1970

A Strike Is Called

Carriers in a Common Cause � 70

Not surprisingly, New York was the center of the drama, for thecity itself had been a cauldron of social unrest, with protestsagainst the Vietnam War, urban race riots, strikes by teachers,transportation and sanitation workers dominating the news for

several years. Angry Branch 36 members had already raised their voicesprotesting the federal government’s indifference to their plight and theirown union’s ambivalence, and they became enraged in early February1970, when Nixon deferred a wage increase scheduled for July 1.

But the spark that lit the fuse was the news that on March 12, a Housecommittee approved a bill reflecting the Nixon-Rademacher compro-mise. At the regular branch meeting that same day, Branch 36 PresidentGustave Johnson was interrupted as he delivered a report about theNixon-Rademacher bill. Although the branch’s executive board had earli-er directed stewards to tell carriers to oppose calling for a strike, angrycarriers exploded with shouts of “No, no! Not enough! Strike! Enoughtalk! Strike!” and demanded a strike vote. Raucous debate verging on abrawl ended with an agreement to meet again the next Tuesday, March17, and hold a strike vote at that time.

But with Branch 36’s leaders, supported by Rademacher, dead setagainst a strike and fearful that a meeting might work to the benefit ofthe more militant members of the branch, the officers arranged only forthe vote. With members’ credentials challenged in an effort to discour-age voting and creating long lines at the voting machines, the vote onMarch 17, 1970 at the Manhattan Center dragged on until around 10:30p.m. Some 30 minutes later, the results were announced to the members:1,555—yes; 1,055—no. NALC’s largest local had chosen by a 3-to-2 mar-gin to strike against the U.S. Government regardless of whether thenational union joined the strike.

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Johnson told the cheering members,“There will be no mail delivery tomor-row in New York,” adding, “Your voicehas been heard tonight.” The leader ofNew York Metro Area Postal Workers,the union representing the insideworkers in the post office, said hismembers would honor carriers’ picketlines even though they could not votewhether to strike until the union’s nextregular meeting in three weeks. ButBrooklyn Branch 41’s president imme-diately announced that his carrierswould join the strike. Letter carriershad taken a stand. The long-threatenedstrike was on.

Since Branch 36 had night routers,the strike began throughout Manhattanand the Bronx earlier than elsewhere inthe New York area. At 12:01 a.m.,March 18, members of Branch 36 setup picket lines outside post officesand, although not all the members hadvoted, almost every letter carrier inBranch 36 stayed out. Immediately,over 25,000 postal clerks and drivers—members of the giant Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union—honored thepicket lines. And later in the morning,when carriers in Brooklyn and in manyparts of Long Island, northern NewJersey and nearby Connecticut shouldhave reported to work, many of theirbranches joined the strike.

And then the wildfire swept the nation:Branch 34, Boston, Massachusetts;Branch 157, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;Branch 1, Detroit, Michigan; Branch 40,Cleveland, Ohio; Branch 84, Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania; Branch 214, San Francisco,California; Branch 9, Minneapolis and

Carriers in a Common Cause � 71

1970

Postal strikers at the 369th Regimental Armory in New York City refusing to

return to work.

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Pickets on duty at the

Dearborn, Michigan Post Office.Ira Rosenberg, Detroit Free Press

First day on a

new job: A soldier

from Fort Dix, NJ

sorts mail at the

Brooklyn General

Post Office. Barton Silverman, The New York Times

Bill Braginetz said it best—infact, said it so well that today,years later, I remember it wordfor word: “For the first time, I finally feel like a humanbeing,” he told me with tears in his eyes on the afternoon ofMarch 18, 1970, as we walkedup and down East 45th Streetin front of the Grand CentralStation post office inManhattan where we hadworked together for more than two decades—Bill, alwaysthe perfect carrier, on time allthe time, and me, always thecut up and far from perfect.

Shortly before midnight, Iwalked across Manhattantoward Grand Central Stationpost office on the East Sidewith two other Grand Centralcarriers—Eddie Morris andCharlie Sprinkle. Eddie andCharlie had grabbed sheets ofoak tag from my truck for pick-et signs, and we carried somewooden barriers, used earlierthat day for the St. Patrick’sDay parade, over to East 45thStreet outside the post office. At midnight, about a hundrednight letter carrier routers andall the clerks and other postalemployees poured out of thebuilding to join us, and everycarrier and clerk just then com-ing to work honored the line.

Personal recollections of Vincent R. Sombrotto,Branch 36, New York, NY

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Carriers in a Common Cause � 72

Carriers in a Common Cause � 73

1970

Branch 28, St. Paul, Minnesota; Branch47, Denver, Colorado; Branch 11,Chicago, Illinois. In large and small com-munities alike, from coast to coast, lettercarriers and postal clerks walked off theirjobs, joined the picket line, and dug in forthe duration. By March 23 the strikersnumbered over 200,000 strong.

Victory!

Almost immediately afterBranch 36 set up picket lineson March 18, the Nixon admin-

istration began maneuvering to crackthe workers’ revolt. Governmentlawyers in New York obtained aninjunction ordering a return to work.But Branch 36’s strikers defied theorder. As the walk-out spread, morecourt orders were issued, and localNALC leaders found themselves in thenearly unprecedented and certainlyuncomfortable position of seekinglegal aid and, in some cases, dodgingfederal process servers.

As the strike reached across thecountry, NALC President JamesRademacher was caught between hisloyalty to his members and his concernfor the union’s future. The incendiaryrhetoric he had employed in New York the previous year when, in theaftermath of the two job actions in theBronx, he had vowed to lead a strike if

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The troops arrive

in New York City.United Press International

United Press International

pay legislation wasnot enacted withina few weeks, mayhave helped fuelthe flames ofrevolt. Rademacherunderstood all thereasons why hismembers walkedoff their jobs tofight. Yet he feared

that if he assumed leadership of thewildcat strike, making it official, thegovernment would totally crush theunion—bankrupt it with fines, padlockits offices, strip away its jurisdiction,jail its officers and fire its members.Rademacher later would acknowledgethat there are times when workers haveno choice but to strike—he simply feltthat the morning of March 18 was notsuch a time.

Trying to escape his dilemma andend the crisis, Rademacher firstattempted to persuade the strikers toreturn to work. After being assured bythe Nixon administration that negotia-tions would begin once the strikeended and only then, the NALC presi-dent carried this message to an emer-gency meeting of the presidents of theunion’s 300 largest branches on March20 in Washington, DC. He personallyurged the presidents to call their mem-bers back to work so he could pursue

negotiations, and in a spirited, noisy session, hundreds of local leadersaccepted the idea with this proviso: If agreement were not reached in fivedays, NALC would stage a nationwidework stoppage.

The next day, Saturday, March 21,Rademacher sent a telegram to all6,500 NALC branches outlining theplan—return to work Monday andallow five days for negotiations beforetaking nationwide action. But theback-to-work appeal had virtually noimpact on the picket lines, because formany of the strikers, the wildcat wasaimed as much at the union’s failuresas it was at the government’s. At ameeting of Branch 36 the same day,the members voted almost unani-mously to stay off the job, and acrossthe country other branches voted towalk out or stay out.

His efforts at persuasion havingfailed, Rademacher turned on thestrikers: At a press conference Sunday,March 22, he charged that the NewYork City walkout had been instigatedpartly by “subversive” elements—members of the left-wing Students for a Democratic Society. Rademacheralso threatened Branch 36’s leaderswith expulsion from the NALC, andsent national officers out to the field to quash support for the strike.

Carriers in a Common Cause � 74

Striking letter carriers

in Paterson, New Jersey.United Press International

Carriers in a Common Cause � 75

1970

But on the picket lines, most strik-ing carriers and clerks were not listen-ing to the administration’s promisesnor those of Rademacher, for despitethe pleas from the national union,fewer than 60 of some 200 branchesout on strike returned to work. Pres -ident Nixon, with business interestsclamoring for action and the effects ofthe strike rolling across the country,went on the offensive on March 23 inan effort to end the crisis. On nation-wide television, Nixon took his case tothe American people and declared anational emergency. He also ordered25,000 soldiers into New York City tomove the mail. Not since GroverCleveland became the first presidentto order troops to break a strike bycalling infantry, cavalry and artilleryunits to end the 1894 Pullman railroadstrike in Chicago had a presidentresorted to such a desperate and ill-conceived move. The troops were inef-fective: They never moved much mail,as shipments had been embargoedacross the country and the militaryunits had none of the skills craft work-

ers possessed. Still, Nixon’s use of soldiers as scabs, his implied threat tosend troops to other cities, the mount-ing legal pressure and threatenedfines, criticism of the wildcat action byAFL-CIO President George Meany plusRademacher’s appeals and claims ofprogress, together convinced manypostal workers to return to work. Butnot the strikers in New York City.

It was only when the officers ofBranch 36, relaying information pro vided by the union’s national leadership, assured the striking lettercarriers that an agreement had beenreached with the administration thatseemed to meet nearly every demanddid the carriers and clerks in New YorkCity put down their picket signs andreturn to work. But no such agreementexisted, for what became known as the“phantom package” was simply NALC’sproposal—a retroactive 12 percent payincrease, fully paid health benefits, aneight-year pay scale, collective bargain-ing with binding arbitration, and fullamnesty for the strikers. Whether thiswas a deliberate deception, as many

The mail began to pile up

as letter carriers and

postal clerks went out

on strike in Chicago.AP Wide World Photos

believed at the time, or a misunder-standing, the effect was an end to thestrike. The New York carriers neverformally voted to return to work, butthe eight-day revolt was over. First togo out and last to go back, New YorkCity’s letter carriers had shown aresolve and courage that would notbe forgotten.

As soon as the New York strikersreturned to their jobs, Rademacherand other postal union leaders,assisted by the AFL-CIO, beganround-the-clock negotiations withthe Post Office Department. By April2, the parties reached an agreementthey believed would satisfy thedemands of the carriers and clerkswho, at great personal risk, haddefied both the federal governmentand their national leaders.

The “Memorandum of Agree -ment” expressed the postal unions’and the Department’s accord in fourbasic areas: pay increases totaling 14 percent—6 percent retroactive toDecember 27, 1969, and another 8percent effective whenever a postalreform bill was enacted; support forthe establishment of an independentpostal authority; collective bargain-ing over wages, hours and workingconditions with unresolved issues tobe settled through final and bindingarbitration; and “compression” of thetime required for postal workers toreach the top step of their grade levelfrom 21 years to eight.

Congress quickly approved the 6 percent retroactive pay increase,and this became law on April 15.Obtaining congressional approval of the remaining elements of theMemorandum of Agreement provedmore difficult, and it was not until

August 12, 1970, that the PostalReorganization Act became law.Letter carriers and other postalworkers had, at long last, achievedfull collective bargaining with theiremployer. Rademacher himselfwould be partly vindicated, for as the decades ahead proved, the postal reform legislation he had supported brought collective bar-gaining to postal employees, freeingthem from “collective begging”—the total dependence on the goodwishes and wisdom of their electedrepresentatives.

Still, only with the strike couldcarriers have achieved substantialeconomic and legislative gains. Thelong struggle of letter carriers fordignity and justice had taken a greatstep forward. The strike—what newsmagazines at the time termed the“Revolt of the Good Guys”—was anuncoordinated, spontaneous upris-ing of aggrieved workers, longing not only for economic justice but alsofor a voice and a recognition of their dignity and humanity.

For many letter carriers, it wasalso a protest against local andnational leaders whose concern fortheir members was outweighed bytheir understandable fear of what an all-powerful federal governmentcould do to their union and theirown liberty. As a result, they vacillat-ed while the anger and resentment of carriers in New York and elsewherein the country grew. In the end, thestrikers changed the Postal Serviceand their union. And yet the strugglefor dignity and justice would contin-ue in the years ahead—on differentbattlefields and with differentweapons.

Carriers in a Common Cause � 76

The years of what some deemed “collective begging” were over.