Jurisdictiona.) Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 167702 March 20, 2009LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL,Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO,Respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 dismissing Civil Case No. 99-297 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for lack of jurisdiction.The facts, as narrated by the CA, are simple.[Petitioner Lourdes] Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (or "village"), Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 208586. On the other hand, [respondent Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the former president and chairman of the board of governors (or "board"), construction committee chairman and village manager of [Urdaneta Village Association Inc.] UVAI, respectively. UVAI is an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.[Eristingcols] action [against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] is founded on the allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and after UVAIs approval of her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and architects fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lot with "concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway"; that for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations (or "CRR") on "Set Back Line" vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty ofP400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on "Set Back Line," is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.On February 9, 1999, or a day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a temporary settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an undertaking which allowed Eristingcols workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.On February 26, 1999, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (or "HIGC")2which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 535, Series of 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986.Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the [RTC] after they voluntarily appeared therein "and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking."On May 20, 1999, Eristingcol filed an amended complaint by (i) impleading Manuel Carmona (or "Carmona") and Rene Cristobal (or "Cristobal"), UVAIs newly-elected president and chairman of the board and newly-designated construction committee chairman, respectively, as additional defendants and (ii) increasing her claim for moral damages against each petitioner fromP500,000.00 toP1,000,000.00.On May 25, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion for production and inspection of documents, which UVAI, Limjoco, Tan, Vilvestre, Carmona and Cristobal opposed. The motion sought to compel [UVAI and its officers] to produce the documents used by UVAI as basis for the imposition of theP400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol as well as letters and documents showing that UVAI had informed the other homeowners of their violations of the CRR.On May 26, 1999, the [RTC] issued an order which pertinently reads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, for lack of merit, the defendants Motion to Dismiss is Denied, and plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in default and for contempt are also Denied."The [RTC] ratiocinated that [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] may not assail its jurisdiction "after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist from prohibiting (Eristingcols) workers from entering the village." In so ruling, it applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.On June 7, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion reiterating her earlier motion for production and inspection of documents.On June 8, 1999, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] moved for partial reconsideration of the order dated May 26, 1999. Eristingcol opposed the motion.On March 24, 2001, the [RTC] issued an order granting Eristingcols motion for production and inspection of documents, while on March 26, 2001, it issued an order denying [UVAIs, Limjocos, Tans and Vilvestres] motion for partial reconsideration.On May 10, 2001, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] elevated the dispute before [the CA] via [a] petition for certiorari alleging that the [RTC] acted without jurisdiction in issuing the orders of May 26, 1999 and March 24 and 26, 2001.3The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order4and dismissing Eristingcols complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Hence, this appeal positing a sole issue for our resolution:Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcols complaint.Before anything else, we note that the instant petition impleads only Limjoco as private respondent. The rest of the defendants sued by Eristingcol before the RTC, who then collectively filed the petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTCs Order, were, curiously, not included as private respondents in this particular petition.Eristingcol explains that only respondent Limjoco was retained in the instant petition as her discussions with UVAI and the other defendants revealed their lack of participation in the work-stoppage order which was supposedly single-handedly thought of and implemented by Limjoco.The foregoing clarification notwithstanding, the rest of the defendants should have been impleaded as respondents in this petition considering that the complaint before the RTC, where the petition before the CA and the instant petition originated, has yet to be amended. Furthermore, the present petition maintains that it was serious error for the CA to have ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over a complaint for declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction Rules. Clearly, UVAI and the rest of the defendants should have been impleaded herein as respondents.Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, requires that the petition shall "state the full name of the appealing party as petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents." As the losing party in defendants petition for certiorari before the CA, Eristingcol should have impleaded all petitioners, the winning and adverse parties therein.On this score alone, the present petition could have been dismissed outright.5However, to settle the issue of jurisdiction, we have opted to dispose of this case on the merits.Despite her having dropped UVAI, Lorenzo Tan (Tan) and June Vilvestre (Vilvestre) from this suit, Eristingcol insists that her complaint against UVAI and the defendants was properly filed before the RTC as it prays for the declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction Rules and asks that damages be paid by Limjoco and the other UVAI officers who had inflicted injury upon her. Eristingcol asseverates that since the case before the RTC is one for declaration of nullity, the nature of the question that is the subject of controversy, not just the status or relationship of the parties, should determine which body has jurisdiction. In any event, Eristingcol submits that the RTCs jurisdiction over the case was foreclosed by the prayer of UVAI and its officers, including Limjoco, for affirmative relief from that court.Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.6To determine the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.7Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in Eristingcols complaint, specifically her amended complaint, to wit:Allegations Common to All Causes of Action3. In 1958 and upon its incorporation, [UVAI] adopted a set of By-laws and Rules and Regulations, x x x. Item 5 of [UVAIs] Construction Rules pertinently provides:"Set back line: All Buildings, including garage servants quarters, or parts thereof (covered terraces, portes cocheres) must be constructed at a distance of not less than three (3) meters from the boundary fronting a street and not less than four (4) meters fronting the drainage creek or underground culvert and two (2) meters from other boundaries of a lot. Distance will be measured from the vertical projection of the roof nearest the property line. Completely open and unroofed terraces are not included in these restrictions."Suffice it to state that there is nothing in the same By-laws which deals explicitly with canopies or marquees which extend outward from the main building.4. [Eristingcol] has been a resident of Urdaneta Village for eleven (11) years. In February 1997, she purchased a parcel of land in the Village, located at the corner of Urdaneta Avenue and Cerrada Street. x x x.5. In considering the design for the house (the "Cerrada property") which she intended to construct on Cerrada Street, [Eristingcol] referred to the National Building Code of the Philippines. After assuring herself that the said law does not expressly provide any restrictions in respect thereof, and after noting that other houses owned by prominent families had similar structures without being cited by the Villages Construction Committee, [Eristingcol] decided that the Cerrada property would have a concrete canopy directly above the main door and driveway.6. In compliance with [UVAIs] rules, [Eristingcol] submitted to [UVAI] copies of her building plans in respect of the Cerrada property and the building plans were duly approved by [UVAI]. x x x.7. [Eristingcol] submitted and/or paid the "cash bond/construction bond deposit and architects inspection fee" ofP200,000.00 and the architects inspection fee ofP500.00 as required under Construction Rules x x x.8. In the latter part of 1997, and while the construction of the Cerrada property was ongoing, [Eristingcol] received a notice from [UVAI], charging her with alleged violations of the Construction Rules, i.e., those on the height restriction of eleven (11.0) meters, and the canopy extension into the easement. On 22nd January 1998, [Eristingcol] (through her representatives) met with, among others, defendant Limjoco. In said meeting, and after deliberation on the definition of the phrase "original ground elevation" as a reference point, [Eristingcols] representatives agreed to revise the building plan by removing what was intended to be a parapet or roof railing, and thereby reduce the height of the structure by 40 centimeters, which proposal was accepted by the Board through defendant Limjoco, Gov. Catalino Macaraig Jr. ([UVAIs] Construction Committee chairman), and the Villages Architect. However, the issue of the alleged violation in respect of the canopy/extension remained unresolved.x x x x9. In compliance with the agreement reached at the 22nd January 1998 meeting, [Eristingcol] caused the revision of her building plans such that, as it now stands, the Cerrada property has a vertical height of 10.96 meters and, thus, was within the Villages allowed maximum height of 11 meters.10. Sometime in June 1998, [Eristingcol] was surprised to receive another letter from [UVAI], this time from the Construction Committee chairman (defendant Tan), again calling her attention to alleged violations of the Construction Rules. On 15th June 1998, [UVAI] barred [Eristingcols] construction workers from entering the Village. Thus, [Eristingcols] Construction Manager (Mr. Jaime M. Hidalgo) wrote defendant Tan to explain her position, and attached photographs of similar "violations" by other property owners which have not merited the same scrutiny and sanction from [UVAI].x x x x11. On 26th October 1998, and for reasons known only to him, defendant Vilvestre sent a letter to Mr. Geronimo delos Reyes, demanding for an "idea of how [Mr. delos Reyes] can demonstrate in concrete terms [his] good faith as a quid pro quo for compromise to" [UVAIs] continued insistence that [Eristingcol] had violated [UVAIs] Construction Rules. x x x.x x x x12. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo sent a letter dated 24th November 1998 to defendant Tan, copies of which were furnished defendants Limjoco, Vilvestre and the Board, reiterating that, among others: (i) the alleged height restriction violation is untrue, since the Cerrada property now has a height within the limits imposed by [UVAI]; and (ii) the demand to reduce the canopy by ninety (90) centimeters is without basis, in light of the existence of thirty-five (35) similar "violations" of the same nature by other homeowners. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo further mentioned that she had done nothing to deserve the crude and coercive Village letters and the Boards threats of work stoppage, and she cited instances when she dealt with [UVAI] and her fellow homeowners in good faith and goodwill such as in 1997, when she very discreetly spent substantial amounts to landscape the entire Village Park, concrete the Park track oval which was being used as a jogging path, and donate to the Association molave benches used as Park benches.x x x x13. On the same date (24th November 1998), defendant Vilvestre sent another letter addressed to [Eristingcols] construction manager Hidalgo, again threatening to enjoin all construction activity on the Cerrada property as well as ban entry of all workers and construction deliveries effective 1st December 1998 unless Mr. delos Reyes met with defendants. x x x.x x x x14. On 2nd December 1998, [Eristingcols] representatives met with defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre. During that meeting, defendants were shown copies of the architectural plans for the Cerrada property. [Eristingcols] representatives agreed to allow [UVAIs] Construction Committees architect to validate the measurements given. However, on the issue of the canopy extension, the defendants informed [Eristingcols] representatives that the Board would impose a penalty of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) for violation of [UVAIs] "set back" or easement rule. Defendants cited the Boards imposition of similar fines to previous homeowners who had violated the same rule, and they undertook to furnish [Eristingcol] with a list of past penalties imposed and paid by homeowners found by the Board to have violated the Villages "set back" provision.15. On 22nd December 1998, defendant Vilvestre sent [Eristingcol] a letter dated 18th December 1998 formally imposing a penalty ofP400,000.00 for the "canopy easement violation." x x x.16. On 29th December 1998, x x x, Vilvestre sent a letter to [Eristingcol], stating that "as far as [his] administration is concerned, there has been no past penalties executed by [UVAI], similar to the one we are presently demanding on your on going construction. x x x17. On 4th January 1999, [Eristingcols] representative sent a letter to the Board, asking for a reconsideration of the imposition of theP400,000.00 penalty on the ground that the same is unwarranted and excessive. On 6th January 1999, [Eristingcol] herself sent a letter to the Board, expounding on the reasons for opposing the Boards action. On 18th January 1999, [Eristingcol] sent another letter in compliance with defendants request for a breakdown of her expenditures in respect of her donations relative to the Village park.18. On 3rdFebruary 1999, [Eristingcol] through her lawyers sent defendants a letter, requesting that her letters of 4th and 6th January 1999 be acted upon.19. On 4th February 1999, x x x, defendant Limjoco gave a verbal order to [UVAIs] guards to bar the entry of workers working on the Cerrada property.20. In the morning of 5th February 1999, defendants physically barred [Eristingcols] workers and contractors from entering the Village and working at the Cerrada property.8Eristingcol then lists the following causes of action:1. Item 5 of UVAIs Construction Rules constitutes an illegal and unwarranted intrusion upon Eristingcols proprietary rights as it imposes a set-back or horizontal easement of 3.0 meters from the property line greater than the specification in Section 1005(b) of the Building Code that "the horizontal clearance between the outermost edge of the marquee and the curb line shall be not less than 300 millimeters." As such, Eristingcol prays for the declaration of nullity of this provision in UVAIs Construction Rules insofar as she is concerned.2. UVAIs imposition of aP400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol has no factual basis, is arbitrary, whimsical and capricious as rampant violations of the set-back rule by other homeowners in the Village were not penalized by UVAI. Eristingcol prays to put a stop to defendants arbitrary exercise of power pursuant to UVAIs by-laws.3. Absent any factual or legal bases for the imposition of aP400,000.00 penalty, defendants and all persons working under their control should be permanently barred or restrained from imposing and/or enforcing any penalty upon Eristingcol for an alleged violation of UVAIs Construction Rules, specifically the provision on set-back.4. Defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code, demonstrated bias against Eristingcol by zeroing in on her alone and her supposed violation, while other homeowners, who had likewise violated UVAIs Construction Rules, were not cited or penalized therefor. Defendants actuations were in clear violation of their duty to give all homeowners, including Eristingcol, their due.5. Defendants actuations have seriously affected Eristingcols mental disposition and have caused her to suffer sleepless nights, mental anguish and serious anxiety. Eristingcols reputation has likewise been besmirched by UVAIs and defendants arbitrary charge that she had violated UVAIs Construction Rules. In this regard, individual defendants should each pay Eristingcol moral damages in the amount ofP1,000,000.00.6. Lastly, defendants should pay EristingcolP1,000.000.00 for litigation expenses she incurred in instituting this suit and for attorneys fees.At the outset, we note that the relationship between the parties is not in dispute and is, in fact, admitted by Eristingcol in her complaint. Nonetheless, Eristingcol is adamant that the subject matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular courts and need not be filed before a specialized body or commission.Eristingcols contention is wrong.Ostensibly, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action.9A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals that the nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAIs Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does not assail the height restriction of UVAIs Construction Rules, as she has readily complied therewith.Distinctly in point is China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals,10which upheld the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the suit and recognized its special competence to interpret and apply Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc.s (VGCCIs) by-laws. We ruled, thus:Applying the foregoing principles in the case at bar, to ascertain which tribunal has jurisdiction we have to determine therefore whether or not petitioner is a stockholder of VGCCI and whether or not the nature of the controversy between petitioner and private respondent corporation is intra-corporate.As to the first query, there is no question that the purchase of the subject share or membership certificate at public auction by petitioner (and the issuance to it of the corresponding Certificate of Sale) transferred ownership of the same to the latter and thus entitled petitioner to have the said share registered in its name as a member of VGCCI. x x x.By virtue of the aforementioned sale, petitioner became a bona fide stockholder of VGCCI and, therefore, the conflict that arose between petitioner and VGCCI aptly exemplifies an intra-corporate controversy between a corporation and its stockholder under Sec. 5(b) of P.D. 902-A.An important consideration, moreover, is the nature of the controversy between petitioner and private respondent corporation. VGCCI claims a prior right over the subject share anchored mainly on Sec. 3, Art. VIII of its by-laws which provides that "after a member shall have been posted as delinquent, the Board may order his/her/its share sold to satisfy the claims of the Club" It is pursuant to this provision that VGCCI also sold the subject share at public auction, of which it was the highest bidder. VGCCI caps its argument by asserting that its corporate by-laws should prevail. The bone of contention, thus, is the proper interpretation and application of VGCCIs aforequoted by-laws, a subject which irrefutably calls for the special competence of the SEC.We reiterate herein the sound policy enunciated by the Court in Abejo v. De la Cruz:6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Courts intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.x x x xIn this case, the need for the SECs technical expertise cannot be over-emphasized involving as it does the meticulous analysis and correct interpretation of a corporations by-laws as well as the applicable provisions of the Corporation Code in order to determine the validity of VGCCIs claims. The SEC, therefore, took proper cognizance of the instant case.11Likewise in point is our illuminating ruling in Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Sps. Gaston,12although it ultimately held that the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent- spouses Gaston for declaration of nullity of a board resolution issued by Sta. Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA) was vested in the regular courts. In Sta. Clara, the main issue raised by SCHA reads: "Whether [the CA] erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the [RTC], to declare as null and void the resolution of the Board of SCHA, decreeing that only members [in] good standing of the said association were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles." In holding that the regular courts had jurisdiction over respondent-spouses Gastons complaint for declaration of nullity, we stressed the absence of relationship and the consequent lack of privity of contract between the parties, thus:Are [Respondent-Spouses Gaston] SCHA Members?In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve preliminarilyon the basis of the allegations in the Complaintwhether [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA.[SCHA] contend[s] that because the Complaint arose from intra-corporate relations between the SCHA and its members, the HIGC therefore has jurisdiction over the dispute. To support their contention that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the association, [SCHA] cite[s] the SCHAs Articles of Incorporation and By-laws which provide that all landowners of the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically members of the SCHA.We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one.More to the point, [respondent-spouses Gaston] cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent. x x x. In the present case, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that [respondent-spouses Gaston] have agreed to be SCHA members.x x x xNo privity of ContractClearly then, no privity of contract exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston]. As a general rule, a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons. The Civil Code upholds the spirit over the form; thus, it deems an agreement to exist, provided the essential requisites are present. x x x. From the moment there is a meeting of minds between the parties, it is perfected.As already adverted to, there are cases in which a party who enters into a contract of sale is also bound by a lien annotated on the certificate of title. We recognized this in Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, in which we ruled:There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic membership was expressly annotated on the petitioners Transfer Certificate of Title and on the title of his predecessor-in-interest.The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by such annotation.Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate x x x. (Italics supplied)The above ruling, however, does not apply to the case at bar. When [respondent-spouses Gaston] purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was no annotation showing their automatic membership in the SCHA. Thus, no privity of contract arising from the title certificate exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston].Further, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that private respondents intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the implementation of the aforesaid Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not members of the association were issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles. This fact has not been disputed by [SCHA]. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were subdivision landowners who were not members thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the ComplaintIt is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.The Complaint does not allege that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA. In point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.13In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is well-established. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latters deft phraseology of its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction Rules. In short, the crux of Eristingcols complaint is UVAIs supposed arbitrary implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, a member thereof.Moreover, as in Sta. Clara (had respondent-spouses Gaston been members of SCHA), the controversy which arose between the parties in this case partook of the nature of an intra-corporate dispute. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 535,14which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over homeowners associations originally vested with the SEC. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides in pertinent part:2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers:(a) x x x; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home owners association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners association registered in accordance therewith.By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SECs original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations.15Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners associations, were transferred to the HLURB.As regards the defendants supposed embrace of the RTCs jurisdiction by appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcols workers from entering the village, suffice it to state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.16is quite a long stretch.The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in the case at bench are worlds apart. As found by the CA, defendants appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in connection with Eristingcols application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On defendants supposed agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing Eristingcols workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this temporary settlement cannot be equated with full acceptance of the RTCs authority, as what actually transpired in Tijam.1avvphi1.zw+The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case.17In that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first timefifteen years after the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred by laches from invoking the CFIs lack of jurisdiction.To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was held on February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On even date, the parties reached a temporary settlement reflected in the Undertaking. Fifteen days thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from questioning the RTCs jurisdiction.In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint, it is the HLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.b.) Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002GABRIEL L. DUERO,petitioner,vs.HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL,respondents.QUISUMBING,J.:This petition for certiorari assails the Decisionl dated September 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No.. 2340- UDK, entitledBernardo Eradel vs. Non. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case No.1075,Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur .The pertinent facts are as follow.Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bemardo Eradel2entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner appended to the complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to file their Answer and was given until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the, Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered into a Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero.Inter alia, the agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero.3Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.4Petitioner presented his evidenceex parteon February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over Lot No.1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000 annual rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorney's fees and the cost of the suit.5Private respondent received a copy of the decision on May 25, 1996.On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.1wphi1.ntMeanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an administrative case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur .On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February 27,1997. On March 12,1997, private respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as follows:IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All proceedings in "Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil Case 1075" filed in the Court a quo, including its Decision,Annex "E"of the petition, and its Orders and Writ of Execution and the turn over of the property to the Private Respondent by the Sheriff of the Courta quo, are declared null and void and hereby SET ASIDE, No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.6Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it held that:I....THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MA TTER OF THE CASE.II...PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.III...THE FAlLURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED.7The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of appeals erred in holding that private respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint was justified.At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,8we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed toAnnex E9of his petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." But it appears thatAnnex Eof his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked this Court to refer toAnnex F,10where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.11But here we find that in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter.12Its action was neither whimsical nor capricious.Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction,13we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement.14Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.15In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the said court,16believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 769117amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession asbona-fidetenant-lessee of the land.18But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.19Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.20The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.21Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.22Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.23The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision inJavier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum.Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.]24Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing."25Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order .In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.1wphi1.ntHaving determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed the suit was properly his landlord's concern.WHEREFORE, the petition isDISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.1075 entitledGabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, areANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner .SO ORDERED.c.) Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 129638 December 8, 2003ANTONIO T. DONATO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA CAPARAS, ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS REYES, ROGELIO GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO G. ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, and NARCISO YABUT,respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a "petition for review on certiorari" filed on July 17, 1997 which should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It assails the Resolutions1dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394.2The factual background of the case is as follows:Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located at Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila on November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and "all unknown occupants" of the subject property.3Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the ejectment case against them.4Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents,5for brevity) filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19, 1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the premises occupied by each of them, and to pay jointly and severallyP10,000.00 per month from the date they last paid their rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at the legal rate allowed by law, as well asP10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. As to the 20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment6on the same day sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the private respondents, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 47) of Manila (RTC).7In a Decision8dated July 5, 1996, the RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. In a Resolution dated March 21, 1997, the CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91;9and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).10On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself12and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC.13Five days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement14to his motion for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.15In a Resolution16dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and its supplement, ruling that "petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition."17Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:I.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:A. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS A DULY AUTHENTICATED CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED AND EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES.B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION 3, RULE 6 OF THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS COPIES OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES BELOW.C. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS TO LOSE SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.II.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.III.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC MANILA, BRANCH 47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC MANILA, BRANCH 26, THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE TERM OF THE LEASE IS MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH EXPIRES AT THE END OF EACH MONTH. IN THIS REGARD,A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT TENANTS UNDER P.D. 1517 MAY BE EVICTED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, TERMINATION OF LEASE OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT.B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED "PRIORITY RIGHT TO BUY THE LOT THEY OCCUPY" DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE LANDOWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO SELL THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN A ZONAL IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD.D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS UNDER THE LAW RESULT IN THE WAIVER OF PROTECTION AGAINST EVICTION.E. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER P.D. 2016 SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ON-GOING NEGOTIATION FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THAT IT RENDERS THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PREMATURE.G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED CASE FOR CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.IV.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT LEASTP10,000.00 PER MONTH FROM THE DATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY VACATE THE SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.V.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF AT LEASTP20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.18Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure is called for in view of the attendant circumstances showing that the objectives of the rule on certification of non-forum shopping and the rule requiring material portions of the record be attached to the petition have not been glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court inFortich vs. Corona:19Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.20(Emphasis supplied).Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the courta quoto entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-month reglementary period, established by jurisprudence.21Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a "petition for review" which was granted by us; and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.We now go to the merits of the case.We find the instant petition partly meritorious.The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91.22It provides that the petitioner himself must make the certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact.23The Court has ruled that with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.24The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration,25petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts attention to the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to personally accomplish and sign the certification.We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective26which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping.27The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance,pro hac vice.In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA,28the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA.29At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his motion for reconsideration.30In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals,31the Court reiterated the doctrine laid down inCusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz32andPiglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission33that subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities."34When technicality deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the Court is justified in exempting from its operations a particular case.35Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.36The Courts pronouncement inRepublic vs. Court of Appeals37is worth echoing: "cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served."38Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities.39This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for reconsideration,40as in this case.In addition, petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the merits without need of remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the elements of unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues that the alleged "priority right to buy the lot they occupy" does not apply where the landowner does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that respondents cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government has no intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the subject property located within a zonal improvement area; and, that assuming that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending case for consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in the present petition for certiorari.1wphi1The issues involved are factual issues which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review filed before it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive evidence, to promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled, "Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, Filomeno Arcepe, et al."SO ORDERED.d.) Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA,petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila,HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City,and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as Manager,respondents.D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision1of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 and its resolution dated June 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54587.The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28254 and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent, through its general manager, informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.On January 15, 1998, the trial court2rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondent the amount ofP10,000 as moral damages and anotherP10,000 as attorneys fees. The pertinent conclusion of the trial court reads as follows:"Aware of such fact, the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on the proposal that he would also buy the same. Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise defaulted in the payment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot 19. Consequently Lot 19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction. Thereafter TCT No. T-29950 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-86612 (Exh. 9) was issued in favor of SSS. This being the situation obtaining, the reformation of instruments, even if allowed, or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 as earlier proposed by the plaintiff, is no longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the owner of Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore (sic). Upon the other hand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having in its favor both Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by him and subsequently foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot 18 where his house is presently standing."The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no longer be reformed."3On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, alleging that the courta quohad no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case ofTijam vs. Sibonghanoy.4Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this instant petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by applying the principle of estoppel, even if the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. 17115.At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of the decision rendered by the trial court.Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down inTijam vs. Sibonghanoy.5We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case ofTijam vs. Sibonghanoy:6"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppelin pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.x x x"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conductnot because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy."Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, inOrosa vs. Court of Appeals;7AngPing vs. Court of Appeals;8Salva vs. Court of Appeals;9National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals;10Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals;11PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,12this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.13Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith.14There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.e.) Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004ARNEL ESCOBAL,petitioner,vsHON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariwith a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantlocated along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information reads:That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death,and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.1On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash4the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994.7Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss8the case. Citing Republic of thePhilippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10denying the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant."11For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantat Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.12On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.lawphi1.ntThe petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration15of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.16The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the crime was committed.On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was committed by the accusedin his relation to his function and duty as member of the then Philippine Constabulary.Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate proceedings.17On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975,18the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial.Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC.The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below "27" committed in relation to office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those