A New Look, Better Look, or Different Look?Author(s): John F. DovidioSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1992), pp. 159-160Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449206 .

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COMMENTARIES 159

of self-fulfilling prophecies in interracial interaction. Journal of Ex- perimental and Social Psychology, 10, 109-120.

Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no in- ferences. American Psychologist, 35, 151-175.

A New Look, Better Look, or Different Look?

John F. Dovidio Colgate University

"Prejudice and the Unfinished Mind" is an entertaining, stimulating, and enlightening treatment of the nature of stereotypes and prejudice. To make his points, Fox refers to philosophical, psychological, and anthropological works, to personal anecdotes, and to informal observations of human and nonhuman (e.g., Vulcan) behavior. Because of the nature of this evidence and inherent problems with verifying evolutionary-based frameworks, empiricists (such as those likely to read Psychological Inquiry) may tend quickly to dismiss Fox's claims and case. It should be noted, however, that this very reaction of stereotyped thinking and prejudg- ment over rational consideration and logic may be taken as supporting Fox's position. Fox raises several interesting and provocative issues. In addition, drawing on sources outside contemporary psychology, he adeptly identifies various phe- nomena (e.g., fundamental attribution error, defensive at- tribution, mere exposure effects, contact and the reduction of bias) that psychologists have labored long hours in the labo- ratory to discover and validate. Thus, this "new look at an old failing" deserves a close look.

Fox's essay centers on Kahneman's (or was it Tversky's) conclusion that "in evolutionary terms, we are an imperfect creature; we have an unfinished mind." In particular, Fox questions whether people's general preference for intuitive judgments to logical arguments indicates that "we are hope- lessly deficient thinking machines" or reflects the evolution, through natural selection, of a mode of thinking that has essential survival value. In contrast to the view that human's reliance on intuition, prejudgment, and heuristics reflects cognitive deficiency relative to the "totally logical thinking machine as an ideal-a computer," Fox argues that these characteristic modes of thinking are functional, essential, and represent the "ideal." In this commentary, I address (a) whether Fox's perspective is "new" and (b) what contribu- tion it offers to the study of stereotyping and prejudice.

A New Look?

Despite the fact that Fox's professional training and orien- tation are outside experimental psychology and his knowl- edge of social psychology is incomplete, his article astutely reflects the evolution of social psychological theory and re- search on the nature of prejudice. Consistent with the as- sumption of an "unfinished mind," the theories that have historically dominated the psychological study of prejudice (e.g., scapegoat theory, relative deprivation theory) have generally pointed to some form of intrapersonal, interperson- al, or societal dysfunction. The syllogism implicitly guiding this research has been: Prejudice is bad; bad is abnormal;

therefore, people who are prejudiced are abnormal. The psy- chodynamic orientation that guided the work on the au- thoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levin- son, & Sanford, 1950), perhaps one of the best known works on prejudice, provides a classic demonstration of how as- sumptions of psychopathology influenced mainstream con- ceptions of prejudice. This research was originally spon- sored by the American Jewish Committee to understand the rise of anti-Semitism in the 1930s and the psychological mechanisms that could permit the Nazi atrocities toward Jews. Indeed, as Fox contends, these traditional psychologi- cal frameworks have focused on deficiencies, limitations, and dysfunction in the human mind and psyche as the origins of stereotyping and prejudice.

In addition, consistent with Fox's functional perspective, much of the contemporary work that has been stimulated by interest in social cognition is based on the premise that preju- dice is substantially rooted in normal processes. A funda- mental assumption guiding this research is that humans are limited in their attentional and cognitive capacities. As a consequence, what people normally perceive is not an accu- rate representation of the objective world, but rather a nar- rowed, selective, and often biased sampling from that world. For example, people rely on the process of categorization to simplify a complex environment. Categorization typically occurs spontaneously on the basis of physical similarity, proximity, or shared fate (Campbell, 1958). Whereas the categorization of objects on the basis of color or of people on the basis of race or ethnic group is not in itself bias, it does form a foundation for the subsequent development of bias. People tend to value members of their own group more than members of other groups (Brewer, 1979), and social catego- rization can elicit expectations that guide what is noticed, remembered, inferred, and predicted about a person (Ste- phan, 1989). Thus, fully consistent with Fox's position, within the cognitive approach, stereotypes are viewed as normal processes aimed at understanding the social world and are conceived as critical aspects of prejudice.

Fox's discussion of the implications of his "new look" also converges with current psychological approaches for reducing intergroup bias. Fox concludes, "The whole point of this argument has been to show that we have no choice but to think in stereotypes. That is what a lot of basic thinking is." Therefore, to reduce undesirable social prejudices, he urges that we build "on human nature to bring about a self- correcting mechanism whereby we try not to replace ster- eotypical thinking-we can't do that-but to edge out unwanted stereotypes and replace them with those we ap- prove." As Fox suggests and psychological research demon-

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160 COMMENTARIES

strates, positive intergroup contact (see Stephan, 1985) and recategorization strategies that are designed to alter repre- sentations of group membership from two groups to one group-from "us" and "them" to a more inclusive "we" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986b; Turner, 1981; Worchel, 1979)-can effectively reduce bias. Thus, although Fox's sources and methods are different, his conclusions are com- patible with those based on the empirical work of contempo- rary social psychologists.

Is, then, Fox's insight that stereotyping and prejudice are rooted in normal, functional psychological processes truly a "new" perspective on an old problem? I think not; others have held that view. What may be different, however, is the process that led Fox to this view. There are aspects of Fox's framework, such as reliance on the processes of natural se- lection, that are unique and may merit a closer look. If Fox does not provide a new look, perhaps he offers a better look.

A Better Look?

Fox's "new look" is based on the premise that stereotyp- ing and prejudice have evolved as part of humans' "basic constitution" because of their survival value: "It is that sim- ple. Creatures with brains that did otherwise might have existed, but they are not here to tell the tale." Although this argument is interesting and provocative, it should not be accepted uncritically. From a scientific perspective, Fox's position is rooted in a broad, Darwinian view of natural selection. Although of historical interest, that view in its most simple form has been repeatedly challenged and in many respects discredited by other perspectives (e.g., so- ciobiology; see Wilson, 1975). Furthermore, the basic as- sumption of a strong functionalistic approach-that which currently is, exists because it is for the best-is questionable and not scientifically verifiable. Certainly, vestiges of our evolutionary past exist with little known current survival value. People, for example, are born with an appendix; no one I know was born without one. That fact, however, is not persuasive evidence that having an appendix is essential to our present survival or represents a contemporary ideal. It is a long leap of faith and an even longer leap of logic to con- clude, by analogy, that having an appendix is essential to our well-being and that creatures without an appendix may have existed but are not here to tell that tale. One can accept that stereotyping and prejudice are normal aspects of cognition without accepting them as ideals or necessities of human functioning. Because people tend to act in a certain way, even automatically and unconsciously, does not imply that they must act that way. Conscious control can override these tendencies (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986a).

It should also be noted that Fox's article represents a posi- tion or perspective, but not a theory. To be fair, Fox does not present it as a theory. One criterion for evaluating a theory is its verifiability. The functional-evolutionary perspective that he offers is not readily accessible to empirical test or verifica- tion. It is not a good theory. Nevertheless, it is an interesting perspective that may have heuristic value in generating test- able hypotheses. Although it may not be a new look or a better look at an old problem, it is a different look.

A Different Look

As Fox himself points out, "'the familiar is automatically good," and difference is usually met with skepticism and

wariness. Thus, it seems appropriate that I conclude with a note of caution. Fox's essay has its philosophical roots in biological determinism. As Gould (1977) noted in "The Nonscience of Human Nature," a chapter in his Ever Since Darwin, the issue of biological determinism has important social and political consequences. Specifically, Gould ar- gued that the basic premise of biological determinism, "we do what we do because we are made that way" (p. 237), can be used not simply to explain and but also ultimately to justify social inequality and discrimination (see Tiger & Fox, 1971, The Imperial Animal). In harsh criticism of this ap- proach, Gould asserts that "the new biological determinism rests upon no recent fund of information and can cite in its behalf not a single unambiguous fact. Its renewed support must have some other basis, most likely social or political in nature" (p. 238). Whether the direction that Fox's perspec- tive provides is productive or counterproductive for science and for society obviously remains controversial.

Thus, beyond its specific content, Fox's article raises an important fundamental issue for psychology. Are questions of human nature, untestable as they are, even legitimate topics of discussion for a science of behavior? On the one hand, if we accept this challenge, then, as Gould suggests, we could become an unwitting tool of political forces to justify discrimination, stratification, privilege, and oppres- sion. On the other hand, if we ignore this question, will people be any better off in the hands of other disciplines? Fox's article may help provide the answer.

Note

John F. Dovidio, Department of Psychology, Colgate Uni- versity, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346-1398.

References

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Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities. Behavioral Science, 3, 14-25.

Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986a). The aversive fonn of racism. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 61-89). Orlando, FL: Academic.

Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986b). Prejudice, discrimination, and racism: Problems, progress, and promise. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner(Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 315-332). Orlando, FL: Academic.

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Worchel, S. (1979). Cooperation and the reduction of intergroup conflict: Some determining factors. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 262-273). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

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