a people’s peace in cyprus - testing public opinion on the options for a comprehensive settlement

8/13/2019 A Peoples Peace in Cyprus - Testing Public Opinion on the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement

1/128Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393198

APEOPLES PEACE IN CYPRUS

TESTING PUBLIC OPINION ON THE OPTIONSFOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

ALEXANDROS LORDOSEROL KAYMAK

NATHALIE TOCCI

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES

BRUSSELS


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CONTENTS

Executive Summary ............................................................................................... i1. Introduction.................................................................................................. 12. Hopes, Expectations and Priorities in the Peace Process ....................... 43. Towards a Future Referendum................................................................ 124. Security: Guarantees, Rights of Intervention and Peacekeeping........ 305. Property: Return and Compensation...................................................... 516. Governance: Decision-making, Representation and Competences.... 587. Rights, Freedoms and the Meaning of Bizonality ................................. 718. Territory and Settlers: An Inevitable Give-and-Take? ....................... 789. A Peoples Peace in Cyprus?.................................................................... 87Annex 1. Research Methodology....................................................................... 98Annex 2. Survey Questionnaire....................................................................... 102About the Authors............................................................................................. 118


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he year 2009 is decisive for the protracted Cyprus conflict. Incentivesfor a settlement might be higher and above all more evenly

distributed among all parties than in 2004, when the Annan Planfailed due to an overwhelming Greek Cypriot rejection of the proposedblueprint despite Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the plan. Yet whilestrategic assessments and elite incentives bode cautiously well for a Cyprussettlement, ultimately an agreement will have to be approved by the twoCypriot communities in referendums and above all it will have to beimplemented by the Cypriots on the ground. In other words, ordinaryCypriots lie at the crux of the conflict settlement as well as the drawn-outconflict resolution process, determining the ultimate success or failure ofany blueprint signed by their leaders.

In view of the centrality of the people in this peace process, theCentre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in collaboration with GreekCypriot and Turkish Cypriot partners, launched a project in late 2007 toinvestigate, through successive opinion polls, what Cypriots think of eachother, of the peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict. Theproject has developed in two distinct stages. The first stage and poll wasconducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island

in March-April 2008 and its results were published in the first book in thisseries: Erol Kaymak, Alexandros Lordos and Nathalie Tocci, BuildingConfidence in Peace Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process, CEPS,October 2008. On the basis of the first survey and book, the authorsproceeded to the second stage of the project, zooming in on the details of afinal settlement. The second survey was also conducted simultaneously inthe southern and northern parts of the island, this time in January and earlyFebruary 2009 and its results are presented here. The questions put in thefirst questionnaire were deliberately broad and general. In this second

survey, the authors unpacked the different components and options of the

T


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ii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

thorniest dossiers on the conflict settlement agenda. The questionunderpinning this second survey and book is the extent to which Cypriotsconverge more once we leave the abstract level of labels and slogans and

enter into the specifics of a package deal. It is often claimed that the devilis in the detail. Does this apply to Cyprus, or is a different and thus farmore promising tendency at work on the island?

The survey results show that by delving into the details of a Cyprussettlement, agreement is possible but it will be a hard sell to the people ofboth communities. What matters above all and more than the positionsadopted by the leaders, political parties or external actors in andsurrounding the Cyprus conflict is the substance of the proposed deal itself,with core issues of concern being, above all: security, property, governance,

rights and freedoms, territory and settlers.

Security

Any agreement on security that could garner the support of bothcommunities would have to reconcile Greek Cypriot opposition regardingTurkish military intervention and Turkish Cypriot desires that Turkeyremain a credible guarantor. Given bizonality and other facts related to anynew state of affairs the extant Treaty of Guarantee would require

amendment, as was the case when the Annan Plan blueprint called foradditional protocols. Amending the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, however,runs a risk of not overcoming Greek Cypriots negative perceptionsregarding the specific document, as evidenced in the current poll; with thisin mind, an amended or new treaty could be designed in such a way as toalso be acceptable to Turkish Cypriots, thus serving as the basis of a newsecurity regime in Cyprus.

While negotiating and designing the future security and treatyarchitecture of a unified Cyprus is a delicate matter, which will require the

creativity and high level commitment of all relevant parties both in Cyprusand internationally, public opinion on the ground does seem to suggestspecific elements that could be considered further by the formalnegotiators. For one, the treaty whatever it is called - could unpack thesecurity and implementation challenges that a unified Cyprus may face inthe future, differentiating between potential military threats, governancecrises and instances of non-implementation of the agreement; defining foreach a differentiated response mechanism that could, as needed in eachcase, involve the federal and constituent state governments in Cyprus, the


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Governance

On the issue of governance it was also possible to register possibleconvergence around the setting-up of a rotating presidency/vice

presidency (according to set time periods) elected on separate tickets withan element of cross-voting. Under such a model the presidential teamwould nominate a council of ministers responsible for those ministriesunder federal or mixed competences. The question of representation ratioswithin federal offices would remain and require compromise, possibly byopting for a mix of 75-25, 60-40 and 50-50 depending on the specific staffingrequirements and other ministry or federal office sensitivities, thus de-politicising and de-polarising the issue of ratios. In the case of the council ofministers, ratios could include a 2:1 configuration in terms of the communalorigin of participants, which is considered reasonable and fair by GreekCypriots, but a 50-50 ratio in terms of the right of each of the two leaders tonominate members to the council of ministers from both communities,which is considered reasonable and fair by Turkish Cypriots. Acomplementary approach to resolving the issue of ratios involvesestablishing a trade-off between competences and ratios: the stronger thefederal government would be in relation to the constituent states, the moreequality in representation would be envisioned; and vice-versa.

Rights and Freedoms

Compromise is also possible on the question of rights and freedoms, withTurkish Cypriots willing to extend a general set of rights and freedoms toall citizens throughout the island with the qualified extension of voting,property and business establishment rights. This finding reflects how theTurkish Cypriot attachment to bizonality is anchored above all in the fearof being dominated both politically and economically by the GreekCypriots, while at the same time they maintain openness towards the

principle of coexistence of the two communities and the creation of amulticultural society.

Territory and Settlers

Major divergences lie instead in the territory and settlers dossiers, whichmay call for give and take between these two dossiers. Territorialreadjustments will inevitably be a major area of Turkish Cypriotconcession, but the blow may be softened by including federal areas (of

which some would be in what is now Greek Cypriot territory) in the new


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APEOPLES PEACE IN CYPRUS| v

map of Cyprus. As far as immigrants from Turkey are concerned,differences may well have to be split down the middle, while at the sametime Greek Cypriot anxieties over immigration and the potential for racism

and xenophobia would need to be tackled urgently through a multi-cultural education drive.

Selling a Cyprus settlement to both communities on the island inseparate referendums will no doubt be a tough challenge. Yet what thisproject, with its two surveys and books, has attempted to demonstrate isthat a peoples peace in Cyprus ispossible. Particularly when delving intothe details of a future plan, including the thorniest issues of the Cyprussettlement, the authors found that not only is a compromise feasible, butabove all, by probing what citizens think, fear and desire, that new and

creative ideas may be put to the service of the overall peace process on theisland.


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1. IntroductionIncentives for a settlement in 2009 may be higher and above all moreevenly distributed among all parties than in 2004, when the Annan Planfailed. The current Greek Cypriot leadership seems conscious of the factthat time is not on its side. Back in 2004 the expectation, fed by the formerleadership, was that through the leverage gained from EU membership, theRepublic of Cyprus would be able to extract new and significantconcessions from the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. True, Cyprus EUmembership has been consistently used and abused as a source of pressureon Turkey; but in many ways developments on the ground have

consolidated the partition on the island. The international reputation of theTurkish Cypriots has changed and improved. While this change ininternational perceptions has not brought with it the longed-for lifting ofthe international isolation of northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots andTurkey are no longer viewed as the indisputable bte noire of the Cyprusquagmire.1 Despite its failure, the momentum generated and theexpectations raised by the Annan Plan and EU accession created newdynamics in the property realm and consequently triggered an economicboom in the north, which, while unsustainable,2 has visibly changed the

economic outlook of Turkish Cypriots. Adding to the pressure, despite thevocal Greek Cypriot resistance to a timetable, political realities related bothto the internal dynamics of the Turkish Cypriot community and to TurkeysEU accession process seem to suggest that the end of 2009 might be a defacto deadline for the peace process.

Turning north, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, electedpresident in February 2005, had ridden on the pro-solution wave that

1

Throughout the 1990s and until the 2003 change of Turkish Cypriot leadership, theTurkish side was widely considered by the international community as resisting theprospect of a federal settlement in Cyprus, promoting instead a confederal solution oralternatively the international recognition of the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state in thenorthern part of Cyprus.

2 In fact, the widely publicised Orams Case and other such lawsuits that GreekCypriots are filing, have increased the risks inherent in purchasing properties fromTurkish Cypriots in the north that were originally owned by displaced Greek Cypriots.As a result, by 2008 demand for properties in the north had dampened, a situation nowfurther exacerbated by the global credit crisis and concomitant recession.


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swept across the north in the final years of the Annan Plan process in 2003-4. Talat faces elections in early 2010 and so far has little to show to his pro-solution constituency. Moreover, despite the re-launch of the peace process

in September 2008, the mood in the north has palpably changed andhardened, as evidenced by the strong showing of the Nationalist UnionParty (UBP) in polls in the run up to the April 2009 parliamentaryelections.3Indeed, the polls conducted for the purposes of this book are incongruence with this trend, demonstrating a shift towards the UBP, withsignificant numbers of former CTP voters declaring their intent not to cast avote or to repatriate to the UBP. Hence the urgency of a solution among theTurkish Cypriots, acutely felt by their leader, Mr. Talat, who has alreadyindicated that he may not stand for re-election if there is no solution by the

end of 2009, explaining that [i]f there is no hope for a resolution by [year-end], I will have completed my mission.4

Stakes are high for Turkey as well. Over the last four years, Cyprushas poisoned EU-Turkey relations, partly due to the direct actions ofmember state Cyprus and largely because other member states havesupported or hidden behind the Cyprus issue to block or slow-downTurkeys accession course. In the autumn of 2009, the European Council isscheduled to review Turkeys accession process in relation to Turkeys(non)implementation of the Additional Protocol extending the EU-Turkeycustoms union to Cyprus. In addition, Turkeys accession negotiations,which are currently proceeding at snails pace, risk grinding to a halt by theend of the year in view of the chapters directly or indirectly blocked by theCyprus conflict. Enthusiasm for EU membership amongst Turkishstakeholders and the public alike has waned, but it is unlikely that anymainstream actor in Turkey, regardless of how nationalist or eurosceptic,desires the process to be completely derailed.5Equally concerned about a

3 A poll conducted by KADEM released in March 2009 revealed that the mainopposition party, the National Unity Party (UBP), enjoys a clear lead over theincumbent Republican Turkish Party (CTP), http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/67507/PageName/Ic-Haberler.

4J. Christou (2009), Talat to Stand Down if No Solution Found, Cyprus Mail, 8 March2009.

5 A. Toksabay Esen & H. Tolga Blkba (2008) Attitudes of Key Stakeholders inTurkey towards EU-Turkey Relations: Consensual Discord or Contentious Accord?, in


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APEOPLES PEACE IN CYPRUS| 3

drastic derailment in EU-Turkey relations is Greece, where governmentand opposition alike have reoriented their foreign policy vision basing it onTurkeys EU accession and its parallel domestic transformation.

Strategic assessments and elite incentive structures thus bodecautiously well for a Cyprus settlement. But ultimately an agreement, ifreached, will have to be approved by the two Cypriot communities inreferendums and above all it will have to be implemented by Cypriots onthe ground in the years to come. In other words, ordinary Cypriots lie atthe crux of the conflict settlement as well as the drawn-out conflictresolution and transformation process, determining the ultimate success orfailure of any blueprint signed by their leaders.

The project to investigate what Cypriots think of each other, of thepeace process and of possible solutions to the conflict has developed in twodistinct stages. The first stage and poll was conducted simultaneously inthe northern and southern parts of the island in March-April 2008, theobjective of which was to explore and suggest ways in which theleaderships in Cyprus and the EU could raise public confidence in andoffer incentives for peace on the island. One of the principal findings of thisstudy was that Cypriots share a high degree of mistrust towards each otherand towards the peace process. In view of this, we highlighted mutually

acceptable confidence building steps that could be pursued alongsidenegotiations on a comprehensive settlement in order to maximize the peaceprocess chances of success.

On the basis of our first survey and book, we proceeded to the secondstage of our project, zooming in on the details of a final settlement. Oursecond survey was conducted simultaneously in the southern and northernparts of the island in January and early February 2009 and its results arepresented here.6 In this second survey we have set aside those issues that

N. Tocci (ed.) Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy,IAI Quaderni: Rome.

6Two identical polls were conducted, in the north and south, by Prologue ConsultingLtd. and CYMAR, respectively. For each poll, 1000 interviews were conducted.Respondents were selected initially through stratification of urban and ruralpopulations based on census data. Details of the sampling process can be found inAnnex 1. The questionnaire was produced by CEPS in collaboration with a researchteam comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and was fine-tuned throughthe input of a selected group of official and non-official Greek Cypriot, Turkish


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giving a poor prognosis on the issue of whether the peace process willdeliver an agreement (see Figure 1). It should be noted however that theresponse of the public to this question is not necessarily a fair indicator of

whether there is public interest in or commitment to achieving a settlement.The responses to such questions, asked frequently by pollsters, often makeit to the headlines of daily newspapers with the subtext gloom and doomin Cyprus. In view of this situation, we decided to ask not just whetherpeople are hopeful that the process will produce results, but whether theywish the process to produce results. Very encouragingly, both communitiesunambiguously want the process to succeed, with 64% of the GreekCypriots and 65% of the Turkish Cypriots desiring a mutually acceptablesettlement to emerge from the peace process (see Figure 2). This is often

overlooked in surveys and the media, which only ask and report aboutlevels of expectation and therefore reach the false conclusion that the publichas given up on and/or does not care about the peace process.

Figure 1. To what extent are you hopeful that the peace process will produceresults?

56%

61%

17%14%

27% 26%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

GreekCypriots TurkishCypriots

Nothopeful

Unsure

Hopeful


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Figure 2. To what extent do you wish and expect from the leaders that theyreach a mutually acceptable settlement through the peace process?

25% 24%

11% 11%

64% 65%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

GreekCypriots TurkishCypriots

Prefer

nothingtocomeofthe

peaceprocess

Ambivalent

Wishthatthe

peaceprocess

willlead

to

a

settlement

The desire for success of the peace process links back to the results ofour first survey regarding the level of (dis)satisfaction with the status quo.In that poll we found that 84% of Turkish Cypriots and 75% of GreekCypriots were either dissatisfied or had mixed feelings about the status

quo. In this survey this perceived dissatisfaction, albeit with an interestingrole reversal between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, wasreconfirmed: 67% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% of the Greek Cypriotseither reject or find the status quo merely tolerable (see Figures 4a and 5a).While to different and changing degrees, both communities in Cyprus thusshare a sense of scepticism about the peace process as well as a resolutedesire for these negotiations to succeed, not least in view of theirdissatisfaction with the current situation on the island.


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Figure 4a. Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, andconsidering each of the alternative settlement models presented here,how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of

these models? (Greek Cypriot self-perceptions)

82% 9% 8%

78% 14% 9%

60% 30% 10%

20% 37% 44%

9% 11% 80%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Twoseparateandinternationally recognisedstates

Aconfederationoftwosovereignstates

Continuation ofthecurrentsituation

Abizonalbicommunalfederation

Oneunitarystateandcentralgovernmentforthe

wholeofCyprus

Iwoulddefinitelyrejectthis Iwouldtoleratethisasacompromiseoption Iwouldfindthissatisfactory

Figure 5a. Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, andconsidering each of the alternative settlement models presented here,how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each ofthese models? (Turkish Cypriot self-perceptions)

48% 19% 33%

41% 26% 33%

41% 20% 39%

28% 24% 49%

14% 15% 71%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Oneunitarystateandcentralgovernment forthe

wholeofCyprus

Continuationofthecurrentsituation

Aconfederation

of

two

sovereign

states


Twoseparateandinternationallyrecognisedstates

Iwoulddefinitelyrejectthis Iwouldtoleratethisasacompromiseoption Iwouldfindthissatisfactory


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Figure 4b. How acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models is forthe majority of the other community? (Turkish Cypriot perceptions ofGreek Cypriot community)

73% 13% 15%

64% 22% 14%

63% 23% 14%

41% 23% 36%

32% 26% 42%

0% 50% 100%

Twoseparateandinternationally recognisedstates




wholeofCyprus


Majorityoftheothercommunitywoulddefinitelyrejectthis

Majorityoftheothercommunitywouldtoleratethisasacompromiseoption

Majorityoftheothercommunitywouldfindthissatisfactory

Figure 5b. How acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models is forthe majority of the other community? (Greek Cypriot perceptions ofTurkish Cypriot community)

50% 36% 15%

39% 29% 32%

23% 45% 33%

25% 38% 37%

37% 20% 44%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%





wholeofCyprus

Twoseparateandinternationallyrecognisedstates

Majorityoftheothercommunitywoulddefinitelyrejectthis

Majorityoftheothercommunitywouldtoleratethisasacompromiseoption

Majorityoftheothercommunitywouldfindthissatisfactory


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Delving deeper into this question, we enquired into the reasons whyGreek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want a solution. What are theirpriorities and motives for wanting the peace process to succeed? As far as

the Greek Cypriots are concerned, the results are clear-cut andunequivocal. Greek Cypriots care above all about security, with the desireto end the perceived threat emanating from Turkey ranking as the numberone motive for solving the conflict (81%), followed by achieving a justresolution of the property issue (63%), living within a functional,democratic and internationally respected state (63%), being able to liveand work anywhere in Cyprus (54%) and finally the issue of territory(50%). Greek Cypriots are significantly less concerned with issues such aspower-sharing or with benefits they already enjoy (e.g., EU membership).

This can be interpreted as an intense focus on and concern for what GreekCypriots view as the core issues of a settlement security, property,functionality, human rights, territory which drown out most otherresponses given when participants had to choose their five preferredoptions. Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, do not display similar peaks andtroughs in motivations and priorities, with reasons to reach a settlementbeing spread more evenly across different options. This said, we find thatimproving the economic situation scores highest (70%), preserving culturalidentity (54%), the independence, functionality and democratic nature of

governance (53%), and securing basic freedoms and EU membership (48%each). Mutatis mutandis, a more evenly spread Turkish Cypriotprioritisation of motives for change is reminiscent of the results of our firstsurvey, which found that Turkish Cypriots are more transformationistthan Greek Cypriots, in so far as they desire change in a diverse set offeatures within their society.7

Summing up, security and property can be seen as common coreissues, that are of strong concern to both communities, whereas territory is

7As a visible effect of different contextual circumstances, Turkish Cypriots appear tobe more transformationist, i.e., willing to change a diverse set of features within theirsociety, valuing almost equally order (59%), democracy (51%), fighting inflation (41%)and freedom of speech (45%). By contrast, Greek Cypriots appear to care more forcurrent problem areas within their society such as maintaining order (71%), fightingcrime (62%) and fighting inflation (59%), as opposed to areas they feel relativelycontent with (e.g., democracy 33% and freedom of speech 34%). See Kaymak, Lordos& Tocci (2008), Building Confidence in Peace: Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process,CEPS, Brussels, pp. 18-19.


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of more concern to the Greek Cypriots and the economy is of more concernto the Turkish Cypriots. An implication here is that in areas of cleardivergence where win-win agreements are difficult to reach, package

compromises could be made based on the issues of prime interest to thetwo communities. A worrying finding however is that both communitiesrate returning to a constitutional order where the two communities sharepower as bottom on their list of priorities (10% of the Greek Cypriots and24% of the Turkish Cypriots). On the one hand this is natural, given thatpower-sharing is a necessary outcome of a compromise rather than amotive for a settlement per se. Furthermore, the specific wordingreturning to a constitutional order may have been interpreted as a returnto the 1960 set-up, on which neither side is particularly keen. On the other

hand, it is a cause for concern if the two communities do not put theirhearts into the power-sharing process and focus instead on what they eachseparately have to gain from an agreement (see Figure 3).

While not viewing power-sharing as a prime motive for a solution, apower-sharing agreement based on a bizonal and bicommunal federation(BBF) was however reconfirmed in this second survey as the only possiblecompromise solution. As in our first poll, we found huge divergence on theoptions of a unitary state (with 80% of Greek Cypriots in favour but 67% ofTurkish Cypriots either rejecting or viewing this as merely tolerable), twoseparate states (with 71% of Turkish Cypriots in favour but 91% of GreekCypriots rejecting or viewing this as merely tolerable) and a confederation(with 39% of Turkish Cypriots in favour but 92% of Greek Cypriotsrejecting or finding this as merely tolerable).

Additionally, there is divergence in each communitys perceptions ofthe other communitys preferences: Turkish Cypriots mistakenly believethat Greek Cypriots prefer the persistence of the status quo (when askedhow acceptable or unacceptable do you believe the Greek Cypriots would

consider each type of solution, Turkish Cypriots respond that the firstoption for Greek Cypriots is the continuation of the status quo, the secondoption is a unitary state while federation is merely their third option whereas in fact Greek Cypriots report that their first option is a unitarystate, their second and also acceptable option is a federation, whilecontinuation of the status quo ranks a distant third). Greek Cypriotsmistakenly think that Turkish Cypriot are open to consider a unitary state(Turkish Cypriots rank a unitary state as their worst option, even belowcontinuation of the status quo, whereas Greek Cypriots think that it ranks

second after a two state solution and preferable to a federal solution).


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Figure 3. Of these possible motives for solving the Cyprus Problem, which five are most importan

10%

34%

24%

32% 34%

37%

48%53%

50%

63%

81%

54%

63%

24%

42%48%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Returningtoa

constitutional

orderwhere

thetwo

communities

sharepower

andgovern

Cyprus

together

Achievingthe

territorialunity

ofCyprus

Achieving

justi cein

relationto

propertieslost

duringthe

eventsfrom

1963to1974

Endingthe

threatthat

emanatesfrom

Turkey/the

GreekCypriots

Puttingthe

pastbehindus

sowecanlook

towardsthe

future

Fullyenjoying

thebenefitsof

EU

membership

Beingableto

liveandwork

anywhere in

Cyprus

Livingwith

functiona

democratic

internation

respecte

state

Greek


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Greek Cypriots and 37% of Turkish Cypriots definitely or leaning towardsa no; a mere 23% of Greek Cypriots and 41% of Turkish Cypriotsdefinitely or leaning towards a yes, and with the Greek Cypriots in

particular displaying high levels of undecided voters (44%) (see Figures 6and 7). In both communities undecided swing voters will determine thereferendum results, and, as opposed to 2004, we are unlikely to witness anoverwhelming wave of Turkish Cypriot support for a future plan, asevidenced by numerous polls. In our first survey the Annan Plan provednot only unpopular among Greek Cypriots (who had rejected it in 2004),but was almost equally among Turkish Cypriots.9Corroborating this data,a recent poll by KADEM asked Turkish Cypriot respondents how theywould vote for the Annan Plan if the 2004 referendum were repeated in

2009. Almost 54% declared that they would vote no.10While it is not theAnnan Plan that will be put to a referendum at the end of the current peaceprocess, but rather a new plan based on the current negotiations betweenMr Christofias and Mr Talat, the fact that the Annan Plan gets such a poorshowing in polls attests to the fact that the mood among Turkish Cypriotshas shifted in a negative direction, a fact that will, mutatis mutandis, makeany future referendum campaign more challenging than the equivalent2004 campaign.

9Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008), op. cit., pp. 30-31.

10See the 5 March 2009 edition of Kibris newspaper, http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/67584/PageName/Ic-Haberler. The significant divergencebetween our polls findings and the KADEM poll might be related to the methodologyunderlying the wording of the question in each case. First, it should be noted that inour case we did not ask about how they would vote if the Annan Plan was put toreferendum but rather how they would vote if the negotiations conclude and a newplan is drafted. Thus, part of the divergence can be explained as representing the hopethat citizens are investing in the current process for a settlement plan that is an

improvement on the Annan Plan. Additionally, for the purposes of our poll, a primaryinterest was to identify swing voters for the sake of further analysis and thus a specificresponse category I am just as likely to vote Yes as to vote No was presented toparticipants. In polls that do not present such a clearly defined intermediate category,such as the KADEM poll, but instead offer only a Yes or No response and recordseparately the refusal to respond, it is typical to find higher values in the Yes andNo categories and much lower values in the Undecided category. While this maybe a better way to identify hidden trends in the public mood, we felt that in our case,and given that a referendum is still a long way away, it was more important to ensurethat swing voters were identified correctly, whatever their current mood.


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Figure 6. Considering a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between thetwo leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum isorganised, how do you see yourself voting in such a future referendum?

(Greek Cypriots)

25%

9%

44%

4%

19%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Iwould

certainly,or

almost

certainly,vote

'No'

Icurrently

lean

towardsa'No'

vote,thoughI

mightatthat

timesway

towardsa'Yes'

vote

Iam

currently

justaslikelyto

vote'Yes'as to

vote'No'

Icurrently

lean

towardsa'Yes'

vote,thoughI

mightatthat

timesway

towardsa'No'

vote

Iwould

certainly,or

almost

certainly,vote

'Yes'

Figure 7. Considering a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the

two leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum isorganised, how do you see yourself voting in such a future referendum?(Turkish Cypriots)

29%

8%

21%

11%

30%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Iwould

certainly,or

almost

certainly,vote

'No'

Icurrentlylean

towardsa'No'

vote,thoughI

mightatthat

timesway

towardsa'Yes'

vote

Iamcurrently

justaslikelyto

vote'Yes'as to

vote'No'

Icurrentlylean

towardsa'Yes'

vote,thoughI

mightatthat

timesway

towardsa'No'

vote

Iwould

certainly,or

almost

certainly,vote

'Yes'


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Returning to our findings in relation to the intended referendumvote, a demographic analysis of the responses allows various importantconclusions to be drawn (see Figures 8a and 8b). First, in relation to age

group, we note similarities but also differences between the twocommunities; in the Greek Cypriot community, older voters in the 55-64and 65+ categories tend towards a Yes vote, younger voters in the 18-24,25-34 and 35-44 categories tend towards a No vote while voters in the 45-54 categories are equally split. It should be noted of course that across allage groups the swing voter category remains the largest segment (seeFigure 8a). Among the Turkish Cypriots, an intriguing situation seems tohave developed whereby the middle-aged groups 35-44 and 45-54,strongly tend towards a Yes, yet both the younger (18-24, 25-34) and older

(55-64, 65+) groups tend more in favour of a No. In other words, thegeneration of Turkish Cypriots that is currently in a position of authorityand driving the Turkish Cypriot pro-solution policy is under siege bothfrom their childrens and their parents generations, who express strongscepticism and reservations over the pro-settlement policy that has beenpursued over the last few years.

Figure 8a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against age group(Greek Cypriots)

29% 11% 44% 2% 14%

31% 7% 43% 4% 16%

30% 11% 39% 4% 16%

23% 10% 41% 5% 20%

19% 8% 50% 3% 21%

17% 3% 50% 4% 26%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

1824

2534

3544

4554

5564

65+

Iwouldcertainly,oralmostcertainly,voteNo

IcurrentlyleantowardsaNovote,thoughImightatthattimeswaytowardsaYesvote

IamcurrentlyjustaslikelytovoteYesastovoteNo

IcurrentlyleantowardsaYesvote,thoughImightatthattimeswaytowardsaNovote

Iwouldcertainly,oralmostcertainly,voteYes


26/128


Figure 8b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against age group(Turkish Cypriots)

38% 10% 13% 14% 28%

33% 10% 23% 10% 25%

21% 10% 27% 9% 33%

22% 6% 21% 21% 40%

32% 8% 20% 12% 28%45% 7% 14% 6% 28%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

1824

2534

3544

4554

556465+



IamcurrentlyjustaslikelytovoteYesas tovoteNo



In relation to political party affiliation, we note another interestingdifferentiation between the two communities. Greek Cypriots adhering tothe three largest parties DISY, AKEL and DIKO all seem to displaysimilar profiles when it comes to their intended vote in a futurereferendum, with in each party about 20-25% trending Yes, 20-25%trending No and 50% being swing voters. While there is a slightly largerproportion of Yes voters in DISY and a slightly larger proportion of Novoters in DIKO, the overall similarity is noteworthy, especially consideringthe differences in expressed policy positions in relation to the Cyprusconflict by the senior leaderships of these three parties. In contrast, amongsupporters of smaller parties such as EDEK, and among those who declare

that they will put in an abstention vote, there is a very strong trend infavour of a No vote with comparatively few swing voters.11What we seein effect is the political marginalisation of the hard No vote, to the extentthat these voters feel that they have no choice but to abstain frommainstream politics given that the major parties no longer represent them.

11In our poll, the same trend seems to apply to other small parties, such as EVROKOand the Green Party, but due to the small number of respondents hailing from thoseparties it is not possible to draw statistically valid inferences.


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What is developing into the dominant political viewpoint instead is a waitand see approach: Lets see the results of the peace negotiations and thenwe will decide how to vote (see Figure 9a). Among Turkish Cypriots, the

situation is quite different since party affiliation and intended referendumvote correlate very closely: those who still support CTP are largelycommitted to voting Yes, those who support UBP are largely committedto voting No, though it is noteworthy that even among UBP supportersthere is a 25% segment tending towards a Yes, while supporters of thesmaller parties display intermediate positions (see Figure 9b).

Figure 9a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against political party

affiliation (Greek Cypriots)

54% 8% 23% 15%

32% 24% 26% 3% 16%

21% 5% 53% 3% 19%

20% 8% 47% 3% 21%

19% 6% 47% 5% 24%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

AbstentionVote

EDEK

DIKO

AKEL

DISY







28/128


Figure 9b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against political partyaffiliation (Turkish Cypriots)

48% 8% 18% 9% 16%

29% 14% 33% 13% 11%

11% 4% 31% 8% 46%

4%5% 18% 11% 61%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

UBP

DP

TDP

CTP

Iwould

certainly,

or

almost

certainly,

vote

No





When relating intended referendum vote to district of residence, wesee substantial differentiation in both communities. Among GreekCypriots, Limassol and Paphos strongly tend towards a No, though theswing voter element remains strong; Nicosia, in contrast, is split three-waybetween the Yes trend, the No trend, and the swing voters. Interestingly,in both the Larnaca and Famagusta/Ammohostos districts swing voteseems to dominate by 80% and over. Residents of these districts appear tobe waiting to hear recommendations from the Capital before making uptheir minds (see Figure 10a). Among Turkish Cypriots we see thatNicosia/Lefkoa slightly trends Yes, Kyrenia/Girne and

Morphou/Gzelyurt slightly trend No, while Famagusta/Gazi Mausa isequally split and highly polarised, and finally skele (the Karpas peninsula)strongly trends Yes a counterintuitive finding given the high number ofsettlers from Turkey who are resident in that area (see Figure 10b).


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Figure 10a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against district ofresidence (Greek Cypriots)

22 88% 2%6%

4%3% 80% 6% 7%

14% 33% 29% 4% 20%

30% 7% 28% 4% 31%

41% 6% 40% 2% 12%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Ammohostos

Larnaka

Pafos

Lefkosia

Lemesos






Figure 10b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against district ofresidence (Turkish Cypriots)

20% 4%7% 26% 43%

25% 6% 31% 7% 31%

28% 20% 22% 14% 16%

36% 5% 27% 10% 22%

37% 7% 9% 7% 40%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Iskele

Lefkosa

Girne

Guzelyurt

Gazimagusa



IamcurrentlyjustaslikelytovoteYes astovoteNo




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However when comparing intended referendum votes to levels ofeducation and levels of income, a more sobering picture emerges. The Yestrend seems to be driven, in both communities, by the higher socio-

economic groups. In terms of education, by those holding post-graduatedegrees, and in terms of income, by those families who earn more than

2,500 in the Greek Cypriot community or YTL 3,400 in the Turkish Cypriotcommunity. An additional finding that deserves to be highlighted is that inboth communities the least educated socio-economic group (up toelementary school only) displays a Yes trend of a similar magnitude tothat displayed by the most educated group (post-graduate degree) and inmarked contrast to all the intermediate socio-economic groups that trendtowards No (see Figures 11a, 11b, 12a, 12b). These findings taken together

are troubling, insofar as they signify a resistance to the peace process on thepart of the middle classes in between,12 which if left unaddressed maylead to a gradual rift between the political elites and the wider populationon matters related to the Cyprus conflict. In such a scenario it will be verydifficult for the political leadership to successfully guide the population ina referendum. To avert such an outcome, it is important that theleaderships are seen to make an effort to engage with the public in mattersrelating to the Cyprus conflict, listening to the concerns of citizens andtaking care to ensure that the peace process is, to the extent feasible,

inclusive of grassroots views.

12 The fact that the least educated seem to be immune to this negativity seems tosuggest that resistance to the peace process is culturally mediated, and specifically thatboth Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots develop more negative attitudes as theycome into contact with the mainstream media, the secondary schooling system etc.


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Figure 12a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of income(Greek Cypriots)

27% 21% 31% 2% 20%

32% 5% 43% 3%17%

32% 8% 39% 2% 18%

24% 7% 49% 2% 18%

20% 2% 51% 2% 25%

22% 7% 44% 9% 20%

0% 50% 100%

501850Euros

8511300Euros

13011700Euros

17012500Euros

25013400Euros

34015000

Euros

I

would

certainly,

or

almost

certainly,

vote

NoIcurrentlyleantowardsaNovote,thoughImightatthattimeswaytowardsaYesvote

IamcurrentlyjustaslikelytovoteYesas tovoteNo



Figure 12b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of income(Turkish Cypriots)

31% 11% 17% 12% 29%

31% 8% 22% 10% 29%

29% 6% 27% 11% 27%

26% 7% 18% 9% 40%

13% 33% 3% 50%

11% 11% 22% 56%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

10011700YTL

17012600YTL

26013400YTL

34015000YTL

50006800YTL

680110000YTL







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Beyond this basic demographic analysis, an additional set ofquestions arises, regarding the relation of intended referendum vote withthe underlying desire for a settlement; with levels of support or opposition

to the status quo; and with the actual vote in the 2004 referendum.Additionally, one might ask to what extent the referendum results will bedetermined by political party affiliation, and more precisely whichsegments of the population will be amenable to such political influence. Toshed some light on these questions we have conducted a Decision Treeanalysis, which is a statistical method designed to reveal the underlyingdecision process that affects respondents when they declare that they aretending towards a Yes or towards a No, or are swing voters.13

The first important finding that emerges from this Decision Tree

analysis is that, in both communities, the vote in the 2004 referendumserved as a formative experience and acts as the first point of referencefrom which voters will make their future decision. From this pointonwards, we see differentiation between the two communities. Among theGreek Cypriots, those who voted Yes in the 2004 referendum now tend tobranch-off into two distinct groups: those who have in the meantimeaccepted the status quo, thus exhibiting a tendency to be swing voters thistime round, and those who fervently reject the status quo, who can beexpected to vote a strong Yes this time as well. Among Greek Cypriotswho had voted No in 2004, the situation is somewhat more complex.Those who declare a low desire for a settlement will give the matter nofurther thought and vote No again. Those who voted No in 2004, butdeclare a basic desire for a settlement but with ambivalent or even positivefeelings about the status quo will turn to their political party for guidance.This specific voter group, comprised of former No voters who are nowtorn between their desire for a settlement and their comfort with thecurrent situation, can be expected to listen very carefully to their partys

line, alongside their own evaluation of the proposed plan and itsconsequences in their daily lives (see Figure 13a).

13The Greek Cypriot Decision Tree was grown in accordance with the QUEST method.The model correctly classified 51.1% of all cases (null model = 20% correctclassification). The Turkish Cypriot Decision Tree was grown in accordance with theCRT method and pruned to avoid overfitting to a maximum difference in risk of 1standard error. The model correctly classified 50.8% of all cases (null model = 20%correct classification)


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Figure 13b. Decision Tree analysis of the decision process underlying theintended referendum vote (Turkish Cypriots)


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In contrast with the Greek Cypriots, in the Turkish Cypriotcommunity, dilemmas characterise former Yes voters instead. In fact mostTurkish Cypriot former No voters can be expected to vote No again,

while former Yes voters can be expected to divide between those who stillstrongly desire a settlement and are expected to vote Yes again, and thosewho are ambivalent or no longer desire a settlement. This final group, offormer Yes voters who have lost faith in a settlement, can also be expectedto turn to the political leadership for guidance (see Figure 13b). Thus, inboth communities there seems to be an inverse relationship betweeninternal conviction and willingness to receive guidance from politicalauthorities, a factor that will undoubtedly affect the outcome of any futurereferendum.

It should be noted however that the above mentioned groups, ofinternally inconsistent Greek Cypriot No voters and internallyinconsistent Turkish Cypriot Yes voters who are open to receivingguidance in either direction, are not large enough segments of society toswing, by themselves, the referendum results.14Most Greek Cypriots andTurkish Cypriots do in fact have strong and clear-cut views on issuesrelating to the Cyprus conflict and can thus be expected to trust their own

judgement in any proposed settlement.

Given the importance of swing voters, we enquired directly into thedetermining factors that would lead undecided respondents to tilt one wayor another. The results are clear-cut and verify the above analysis: as far asthe mainstream of swing voters goes, they will above all look into thesubstance of the plan, rather than be influenced by the positions ofparticular actors, be this their family, their friends, their political party,their president or their motherland. The only partial exception to thisconclusion is the relative weight attached by Turkish Cypriot swing votersto Turkeys position (28%). In the actual practice of evaluating a proposed

settlement plan, this could mean a higher attributed value to security issuesfor the Turkish Cypriots, security being amongst Turkeys principalconcerns in a Cyprus settlement. Linked to Turkeys role and position, it isalso notable that the Greek Cypriot swing vote is highly sensitive to theperceptions of Turkeys post-settlement intentions, that is, whether Turkey

14The precise segment of the electorate that can be classified as swing voters amenableto social and political influence is approximately 10% of the population in eachcommunity, as will be seen in the cluster analysis below.


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will have convinced me that it intends to honour the agreement (45%).Thus, taken together, these two findings highlight the critical role thatTurkey will play in securing a Cyprus settlement. Beyond Turkeys

position towards a future settlement, for undecided voters on both sidesthe issues that rank highest as determining factors in a future vote are, forGreek Cypriot swing voters, the security and guarantees provisions in theplan, which influence 85% of swing voters, territory (60%), citizenship(57%), property (53%) and governance (39%); valued most by TurkishCypriot swing voters are security and guarantees (66%), property (49%),power-sharing (44%), the economy (39%) and the legal status ofsovereignty (34%) (Figure 14).

An additional cluster analysis of swing voter priorities reveals that

Greek Cypriot swing voters fall into three major categories: those who areconcerned exclusively or almost exclusively with security issues (40% ofswing voters, 24% of total population): those who will evaluate the futureplan in all its major dossiers (42% of swing voters, 22% of total population);and those who are amenable to social influence from the leader of theircommunity, their political party or their close social and family circle (18%of swing voters, 10% of total population) (see Figure 15). In contrast,Turkish Cypriots fall into four major categories: those who will evaluate theplan in a balanced manner (50% of swing voters, 21% of total population),those who are amenable to social and political influence (23% of swingvoters, 9% of total population), those who will look almost exclusively intothe citizenship provisions of the plan (13% of swing voters, 5% of the totalpopulation), but additionally those who are driven by trust-related issuesand will make their decision on the basis of whether they perceive theGreek Cypriots to be a credible, trustworthy and safe partner (14% of swingvoters, 6% of total population) (see Figure 16).


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Figure 15. Cluster analysis of voter profiles in a future referendum(Greek Cypriots)

CommittedNo

Voters,25%

'Overall Plan'

SensitiveSwing

Voters,24%Security

Sensitive

SwingVoters,22%

SwingVoters

amenabletosocial

andpolitical

influence,10%

CommittedYes

Voters,19%

Figure 16. Cluster analysis of voter profiles in a future referendum(Turkish Cypriots)

CommittedNo

Voters,29%

'OverallPlan'

SensitiveSwing

Voters,21%

Citizenship

SensitiveSwing

Voters,5%

TrustSensitive

SwingVoters,6%

SwingVoters

amenabletosocial

andpolitical

influence,9%

CommittedYes

Voters

30%


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The results for swing voter preferences analysed alongside the resultsregarding the priorities of the two communities as a whole (see Figure 3above) lead us to conclude that security is the number one concern for both

communities, while property and governance are also important concernsfor both communities, each of these dossiers influencing more than 35% ofswing voters within each community; territory is of prime concern to theGreek Cypriots, while the economy is of prime concern to the TurkishCypriots. Citizenship is a prime concern of Greek Cypriots as a whole, andyet it is the sole issue on which a substantial minority group within theTurkish Cypriot community will vote. It is to the vexatious issues withinthese dossiers that we now turn.

4. Security: Guarantees, Rights of Intervention andPeacekeeping

Our poll data revealed security to be a prime issue of concern for bothcommunities. To date, beyond general statements made by the twoleaderships, with the Greek Cypriot side insisting on the abolition of theTreaty of Guarantee and the Turkish Cypriots adamant on its continuation,the security dossier has not been tackled in direct negotiations. Yet turningto the people and delving into the details of the security provisions of a

future agreement, we found scope for convergence, particularly on lessconventional options lying beyond the traditional positions to which theleaderships have been anchored over the decades.

Beginning with the thorniest issue guarantees we predictablyfound divergence on the question of whether there should be acontinuation of the Treaty of Guarantee as it currently stands, which GreekCypriots deem to be entirely unacceptable (69%). About half of GreekCypriots (48%) also strongly reject the continuation even of an amended

version of the existing Treaty of Guarantee, a finding that highlights thechallenges of attempting to solve the security dossier on the basis of theTreaties that accompanied the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960(Figure 17a). While the Turkish Cypriots are predictably more positive overthe prospect of a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, it is interesting tonote that their support for such a scheme is far from enthusiastic, with only47% of Turkish Cypriots finding the continuation of the Treaty ofGuarantee satisfactory or essential, 27% finding it merely tolerable and 26%


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finding it unacceptable.15 For Greek Cypriots, the ideal solution wouldsimply be to avoid any kind of treaty between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece,and just allow international law and the UN Charter to govern relations

between them (62% satisfactory to essential). This however is the worstoption for Turkish Cypriots, with 57% finding it unacceptable or merelytolerable, but interestingly, again, 43% finding it satisfactory. In addition,the specific option of not having any treaty whatsoever would also have tobe evaluated in the light of Turkeys security role on the island and thevalue attributed by Turkish Cypriots to Turkeys position on a future plan(see Figure 14), as well as the importance of the guarantee issue for theTurkish Cypriot leadership.16 In view of these realities, any proposal toentirely do away with any kind of Treaty super-structure would swiftly

lead to the conversion of this Turkish Cypriot public ambivalence over theno Treaty proposal into a strong rejection.

Of course, any settlement in Cyprus would require, at minimum, theadaptation of the existing Treaty of Guarantee to the new state of affairsthat would include, among other features, bizonality. The 2004 UNblueprint included additional protocols to amend the treaty so that itwould carry over mutatis mutandis. However, the proposal that the Treatyof Guarantee should be maintained but amended is not especially populareither (see Figures 17a and 17b). In particular, amending the 1960 Treaty ofGuarantee runs a risk of not overcoming Greek Cypriots negativeperceptions regarding the specific document, as evidenced in the currentpoll, so this is a public presentation challenge that the negotiators ought tokeep in mind.

15One could argue that the Turkish Cypriots are a divided society, with a fundamental

polarising issue being the relation of the Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. Seen from thispoint of view, those who answered to the above question that they support thecontinuation of the Treaty of Guarantee about half may be seen as the segment ofthe population wishing to see Turkey remain on the island and are aligned to Ankarawithout hesitation; those who merely tolerate the Treaty of Guarantee about onequarter as well as those who reject it, may represent an ambiguity regarding the roleof Turkey in Cyprus as well as on sources of security.

16The Turkish Cypriot leadership has repeatedly affirmed the need for a continuationof effective guarantees that would not simply remain on paper. See Foreign MinisterAvci criticizes Christofias, 13 October 2008, TRNC Foreign Ministry website.


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Figure 17a. One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the security and guarain which unified Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implewill happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how acceptable or unaccepof the following overall frameworks? (Greek Cypriots)

69%

48%

29% 25%

19% 19% 19%

0% 20% 40% 60

TheTreatyofGuaranteeof1960 betweenCyprus,Greece,Turkey

andtheUnitedKingdom willcontinuetoapplywithoutany

changes,aspartoftheComprehensiveSettlementagreement.


andtheUnitedKingdom willcontinuetoapplybutcertain

amendmentswillbemadetoitinresponsetospecificconcerns

expressedbyoneortheothercommunity.

AnewTreatywillbesignedbetweenunifiedCyprus,Turkeyand

Greece,thatwillclarifyeachsidesresponsibilityregardingthe

implementationoftheagreement,inaspiritofequalitybetween

thesignatory

states.

TherewillbenoTreatyspecificallygoverningtherelationsbetween

unifiedCyprus,TurkeyandGreece.Instead,thethreestateswillbe

expectedtoactincompliancewithinternationallawassetoutinthe

UNCharterandotherinternationalagreements.

EntirelyUnacceptable Tolerableifnecessary Satisfactoryonthewhole Highlydesirable Absol


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AP

Figure 17b. One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the security and guarain which unified Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implewill happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how acceptable or unaccepof the following overall frameworks? (Turkish Cypriots)

29% 28%

25% 33%

26% 27%

19% 26% 25

0% 20% 40% 60

TherewillbenoTreatyspecificallygoverningtherelationsbetween

unifiedCyprus,TurkeyandGreece.Instead,thethreestateswillbe

expectedtoactincompliance withinternationallawassetoutinthe

UNCharterandotherinternationalagreements.


andtheUnitedKingdom willcontinue toapplybutcertain

amendmentswillbemadetoitinresponsetospecificconcerns

expressedbyoneortheothercommunity.


andtheUnitedKingdom willcontinuetoapplywithoutany

changes,as

part

of

the

Comprehensive

Settlement

agreement.

AnewTreatywillbesignedbetweenunifiedCyprus,Turkeyand

Greece,thatwillclarifyeachsidesresponsibilityregardingthe

implementation oftheagreement,inaspiritofequalitybetween

thesignatorystates.

EntirelyUnacceptable Tolerableifnecessary Satisfactoryonthewhole Highlydesirable Absolu


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Another possibility that may win the support or at least the toleranceof significant majorities in both communities, would be a new treaty signedby a post-settlement Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, in a spirit of equality

between the signatory states that would clarify all the signatoriesresponsibilities regarding the implementation of an agreement. Dependingon its design, this may or may not be significantly different from anamended Treaty of Guarantee. Particular provisions will be elaborated onbelow. The primary advantage of this option is that it is more likely tomotivate Greek Cypriots to ratify a settlement in a referendum while notnecessarily being ruled out by the Turkish Cypriot voters.

This proposal actually ranks first for Turkish Cypriots (55%satisfactory, 26% tolerable, 19% unacceptable), marginally over the

proposal for a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee that was discussedabove. Of course the level of acceptability of such a proposal wouldultimately depend on the specific terms of a new treaty and whether itindeed responds credibly and effectively to Turkish Cypriot security needs.The reasons for the relative popularity of this proposal among TurkishCypriots would require subsequent investigation but may be related to, onthe one hand the emphasis on the implementation of the settlement, anissue over which the Turkish Cypriots are very sensitive, and on the otherhand to the emphasis on the equality between the signatory states. For theGreek Cypriots, this proposal ranks second after the no Treaty proposal(46% satisfactory to essential, 25% tolerable, 29% unacceptable), but it isstill acceptable enough to form a framework for the resolution of thesecurity aspect of the Cyprus conflict. Again, as in the case of the TurkishCypriots, the ultimate acceptability of such a proposal would depend onthe specific terms of the treaty and the extent to which it responds to theirsecurity concerns.

In this context, and irrespective of the label and symbolism with

which the treaty superstructure is imbued, what specific treaty provisionswould be effective in convincing both communities that their securityneeds have been met? The first and primary question regards rights ofintervention and in particular under which conditions and through whichprocedures external actors would be called upon to intervene.

Unsurprisingly, Greek Cypriots reject unilateral rights of interventionwithout prior consensus between the signatories (76% viewing this asentirely unacceptable), and about half of Turkish Cypriots reject both theexclusion of military means of intervention as well as abolishing rights of


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intervention altogether (47% viewing both options as entirely unacceptable)(see Figures 18a and 18b). By contrast, we found a measure of convergencebetween the communities on several options.

One option for a new or revised treaty is to introduce the EU or UNas guarantors of implementation of any agreement. This is generallypopular with Greek Cypriots who strongly favour this (see Figure 19a). Tolesser degrees, Greek Cypriots are also open to consensual mechanisms thatare designed to resolve implementation-related challenges, subsequentlyleading to a UN role in mediating outcomes.

Turkish Cypriots are also cautiously open to this consensual option,though we note significant resistance to giving the UN Security Council arole in implementation under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (see Figure 19b).These findings taken together suggest that a further exploration ofconsensual models, which capitalise on the initial willingness of the twocommunities to work for consensus on implementation-related challenges,might be worth pursuing in research and in the negotiations. The keychallenge in this respect would be to devise a mechanism wherebydecisions on action in cases of an implementationrelated crisis would bemade with the consensus of unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, while alsoconsidering channels, viewed as credible by all sides, to effectively resolve

deadlocks in cases where consensus between the parties proves elusive.While some type of consensus model is met with initial interest by

the Turkish Cypriots, of all the offered options, Turkish Cypriots are mostat ease with the clarification of a set of guidelines that establishesappropriate responses and responsibilities to implementation problemsthat may arise. In this spirit, intervention by Greece and Turkey, as well asby the UN and the EU (the latter intervening exclusively within the realmof its competences through the suspension of EU benefits and voting rights)could be mandated in relation to specific non-implementation scenarios,

assigning to each scenario the appropriate response and responsibility byeach actor (see Figures 19a and 19b).


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Figure 18a. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mimplementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable woulof each of the following elements? (Greek Cypriots - responses to 'intervention rights

76%

27% 17% 20%

11% 6% 13% 19%

4 4 10% 26%

0% 20% 40% 60

ItshouldbereaffirmedthattherightofinterventionofGreece

orTurkeycanstillbeexercisedunilaterallybyoneortheother,in

caseagreementbetweenthemprovesimpossible.

Itshouldbemadeclearthatbeforeanymilitaryinterventioncan

takeplace

by

Greece

or

Turkey,

permission

will

need

to

be

grantedbytheUNSecurityCouncil.

ItshouldbemadeclearthattherightofinterventionbyGreece

orTurkeyexcludesthepossibilityofmilitaryintervention.

RightsofinterventionbyGreeceorTurkeyshouldbeabolished

altogetheronthebasisthatunifiedCyprusisgoingtobea

sovereigncountrythatiscapableoftakingcareofitsownaffairs.

EntirelyUnacceptable Tolerableifnecessary Satisfactoryonthewhole Highlydesirable A


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AP

Figure 18b. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mimplementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable woulof each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots - responses to 'intervention righ

47% 16%

47% 17%

34% 18% 2

30% 25%

0% 20% 40% 60

RightsofinterventionbyGreeceorTurkeyshouldbeabolished

altogetheronthebasisthatunifiedCyprusisgoingtobea

sovereigncountrythatiscapableoftakingcareofitsownaffairs.

ItshouldbemadeclearthattherightofinterventionbyGreece

orTurkey

excludes

the

possibility

of

military

intervention.

Itshouldbemadeclearthatbeforeanymilitaryinterventioncan

takeplacebyGreeceorTurkey,permissionwillneedtobe

grantedbytheUNSecurityCouncil.

ItshouldbereaffirmedthattherightofinterventionofGreece

orTurkeycanstillbeexercisedunilaterallybyoneortheother,in

caseagreementbetweenthemprovesimpossible.

EntirelyUnacceptable Tolerableifnecessary Satisfactoryonthewhole Highlydesirable A


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AP

Figure 19b. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mimplementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable woulof each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots - responses to implementation g

36% 23%

28% 19% 27

25% 27%

12% 21% 24%

0% 20% 40% 60%

WhatevertreatyisagreedshouldberatifiedbyaUNSecurityCouncil

ResolutionunderChapter7oftheUNCharter,whichmeansthatin

caseofnonimplementationtheUNwouldhavetherighttoforcefully

intervenetorestoretheagreedstateofaffairs.

TheEU

should

set

for

all

the

sides

motives

for

implementation

and

penaltiesfornonimplementation,relatedtoEUbenefitsand

participationinEUdecisionmaking.

AconsensualmechanismshouldbedevisedsothatTurkey,Greece

andunifiedCypruscanresolveallimplementationrelatedchallenges

thatmayarise;andincaseconsensus provesimpossiblethentheUN

willdecideonwhatcourseofactionmustbetaken.

Asetofguidelinesshouldbeagreedinadvancebyallthesides,

clarifyingtheappropriateresponseandresponsibilityforeach

implementationrelatedchallengethatmayinthefuturearise.

EntirelyUnacceptable Tolerableifnecessary Satisfactoryonthewhole Highlydesirable


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The issue thus becomes:what kind of non-implementation challenge,i.e., what kind of threat scenario, would warrant what kind of response andby whom? When asked about likely threat scenarios, both communities

remain anchored in memories and fears of the past: Greek Cypriots aremost concerned about issues relating to Turkeys compliance, above all thewithdrawal of troops (77%), the agreed repatriation of settlers (77%) andthe abuse of guarantor rights (68%), as well as internal Cypriot issues suchas Turkish Cypriot return of agreed properties (71%) and problems anddeadlocks in governance (58%). Turkish Cypriots are concerned aboutGreek Cypriot usurpation of their collective rights, fearing most thedeadlocks in governance (78%) that might lead to Greek Cypriots evictingor rendering politically ineffective Turkish Cypriots at the federal level

(58%) (Figure 20).As far as appropriate responses to these threat scenarios by external

guarantors are concerned, Greek Cypriots reject any kind of militaryintervention by Greece and Turkey, preferring instead a mix of EUsanctions and UN peacekeeping for the different non-implementationchallenges. Turkish Cypriots instead prefer military intervention byguarantor actors in cases of attempted military control over all of Cyprus(interestingly both by Greece/Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriotconstituent state and vice versa) and attempted secession. The most likelyreading of the latter result is that military intervention may have beeninterpreted as Turkey acting in support of the Turkish Cypriot sideattempting secession because they find themselves under attack oroppression by Greek Cypriots or Greece. Note further that among TurkishCypriots the lowest response to support for military intervention is 17%,which can be interpreted as the baseline resistance to any kind ofabrogation of Turkeys intervention rights among a segment of TurkishCypriot society. Another interesting finding, pointing to a certain mirror

situation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, is that whereasGreek Cypriots have a distinctly higher threat perception when it comes toissues pertaining to Turkeys compliance, they tend to reject Greek militaryresponses to these, thus showing that they either reject the principle ofmilitary intervention per se, or alternatively that they reject Greece as acredible provider of military security against Turkey. By contrast whereasTurkish Cypriots are far more willing to accept Turkish military responsesunder particular scenarios, for those threat scenarios they are mostconcerned about Greek Cypriot usurpation of their collective rights they

would prefer to see either EU sanctions or a mix of Turkish intervention,


51/128


52/128


Figure 20. The possibility of challenges and difficulties after a solution is agreed is often discusseeach community. Regarding this matter, which of these post-solution scenarios do yo

materialise in the future? (up to five responses)

28%

46%

68% 71%

9% 11%

40% 42%

5%

9%

14%

58%

30%

48%

57%

78%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

GreekCypriots

withGreece

attackand

attempttotake

overtheTurkish

Cypriot

constituentstate

sothattheywill

controlallof

Cyprus

Greeceabuses

herguarantor

status,to

interfereinthe

internalaffairsof

Cyprus

TheGreek

Cypriotsevictor

renderpolitically

ineffectivethe

TurkishCypriots

atFederal

Governmentlevel

andtakeoverfor

themselvesall

thedecision

makingauthority

TurkishCypriots

withTurkey

attackand

attempttotake

overtheGreek

Cypriot

constituentstate

sothattheywill

controlall of

Cyprus

TurkishCypriots

withTurkeyuse

whatever

elementsof

separationarein

theagreementin

ordertosecede

fromthe

Federationand

achievea

separate

independent

statein

the

north

Problems and

deadlocksoccur

inthedecision

makingofthe

Federal

Government

leadingto

inadequate

governance

Turkeyabuses

herguarantor

status,to

interfereinthe

internalaffairs of

Cyprus

TheTurkis

Cypriotsw

Turkeyrefus

returnprope

andterritor

which,itw

agreed,b

returnedtot

originalown

inthecontex

thesettlem

Gre


53/128

AP

Figure 21a. For each of these threat scenarios, what type of external intervention aimed at restoriwilling to consider? (Greek Cypriots)

3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3%

9%

51% 51% 53%

57%

50%

42%41%

49%

39%

45%45%

49%

46%42%

54%

49%

51% 53%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Problemsand

deadlocks

occurinthe

decision

makingofthe

federal

government

leadingto

inadequate

governance

TheGreek

Cypriotsevict

orrender

politically

ineffectivethe

Turkish

Cypriotsat

federal

government

levelandtake

overfor

themselvesall

thedecision

making

authority

TheTurkish

Cypriotswith

Turkeyrefuse

toreturn

propertiesand

territories

whichitwas

agreedto

returntotheir

originalowners

inthecontext

ofthe

settlement

Turkeydoes

notwithdraw

hertroopsfrom

Cyprusin

accordance

withtheagreed

timetable

Turkeyabuses

herguarantor

status,to

interfereinthe

internal affairs

ofCyprus

Greeceabuses

herguarantor

status,to

interfereinthe

internal affairs

ofCyprus

Thepeople

fromTurkey

(Settlers)that

itwasagreed

shouldleave

aftera

Settlement,do

notdepartas

planned

GreekCypriots

withGreece

attackand

attempttotake

overthe

TurkishCypriot

constituent

statesothat

theywill

controlallof

Cyprus

Turkish

Cypriotswith

Turkeyattack

andattemptto

takeoverthe

GreekCypriot

constituent

statesothat

theywill

controlallof

Cyprus


54/128


Figure 21b. For each of the following threat scenarios, what type of external intervention aimed abe willing to consider? (Turkish Cypriots)

22%21%

25%

17%

35% 35%

30%31%

27%

35%

24%

28%

21%

35%

32%

24%

19%

21%

18%

28%

20%

24% 25% 26%

21%

24% 22%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Problemsand

deadlocks

occurinthe

decision

makingofthe

federal

government

leadingto

inadequate

governance

TheGreek

Cypriotsevict

orrender

politically

ineffectivethe

Turkish

Cypriotsat

federal

government

levelandtake

overfor

themselvesall

thedecision

making

authority

TheTurkish

Cypriotswith

Turkeyrefuse

toreturn

propertiesand

territories

whichitwas

agreedto

returntotheir

originalowners

inthecontext

ofthe

settlement

Turkeydoes

notwithdraw

hertroops

fromCyprusin

accordance

withthe

agreed

timetable

Turkeyabuses

herguarantor

status,to

interfereinthe

internalaffairs

ofCyprus

Greeceabuses

herguarantor

status,to

interfereinthe

internalaffairs

ofCyprus

Thepeople

fromTurkey

(Settlers)that

itwasagreed

shouldleave

aftera

Settlement,do

notdepartas

planned

GreekCypriots

withGreece

attackand

attemptto

takeoverthe

TurkishCypriot

constituent

statesothat

theywill

controlallof

Cyprus

Turkish

Cypriotsw

Turkeyatta

andattemp

takeovert

GreekCypr

constituen

statesoth

theywil

controlall

Cyprus


55/128


Initial convergence seems instead to be possible on the creation of aunified bicommunal force (68% of the Turkish Cypriots and 82% of theGreek Cypriots), confirming the results of our first survey, which found

that 72% of the Greek Cypriots and 67% of the Turkish Cypriots favouredthe creation of such a force. Both communities also concur that such a forcecould participate in UN missions abroad (68% of the Turkish Cypriots and78% of the Greek Cypriots) and ESDP missions together with Greece andTurkey (75% of the Turkish Cypriots and 63% of the Greek Cypriots).17Important issues to research further in future public opinion polls but alsoto clarify on an expert level in relation to the creation of such a unifiedbicommunal security force include, the precise mandate of such a force, thechain of command leading up to the federal level, whether non-Cypriots

would be included in the force and at which levels, etc. In addition to abicommunal force, both sides also would find satisfactory or at the veryleast tolerate a new UNFICYP mandate to oversee the implementation ofthe agreement (72% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% of the Greek Cypriots)(see Figures 22a, 22b, 23a, 23b).

17 It should be noted in this regard that in the 1960 Agreements a provision wasincluded for the establishment of a Cyprus army, which however was neverimplemented due to disagreements over specific issues that had to do with thedisbanding of the militias and the establishment of the new army. If a proposal tocreate a unified bicommunal security force is now taken up in the context of a newfederal Cyprus, the relevant events of the 1960s should be read as a case study ofpitfalls to avoid when attempting to proceed to a new security order. Along with theissue of the disbanding and/or withdrawal of existing troops, the creation of any newsecurity force would definitely have to be supervised very closely through whateverimplementation mechanism is established.


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Figure 22a. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensiwould you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (

for Cypriot, Turkish and Greek troops)

90%

87%

65%

61%

37% 29%

22% 34%

18% 26% 25

0% 20% 40% 6

ATurkishmilitarybasesomewhereinthenorthernpartofCyprus,whichwill

begiventoTurkeyinreturnforthecancellationofthe1960Treatiesof

Guaranteeand

a people’s peace in cyprus - testing public opinion on the options for a comprehensive settlement

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