a rejection of species-wide perspectivalism

8/6/2019 A Rejection of Species-Wide Perspectivalism

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B. Bridson 1

A Rejection of Species-wide Perspectivalism

In his essay Panmorphism Povinelli tries to provide an argument which

demonstrates that anthropomorphism, the human tendency to understand all possibleminds the way we understand our own, while inevitable, need not be as crippling as we

may prima facie believe. In this essay he argues that other species, if they too haveawareness of their own mental environments, will understand their own minds and theminds of others in a manner that is analogous to anthropomorphism. The presuppositions

that are necessary for Povinellis argument is that individual humans share in a species-

wide perspective, and that we are not only able to attribute mental states to other humans,

but can do the same with other species. To this way of thinking I am adamantly opposed.I am so opposed to this belief because it seems to contradict experience.

What I will argue in this paper is that because we are necessarily individuals,

beings with unique experiences, we likewise necessarily possess unique perspectives ofthe world, and that while they may be similar they are incapable of being reduced to

equivalency. Because we each possess a perspective shaped uniquely, our perspectives

and thus our understanding of the world, as well as the content of our thoughts and theirmeanings, will likewise be irreducible to equivalency. If this is the case and we are

confined to our own perspectives, then we are ipso facto unable to acquire or adopt any

other beings perspective, human and non-humans alike. We can come to know other

humans and non-humans by experiencing them in our lives, but how we understand themwill be determined by our own perspectives. What any two people mean about anything

will be coloured differently because of their different perspectives; our perspectives

create uncrossable chasms between us, distanced infinitely by difference despitesimilarity. In this paper I will argue that anthropomorphism and other such species-wide

perspectives like panmorphism are impossible because individuals are incapable ofescaping their own perspectives, let alone being capable of adopting species-wide

perspectives. Thus, I will argue that Povinelli cannot reasonably hold the position he

purports in his essay. In order to demonstrate this, I will first provide the reader with anaccount of Povinellis argument in Panmorphism. Secondly, I will provide an argument

for my own position regarding perspective-taking. Thirdly, I will use my own argument

to demonstrate why Povinellis argument does not hold water. And finally, I shallconsider a number of arguments contra my view and do my best to demonstrate the

strength of my argument.

I

In his essay Panmorphism, Povinelli tries to argue that our anthropomorphic

tendencies need not be as crippling as we might think. In fact, what Povinelli argues isthat these anthropomorphic tendencies might allow us to understand how members of

another species may conceptualize the world and other minds around them. Povinelli is

an evolutionary biologist, and so we will find that his argument is based largely upontenets of this theoretical approach, viz. that humans and other primates like chimpanzees

are descendents of a common genetic ancestor, and as such, we have good reason to

believe that we share a number of traits, including mental faculties. Thus, that certain


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other species share similar faculties as humans is something that we have to allow whentrying to understand Povinellis essay.

Povinelli begins with a rhetorical question of sorts, Who doesnt confidently

presume the shorthand of announcing that squirrels know where they have hidden theiracorns? 1 He argues that whenever we try to account for the actions of another organism

we do so anthropomorphically; that is, assuming that there are mental states similar to ourown in other organisms and trying to understand these mental states the way weunderstand our own. To further demonstrate that we always engage in anthropomorphic

ways of understanding other entities in the world, Povinelli asks us to consider a robot in

a park looking for a little girl. What we will do he thinks, when we see a robot moving

around a park and dodging obstacles in its way, is to try and understand what it is doingin the same ways that we tried to account for the actions of the squirrel earlier. We will

ask, What is it doing? What is it looking for? What does it want? etc. This entails

making reference to mental states such as intention, desire and knowledge, despite ourbelieving that we have little reason to think that there are mental happenings going on.

That we do this is not questionable. What is questionable, he writes, is to what degree

each of us is anthropomorphic.

2

Then, as the evolutionary biologist, he argues that mental state attribution, which

requires knowledge of the mental environment and mental happenings, is the product of

evolution.3 What is problematic, he states, is that most of the research that has been

conducted historically to determine whether or not there are differences in the mentalabilities of humans and non-humans, specifically primates, have demonstrated that there

are relatively few differences.4 He argues that this is the result of inadequate research;

we have been testing for attributes that are not sufficiently specific or unique. Anexample he provides is the testing for associative learning. We should not consider this

uniquely human, as most organisms that exist in a causal system will become quiteaccustomed to the relationship of cause and effect, though they may never develop

advanced cognitive states or abilities.5 What we need to do, he argues, is conduct

observational and experimental projects in which we test for attributes that we believe aresufficiently rare, such as mental state attribution.6

He writes, research suggests that at some point in the past 25 million years or

so, the capacity to conceive of intentions and desires evolved within the primate order,resulting in a detectable pattern of psychological diversity in extant representatives of the

clade in question.7 Thus he believe that we can limit our research to the members of the

species which we believe are part of this evolutionarily distinct group, and within this

group test for the ability to perform mental state attributions. If we find that there areorganisms that we can demonstrate have mental happenings and are able to make mental

state attributions, then we must accept that because they are not human, what they do is

1 Povinelli. Panmorphism. p. 922 Povinelli. p. 933

Povinelli. p. 93-94. Also see above.4 Povinelli. p. 955 Povinelli. p. 956 Povinelli. p. 967 Povinelli. p. 96


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not the equivalent of anthropomorphizing, but is analogous to it.8

In the case ofchimpanzees, or Pan troglodytes, they would be panmorphic.

9

Povinelli argues that this tendency to anthropomorphize is inevitable, and that

instead of repeatedly debating whether or not it clouds our judgment, produces poorscience, or is a valuable heuristic tool, we should realize that attempts to understand

Panmorphism, for example, will ultimately inform us as to the accuracy of our inevitableanthropomorphic outlook on the world.10

Povinelli argues that our anthropomorph-izations do not prohibit us from knowing how other species conceptualize the world, nor

does it prohibit us from knowing how they conceptualize both their own mental states

and the mental states of others. With this new knowledge in hand, we will be able to

study both worldviews, make note of any similarities and differences we find, andperhaps, come to better understand the reality we are in. Therefore we should not, he

thinks, consider our tendency to be anthropomorphic to be something which prohibits us

from getting to know what really comprises reality, as he believes he has found a wayaround this shortcoming.

II

Having provided a brief account of Povinellis argument, I would now like to shift

the focus of this paper and present my argument regarding perspectivalism. It is my

intention to argue that we have each an individual, unique perspective of the world andare unable to share a perspective with any other person, let alone an entire species.

Following my own argument I will return my attention to Povinellis essay and by means

of contrasting our arguments demonstrate why it is that his position is simply not areasonable one to hold. My argument contra species-wide perspectivalism will take the

following form:

1) Individuals experience life uniquely.2) Individual experience develops a unique perspective for each individual.3) Perspective provides the foundation for all our interpretations.4) The perspectives of individuals can never be identical.5) Perspectival differences at the level of the individual disallow a shared

perspective at the level of species.

C) Therefore there can be no species-wide perspectives.

As such I will show that anthropomorphism and species-wide perspectives do not reflect

reality and that we should as such regard them as false.My first point is that individuals experience life uniquely or in their own personal

manner. This is not to say that individuals do not share similar experiences, becausemost individuals do undergo similar experiences. However, that two or more things are

similar does not mean that they are equal. In the case of similar experiences, theexperiences are different because the individuals doing the experiencing are different. It

is impossible for two objects (or individuals) to occupy the same space at the same time.

8 Povinelli. p. 999 Povinelli. p. 10010 Povinelli. p. 100. He suggests this can be accomplished by means of using Venn Diagrams.


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Because of this reality, individuals cannot possibly experience any given situation inprecisely the same manner. Because it is impossible for any two things, people or

otherwise, to experience any event in the same way, we must admit that despite how

similar any experience may be for the individuals involved, each of their experiences arenecessarily unique, in that no one experience is identical to any other. Thus, individuals

experience life uniquely.If individuals experience life uniquely, then individual experience develops aunique perspective for each individual. Because individual experience is unique, how

each individual is affected by the experience will likewise be unique; not only in how the

experience affects them externally, but also how each individual will reflect upon the

experience and thus how that person conceives of themselves and how they experiencesthe world and others around them. The experience affects each individual both

physically and mentally in different ways. As such, over time each individual will

develop their own perspective of the world, and because their perspective is shaped bytheir unique experiences in the world, their perspectives will also be unique. As I

cautioned above, it would be foolish to deny that perspectives can in some instances be

similar, but to claim that this similarity makes them identical is inane.My third point follows from the first and second: because individuals endure

unique experiences and that through these experiences individuals develop unique

perspectives, these same individuals must likewise have unique interpretations of the

world, as how we interpret and understand the world is determined by how we interactwith and are influenced by the world. Thus, because the perspectives of individuals are

unique, the meaning each associates with the world, including the individual in question

will also necessarily be unique. Every meaning an individual creates is a product of theirperspective and because perspective is based upon individual, unique experiences, both

perspective and meaning are necessarily unique. Individuals then are necessarily a-perspectival or self-morphic

With this reality in mind, let us focus turn now to the concept of anthropomorph-

ization or species-wide perspectives. If each individual possess their own perspectivewhich is no way identical to any other perspective, then it seems to be quite foolish to

discuss species-wide perspectives. Of course two or more people can share similar

opinions or bestow similar meanings upon phenomena, even extremely similar opinionsor meanings, but we cannot say that their meanings or opinions are identical. To do so

would be to posit that they share an identical perspective, because perspective determines

meaning, and as I argued above, this would necessitate physical impossibilities, viz. two

or more people occupying the same space simultaneously and being influenced bothinternally and externally in precisely the same (identical) way. As such we must, in the

interest of honesty, abandon the discussion of species-wide perspectives which claims

that species x has this perspective. Formulas such as this do make things seemsuperlatively simple, but life is not so simple. By prohibiting discussion of

anthropomorphisms and the like on epistemic grounds, we are able to avoid much of the

problems that arise in discussion of minds in other species, specifically regarding how itis that we should be trying to understand these minds.

Having thus argued against the possibility of there being any instance of species-

wide perspectives, and favouring instead individual perspectivalism or a-perspectivalism,


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I would like to return to Povinellis essay and evaluate his argument in light of what Ihave argued above.

IIIMy first response to Povinelli would be that we do not engage in anthropomorph-

izations because we cannot engage in this type of perspective taking. In the case ofhumans, we understand that everyone has a different understanding of what it means toknow something, both in terms of what it means to know something and who is capable

of knowing anything. As such, to make use of Povinellis example of the squirrel, there

would be some people who would claim that the squirrel knows where it left its acorn,

just as there would be some people who would argue that it does not know where it leftits acorn (perhaps it is sniffing or digging for acorns, or perhaps what it is doing is in no

way associated with acorns or food in general), just as there would be some people who

argue that we cannot claim to know what kinds of mental events, if any are going on inthe squirrels head. How people choose to describe the squirrel in this situation will vary,

just as their reasons for describing the behaviour in a particular way will. Clearly then,

there is no blanket way for describing how people interpret behaviour of animals (I wouldbe as bold as to argue the same regarding human behaviour). We are all bound to

develop different interpretations of the same event, or in the event that we come to the

same conclusion are bound to reason about that conclusion differently, and this because

we do not share a common perspective.The same holds true for animals: if they are capable of having complex mental

states, such that they can have perspectives of and interpret the world (which is still

inconclusive), they will not have a species-wide perspective (assuming of course thatthey are individuals and not a species like the Borg in Star Trek). They, like us, would

have their own perspectives and interpret and understand the world in light of thisperspective. I do not see why we should make an exception in the case of animals if we

are assuming that they are capable of complex mental faculties like we are. Thus, just as

I denied species-wide perspective holding above and barred discussion ofanthropomorphisms, so I too here bar discussion of panmorphisms or anything of the sort

whereby the species we are talking of is believed to be comprised of individuals.

Another concern I have regarding Povinellis essay is his cross-speciescomparative perspectival analysis. Why is it he believes that we would be capable of

doing this escapes me. Povinelli himself admits that we cannot prove, at the moment at

least, what mental events are occurring in the heads of other species. But even if we

could hypothetically know what mental states were occurring say in the head of achimpanzee, this would only be part of the problem. We would also have to know what

these mental states mean. But to know what these mental states mean would require

having the perspective of the chimpanzee in question so that we would be able to makesense of what all these mental states mean. But this is precisely what we cannot do; we

cannot know what it is like for a chimpanzee to be a chimpanzee, just as Nagel argued

that we cannot what it is like for a bat to be a bat, all we can do is imagine what it wouldbe like for us to be a bat, which is far from being equivalent. 11 Thus, just as we must

abandon the concept of species-wide perspectives, so too must we abandon trying to

11 See Nagel What Is It Like to Be a Bat?


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know what it is like for the chimp to be a chimp in hopes that understanding thisperspective will enable us to come to better terms with what reality really is.

There are of course other issues in Povinellis essay that I could spend a good deal

of time discussing, such as theory of mind, but this extends beyond the purpose of thispaper. What I have sought to do is demonstrate why discussing anthropomorphism like

Povinelli and others do is so problematic and to give us reason for searching foralternatives to this method. Having done this I would like to now consider a number ofpossible criticisms regarding what I have argued thus far.

IV

One criticism I have received from Kristin Andrews is that my argument

regarding perspective, specifically how I have gone about arguing it in an earlier draft is

circular. Despite disagreeing with Andrews on this point, I have sought to clarify myposition in this draft so that the same criticism could not be justly made a second time. I

have clearly laid out my argument in the premise, premise, conclusion format. All I can

do is hope that I have not to my unbeknownst here begged the question a second time.Another concern may be that I am being far to stringent when it comes to

discussing species-wide perspectivalism, and that it would be much more pragmatic to

discuss perspective-holding at the species level due to such frequent similarities. This

concern itself arises from a difference in epistemic standards, between those who valuepragmatism highly and believe that truths should be pragmatically constructed. I am

afraid that I am unable to empathize with this position. The last I checked philosophy

was supposed to be the pursuit of knowledge or wisdom by those who are themselveslovers of wisdom. And thus to suggest that in philosophical discourse we should

substitute honesty with what seems to us to fit how we feel about a situation or what wewant to believe is repugnant and evidence of very low epistemic standards. If we are not

willing to be as honest as we possibly can be, then I ask what we are in pursuit of. Thus,

I respond by declaring that the concern has no place here, amongst those of us who areconcerned in discussing things honestly.

Similar to the previous critique, someone may argue that I am plainly wrong

regarding perspectivalism and that we can honestly speak of species-wideperspectivalism. What would be needed to make this argument live is to demonstrate that

I am wrong in arguing that individual experience develops a unique perspective for each

individual, which in turn necessitates unique interpretations of reality. And to do so they

must argue in such a way that their premise is not that similar is equal; they must respectthe differences that each of us faces because of our unique perspectives.

One question that a colleague asked me was where our perspectives come from

and if we are capable of having the same perspective at different times. The first part ofthe question I have already addressed: our perspectives are made possible because we

have experiences in the world; a new-born would presumably have no perspective

because it has had no experiences that would furnish it with one. As we have experienceswe develop perspective and we would have to admit that had any of our experiences been

different, our perspective would necessarily be different also. Also, after a certain

amount of time has elapsed we will have new experiences which in turn provide us with anew perspective of the world: perspective is not static! As such, perspective cannot be


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the same, if by the same we mean identical, at different times; they can certainly besimilar, but not identical.

Another question asked by the same colleague is, Where does this leave us in the

bigger picture? His worry is that my view treats us, that is, humans as lackingsignificance. I would have to ask what he means by significance. If he is speaking in

terms of the currency of our perspectives, then I would have to respond to his worry bysaying that no, in the big picture, our perspectives are not insignificant. Our perspectivesare not special though either. As humans we have certain perspectives, but there are

perhaps an infinite number of other perspectives within reality, which can be more or less

accurate than our own perspectives. It should really change very little in the end, because

those of us who are honest already admit that we are far from understanding everything;we do know, or seem to know some things, and we must be content with this. We are

unable to evaluate the perspectives of anything else and are thus unable to judge whether

our perspectives are very significant or not. We must be content knowing that we haveperspectives, and that because we are able to interpret and come to understand reality,

that are perspectives are important for us.

V

Over the course of this paper I have striven to demonstrate that we cannot

reasonably hold the belief that there are actually species-wide perspectives, and thus toargue that we must abandon the discussion of such spooky notions as anthropomorphism

in intelligent discussions. Honesty dictates that we employ some restraint, and thus

carefully evaluate our knowledge from the foundations up, modifying and throwing outwhat we need to on our way. This forces us to come to terms with how much of a

mystery life is and to not be afraid to admit how slow and difficult it is to move forwardon the path towards knowledge. The alternative to the species-wide perspectivalism I

have done my best to slay here is to simply begin respecting individuals as such and to

always employ caution. It means that we must respect not just that animals are not justlike us, but also that other humans are not just like us. It means we know less than we

thought we did, but it also means that we have learned something, and this is what serious

philosophical investigation is all about.


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Bibliography

Nagel, Thomas. What is it Like to be a Bat? In Philosophical Studies. Vol. 83 (4),

435-450.

Povinelli, Daniel J. Panmorphism. InAnthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and AnimalsEdited by Mitchell, Thompson, Miles. Albany, State University of New YorkPress: 1997.

a rejection of species-wide perspectivalism

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