. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the AEW&C aircratand the air warare destroyers Aegis air deence capacity, the aircrat could providea credible capability in many scenarios.

This suggestion that the RAAF could operate STOVL JSFs rom the amphibious shipsis in line with the UK situation in which the Royal Air Force will y STOVL JSFs romthe Royal Navys new attack carriers. In this sense then it is not in any way a returnto the glory days or the RAN but simply a way to ensure that air support is alwaysavailable or expeditionary operations, through making ull use o the capabilities othe amphibious ships and o two versions o the JSF aircrat. Even i the idea is nottaken up, however, selection o the Spanish amphibious ship design will enable alliedor coalition partner STOVL aircrat to operate rom the ships.US Marine Corps STOVLJSFs would be the most likely partners.


24/123

13INTRODUCTION

Conclusion

The recent government decision to acquire two large at-top amphibious ships or theRAN will provide the ADF with an unprecedented capability to project military orce

rom the sea. Acquisition o any kind o ships or the RAN, but especially large ones,oten generates criticism, inormed and otherwise. The acquisition o these amphibiousships is no exception, with some commentators seeing them as simply too big andothers seeing in them some devious Navy plan to reintroduce aircrat carriers.

The attached 1978 Central Studies Paper, supported by some more recent materialin this introduction, aims to meet these criticisms and to provide a rationale or theacquisition o these ships. The paper itsel shows that in the years up to 1976 therewere many instances in which the capability proved to be invaluable in both peacetime

and wartime or warlike operations. This introduction provides more contemporaryexamples to reinorce the point. It also shows that several countries either havealready introduced amphibious ships o the LHD type to their navies, or have plans todo so. Finally, the introduction provides some thoughts as to how the expeditionaryorce capabilities o the ADF could be extended with the embarkation o STOVL JSFaircrat in these ships.


25/123


Notes

1 Alan Robertson, The Need or an Australian Aircrat Carrier Capability, Working Paper No. 59,

Strategic and Deence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1982,

p. 13.

2 James A. Boutilier, Get Big or Get Out: The Canadian and Australian Decisions to Abandon

Aircrat Carriers in T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick and P.D. Jones (eds),Refections on the RAN,

Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, NSW, 1991, p. 398.

3 A.T Ross and J. H. Sandison,Historical Appreciation o the Contribution o Naval Air Power,

Working Paper SACG 7, Central Studies Group 431-7-82, Department o Deence, Canberra,

13 January 1978.

4 Jack McCarie, Australias Maritime Strategy and Air Power in Keith Brent (ed), 100 Years

o Aviation: The Australian Military Experience, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra,2004, p. 160.

5 McCarie, Australias Maritime Strategy and Air Power, p. 160.

6 Gary Brown and Derek Woolner, A New Aircrat Carrier For The Royal Australian Navy?,

Strategic and Deence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1982,

p. 2.

7 D.A. Francis, Ashes to Ashes The Rise and Fall o the RAN Carrier Project,Journal o the

Australian Naval Institute, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 1985, p. 10.

8 Robertson, The Need or an Australian Aircrat Carrier Capability, p. 13.


10 Francis, Ashes to Ashes The Rise and Fall o the RAN Carrier Project, p. 11.




14 Brown and Woolner,A New Aircrat Carrier For The Royal Australian Navy?, p. 6.

15 Boutilier, Get Big or Get Out: The Canadian and Australian Decisions to Abandon Aircrat

Carriers, p. 403.



18 Joint Committee on Foreign Aairs and Deence,An Aircrat Carrier or the Australian Deence

Force, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1982, p. 51.


26/123

15INTRODUCTION

19 All USN examples up to and including 1995 are taken rom Roy A. Grossnick, et al., United

States Naval Aviation 1910-1995, Naval Historical Center, Department o the Navy, Washington,

DC, 1996.

20 Tarawa Expenditionary Strike Group WESTPAC 98 Deployment, accessed 11 September 2006.

21 Tarawa Expenditionary Strike Group WESTPAC 00 Deployment,

accessed 11 September 2006.

22 Some JTF Katrina Units to Return Home, accessed 18 September

2006.

23 Operation Stabilise Timor Crisis - American Forces, accessed

18 September 2006.

24 US Forces Order o Battle 01 September 2002, ; Peleliu ESGWESTPAC 01 Deployment, accessed 18 September 2006.

25 Bataan Amphibious Ready Group MED 03 Deployment; Boxer ARG WESTPAC 03

Deployment, accessed 18 September 2006.

26 Janes Fighting Ships, accessed 17 July 2007.

27 Department o Deence, The Deence o Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service,

Canberra, 1987, p. 2.

28 Department o Deence, The Deence o Australia, p. 6.

29 Peter Jones, 1983-1991 A Period o Change and Uncertainty in David Stevens (ed), The

Australian Centenary o Deence, Volume III: The Royal Australian Navy, Oxord University

Press, Melbourne, 2001, p. 261.

30 This and the ollowing three operations are listed in Vanessa Bendle, et al.,Database o Royal

Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, Working Paper No. 18, Sea Power Centre Australia,

Canberra, 2005, pp. 3, 15, 21, 32.

31 Department o Deence, Strategic Review 1993, Deence Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993,

p. 40.

32 Kathryn Spurling, 1991-2001 The Era o Deence Reorm in Stevens (ed), The Australian

Centenary o Deence, Volume III: The Royal Australian Navy, p. 275.

33 Spurling, 1991-2001 The Era o Deence Reorm, p. 275.

34 Department o Deence,Deending Australia: Deence White Paper 1994, Australian Government

Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, p. 45.

35 Bendle, et al.,Database o Royal Australian Navy Operations, pp. 39, 41, 44, 48, 61.

36 Department o Deence,Deence 2000: Our Future Deence Force, Deence Publishing Service,Canberra, 2000, p. 48.


27/123


37 Department o Deence,Deence 2000: Our Future Deence Force, p. 51.

38 Greg Nash and David Stevens,From Countenance to Catalyst, 1941 2006: Australias Navy

in the Gul, Topmill Pty. Ltd, Silverwater, NSW, 2006. pp. 66-70.

39 Department o Deence, Australias National Security: A Deence Update 2003, DeencePublishing Service, Canberra, 2003, p. 23.

40 Howard Anson, Amphibious Manoeuvre: On and O the Water,Deender,Vol. XXI, No. 3,

Spring 2004, pp. 31-32. More recent statements suggest that the battalion group may now

comprise over 2000 troops.

41 Department o Deence, Deence Capability Plan 2006-2016, Deence Publishing Service,

Canberra, 2006, p. 69.

42 Hugh White, Our deence chies are thinking big-too big, The Age, 13 July 2004, p. 13.

43 Bruce McLennan and Gregory P. Gilbert, Amphibious Ships Bigger is Better, Quadrant,

September 2006, p. 57.

44 As examples, the Italian San Giorgio class LPD o 7950 tonnes displacement carries up to

400 troops and has two helicopter landing spots, while the Japanese OosumiLPD o 8900

tonnes can carry up to 330 troops. Stephen Saunders (ed),Janes Fighting Ships 2002-2003,

Janes Inormation Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 2002, pp. 366, 390.

45 McLennan and Gilbert, Amphibious Ships Bigger is Better, p. 55.



48 Strategic Projection Ship,Janes Fighting Ships, accessed 26 July 2007.

49 Navy planning or two new aircrat carriers, The Daily Telegraph, 14 March 2005, p. 2.


28/123

b

A.T. Ross and J.M. Sandison

Reprinted from the 1978 Department of Defence

Working Paper of the same name.


THE CONTRIBUTION

OF NAVAL AIR POWER


29/123



30/123

General Introduction

The purpose o this study is to provide a consolidated historical record o the operationaluse o aircrat carriers in peace and in war, with a view to identiying the key actorsthat operated in avour o sea-based air power in the situations examined. The study isconfned to an appreciation o the operational experience pertaining to aircrat carriertypes in the various orms in which they have existed to date. Table 1 contains a short listo nomenclature and description o aircrat carrier types considered. Aircrat embarkedin carriers as air groups, which comprised a mixture o aircrat that could undertake avariety o tasks.

The study is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 considers the main aircrat carrier roles

in peacetime, and concentrates on:a. defning the peacetime uses o orces

b. identiying the types o situation which have involved aircrat carriers

c. noting the important capabilities possessed by aircrat carriers which determine theirsuitability or peacetime roles

d. examining the reasons why aircrat carriers were preerred to other means or thesituations analysed.

Chapter 2 considers the main wartime roles o aircrat carriers with respect to relevanthistorical experience. The analysis:

a. identifes the important strategic and tactical roles played by aircrat carriers duringwar

b. examines the reason why aircrat carriers were superior to or preerred to other meansor execution o the tasks.

Chapter 3 summarises the conclusions o the analysis o historical employment o aircratcarriers in peace and in war, listing the important actors that led to their choice and thecapabilities they aorded. A short discussion completes the study, by considering thepossible relevance o the conclusions o this analysis to Australia today [Ed: that is 1978]and in the uture, making reerence to ongoing studies and the impact o technologicaladvances where applicable.

The obvious but important caution to the reader is that uture studies examiningreplacement options, which include new equipment and new technology, must do so in thelight o the true capability required. For example, a cruiser equipped with a landing padand our small helicopters could conceivably be defned as an aircrat carrier. It patently

could not replace the capability o a conventional aircrat carrier such as HMASMelbourne.But the capabilities represented byMelbourne may no longer be what are required orAustralia rom naval air power.


31/123



32/123

Chapter 1: Aircraft Carrier Roles in Peacetime

IntroductionThis part o the study considers operational experience with aircrat carriers so as toestablish the number o distinctive methods o employing them in peacetime. Thereare signifcant dierences in political constraints between peacetime and wartimeroles, particularly with regard to the actual employment o orce. A peacetime rolemay involve, or example, the discharge or exchange o live ordnance. However, inadopting a strategy that requires the use o armed services in a peacetime role, theinitiating government and its armed service advisers take great care to minimise therisk o entering a state o war, whether it be declared or undeclared. An exercise opeacetime orce that evolves into a state o war is a disastrous ailure o policy. Thereore,although the peacetime roles include the use o the armed services, there are severelimitations and constraints on the use o armed orce.

Peacetime use of force

The exercise o orce, or the threat o its use, has not been confned to wartime. Ithas been an intrinsic part o normal governmental peacetime international activities(although conducted under more restraint than in war) providing a means o acting andprojecting power and inuence when normal diplomatic measures, such as diplomaticlobbying, extension or withdrawal o diplomatic representatives, or severing o tradeagreements have ailed to achieve a satisactory result. Underlying these acts opeacetime orce is a number o coherent strategies, which indicate how such acts areto be employed or maximum eect. We shall call them the strategies o:

a. corrective orce

b. preventative orce

c. precautionary orce

d. demonstrative orce.

Each o the strategies envisages the use o one or several parts o the armed servicesin various ways, either direct or subtle, to achieve an end.

Corrective orce is the strategy by which governments seek to reverse the course ounavourable external events that have overtaken them; events that were not whollyoreseen and that have ailed to be contained by diplomatic action. Provided thatthere is sufcient armed strength available to meet the requirements o the task, theobjective is to reverse the course o events by an act that could provoke the outbreak

o war i it is not judged careully.


33/123


Preventative orce is the strategy by which governments seek to prevent thedevelopment o unavourable external events that they have oreseen, and that haveailed to be contained by diplomatic action alone. Provided there is sufcient armedstrength to meet the requirements o the contemplated task, the objective is to usethe armed services to take pre-emptive action so as to deter or physically prevent theopponent rom achieving his aim.

Precautionary orce is the strategy by which governments respond to external situationsthat herald the prospect o some threat to specifc national interest in particular areas.However, there are usually uncertainties surrounding the defnition o the threat thatdo not allow the use o preventative orce, which is predicated on a clear knowledge othe potential opponents capability and intention. Precautionary orce oten attemptsto overcome the uncertainty o the situation by ambiguous deployment o orces, in

a manner that is evident to those elements that may pose a threat, yet could also beconstrued as having an innocent purpose. The main aim o the use o precautionaryorce is to deter any opponent by posing a latent threat to any emerging hostileinuences.

Corrective, preventative and precautionary orce are strongly related to one another; themain dierentiating actors being timing and actions. Precautionary orce deployments,i successul, should obviate the need or preventative or corrective measures, whilepreventative orce deployments should likewise obviate the need or corrective ones.All run the inherent risk o escalation, and or this reason the use o orce in such a

manner has become characterised by the ollowing important underlying principles:

a. the use or threat o orce and the size o orces involved must be clearly relatedto the achievement o a limited objective that, by defnition, does not threaten thesurvival (or national security) o the other party or nation

b. to this end, such orces employed must be deployable near the symbolic centre othe conict

c. the purpose o those employing orce must be recognised not only as limited butas tolerable. It must be more acceptable to the opponent than a resort to war. Anelement o ambiguity about the presence o the orces deployed is sometimes anadvantage

d. the orces employed must be capable o achieving the intended purpose; to deter,prevent or correct the developing situation, regardless o the reactions o the otherparty

e. the violence employed should maniestly be the minimum needed to achieve theobjective. Damage or casualties must be strictly related to achieving the aim.Otherwise, it will appear to the opponent that the hostile intentions are not confnedto the achievement o an immediate and limited result


34/123

23AIRCRAFT CARRIER ROLES IN PEACETIME

. the use o surprise reduces the opponents ability to respond adequately to the act,lowering the possibility o an extended fght escalating to eventual war.

All three o the above strategies have an element o demonstration about them,

especially when aircrat carriers are involved.In this paper the term demonstrative orce is used to describe the strategy by whichgovernments may escape the commitment involved in the other three peacetimestrategies, yet still may make a gesture more strongly than diplomatic methodswill allow. This usually results in a ag-showing exercise, designed to emphasisegovernment attitudes and to attempt to lend verisimilitude to what otherwise might beunconvincing statements o intent. An act o demonstrative orce can also be used toprovide an outlet or public emotion; to prove to an outraged public that its governmentis doing something, without the attendant risk that a more determined act might bring.

The conditions defning an act o demonstrative orce dier somewhat rom the otherpeacetime roles:

a. the demonstration needs to be made near the symbolic centre o the crisis area

b. only token orces are employed

c. the demonstration orce needs to be very obvious. It should be capable o advertisingits presence.

There is a fth, but secondary role not involving the threat or actual use o orce in

which aircrat carriers have played an important historical part: disaster relie. Disasterrelie is the aid extended to counteract the eects in ones own or another nationsterritory, especially in remote areas, o large scale catastrophes, such as earthquakesand dam collapse. The motives behind the extension o such aid can range rom asense o moral obligation, to attempts to curry avour as a means o gaining someuture advantage.

Tables 2 to 6 record, according to role, the relevant operational instances in whichaircrat carriers have been employed in peacetime. Great care has been taken to studythe background events and acts o each instance to associate it with the correct role.However, there will no doubt be a ew instances that readers will still be inclined toreorder. There will always be some difculties o this nature, as not all historical eventsconorm completely to the necessarily simplifed theories that are developed to helpexplain them. The important point is that the majority o relevant instances that haveoccurred will be sufciently obvious in their characteristics to give ample support tothe validity o the writers method o analysis.

Tables 2 to 6 also characterise each instance by date, geographic location and a shortnarrative describing orces involved and the consequence o events. Each instance is

also classifed as either close or distant. A distant incident is one that occurs beyondthe eective radius o action o aircrat operating rom the involved nations nearest


35/123


secure military air base. The converse circumstances make or a close incident. Thesignifcance o this distinction is discussed later. For those three roles in which orce isemployed or threatened; corrective (Table 2), preventative (Table 3) and precautionary(Table 4), incidents are urther categorised by:

a. the interest threatened

b. the orm or nature o the threat; or example naval, air, or ground elements. Theterm ground elements is used to describe any military or para-military orcesranging rom regular troops to insurrectionists or rioters

c. the key capabilities o the orce deployed or the particular situation; that is, whethertroops or marines ormed an essential part o the orce and what types o aircratwere important or operational availability or actual operations.

In the ollowing paragraphs the nature o the incidents within each group is discussedin more detail.

Corrective force (Table 2)

A classic incident o the application o corrective orce occurred in 1964, when theTanganyikan [Ed: now Tanzanian] Army mutinied against its national government. TheBritish Government decided to intervene against the rebels and despatched the lighteet carrier Centaurwith a complement o 600 marines and helicopters, plus her normalair group. Within our days o departure rom Aden, Centaurwas sailing o Dar Es

Salaam, the centre o the mutiny. A surprise helicopter assault succeeded in recapturingkey points in the city and trapping the rebel units within their barracks. Other rebelunits in other parts o the country quickly surrendered in the ace o threatened carrierfxed wing aircrat strikes, combined with urther marine commando assaults.

The British orces involved, which later included Royal Air Force (RAF) and Armyunits, were sufcient to achieve the limited aim o controlling the rebellion, but notto gain any other objective, such as the re-occupation o Tanganyika. For this reason,the general population accepted and aided the British troops against the indigenous

rebel army units.The actor that most characterises the 16 incidents listed in Table 2 with the notableexception o maritime incidents, such as those at Hainan Island, the Gul o Tonkin ando the North Korean coast has been the existence o a credible threat rom militaryor dissident ground orce elements to the saety o nationals or o a riendly indigenouspopulace. Thereore, corrective orce could not be applied solely by aircrat, whetherland-based or sea-based, and troops or marines have been an important componento what has invariably been a joint orce operation. In all but one such incident, thesetroops or marines have been inserted ashore. The important capabilities o aircrat

carriers in incidents involving the application o corrective orce have thereorebeen:


36/123


a. the provision o a mobile sea base with associated command, control andcommunications (C3) and Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) acilities theamphibious assault ship (or LHA) concept

b. the provision o rotary wing tactical transport acilitiesc. the provision o rapid response, direct fxed wing tactical aircrat, with ground or

surace strike and reconnaissance capabilities, in those situations in which thenaval, air or ground threat was sufcient to warrant it.

Preventative force (Table 3)

A recent example o the use o preventative orce occurred during the Yom KippurWar o October 1973. Israeli military ortunes improved steadily ater the frst weeko the war, and the Egyptian and Syrian military initiative appeared likely to collapse

as a consequence. Then, the Union o Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) threatened tosend in Russian troops directly to aid the Arabs, unless the US agreed to an immediateceasefre. This would have let the Arabs with a substantial part o their militaryconquests rom Israel.

The US rejected the threat and moved the Sixth Fleet (which it had been unobtrusivelyreinorcing or the previous week) into positions in the eastern Mediterranean, romwhich the eet could selectively interdict all sea and air routes into Syria and Egypt.This conronted the USSR with the prospect o having to remove the Sixth Fleet i it

was to succeed in its plan. It was by no means certain o achieving this task shorto total war, and certainly not in time to render useul assistance to Egypt and Syriabeore they were deeated.

The result was that the USSR had to back down on its threat and the US was largelyable to determine when the war would fnish. Even though this example involvedthe use o aircrat carriers, the exercise o preventative orce can be carried out byother elements o the armed services, as may corrective orce. The recent crisis inBelize [Ed: in 1977] was in act met by British Army and Air Force units exercisingpreventative orce.

As would be expected rom the intrinsic nature o the 11 incidents in Table 3 callingor the use o preventative orce, the situations had not then reached the point at whichcorrective orce would have been required. Consequently, there were ewer instances,although they were still amongst the most important, in which troops or marines ormedan essential component o the deployed orce.

In the majority o cases, the interests at stake have been the sovereignty o a colonialadministration or the security o a riendly government. Signifcantly, in eight othe eleven incidents, the threat posed had included naval or para-naval elements

attempting to infltrate ground orce elements or supplies. This activity required therapid establishment o an air and sea blockade in the immediate vicinity o the crisis.


37/123


Note that especially in peacetime, when board and search operations are mandatory,this is also an operation that cannot be carried out solely by aircrat, whether they aresea-based or land-based. The important capabilities o aircrat carriers in incidentsinvolving the application o preventative orce have thereore been:

a. provision o rapid response, including direct support by fxed wing tacticalreconnaissance aircrat with the threat o ground attack or surace strike i requiredat the desired location

b. provision o C3 and JFHQ acilities or tactical control o air and sea blockadeoperations

c. provision o a mobile sea base with rotary wing aircrat, troops or marines andtheir logistic support the LPH or LHA concept.

Precautionar force (Table 4)

A recent example o the exercise o precautionary orce concerned the uncertainposition o US nationals in Uganda during March 1977. The disturbed nature o Ugandanaairs and widespread killing, matched with the unpredictable behaviour o PresidentAmin, led the US Government to ear or the saety o its nationals when they weredetained on the orders o the Ugandan President. In addition to vigorous diplomaticeorts to ensure their saety, the US Government ordered the carrier Enterprise tocruise o the Kenyan coast to back up their diplomatic actions with the hint o the

direct use o orce against key targets.The frepower that theEnterprise could bring to bear on Uganda outweighed anythingthat country could do adequately to deend itsel, but was limited by the need to ythrough Kenyan airspace. The Kenyan Government was prepared to allow US aircrat tocarry out operations which were directly related to the saety o US nationals in Uganda,but nothing more. Uganda was surprised by the speed o the deployment o US orces,and responded to the vigorous diplomatic eorts by releasing all US nationals.

With the exception o two sea control or rights o passage incidents (Straits o Tiran

and Sulu Sea) the essential eature o the remaining 17 events listed in Table 4 and inwhich precautionary orce was used, has been that no air or naval threat existed or wasposed directly or indirectly to elements o the deployed orces. Any threat that mighthave emerged would generally have been restricted to some orm o ground elementthat could hazard the security o a local administration or the saety o nationals. Thus,the scale o operations has seldom required any orce with capabilities beyond that othe mobile sea base (LPH or LHA) concept. The important capabilities o aircrat carriersin incidents involving the application o precautionary orce have thereore been:

a. the provision o a mobile sea base with associated C3 and JFHQ acilities the LPH

or LHA concept


38/123


b. the provision o rotary wing tactical transport acilities, troops or marines and theirlogistic support

c. the notion o some ambiguity o purpose associated with the deployment, which

may be assisted by the presence o fxed wing tactical strike and reconnaissanceaircrat within the orce.

The questions o rights o passage and sea control deserve some attention. A majorityo nations that are party to the United Nations Convention on the Law o the Seasubscribe to the view that warships have rights to innocent passage through straitsand other contiguous seas that other nations hold to be sovereign territory. It is oten acourtesy rather than a requirement that permission is sought rom the nation claimingsovereignty beore any transit is made by a warship. [Ed: The United Nations Conventionon the Law o the Sea 1982 gives warships the right o innocent passage in territorial

waters, without seeking approval rom or advising the coastal state.]

I permission is reused, assertion o rights may be a policy option, and there areexamples in the reerences o such options being activated. Whether this is an exampleo use o precautionary orce or demonstrative orce depends on the circumstances,but it is signifcant that aircrat carriers have very seldom been used to conduct suchoperations. Other studies have contended that, with the increasing sophistication oavailable anti-ship weapon technology, which is becoming more readily available tosmaller nations, aircrat carriers and fxed wing tactical aircrat may either be:

a. essential to the operation, to pose a threat o retaliatory or pre-emptive strikesagainst selected targets, such as coastal missile batteries, or

b. too expensive an asset to risk in such circumstances.

The case rests.

Demonstrative force (Table 5)

An interesting example o the exercise o demonstrative orce occurred in November1969, relating to the Spanish claim to Gibraltar. A change in some key personalities in

the Spanish Government prompted international and domestic speculation that Spainwould press her claim or Gibraltar less vigorously than in the past. To reute theseviews, but to avoid escalating the dispute, the government ordered its helicopter carrier(LPH)Dedalo plus 12 other warships to visit Algeciras Bay and to anchor in sight othe Rock in what was meant to be a pointed and expressive gesture o continuedSpanish determination. It was met by an equally demonstrative gesture rom theBritish Government, which had quietly slipped the aircrat carriersHermes andEagleinto Gibraltar shortly beore the arrival o the Spanish warships.

An alternative example that indicates the exercise o demonstrative orce is notconfned to the use o aircrat carriers, concerns the conrontation between Uganda


39/123


and Kenya during June and July 1976. To indicate its support or Kenya in the evento a war between the latter and Uganda, the US made the symbolic gesture o sendingtwo P-3 aircrat to Nairobi and the rigateDonald B. Bearyto Mombasa. These moveswere eventually supported indirectly by the movement o the aircrat carrierRangerand support ships into the Indian Ocean.

Apart rom the 13 incidents listed in Table 5, there have been other ag-showingoperations, too numerous to list, in which aircrat carriers have not been present.Aircrat carriers are included or their obvious prestigious attractions as powerulcapital leet units. Their inclusion also demonstrates the range o operationalcapabilities they aord, or use o orce in peacetime or in war and that can be broughtto bear at comparatively short notice.

What has been signifcant is the choice o geopolitical location or employment o

demonstrative orce by aircrat carriers. Table 5 shows this to have been regions oexisting or anticipated political instability. This study has not pursued in detail the long-

term or short-term success o such demonstrations, but the inclusion o aircrat carriers

as instruments o demonstrative orce seems on the whole to have been a substantially

successul contribution to stabilising a situation, with one or two notable exceptions.

Disaster relief (Table 6)

Table 6, Aircrat Carriers and the Exercise o Disaster Relie, is a list o the moreimportant operations concerning the use o aircrat carriers in this way since 1945. They

have been involved usually when there has been signifcant difculty in transerringsupplies rom ships to the disaster area. This has largely occurred during oods or in theatermath o cyclones and earthquakes, when roads and airfelds have been seriouslydisrupted. Carrier aircrat and helicopters operating rom their own sel-reliant andunaected air base have requently been used to distribute supplies and civil deencepersonnel in rescue operations.

Peacetime Roles in Comparison to Other Means

CapabilitiesGovernments have used aircrat carriers in applying orce in peacetime, to projectpower and inuence as an extension o diplomacy. Examination o the precedinghistorical experience, exemplifed by the incidents listed in Tables 2 to 6, shows theollowing important capabilities or defnitive qualities that have been applicable toaircrat carriers and their air groups in peacetime roles:

a. They can provide a mobile sea base equipped with rotary wing aircrat, containingacilities or troops and marines and their logistics support the LPH or LHA

concepts.


40/123


b. They have provided rapid response, direct fxed wing tactical aircrat or:

(1) reconnaissance

(2) surace or ground tactical strike, or the threat thereo, in the immediatevicinity o the incident

(3) conveying a sense o ambiguity o purpose or the deployed orce, especiallyin those incidents involving application o precautionary orce.

c. They have provided C3 and JFHQ acilities within a mobile sea base or:

(1) amphibious operations

(2) air and sea blockade and sea control operations.

d. The sel-sufcient nature o aircrat carriers (particularly as mobile sea bases LPHor LHA) makes them ideal or contribution to disaster relie.

So it can be said that aircrat carriers have been a good thing in peacetime applications.What is yet to be established is whether there were special reasons or the use oaircrat carriers in these peacetime roles, making them better than alternative means,or whether they were used simply because they were available.

Close and distant crises

A frst step towards answering these questions is to consider the geographic distribution

o crises to which governments, particularly major and regional powers, have beencompelled to respond in peacetime. These all into distant and close crises. A distantcrisis is one that occurs beyond the eective operational radius o land-based aircratrom the involved nations nearest major secure military air base. The conversedescribes a close crisis. The eective operational radius is that within which allocatedunits can accomplish the operational aim. In peacetime acts o orce, the operationalaim is invariably to provide useul orces (or the threat thereo) at or in the vicinityo the crisis point. This approach takes into account the extent o the crisis and thecapacity o the nearest military bases to cope with it. The capacity o a military base

to contribute to crisis response is inter alia a unction o the number o weapons andweapons platorms it can sustain and operate at short notice, and the distances theyhave to traverse to reach the crisis area.

In the incidents involving the our main strategies or the use o orce in peacetime,the breakdown o incidents taken rom Tables 2 to 5 by categories is as ollows:


41/123


No. of Incidents

Close Distant

Corrective Force 11 5

Preventative Force 5 6

Precautionary Force 9 10

Demonstrative Force 10 3

It should be intuitively obvious that the difculties in responding to distant crises willbe quite dierent rom those associated with close crises.

The response to distant crises Land-based air power

The quickest means o responding to a crisis, whether it is distant or close, is by usingaircrat or transport or attack, as they represent the astest means o reinorcement.However, when responding to crises that are outside the operational radius o land-based aircrat, there are likely to be some problems in transporting orces by air tothe appropriate area.

Use of bases on foreign soil

Many nations have recognised this act or years. Consequently, they have attemptedto acquire bases or land orces, land-based aircrat and naval squadrons at strategic

locations around the world, to acilitate orce deployments. This approach reachedits zenith during the Cold War when, in 1957, the US, or example, had 119 airbasesin other countries. However, with the growth o dtente between the super powers,the development o ICBMs, and the increased number o newly independent nationsjealous o their autonomy, the availability o bases on oreign soil or global or regionalpowers has declined dramatically. By 1971, Britain, France and many lesser powerswere obliged, or one reason or another, to give up most o their oreign bases. However,despite developments in transport aircrat resulting in signifcant improvement intheir range and payload perormance, overseas bases are still required by the major

powers or staging purposes.Furthermore, those host nations that still allow oreign air, sea or land orces to bebased on their soil have become ar more discriminating in what they will allow thebases to be used or. Thus, the US was obliged not to use any o its European bases orthe transer o A-4 and F-4 aircrat and other supplies to Israel during the Yom KippurWar in October 1973. Its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners wererightened o Arab reprisals against their oil supplies.

Similarly, the US was unable to respond in time to aid the Pueblo as, among other

reasons, its main strike aircrat in the area (the Marine air wing at Iwakuni, Japan)could not be used. The Japanese and US governments had an understanding that US


42/123


bases in Japan would not be used to launch direct military attacks against enemieso the US. The obvious solution was to y the aircrat frst to South Korea, but therewas insufcient time.

The danger o ignoring the wishes o the host nation in respect o the use o such baseswas amply demonstrated by the MayagezAair in May 1975. In this case, the US usedsome o its air bases in Thailand to y aircrat to interdict Cambodian orces engagedin the seizure o the SSMayagezand its crew. The Thai Government did not agreewith this action, and obliged the US to give up all o its bases in Thailand.

In recent years the US has also had substantial trouble over the use o its air, navaland land bases in Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, Panama, Ethiopia and Spain. Britainhas had similar problems with Malta and the USSR with Egypt (and since, Somalia).The result o these developments has been to increase the number o crises that occur

beyond the operational radius o land-based aircrat o global or regional powers. Thisassertion is supported by the inormation contained in Tables 2 to 5, which indicates thatthere has been a substantial rise in the proportion o distant crises in recent years.

Distant Crises Close Crises

Distant Crises as

% of Total Crises

Corrective Force

1945 1964 3 5 37

1965 1977 2 6 25

Preventative Force

1945 1964 2 5 29

1965 1977 4 100

PrecautionaryForce

1945 1964 2 5 29

1965 1977 8 4 66

DemonstrativeForce

1945 1964 2 7 22

1965 1977 1 3 25


43/123


Transit and temporar basing rights

The desirability o responding eectively and quickly to distant crises has not diminished,at least or major and regional powers. Nations, where they have elt compelled to respond,

have adopted several methods to overcome the problem described above. The frst hasconsisted o obtaining special transit rights rom third party nations to y transport andcombat aircrat through their airspace and possibly to use some o their reuelling acilitiesen route. The act that Israel gained permission to land and reuel in Kenya enabled theEntebbe rescue mission (an act o corrective orce) to take place on 3 and 4 July 1976. Itwas not a practical proposition or Israels capabilities without this support.

Similarly, the US obtained permission rom the Portuguese Government to use the Azoresas a reuelling stopover or C-5 aircrat during their arms and supply ights to Israelduring the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. I this acility had not been available, the

C-5s would have had to y directly to Israel rom the US as the European and Arab nationshad indicated a strong desire not to cooperate. This would have limited their capacity to33.5 tons o cargo each. The availability o the Azores airport acilities allowed the C-5s tocarry 74.2 tons each, greatly aiding the speed and eectiveness o the resupply eort. Thedevelopment o a stretched version o the Lockheed C-141 Starliter, which was given anin-ight reuelling capability, has to some extent been carried out in an attempt to reduceUS reliance on oreign staging bases.

Despite the success associated with these two examples, however, the reality is that

nations are reluctant to grant such transit rights to the armed orces o other nations. Thisapplies particularly during times o international tension, when the desirability o havingsuch rights is at its highest point. Thus, during the Lebanon crisis o July 1959, the USattempted to gain transit rights or some o its army and air orces in Germany to y toLebanon. Three days o delicate and uncertain negotiations were needed to gain overightpermission in a tug-o-war, with communist political pressure applied to each o the nationsin the planned ight paths o the transport aircrat. The Lebanese President had requestedhelp within 48 hours, which in this event could not be provided by US ground orces andland-based aircrat.

Another example concerns the Beira Patrol o 1966. In this, the British Government soughtpermission rom the Malagasy Republic [Ed: ormerly Madagascar] to base Shackletonmaritime patrol aircrat on its soil, to complement an eective naval blockade o Rhodesianoil supplies entering through the Portuguese Port o Beira in Mozambique. This waseventually gained, but only or three aircrat, and these had to operate rom an airport withno night ying acilities. This arrangement was not eective, and the British Governmentsought another means o imposing the blockade. Similar problems aced the PakistaniGovernment during the suppression o East Pakistan in 1971. The Indian Governmentreused transit permission or Pakistani military aircrat and transports to y direct to East

Bengal rom West Pakistan. This caused major ight diversions around the Indian coast,greatly complicating the Pakistani Armys speed and exibility o deployment by air.


44/123


In-ight refuelling as an option

The alternative to the uncertain wrangle in gaining transit rights or overights orlandings in neutral territory is to extend the range o military aircrat by in-ight

reuelling, so that neutral territory and airspace can be avoided and reinorcements canreach their destination quickly. This method was used during the British reinorcemento Belize, British Honduras, in response to the threat o invasion rom Guatemala inJuly 1977. Harrier aircrat were own in by this means. A-4 and F-4 aircrat beingtranserred to Israel during the Yom Kippur War also used air-to-air reuelling.

Both o the methods already mentioned or responding to distant crises have twocommon weaknesses. Both assume that there will be a secure and eective air base atthe end o the respective journeys to the crisis zo

a historical appreciation of the contribution of naval air power

Documents