a new strategy for europe’s neighborhood

8/11/2019 A New Strategy for Europes Neighborhood

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the countrys uture. Te ailure o the Vilnius summit in

November 2013, Russias annexation o Crimea, and thedestabilization o Ukraine and o the region, put paid tothe notion that the ENP could provide the EU with a stablehinterland in Eastern Europe.

Frozen conflicts involving Georgia, Armenia, Azer-baijan, and Moldova, which flare up at times and carry theconstant risk o escalation, have proved intractable, andUkraine may well witness another such situation. Tere isa eeling o anxiety in Estonia and Latvia, with their largeRussian-speaking minorities. Putins doctrine o limitedsovereignty or ormer Soviet states with Russian-speaking

minorities could, they ear, one day be applied to them,putting NAOs security guarantee to the test. Poles aretroubled by the risk that Ukraine, its immediate neighbor,might again all under Russian domination. Te persistenceo authoritarian rule in several ormer Soviet states coveredby the ENP shows that it has not generated a consensusthere in avor o European values.

Failure in the South

Te repercussions o the uprisings in North Arica andthe Middle East, violent sectarian conflict in Syria with itsallout in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as a new outbreak ohostilities between Israel and Hamas indicate that the ENPhas been no more successul to the south. Te winner-take-all approach that prevails afer elections in many o thesecountries has intensified underlying political, economic,social, and religious tensions. It has become a barrier totransition toward a more inclusive orm o liberal democ-racy. Only unisia and Morocco show possible signs o

evolving toward more open societies. Regions covered by

the ENP now pose security risks to the EU itsel, not leastin the orm o returning European jihadists ofen tran-siting through urkey.

The Neighbors of the Neighbors

Developments in Eastern Europe, North Arica, and theLevant are strongly influenced by contiguous countries notcovered by the ENP, including Russia, Iraq, and Iran as wellas Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan; this puts the geographiclogic o the policy into question. Russia remains themajor point o reerence or the countries o the SouthernCaucasus that would become neighbors o the EU onlyin the increasingly unlikely event o urkish accession.Armenia has been pressured by Russia into joining theEurasian customs union, President Vladimir Putinsramework or ingathering ormer Soviet states.

Te very existence o Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria in theirpresent orms depends largely on what happens in Iraq,which, in turn, is influenced by Iran and the Gul. TeIslamic State pursues its violent course in Iraq and Syria,without heed to the boundaries o policies made in Brus-sels. Europes security environment needs to be analyzedas a whole and policy responses developed accordingly.Neighborhood is too confining a concept or cali-brating policies to advance EU values and interests in suchunstable, diverse, and interdependent regions.

Dialogue and engagement with the neighbors o theneighbors is an essential condition or the success o anyuture efforts to stabilize regions adjoining the EU. Whendesigning uture initiatives, the EU should take a moreintegrated approach, responding to various trans-boundarythreats and challenges. It should coordinate closely onobjectives and initiatives with the United States and otherlike-minded countries.

A New Security Strategy

Te ENP does not have a well-thought-out strategic dimen-sion. Its long-term goals remain unclear beyond a generalyearning or a peaceul and well-governed hinterland. Itsbasic design, modelled on the enlargement process butwithout the perspective o EU membership, is uncon-vincing. Te ENP is ill-equipped to address transnationalphenomena, including terrorist groups, organized crime,

The persistence of authoritarian

rule in several former Soviet

states covered by the ENP

shows that it has not generated

a consensus there in favor of

European values.


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and international migration flows, which are among the

main sources o tension and human suffering around theMediterranean Sea. Te new high representative shouldmainstream these issues as part o a new European securitystrategy and coordinate closely with the intelligence, secu-rity, and border management services o member states.

No Leverage Without Incentives

In the absence o an offer o membership, the EU lacks theincentives and the political standing to impose on thirdcountries respect or the rule o law, democracy, and theprotection o human rights or the territorial integrity ostates and the inviolability o borders. Tese are amongthe core principles upon which the EU and, indeed, theliberal international order are based, but they are not thetop priority in most neighboring countries. Te putativebeneficiaries o the ENP are increasingly subject to othernon-western models and ideologies, including authoritari-anism, intolerant orms o religion, and archaic orms onationalism. Some, like Libya, ace the risk o state ailure.

Te financial resources at the disposal o the ENP pale bycomparison with those mobilized by the Gul States, orexample to prop up Egypt. Tese states clearly do not sharethe European approach to undamental rights and ree-doms. Te scale o their aid renders ineffective EU effortsto reward supposed political reorms by marginal incre-ments o EU assistance (known in EU jargon as more ormore).

In any event, member states themselves generally ignoreENP political conditionality in their bilateral dealingswith the countries concerned and are influenced rather bytraditional links as well as commercial and energy inter-ests. Under these circumstances, EU institutions, especiallythe Commission, lack credibility when seeking to imposepolitical conditionality.

A Test Case for European Foreign Policy

Te success or ailure o the EUs overall efforts to createa oreign and security policy will largely be determined inthe EUs own neighborhood; this is the part o the worldwhere the EU could most expect to exercise an influence.

Te ENP has been adjusted several times to take intoaccount the difficulties that have arisen and the changed

circumstances. Tese adjustments include differentmodules or countries to the east (the Eastern Partner-ship promoted by Poland and Sweden) and or Mediter-

ranean countries. But such variants have ailed to convince;indeed, the Eastern Partnership contributed to a dramaticescalation o regional tensions in the case o Ukraine. Inlight o the ast deteriorating situation in the EUs neigh-borhood, a undamental rethink o the overall approachis urgently needed. Another minor adjustment will not beenough to enable the EU to make a real contribution tosecurity, stability, and economic development in neigh-boring regions.

Te ENP label coexists with a plethora o policy rame-works with similar goals including Black Sea Synergy,Eastern Partnership, the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the Union or the Mediter-ranean. Te earlier term Wider Europe is still current.All this creates conusion and obscures political messages.Te new high representative should make a clean sweep othese overlapping initiatives and put into place a dedicatedstrategy or each country, or group o countries, based ontheir specific needs and capacities. Tere is a strong case ordropping the ENP branding altogether.

Vested interests in the member states will be reluctantto depart rom the status quo, however ineffective it hasproved. Southern member states may resist any perceiveddowngrading o certain dysunctional Mediterraneanstates with which they have traditional links. Tey tend todemand equal unding or states to the south and the east,regardless o their respective merits. Nordic countries mayobject to a high level o engagement, or example on energysecurity, with authoritarian states like Azerbaijan that arear rom meeting EU human rights standards. Te highrepresentative will need to mobilize considerable reserveso political capital and powers o persuasion to alter an

EU institutions, especially the

Commission, lack credibility

when seeking to impose political

conditionality.


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existing policy that is essentially a package deal based on

the lowest common denominator among member states.

Te European External Action Service should continue toprovide political analysis and guidance. But the new highrepresentative should work much more closely with theCommission, including the commissioner with a dedi-cated neighborhood or wider Europe portolio. Mosto the EU instruments that could have an impact in neigh-boring countries are managed by the Commission. Sheshould make ull use o the authority that comes with hersimultaneous role as vice-president o the Commission orexternal relations to coordinate the work o her colleagues

with a bearing on external relations.

Closer coordination on political priorities, not merelyprojects, should be undertaken with the European Invest-ment Bank and the European Bank or Reconstructionand Development as well as other international financialinstitutions and bilateral donors. Dialogue with the GulStates and with Russia, i political circumstances eventuallypermit this, should aim to improve understanding o eachothers priorities and to ocus efforts on areas o greatestneed.

o be sure, worrying developments in the EUs neighbor-hood cannot principally be ascribed to the inadequacies oa policy ramework devised in Brussels. Such developmentsare the product o internal dynamics within the societiesthemselves precipitated, at times, by external interven-tion. Te EU is not the only external actor that could helpbring order to troubled regions. Coordination with othermultilateral and bilateral actors is essential. Still, the EUcan make a significant contribution to international effortsto bring better political and economic prospects to EasternEurope, North Arica, and the Levant, provided it adoptspractical and attainable objectives and develops effective

policy instruments.

Values and Interests

A thorough strategic evaluation o EU interests in eacho the countries and regions concerned should precedeany urther adjustments in EU policy toward neighboringcountries. Tis analysis should be wide-ranging andrealistic, taking ully into account spillover rom adjoiningregions. Te high representative should be ready to proposethat the ENP be replaced by dedicated policies addressing

the specific needs and capacities o each o the countriesconcerned.

Te review should question the assumption that sharedvalues are the basis or European polices toward neigh-boring countries. It should acknowledge the growingprevalence o values and practices in a number o thesecountries that are very different rom those prevailing inthe EU itsel. However the prudent promotion o Westernvalues, in societies that are receptive to them, shouldremain part o the EUs approach.

A Differentiated Approach

A differentiated country-by-country approach is required.It should combine the EUs security, energy, and commer-cial interests with support or better governance, the ruleo law, and democracy in societies that themselves haveopted or these. Member states must summon the politicalwill to support those in neighboring countries who seemgenuinely committed to Western values, while maintaininga greater political distance rom corrupt, authoritarian, ordysunctional regimes. Nonetheless the EU will ofen needto do business with regimes that are not to its liking, in linewith the practice o member states.

In the uture, the EU should design policies to address thespecific needs and capacities o individual countries, or,where they share policy-relevant characteristics, groupso countries. Tis implies, or example, that Ukraine,Moldova, and Georgia might qualiy or a deeper orm oengagement than Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. None-theless, in the case o Azerbaijan, the EU should be readyto develop relations in areas o common interest, notablyenergy.

The EU is not the only external

actor that could help bring order

to troubled regions. Coordination

with other multilateral and

bilateral actors is essential.


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No Over-Ambitious Agreements

Deep and Comprehensive Free rade Agreements(DCFAs), requiring the adoption and implementation ovast swathes o EU laws and rules (the acquis), are notnecessarily the most appropriate instrument or countriesacing undamental political and economic developmentchallenges. Such agreements should be limited to ratherew countries that have demonstrated the will and capacityto adapt their societies to the standards and practicesprevailing in the EU. Even where such agreements arealready on the table, the EU should replace them with morelimited orms o engagement adapted to the specific situa-tion o the countries concerned.

At present in North Arica and the Levant, beyond Israel,Morocco, and unisia, there is little scope or concludingambitious and demanding DCFAs. Te EU should takeinitiatives toward Jordan and Lebanon designed principallyto reinorce their ragile political oundations and helpthem cope with the huge influx o reugees. Te EU needsto develop political, security, and humanitarian initia-tives covering Iraq and Syria, in close liaison with urkey.urkish cooperation should be sought in preventingthe transit o European jihadists. Any offices in urkeyservicing jihadists should be closed.

Despite the rise o xenophobia within the EU, as mani-ested in the 2014 European Parliament elections, EUleaders must be resolute in pushing through incentives, inthe orm o trade openings and easier migration acilitiesor legitimate travelers, i they wish to wield influence inthe ew countries that have chosen the path o political andeconomic reorm.

Partners Crucial to Success

Te top priority o the EUs new high representative shouldbe a thorough review o the ENP in close liaison with the

Commission and member states. Te high representative

should consult with the United States, urkey, Israel, the

Gul countries, and other interested states in preparing thisanalysis. Te United States is supportive o a renewed EUcommitment to strengthen security and stability in EasternEurope and the Mediterranean basin, in line with Washing-tons wish to see Europe assume greater responsibilities inthese areas. When political conditions permit, a dialogueshould be opened with Russia.

Te new high representative will need to make ull useo her prerogatives as Commission vice-president tomobilize such policy instruments as trade, financial anddevelopment assistance, institution building, training, and

mobility partnerships in support o new EU initiativestoward neighboring countries.

Recommendations to the High Representative

1. Given the urgency o the situation, a thorough prag-matic, policy-oriented review o the ENP should bethe high representatives top priority.

2. Within 100 days o taking office, the high represen-tative should present an assessment o the ENPseffectiveness and recommendations or modiying orreplacing it.

3. Te geographical scope o the ENP, its goals, meth-odology, and branding, should be included in theanalysis. Te option o dissolving the ENP andreplacing it with dedicated policies addressed toindividual countries or groups o countries should beconsidered.

4. A commissioner should be appointed with specificresponsibility or relations with non-EU Euro-pean countries and those in adjoining regions. Tiscommissioner should work together with the high

representative to mobilize initiatives in areas such astrade, competition policy, development assistance,humanitarian aid, human rights, energy, transport,environment policy, and migration to enable the EUto achieve its oreign and security policy objectives.

5. Te goal o EU policies toward its neighbors shouldbe to reinorce European security, stability, and pros-perity through careully calibrated engagement witheach partner country.

Turkish cooperation should be

sought in preventing the transit of

European jihadists.


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6. Te EU should promote good governance in coun-

tries open to advice and support rom the EU. Itshould urther develop existing institution-buildingand training programs as well as efforts to improvethe investment climate in countries with a genuinepolitical will to move orward in these areas.

7. Te EU should work with partners to strengthen theeffectiveness and independence o the judiciary andthe transparency o public procurement and shouldshare its experience in the fight against corruption.

8. Te EU should be ready to respond to requestsrom governments and civil society representativesto provide support or institutional building andother reorms designed to strengthen the rule olaw, democracy, and the protection o human rights.Commitments in these areas should not, however, beconditions or working together in mutually advanta-geous areas such as security, trade, energy, environ-mental protection, and migration.

9. Effective capacities or conflict prevention, conflictmanagement, and conflict resolution should be devel-oped by the EU, in close liaison with relevant agenciesin the member states.

10. Te EU and partner countries should work togetherto limit illegal cross-border flows o people; at thesame time the EU should promote mobility or busi-ness people, proessionals, university aculty andstudents, skilled workers, and other bona fide trav-elers.

11. Te EU should propose a range o strategic partner-ships, trade and cooperation agreements, or associa-tion agreements adapted to the needs and capacitieso each partner country.

12. Te EU should be ready to conclude DCFAs withcountries that demonstrate the will and the capacityto implement them. Such agreements should not beproposed to countries whose level o developmentand administrative capacity present obstacles to theirimplementation. At present, DCFAs are not appro-priate rameworks or relations with most Mediterra-nean countries, beyond Israel, Morocco, and unisia.

13. Te EU should provide careully targeted financial

assistance to partner countries to help them achievemutually agreed objectives; this assistance should becoordinated with the member states, the EuropeanInvestment Bank, the European Bank or Reconstruc-tion and Development, other international financialinstitutions, and bilateral donors. Te EU shouldencourage these institutions to expand their lendingprograms or viable projects o common interest.

14. Partner countries should be invited to cooperate withthe EU in the ramework o relevant internationalconventions, including those covering environmental

protection and individual rights.

15. Te EU should support regional cooperation amongpartner countries i they request it to do so. Regionalcooperation should be based on mutual interests inconcrete fields such as environmental protection andthe security and stability o energy installations. TeEU should promote regional cooperation only amongcountries that see added value rom it and ask tobenefit rom Europes experience.

16. Te EU should set up dedicated dialogues respec-tively with the United States, urkey, Israel, and theGul States to share assessments and coordinate initia-tives toward the countries concerned. On the EU sidethese dialogues should be led by the high representa-tive with the participation o the relevant commis-sioner and member state representatives.

17. A successul neighborhood policy requires the EUand Russia to develop a sound ramework or bilat-eral relations, including a dialogue on their common

The EU should promote regional

cooperation only among countries

that see added value from it and

ask to benet from Europes

experience.


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Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views o the author alone.

About the Author

Sir Michael Leigh is senior adviser to the German Marshall Fund o

the United States.

About the Europe Program

Te Europe Program aims to enhance understanding o the challeng-

es acing the European Union and the potential implications or the

transatlantic relationship. Analysis, research, and policy recommen-

dations are designed to understand the dichotomy o disintegration

and deepening o the EU and to help improve the political, economic,

financial, and social stability o the EU and its member states. In 2014,

the Europe Program ocuses on integration and disintegration in the

EU, the deepening o the euro area, the changing role o Germany in

Europe and the world, as well as challenges in the EUs neighborhood.

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthens

transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges

and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by

supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic

sphere, by convening leaders and members o the policy and businesscommunities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic

topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed

commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF sup-

ports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in

1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gif rom

Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF

maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic. In addition

to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin,

Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also

has smaller representations in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.

neighborhood. When circumstances permit, EU

leaders should signal their willingness to overcometensions and to engage with Russia. Te unsuccessulpursuit o common spaces that has dominatedEU-Russia interactions or much o the past decadeshould be set aside in avor o a more operationalramework in which common interests, includingtrade, energy, and relations with neighboring coun-tries, can be handled effectively. Te EU needs bothto uphold the principles that have generally ensuredpeace and stability in post-cold war Europe and tobe pragmatic in taking Russian perceptions o itsown interests, and o the shifing balance o power

in Europe, into account. In the long run, the ques-tion o working toward a common economic spacethroughout Europe should be considered.

a new strategy for europe’s neighborhood

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