A Missing Piece of the Contemporary CharacterEducation Puzzle: The Individualisation of MoralCharacter

Yi-Lin Chen

Published online: 30 October 2012� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Abstract The different sorts of virtuous people who display various virtues to a

remarkable degree have brought the issue of individualisation of moral character to the

forefront. It signals a more personal dimension of character development which is noto-

riously ignored in the current discourse on character education. The case is made that since

in practice, the individualisation of moral character must, by necessity, advance side by

side with the cultivation of virtues, a full account of character education needs to give

consideration to both concerns. After analysing the specific ways which temperament,

social roles, and occupations respectively contribute to the individualisation of moral

character, some practical implications are drawn to shed new light on the common practice

of the inculcation of virtues. Firstly, since the varieties of moral personality is the norm, it

is appropriate to encourage the educated to become virtuous people of different sorts.

Secondly, given the influence that temperament may exert on virtue, having good

knowledge of each child’s temperament, identifying the specific difficulties possibly

confronting him/her accordingly, and then providing more opportunities to strengthen the

cultivation of the related virtues are crucial. Thirdly, since children with different tem-

peraments are inclined to identify with different sorts of moral exemplars, it is valuable to

present them a great variety of moral models, from which they can choose the kind of

virtuous people they would want to emulate. Lastly, since assuming different occupations

and social roles is liable to result in various moral characters, character formation cannot

be confined to the family or school. Among others, workplaces and communities are also

important variables.

Keywords Character education � The unity of the virtues � The individualisation of moral

character � Temperament � Moral luck � Moral styles

Y.-L. Chen (&)Center for Teacher Education, National Taiwan University, No.1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road,106 Taipei, Taiwane-mail: chenyilin@ntu.edu.tw

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Stud Philos Educ (2013) 32:345–360DOI 10.1007/s11217-012-9331-6

Introduction

‘Character education’ is an eye-catching buzzword in modern educational circles. As a

matter of fact, character education has become increasingly popular in current educa-

tional policies and practices in many other countries—particularly in the United States

where it is now widely recognized as an inescapable point of reference in this field

(Kristjansson 2002; McLaughlin and Halstead 1999). Constructive criticisms and pro-

found reflections have come in the wake of its fast and widespread development. Among

other things, it has been clearly shown that given the heterogeneous nature of this

character education movement, its focus has become blurred and the notion of character

education has even become equivocal. Its lack of common theoretical perspective and

practice, as well as the various approaches in methodology have all added ambiguity to

the movement (Lockwood 1993, 1997; McLaughlin and Halstead 1999). A great variety

of approaches have been developed and gathered under the generic term of character

education; and for that matter, character education cannot be generalised to represent one

distinct idea. As a result, the very concept of character education is open to different

interpretations, and can thus become a major source of confusion in itself. Furthermore,

it is incumbent on a researcher of character education to specify the particular version of

character education under consideration from the very start. Here, I will borrow

McLaughlin and Halstead’s (1999) and Kristjansson’s (2002) distinct conceptual

frameworks of character education for the discussion in this paper. This notion of

character education is non-expansive, and is understood as an educational enterprise

aimed at the inculcation of virtues—with Aristotle’s ethics being widely accepted as its

main theoretical root (Carr 2008; Kristjansson 2002, 2006b; Noddings 1997; Pritchard

1988; Sommers 2002). This choice is made predominantly on the grounds that it is

widely agreed that the contemporary character education movement is understood in a

non-expansive sense (Kristjansson 2002; McLaughlin and Halstead 1999). This is made

explicit by Kristjansson (2002, p. 137):

The view trotted out under the banner of ‘character education’ in the United States

and elsewhere is more often than not synonymous with a specific conception of

character education, espoused by thinkers such as Lickona, Kilpatrick, Wynne and

Bennett, a conception that I shall, following McLaughlin and Halstead’s (1999) lead,

term ‘non-expansive’.

According to the two ready-made frameworks for classification, the non-expansive

version of character education is generally characterised in terms of the inculcation of

virtues, and more precisely, cosmopolitan virtues, which are transcultural and universally

accepted moral values. However, it must be made clear that this simple characterisation of

character education in terms of the inculcation of virtues is not without problems. To begin

with, a common misgiving is that contemporary character education is simply a duplication

of the ‘bag of virtues’ approach, derogatorily dubbed by Lawrence Kohlberg, who criti-

cises the problematic way in which the virtues are taught in an entirely separate and

fragmented way, as if they were randomly scattered in a bag. Indeed, this flawed practice

of treating the formation of virtuous character as nothing more than the aggregation of

freestanding virtues acquired in a completely separable and disconnected way is not

uncommon in actual educational practice. This familiar problematic picture is well

depicted by Kent as follows (1999, p. 111):

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Virtuous character threatens to dissolve into a hodgepodge of admirable traits,

leaving moral development to look like nothing more than a matter of acquiring moresuch traits, no matter which combination or in which order.

In response, I should argue that contemporary character education can safely escape this

criticism as long as it fully accounts of the relationship among the virtues, and more

particularly, the integration of the virtues as an accompaniment of the cultivation of the

various individual virtues. That is, in order to correct this common misconception, the

long-running controversial doctrine of the unity of the virtues demands a serious look; one

that would allow the inculcation of virtues at issue to be theorised in a more sophisticated

manner.

However, this paper is concerned with the second problem of this simple character-

isation. That is, a serious drawback of this notion is that the task of cultivating a full set of

virtues is often emphasised at the cost of giving due attention to other critical issues, such

as the individualisation of moral character and the varieties in moral personalities.1 After

setting up the goal of inculcating a set of virtues, character education may give a false

impression that all pupils are expected to ultimately develop the same sort of moral

character and with full possession of all of virtues on the list. However, in contrast with

this, our moral experience clearly shows that there are different sorts of virtuous people in

the world who excellently display different virtues to a remarkable degree. In view of this

apparent disparity, the main purpose of this paper is to bring to the forefront the very fact

that the individualisation of moral character must accompany the inculcation of virtues.

1 Under the lead of Peterson and Seligman, a group of positive psychologists collaborated to develop amanual of the classification of virtues and strengths (2004). In doing so, they purport to ‘reclaim the study ofcharacter and virtue as legitimate topics of psychological inquiry’ (Peterson and Seligman 2004, p. 3).According to this classification, there are six virtues and twenty-four human strengths of character in total.Regarding the difference between the two key concepts in question, they clearly remark that ‘Characterstrengths are the psychological ingredients—processes or mechanisms—that define the virtues. Said anotherway, they are distinguishable routes to displaying one or another of the virtues.’ (Peterson and Seligman2004, p. 13) It needs to be noted that, Peterson and Seligman stress that one need not make efforts to acquireall of the twenty-four strengths. Quite the contrary, since the various strengths are simply concrete routes tothe six broad virtues respectively, insofar as the cultivation of virtues (namely, virtue education, in onesense) is concerned, an individual is allowed to choose among the great variety of strengths. In order toillustrate this point, Peterson and Seligman coin the term of ‘signature strengths’ which represent anindividual’s top and highest personal strengths and therefore are most characteristic of one’s distinctivecharacter. In this regard, two points can be made. Firstly, in the light of Peterson and Seligman’s positivepsychological theory of the cultivation of virtues and strengths, virtuous people (in the sense that they haveacquired the six broad virtues, inevitably, only to some extent) are doomed to be of different sorts, sinceeach of them possesses a distinct moral character that is the function of a complicated combination of thevarious strengths. For that matter, some people may suspect that the thesis of the individualisation of moralcharacter is also recognised and addressed by positive psychologists. Specifically, it is addressed by theconcept of ‘signature strengths’. In response, I must emphasise that their approach to the issue of theindividualisation of character cannot appropriately deal with the problem I really want to grapple with in thispaper. This is because, secondly, Peterson and Seligman’s remarks here clearly show that they do not aspireto approach the ethical ideal of ‘full virtue’ which is achieved by possessing and exercising all of the virtuesand strengths in life as often and as widely as possible when the relevant moral demands emerge. On thecontrary, their version of virtue education is proposed to serve the broader and ultimate agenda of positivepsychology, namely, the pursuit of the good life. That is, for positive psychology, the importance of virtuesand human strengths is appreciated in terms of their contribution to the good life. Seligman’s remark belowis a good example: ‘Herein is my formulation of the good life: Using your signature strengths every day inthe main realms of your life to bring abundant gratification and authentic happiness.’ (Seligman 2002,p. 161) In contrast, it must be stressed that in my version, the individualisation of moral character is indeedan indispensable segment integral to the project of the inculcation of virtues as well as the aspiration for theethical ideal of ‘full virtue’.

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This issue, notoriously ignored in the current discourse of character education, is a

lamentable missing piece of contemporary character education puzzle that needs to be

recovered. Moreover, I shall argue that a serious investigation of this important topic helps

to shed new light on the age-old issue of instilling virtues by taking some ineluctable

critical factors into consideration.

Nonetheless, it must be admitted that this neglect in some sense seems understandable.

This is because some may argue that the cultivation of virtues is essential and beneficial to

the well-being of both the moral agent himself/herself and the human community as a

whole, whereas the individualisation of moral character is more perceived as a personal

dimension of character development, and hence a personal affair. Educators, in this light,

are not expected to play an active role in the latter. In response, I shall argue that since, in

practice, these two educational enterprises of the inculcation of virtues and the individu-

alisation of moral character advance side by side of necessity, and more specifically, given

the inevitable involvement of certain factors in character development, the individualisa-

tion of moral character is in fact a necessary natural result of the inculcation of virtues, and

for this reason, educators are duty-bound to confront this important issue.

On the whole, this paper aims to make the case that the individualisation of moral

character is a natural corollary, or metaphorically, a by-product of the inculcation of

virtues. To put it differently, the inculcation of virtues and the individualisation of moral

character is a two sided coin, as is the case of the development of moral character.

Therefore, character education should give consideration to both concerns. To this end, I

will firstly highlight the ordinary phenomenon of distinctive moral styles which is repre-

sentative of the individualisation of moral character and its sister thesis of the varieties of

moral personality. Secondly, a preliminary investigation into the genesis of distinctive

moral styles is undertaken, and specifically, among others, three major formative factors,

i.e. temperaments, social roles and occupations, will be brought to the forefront. The exact

ways which these suggested contributive factors influence the inculcation of virtues, and

consequently contribute to the individualisation of moral character, will be explored.

Finally, based on the foregoing discussion, some practical implications are drawn to

improve the common practice of the inculcation of virtues.

Distinctive Moral Styles

Suppose two virtuous people, A and B, who respectively possess two different sets of

virtues, are confronted by one and the same moral situation, will they respond in the same

way? It is reasonable to think that, if there is a clear and definite right judgment to be made

in this situation, undoubtedly, they will make the same judgment. However, moral situa-

tions of this sort are not my concern. Rather, an interesting point about distinctive moral

character arises when, in Watson’s terms, an ‘indeterminate moral case’ or in Carr’s words,

a ‘moral dilemma’2 is at issue. In a moral dilemma, considerations associated with dif-

ferent virtues favour incompatible courses of action (Walker 1989), and in such a painfully

difficult situation, there is no single definite right choice, but only a better or least worst

option (Carr 2003). The distinctiveness of a virtuous character is most clearly manifested in

2 It should be noted that moral dilemmas present no threat to ‘the compatibility thesis’ which indicates thatthe virtues are compatible, and therefore, it is possible for an individual to possess all of them (Walker1989). The point is that an honest and kind person may not be able to act honestly and kindly at the sametime under some circumstances.

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this kind of moral situations; and to illustrate this point, Watson’s example and exposition

are in order (1984, p. 65):

Suppose A asks B and C for an opinion of his book. B is characteristically more

frank, more straightforward and open than C; C is more sensitive to other’s feelings

than B. B expresses her low opinion of the work, without brutality or aggression.

Tactfully, C shifts the discussion, without deception. We may suppose that neither

response is wrong. Each may be admirable in its own way, expressing a virtue. B’s

response did not express kindness, but nor was it unkind. C’s response did not

express honesty, but it was not dishonest either. Each life and character has adifferent focus and emphasis, but both may be said to have due concern for therelevant considerations. (emphasis added)

In this case, since it is impossible for kindness and honesty to be fully satisfied at the

same time, B and C chose to prioritise on honesty and kindness respectively; and it is

exactly these different focuses which display the distinctiveness and individuality of their

moral characters.

The same point is also made by Carr (2003), who indicates that in a moral dilemma,

virtuous people who act in either way (either generously or justly) may be judged to be

equally justifiable, but they cannot be equally generous or just. Their different focuses of

concern express the distinctiveness of their moral character, namely, one is more generous,

and the other is more just. It is worth mentioning that, in a moral dilemma, one’s choice is

destined to go along with moral loss, since one cannot simultaneously give full and equal

consideration to another virtue (Carr 2003). The moral loss in question is well exemplified

in Carr’s case (2003, p. 224):

My mother has bought a new hat and asks my opinion; I think that the hat is awful,

but do not want to say so in order to avoid unnecessarily wounding her feelings. I am

therefore faced with a choice between honesty and considerateness in which it seems

I can only be considerate at the price of honesty, or honest at the cost of consid-

erateness. (emphasis added)

The moral loss accompanying his choice is signified by the terms ‘at the price of’ and

‘at the cost of’. Although virtuous people are inclined to place more emphasis on the

specific virtues which best represent their distinctive moral characters, they may well feel

uneasy about their choices, for they clearly know that some moral values are unavoidably

marginalised, or even sacrificed, in the choices made.

An attempt to determine a virtuous person’s distinctive moral style mainly depends on

acquiring information about his/her choices, made particularly in moral dilemmas over

time. This is because for one thing, moral style is manifested most clearly in moral choices

made in moral dilemmas; for another, just as the way in which moral virtues are acquired,

moral styles are gradually formed and reinforced by moral judgments and choices made

through one’s daily life. As Aristotle points out, one swallow does not make a summer

(1998, p. 14), and moral styles cannot be formed in a day by means of moral choices made

merely several times.

At this point, a virtuous character can be generally analysed in two respects. Firstly, a

virtuous person must have due concern for—and moral sensitivity to all—moral consid-

erations which simultaneously appear in a moral situation. Secondly, when confronted by a

moral dilemma, a virtuous person’s specific focus of emphasis, manifested in his/her moral

choice, is an expression of his/her distinctive moral style. It is here that the thesis of the

individualisation of moral character is underscored.

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In summary, the ethical ideal and the educational objective of becoming a virtuous

person does not mean that all of the virtues must be equally and fully developed, or given

the same emphasis. Rather, it is both temporally and psychologically impossible to focus

on all worthy concerns, and more specifically, it is impossible for any particular way of life

to give full and equal expression to all of the virtues (Watson 1984). It is necessary that ‘a

distinct focus of concern goes with a distinct character, a distinct complex disposition to

feel, discriminate and behave in a manner appropriate to a given way of life’ (Watson

1984, p. 64). As a result, the possessors of diverse moral characters are virtuous in different

ways (Carr 2003).

How Do Distinctive Moral Styles Come into Being?

If it is natural and unavoidable for virtuous people to come to have different moral styles, it

is intelligible to ask how these various moral styles come into being. In this regard, Carr’s

illustration of the close connection between moral choice and moral character is relevant

(2003, p. 228):

In the making of particular choices…we are making particular kinds of persons of

ourselves. We are choosing character, not only in choosing between good and bad

characters, but also in choosing between different incompatible or not simulta-

neously realizable virtues.

This suggests that, just like moral characters, moral styles are formed by the making of

moral choices, and particularly in moral dilemmas, where one is forced to choose between

incompatible moral concerns. In general, it can be said that each moral choice contributes

to the shaping of moral character and moral style.

With that said, it is still sensible to ask why people tend to make different moral choices

when confronted by the same moral situation. For example, why does A consistently give

priority to kindness rather than justice, while B persists in choosing justice over kindness?

This is an important question about the specific factors conducive to the genesis of dif-

ferent moral styles displayed by virtuous people. In this regard, in line with Hampshire,

Watson (1984) contends that an individual’s distinct character has to do with his/her

particular way of life. Although Watson does not specify the notion of a way of life, it is

reasonable to regard the assuming of different occupations and social roles as an important

principal way to lead one’s preferred life. This in turn helps to explain why people

pursuing different forms of life tend to form distinctive moral characters. For example, it

seems plausible to believe that a virtuous person who works as a judge is inclined to give

priority to justice rather than other virtues when no fault has been caused, while a virtuous

social worker is apt to lead a benevolent life.

Although Carr does not purport to discuss the genesis of moral styles, his remarks given

below suggest that ‘temperament’ and ‘preference’ are two contributive factors.

All the same, in so far as ‘naturally’ sympathetic agents are still faced in morally

problematic circumstances with a choice between choosing the sympathetic response

(I am given to sympathy, but this is a morally valuable quality which I should seek to

cultivate) or the less sympathetic one (I am given to sympathy, but this is a tendency

that I should seek to control in the interests of justice), and such choices are in the

long run choices of character, any such choosing may seem nevertheless bound up

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with the general process of free-self-creation which is no less a matter of personal

(albeit moral) preference than of obedience to ‘external’ imperative (2003, p. 230).

On this note, three primary factors are used to explain different moral styles embodied

in virtuous people: namely, the particular ways of life (lived out by taking diverse social

roles and occupations), temperament, and personal moral preferences. Surely, these are not

completely irrelevant to each other. Rather, it is plausible to suppose that, for example, a

naturally benevolent person is inclined to adopt a helping profession, such as social work.

The cause of personal moral preference has its own problem, because it is an elusive idea

which is waiting to be expounded. More importantly, it is unclear whether personal moral

preference is a cause or an effect of moral style. Given these misgivings, the following

section will explore how the remaining two factors may be conducive to the individuali-

sation of moral character.

Temperament and the Individualisation of Moral Character

Some Characteristics of Temperament

In his careful differentiation of natural virtue from moral virtue, Aristotle gives a pre-

liminary but insightful account of the role of temperament in virtue. In the first instance,

Aristotle indicates that ‘each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by

nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or brave or

have the other moral qualities’ (1998, pp. 156–157). The main idea is that it is nature,

i.e. human nature, which stimulates the cultivation of the virtues in humans, and that ‘we

are adapted by nature to receive them.’ (Aristotle 1998, p. 28) This is the first sense in

which virtue is said to be natural. Moreover, according to his observation, Aristotle

remarks that ‘both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities’

(1998, p. 157). A possible explanation for this notion is that, in their very early years,

children are observed to show some signs of virtue, namely, natural dispositions of the

virtues. For instance, some little children are observed to be more compassionate than

others, and virtue in this sense is utterly given by nature, and is not an outcome of

nurture. Natural virtue in this sense is utterly beyond anyone’s control. It is in this

specific sense that children can be said to possess the virtues. Furthermore, natural

dispositions are not restricted to the human species. For example, it is widely recognised

that lions are brave, lambs are meek, and dogs are loyal (McKinnon 1999, p. 62; Wolf

2007, p. 152). However, a crucial difference which needs to be pointed out is that in

contrast to an animal’s natural disposition which seems to be equally distributed among

individuals, there are conspicuous individual differences in mankind’s natural virtues; for

instance, some people may be more privileged in inheriting a natural disposition to do

what a particular virtue requires them to do on certain occasions, whereas others may not

have this same fortune (MacIntyre 1985, p. 149).

However, natural virtue is not Aristotle’s major concern, since natural dispositions are

simply an inclination to act in certain ways. Without the proper guidance of reason, they

are still liable to lead people astray and can, therefore, be harmful. In short, natural virtue

without reason is like a strong body which may stumble badly without sight (Aristotle

1998, p. 157). In this regard, Aquinas’ remark that it is better for a blind horse if it is slow

(Foot 1978, p. 16) hits the mark. In Aristotle’s view, it is exactly the presence of practical

wisdom which crucially distinguishes moral virtue from natural virtue. Also, in terms of

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causes which are different from natural virtues, moral virtues come about mainly as a result

of habituation. That is, we become just by performing just acts, and temperate by doing

temperate acts (Aristotle 1998).

In today’s language, Aristotle’s natural virtue is in substance a function of temperament.

In addition to Aristotle, Foot also highlights the common observation that some people are

naturally charitable while others are naturally generous.3 In the cases of fortune’s

favourites, their temperamental dispositions endow them with a salutary breeding ground

for certain virtues, the cultivation of which thereby appears less difficult, or relatively easy.

In other words, given the substantial effects of temperament on virtue, people with dif-

ferent temperamental dispositions are doomed to occupy an uneven playing-ground in

terms of the inculcation of virtues. Regarding this point, Foot clearly remarks (1978, p. 11):

I have argued that the virtues can be seen as correctives in relation to human nature

in general but not that each virtue must present a difficulty to each and every man.

(emphasis added)

To more fully understand the role of temperament in virtue, and especially how it

contributes to the individualisation of moral character, it is necessary to first take a close

look at the concept of temperament. As a start, the dictionary definition is as follows:

‘temperament is the part of your character that affects your moods and the way you

behave.’4 Goldie (2004) adds that temperament has more to do with feelings, and is more

embedded and enduring; cheerfulness, nervousness, and gloominess are some examples of

temperament. By and large, temperament is mainly endowed by nature, and is easily

perceived in the early years of life. For example, parents often talk about the dramatic

differences in temperament among young children; some are sweet and happy, some are

irritable and impatient, some are tame, and others are aggressive (Trianosky 1993). It can

be said that temperament is innate, inherited, unalterable, and consists of built-in factors or

tendencies in us which are out of our control (Nicgorski and Ellrod 1986).

In personality psychology, temperament is classified as a particular type of personality

trait, distinct from others in the following respects (Buss and Plomin 1984): (1) early

appearance—temperaments are personality traits which mark individual differences in

infancy; (2) biological foundation—temperaments are biological or constitutional (this

term comprises inheritance, pre-natal events and post-natal events) in origin; and (3)

people expect temperaments to be much more stable than other personality traits. In

contrast, personality psychologists place more emphasis on the developmental origins of

personality traits. These features show that people are fundamentally passive recipients of

the blessing or misfortune of temperament. In Williams’s terminology, human beings are

subject to ‘the lottery of temperament’ (McKinnon 1999), and the temperament one has is

simply a matter of ‘constitutive moral luck’ (Trianosky 1993). Since the genesis of tem-

perament is utterly beyond anyone’s control, people cannot be held responsible for having,

or lacking, certain temperamental dispositions. Similarly, it is unreasonable to blame

people for possessing an unpleasant temperamental disposition, or praise them for having a

pleasant one.

3 Foot argues that virtues are correctives to temptations, or deficiencies of motivation, which are groundedin human nature. She explains that ‘they are corrective, each one standing at a point at which there is sometemptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good’ (1978, p. 8).4 Consult Cambridge Dictionary Online: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?dict=CALD&key=81835&ph=on.

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With that said, it does not mean that people are entirely immune from taking responsibility

for the way in which their temperamental dispositions are manifested. Quite the contrary, the

manner in which they are exhibited is, to some extent, subject to deliberative control. For

example, although it is almost impossible to root out my gloominess, I can still make efforts

to manage it in such a way that its proper expression does not hurt others. In other words,

although the entry and ongoing presence of temperament is involuntary, one can voluntarily

choose or control the ways which it exerts an influence (Jacob 2001). Insofar as natural

propensities and temperamental dispositions are reflected in reasoning and judgment, we are

more or less able to discipline ourselves in respect to them (Jacob 2001).

To sum up, although we are typically not thought to be responsible for having some

mental states, such as temperamental dispositions, we are to be nonetheless held respon-

sible for controlling their expression (Sabini and Silver 1989). It is not possible for us to

completely eliminate the influence of temperament, but the way they are displayed is

manageable to some degree. It must be stressed that since we must work with our tem-

perament throughout our lives, it is crucial to examine how it can be managed through

educational methodologies. Moreover, insofar as the extent to which temperament figures

in the cultivation of virtues, effective management of temperament for the purpose of the

inculcation of virtues is indeed an important segment of character education .

To this point, it should have been clear that the three concepts of temperament, per-

sonality, and character are closely related.5 Broadly, temperament is an integral part of

personality that is inherited and has much to do with one’s moods and feelings. On account

of its genetic origin, temperament is different from other personality traits in that it is much

more stable and resistant to artificial intervention. Since one is born with a distinctive

temperament of necessity, it constitutes an inescapable foundation of the development of

moral character. One of the major tasks is thus to manage and integrate the temperamental

dispositions appropriately into one’s moral character.

As to the distinction between character and personality, it is widely recognised that what

psychologists are referring to is personality theory rather than character theory, while character

is tacitly left to moral philosophers (Kupperman 1991; McDougall 1932). An explanation for

this is that character has moral overtones which are lacking in personality. Character traits such

5 It is well-known that personality psychologist, Gordon Allport, who is recognised as the father of modernpersonality theory, has urged people to replace the words of character and virtue which are claimed to be‘bothersomely Victorian and moralistic’ with a more scientific, value-free and perfectly neutral term,namely, personality (Seligman 2002). For psychologists to establish their profession of psychology to be adiscipline of ‘science’, it is an important step to substitute personality for character, since it is widelyaccepted that ‘Personality is a descriptive word while character is a prescriptive word.’ (Seligman 2002,p. 128) With that said however, it must be stressed that the subject of virtue and character is never absentfrom the psychological circles. Rather, ‘it was that the morally laden concepts of character and virtue gotsmuggled into scientific psychology in the guise of the lighter concept of personality’ (Seligman 2002,p. 128). That seems to be a bittersweet matter. For one thing, it is good to see that personality psychologydoes not abandon the study of character and virtue altogether. For another thing, this ’smuggle’ in question,and the practice of lumping character and personality together is lethal, given that it runs the risk of ignoringsome subtle but significant differences between character and personality by conflating them. In this regard,positive psychologists Peterson and Seligman’s recent project, published under the title of Characterstrengths and virtues: A handbook and classification (2004) is a case in point. At the outset, they claim toundertake a study of character, and good character in particular. However, after having a look at theirclassification, it is worrying to find that some morally-neutral or non-moral (morally-irrelevant) personaltraits, such as curiosity, leadership and humour, to name some, are dubiously confused with other evidentlymoral traits of character, such as kindness and self-control. In sum, in view of the critical differencesbetween traits of character and traits of personality, especially with respect to their moral value, personalitypsychologists should not openly claim that everything that is said in terms of character can be said moreserviceably in terms of mere personality. Quite the contrary, it is crucial to make the differences clear.

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as honesty, justice, courage and their opposites are value-laden; that is, the former three are

morally good while their contraries are morally bad. In contrast, there is no obvious good and

evil among personality traits such as introversion, extroversion, taciturnity, talkativeness,

shyness, outgoingness, humour and its lack.6 Moreover, character traits are generally reason-

responsive while personality traits are not.7 With that said, a similarity between personality and

character must be recognised. There is a long-running nature and nurture controversy over the

origin of personality, and it is commonly agreed that personality is a result of both factors, with

more emphasis on the developmental origin of personality in contrast to the biological origin of

temperament. Likewise, although (moral) character is mainly an outcome of construction and

habituation, it is also constrained by some inevitable conditions coming from nature.8

How Does Temperament Figure in the Inculcation of Virtues?

This section draws heavily on Trianosky, whose account of how temperament figures in

character development can be roughly divided into two parts, the first of which is

straightforward and widely noticed, and the second indirect and easily overlooked.

Firstly, there seems to be an easy fit between natural temperaments and their relevant

moral virtues (Trianosky 1993). More specifically, someone may have a temperament

which can favour, or contradict certain virtues and certain vices (Jacob 2001). As noted,

the positive influence of temperament on virtue is heralded by Aristotle with his notion of

natural virtue and echoed by Foot. The negative effects of temperament on virtue can be

briefly illustrated as follows: if someone has the temperamental quality of laziness, it is

more difficult for him/her to develop such virtues as perseverance and diligence, since they

happen to go against the grain of his/her temperament. Likewise, a naturally self-centred

person may find it fairly difficult to empathise with others (McKinnon 1999). As seen,

some temperaments may hinder people in developing certain virtues (McKinnon 1999).

Although it can hardly be concluded that possessing certain adverse temperaments

entirely rules out the possibility of developing certain relevant virtues, it seems unques-

tionable to say that it is indeed more difficult for their possessors to acquire these virtues,

and almost impossible to cultivate them to an ideal extent. As Flanagan’s (1991) example

clearly shows, a constitutionally shy person cannot be expected to develop warmth and

gregariousness in anything like the ideally desirable forms. In general, the influence of

6 There is no denying that personality traits are sometimes judged by people, but this is done in the light of aspecific project or task (Goldie 2004). For instance, in terms of the recruitment of a TV-shopping sales-person, outgoingness is more suitable for this task and therefore more highly valued than shyness(Goldie 2004).7 A crucial feature of character traits (and virtues) which distinguishes them from other dispositions, say,personality traits, is that they are reason-responsive, since they reliably respond to certain kinds of reasonsand certain sorts of situations (Goldie 2004). For example, such character traits as honesty, justice, andcourage are respectively responsive to certain goods reasons which are concerned with moral considerationsand hence reveal values. The possessor of a character trait can reliably discern certain morally salientfeatures of the situation which demand the exhibition of that trait. In this case, the agent can be intelligiblyasked why he/she acts this way, and he/she is supposed to be able to provide an explanation of his/herbehaviour, at least after reflection. For that matter, character traits are not blind or mechanical behaviouraldispositions. In contrast, personality traits are generally not reason-responsive. For example, when anintroverted person is asked the same question, ‘Why do you act in this way?’ he/she may not be able toprovide an explanation, nor is he/she expected to give a reply other than ‘I act this way, because this is whatI am’.8 Aristotle recognises three factors which contribute to the production of virtues, namely, nature, habitu-ation and teaching (see 1998, pp. 270–271). However, there is no doubt that Aristotle puts the supremeemphasis on moral habituation.

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temperament on virtue is that, when someone is disposed by temperament, this means that

something is easy or difficult for him/her (Jacob 2001), and people are inclined to act in a

way which is consistent with their temperament.

A less direct way in which temperament disposes one toward virtues or vices is by way

of affecting our perception of ends, and the merits of certain desires (McKinnon 1999). For

instance, it is rather difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for a naturally self-centred

person to correctly appreciate the value of helping others, since he/she is inclined to ignore

other people’s worth, given his/her temperament. Given the influence of temperament,

certain desires and ends strike the agents as being more or less attractive or compelling

(McKinnon 1999).

In summary, in view of the impact of temperament on virtue, it seems reasonable to

believe that firstly, insofar as individual development is concerned, unless one is lucky

enough, it is unlikely that one can fully develop all of the virtues with excellence. Sec-

ondly, from an interpersonal viewpoint, since people have different temperaments, it is

unrealistic, or utterly absurd to expect them to develop all of the virtues to the same degree,

and become virtuous people of the same sort.

An indirect way in which temperament figures in the inculcation of virtues relates to

one’s ability to critically evaluate, and reflectively endorse, certain values. Temperament

may dispose one to be more or less critical, and accordingly affect one’s ability to critically

scrutinise the values which have been endorsed. For example, a naturally malleable and

uncritical person is less able to critically examine his/her values, commitments, and

motives which reflect those of his/her parents’. His/her lack of ability to be critical protects

the transmitted values from challenges and changes (Trianosky 1993). In contrast, a nat-

urally critical person is better able to put the endorsed values under critical scrutiny, and

deliberately change them if necessary.

In summary, the direct way in which temperament affects the inculcation of virtues

concerns the content of commitments expressive of one’s temperamental disposition, while

the indirect way is mediated by one’s rational ability, which is preconditioned by tem-

perament to some extent.

Temperament as an Inescapable Starting Point

Recognising the pervasive influence of temperament on virtue helps to prevent people from

being over-optimistic about the human agency in undertaking the inculcation of virtues.

The pursuit of virtues as excellences of moral character is not entirely within one’s control,

but is rather preconditioned by one’s temperament, which inevitably acts to either

potentially assist or resist the cultivation of certain virtues. Our inherited temperaments set

limits to our disposition toward certain virtues, and away from others. As a result, we are

forced to accept the conclusion that not all virtues are equally available to each individual.

This idea is expressed well by Trianosky (1993, p. 105):

It is a species of excellence, and excellence is not in general equally within every-

one’s reach. Not everyone can be equally sympathetic, sensitive, devoted, or cou-

rageous, try as they might, any more than everyone can be equally intelligent,

musical, strong, or graceful.

Both Trianosky and McKinnon agree that we should not be surprised at the conclusion.

Just as we think it unreasonable to expect everyone to be equally intelligent, musical,

strong, and graceful, it is implausible to expect everyone to be equally sympathetic, sen-

sitive, devoted, or courageous (McKinnon 1999; Trianosky 1993). This is because we

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believe that, in these respects, excellence depends, to a substantial degree, on the ‘mate-

rials’ within ourselves which set limits on our prospects of success. Since it is impossible to

eliminate the compelling force of temperament, we should accept it as an inescapable

starting point from which the inculcation of virtues proceeds.

A natural corollary of this reasoning is the so-called ‘anti-egalitarian’ position with

respect to virtue (Trianosky 1993). To forestall unnecessary misgivings, it should be said

that this view is not intended to straightforwardly claim that some people are destined to be

virtuous, while others are fated to be vicious. Rather, the point is that people’s availability

of any specific virtue is not equal and the same. Put briefly, ‘virtuous dispositions may be

unequally available to all’, and for that matter, ‘agents do not start their moral lives on a

level playing-ground’ (McKinnon 1999, p. 62, p. 238).

In this regard, a practical implication is that being able to construct one’s moral

character as one wants it to be is utterly wishful thinking. Moral character is not created

from nothing, but rather, there are some raw materials upon which moral character is

possibly built and to be respected. In some sense, it acts as an important counter-weight to

an exaggerated claim on behalf of deliberate self-making with regard to moral character by

bringing the role of temperament in virtue to light (Jacob 2001).

Social Roles, Occupations and the Individualisation of Moral Character

This section is intended to underscore the point that people playing different social roles

and assuming different occupations are apt to become moral people of different sorts by

virtue of the nature of those roles and occupations. It is undeniable that, in our time, work

occupies a central place in our lives, and given its importance, the choice of occupation

becomes an important channel through which people can pursue their favoured good lives.

Therefore, our concern is the relationship between virtues on the one hand, and occupa-

tions and social roles on the other, as well as how it is conducive to the individualisation of

moral character.

Particular virtues are often associated with different social roles, and this is demon-

strated by the so-called ‘occupational virtues’ (for instance of policemen, soldiers, and

social workers) (Irwin 1988). Our propensity to associate good practitioners of a specific

profession with certain character traits implies that there is a common consensus on the

specific virtues appropriate to a given profession. For example, the virtues especially

linked to the profession of medicine include fidelity to trust, benevolence, intellectual

honesty, courage, compassion, and truthfulness (Pellegrino 2002). These virtues are gen-

erally acknowledged to be essential for a good physician to achieve the ends of the medical

profession with excellence. In other words, good physicians are expected to possess those

character traits which can most effectively enable them to excellently attain the ends of

medicine (Pellegrino 2002). Generally speaking, if the ends of a given profession are to be

attained with excellence, its practitioners must acquire, and exercise, the relevant virtues as

fully as possible.

Likewise, different social roles such as parents, colleagues, and neighbours make par-

ticular traits of character desirable (Irwin 1988). Certain virtues are taken to be essential to

different social roles, such as a good parent’s virtues, a good husband’s virtues, a good

daughter’s virtues, a good leader’s virtues and so on. These are the requisite virtues for

successfully achieving the ends of each role. People playing different social roles are

therefore expected to acquire and exercise different sets of virtue to a remarkable extent.

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Since practitioners of different occupations are expected to manifest certain virtues to a

remarkable degree, it is reasonable to believe that, through proper moral habituation and

practice in the workplace, they may turn into moral people of particular sorts, who tend to

place more emphasis on some virtues than others. Moreover, this focus of concern on

particular virtues is not only perceivable in workplaces, but may also extend to the rest of

their lives as a whole. For example, a judge may show more concern for issues of justice in

society at large, whereas a nurse may be inclined to pay more attention to people’s

feelings. In this regard, the impact of occupations and social roles on the individualisation

of moral character is clear.

Apart from what has been said, the relationship between occupations and the individ-

ualisation of moral character is more complex, when the intermediate variable of tem-

perament is taken into account. As stated, it is less difficult, or relatively easy, for those

lucky people who are born with certain natural virtues, to develop corresponding virtues to

an excellent extent. Given the common practice of associating certain virtues with par-

ticular occupations, such as courage-firemen, caring-nurses, compassion-social workers

and the like, an individual’s knowledge of his/her temperament may dispose him/her to

take a job which demands certain virtues in favour to his/her temperament. For instance, a

naturally compassionate person is likely to be more interested in engaging in a helping

profession. Likewise, it is congenial to a naturally just person to devote himself/herself to a

career commensurate with social affairs and justice. In light of this, temperament, occu-

pation, and the individualisation of moral character are intricately connected.

Educational Implications for Character Education

‘What kind of person ought I to be?’ and ‘what sort of person do I want to be?’ are two

different, but closely related, questions which intrigue virtue ethicists. However, the former

has drawn far more attention than the latter, and it is generally addressed by articulating the

relationship between virtue and human flourishing. In contrast, the second question is less

impersonal, and is subject to personal preference and choice. In some sense, they corre-

spond to the aforementioned two educational concerns of character development, namely,

the inculcation of virtues, and the individualisation of moral character. At the outset, it

must be stressed that the way educators can be held responsible for the individualisation of

moral character is substantially different from the way they can be held responsible for

inculcating the virtues in the younger generation. This is because the individualisation of

moral character is a natural outgrowth of the inculcation of virtues and not an educational

goal which can be isolated and pursued straightforwardly on its own. For that matter, our

concern for the individualisation of moral character can be appropriately addressed only in

the process of undertaking the inculcation of virtues. In practice and in this regard, taking

full account of the individualisation of moral character should not be an extra burden on

educators.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that recovering the missing piece

of the individualisation of moral character enables us to have a whole picture of the puzzle

of character education, and it allows us to engage in character education in a more thor-

ough sense. More specifically, a serious investigation into the genesis of the individuali-

sation of moral character and the causes of the varieties of moral personality results in

some transformative views of the common practice of the inculcation of virtues. Some

implications can therefore be drawn for character education in respect of objectives,

pedagogies and so on.

A Missing Piece of the Contemporary Character Education Puzzle 357

123

Firstly, in terms of educational objective, it is appropriate to expect and encourage the

educated to become virtuous people of different sorts. This is because it has been made

clear that not all virtues are equally within the reach of any individual, nor can they be fully

developed. Also, from an interpersonal perspective, the varieties of moral personality is the

norm, meaning that virtuous people are supposed to be of different sorts and who manifest

different virtues to a pronounced degree.

Secondly, given the influence that temperament may exert on virtue, it is important for

educators to know the individual temperaments of those to be educated, and to identify and

anticipate specific difficulties possibly confronting each person. One method to assist

people to overcome possible adverse effects of temperament on the acquisition of virtues is

to provide, and even create, more opportunities to confront them with relevant situations.

These will in turn strengthen the training of the relevant emotions implicated in temper-

ament (i.e. shyness). Also, one can assume the responsibility to actively transcend the

limits which may be set by his/her temperament on the acquisition of certain virtues. This

self-knowledge (of one’s temperament and the specific constraints it may have on the

inculcation of certain virtues, and the specific virtues one is more likely to exercise with

excellence) can also help an individual to think about a particular suitable way of life for

him/her to lead. Undoubtedly, the foregoing is premised on a well-researched knowledge

base about the actual influence of different temperamental dispositions on the acquisition

of virtues, and in this regard, related empirical research is needed.

Thirdly, since children with different temperaments are inclined to identify with dif-

ferent sorts of moral exemplars, providing them with multiple moral models is educa-

tionally significant for the purpose of the inculcation of virtues. More specifically, this has

two advantages. On the one hand, they come to know that virtuous people are actually of

different sorts, and on the other hand, they can be inspired to emulate moral paragons who

are more in tune with their own temperament. In the process of maturation, when one starts

to observe and judge other people’s characters as admirable or despicable, or when one

begins to think about the kind of virtuous person he/she wants to be, this same person will

consciously claim the authorship of one’s moral character. From a psychological per-

spective, what kind of moral exemplar is more attractive, motivating and inspiring? Mother

Teresa, Martin Luther King, or Gandhi? Although all of these characters are admirable, it

is reasonable to believe that one’s temperament will effectively sway the preference of one

over another. For example, despite the moral value associated to characters such as Martin

Luther King and Gandhi, a shy person may be more inclined to choose Mother Teresa, for

her moral character is more in tune with his/her temperament.

Therefore, it is educationally important to provide pupils with a great variety of moral

models, from which they can choose the kind of virtuous people they would want to

emulate.9 Moral role models are presented with the hope of encouraging them to identify

with some congenial characters and to further emulate them. The significance of identi-

fying with others should not be underestimated, since the rudiments of our personality are

shaped, in no small way, through identificatory mechanisms (Sherman 1999). From a

psychological point of view, people tend to choose those closer to their temperament, since

there seems to be a relatively shorter psychological distance between them. The match

between his/her temperament and certain types of moral exemplars enables a moral agent

9 Based on the Aristotelian conception of emulation, Kristjansson (2006a) argues against conceiving role-modelling as mere imitation, and a copycat process. According to Aristotle, an emulous person thinks ofhimself as the kind of person who is able to actualise the relevant good qualities embodied in others, andmakes an effort to attain the good himself (Kristjansson 2006a).

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to feel more confident about the prospect of becoming a certain type of virtuous person. In

this regard, when teaching children to evaluate moral characters and to choose the kind of

person they want to be, it is also important to encourage them to explore their own

temperaments.

Lastly, assuming different occupations and social roles is liable to result in various

moral characters, and highlights the fact that character formation is a lifelong objective that

should not be confined to the early years of life, family and school. For example, work-

places are also important sites in which moral character is continuously constructed. This

explains the current emphasis placed on occupational virtues and the virtue-based ethics of

professions.

Acknowledgments I appreciate the great help offered by my supervisor, Dr. Graham Haydon, and twoexaminers of my doctoral thesis, Professor Kristjan Kristjansson at the School of Education, University ofIceland, and Professor Paul Standish at the Institute of Education, University of London.

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