a research paper on the professionalism in the royal solomon islands police force, and the ramsi...

Cameron Gruschow University of Canterbury 29 September 2016

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A Research Paper on the Professionalism in the Royal Solomon

Islands Police Force, and the RAMSI Rectification.

Although not seen at the same scale as interventions in Afghanistan and

Iraq, the Reginal Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was a

significant event in state building to many states in the Pacific region.

RAMSI consisted of a joint military, police, and government operation which

is primarily led by the Australian Government, but also featured contingents

from New Zealand, and other states within the Pacific. It has changed the

face of the Solomon Islands (SI), which was stuck with the potential for

ethnic violence on a large scale in 2003, to what appears to be relative

stability presently in 2016. This research paper will assess the

professionalism of the Royal SI Police Force (RSPIF), who act both as the

state’s police and defence force. Using the theories of Samuel Huntington,

and Rebecca Schiff, this paper will provide a conclusion that a lack of

professionalism was a key factor that led to the SI Government (SIG)

requesting a military intervention from Australia, and the creation of RAMSI.

This paper will also look at what military measures RAMSI has undertaken

to ensure the mission is a success, and to re-professionalise the RSPIF. A

number of primary and secondary sources will be used to help determine

the outcomes of these questions.


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Prior to the intervention of RAMSI, the SI defence sector was the

responsibility of the RSPIF Therefore, they held both the responsibilities for

civilian and territorial control. The key background events that led to

questions of the professionalism of the RSPIF, and the creation of RAMSI

were from 1998-2003. In 1998, an ethic conflict, known as “The Tensions”

begun on the island of Guadalcanal, which is home of the SI’ capital,

Honiara. It has been described as a “low-level” conflict, where local militias

begun to harass citizens who had settled there from the nearby island of

Malaita (Dinnen, 2014: 196). The main force was known as the Isatabu

Freedom Movement (IFM), who believed that Malaitan settlers on

Guadalcanal were socially advantaged at the expense of the local Guale

population (Dinnen, 2014: 202-203). At its peak, around 30,000-35,000

people, who were mainly Malaitian settlers were displaced from their rural

homes by force (Dinnen, 2008: 12). In response, militias that justified their

existence to protect the interests of Malaita Province emerged, the main

group known as the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF). This led to violence, and

saw the SIG stuck in the middle. They were seemingly unable to respond to

the unprecedented event where young men had organised themselves into

militia groups that claimed to represent the interests of either Guales or

Malaitians (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 300).

The SI has no recognised military force, so the RSPIF is tasked with its

defence. However, its lack of professionalism is possibly a cause to the SIG

seeking military intervention. The theories of Samuel Huntington and

Rebecca Schiff can be used. While both theories relate to factors behind

military coups, it can be used to determine the key factors for the SIG to

seek what would eventually be RAMSI’s intervention. Huntington (1957: 8-

10) argued that there were three criteria for a military to be considered as


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professional; expertise, corporateness, and responsibility to client. Firstly,

Huntington describes expertise as having “specialized knowledge and skill

in a significant field of human endeavour”. This is often achieved through

specialised education and training on military matters. Research appears to

show that this expertise was not present in the RSIPF at the time of The

Tension. On the facts, attempts had been made through the Townsville

Peace Agreement to reduce hostilities between the militias by appointing

Special Constables. Many of these people were in fact ex-militia men,

enlisted to work with the Police force (Fraenkel, 2008: 154). Based on this

information, it is highly unlikely that all of these members were trained to a

level of professionalism which would satisfy Huntington.

Secondly, there is a question as to whether the RSPIF showed a sufficient

amount of corporateness in their conduct. Huntington (1957: 10) claimed

that a “sense of organic unity” and the “sharing of a unique social

responsibility” were key aspects to achieving this concept. If there is

disunity, then the result will be a factionalised force, and potential clashing

of personalities. There are two aspects analysed which are of a concern in

meeting this concept. Firstly, the mass recruitment of special constables,

particularly those who had a militia background. To show lack of trust, the

United Nations decommissioned several hundred officers from a funded

programme (Hameiri, 2007: 431; Dinnen, 2014: 196). The RSPIF was

divided ethnically, which reflected the rival militias’ position. This would be

in correlation with a disproportionate amount of Malatians in the public

service, in particular the police.


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Thirdly, there needs to be a responsibility to the client. This is where a

service is performed that promotes the essential functioning of society

(Huntington, 1957: 9-10). The holder of this responsibility is also required to

have a monopoly of this responsibility. In this case, there are problems that

emerge, such as the raiding of police armouries. The RSPIF hold multiple

responsibilities to both the head of state, and society as a whole, as it acts

as both a police and defence force. While that can be managed, it is

problematic, when officers are supporting the militias which they were

supposed to have been eliminating. At a joint meeting between provincial

and political representatives in 2000, comments had made it clear that the

RSPIF was incapable of acting independently, and so recognising who their

client was (Scales, 2008: 227-228). This reached its peak when then Prime

Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu was forced to resign after certain entities in

the RSPIF backed a coup (Dinnen, 2002: 285-298).

While looking at Huntington’s military theory of professionalism can be

useful, it is too simplistic, and inconclusive. For example, Huntington

presumes that an unprofessional military may stage a coup d’état. He does

not consider the culture and context of a state, such as the SI. He also fails

to recognise that not all militaries that are unprofessional are capable of

staging a coup, they may just fail to provide adequate protection for the

government. Before RAMSI’s intervention, the SI had no detached military

force, it was the responsibility of the RSPIF. However, in this case

professionalism of the RSPIF in its role of defence can still be analysed.

Rebecca Schiff (1995: 12-16), provides a measure that can be used to

analyse the how the SI Government conducted itself in the lead-up to the

de-facto coup in 2002, and ultimately RAMSI intervention in 2003. Schiff

argues that in order to have a stable state, there needs to be concordance


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between the military (a role of the RSPIF), the state (the SIG), and society

(which includes those in the militias). This means that there are multiple

clients. All three bodies must agree on the social composition of the RSPIF

leadership, the political decision making process (recognition of who the

client is), agreement on a recruitment method, and military style.

The problem that Sinclair Dinnen (2014: 196) found was that the RSPIF

was so divided, that nothing could be done to maintain concordance

between them and the state. The anarchical behaviour of some of these

factions and the societal militias did not recognise the decision making

process, which is why Ulufa’alu was forced to resign. Total disaster was

however avoided, due to the Australian and New Zealand brokered

Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) between the rival militias in 2000. The

Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Phil Goff (2013: 2) felt that a

diplomatic approach similar to the Bougainville conflict in Papua New

Guinea was the best approach to take at the time. Here, a neutral venue

was provided, where the militias would be able to sort out their differences.

However, it did not address the underlying problems of professionalism,

and thus eliminate the serious risk of violence from occurring. The state

remained highly militarised, while ex-militants and rogue police officers

engaged in opportunistic violence throughout Guadalcanal, and Malaita

(Dinnen, 2014: 196).

If we look at the social composition of the RSPIF, we can see that it is

primarily dominated by those of Malatian ethnicity. While Schiff does not

require all ethnicities to be represented in the officer corps, in this case, a

Guadalcanal based militia threatening Malatian settlers on the island, the

likelihood of it causing division if the Government were unable to disperse

tensions quickly was high. Consequently, when they were ordered by the


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SIG to suppress the Guale militias as a means to restore order, which just

resulted in a further escalation of conflict because it was seen as a racial

crackdown (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 310). The RSPIF “was so compromised

by its links to former militants and criminal gangs that it was unable to keep

the peace” (Butler, 2008: 271). This analysis would suggest that a number

of Police officers joined, or cooperated with Malatian militias (Amnesty

International, 2000: 4-8). This would show a breach in the social

composition, but also breach the principle of responsibility according to

Huntington. For example, the paramilitary arm of the RSPIF had joined

forces with the MEF (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 300). At the very least, we can

conclude that the SIG failed to deal with the Tension appropriately.

The political decision making process was also compromised by the

Government at the time. Their inability of the government to put down the

Guale militiamen’s attempts to force Malitians off the island is likely due to

the great divides within the RSPIF. Society’s confidence in being protected

by the SIG and the RSPIF appeared to be at an all-time low. When RAMSI

did arrive, military personnel that disembarked off the HMAS Manoora were

warmly welcomed by the local population (Glenn, 2007: 23). Even after the

signing of the TPA and the appointment of new Prime Minister Manasseh

Sogavare, the SIG was incapable of implementing any of the provisions in

the Treaty. This was to the point where militias were organising their own

disarmament plans instead of that responsibility being given to an

independent body (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 311-312). When factions of militia

groups, such as Harold Keke, who refused to accept the terms of the TPA,

it required a swift response from the SIG, through the RSPIF. As they did

not have the capacity to do so, they failed. As a result, the decision making

process is not functional, and as a result, there can be no concordance.


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A key concept for there to be professionalism through Huntington’s or

Schiff’s theory is that a professional military must hold a monopoly on

advanced weaponry in the state. With the emergence of the militias, there

was serious concern that the SIG was not able to maintain this for the

RSPIF. When reports of militants holding automatic weapons emerge, it

places a high likelihood on the monopoly being broken (Scales, 2008: 229).

There were also reports that members of a faction from Bougainville

Revolutionary Army (an armed separatist group based in the semi-

autonomous Papua New Guinean of Bougainville) had landed in

Guadalcanal with weaponry, as they looked to repel the Malatan Eagle

Force (MEF) from the province (Scales, 2008: 229-230). This report would

suggest that there was a risk of a movement of weaponry from Bougainville

to Guadalcanal. Additionally, the fractured RSPIF was unwilling/unable to

prevent their armouries from being raided, again leaving the monopoly of

weapons broken. In some cases, there have been reports that in fact

factions of the RSPIF also took part in these raids with the MEF, “which

released modern small armaments into the conflict”, and further broke the

monopoly (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 300).

Even when the TPA was signed, the fact that it was former militias and not

the SIG organising their own disarmament shows that there was a heavy

reliance on the word of these former militants (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 311-

312). We can therefore conclude that there was minimal concordance

between all three sectors of the state. This played a key role in the removal

of Ulufa’alu from power (Amnesty International, 2000: 8-9), (Hameriri, 2007:

428), (Dinnen, 2013: 196). Although the TPA attempted to restore the

requirements for concordance, the SIG was incapable of governing

effectively, the RSPIF split, and as the institutional factors were not dealt


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with, until RAMSI was introduced. From this we can determine that a lack of

concordance, and professionalism in the RSPIF played a key role in the

escalation of violence and instability in the SI.

So how has RAMSI looked to improve the professionalism of the RSPIF in

its role as a defence force, and bring stability to the Solomon Islands? It

was not until 2003 that the requests from the SIG lead to a full joint military

and police intervention, and a complete shift in Australian foreign policy in

the Pacific. Phil Goff (2013: 3), in his capacity as Foreign Minister felt that

intervention was required to prevent “social, economic, and political

collapse in the SI, which Cabinet only reluctantly approved”. The Australian

Government meanwhile was more easily persuaded to commit to an

intervention. In their eyes, there was a serious risk to security in the Pacific

region if a failed state were to emerge it would provide a safe-harbour for

terrorist organisations (Goff, 2013: 3). There is no doubt that the 2001

World Trade Centre terrorist attacks, and the 2002 Bali Bombings were still

in the minds of Australian officials (Hameiri, 2007: 410). By restoring the

professionalism of the RSPIF and eliminating the continued existence of

militias in the SI, Australia’s objective would be achieved.

RAMSI were given a mandate to carry out four particular goals. Three of

these goals were related to improving the professionalism of the defence

forces; Firstly, to Restore civil order in the SI. The first objective involved

the additional assistance of the Australian and New Zealand militaries

restoring law and order in the country. Secondly, to “rebuild and reform the

machinery of government, improve government accountability and improve

the delivery of services in urban and provincial areas”. Thirdly, to fight

corruption (Reginal Assistance for the SI: 2016). The approach is different

one to what is considered a traditional peacekeeping mission. This seemed


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appropriate, as the state was experiencing a breakdown in law and order,

not a civil war (Hayward-Jones, 2014: 12). The large presence of military

forces was also there to protect police personal, and provide logistical

support (Hayward-Jones, 2014: 12; Wainright, 2005: 2). Jenny Hayward-

Jones (2014: 2) notes that instead of being involved in direct armed conflict,

the military forces in RAMSI played a vital psychological role in convincing

those within the militias to give up their weaponry and surrender. The

results RAMSI showed were impressive, some 3700 weapons, and an

estimated 300,000 rounds of ammunition were surrendered (Goff, 2013: 4).

Law and order was quickly restored without any bloodshed (New Zealand

Defence Force, 2013). Some 3000 of those responsible for the series of

ethnic tensions, subsequent lawlessness and violence were arrested,

including the key Guale militant figure, Harold Keke (RAMSI, 6: 2013). His

surrender showed that RAMSI was having a positive effect in improving the

professionalism of the RSPIF, and concordance between the three sectors.

Many New Zealand Police officers have acknowledged that without the

work of the Australian military, their tasks would have been impossible to

achieve (Ydgren, 2014: 97).

Another key function that RAMSI played was a complete overhaul and

rebuilding of the RSPIF, to a level that would see them become

professional enough to take over the responsibility of defending the state.

As mentioned previously, a lack of expertise under Huntington’s theory may

have attributed to the inability of the RSPIF to operate effectively. This was

a key aim for RAMSI (New Zealand Herald, 2003). Mary-Louise

O’Callaghan (2008: 190) commented on the positive results that RAMSI

has had on RSIPF recruitment, particularly around the development of a

police academy. Additionally, other education and training programmes


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jointly run by the police or military personnel from RAMSI looked to create a

new generation of professionalism. In 2015, RAMSI supported the training

of 511 RSPIF officers (41% of the total force), and had ultimate goal of

rearming the Force. In restoring the monopoly of weaponry to the RSPIF,

RAMSI undertook a number of activities. Some involved discouraging

combat, with the presence of armed forces. Additionally, naval vessels

were stationed between Bougainville and Guadalcanal in order to cease

any transportation of weaponry (Londey, 2004: 228). This training is clearly

important to ensuring that there is an adequate level of expertise within the

RSPIF, and would aid professionalism. Further integration of technology,

and “higher standards for recruitment” played a role in creating a highly

professionalised RSPIF (Ydgren, 2014: 42). From this we can see that the

background role of the intervening military to the benefit of the police

contingent played a key role in improving the professionalism of the RSPIF,

and setting up a possible long-term success in the SI.

To conclude, based on the above analysis, we can likely conclude that the

RSPIF lacked the professionalism along both Huntington’s and Schiff’s

separate theories. We can also note that there was lack of concordance

between the RSPIF, civilian, and political leaders. It is likely that RSPIF was

not able to fulfil its objectives to protect its citizens. The full effect of

RAMSI’s intervention will not yet be known until there is a complete

withdrawal, and the SIG governs in complete self-sufficiency. However, all

participants in RAMSI should look with great pride at what has been

achieved. A lack of professionalism in the RSPIF continually forced the SIG

to recognise the extreme danger of violence emerging from this once failed

state. RAMSI’s response have seriously improved the conditions to ensure

that the RSPIF becomes a defence force that is professional enough to


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protect the state, and society as a whole. While interventions such as this

can be expensive to maintain, the long term benefits for the state and the

region can be recognised if the correct cultural, political, and professional

processes are maintained. While this intervention cannot be seen as the

‘silver bullet’ for all interventions, it provided a blueprint on building trust

and mutual respect with the local populations. In the end however, time will

tell.


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Butler, A. 2008. “The unrest in Honiara-an Australian government

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September 2016).

Elsina Wainwright, 2013. “How is RAMSI faring? Progress, challenges, and

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