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AShiftingRelationshipBetweenDevelopmentandSecurity?EmergingPowers,
Post-ConflictReconstructionandFragileStates
AgnieszkaPaczynskaSchoolforConflictAnalysisandResolutionGeorgeMasonUniversity/StimsonCenter
PaperpresentedforpresentationattheInternationalStudiesAssociationAsia-Pacificconference,HongKong,June25-27,2016
DRAFT:pleasedonotcitewithouttheauthor’spermission
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Introduction
Thelasttwodecadeshavewitnessedfundamentalshiftsininternational
economicdynamicsandthegradualreshapingofglobalpoliticalrelationshipsand
collaborations.EmergingpowerssuchasChina,India,Brazil,andArabGulfstates
havebeenplayingamuchmoreprominentroleintheglobaleconomy.To
demonstratetheirneweconomiccloutandaspirationsforgloballeadership,these
emergingpowershavealsobegunplayingamuchmoreprominentrolein
internationalpeacekeepingandinprovidingdevelopmentandhumanitarian
assistancetocountriesintheGlobalSouth.Theyhavealsobecomeimportant
donors,investorsanddiplomaticandtradingpartnersforcountriesaffectedby
fragility,violenceandconflict.1Despitetherecentslowdownofeconomicgrowthin
China,RussiaandSouthAfrica,andthepoliticalandeconomiccrisisinBrazil,there
islittlereasontoexpectthatthistrendwillshiftoverthelongterm.
Althoughscholarshaveexploredemergingdonors’developmentassistance
policies,significantlylessattentionhasbeendevotedtotheirroleinpost-conflict
andconflict-affectedstates.Thispaper,whichdrawsonthepreliminaryconclusions
ofacollaborativeproject,2explores,oneofthemostimportantbutleastunderstood
dimensionsofthisnewassertiveness–emergingdonors’assistancetoconflict-
affectedstatesandcountriesemergingoutofcivilwar.Thepaperalsoinvestigates
1WorldBank.2011WorldDevelopmentReport2Theproject,“GlobalizingReconstruction:EmergingPowersandPost-ConflictSettings,”directedbythepaper’sauthorandfundedbytheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,broughttogether8scholarswhoinvestigatedtheroleofArabGulfStates,China,Brazil,India,Russia,SouthAfricaandTurkeyinprovidingassistancetopost-conflictstates.
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howemergingdonorsconceptualizethenexusbetweensecurityanddevelopment
andhowthesecomplementorcontrastwiththoseoftraditionaldonors.
Thereareanumberofchallengesofinvestigatingtheroleofemerging
donorsinpost-conflictsettings.Oneisthepaucityofdata.Unliketraditionaldonors
whoreporttoOECDDAC,mostemergingdonorsdonotshareinformationthrough
DACmechanisms,.Manyalsodonotcollectandreportdatasystematically.Often
theydisburseassistancenotthroughasingleagencybutratherthroughavarietyof
institutions,makingitmoredifficulttotrackallocatedfunds.Finally,the
cooperativeventuresemergingdonorsestablishwithrecipientcountriesoftendo
notconformtohowdevelopmentassistanceismeasuredbyDACdonors,rising
questionsaboutwhatshouldbeconsidereddevelopmentassistance.
Anotherchallengeisoneofterminology.Theterm“emergingdonor”usedin
thispaperisproblematic.Mostofthesedonorsarenotnew.Manyhavebeen
providingdevelopmentassistancesincethe1960sandarethemselves
uncomfortablewiththisterm.Analternativeterm,“risingdonors”whileavoiding
theproblemofcharacterizingthesedonorsasnew,isalsoimpreciseanddoesnot
acknowledgethatsomeofthesedonors,likeChina,RussiaandIndia,havebeen
significantglobalpowersforsometime.Equallyproblematicistheterminologyof
“developmentassistance”or“aid”aswellas“recipient”Thesedonors,unlike
traditionaldonorsconceptualizetheirrelationshipsincollaborative,non-
hierarchicalwaysandthereforeavoidusingtheseterms.Inotherwords,although
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thepaperwillusethisterminology,itisimportanttokeepinmindthattheseterms
arecontestedandnotaltogetheraccurate.
Oneofthispaper’sconclusionsisthatemergingdonorsaresympatheticto
someaspectsoftheliberalpeacebuildingmodelthathasdominatedtraditional
donors’approachestopost-conflictreconstructioninthepastcoupleofdecadesas
wellaschallengeitinsignificantways.Althoughtherearesignificantdifferences
amongemergingdonorsthatwillbeaddressedinthispaper,overall,bothemerging
andtraditionaldonorsareinterestedinaddressingpovertyaswellasincreating
conditionsthatarefavorabletoforeigndirectinvestmentandtradeinconflict-
affectedstates.Wheremostofthemchallengetheliberalpeacebuildingframework
tendstorelatetoissuestheyviewasaffectingstatesovereignty,andinrelationto
conditionalitiesorpromotionofparticularpoliticalreforms.Thesedifferences
betweentraditionalandemergingdonorsareareflectionoftheirdifferenthistories
andexperienceswiththeirowndevelopmenttrajectories.Mostemergingdonors
haveexperiencedcolonialdominationandtrytoavoidreplicatingsuchhierarchical
relationshipswhenestablishingcollaborationswithconflict-affectedstates.Atthe
sametime,manyemergingdonorshavebeeninthepastorcontinuetobeconflict-
affectedstatesthemselves.Theseexperienceswiththeirownconflicts,alsoshapes
howtheyconceptualizerelationshipswithstatesaffectedbyviolence.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.First,Ibrieflyreviewtheextantliterature
onpost-conflictreconstruction.Next,Idiscusssomeofthechallengesofexploring
therolethatemergingdonorsareplayinginconflictaffectedenvironments.Next,I
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discusshowemergingdonorshaveapproachedtheirassistancetoothercountries
oftheGlobalSouthingeneralandconflict-affectedstatesinparticular,highlighting
differencesamongemergingdonorsaswellasshiftsthathaveoccurredintheir
approachovertime.Inthefollowingsection,Idiscusstheemergenceofthe
developmentsecuritynexusasunderstoodbytraditionaldonorsandcontrastthis
withhowemergingdonorsareconceptualizingthisnexus.
TheChallengeofPost-ConflictReconstruction
Recentstudiesincreasinglyacknowledgethegrowingroleofemerging
powersindevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.However,ourcollective
knowledgeoftheirengagementinpost-conflictsettingsislimited—particularly
withregardtothequestionofhowthesedonorsconceptualizetherelationship
betweendevelopmentandsecurityinfragileenvironments.
Emergingdonors’assistanceprovisionisofcoursenotnewandcanbetraced
backtotheearly1960sandtheformationoftheNon-AlignedMovement.Ledby
countriessuchasEgypt,IndiaandIndonesia,theMovementsoughttochartan
independentpathforcountriesemergingfromcolonialismandwhodidnotwantto
alignwitheithertheUnitedStatesortheSovietUnionintheintensifyingColdWar
betweenthetwosuperpowers.Atthecoreofthismovementanditsoppositionto
imperialismandforeigndominationwastheprincipleofnon-interferencein
domesticaffairsofmemberstatesandtherespectfortheirautonomyandstate
sovereignty.
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Nonetheless,thereisaconsensusthatthesedonorsarenowplayingamuch
moresignificantroleinassistanceprovision.Thisnewprominenceisreflectedin
thenewglobalpartnershipagreementsthatwerehammeredoutbetween
traditionalandemergingdonorsattheHighLevelForumforAidEffectivenessin
Busan,SouthKoreain20123.
Anumberofkeyfindingsemergefromtheliteraturethatexaminesthe
growingimportanceofemergingdonors.First,howemergingdonorsdefine,
disburse,andreportaidissignificantlydifferentfromtraditionaldonors4.Second,
emergingdonors’policiesandstrategicobjectives,economicinterests,assistance
provisionphilosophiesandprioritiesarediverse.5Traditionaldonorshavebeen
concernedaboutthepotentialnegativeconsequencesofemergingpower’s
developmentassistanceonrecipientcountries’political,socialandenvironmental
standards.Availableevidencesuggeststhattheseconcernsareoftenexaggerated.6
Third,emergingdonors’publicrhetoricmasksmuchmorecomplex
rationalesforaidprovisionandthemodalitiesofassistanceprograms’
implementation.Thisrhetoricprioritizessolidarity,cooperationandmutual
supportandtheprincipleofnon-interferenceininternalaffairsofotherstates.3L.Chandy,“NewinTown:ALookattheRoleofEmergingDonorsinanEvolvingAidSystem,”MonthlyDevelopmentsMagazine,theBrookingsInstitution,April20124Mawdsley20115SusanWhite,“EmergingDonors,EmergingPowers:TeasingoutDevelopingPatters,”Washington,DC:CenterforInternationalandStrategicStudies,February2011;JulieWaltzandV.Ramachandran,“BraveNewWorld:ALiteratureReviewofEmergingDonorsandtheChangingNatureofForeignDirectAssistance,”WorkingPaper273.Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment,November20106N.Woods,“WhoseAid?WhoseInfluence?China,EmergingDonorsandtheSilentRevolutioninDevelopmentAssistance,”InternationalAffairs,vol.84,no.6,2008
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Emergingdonorslargelyeschewthelanguageofassistanceandconditionalities
usedbytraditionaldonorspreferringtoframetheserelationshipsincollaborative
andcooperativeterms.7Patternsofemergingdonorassistance,however,revealsa
muchmorenuancedpictureandpointstotheexistenceofmultipleagendasand
interestsdrivingtheirdecisionsaboutwheretofunnelmoney,deepentrade
relations,andencouragetheentryofprivateinvestors8.
Untilquiterecentlymoststudiesofpost-conflictreconstructionpaid
relativelylittleattentiontothegrowingroleofemergingpowers.Thekeydebates
focusedontheeffectsoftheliberalpeacebuildingmodel;9onthepowerimbalances
betweentraditionaldonorsandpost-conflictcountries;10andonvarioustechnical
issuessuchassequencingofpoliciesandreformeffortsaswellasdonor
coordination.11AsarecentSafterworldreportputsit,inmuchofthisliterature,
therehasbeenanunderlyingassumptionthatthe“internationalcommunityis7D.Rowlands,EmergingDonorsinInternationalDevelopmentAssistance.PBDDReports,January20088EmmaMawdsley,TheChangingGeographiesofForeignAidandDevelopmentCooperation:ContributionsfromGiftTheory,”Transactions,vol.37,no.2,20119ChesterA.Crocker,FenOlserHampsonandPamelaAall,editors.ManagingGlobalChaos:SourcesandResponsestoInternationalConflict.Washington,DC:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,1996;MatsBerdal.BuildingPeaceAfterWar.London:Routledge,2009;RolandParis.AtWarsEnd:BuildingPeaceAfterCivilConflict.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004,“SavingLiberalPeacebuilding,”ReviewofInternationalStudies,vol.36,no2.2010,337-65.10MarkDuffield.Development,SecurityandUnendingWar:GoverningtheWorldofPeoples.Cambridge:Polity,2007;K.Liden,“BuildingPeaceBetweenGlobalandLocalPolitics:OntheCosmopolitanEthicsofLiberalPeacebuilding,”InternationalPeacekeeping,vol.16,no.5,2009,616-34;SusannaCampbell,DavidChandlerandMeeraSabaratnam,editors.ALiberalPeace?TheProblemsandPracticesofPeacebuilding.London:ZedBooks,2011.11AnnaK.JarstadandTimothyD.Sisk,editors.FromWartoDemocracy:DilemmasofPeacebuilding.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008;RolandParisandTimothyD.Sisk,editors.TheDilemmasofStatebuilding:ConfrontingtheContradictionsofPostwarPeaceOperations.London:Routledge,2009.
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composedoflike-mindedactorswithgloballeverageandlegitimacyinthecountries
inwhichtheyintervene.”12Althoughthislikelyoverstatesthecommonalitiesand
similaritiesamongtraditionaldonors,withthegrowingprominenceofemerging
donors,thisassumptionisevenweakerandthedevelopmentandhumanitarian
assistancelandscapehasbecomeevenmorecomplex.
Despitegrowingnumberofstudiesonemergingdonors’developmentand
humanitarianassistance,therehavebeenfewstudiesthathaveattemptedtomore
systematicallyexaminetheirengagementwithconflict-affectedstatesandtheir
policiesregardingpost-conflictreconstructionandpeacebuilding.Thosestudies
thathavelookedattheirroleinsuchsettings,suggestanumberofpatterns.First,
emergingdonorsareclearlyplayingamuchmoresignificantroleinpeacebuilding
andpeacekeepingoperationsandlookingtoshapethecontentoftheseoperations
ratherthansimplyprovidingtroopsaswasthecaseinthepast.13Second,these
donorsareincreasinglypayinggreaterattentiontocountriesoutsideoftheir
immediategeographicneighborhoodandlookingtoestablishamoreglobal
presence.14Third,therearesignificantdifferencesamongemergingdonorsinareas
12IvanCampbell,ThomasWheeler,LarryAttree,DellMarieButlerandBernardoMariani.ChinaandConflict-AffectedStates:BetweenPrincipleandPragmatism.London,SafterworldReport,2012,7.13BenjamindeCarvalhoandCedricdeConing,“RisingPowersandtheFutureofPeacebuilding,”NOREFReport,2014;CedricdeConingandChanderPrakash,“PeaceCapacitiesNetworkSynthesisReport:RisingPowersandPeaceOperations,”NorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairs,2016;OliverP.RichmondandIoannisTellidis,“TheBRICSandInternationalPecebuildingandStatebuilding,”NOREFReport,201314SultanBarakatandS.A.Zyck,“GulfStateAssistancetoConflict-AffectedEnvironments,”theCentrefortheStudyofGlobalGovernance,UniversityofYork,2010;RuddandViken2011;PaulAmar,“GlobalSouthtotheRescue:Emerging
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ofassistancefocusandthemodalitiesofassistancedelivery.15Fourth,thegrowing
involvementofemergingdonorsinpost-conflictcountriesiscreatingtensions
betweentheprincipleofnon-interferenceinrecipientcountries’internalaffairsand
theinterestinpreventingresumptionofconflict.16Finally,whenengagingwith
post-conflictstates,emergingpowersuseverydifferentterminologythan
traditionaldonors,generallyrefusingtorefertothesestatesasfragileorfailing
states.
ChangingLandscapeofAssistancetoPost-ConflictStates
Theemergingdonorsareanextremelydiversegroupandincludenew
economicpowerhousessuchasChinaandBrazil17,aswellasgrowingeconomies
likeIndia,SouthAfrica,Turkey,RussiaandArabGulfstates.Theseemergingdonors
areforgingpartnershipsoutsideoftheOrganizationforEconomicCo-operationand
Development(OECD)frameworkandarenowplayingamuchmoresignificantrole
indevelopmentandhumanitarianassistanceprovision.In2004forinstance,the
India-Brazil-SouthAfrica(IBSA)DialogueForumestablishedtheIBSATrustFund
forthePovertyandHungerAlleviationaimedatstrengtheningSouth-South
cooperationanddisseminatingbestpracticesinpromotingdevelopmentand
HumanitarianSuperpowersandGlobalizingRescueIndustries,”Globalizations,vol.9,no.1,2012.15J.Sherman.M.M.Gleason,W.P.SSidhu,andB.Jones,editors,EngagementonDevelopmentandSecurity:NewActors,NewDebates.NewYork:CenteronInternationalCooperation,NewYorkUniversity,September201116Campbelletal.201217MorerecentlyBrazilhasbeenexperiencingadeepeningeconomiccrisis.
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fightingpoverty.18Morerecently,withtheestablishmentoftheBeijingAsian
InfrastructureInvestmentBank(AIIB)andtheNewDevelopmentBank(NDB),they
arefocusingonprovidingalternativesourcesofdevelopmentandinfrastructure
financingtothoseavailablethroughWest-dominatedfinancialinstitutions.TheNDB
isoperatedbyBrazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouthAfricaandissetup“tofoster
greaterfinancialanddevelopmentcooperation”betweenthefive.In2014,Brazil,
Russia,IndiaandChinaaccountedfor41.4percentofglobalpopulationand25
percentofglobalGDP.UnliketheWorldBank,wherevotesareweighedaccordingto
thecapitalsharethememberstateprovides,everymemberoftheNDPwillhave
onevoteandnonewillhavevetopower.19TheBRICSseethisbankasprovidingan
alternativesourceoffinancingsothatcountriesdonotneedtoonlyrelyonthe
WorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund.20
Theemergingdonorsgrowingprominenceisreflectedinthenewglobal
partnershipagreementsthatwerehammeredoutbetweentraditionalandemerging
donorsattheHighLevelForumforAidEffectivenessinBusan,SouthKoreain2012
thekeyrolethattheyplayedinthedebatesaboutthedesignofSustainable
18TheIndia,BrazilandSouthAfricaFacilityforPovertyandHungerAlleviation(IBSAFund)-IBSATrustFund(http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/library/solutions/partners/expo/The_India__Brazil_and_South_Africa_Facility_for_Poverty_and_Hunger_Alleviation__IBSA_Fund____IBSA_Trust_Fund.html)19http://ndbbrics.org20AsKandapurVamanKamath,thedirectorofNDP,putit,“Ourobjectiveisnottochallengetheexistingsystemasitisbuttoimproveandcomplementthesysteminourownway.”BBCNews,July21,2015(www.bbc.com/news/33605230)
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DevelopmentGoals(SDGs)whichtheUnitedNationsadoptedinSeptember2015,
andtheirkeyroleontheUNPeacebuildingCommission.21
Assemblingaccuratedataonhowmuchemergingdonorsareprovidingand
whatkindofsectorsandprojectstheysupportisdifficult.Unlikethetraditional
donorswhoreporttotheDonorsAssistanceCommittee(DAC)oftheDevelopment
Co-OperationDirectorateoftheOECD,mostemergingdonorsdonotshare
informationthroughDACmechanisms.22Manyemergingdonorsarenotcollecting
andreportingdatasystematically.Oftenemergingdonorsdisburseassistancenot
throughasingleagencybutratherthroughavarietyofinstitutions,makingitmore
difficulttotrackallocatedfunds.Finally,thecooperativeventuresemergingdonors
establishwithrecipientcountriesoftendonotconformtohowdevelopment
assistanceismeasuredbyDACdonors.Asthe2011AfricaEconomicOutlookreport
pointedout,developingcountriespursueverydifferentstrategiesthantraditional
donors,andtheirassistance“combinescommercialanddevelopmentinterestson
financingmodalities(…)Exportcreditsplayanincreasinglylargeroleinrelations
betweenAfricaanditsdevelopingcountrypartners.Emergingpartnersalsouse
whatiscalledmixedcreditsi.e.afinancingpackagethatcombinesconcessionalrate
andmarketrateloans.”23Inotherwords,inthisnewdonorlandscapeitisnotatall
clearwhatexactlyshouldbecountedasaid.Furthercomplicatingthepicturesis21LaurenceChandy,“NewinTown:ALookattheRoleofEmergingDonorsinanEvolvingAidSystem,”MonthlyDevelopmentsMagazine,theBrookingsInstitution,2012.22ManyemergingdonorsdidnotcontributetothedevelopmentoftheDACreportingmechanismsandthereforeseelittlereasontoparticipateintheorganization.23AfricaEconomicOutlook2011,52.
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thatdetailsaboutnewtrade,investmentandlendingarrangementsbetween
emergingdonorsandrecipientcountriesarealsooftendifficulttocomeby.
Whileincomparisontothetraditionaldonorsmostemergingdonorlevelsof
assistancearestillrelativelysmall,thevolumeofassistanceoverthelastdecadehas
rapidlyincreased.Forinstance,between2000and2009SouthKorea’sdevelopment
assistance(excludingbilateraldebtrelief)grewfrom$233.31millionto$825.8
millionormorethan250percent.ItsbilateralassistancetoSub-SaharanAfricagrew
especiallyrapidly,increasingby465percent.By2010itsdevelopmentassistance
amountedto$1.2billion.Turkey’sdevelopmentassistancebetween2002and2012,
increasedfromabout$73millionto$3.3billion.24Brazil’sbilateralandmultilateral
aidaccordingtosomeestimatesreached$1billionin2010.India’sassistance
increased400%between2004and2014,reaching$6billionby2015.25According
tosomeestimatesChina’sworldwidepledgedaidgrewfrom$1.7billionto$189
billionannuallybetween2001and2011accordingtooneestimate.26These
numbers,however,needtobetreatedwithcaution.Becauseemergingdonorsdo
notreporttotheDAC(withtheexceptionofSouthKorea)andbecausetheir
assistanceportfoliolooksverydifferentlythanthoseoftraditionaldonors,the
estimatesofthesedisbursementscanvarywidelybetweendifferentsources.24PinarTank,“TurkeyasanEmergingDonorinHumanitarianAssistance,”paperpresentedattheEmergingPowersandConflict-AffectedStatesWorkshop,Arlington,VA,March14,2016.25RaniMullen,“IndianDevelopmentPartnershipswithConflictAffectedStates,”paperpresentedattheEmergingPowersandConflict-AffectedStatesWorkshop,Arlington,VA,March14,2016.26CharlesWolf,Jr.,XiaoWang,EricWarner.China’sForeignAidandGovernmentSponsoredInvestmentActivities:Scale,Content,DestinationsandImplications.RANDCorporation,2013,19.Thisfigureincludesgovernment-sponsoredinvestments.
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DifferencesBetweenEmergingDonorsandShiftsOverTime
Initially,emergingdonors’assistancefocusedprimarilyontheirimmediate
geographicregion.Thus,RussiafocusedinparticularonCentralAsiacountriesthat
usedtobepartoftheSovietUnion;Indiahasfunneledmuchofitsassistanceto
Afghanistan,SriLanka,andNepal;Brazilwasbeenanimportantactorin
reconstructionofHaiti;SouthAfricahasconcentratedoverwhelmingmajorityofits
aidinSub-SaharanAfricaandinparticulartheCongo;andtheArabGulfcountries
prioritizedassistancetoSomalia,SudanandtheOccupiedPalestinianTerritories.27
China,ontheotherhand,focusedonothercountriesinAsia,suchasMyanmarand
Cambodia.
Overthepastdecadeorso,mostemergingdonorshavelookedtoexpand
theirreach,payinggreaterattentiontocountriesoutsideoftheirimmediate
geographicneighborhoodandlookingtoestablishamoreglobalpresence.28India,
Brazil,TurkeytheArabGulfStatesandinparticularChinahavesignificantly
expandedtheirfootprintinsub-SaharanAfrica.TheArabGulfstatesalsoprovide
assistancetocountrieswithlargeMuslimpopulationsoutsideoftheMiddleEast,for
instanceBosnia-HerzegovinaandTajikistan.
27HarrietK.RuddandTonjeM.Viken,“ChangingtheFaceofAid,”Perspectives,no.1,2011,13.28SultanBarakatandStevenZyck,“GulfStatesAssistancetoConflict-AffectedEnvironments,”TheCentrefortheStudyofGlobalGovernance,UniversityofYork2010;RuddandViken2011;PaulAmar,“GlobalSouthtotheRescue:EmergingHumanitarianSuperpowersandGlobalizingRescueIndustries,”Globalizations,vol.9,no.1,2012.
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Althoughsomeemergingdonors,forexampleIndia,havelongprovided
significantnumberofpeacekeepingtroops,overthelastdecade,oneofthekey
changeshasbeentheirgrowinginvolvementinUnitedNationspeaceoperations.
Forinstance,between2001and2010,Brazil,China,IndiaandSouthAfrica’sshare
ofdeployedpersonnelintheseoperationshasincreasedfrom5percentto15
percent.29In2013,ChinawascontributingmoretroopsandpolicetoUN
peacekeepingoperationsthananyotherpermanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil.
Atthesametime,ithasbecomemorewillingtocommitcombattroopstothese
missions.30Todaymoreoftenthaninthepast,theyemergingdonorsaresending
theirpeacekeepingtroopstoareasoutsidetheirimmediateneighborhood.31Atthe
sametime,emergingdonorsarelookingtoshapethepeacebuildingand
peacekeepingpoliciesandhavebecomeveryactiveintheUnitedNations
PeacebuildingCommission.32However,thegrowinginvolvementofemerging
donorsinUNpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingoperationsshouldnotbeseenasa
signthatthesedonorsfullyapproveofthecurrentUNapproachtoconflict-affected
andpost-conflictcountries.Chinaforinstance,believesthattheUNhasreliedtoo
heavilyontheWesternpeacebuildingmodel,focusingtoomuchondemobilization
29SharonWiharta,NeilMelvinandXeniaAvezov,TheNewGeopoliticsofPeaceOperations:MappingtheEmergingLandscape,StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI),September2012.In2015theseincreasedcommitmentlevelscontinued.TheBRICScontributedover13percentofpolice,UNmilitaryexpertsandtroopstopeacekeepingoperations.ContributorstotheUnitedNationsPeacekeepingOperationsasof31January2016.www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/jan16_1.pdf30Chinadispatched700infantrytroopstoSouthSudanin2015.31Wihertaetal.,TheNewGeopoliticsofPeace,1132deConingandPradash,2016.
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andgovernanceissueswhileneglectingeconomicreconstructionprocessesand
payinginsufficientattentiontotheparticularitiesoflocalcontexts.33
Atthesametime,emergingdonorshavealsobecomemoreengagedin
conflict-affectedandpost-conflictcountriesbyforgingbilateralrelationshipsandby
workingthroughregionalandmultilateralfora.Inmanycaseswhatpushesthemto
interveneinconflict-affectedsettingsisamixofeconomicandsecurityinterests.In
otherwords,concernwithsupportingstabilityinconflict-affectedcontextsisoften
drivenbyinterestinaccessingmarketsandresourcesofthesestatesratherthana
concernwithconflictpreventionorpost-conflictreconstructionandpeacebuilding
perse.Atthesametime,formanyemergingdonors,thekeytoensuringstability
andlong-termpeaceisensuringsustainableeconomicdevelopment.Thus,their
owncommercialinterestsandthepromotionofeconomicdevelopmentinconflict-
affectedstatesissymbiotic.
Emergingdonors,however,areadiversesetofcountriesandtheirpolicies
andstrategicobjectives,economicinterests,assistanceprovisionphilosophiesand
prioritiesalsodiffer.34 India’softenfocusesprimarilyoninfrastructure
development,education,andhealthaswellastechnicalcooperation.Braziltendsto33ChrisAldenandYixiaoZheng,“ChinaandPost-ConflictReconstruction,”paperpresentedattheEmergingPowersandConflict-AffectedStatesWorkshop,Arlington,VA,March14,2016.34JakeSherman,MeganM.Gleason,W.P.S.Sidhu,andBruceJones,editors.EngagementonDevelopmentandSecurity:NewActors,NewDebates.NewYork:CenterforInternationalCooperation,NewYorkUniversity,September2011;AsiaFoundation2014;White2011;JulieWaltzandVijayaRamachandran,“BraveNewWorld:ALiteratureReviewofEmergingDonorsandtheChangingNatureofForeignDirectAssistance,”WorkingPaper273.Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment,November2011.
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targetagriculturaldevelopment,especiallyleveragingitsexpertiseintropical
agricultureandprovidestechnicaltraining,aswellaspublichealth.SouthAfrica
oftensupportsgovernmentcapacitydevelopmentprojectsanddemocracy
promotion.Chinaemphasizesinfrastructuredevelopment;Turkeyhumanitarian
assistanceanddevelopingsocialinfrastructure,whileRussiaprimarilysupports
health,educationandfoodsecurityprojects.
ArabGulfstates,andinparticularKuwait,SaudiArabia,theUnitedArab
Emirates(UAE)andQatar,havetendedtosupportinfrastructuredevelopmentand
reconstructionprojects.35 Historically,mostoftheassistancefromArabGulfStates
hasbeenprovidedintheformofsoftloansandgrantsandhasbeenadministered
eitherdirectlytogovernmentsorthroughregionalfinancialinstitutionsand
nationalfunds.Therearebothformalgovernmentalinstitutionsaswellasmore
informalorganizationsthroughwhichassistanceischanneled.Theformercategory
includessuchinstitutionsastheKuwaitFundforArabEconomicDevelopment,Abu
DhabiFundforDevelopment,andtheSaudiFundforDevelopment.Inthelatter
therearevarious“quasinon-governmentalandadhocdonorinstitutions,which
whileformallyprivate,disburseassistancefromandinthenameofthestate.”36
Mostemergingdonors,astheirrelationshipswithandengagementinstates
emergingoutofconflictdeepens,havealsobeguntomoreexplicitlyarticulatetheir
viewsontherelationshipbetweensecurityanddevelopment.Furthermore,these
approachesseemtobealsoshiftingovertime,ofteninresponsetotheexperienceof35ThelevelsofassistanceprovidedbyBahrainandOmanaresmall.36BarakatandZack,10.
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engagementinconflict-affectedstatesandtheneedtoadjustpolicypreferencesto
therealitiesontheground.China,whichinitiallyappearedtolargelythinkof
securityanddevelopmentasseparateanddistinctcategories,hasmovedtoward
moreexplicitlylinkingthetwo.37Itsgrowingengagementwithconflict-affected
stateshasalsobegunshiftingitsviewsonnon-interference.Whilenon-interference
remainsChina’sofficialpolicy,ithasincreasinglyengagedininternational
mediationefforts,forinstanceinDarfur.In2012anew“InitiativeonChina-Africa
CooperativePartnershipforPeaceandSecurity,”wasintroduced.Itprovidesfunds
to“helpstrengthenAfrica’sindigenouscapabilitiesformaintainingpeaceand
security”andhasbecomepartoftheForumonChina-AfricaCooperation(FOCAC).38
Morerecently,Chinahasbeenwilingtochannelsignificantfundtoward
peacebuildingactivities.In2015forinstance,PresidentXiJinpingcommitted$1
billiontosupportingUNPeacebuildingprogramsand$10milliontoAfricaUnion’s
peaceandsecurityoperations.
India,BrazilandSouthAfricaarealsomakingtheselinkagesmoreexplicit.
Brazil’spolicyseesaneedtobalancedevelopment,peaceandsolidarity.Itviews
mostofitssupportforpeacebuildingactivitiesthroughthelensofSouth-South
cooperationaimedatreducingsocialvulnerabilitiesthatcontributetoconflict,37ChrisAlden,“SeekingSecurityinAfrica:China’sEvolvingApproachtotheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,”NOREFReport,March2014.Oslo:NOREF;EllingN.Tjonneland,“ChinaandAfricaPolitics:FromNon-InterferencetoReluctantEngagement,”PaperpresentedattheinternationalconferenceonChinaandAfricaMedia,CommunicationsandPublicDiplomacy,10-11September2014,Beijing;Campbelletal.ChinaandConflictAffectedStates.38ChrisAldenandYixiaoZheng,“ChinaandPost-ConflictReconstruction,”paperpresentedattheEmergingPowersandConflict-AffectedStatesWorkshop,Arlington,VA,March14,2016.
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whilerespectingstatesovereigntyandnon-conditionality.Itsmostextensive
interventnionsinpost-conflictsettingshavebeeninGuinea-BissauandHaitiwhere
itsoughttointegrateworkonreconciliationandestablishingsecuritywith
supportingeconomicdevelopment.39
Indiaprioritizesconsolidatingpeace,rebuildingtrustinthestate,and
strengtheninggovernance.40However,Indiadoesnotmakeadistinctionbetween
developmentassistanceandassistancetoconflict-affectedstatesorforpost-conflict
reconstructionprojects.41Itsengagementswithconflict-affectedstatesinits
immediateneighborhood,forinstanceSriLankaandNepal,however,havebeen
shapednotjustbyprinciplesofSouth-Southcooperationandrespectforstate
sovereigntybutalsobyitsownsecurityconcerns.42
SouthAfrica,drawingonitsownexperiencewithtransitionfromapartheid
todemocracy,isespeciallyinterestedinacceleratingsocio-economicdevelopment
andpromotingreconciliation.UnlikeIndia,SouthAfricahasplacedpeacebuilding
andpost-conflictreconstructionasacentralfocusofitsforeignpolicy.The2011
WhitePaperonSouthAfrica’sForeignPolicylaysoutthegovernment’splanto
“continuetoplayaleadingroleinconflictprevention,peacekeeping,peace-building,
39Saferworld,“AddressingConflictandViolencefrom2015:RisingPowersandConflict,”IssuePaper3,November24,2012,2-4.40Sherman,Gleason,Sindhu,Jones,2011,3.41RaniMullen,“India’sDevelopmentAssistance,”paperpresentedattheEmergingPowersandConflict-AffectedStatesWorkshop,Arlington,VA,March14,2016.42Saferworld,“AddressingConflictandViolencefrom2015:RisingPowersandConflict,”6-8.
19
andpost-conflictreconstruction.”43Ithasfocusedmuchofitsassistanceon
supportingpost-conflictpeacebuildingeffortsinBurundi,theDemocraticRepublic
ofCongo,andSouthSudan.44Theseinterventionshavehadmixedresults.Asthe
economicmalaiseinSouthAfricahasdeepened,thegovernmenthasstruggledto
justifytoanincreasinglyskepticalpublicthewhythecountry’sscarceresources
shouldbedevotedtocontinuingtheseengagements.
Turkey’assistancetofragilestateshasincreasedfrom$94millionin2004to
$1.5billionin2012,anincreaseof1540percent.45Inotherwords,twothirdsofits
foreignassistancetargetsfragilestates,withfundsflowingtosuchconflict-affected
statesasAfghanistan,Pakistan,Kyrgyzstan,Iraq,MyanmarandSomalia.Turkey
framesthishumanitarianassistanceasstemmingfromitsIslamicvaluesandargues
thatitis“undertakenforthe‘loveofGodandwithnohiddenagendas’”andisthus
apoliticalanddoneinclosecollaborationwithlocalactorsinrecipientstates.46
Althoughmostemergingdonorshave,overtime,expandedthegeographic
reachoftheirengagementwithconflict-affectedandpost-conflictstates,howthese
relationshipsarepursued,theprioritiesandpoliciesvis-à-visthosestatesinthe
donors’immediategeographicneighborhoodandoutsideofittenddiffer.Conflict-
43BuildingaBetterWorld:TheDiplomacyofUbuntu,’WhitePaperonSouthAfrica’sForeignPolicy,May13,2011,2044GilbertKhadiagala,“SouthAfrica’sDemocracyPromotioninAfrica,”paperpresentedattheEmergingPowersandConflict-AffectedStatesWorkshop,Arlington,VA,March14,2016.45DenizGole,“Turkey’sDevelopmentAssistancetoFragileStates:FromSporadicActionstoSystemBuildingPractices,”TurkishJournalofInternationalRelations,vol.12,no.1-2,Spring/Summer2014,90.46Tank,2016.
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affectedstateslocatedclosetothedonorcountry,aremorelikelytobeviewed
throughasecurityandgeostrategiclenses.(giveafewexampleshere:India,Russia,
Turkeyforinstance)
TheSecurity-DevelopmentNexus
Debatesaboutprocessesofreconstructionaftercivilwarareembedded
withinabroaderdebateabouttherelationshipbetweensecurityanddevelopment.
Althoughbothtraditionalandemergingdonorshavecometoseetheimportanceof
thelinkagebetweensecurityanddevelopment,howthisshouldbetranslatedinto
policiesremainsdistinct.
Althoughinthelasttwodecadestraditionaldonorshavecometopay
particularattentiontothenexusbetweensecurityanddevelopment,concernsabout
therelationshipbetweenconflict,especiallyviolentconflict,andeconomic
developmentgobacktotheendofWorldWarIIwhentheinternationalcommunity
grappledwiththechallengeofpost-conflictreconstructioninEuropeandthe
crumblingofcolonialempires.Twoissuescametodominatetheinternational
agenda:therebuildingofcountriesdevastatedbythewarandtheeconomicand
politicaldevelopmentofthenewlyindependentstatesofAfricaandAsia.What
linkedthemtogetherwastheperceptionthatfutureviolenceandwarscouldbe
preventedbyensuringeconomicdevelopmentandinternationalfinancialstability.
Newinstitutionswereestablished,mostimportanttheInternationalBankfor
ReconstructionandDevelopment(theWorldBank),theInternationalMonetary
FundandtheUnitedNationsinordertoguaranteetheflowoffundsfor
21
reconstructionanddevelopmentprojects,availabilityofshort-termloanstoprevent
financialcrisesandtheprovisionofaforumforpeacefulresolutionofinternational
disputesandconflicts.
WiththeendoftheColdWarintheearly1990showtheinternational
communityviewedtherelationshipbetweendevelopmentandsecurity
fundamentallytransformed.First,withthedisintegrationoftheSovietUnion,the
relationshipbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStateswithintheUnitedNations’
SecurityCouncilimprovedwhileatthesametimethenumberofcivilwarspiked,
makingtheorganizationbothmorewillingandmoreabletoexpandUN’speace-
keeping,peace-enforcingandpeace-buildingactivities.Thescopeofthe
internationalcommunity’sinterventionsindomesticconflictsimpliedaredefining
statesovereigntynormsandanexpansionofthelegitimatedomainforexternal
intervention.AsDoylepointsout,“Memberstatesendorsedaradicalexpansionin
thescopeofcollectiveintervention.MattersoncelegallypreservedfromUN
interventionsuchascivilconflictsandhumanitarianemergencieswithinsovereign
statesbecamelegitimateissuesofUNconcern.”47
Atthesametime,securityanddevelopmentcametobeseenbymanywithin
theUnitedNationsandtheWorldBankaswellasothertraditionaldonors,asinter-
relatedandmutuallyreinforcing.Inordertobreakthisconflicttrapandestablish
conditionsfordurablepeacerequiredenablingthesesocietiestogenerate
47MichaelW.Doyle,“WarMakingandPeaceMaking:TheUnitedNations’Post-ColdWarRecord,”inChesterA.Crocker,FenOslerHampson,andPamelaAall,editors.TurbulentPeace:TheChallengeofManagingInternationalConflict.Washington,DC:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,2001,529.
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sustainableeconomicgrowth.48Thisperceivedlinkbetweenpoverty,inequalityand
lackofdevelopmentandviolentconflictwasatthecenteroftheMillennium
DevelopmentGoalsadoptedbytheUnitedNationsin2000:
Morethanabillionpeople–-one-sixthoftheworld’spopulation–liveinextremepoverty,lackingthesafewater,propernutrition,basichealthcareandsocialservicesneededtosurvive.Theconsequencesofthispovertyreachfarbeyondtheafflictedsocieties.Poverty,inequalityanddiseasearechiefcausesofviolentconflict,civilwarandstatefailures.Aworldwithextremepovertyisaworldofinsecurity.49
Thus,sincetheendoftheColdWar,theUN,traditionaldonors,likethe
UnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom,theWorldBankandtheOrganizationfor
SecurityandCooperationinEurope(OSCE)havecometoseedevelopmentand
securityasdeeplylinked,mutuallydependentandreinforcing.50In2001,the
InternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereigntyinitsreportThe
ResponsibilitytoProtectarguedthat,“thereisagrowingrecognitionworld-wide
thattheprotectionofhumansecurity(…)mustbeoneofthefundamentalobjectives
ofmoderninternationalinstitutions.”51
TheSeptember11,2001attacksontheTwinTowersinNewYorkCityand
onthePentagonstrengthenedtheperceivedlinkbetweendevelopmentandsecurity
48PaulCollier,V.L.Elliott,HavardHegre,AnkeHoeffler,MartaReynal-Querol,andNicholasSambanis..BreakingtheConflictTrap:CivilWarandDevelopmentPolicy.Washington,DC:TheWorldBankandOxfordUniversityPress,2003,GerdJunneandWillemijnVerkoren,editors.PostconflictDevelopment:MeetingNewChallenges.Boulder,CO:LynneRiennerPublishers,2005.49http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/who/index.htm50NicholasWaddell,“TiesThatBind:DfIDandtheEmergingSecurityDevelopmentAgenda,”Conflict,SecurityandDevelopment,vol.6,no.4,December2006.51InternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereignty.TheResponsibilitytoProtect,2001,6.
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amongtraditionaldonorsevenfurther.Conflictwasnolongeraproblemofthepoor,
ofthedevelopingworld,oftheglobal“zonesofwar.”Theattacksbroughtviolence
directlyintowhatseemedlikethesafeandcomfortable“zonesofpeace”ofthe
advancedpost-industrialdemocracies.Thedominantdiscoursenowcame“inthe
magicmantraofmutualvulnerabilityofthedevelopedandtheunderdeveloped
world.”52ItsuggestedthatthefailedstatesoftheGlobalSouthandtheirconflicts
posedadangernotjusttothoseresidingwithinthesestatesbutrathertotheglobal
communitywritlargebyspreading“thevirusofdisorder.”53The2002UnitedStates
NationalSecurityStrategyunderscoredthat,“Americaisnowthreatenedlessby
conqueringstatesthanwearebyfailingones.”54Atthesametimethedefinitionof
securitybeguntowidentonowincludehuman,economic,foodandenvironmental
security.Thefearofdisorderfurtherexpandedthescopeofacceptable
interventionsandtheextenttowhichinternationalcommunitywaswillingtoshape
andmoldtheeconomic,political,legalandsocialstructuresoftheseconflictaffected
andfragilestates.Thefocusonthenexusbetweensecurityanddevelopmenthas
resultedinchangesinthetypesofprogramsandactivitiesthatbothbilateraland
multilateraldonorsareengagedwithsome“traditionallyassociatedwithsecurity
ratherthandevelopment,andviceversa.”55
52MandyTurnerandMichaelPugh,“TowardaNewAgendaforTransformingWarEconomies,”Conflict,SecurityandDevelopment,vol.6,no.3,October2006,471-9.53TurnerandPugh.54WhiteHouse.TheNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica.September2002,1.55AndrianaErthalAbdenurandDanilorMarcondesDeSouzaNeto,“RisingPowersandTheSecurity-DevelopmentNexus:Brazil’sEngagementwithGuinea-Bissau,”JournalofPeacebuildingandDevelopment,vol.9,no.2,2014,2.
24
Theconcernwiththeimpactofstatefragilityonglobalsecuritywasreflected
intheproliferationoflistsoffragilestates,suchastheOECD’sStatesofFragility
annualreport,56theconveningbytheWorldBankoftheannualFragility,Violence
andConflictForum,thepublicationbytheWorldBanktheDevelopmentReport2011:
Security,DevelopmentandConflict,anddebatesattheWorldEconomicForumabout
thenatureofstatefragility.57Morerecently,thisconcernwithsecurityand
developmenthasbeenreflectedinthepolicyofCounteringViolentExtremism.As
PresidentObamanotedinhisremarksinFebruary2015,
Wemustaddressthegrievancesthatterroristsexploit,includingeconomicgrievances(…)povertyalonedoesnotcauseapersontobecomeaterrorist,anymorethanpovertyalonecausessomeonetobecomeacriminal(…)Butwhenpeople--especiallyyoungpeople--feelentirelytrappedinimpoverishedcommunities,wherethereisnoorderandnopathforadvancement,wheretherearenoeducationalopportunities,wheretherearenowaystosupportfamilies,andnoescapefrominjusticeandthehumiliationsofcorruption--thatfeedsinstabilityanddisorder,andmakesthosecommunitiesripeforextremistrecruitment.58
TheSecurity-DevelopmentNexusandEmergingDonors
Thelinkingofsecurityanddevelopmentbytraditionaldonorshascome
underscrutinyfromawiderangeofcritics.Duffieldforinstancehasarguedthat
ratherthanseekingtoimprovethelivesofpeoplewithinthesefragilestates,these
expandinginterventionsareratherdesignedaswayfortheGlobalNorthtoexert56Becausetherewaslittleagreementabouthowtoassessandclassifyfragility,oftendifferentstatesappearedonthesedifferentlists.57Anne-LiseKlausen,“WhatisStateFragility?”WorldEconomicForum,April1,2015(https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/04/what-is-a-fragile-state/)58RemarksbythePresidentattheSummitonCounteringViolentExtremism,February19,2015(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarks-president-summit-countering-violent-extremism-february-19-2015)
25
politicalcontrolandcontainwhatisseenasthreatofspreadingdisorder.59Uvin,on
theotherhand,connectedthenewpoliticsofpost-conflictreconstructionto
neocolonialismduringwhich“inthenameofatotalizing,missionary-styleideology
(basedonadeeplyromanticizedvisionofthesituation‘athome’)foreignersare
encouragedtomakedeeplyinterventionistlifeanddeathdecisionsforother
societies,unboundbyoutsidecontrol,unconstrainedbyprocedure,unaffectedby
outcomes.”60Thesecurity-developmentnexushasalsobeencriticizedforits
legitimizingofextensiveinterventionsinstatesthataredeemedfragilebythe
GlobalNorthandforsecuritizingdevelopment.Thissecuritization,criticsargue,can
beseenmostexplicitlyinthecounterinsurgencystrategiesthatU.S.-ledcoalitions
havepursuedinIraqandAfghanistan.61
Despitevariouscritiquesofthedevelopment-securitynexus,ithasbecomea
keywayinwhichtraditionaldonorshaveapproachedassistancetoconflict-affected
andfragilestates.Whataboutemergingdonors?Havetheyalsoapproached
conflict-affectedstatesthroughthislinkingofsecuritywithdevelopment?First
althoughemergingdonorshavetendedtoeschewusingtermssuchasstatefragility
andhavevoicedconcernsabouthowassistancepolicieswithconditionalitiesaffect
59MarkDuffield.Development,SecurityandUnendingWar:GoverningtheWorldofPeoples.Cambridge:PolityPress,2007.60PeterUvin,“DifficultChoicesintheNewPost-ConflictAgenda:theInternationalCommunityinRwandaAftertheGenocide,”ThirdWorldQuarterly,vol.22,no.2,2001,195-6.61DavidChandler,“TheSecurity-DevelopmentNexusandtheRiseof“Anti-foreignPolicy,’JournalofInternationalRelationsandDevelopment,vol.10,no.4,362.Seealso,MariaSternandJoakimOjendal,“MappingtheSecurity-DevelopmentNexus:Conflict,Complexity,Cacophony,Convergence?SecurityDialogue,vol.40,no.1,2010,5-30.
26
statesovereignty,therearealsoimportantdifferencesamongemergingdonors’
approachestoprovidingassistancetoconflictaffectedstates.Furthermore,these
policiesappeartohaveshiftedovertimeatleastinthecaseofsomedonors.
Althoughtraditionaldonorsregardedthemwithunease,emergingdonors
growinginternationalroletranslatedintoaninvitationtoparticipateindebates
aboutinternationalcooperation,coordinationandaideffectiveness.While
emergingdonorshavebeeninvolvedinsomeofthedebatesaboutreforminghow
developmentassistanceisprovided,theyhavenonethelessremainedwaryofOECD-
generateddevelopmentassistanceframeworks.Forinstancethe2005Paris
DeclarationonAidEffectivenessthatemergedoutofaninternationalforum
attendedbybothdonorsandrecipientcountries“promisedarevisedaidsystem,
withcommitmentstoimproveownership,alignment,harmonization,resultsand
mutualaccountability.”AnumberofemergingdonorsincludingSaudiArabia,
Kuwait,SouthAfrica,Brazil,China,andTurkeyparticipatedintheforum,.This
meetingwasfollowedbytheAccraAgendaforActionin2008inwhichagainboth
traditionalandemergingdonorsparticipated62.Mostemergingdonorsarelistedas
adheringtoboththeParisDeclarationandAccraAgenda.63Nonetheless,emerging
donorshavenotendorsedtheNewDealforEngagementinFragileStatesadopted
62TheAccraAgendaforAction“containsthefirsttrilateralcooperation(amongtraditionalandemergingdonorsandrecipientcountries)foundinofficialDACcircles.”JanWouters,Jean-ChristopheDefraigne,MatthieuBurnay,editors.China,theEuropeanUnion,andtheDevelopingWorld:aTriangularRelationship.EdwardElgerPublishing,2015,406.63Afulllistofcountriesadheringtobothcanbefoundathttp://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/countriesterritoriesandorganisationsadheringtotheparisdeclarationandaaa.htm
27
duringthe2011Busanconferenceonaideffectiveness.64Brazil,ChinaandIndiadid
signontotheBusanPartnershipforEffectiveDevelopmentCooperationbutonly
after“demandingtheinsertionoflanguagedistancingnon-OECDdonorsfrom
concretecommitments.”65
SouthAfricaandIndonesiahavebeeninvitedtoparticipateasobserversin
theOECDWorkingPartyonAidEffectivenessandChinaandBrazilinOECD-
sponsoredInternationalDialogueonPeacebuildingandStatebuilding(IDPS)which
providesaforumfordiscussingwiththeg7+groupoffragilestates,donorsandcivil
societygroups.Despitetheseinvitations,emergingpowershavebeenabsentfrom
deliberationsoftheInternationalDialogueonPeacebuildingandStatebuilding.66,
Inotherwords,althoughtheemergingdonorsparticipatedinmanyofthe
forumswherenewaidarchitecturewasbeingdeveloped,providedfundstovarious
multilateralorganizationsforbothdevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance,and
contributedincreasingnumbersoftroopstoUnitedNationspeaceoperations,this
64FritzNganje,“SouthernVoices:Two-WaySocializationBetweenTraditionalandEmergingDonorsCriticalforEffectiveDevelopmentCooperation,”AfricaCloseUp,January6,2014,WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars(http://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org).ThePeacebuidlingandStatebuildinggoalsthatformtheNewDealfocusinclude:Legitimatepolitics(fosterinclusivesettlementsandconflictresolution);security(establishandstrengthenpeople’ssecurity);justice(addressinjusticesandincreasepeople’saccesstojustice);economicfoundations(generateemploymentandimprovelivelihoods);andrevenueandservices(managerevenueandbuildcapacityforaccountabilityandfairservicedelivery),EuropeanCommission,Conflict,FragilityandDevelopment.65InternationalPeaceInstitute,IssueBrief“BusanandBeyond:ImplementingtheNewDealfor“FragileStates,”July2012,5.66Forafulllistofparticipatingcountriesseehttp://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/id/participating-countries-and-organisations/
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didnotimplythattheysharedsimilarunderstandingaboutthesecurity-
developmentnexusastraditionaldonors.
InSeptember2015theinternationalcommunityformallyadoptedthe
SustainableDevelopmentGoalsattheUnitedNationsmeetinginNewYorkCity.The
SDGsformallyreplacedtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsandrepresentedashift
inhowdevelopmentatthegloballevelwasconceptualizedandsignaledashiftin
therelationshipbetweenGlobalNorthandGlobalSouth.Inparticular,thedebates
aroundthecontentofSDGsindicatedthegrowingimportanceofemergingdonorsin
thedebatesaboutglobaldevelopmentarchitecture.Althoughthenegotiationsover
SDGsaimedatmakingtheprocessmoreinclusiveandintegratingvoicesfromthe
GlobalSouthintothedebates(unlikeinthecaseofMDGnegotiationswhichwere
muchmoretopdown),inrealitytheabilityofmanydelegationsformtheGlobal
SouthtoparticipateonanequalfootingwiththosefromtheGlobalNorthwas
constrainedbylimitedresources.Nonethelessemergingdonorsplayedan
importantroleinthenegotiations.ThedebateswithintheOpenWorkingGroup
wereoftenquitecontentiouswithsharpdivisionsaroundsuchissuesas
reproductiverights,climatechange,ruleoflaw,sustainableconsumption,and
modesofimplementationamongothers.Theseconflictsmirroredthebroader
divideinhowtraditionalandemergingdonorsaswellasrecipientsofaid,viewthe
globaldevelopmentarchitecture.Inparticular,theattitudesabouttheappropriate
relationshipbetweenassistanceandgoodgovernanceconditionalitiescontinueto
divergebetweentraditionalandemergingdonors,withtheformerfavoringthem
29
whilethelattercontinuingtoviewthemasunnecessaryandunwelcome
interferenceindomesticpolicies.67’
OneofthekeycontentiousissuesinthenegotiationsaroundtheSDGswas
Goal16:Peace,JusticeandStrongInstitutions.Thegoalexplicitlylinkedissuesof
economicdevelopmentandthereductionofviolence.68Formanyatthenegotiating
table,inparticularfromtheGlobalSouththereweredeepconcernsthatthelinking
ofdevelopmentandsecuritywouldinevitablyleadtothesecurtizationofthe
developmentagenda,“withaidbeingusedtoadvancethenationalsecurityagenda
67SophieHermanns,“North-SouthPerspectivesonSustainableDevelopmentGoals,”paperpresentedatthePerspectivesontheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsAgenda:AbackgroundBriefingforRethinkingSustainability,ReysonUniversity,Toronto,October2,2104(http://academicsstand.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Rethinking-Sustainability-Background-Briefing.pdf)
68 Init’sfinal,adoptedversionGoal16reads:“Peace,stability,humanrightsandeffectivegovernancebasedontheruleoflawareimportantconduitsforsustainabledevelopment.Wearelivinginaworldthatisincreasinglydivided.Someregionsenjoysustainedlevelsofpeace,securityandprosperitywhileothersfallintoseeminglyendlesscyclesofconflictandviolence.Thisisbynomeansinevitableandmustbeaddressed.
Highlevelsofarmedviolenceandinsecurityhaveadestructiveimpactonacountry’sdevelopment,affectingeconomicgrowthandoftenresultinginlongstandinggrievancesamongcommunitiesthatcanlastforgenerations.Sexualviolence,crime,exploitationandtorturearealsoprevalentwherethereisconflictornoruleoflaw,andcountriesmusttakemeasurestoprotectthosewhoaremostatrisk.
TheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)aimtosignificantlyreduceallformsofviolence,andworkwithgovernmentsandcommunitiestofindlastingsolutionstoconflictandinsecurity.Strengtheningtheruleoflawandpromotinghumanrightsiskeytothisprocess,asisreducingtheflowofillicitarmsandstrengtheningtheparticipationofdevelopingcountriesintheinstitutionsofglobalgovernance.”(http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-16.html)
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ofparticularStates,ratherthantopromotedevelopmentforpeople.”69Therewere
alsoconcernsabouttheframingofthisgoalprovidinganopportunityforsome
donorstoviolaterecipientcountries’sovereignty.Therewerealsoconcernsthat
“peace-relatedtargetscouldtranslateintonewaidconditionalities.”70
Someofthemostrecentpublicstatementsofemergingdonorsregardingthe
linkagebetweensecurityanddevelopmenthavecomeattheUnitedNations
SecurityCouncilmeetingheldshortlyaftertheterroristattacksinParisin
November2015.Theyhighlightsomeofthepersistingkeydifferencesbetween
traditionalandemergingdonors.Atthemeeting,ChineseAmbassadorLiuJieyi,
affirmingthelong-standingprincipalofnon-interferenceandrespectforstate-
sovereignty,statedthat,
Thepresentworldisfarfrompeaceful.Regionalconflictsarespreadingandtherootcauseshaveyettobeeliminated(…)Theimbalanceininternationaldevelopmentisstriking.Thepathtoachievinglastingpeaceandcommonprosperityislong.Establishinganewtypeofinternationalrelationshipcenteredaroundwin-wincooperationandbuildingacommunityofcommondestinyforhumankindisafundamentalguaranteeforpromotingpeaceanddevelopmentandeliminatingtherootcausesofconflictsaroundtheworld(…)Allcountriesmustbetreatedequallyandtheirsovereigntyandterritorialintegritymustberespected.Thereshouldbenointerventionintheinternalaffairsofothercountriesandtherightsofothercountriestoindependentlychoosetheirsocialsystemsanddevelopmentpathsshouldberespected.71
69LarryAtreeandAnnaMoller-Loswick,“Goal16–EnsuringPeaceinthePost-2015Framework:Adoption,ImplementationandMonitoring,”April17,2015,Safterworl.70Ibid.71StatementofAmbassadorLiuJieyiattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil7561stmeeting,November17,2015.
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TheRussianAmbassadorChurkin’sviews,duringthesamedebate,hintedat
someofthetensionsinhowtraditionalandemergingdonorscontinuetoviewthe
relationshipbetweensecurityanddevelopment,
Despiteits[thetopicofthatday’sdiscussion]innocuousappearances,poses,inourview,certainrisksfortheSecurityCouncil.Ontheonehand,itdoesnottakemuchimaginationtounderstandthatthereisadefinitelinkbetweensecurityanddevelopment.Thedangerliesinmakingthatanabsolutetruthinahastyattempttocraftsomesortofuniversalapproachtoresolvingproblemsinthecontextofsecurityanddevelopment(…)Excessivefocusonanyoneaspectofsecuritymeansthatwelosesightofmanyothers,includingterritorial,ideological,historical,religious,psychological,environmentalandtechnologicalaspects(…)ThedevelopmentofStatesisaprocessthatcannotbeforcedintoimplementation.Thereisnoonerightanswer.Theprocesscanbeassistedbutnotimposed.72
AmbassadorChurkinquitealsoexplicitlycritiquedthestatebuildingmodel
advocatedbytraditionaldonorsandtheinterferenceindomesticaffairsofstates,
highlightingthepotential“destructiveimpactofbothsidesoftheequation[security
anddevelopment].”Forhispart,theBrazilianAmbassadorAntoniodeAguiar
Patriotanotedthat,
Brazilhaslongupheldthenotionthatdevelopmentandsecurityareqcloselyinterconnected,mutuallyreinforcingandcentraltotheachievementoflastingpeace(…)However,therelationshipbetweensecurityanddevelopmentcannotbeunderstoodfromasimplisticperspective.Weshouldclearlyrejectanynotionthatpovertyitselfmightconstituteathreattopeace.Oneshouldnotlosesightofthefactthatthegravestthreatstointernationalpeaceandsecurity,includingworldwars,havehistoricallyrisenfromtensionsbetweendevelopedindustrialnations.Militaristicagendasandtheunilateraluseofforcearefarmoresignificantsourcesofinstabilitythanpovertyperse(…)Understandingandtacklingtherootcausesofconflictareakeystepinpreventingtheemergenceofnewhostilities(…)Somechallengesareparticularlyfrequent,includingeconomicandsocialinequality,
72StatementofAmbassadorChurkinattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil7561stmeeting,November17,2015.
32
disputesregardingownershipoflandandnaturalresources,humanrightsviolations,theinsufficientparticipationofwomenandthemarginalizationofminoritiesandvulnerablepopulations(…)Discerningtherootcausesofaparticularconflictisacomplexendeavorthatshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeattainmentofadevelopmentagenda.Thefirstsilotobebrokendownbythisdebateistheerroneousperceptionthatonlydevelopingcountriesneedtobuildpeacefulandinclusivesocieties.73
TheIndianAmbassador,Mr.Bishnoi,concurredwiththeassessmentthat
peaceanddevelopmentareinterconnected,withabsenceofdevelopmentoften
contributingtoasenseofrelativedeprivationwhichmaydriveconflict.However,
hesawanthecausesofcurrentconflictselsewhere,
Thegreatestthreattopeaceandsecuritycomesfromviolentextremismandreligiousfanaticism,notfromtheabsenceofsocialandeconomicdevelopment(…)WeneedtoalsoacknowledgethatitistheabsenceofStateauthority,orweakStateauthority,thatprovidesthebreedinggroundforextremistorganizationstooperate.74
OnlyTurkey’srepresentativevoicedsupportforamorecomprehensiveapproachto
addressingcyclesofconflict.Theseneedtoinclude,AmbassadorCevikargued,the
promotionoftheruleoflawandpromotionofhumanrights,goodgovernanceand
institutionalbuilding,securitysectorreformaswellasaddressingpoliticaland
economiccausesofconflict,notingthat,“Inequality,notjustofincomesbutalsoof
opportunities,isasourceofsocialandpoliticalinstability.”75Theserecent
statementsunderscorethekeydifferencesbothamongemergingdonorsand
73StatementbyAmbassadorAntioniodeAguairPatriotaattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil7561stmeeting,November17,2015.74StatementbyAmbassadorBishnoiattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil7561stmeeting,November17,2015.75StatementbyAmbassadorCevikattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil7561stmeeting,November17,2015.ItwillbeinterestingtoseeifthesepositionsbeginshiftinginlightofthetighteningofpoliticalspaceinTurkeyinrecentmonths.
33
betweenemergingandtraditionaldonorsregardingthesecurity-development
nexus.
Conclusion
Emergingdonorsareplayingamuchmoresignificantrolethanjustadecade
agoinprovidinghumanitariananddevelopmentassistance,includingtocountries
affectedbyconflict.Itisimportanttounderscore,however,thatmanyofthese
emergingdonors,suchasRussiaorArabGulfStates,havebeendonorsforalong
time,andothersIndiainparticular,hasbeenprovidingpeacekeepingtroopstoUN
operationsfordecades.Nonethelesstheircurrentlevelsofengagementare
unprecedented.
Asthispapernoted,thereareanumberofchallengesinassessingthelevelof
thatengagementsincemostemergingdonorsarenotmembersofDAC,oftendonot
haveasingleagencychargedwithprovidingdevelopmentassistanceandtheir
assistanceportfolioslookquitedifferentfromtraditionaldonors,andincludefor
instanceincludingexportscreditsandsoftloans.Thesefactorscombinedoften
makeitdifficulttoaccuratelyassesstheirlevelsofinvolvement.
Nonetheless,somekeyconclusionscanbedrawn.First,whileinitiallymost
emergingdonorschanneledassistanceprimarilytowardstheirimmediate
geographicneighborhood,overtimetheirreachexpandedandassistancenowgoes
toabroaderarrayofstates.Second,althoughemergingdonorsoftenframetheir
relationshipswithrecipientsofaidincollaborativetermsthateschewthenotionsof
hierarchytheyseeintraditionaldonors’engagementwithdevelopingcountries,the
34
motivesfortheirprovisionoffinancingarevariedandincludeeconomic,political
andstrategicobjectives.Third,therearesignificantdifferencesamongemerging
donorsthemselves.
Whenitcomestoemergingpowersengagementwithconflict-affectedstates,
emergingdonorsliketraditionaldonorsareinterestedinsupportingpoverty-
reductionandencouragingconditionsfavorabletoforeigndirectinvestment.
However,theyaremuchmorefocusedontechnicalassistanceratherthancapacity
buildingandtheirfundingtendtobebilateralprovidingandtendnottosupport
civilsocietyorganizations,somethingthattraditionaldonorsdo.Ontheotherhand,
emergingdonorstendnotfavorconditionalitiesandtyingassistancetogood
governancereformsorenvironmentalpoliciesalthoughsome,likeBrazilandSouth
Africadosupportstrengtheningdemocraticpractices.
Finally,althoughemergingandtraditionaldonorsbothseealinkbetween
securityanddevelopmentthereremainprofounddifferencesinhowthatlinkage
shouldbeunderstood.Whiletherearealsodifferencesamongemergingdonorsin
howtheyconceptualizetherelationshipbetweensecurityanddevelopment,oneof
thecommonconcernsisaboutsecuritizationofdevelopmentpoliciesandseeing
povertyasthesolecauseofglobalconflicts.