a study on the muslim world's and great powers’ approaches

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A STUDY ON THE MUSLIM WORLD’S AND GREAT

POWERS’ APPROACHES TOWARDS IRAN’S

NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE EFFECTS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

BY

MR. SAKHANAN RATTANARUNGSUN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF

ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

ACADEMIC YEAR 2016

COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY


A STUDY ON THE MUSLIM WORLD’S AND GREAT

POWERS’ APPROACHES TOWARDS IRAN’S

NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE EFFECTS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

BY

MR. SAKHANAN RATTANARUNGSUN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF

ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

ACADEMIC YEAR 2016

COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY


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Thesis Title A STUDY ON THE MUSLIM WORLD‘S AND

GREAT POWERS‘ APPROACHES TOWARDS

IRAN‘S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE

EFFECTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

Author Mr. Sakhanan Rattanarungsun

Degree Master of Arts

Major Field/Faculty/University International Relations

Faculty of Political Science

Thammasat University

Thesis Advisor Professor Jaran Maluleem, Ph.D

Academic Years 2016

ABSTRACT

The Islamic Republic of Iran‘s (or Iran) nuclear program is one of the

most significant subjects in contemporary international relations, one which has

significant impacts on our contemporary world. Whether its nuclear program is used

for the generation of potential energy for civilian proposes or a move towards the

development of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) depends

on inherent political and economic (politico-economic power) benefits and the

individual actors‘ aims.

The study illustrates the Muslim World‘s and the Great Powers‘

approaches towards Iran‘s nuclear program in order to understand their motives in

international relations. Recently, a nuclear deal was signed on 14 July 2015 which

resulted in the lifting of a majority of sanctions against Iran on ‗Implementation Day‘.

Nevertheless, the study in this paper examines the issue from the realists and balance

of power perspectives together with the Muslim Ummah and Liberal

Intergovernmentalism schools of thought. The Muslim World‘s approach to the issue

is also taken into consideration in order to gain solidarity among Islamic countries and

to ensure the survival of the regime.


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The balance of power study confirms the existence of a concealed power

matching move. Iran is using their nuke capabilities in an attempt to become a

formidable voice on the international platform and even to inferior states. In the

Muslim World‘s case, Iran‘s move was to deter the influence of the Great Powers in

the region. Based on studies from realism, states will do what is necessary to

guarantee their own survival in an international system. However, when the study of

the balance of power is also considered, it is quite clear that states remain suspicious

of one another and will cooperate only when they have to. Therefore, the Great

Powers may seem to approach Iran‘s nuclear issue to avert terrorism. Nevertheless, in

a region with large power resources and a country located on the main marine route,

there is evidence that individual countries of the Great Powers want to extend their

power over the region for their own political and economic benefits.

Keywords: The Great Power, Nuclear Program, Iran, International Policy,

International Relations, JCPOA, Balance of Power, Muslim Ummah, Muslim World,

Realist, Middle East, WMD, IAEA, Organization of the Islamic Conference, OIC.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis advisor,

Professor Dr. Jaran Maluleem, for his support and insightful guidance on my paper. In

addition, I am thankful to my thesis committees: Assistant Professor Dr. Pisanu

Sunthraraks and Dr. Pichai Israbhakdi for their invaluable guidance and advice.

Secondly, I would also like to thank my family for all their support

throughout my Master‘s study.

Mr. Sakhanan Rattanarungsun


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT (1)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (3)

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Background and Significance of the Study 1

1.1.1 History of Iran‘s Nuclear Program 1

1.1.2 The Importance of Middle East and Muslim World 3

1.1.3 The Importance of Great Powers 3

1.1.4 Driving forces behind Iran‘s nuclear issue 4

1.1.5 Significance of this study 7

1.2 Research Objectives 7

1.3 Research Questions 8

1.4 Hypothesis 8

1.5 Theoretical Framework 9

1.6 Scope of the study 10

1.7 Research Methodology 10

1.7.1 Data Collection 10

1.7.2 Data Analysis 11

1.8 Literature Review 11

CHAPTER 2 IRAN‘S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND AFFECTS: PERSPECTIVE 17

FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

2.1 The Background of Nuclear Evolution in the Middle East 17

2.2 Balance of Power in the Middle East 19

2.2.1 Iran in Perspective 20

2.2.2 Iran Nuclear Activities and the Middle East 21


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2.2.3 Iran‘s Nuclear Program and the Balance of Power 22

2.3 Israel 23

2.3.1 Israel in Perspective 23

2.3.2 Israel‘s Nuclear Concern 24

2.3.3 Israel and Iran Relations 26

2.4 Saudi Arabia 28

2.4.1 Saudi Arabia in Perspective 28

2.4.2 Saudi Arabia‘s Nuclear Concern 29

2.4.3 Saudi Arabia and Iran Relations 31

2.5 Turkey 31

2.5.1 Turkey in Perspective 31

2.5.2 Turkey‘s Nuclear Concern 32

2.5.3 Turkey and Iran Relations 35

2.6 Egypt 36

2.6.1 Egypt in Perspective 36

2.6.2 Egypt‘s Nuclear Concern 37

2.6.3 Egypt and Iran Relations 39

2.7 Overall Conclusion on the Balance of Power in the Middle East 39

CHAPTER 3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN‘S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 41

3.1 The history of Iran before Islamic conquest and Islamization 41

3.2 Sunni/Shiite division 43

3.3 The Early stages of Iran‘s Nuclear Program 44

3.3.1 Atoms for Peace 44

3.3.2 The Shah‘s Nuclear Program 47

3.4 The Islamic Republic Iran‘s Nuclear Program 50

CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF OIC ON IRAN‘S NUCLEAR ISSUE 53


4.1.1 Muslim Ummah approach 54


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4.1.2 Intergovernmentalism approach 58

4.2 The two Islamic Republic of Iran‘s Presidents 2005- present 62

4.3 The OIC Significance 64

4.4 The Role of OIC on Iran‘s Nuclear Issue 67

CHAPTER 5 THE ROLE OF GREAT POWERS ON IRAN‘S NUCLEAR 69

ISSUE


5.1.1 Realist Approach 70

5.1.2 Balance of Power Approach 80

5.2 Multilateral Relations 84

CHAPTER 6 THE MUSLIM WORLD‘S VS THE GREAT POWERS‘ 89

RESPONSE TO IRAN‘S NUCLEAR POWER

6.1 International Level 89

6.1.1 Power Struggle 90

6.1.2 Key Players 92

6.2 Regional Level 93



6.3 Domestic Level 98



6.4 The Muslim World‘s vs the Great Powers‘ Response to 101

Iran‘s Nuclear Power

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 103

7.1 Summary 103


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7.1.1 What are the Muslim World‘s Approaches towards 104

Iran‘s Nuclear Issue?

7.1.2 What are the Great Powers‘ Approaches towards 105

Iran‘s Nuclear Issue?

7.1.3 What are Different Approaches between the Muslim 106

World and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s Nuclear Issue?

7.2 Recommendation 108

REFERENCES 110

BIOGRAPHY 121


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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Significance of the Study

1.1.1 History of Iran’s Nuclear Program

It has been assumed that the nuclear issue of Iran has been the most

controversial subjects of the world affairs, one which greatly impacts the world today.

Tehran points out that its nuclear program is to generate necessary energy for civilian

proposes including for electricity, fuel, and medical facilities in order to substitute

their traditional dependencies. Nevertheless, other countries, especially Western and

European ones, perceive their nuclear ambitions as an attempt to move towards the

nuclear expansions that tend to be a series of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction).

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (2014), Iran has been

interested in a nuclear program since the 1950s. In 1953, due to the support from the

US, a nuclear non-proliferation scheme with the Atoms for Peace Program was

initiated (Cirincione, 2007). However, Iran had to notify and agree on NPT (the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) together with 190 States and

declare itself as a country with non-nuclear weapons in 1970. The main objective of

this agreement is that all states should have a right to benefit from nuclear power for

civilian usage, whereas they must not use it for the military reasons. There were five

countries that donated nuclear devices for this program, which are, the United States

of America (USA), United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. The regulator and

authentication that established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

ensures that NPT member states comply with the agreement (Cirincione, 2007).

The NPT has faced a rigid crisis since the Conference in 2005. The US

and European Union (EU) and the US demanded members‘ dedication to non-

proliferation and non-nuclear warhead countries to demobilize their nuclear military

warehouses owned by the five states with nuclear weapons (Pilat, 2007). Müller

(2005) also stated that Articles III and IV NPT state that each member has an

opportunity to use the nuclear power for peaceful means, as well as the right to

develop a capability of domestic nuclear enhancement.


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Iran is at the centre of international attention due to its nuclear program.

There are many motivations for the increased interest in its foreign and security

policies since Iran has shown their support for ‗political militant groups‘ in Lebanon

and the Palestinian Territory as well as in the conflict areas of its neighbours,

Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to these reasons, there is cause for concern (Zimmermann,

2004). Besides, Iran has caused on-going and intense debates about its nuclear

program for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation goals. This debate has caused

Iran to declare its nuclear activities to the IAEA, according to Iran‘s IAEA Safeguards

Agreement (Zimmermann, 2004). However, the limitations of their nuclear program‘s

expansion was limited by the revolution in Iran as well as the Iran-Iraq war in the

1990s (NTI, 2014).

So far, the situation concerning Iran's nuclear program is hanging in the

balance. While the so called ‗carrot and stick‘ actions in the form of economic

sanctions and diplomatic dialogues such as the P5+1 have been initiated with Tehran,

Iran‘s nuclear program is still ongoing. On the other hand, the countries in the Middle

East region are definitely affected by this nuclear issue. Therefore, Middle East

countries are responding strongly to this inevitable issue. The Organization of the

Islamic Conference (OIC) is a large organization in the Muslim World (including Iran

as a member) that aims to maintain peace, common interests, and unify the efforts of

the Member States (NTI, 2014). Therefore, it is interesting to examine their response

to Iran‘s nuclear pursuits.

1.1.2 The Importance of the Middle East and Muslim World

During the course of the history of the Middle East, ample valuable

resources, e.g. fossil fuel energy, oil, freshwater, and natural gas have been

discovered. Ejjeh (2007) claimed that there are over 15,233 working desalination

stations in the Middle East region, with a capability of around 32.4 million m3/day of

portable water. In addition, 60% of the total globe stations are found in this region. On

the contrary, only approximately 19.7% of the globe‘s seawater desalination

capability is found in the Caribbean and North America.

Asculai (2012) pointed out that alternative renewable energy resources

will not be able to replace existing nuclear electrical supplies, at least not in an


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economically viable manner in the near future. Furthermore, these alternative

technologies are very geographical-dependent, not suitable for all countries, and most

methods of production still bear higher costs than the production of nuclear

electricity. The factors that will drive future electrical supply trends include future

economic growth, growing demands for electrical power, and demands for the drastic

reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

As for economic considerations, Iran is an energy-rich state with huge gas

and oil supplies. Therefore it is why nuclear power programs are distinctly

uneconomical, even today. However, another reason to create a nuclear program is to

withhold oil reserves for the future, when prices would be higher. Besides, when

carbon-based fuel is more costly and a carbon tax has to be considered, nuclear

energy will be economically advantageous.

The huge financial resources are required in order to establish the nuclear

power in the Middle East, and they are already available to some for example in the

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and modestly available in other countries

such as Egypt, Libya and Algeria. Nevertheless, the nuclear power possibility is turn

out to be an issue of requirement in order to meet future freshwater and energy needs

in the region, since the natural gas and oil resources are estimated to be drained

around the following 50 years. Moreover, the shared costs of the operation and

construction of nuclear plants are more attractive than those of fossil fuel electrical

power plants. Therefore, through public and private partnerships, it could be

achievable to start and maintain a moderate nuclear program in the Arab countries of

Asia and North Africa beginning within the following 10-15 years (El-Genk, 2008).

Therefore, the Middle East and the Muslim World continue to be an

important region due to the fact that the countries in the region are energy rich.

However, these countries acknowledge that nuclear power is also crucial for their

future use. They attempt to generate power themselves by maintaining energy

resources along with the use of nuclear power.

1.1.3 The Importance of Great Powers

Many international relations academics believe that ‗Great Powers‘ is a

group of states which have big effects on the political world instead of the


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combination of many small states. Many scholars emphasize on the outcomes of the

expansion and weakening of this group of states.

Gilpin (1981, p. 30) stated that the countries are named as the Great

Powers, also called ‗superpowers‘, found and apply the principal regulations and

rights influencing their individual countries as well as those of other countries. Great

Powers are assumed to appreciate several benefits without the permission from many

countries.

According to Waltz, for instance, ―States are placed in the top rank

because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on

all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment,

economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence‖ (Waltz

1979, p. 131).

In this research, Great Powers refers to the United States (US), EU-3

(United Kingdom, France, Germany,) and China.

1.1.4 Driving Forces behind Iran’s Nuclear Issue

This part of the study is represented by a ‗timeline‘ table which is found

below. It clearly depicts the driving forces behind Iran‘s nuclear issues and the

consequences of Iran‘s recent negotiations with group P5+1 that took place.

Table 1.1

Timeline of Iranian Nuclear Program

1950s Shah of Iran began receiving support from the US through its „Atoms

for Peace‘ program.

1968 Iran signed the Treaty on the NPT (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons).

1970s Iran ratified NPT; nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution quickly ensued

and was followed by the Iran-War which limited the expansion of the

nuclear program.


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Table 1.1 Continued

1990‘s Iran‘s nuclear program grew its capacity throughout the expansion of

uranium mining infrastructure and the engagement of its enrichment

and conversion.

1989-

2003

From the years 1989 to 2003, under the radar of the international

community, there were acceleration activities.

2003-

2010

During this period, the nuclear conversion and enrichment activities

were suspended by Iran.

2003 The negotiations between EU-3 (France, Germany, UK) and Iran

2003 Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) which involved an agreement to suspend its nuclear

conversion and enrichment activities on a temporary-basis.

2004 The Paris Agreement between Iran and EU-3 was reached on a

consensus

2005 Iran resumed Nuclear conversion and enrichment operations leading to

almost a 20% increase of the amount reported in 2010.

2006 A series of diplomatic incidents from both parties, Iran and EU-3 were

recognized.

2009 Iran brought its construction of a second pilot enrichment facility to the

attention of IAEA.

2009 Iran and the P5+1 resumed their talks in Geneva and Vienna

respectively during which time representatives from the P5+1 and Iran

tentatively agreed to a fuel swap arrangement.

2010 Another set of sanctions under UNSCR 1929 aimed at Iranian nuclear

and investment activities were also approved by the UN Security

Council.

2010 Iran attempted to renegotiate with P5+1 through IAEA, but it was not

successful.

2010-

2011

There have been increased P5+1 talk from 2010 up until the present

day.


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Table 1.1 Continued

2011 US put more pressure on several companies which were charged with

falsified operations through nine major banks located in New York.

2011 The subsequent talk in Turkey was scheduled but failed to achieve

anything given that the pre-conditions for the talk that was set up by

Iran involved the lifting of economic sanctions against the country.

2011 The Russian Foreign Minister proposed an approach based on five

stages to address the nuclear conflict issue through Iran‘s cooperation

with IAEA, including limiting Iran‘s nuclear enrichment activities. In

return, P5+1 would need to lift sanctions imposed unilaterally and

through the UN Security Council.

2011 The November 2011, a report by IAEA were released, detailing in

particular Iran‘s engagement in activities that were connected with the

development of ‗nuclear explosive devices‘.

2012 President Obama signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria

Human Rights Act, expanding sanctions against Iran. The European

Union tightened its restrictions on trade with Iran, prohibiting the

import, financing, insurance, and brokering of Iranian natural gas, and

banning the supply of vessels to transport or store Iranian oil.

2012 An IAEA team headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards,

Herman Nackaerts, visited Iran to discuss ways to resolve outstanding

issues.

2012 Iran and the P5+1 countries met in Istanbul to re-open discussions

about Iran's nuclear program.

2012 The second round of new P5+1 talk with Iran was held in the ‗Green

Zone‘ of Baghdad, Iraq.

2013 A US Congressional committee approved legislation to further limit

Iran's oil exports and access to foreign currency reserves.

2013 The Iranian presidential election of Hassan Rouhani.


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Table 1.1 Continued

2013 President Obama and President Rouhani held the first direct talks

between the US and Iranian leaders since the 1979 revolution.

2013 After intensive negotiations in Geneva, Iran and P5+1 announced that

they had reached an agreement on a joint plan of action, including

interim steps over the next six months and elements of a longer-term,

comprehensive solution.

Source: Adapted from ―Nuclear‖ by Nuclear Threat Initiative (2016, March).

Retrieved from http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/

1.1.5 Significance of This Study

Whether Iran can build nuclear weapons has not been fully determined,

but the issue has been seriously raised among the Great Power countries on the

international stage. There have been many studies from Western scholars attempting

to elevate Iran‘s nuclear program to a weaponized stage. The achievement of Iranian

scientists on indigenous nuclear capability development, the existing Iranian nuclear

infrastructure, the uranium enrichment, nuclear arms race, and its non-cooperative

effort to the enhanced safeguards system contained in the IAEA‘s were used to justify

the concern. However, for more than 30 years since 1983, their theories have not been

prominent proof of nuclear weaponization. The study in this paper will prove that

Iran‘s nuclear issue is only a political excuse for the Great Powers to gain advantage

in the resource-rich region and for the Muslim World to obtain security and

international influence.

1.2 Research Objectives

This paper mainly aims to study the Muslim World‘s and the Great

Powers‘ perceptions towards the Iran nuclear program, to examine the multilateral

channels of the Muslim countries, and to explore the angle of responses and actions to

Iran‘s Nuclear Issues. It will study the background of Iran‘s nuclear program,

including the current situations as well as the disputed settlements.


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To have a clear understanding of the research objectives, the statements

below outline the purposes of this research:

1. To identify the Muslim World‘s approach(es) towards the Iran‘s

nuclear issue.

2. To identify the Great Powers‘ approach(es) towards the Iran‘s nuclear

issue.

3. To compare the different approaches between the Muslim World and

the Great Powers towards the Iran nuclear issue.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What is/are the Muslim World‘s approach(es) towards the Iran nuclear

issue?

2. What is/are the Great Powers‘ approach(es) towards the Iran nuclear

issue?

3. What is/are the different approaches between the Muslim World and the

Great Powers towards the Iran‘s nuclear issue?

In answering these questions, this study understands very well that the

approaches taken by both the Great Powers and the Muslim World towards the Iran

nuclear issue are not absolute. It is not possible in this real world to reach an absolute

consensus in politics. Therefore, the answers to these questions will be based on

collective approaches that have been presented to the world.

1.4 Hypothesis

This thesis paper hypothesizes that the nuclear weapon issue in Iran is

something which both the Muslim World and the Great Powers are concerned about

based on their realistic points of view; however, both sides take different courses of

action towards Iran according to their own benefits and hidden agendas.

The statements that follow are the clear hypotheses of this study:

1. There is/are some of the Muslim World‘s significant approach(es)

towards the Iran nuclear issue.


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2. There is/are some of the Great Powers‘ significant approach(es)

towards the Iran nuclear issue.

3. There is/are some significant different points of views about the Iran

nuclear issue between the Muslim World and the Great Powers.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

In explaining international relations theories and their relevance to this

study in terms of the Muslim World‘s and Great Powers‘ approaches towards Iran

nuclear program, varying international relations approaches and schools of thought

can be considered. One of which is the ‗realist‘ approach, which emphasizes the

state‘s self-interest when responding to issues on a relative-gain basis. However, by

taking the role of the Muslim World into consideration, a different school of thought

called the ‗Muslim Ummah‘ is used, which emphasizes the strengthening of the

Muslim community by forming a unity. Haas (2014, 732) pointed out that alliances

across ideological lines in ideological multipolarity are barely impossible; they are

just harder to attain than Realist interpretations of balance of power theory would

foresee. Realism undermined as dominant theory for failing to predict end Cold War

Role of non-material factors such as ideas, identities, values which increasingly

recognized as significant for understanding and analysing IR. Religion no longer

considered irrelevant to study of international relations, but when and how it matters

and how to study were and continue to be significantly challenged. Bringing religion

into existing theoretical frameworks in IR does not sufficiently address all limitations

influencing the study of religion in IR (Hurd, 2007).

Finally, the ‗Institutionalism Approach‘ or, to be specific ‗Liberal

Intergovernmentalism‘, which builds on an earlier approach, ‗Intergovernmental

Institutionalism‘, by refining its theory of interstate bargaining and institutional

compliance, and by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation

grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence (Moravcsik, 1993).

More importantly, the traditional concept of ‗balance of power‘ will also

be considered throughout the study. A thorough theoretical review of all the above


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mentioned theories shall be conducted and presented accordingly in each part of the

analysis in the following sections.

1.6 Scope of the Study

As outlined in the above timeline and overview of Iran‘s nuclear

ambitions, it seems that Iran has hidden agendas vis-à-vis their nuclear program. This

is why Great Powers are against Iran. This research will shed light on the crucial

issues and approaches of the Muslim World and Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear

program. In particular, the evolution of nuclear power in the Middle East by

comparing four countries will be explored in Chapter 2; the development of Iranian

nuclear program since the Shah era will be presented in Chapter 3; the role of the OIC

on Iran‘s nuclear program will be examined in Chapter 4; the role of Great Powers on

Iran‘s nuclear issue will be explained in Chapter 5; the Muslim World‘s and the

Great Powers‘ responses to Iran‘s nuclear program will be compared and analyzed in

Chapter 6; and the conclusion and recommendations of this report‘s research findings

will be elucidated in Chapter 7.

1.7 Research Methodology

1.7.1 Data Collection

The thesis is developed by collecting data using a qualitative approach to

review the information via the internet (or secondary sources). Secondary sources

such as news websites, reports, articles, journals, press releases, and other official

government websites were used for data collection. According to Bryman and Bell

(2007), the qualitative method is flexible and more adaptable during the data

collecting process. Meanwhile, Perren and Ram (2004) suggested that the advantage

of the qualitative approach would allow the researcher to understand the complexity

of the whole process.


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1.7.2 Data Analysis

In order to answer the research questions, in-depth analysis of secondary

data is necessary. However, the major analytical part would be the connection and

comparison between the theories and the related political as well as nuclear situation

presented in the reports and news on the Muslim World and Great Powers in their

approaches towards the Iran nuclear program.

1.8 Literature Review

This section illustrates the main empirical literatures which the researcher

used as reference to carry out this academic research. The review of related literatures

encompasses various academic books, journal articles, and documents from many

scholars that provide information on Iran‘s nuclear issues and its implications on the

international political stage since its failure to declare the import of natural uranium

from 1991 until present. In addition, the related literatures explained the diplomatic

relations between Iran and the world, especially in terms of its nuclear program.

The first work to be reviewed is the that of Mustafa Kibaroglu (2006) in

his article entitled ‘Good for the Shah, banned for the Mullahs: The West and

Iran’s quest for nuclear power’, Middle East Journal, 60(2), 207-232, 26p.

Kibaroglu provides a comprehensive introduction to the issue of Iran‘s nuclear

program since August 2002, explaining some of the ambiguities that surrounded the

secretly- constructed Nuclear development capacity in Natanz and the heavy water

construction plant in Arak. The article then describes how the United States

administrators and specialists highlighted the fact that Iran had secret strategies to use

its nuclear abilities to acquire nuclear weapons. Iranian officials, on the other hand,

refused to accept such accusations and claimed that they would use their abilities

totally for nonviolent objectives. In spite of the official speech, some Iranian

academics, intellectuals, and even administrators argued that Iran should extremely

consider progressing nuclear weapons given that they have the essential abilities and

the reasons to do so. The secretarial leaders had apparently not yet determined about

their country‘s use of nuclear weapon given Iran‘s capability. However, the increasing

size of Iran‘s current nuclear plant, and the accomplishments of Iranian scientists who


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claim to have developed native abilities, can very well raise Iran to the status of a

nuclear power, even a de facto nuclear-weapon country.

Additional evidence about the political proof that Iran is finding to launch

a 'nuclear hedging‘ capability has progressively risen over the past. In the article by

Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer (2011). Iran's nuclear challenge: Nine

years and counting, International Affairs, 87(4), 923-943. 21p, the authors

describes how the Iran has remained to claim that its nuclear energy is merely

peaceful purpose. In addition, Iran has challenged the international community's

dual-track policy which encompasses both dialogues and sanctions, to influence Iran

to be wholly transparent about its nuclear capacities, and to suspend work associated

to uranium enhancement. Although the possibilities for a discussed solution presently

seem unlikely, Iran does not seem to have determined whether to construct nuclear

weapons and to break out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is important to

understand the pressure on Iran and to strengthen efforts to disrupt its purchasing of

technology and supplies for its nuclear power. Also it is essential for the international

community to sustain negotiations and also consider other diplomatic methods to

enhance the forecasts of continuing Iran focused merely on civil nuclear power, but in

the meantime determining questions associated to the potential military aspects of

Iran's nuclear power.

‘Iran’s foreign policy under President Rouhani: Pledges versus

reality’, Middle Eastern Analysis / OrtadoguAnaliz, 5(57), 64-71. 8p, appeared in

the working paper of Sermin Przeczek (2013) which analyzed Iran‘s foreign policy

under newly-elected president Hassan Rouhaniin. It discussed various subjects,

including the Iranian nuclear program. Even though when considering the ideologies

of Iranian foreign policy that are entrenched from the Islamic revolution, it appears

very challenging for President Rouhani to achieve an average level adequate to reduce

pressures on Iran‘s nuclear program and economy, the ideological basis upon which

the regime in Iran stands has already had to be abandoned more than once throughout

the lifetime of the Islamic revolution. Considering the recognized capability of

President Rouhani and his officers, as well as their promises for improvement in

Iran‘s position in the international arena, new Iranian foreign policies should be seen

across positive lenses.


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Przeczek (2013) also pointed out that President Rouhani is recognized to

be predisposed to practicality. He is also an appropriate speaker who is already

recognized to deliver assured concessions in suspending Iran‘s nuclear program

voluntarily during Khatami‘s presidency although, at the same time, he supported its

continuation. Accommodating strategies of an alliance policy might well be followed

by President Rouhani given that even until the end of President Rouhani‘s term, Iran

will continue to remain a middle-power within world politics. This fact would not

only restrict Iran, but also any other countries retaining the same level of power. It

does not mean that President Rouhani would continue to follow a reactionary foreign

policy. In contrast, his exact aim is to achieve a rather proactive foreign policy.

Therefore, it can be expected that Tehran will indeed actively seek ways to change

Iran‘s hostile and uncooperative image in the eyes of the West. Aside from President

Rouhani himself, Iran‘s new foreign minister, Zarif, who is now also the chief nuclear

negotiator of Iran, and Ali Akbar Salehi, the leader of Atomic Energy Agency of Iran,

are known to be pragmatic and moderate statesmen who are likely to provide

President Rouhani‘s term in office much support in the nuclear talks processes.

On the contrary, Kenneth N. Waltz (2012) who wrote a paper entitled

‗Why Iran should get the bomb’, Foreign Affairs. 91(4), 2-5. 4p, gave a different

opinion from many other writers who wrote about Iran‘s nuclear program. Waltz

(2012) reflected on nuclear power of Iran and suggested that its achievement of

nuclear power would be an optimistic progress accomplished of causing stability to

the Middle East region. Certain attention is given to US and Israeli reactions to the

probability of Iran‘s nuclear weapon or its facility. According to Waltz (2012), US

and Israeli politicians have mistakenly described Iranian governance as unreasonable

and vulnerable to bold aggressive moves. Nevertheless, it is recommended that if Iran

obtains nuclear weapons, it will be determined by self-defense and will lead to the

precautious behavior presented by other nuclear states for example India, China, and

Pakistan.

In ‗Iran: Resolving the nuclear crisis’, Journal of Public &

International Affairs, 23, 74-92, 18p, a paper written by Farzan Sabet (2013),

discussed the United States foreign policy towards the Iran nuclear program under

President Barack Obama and his cabinet. In the beginning year of Obama‘s second


14

term, he had significant political capital and a great alliance of states following his

sanctions policy and nuclear talks overseas. Moreover, since 2012 the overwhelming

economic sanctions should have raised the readiness of the Iran to cooperate on its

nuclear power. This policy paper discusses that Obama should capitalize on this

significant issue of probability by admitting the right of Iran for a nonviolent nuclear

power and suggesting a roadmap for ending sanctions in return for Iran‘s nuclear

concessions. The US has not yet lifted the sanctions, and this might be the significant

issue to ending the deadlock in Iran and P5+1 nuclear talks. Nevertheless, the present

effective US negotiating policy will erode over time and therefore President Barack

Obama have to take conclusive act to settle the issue of Iranian nuclear program.

The relations between China and Iranian nuclear issue was studied by

Bernt Berger and Phillip Schell (2013) in an article which appeared in the China

Report, 49(1), 89-101 ‗Toeing the line, drawing the line: China and Iran’s nuclear

ambitions’. The author claimed that China decide not to interference is the best

option that Iran could wish for. Beside this political courage, China offered Iran a

little bit of substantive assistance that it can depend on. Adequately, the state is

subjected to a variety of tactical and planned perspectives that Beijing‘s policymakers

regard as crucial for stability in the region. China relies heavily on energy supplies

from Iran‘s long-time rival Saudi Arabia. However, Beijing has never sought direct

involvement in the region‘s security affairs. Therefore, China has employed a foreign

policy concerning Iran nuclear powers that fulfilled international interests and

demands, but abstaining from various kind of undermining containment strategies.

Generally, China showed obligation to global export control systems. Even though

export controls have not been adequately employed, China has attained great

development in creating practical actions and regulations. Due to the range of its own

international policy ideologies, China has followed European and the US plans that

were intended to bring Iran‘s suspected nuclear weapons program to a hold. In view

of its own foreign policy ideologies in addition to regional tactical considerations,

China‘s policymakers have limited their proactive and support of sanctions, and

therefore, interference in Iran‘s political environment.

As pointed out by Alon Ben-Meir (2009) who wrote an article entitled,

‗Nuclear Iran is not an option: A new negotiating strategy to prevent Iran from


15

developing nuclear weapons’, Digest of Middle East Studies. 18(1), 74-89. 16p, the

talks among the P5+1 (US, U.K., China, Russia, France, and Germany) and Iran over

its nuclear weapon programs have not only unsuccessful to achieve an arrangement

but have effected Iran nearer to the line of understanding the expertise to create

nuclear powers. There are many aspects which lead to this failure, as well as the

West's incapability to comprehend and encounter with the Iran‘s mental disposition,

the unsuccessful to offering to Iran the cruelty of the disciplinary actions that can be

imposed because of their disobedience, and the US government's deceptive strategy

that allowed Iran to response. There is a serious requirement to change a particularly

new policy towards Iran involving the three separate ways but interrelated talks: The

first should address on the economic incentive package and the present talks on Iran's

nuclear issue; the second should focus on regional security and the results of sustained

Iranian disobedience; and the third should emphasis Iran's and the United States'

complaints in contradiction of each other. The US have to introduce all three tracks

exclusive of which future negotiation will be as indescribable as the earlier talks, but

this time Israel and the West will be confronting the upsetting viewpoint of the Iran‘s

nuclear.

Furthermore, the article entitled ‗Negotiating Iran’s nuclear populism’,

Brown Journal of World Affairs, 12(1), 255-268. 14p, written by Kaveh Afrasiabi

and Mustafa Kibaroglu (2005) analyzed the positions of Iran, the US, the European

Union, as well as Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the

area of nuclear power and proposes solution to the deadlock that would ensure Iran

remains a civilian nuclear power, therefore mitigating the fears of Iranian

proliferation. It describes the effects of the altering security situation of Iran on the

risk appraisals created by Iranian specialists. Policies that are likely to stimulate

nuclear arms races because they are seen as dramatically increasing the vulnerability

and insecurity of non-nuclear weapons countries. Plus, the article explains the

viewpoint of Iran regarding weapons expansion and a possible nuclear power.

It is interesting to note the work of Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem

Askar Karakir (2008) in their article entitled ‘Attitudes of the international

community toward Iran’s nuclear puzzle’, Journal of International and Area

Studies, 15(2), 1-19, focus on question the viewpoints of the US, the EU-3, Russia,


16

and China, on Iran's nuclear program. The fundamental issue is that whether

international society can reach consensus for a complete settlement. In order to

answer this inquiry the article first concisely analyses Iran‘s purposes and foreign

support in the Iran's nuclear expansion. The article then concentrate on individual

states involving the US, the EU-3, China and Russia, a comparative study is applied

for explaining likenesses and dissimilarities of these countries standpoints since the

Iranian Revolution in 1979. The conclusion of this article is on the foundation that the

negotiation is probable to remain because the international society does not have a

common approach towards the Iranian nuclear program.

In conclusion, there are many perspectives from various scholars on Iran‘s

nuclear issues and the diplomatic relations between Iran and the world regarding its

nuclear program. However, it can be summarized that with Iran‘s necessary skills and

capabilities to develop nuclear weapons, the Great Powers see that it is essential,

therefore, for the international community to sustain and expand the pressure on Iran

and to attempts to disturb the purchase of nuclear technology and resources from Iran.

Nevertheless, with economic pressure and President Rouhani‘s pragmatism and an apt

negotiator who would like to seek ways to change Iran‘s hostile and uncooperative

image in the eyes of the West, the US President Obama should capitalize on this gap

of chance by recognizing the right of Iran to a enrich the nuclear energy for the

peaceful mean. This is unavoidable for Iran to bring stability to the Middle East.

Offering Iran a roadmap for releasing sanctions will in fact ease the present economic

tension in diversion for deep concerns on Iran nuclear program.


17

CHAPTER 2

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND AFFECTS: PERSPECTIVE

FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

This chapter aims to explore the nuclear program‘s evolution in the

Middle East region. Countries that will be focused in this paper are Iran, Israel, Saudi

Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. These countries were chosen because they share mutual

interests in nuclear power. However, these countries have shown their interests in

nuclear during different periods of time (Acton & Bowen, 2008).

Therefore, these five countries are good for case studies. Iran, as

mentioned in the first chapter, seems to have a hidden agenda to the development of a

nuclear program. Israel is attempting to gain power within the region. Saudi Arabia,

an extremely rich country, has comparatively little extant nuclear expertise. Turkey

has a good fundamental development of nuclear power and an economic large scale,

which also describes Libya. Last but not least, Egypt is the state that does not have

enough financial resources, but it has general knowledge of nuclear program which is

unique to other Middle Eastern states (Acton & Bowen, 2008).

The structure of this chapter, first of all, will discuss the general

background of the evolution of nuclear power in the Middle East followed by the

balance of power in this region. It will commence with an overview of Iran and its

nuclear activities, as well as its perspective power, since Iran is the main state and

focus of this academic research. Secondly, the researcher will point out the balance of

power concerning Iran to other states (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt) and

examine each case.

Finally, the overall conclusion of Middle East‘s balance of power will be

further discussed at the end of this chapter.

2.1 The Background of Nuclear Evolution in the Middle East

The Middle East has served as the central point for nuclear power and

conflicts for such a long time since they have had many wars in these regions which


18

have affected world politics to today (Kuntay, 2014; Miller, 2006). As Millier (2006)

wrote: ‗The Middle East is one of the most war-prone regions in the international

system‘. The Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Arens said in October 1991 that the

Middle East entered the nuclear age in the 1990s (Sayign, 1992). For this reason,

there has been a need to balance the power strategically among players in the Middle

East for over the past decades.

In the mid-1950s, Arabs and Israel started launching their nuclear and

missile development programs, followed by Egypt a few years later (Sayign, 1992).

A more obvious arms race occurred in the 1973 War, with revenues from fuel and oil;

they had more strategic advantage to strengthen their conventional power. However, a

more non-conventional arms race emerged when Israel cooperated with South Africa

on its nuclear power and during the beginning of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

From the late 1970s onwards, extreme conflicts arose in the Middle East

with the withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the rise and fall

of the Shah‘s military ambitions of Iran. It was then followed by the invasion of Iraq

to Iran, Israel‘s bombing of Iraq‘s Osirak reactor, invasion of Lebanon, and Syria‘s

acquisition of SS-21 missiles, among other events (Sayign, 1992). The countries in

the Middle East region had established these historical relationships. In 1970, Iran

was offered the capability to develop a nuclear warhead from Israeli. In 1980, on the

other hand, Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation occurred due to the development of ballistic

missile. All political conflicts occurred until 1990s.

The regional complexity, multiplicity, and diversity can be considered as

the ‗conflict areas‘. The population, administration, economy and infrastructure in

rival states are also critical factors to be considered. For an example, during 1990-

1991, Iraq efficiently applied the policy to affect the Arab-Israeli and Gulf risks.

While Israel used ballistic missile and satellite launches to attack Baghdad and Tunis

(Sayign, 1992). Israel‘s strategy involves using a monopoly of strategic power of a

nuclear-armed state with aims of survival under the restraining influence of the US. It

was believed that there would be stability and facilitation of Israeli territorial

concessions in a settlement with its Arab foes.

It is evident that the regional arms race had arisen as a war of survival due

to the social and economic factors. During the first Gulf war, Iraqi conducted war


19

with Iran using chemical weapons and in the second war against Israel using ballistic

missiles. On the other hand, Israel was afraid to lose the dominance of technology and

convention above the Arabic military, and nuclear missile has been introduced to the

war since 1967 (Sayign, 1992).

2.2 Balance of Power in the Middle East

As pointed out by Miller (2006), the balance of power for Middle East

countries means the range of harmony concerning the divided states territory in the

region as well as the ambitions of nation and the identifications of politic of people in

the Middle East. The balance of power in this issue also denotes the measure to

maintain political equality among the powerful and weak countries in the Middle

East. As can be seen from the situations mentioned above, the continuous events of

imbalance of power in the Middle East can be considered as state incoherence, power

difference, and revisionism.

The Middle East countries attempted to build alliances in the region

during World War II (Geller & Singer, 1998, pp. 98-100; Halliday, 2005, p. 173;

Walt, 1987). They imported various kinds of weapons to finish the war (Halliday,

2005, p. 153). Miller (2006) illustrated that the greater the imbalance of power in the

Middle East, the more powerful the nationalist-revisionist forces became.

Leverett (2011) pointed out that the Soviet Union collapsed when World

War II ended, the US was forced from going for ‗all-out hegemony‘ in the region by

an outside force which is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as well as

two internal powers allied with Moscow, Iraq, and Egypt.

‗We were essentially unconstrained going into the 1990s in both our

ability and our determination to consolidate hegemony in the Middle East, and by this

I mean a greatly militarized, the Middle East was led by US in term of diplomatic

regulation. Today, that is disappearing right before our eyes,‘ Leverett explained.

Leverett also further mentioned that there had been a dramatic shift of balance of

power in the Middle East from US to Iran as well as its allies. This has occurred for

more than decades with the ‗Arab awakening‘ of 2011. This also brings the

advantages to Iran in the realm of ‗soft power‘, as opposed to hard military power.


20

Leverett (2011) further discussed that the Middle East countries view

strategic cooperation with the US for a negotiated peace settlement with Israel for

both military power and legitimacy. However, US has an intention to acquire ‗buy-in‘

of Arab states for US hegemony since it can bring greater security as well as a

resolution to the ‗core dispute in the region – the Arab-Israeli conflict‘.

Since this research paper focuses on the Iran nuclear program as

mentioned in Chapter One, an explanation of the background of Iran‘s contentious

nuclear program should be provided to help solidify understanding about this issue

prior to further analysis. There will be more information in the next parts.

2.2.1 Iran in Perspective

From the beginning until 1935, Iran had been recognized as Persia. In

1979, it was established as an Islamic republic. Iran has a population of 80,840,713

which is ranked as the 19th

state of the world, and it has a whole area of 1,648,195 sq.

km, which is ranked as the 18th

biggest state of the world.

In November 1979, the US and Iran relationship was strained by Iranian

students who detained the US Embassy in the Iran‘s capital. For this reason, in April

1980 US government stop political collaboration with Iran. In 1980, Iran battled with

Iraq in the war to expand its power to the Persian Gulf. Thus, the United States, the

United Nations, and the European Union announced economic sanctions and export

controls fearing that Iran would possible gain military power through its nuclear

program. In July and October 2012, the economic deterioration was caused by word

sanctions and misconduct of government which drove two main protests relate to

economic. As a consequence, Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI, the president of Iran,

announced societal reforms and Iran's international plan in June 2013. At that time,

the UN Security Council asked Iran to stop increasing the uranium and re-cooperating

actions in compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency‘s accountabilities

and regulations. To do so, P5+1 agree with Iran the cooperative plan which assisting

to release the pressure from the other countries in exchange for further works on its

nuclear program.

With the economic perspective, a major source of the Iran‘s income is oil

exports (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). Price controls, subsidies, and other


21

distortions weigh down the economy, making it also known as an inefficient state

sector. ―New fiscal and monetary constraints on Tehran, following the expansion of

international sanctions in 2012 against Iran's Central Bank and oil exports,

significantly reduced Iran's oil revenue, forced government spending cuts, and fuelled

60% currency depreciation‖.

2.2.2 Iran Nuclear Activities and the Middle East

Windsor and Kessler (2007), with the help of David Sanger from New

York, mentioned that the emergence of nuclear interests in the Middle East is mainly

a response to Iran‘s nuclear capability which threatens neighbouring nations to a great

degree since Iran needs to stabilize the balance of power with the group of religion in

the Middle East. Below examine a summary of the nuclear activities in this region.

• There were various threats of the conflict of nuclear power in the region.

One of them involved bombs in Israel in the late 1960s. Several countries in this

region trusted that many Arab states prefer to react with their own defensive weapon.

The obvious evidence was Egypt and many other countries which still strongly

expressed their interests in nuclear weapons.

• Many diplomats and outside experts were convinced that Iran was far

more threatening to many countries in the Middle East because Iran stands for Shi‘a

state where positioning in Sunni Arab countries. Iranian is regarded as an uncertain

regime in this region. Besides, it also has ambitions to be the most powerful country

in the Middle East.

• There were some Arab leaders in the Middle East who attempted to

block Iran and other states from obtaining nuclear technology. However, these leaders

had their own interests in developing nuclear technologies. As a result, the nuclear

power capability led to the building of regional relationships.

• Many Arab countries agreed to apply for IAEA policies of nuclear

expansion for civil purposes, contrary to Iran. There have been developments in these

countries‘ nuclear programs as well as technical research involving knowledge,

technology and/or material usefulness.

• The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows

five countries that have nuclear weapons to assist others in developing nuclear power


22

in a peaceful way. On the other hand, all technologies must be shared with all

members but not be fully transferred. Lastly, the United States and several other

countries disturbed about nuclear issues established new proposals to restrict the

spread of nuclear technologies.

In summary, several countries in the Middle East have gained benefits

from nuclear power with regard to economics, national growth, and development as

well as environmental protection. Egypt and Turkey are the top two countries in this

region which have gained the most advanced nuclear infrastructure. These two

countries can become leaders in the region‘s nuclear power projects (Windsor &

Kessler, 2007).

2.2.3 Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Balance of Power

According to Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen (2010), the rise of Iranian

power is unsustainable and less harmful if compared to other Middle East countries‘

power. Iran increased its own power as a result of various factors, i.e. uncontrollable

Tehran because of diverse ethnic groups, the failure US policies, the high price of oil,

and the Palestinian- Israeli dispute.

Iran‘s power determines the future outcome of the Middle East and the

Persian Gulf (Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen, 2010). Besides, Iran‘s power can create

difficulties for Tehran to perform according to proactive foreign and security policies

by reducing its political and economic growth. This is the balancing of power through

Tehran‘s active support for Hamas and Hizbullah.

Meanwhile, the US allied with the Middle East by supporting the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC)‘s move to balance Iran as well as refuse assisting it with

any of its nuclear weapons capacity. As a result, this shows that the US had raised an

influence in the region in term of politic (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010).

However, Iran‘s power and the inflated threat are very critical since there was

depressing effect on any discussions that focused on convincing Iran to perform

positive role. However, these moves may embolden Tehran to act more aggressively,

which might affect the capability Iran nuclear arms and convert the country to become

Middle East hegemony. Perhaps it can be concluded that the US administration was

proposing excessively to Iran to eliminate the inflated risk. ‗This could make it easier


23

for hawks in Tel Aviv and Washington to make the case for launching a preventive

attack against the Iranian nuclear program and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

(IRGC)‘.

Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen (2010) purposed that it would be a big

mistake to conclude that Iran is less powerful and less threatening than generally

thought. This proved that Iran is unlikely to stop the unproven wish of nuclear arms.

‗Although Iran is less powerful and less threatening than generally thought, the

regime in Tehran must still be taken seriously. Iran has increased its relative power,

played a destabilizing role in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, and it certainly has the

capacity to continue to do so‘.

Last but not least, Iran also benefited from the changes in the power

balance in Middle East (NCAFP Roundtable, 2008). ‗Iran is building a glacis–a

seemingly impregnable fortress represented by Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon–thus putting

itself on Israel‘s borders if conflict erupts‘. Iran tried to change its image as well as

obstruct its enemy, the United States, which cannot get along with the country.

2.3 Israel

2.3.1 Israel in Perspective

The State of Israel was established in 1948 by the Zionist, an ethnic

national liberation movement by the population of Jewish (Miller, 2006). Some minor

Israel‘s groups sustained to follow the belief of revisionist by starting the 1956 War

(Morris, 2001). In fact Arabs were consequently defeated by Israelis in many wars

between two sides.

Israel has a population of 7,821,850, and ranked as the 99th

country in

globe which has the most population. Israel has a technologically-advanced market

economy. The major income of Israel comes from diamond cutting, high-technology

equipment, and pharmaceuticals. However, Israel has to import other resources form

aboard, i.e. raw resources, grains, weapons and crude oil. Between 2004 and 2011, the

average export growth was nearly 5% annually. There was an economic recession in

2008-2009. The economy has recovered in the next decade and reached a 3% level of

growth. Fortunately in 2009, Israel found the natural gas resources locate on its coast


24

which also enhanced its energy security viewpoint. It provided a one percentage point

boost to Israel's GDP in 2013 and was expected to contribute 0.5% growth in 2014.

Israel was said to be allied with Iran to start the wars against Iraq from

1980 to 1988 and Kuwait from 1990 to 1991 (Miller, 2006). This pointed out the

trans-border external incongruence that encouraged a revisionist-irredentist policy: a

significant Arab minority in south-western Iran. Israel and Iraq also claimed the

territory surrounding the Shat-al-Arab waterway.

According to Bergman, the Iraq-Iran war supported by Israel was used by

Israel to reach its 4 ambitious goals of reestablishing some influence in Iran which

was lost when the Shah was defeated in 1979; weakening both Iran and Iraq, both of

whom opposed the existence of Israel; preventing Iraq from conquering Iran as they

feared a victorious Saddam Hussein; and creating business for the Israeli weapons

industry (Bergman, 2008)

Ariel Sharon believed this is a strategic move of Israel to "leave a small

window open" to the prospect of good relations with Iran in the future (Parsi, 2007).

Despite the anti-Israeli rhetoric publicly exposed by Iran, in fact, some dependencies

between the two nations existed secretly at that time to support one another to face the

formidable opposition of both Iraq and the Soviet Union. Israel and Iran only truly

began to see each other as strategic rivals after the threat of Soviet Union fell away,

and after Iraq no longer could serve as a power check in the region. The concern of

Iran Nuclear Weaponization started to be a subject for Israel.

2.3.2 Israel’s Nuclear Concern

According to Krepinevich (2013), Iran could obtain nuclear weapons

capability while avoiding the blocking of its weapons by the Israeli or the US

military. However, other countries in the Middle East may be concerned that if Iran

can acquire nuclear weapons successfully, it would be far more problematic, costly

and dangerous for historical deterrence relationships in other regions.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, the Middle East history and cultural

differences between Israel and Iran are sufficient evidence to make US and Israeli

leaders consider making assumptions regarding the Iranian leadership‘s response to

nuclear use (Krepinevich, 2013).


25

Also, ‗if Iran acquired a significant nuclear capability, it could achieve

Tehran‘s apparent goal of making the United States and Israel tread with far great

caution in the region‘ (Krepinevich, 2013). The Cold War of Israel and Iran was an

indirect competition through the use of representatives (Washington and Moscow) to

avoid a direct confrontation involving the employment of nuclear weapons.

In summary, an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition has several factors that

can harm the Middle East countries (Krepinevich, 2013). In the following section, the

dynamics of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition will be discussed.

Dynamics of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition

Looking back to historical records and circumstances of Iran and Israel in

a nuclear competition, there were no ‗absurd risks‘ as others believe. A variety of

evidence shows the miscalculations between these rivals regarding their nuclear

competition. ‗There is no compelling evidence that Iranian and Israeli leaders have a

clear sense of how the other side calculates cost, benefit, and risk‘ (Krepinevich,

2013).

If Iran and Israel both need to avoid using nuclear weapons, the

geographical realities, delivery-system speed and increasing accuracy may cause them

to undermine their efforts. According to Krepinevich (2013), ballistic missile flight

times between Iran and Israel are so short that it would not allow for any warning or

controlling systems to confirm the attack in a timely manner.

The chances of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use might be increased

since a nuclear attack would guarantee nuclear revenge between these two states. For

this reason, both sides might look to devolve nuclear release authority to lower

command elements (Krepinevich, 2013).

In conclusion, the dynamics of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition will

hardly be stable, especially during periods of crises. It requires the kind of deep

analysis and efforts of both diplomats and the military that would enable the United

States and the Soviet Union to wage a forty-year global competition to avoid a nuclear

disaster (Krepinevich, 2013).


26

2.3.3 Israel and Iran Relations

As seen from the above that Israel and Iran have been long-term enemies.

It is also hard to predict when the nuclear competition will end since both countries

have their own reasons to acquire nuclear weapons. However, it is very clear that Iran

has attempted to use nuclear weapons to attack Israel for territory and power in the

Middle East area. They both are afraid of the other side gaining more power and

taking revenge. This is an interesting point that supports the idea that ‗their

competition will hardly end‘.

In fact, if we look at the issue more thoroughly, we would find that Iran

gains a greater competitive advantage regarding the nuclear issue. Having said that,

Ben Piven‘s article (24 April 2012) entitled ‗Politics, US & Canada, Israel, United

States‘ needs to be further evaluated.

While a military strike on Iranian nuclear sites is far from certain, the

possibility of a confrontation between Iran and Israel is unavoidable. If we compare

the strengths of the Iranian and Israeli forces, it would reveal that there are

discrepancies in equipment, capabilities, and numbers of enlisted troops between the

two countries.

Regarding the population, Iran has ten times more people than Israel. This

means that they can draw more of its armed forces. However, due to the arms

embargo in place in various forms since 1979, it is not clear if Iran‘s military

hardware is in good condition. David Roberts, deputy director at the Royal United

Services Institute (RUSI), cited that many Iranian tanks and planes used older

technology with varying levels of maintenance. They were used in the war with Iraq a

decade ago in the 1980s. A ‗no first-strike doctrine‘ along with a code of ‗plausible

deniability‘ for irregular military actions are credible proofs. Roberts also stated that

Israel's military is the best-equipped and best-trained in the whole region. However,

the main concern in this respect is not Iran's conventional forces, the better-paid and

organised Revolutionary Guards with Quds Force and naval capabilities are big

unknowns. Bearing this in mind, the two countries may not enter direct army-to-army

combat any time soon but would square off via proxy forces in Gulf or Mediterranean

states.


27

Geographically, the two countries may not be far from each other, but in

reality, they are too far from each other to be engaged in some sustained conflict.

Israel is believed to be a nuclear power, so it is impossible that nuclear power has ever

nuked another nuclear power even with the most ruthless dictators. The very real

threat, according to Israeli military historian Martin van Crevald, is if Israel attacked

Iran, Iran could respond with a constant stream of missiles for a very long time.

Consequently, Israel‘s economy could grind to a halt. Roberts, the security specialist

at RUSI, believes that ‗the Israelis don't have enough planes and enough of the right

bombs to significantly set back whatever is going on in Iran ... I don't think it's a very

sensible thing to do. There should be no [illusion] that Israel can unilaterally put an

end to the Iranian nuclear programme‘. Bokharialso believed that Iran's power lied in

its ‗ability to disrupt the global economy‘ and keep the other side from unleashing a

military campaign via associated costs that are too high. Thus, the critical issue was

Iran's asymmetric capabilities and future nuclear capabilities.

Nevertheless Israeli officials were mainly convinced Iran was committed

to developing a bomb. They believed and continue to believe that this is going to be

the case even Iran had made many obligations. Israel said that Iran could reach the

point to develop a bomb as early as spring 2013. Prime Minister Netanyahu told the

UN in September 2012 this would cross a ―red line‖ for Israel. Many people

considered that if no other nation acts, Israel will then feel compelled to use force to

remove the Iranian threat (Dahl, November 27, 2012). The Obama Administration

claimed at that time that the United States would know well in advance if Iran

developed a bomb and could take proper action. Israel and others raised doubts about

this and proposed at that point it may already be too late. They kept approaching US

and the P5+1 and expecting a fresh round of crippling sanctions against Iran to come

from the United States in response to a deal not being reached. Netanyahu felt that

economic sanctions were the route that needs to be taken when dealing with Iran

(Washington Post, November 24, 2014).

This believes was also supported by the 2 Arab Countries, Saudi Arabia

and Egypt. Both countries considered Iran as a threat to the region and they shared the

belief that the nuclearization of Iran would undermine their security.


28

2.4 Saudi Arabia

2.4.1 Saudi Arabia in Perspective

Based on Windsor and Kessler (2007)‘s research, Saudi Arabia is an

Islamic country which has two holy cities: Mecca and Medina. Most Saudis are Arabs

and Islamic due to its legal requirement that all peoples are Muslims. Saudi Arabia

has been known as the world‘s leading producer of petroleum and holds about 17% of

the world‘s proven oil reserves (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). With a

population of 27.6 million, including more than 30% consisting of foreign workers,

Saudi Arabia is ranked as the 47th most populous country in the world. More than

95% of its population has settled since 1960s due to the rapid economic and urban

growth.

Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economic country strictly controlled by the

government who has brought about rapid economic growth for the country,

particularly the people‘s standard of living. It was further mentioned in the Central

Intelligence Agency (2014) that ‗With a nominal GDP per capita of $31,300, Saudi

Arabia ranks 44th

in the world. Saudi Arabia‘s per capita energy consumption is about

190.9 billion kWh (latest research in 2010), which is much lower than 388 billion

kWh in the US, but it is considered high for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia depends

solely on oil revenues. The Saudi government has promoted private and foreign

investment in agriculture and industry, and also implemented other measures of

economic reform and diversification. In 2005, Saudi Arabia reached an agreement

with the World Trade Organization (WTO) to assist other neighbouring Arab

countries by spending billions of dollars on economic aid and welcoming over

240,000 Palestinian refugees‘ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014).

Saudi Arabia‘s main resources are energy while its water resources are

very limited (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). Therefore, Saudi Arabia‘s nuclear program

is for environmentally-friendly and efficient nuclear desalination. This is the reason

Saudi Arabia needed to collaborate with Egypt for its professional infrastructure and

technology development. Since Saudi Arabia had less technical capabilities,

cooperation is necessary. Moreover, with the assistance of the other Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) members, Saudi Arabia has built relationships with other countries in


29

the region for the research and development of nuclear energy and desalination for

peaceful purposes. However, Saudi Arabia does not currently have any nuclear power

or research reactors (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007).

From the above paragraph, Saudi Arabia government‘s main concerns

involve its population growth, minimal fresh water resources, terrorism,

desertification and depletion of underground water resources. The most critical one is

the development of extensive seawater desalination facilities (Windsor & Kessler,

2007).

Saudi Arabia is not known to have a nuclear weapons program. However,

over the years there had been reports of Saudi Arabia's intent to purchase a nuclear

weapon. There were three potential options for the Saudi government, a leaked

strategy paper laid out in 2003. The three options were to develop a nuclear deterrent,

to ally with and become protected by an existing nuclear nation, or to attempt to

achieve agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East. This was encouraged by a

distancing of relations with the US, concerns over Iran's nuclear program, and the lack

of international pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear weapons (The Guardian,

2003). The Sunni Arab governments were so anxious about Iran's nuclear progress

that many times they would support a United States military strike against Iran

although might not be so obvious.

2.4.2 Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Concern

According to Acton and Bowen (2008) and Shihab-Eldin (2012), Saudi

Arabia is the major motivator behind the announcement made by the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) in December 2006. The Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) is an organization that launched a joint program in nuclear technology for the

purpose of world peace and developed a first joint NPP in 2009, according to

international standards and arrangements.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has shown an interest in developing nuclear

power capability since the 1970s. Its main purpose is to apply it in the field of

desalination (Acton & Bowen, 2008). The major countries that assist Saudi Arabia in

developing a nuclear program are Russia, France, and the United States.


30

Shihab-Eldin (2012) supported the above argument that ‗The future of a

GCC program for Saudi Arabia and the UAE‘s energy independent programs

corresponding to limited supply situation of all the member states to gain cooperation

on regional grid development other than nuclear emergencies for system security

under large reactor trip conditions is still uncertain.‘ In this particular nuclear

program, Saudi Arabia could be the nucleus and regulator whereas other Member

states participate in investments and manpower fulfillment as well as production

sharing. At the same time, the waste from GCC would be managed and located in

Saudi Arabia.

In May 2008, Saudi Arabia signed the US-Saudi Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation and stated its intention

to rely on international markets for nuclear fuel and not to pursue sensitive nuclear

technologies, which is a direct contrast to the actions of Iran (US State Department,

2008). This agreement did not allow Saudi Arabia to develop uranium enrichment and

plutonium reprocessing capabilities if it accepted US assistance (Acton & Bowen,

2008).

In 2012, Shihab-Eldin pointed out that with Saudi Arabia current

availability of huge financial resources and absolute monarchy would certainly make

it the largest Middle East and North Africa (MENA) nuclear program. However, ‗it

was initiated only in 2009 with a royal decree establishing the King Abdullah Centre

for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE) in 2010 as the responsible entity...

Statements were that generating capacity would double to over 100 GW by 2032, that

2 reactors would be built by 2022 and 16 by 2032. Intent of 40 GW of solar and 4 GW

from waste and geothermal is also stated. The remit of KACARE is an energy mix,

evidently of the order of 15:45:40, nuclear, fossil and RE‘. In 2009, Saudi officials

had clearly issued explicit warnings about Riyadh's purpose to develop nuclear

weapons in the event Iran did. According to a senior U.S. official, King Abdullah of

Saudi Arabia warned in 2009 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, "we will get

nuclear weapons." (―King says,‖ 2012)


31

2.4.3 Saudi Arabia and Iran Relations

It is apparent from the above that Saudi Arabia and Iran have no power

balancing relations in the Middle East since both of them have different objectives

towards the nuclear program. Iran has been perceived as having a hidden agenda on

acquiring nuclear program, while, Saudi Arabia wanted to use nuclear technologies

for peaceful and environmentally-friendly intentions to obtain water resources from

nuclear desalination. Saudi Arabia has no intention to fight against Iran for any

purpose. Therefore, these countries have no need to balance their power against each

other.

Saudi Arabia is not concerned only with Iran but also its standing among

other regional leaders. In this respect, the proliferation directions of Egypt, Turkey

and, more remotely, Iraq will also weigh heavily on Saudi Arabia‘s decision calculus.

American officials and many critics continued to warn of the Saudi possible for

proliferation. The Riyadh will proliferate in believing that not going down this path

will make it appear weak in the face of domestic audiences, regional peers like

Turkey and Egypt, and most important of all, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2.5 Turkey

2.5.1 Turkey in Perspective

According to Windsor and Kessler (2007), Turkey is a country that joins

the European and Asian continents together. It is a democratic Muslim country that is

governed by the Islamic party (NCAFP Roundtable, 2008). The major population is

99.8% Sunni Muslim from more than a total of 80 million people, and it is the 17th

most populous country in the world. Geographically, Turkey is the largest country in

the Middle East and was ranked as the 37th

largest country in the world (Central

Intelligence Agency, 2014).

In 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO and the United Nations.

Turkey joined the European Community in 1964. With its strong democracy and

economy, Turkey could gain membership in the European Union (Windsor & Kessler,

2007).


32

Economically, Turkey has a nominal GDP per capita of $15,300 and is

ranked 90th

in the world (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). Its inflation rate is 7.6%

annually with a high current account deficit and high public debt. Turkey faced an

economy crisis in 2001, but with IMF support and tighter fiscal policy, its GDP grew

to 9% in 2004. Turkey‘s major spending is on military, and it was ranked 18th in the

world in 2007.

For energy resources, Turkey imports energy from other countries to

sustain and develop renewable energy resources. The energy consumption of Turkey

per capita is about 2,000 kWh, compared to 12,454 kWh in the US or 2,962 kWh for

the world average in 2007 (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). To meet demand for growth in

this country, Turkey imported 33% of its energy slate from Russian gas and 17% from

Iran. Since Turkey became an industrialized country with rapid growth, the demand

per capita has trebled in two decades (Shihab-Eldin, 2012). Turkey planned to use

nuclear energy as a minor option. The nuclear energy program of Turkey consists of

complex nuclear infrastructure, complete with a research reactor, fuel facilities, and

an extensive knowledge management capacity. The fuel cycle, i.e. waste disposal or

fuel fabrication for research reactors, has been in demand with personnel training in

disciplines such as radiation protection or chemistry. These people could be retrained

to work in an NPP (Acton & Bowen, 2008). These fuel cycle activities which were

conducted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey consist of mining, milling, conversion,

enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing, including irradiation experiments and

isotope facilities.

However, these attempts of developing nuclear program failed because of

the economic costs involved as well as environmental, safety, and proliferation

concerns (Acton & Bowen, 2008). Turkey, as a member of NATO and European

Union, has to work together with the European Union, the United States, and Israel to

fund and to develop a peaceful nuclear energy resource which meets the domestic

energy needs.

2.5.2 Turkey’s Nuclear Concern

Turkey, which has similar objective as Egypt, has tried on multiple

occasions to develop nuclear power (Acton & Bowen, 2008). As mentioned above at


33

the end of the last section, the nuclear development in Turkey‘s case is based on a

peaceful program as well as research and regulation. The nuclear energy import is

average (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). In Turkey‘s point of view, nuclear power has

been considered a key component of economic growth since 1970; however, the

program was delayed and tenders were cancelled partly due to financial concerns

(Shihab-Eldin, 2012). In 2008, only Atomstory placed a bid for 4 x 1200 Mw reactors

for the Akkuyu site on the Mediterranean with chemical oxygen demand (COD)

2017-2009 requirements. This was cancelled after lengthy delays by the Government;

however, cooperation agreements with Russia were signed. Erdener‘s (2002)

empirical literature mentioned that Turkey, as an industrial nation, has had a high

demand for electricity since 2010. 50-60% of the total income earned by exports was

spent on importing fuel energy, i.e. crude oil and natural gas (Erdener, 2007). ‗As a

result, its dependence on imported energy, especially oil and gas, has increased

significantly over the last two decades‘ (Jan, 1996).

According to Shihab-Eldin (2012), Rosatom, as part of an aggressive

policy to establish Russia in the international nuclear industry, offered an agreement

for Turkey to sign as well as an intergovernmental agreement to build, own and

operate the Akkuyu plant using the AES 2006 reactor in 2010. It was able to provide

100% initial equity in a Turkish company established for the purpose. The licensing

process is on course for a code of conduct evaluation in 2020.

Turkey also imported small uranium resources and signed the Rosatom

Akkuyu agreement, including the possibility of fuel fabrication in the country.

Furthermore, Turkey has signed IAEA safeguards agreements and has adhered to the

additional protocols (Shihab-Eldin, 2012).

The Government of Turkey claimed that the country is one of the few

developing countries that possess the infrastructure to transfer and to develop nuclear

technology. Since then, Turkey announced plans to start a nuclear power plant

construction in 2007 (Broad, & Sanger, 2007).

According to Windsor and Kessler (2007), Turkey‘s energy policies aim

to promote the welfare and the development of its own economy. These policies can

be concluded within five categories:


34

1. Liberalizing the segment, raised all efficiency and effectiveness, and

increased its transparency through building the competitive energy market;

2. Transporting the supplies of hydrocarbon from Eastern states to expand

in Western markets via ‗East-West Energy Corridor‘ throughout Turkey;

3. Diversifying its resources to ensure that Turkey‘s energy is secure as

well as to focus on raising demand and import dependency;

4. Aiming sustainable development in utilization of energy resources, and

considering the problems that may cause to the nature; and

5. Strengthening R&D educations involving energy expertise such as the

nuclear resources.

However, Turkey would like the Middle East region to become nuclear

arms free zone (Windsor & Kessler, 2007).

‗There is no evidence in available open sources that suggests Turkey has a

nuclear weapons program. Indeed, given the openness of Turkey‘s nuclear research

program, small uranium reserves, and lack of enrichment and reprocessing

capabilities, it is difficult to believe that Ankara could develop a weapons program in

the near future‘ (Bowen, & Kidd, 2005). Turkey is now an agency importer of nuclear

power, and again it appears to be an attractive option because when the energy price

increase the electricity consumption will also rise. The main technology suppliers for

Turkey are South Korea, Canada, Germany, and the United States (Acton & Bowen,

2008).

Nonetheless, discussions within the nuclear community about emerging

nuclear powers over the past two decades continuously focused on the "usual

suspects": Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Not surprisingly, opinions as to the

probability of a military nuclear program differed. While in Iran‘s case, the evidence

seemed solid, the case of Turkey was built on ambiguous indications. Simply put

Turkey was working both on nuclear weapon systems and on their means of delivery

using Iran as the model to follow, said the Western intelligence community. President

Abdullah Gül, in an interview with the journal Foreign Affairs, assured that Turkey

would not allow that a neighboring country (Iran) had weapons that Turkey itself did

not have.


35

2.5.3 Turkey and Iran Relations

According to NCAFP (2008), the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK) and

the Justice and Development Party of Turkey (AKP) are the sources of change in the

relationship between Turkey and Iran. Iran was afraid of the intimidation; therefore,

the leader of Iran terminated the support for the PKK since 2003. Besides, that year

Iran feared that US forces were not only on their border with Afghanistan but also in

all states nearby Iran. For this reason, Iran attempted to build a relationship with

Turkey and be friends with the enemy through harmonious relations. They later

bombed PKK camps and arrested PKK members.

Interestingly, Turkey adjusted the relation toward Iran according to its

neighbour‘s new method which considering the PKK as enemies (NCAFP

Roundtable, 2008). The Turkish government was of the opinion that Iran and Syria

had implemented the strategy towards terrorists.

Moreover, the developments of ‗a significant revision of Turkish foreign

policy towards its Middle Eastern neighbours is generally and a new era in Turkish-

Iranian relations in particular‘. Both Turkish and Iran have fostered closer

relationships through trade, diplomacy and strategic affairs, especially when Iran

desperately needs regional allies. When Iran suffered under international sanctions

aimed at halting its nuclear program, Iran tightened its relationship with Turkey

(Kuntay, 2014).

Therefore, it can be concluded that Turkish-Iranian relationship is on a

friendly basis, for mutual benefits, since Turkey will be of no harm to Iran. It only

requires nuclear power as a source of energy for its own country. Meanwhile, Iran

needs to ally with Turkey to become a more powerful state in this region.

Iran and the West conflict on the nuclear issue since 2006, Ankara has

pursued to do favor toward the guidance of Iran with the intention of acting as the role

of mediator in diplomacies on the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, there have never been

true friends in politics, secretly; Turkish politician have planned to manage the

nuclear issue of Iran as the key security dangers. For short period, the conflict of

nuclear issue can cause a war between region including Turkey influencing massive

economic capitals. Additionally for long period, the balance of power would shift to

Tehran because of its nuclear status and threaten Turkey, even if Turkey were not a


36

direct target of Iranian hostility. As a result, Ankara pursued a mixed policy aimed at

preventing military conflict as well as minimising Iranian hostility, a balancing act

that caused friction with its traditional Western allies. Nevertheless, for Turkish-

Iranian relations, the nuclear issue was an advantage to Turkey. It allowed Ankara to

elicit Iranian goodwill on bilateral issues, notably on opposition to Kurdish militancy

and the completion of favorable energy deals that should enable Turkey to become a

key energy transit corridor. Lastly, by ultimately accepting Turkish mediation on the

nuclear file and by virtue of the Turkish vote against the US in the UN Security

Council, Iran has reluctantly promoted Turkey‘s image as the leading regional power.

When there was reconciliation between Iran and Turkey‘s Atatürkists,

Egypt‘s Gamal Abdel Nasser was far from this convergence. With Anwar Sadat‘s

assumption of power in Egypt, all three countries came into one camp. These three

countries forming the gateway to the region in the three corners or pillars of the

region — if they huddle together, can close the gateway and prohibit the entry of

outsiders.

2.6 Egypt

2.6.1 Egypt in Perspective

Egypt is the most crowded country and the second largest country in the

Middle East and North Africa (Kuntay, 2014). Kuntay pointed out that Egypt has

been known as heading state in Middle East politics which engages in mediation

procedures, political crises, and armed disputes during the 20th

century since both Arab

nationalism and political Islam live in this country.

With evidence from the Central Intelligence Agency (2014), Egypt has

about 86 million people, making it ranked as the 16th

country in globe which has the

most population. The nominal GDP per capita of Egypt is about $6,600, and it is

ranked 144th

in the world. Egypt spent 1.72% (as of 2012) of its GDP on military

spending, making it ranked 49th

in the world. Most of the land in Egypt is for

agricultural purposes.

For electricity resources, as of 2011, Egypt produced 138.7 billion kWh

and consumed 122.4 billion kWh (as of 2010) annually (Central Intelligence Agency,


37

2014). The electricity resources consist of 87.6% fossil fuels; 10.4% hydropower from

the Aswan Dam; and some wind power generated by a wind power unit near the Suez

Canal. However, Egypt does not use nuclear power to produce electricity.

On the other hand, Egypt is likely to have the most highly developed

nuclear technology, compared to other Arab states (Windsor & Kessler, 2007).

Nuclear infrastructure was well developed with controlling devices and two reactors

of nuclear technology; nevertheless, Egypt lacked any proven uranium resources.

Meanwhile, Egypt is the country that has a high local demand for electricity usage

and seeks for water desalination from nuclear energy. Fuel slate is primarily from

local gas that is estimated to be drained out within 20 years later. The nuclear energy

incentive is high in terms of demand, and Egypt has sought it for more than 40 years

(Shihab-Eldin, 2012). These are the reasons Egypt has been interested in developing a

nuclear power program. Egypt decided to decrease oil production and decrease

reserves since increasing oil consumption provides justification for R&D of substitute

resource.

Although Egypt signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and

the country is IAEA‘s membership, the legal structural framework of nuclear safety

and security is still not incomplete (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). Besides, Windsor and

Kessler (2007) disclosed that Egypt was a main actor in the region that tried to create

a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. However, Egypt has been known for its

low-risk domestic nuclear weapons development program and its involvement with

international agreements and protocols as well as various projects of Technical

Cooperation in three levels interregional, regional and domestic. Egypt is mostly

involved with the nuclear development program by training and sharing technology

with many Arab countries in North Africa as well as the Middle East region.

2.6.2 Egypt’s Nuclear Concern

Egypt has had an interest in nuclear power development since the 1960s

(Acton & Bowen, 2008). ‗It entered into numerous sets of negotiations and even

signed contracts for the provision of nuclear reactors with, among others, Siemens and

Westinghouse, but without any significant results.‘ However, the Government of

Egypt has made plans for nuclear power plants to develop electricity generation and


38

water desalination since the 1980s (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). Egypt‘s Energy

Minister announced in late September 2006 that the state will resume a nuclear power

program since it has been frozen for 20 years following the Chernobyl accident.

Therefore, the first nuclear power station would be constructed at El-Dabaa, along

Egypt‘s northern coast, within a decade. This nuclear power plant has a projected cost

of US$1.5 billion with the financial support of foreign investments (―Egypt unveils,‖

2006).

As a result of decreasing oil resources and small amount of natural gas,

the government of Egypt has declared that the country plans to seek the nuclear

energy resource for its needs. This is especially important at a time when there is

rapidly increasing demand, a need to replace oil and gas which are facing shortages, a

desire to sustain its growth and development with the assistance of Russia and China

to build and run nuclear reactors (Deena, 2006; Acton & Bowen, 2008). Moreover,

the US Ambassador to Egypt and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had also

attempted to support Egypt‘s nuclear energy program (Windsor & Kessler, 2007).

In March 2007, the Energy and Electricity Minister Hassan Younis stated

that under current projections, Egypt would build ‗10 nuclear-powered electricity-

generating stations across the country‘ (Acton & Bowen, 2008). Canada, China,

France, Germany, Russia, South Korea, and the United States were the countries

coordinating with Egypt to provide the technology and materials needed to launch a

nuclear program. According to Windsor and Kessler (2007), the IAEA‘s Department

of Nuclear Energy disclosed Egypt‘s nuclear power intentions: ‗The reasons which

led the country to promote launching a nuclear power program was basically the

following:

1. Steadily increasing demand for energy and electricity as well as the

standard of living of the people;

2. Inadequate and insufficient known national primary energy resources to

supply on a medium and long term the increasing demand for energy and electricity;

as well as limited potable water resources, which will require the utilization of energy

intensive desalination technology particularly in remote areas.

3. Perception of nuclear power as a convenient, economically competitive

and viable source of energy which, if introduced in the country, would not only


39

complement the traditional energy sources, but would also promote technological

development and serve as an incentive for social and economic progress.‘

In summary, the rational for a nuclear program is in line with the

expectations of economic development. However, Egypt‘s future nuclear program

depends on newly-empowered public opinion and the availability of financial

resource, possibly via the partnering policies with Russia and China in Turkey and

Jordan (Shihab-Eldin, 2012).

2.6.3 Egypt and Iran Relations

There is few evidence that shows the relationship of the balance of power

between these two countries. It can be concluded that Egypt and Iran have no direct

relationship regarding nuclear issue since both of them have different objectives

towards the requirements of a nuclear program. Iran has always tried to acquire

nuclear weapon for wars against other countries in this region as mentioned in the

beginning of this chapter. On the other hand, the intention of acquiring nuclear

technology for Egypt is for the construction of a nuclear power plant to develop

electricity generation and water desalination capabilities. Egypt aimed to increase its

economic and energy growth rate. It can be understood that both Egypt and Iran have

no need to balance power against each other.

2.7 Overall Conclusion on the Balance of Power in the Middle East

Nuclear evolution in the Middle East began with Arab and Israel and then

Iraq. It started as a mission to gain power in the region in the 1960s. After reviewing

all the literature and evidence of Middle East‘s balance of power, it was found that

Iran is an active country that needs to gain power through a nuclear program and use

it against other conflicting countries. The cases of Israel and Iran are good examples

of high nuclear competition as per the above discussion. Obviously, Israel attempted

to fight back against Iran and protect the country and balance the power against Iran.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt have fewer interests in balancing the

power against Iran since all of them need nuclear program for the purpose of

generating energy. However, there are some political relations between Turkey and


40

Iran since Iran requires a military alliance with other states like Turkey. Iran‘s move

to gain relative power in the region through its nuclear program and military alliances

leave the World wondering if Iran‘s nuclear program will proliferate and stimulate a

nuclear arms race in the Middle East.


41

CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

This chapter aims to give some background on the history of Iran‘s

nuclear program development, from a gleam in the Shah‘s eye to its current state as a

self-proclaimed nuclear power. To best understand the scope of such a large time

frame, momentous seat change, and large technological leap in the region, one must

better understand the history of the situation as its roots are far in the past and extend

until today.

3.1 The History of Iran before Islamic Conquest and Islamization

The Islamic conquest of Persia (637-651), which in some circles is known

as the Arab conquest of Iran, led to the end of the Sasanian Empire. Even though the

Sasanian state was a well-established and powerful empire, there were a myriad of

reasons for its fall. As what may be perceived as eerie portents of what was to come

during the Shah‘s reign, much of the Sasanian‘s collapse was credited to class and

religious discord within their own social fabric; the absence of support for an elitist

and decadent regime; conflict among those elites; dynastic instability in the

leadership; and finally the cost of an unsuccessful, long and drawn-out war with one

of its neighbors (Encyclopædia Iranica, 2015).

Formerly, Iran‘s main religion was Zoroastrianism. After their defeat to

Arabs, Iranians slowly converted to Islam. Iranians were more rebellious than other

people conquered by the caliphate as demonstrated by the fact that some cities rose up

against the caliphate‘s government representatives (Malayeri, 1982). The Iranians

additionally kept their Farsi language as the day-to-day language as well as their

culture of art and sports such as wrestling and horse breeding. Bernard Lewis states

the Iranian/Arab as a cross pollination and describes the relationship as follows:

―Iran was indeed Islamized, but it was not Arabized. Persians remained

Persians. And after an interval of silence, Iran re-emerged as a separate,

different and distinctive element within Islam, eventually adding a new


42

element even to Islam itself. Culturally, politically, and most remarkable

of all even religiously, the Iranian contribution to this new Islamic

civilization is of immense importance. The work of Iranians can be seen

in every field of cultural endeavour, including Arabic poetry, to which

poets of Iranian origin composing their poems in Arabic made a very

significant contribution. In a sense, Iranian Islam is a second advent of

Islam itself, a new Islam sometimes referred to as Islam-iAjam. It was this

Persian Islam, rather than the original Arab Islam, that was brought to new

areas and new peoples: to the Turks, first in Central Asia and then in the

Middle East in the country which came to be called Turkey, and of course

to India. The Ottoman Turks brought a form of Iranian civilization to the

walls of Vienna‖ (Lewis, 2001).

This however is not merely in the modern day, the earlier revisionist

history historians also expressed a view on the Persian influence of Islam and its

fostering of a community of scholars, scientists and philosophers. Persians have long

had a reputation as great contributors to the sciences. From algebra, geometry and

medicine, the Persians made their considerable mark as they picked up the remains of

Ancient Greece and Rome. They also made great contributions to language and arts;

here is how the famous historian Ibn Khaldun perceived them:

―It is a remarkable fact that, with few exceptions, most Muslim

scholars…in the intellectual sciences have been non-Arabs...All of them

were of Persian descent who invented the rules of (Arabic) grammar.

Great jurists were Persians. Only the Persians engaged in the task of

preserving knowledge and writing systematic scholarly works. Thus the

truth of the statement of the prophet (Muhammad) becomes apparent, ‗If

learning were suspended in the highest parts of heaven the Persians would

attain it‘…The intellectual sciences were also the preserve of the Persians,

left alone by the Arabs, who did not cultivate them...‖ (Khaldun, 2004).


43

3.2 Sunni/Shiite Division

It is in the seventh century that we see a schism within Islam that divided

the people of the Quran into two separate camps, or in the words of Hillel Fradkin and

Lewis Libby, ‗the bloodiest and longest-running dispute in Muslim politics‘ (Fradkin,

2013). The schism was focused on the question of succession after Muhammad‘s

death and the legitimacy of the certain Islamic interpretations (Nasr, 2006). Augustus

Richard Norton puts the historical case as one that affects 1.3 billion followers of

Islam of which 15% are Shiite whose denomination is centered on succession:

―There are three major Shiite sects, but they all share a special regard

for the House of the Prophet Muhammad and the belief that the Prophet‘s

spiritual guidance was transmitted by divine ordination through his

descendants, especially through his son-in-law and cousin Ali. (The

Sunnis believed caliphs did not need to be descended from the Prophet.)

For Shiite Muslims, the holy day Ashura commemorates the martyrdom

of one Imam Hussein—the grandson of the Prophet and son of Ali—

whose demise in the seventh century, near the city of Karbala in modern-

day Iraq, has become a lodestone of modern identity for Shiites, much as

the crucifixion of Jesus is central to Christian identity‖ (Norton, 2007).

Shiites are found in quite a large number in the Middle East. Iran is the

largest Shiite state with a population over 70 million, 90% of which was identified as

being Shiite. Iraq also has a large number of Shiite adherents, including as many as

60% of Iraq‘s near 30 million citizens. Due to that inherent imbalance in the region, it

is no surprise that the two countries share a long, complex, and rather tumultuous

history. In addition, 20% of Pakistan‘s 166 million inhabitants and 19% of

Afghanistan‘s 31 million people practice Shiite Islam. Additionally, there is a Shiite

population of 1.3 million in Lebanon and another 2 million practitioners spread out

among Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Petrou,

2014).

To put it briefly, Michael Petrou states ‗Divisions between the Sunni and

Shia interpretations of Islam are almost as old as the faith itself‘ (Petrou, 2014). Due

to the perceived subterfuge and schemes that arose from the succession of the caliphs


44

(Islamic community leaders) by Shiite practitioners and scholars, there was noticeable

tension within the early Islamic community that has led to bloody fitnas (civil wars)

over control and direction (Hinds, 2012) that influences modern friction between the

Sunni and Shiite denominations (Robinson, 2010). Such incidences include the

assassination of the Uthman, the suspected poisoning of HasanIbn Ali (grandson of

Muhammad) by one of his wives encouraged by his political rival Muawiyah, and the

suspected trap of Husaynibn Ali by the Umayyads which directly led to their

overthrow and the propagation of Shiite Islam in Iran (Robinson, 2010). Considering

that before Islam, the Middle East was home to the common rite of blood feuds and

long held grievances, it is not surprising that some of those earlier practices still echo

throughout the region with some measure of suspicion or hurt feelings.

3.3 The Early Stages of Iran’s Nuclear Program

3.3.1 Atoms for Peace

The ‗Atoms for Peace‘ program gets its name from the title of a speech

delivered by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953 to the assembled

representatives of the world at the United Nations in New York City. It is important to

realize the importance and gravitas of this speech. In it, he denotes worry at the future

of warfare and the repercussions therein. This speech would set the tone during the

Cold War and shape Western policy throughout the world for years to come. He

stated:

―I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new one,

which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession,

would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of

atomic warfare.

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of

the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms,

of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one

of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent

search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's

existence.


45

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United

States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know, I

need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is

global, not merely national in character.

On 16 July 1945, the United States set off the world's biggest atomic

explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has

conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs are more than twenty-

five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned,

while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of

Trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent.

Today, the United States‘ stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of

course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the

total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun

in every theatre of war in all the years of the Second World War. A single

air group whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable

target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on

Britain in all the Second World War.

In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no

less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons

have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In

the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine

Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.

But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not

ours alone.

In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, the

United Kingdom and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous

contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.

The secret is also known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has

informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to

atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has exploded a

series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear

reactions.


46

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called

a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years

ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate

what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today

comprehend two facts of even greater significance. First, the knowledge

now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others,

possibly all others.

Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a

consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself,

against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be

inflicted by surprise aggression‖ (Eisenhower, 1953).

The Atoms for Peace program was orchestrated as a two-prong campaign.

On one hand, the media rollout code named ‗Operation Candor‘ was meant as a

propaganda vehicle to bolster America‘s Cold War policy of ‗containment‘ (Chernus,

2002). Containment was intended to prevent the spread of the Soviet Union‘s

influence in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, and more specifically China, Korea, and

Vietnam. It was thought, at the time, that if the Soviets were left unchecked and

allowed free reign, they would eventually infiltrate all forms of government

throughout the world. The other side of the campaign was focused on assuaging the

fears of the world on the destructive powers of nuclear arms after the world had

witnessed the utter annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the US as its

masterstroke in their Pacific campaign to end the war. In particular, this marketing

campaign was aimed at diminishing the fears of America‘s European allies who held

an understandable apprehension at the idea of a nuclear battle in its own backyard that

would leave them even more devastated than they had been during the bombing runs

that had gone on during the most contentious and destructive moments of the Second

World War. In effect, Eisenhower‘s speech motioned towards the proliferation of

civilian nuclear energy in other countries and self-control in the use of nuclear arms in

possible future conflicts (Chernus, 2002).


47

3.3.2 The Shah’s Nuclear Program

Iran‘s nuclear program was initiated in 1959 between the Shah of Iran,

Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979), and the United States Eisenhower

administration‘s Atoms for Peace project which helped to build the Tehran Research

Reactor (TRR) that was designed to act as a conduit between the US and Iran‘s

burgeoning nuclear interests (Milani, 2010).The Shah had a vision of constructing a

2,000-megawatts of electricity across 20 nuclear power stations by 2000, this nuclear

industry was envisioned within his country so as to not be completely reliant on his

own country‘s oil production (Sabet, 2013). That being said, as Farzan Sabet

states,‗While the Shah's nuclear program was, in theory, aimed at generating nuclear

energy, there were already nuclear proliferation concerns at this time‘ (Sabet, 2013).

Those in Washington and Britain perceived the Shah as an ally that kept the oil

flowing to the West (Tarock, 2006). The Shah states his relationship thusly, ‗If you‘re

asking me whom I consider our best friends, the answer is: The United States amongst

others. The United States understands us best for the simple reason they have many

interests here including economic as direct interests, and arid political, as indirect

interests‘ (Pahlevi, 1973). In his own country, the Shah was perceived by the clerics

as a puppet that cared more about his personal wealth and jewelry then his own

people or an iron-fisted tyrant.

Apparently, the answer lies somewhere in between. The Shah had the

international reputation of a playboy and celebrity as he was handsome, charming and

a natural schmoozer who threw banquets and parties to woo foreign interests. He also

had the reputation as being authoritarian in practice and contrastingly progressive

with some social reforms. For example, the Shah personally thought of women as a

hindrance in some respects and would be seen as a misogynist today, but in political

contrast he also promoted women‘s rights more so than his other Islamic monarch

contemporaries. To better illustrate this dichotomy, one can look at the Shah‘ own

words as he states his opinion on women in an interview with Oriana Fallaci, a well-

known female journalist and writer, in this manner:

―Look, let‘s put it this way. I don‘t underestimate them, as shown by

the fact that they have derived more advantages than anyone else from my

White Revolution. I have fought strenuously to obtain equal rights and


48

responsibilities for them. I have even incorporated them in the Army,

where they get six months‘ military training before being sent to the

villages to fight the battle against illiteracy. Nor should one forget that I‘m

the son of the man who removed women‘s veils in Iran. But I wouldn‘t be

sincere if I asserted I‘d been influenced by a single one of them. Nobody

can influence me, nobody at all. And a woman still less. In a man‘s life,

women count only if they‘re beautiful and graceful and know how to stay

feminine and…This Women‘s Lib business, for instance. What do these

feminists want? What do you want? Equality, you say? Indeed! I don‘t

want to seem rude, but…You may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not,

I beg your pardon for saying so, in ability‖ (Pahlevi, 1973).

An accusation against the Shah was that he was an authoritarian dictator.

Such accusations are well substantiated by the actions of the Organization of

Intelligence and National Security, or commonly known as SAVAK. SAVAK was an

organization that was the Iranian counterpart of the United States‘ CIA and Britain‘s

MI6. The intelligence unit oversaw the strict secret police actions, the torture of

political dissidents and enemies of the state. SAVAK was established by the Shah and

operated from 1957 to 1979 (Afkhami, 2009). When asked if he would deny that he

was too much of an authoritarian leader by Iranians, in the same interview he

responded:

―No, I wouldn‘t, because, in a sense, I am. But look: To go through

with reform, one can‘t help but be authoritarian. Especially when reform

takes place in a country like Iran, where only 25 percent of the inhabitants

can read and write. Believe me, when you have three-quarters of a nation

afflicted with illiteracy, only the most strict authoritarianism can ensure

reform; otherwise nothing can be achieved. If I hadn‘t been strict, I

couldn‘t have carried through even agricultural reform, and my whole

program would have been at a standstill. If that had happened, the extreme

left would have liquidated the extreme right within a few hours, and more

would have been lost than the White Revolution. I had to act as I did, for

instance, to order the troops to fire at those opposing land redistribution‖

(Pahveli, 1973).


49

In the same distinctive and defined manner, the Shah himself saw nuclear

technology for Iran as a pragmatic solution to an apparent problem that would plague

his country in the future: his country would eventually run out of oil. Seeing the

writing on the wall, the Shah decided that it would be best if Iran diversified its

energy sector. Adam Tarock states it this way:

―Since the early 1990s, Iran‘s consumption of oil has increased eight

percent. If this trend continues, Iran will become a net oil importer by

2010, a gigantic catastrophe for a country which relies on oil for 80

percent of her foreign currency and 45 percent of her total annual budget.

If that happens, how will Iran be able to feed her population, estimated to

reach 100 million by 2025, and also spend on her development and

national security? ...It is estimated that Iran‘s known uranium ore reserves

can produce as much electricity as 45 billion barrels of oil‖ (Tarock,

2006).

It was thought that a nuclear program would thus be mutually beneficial to

both parties: the West continued to get large amounts of cheap oil and Iran would

have access to large amounts of electricity for its own people and continue to make

vast sums of money from petroleum exports. The Shah states it this way, in his own

words, ‗It‘s quite simple. I‘ve got this oil and I can‘t drink it. Libyan oil reserves will

be exhausted 10 years from now. My oil, on the other hand, will last at least 30 or 40

years. Maybe 50 or 60, even‘ (Pahveli, 1973). In addition, the Shah knew the value of

a nuclear deterrent. When asked how strong his country was militarily, he stated that

his people could not directly repulse a major invasion from a world power without

having an atom bomb; this is during the peak of the Cold War (Pahveli, 1973). Adam

Tarock drives home the point bluntly, ‗According to Asadollah Alam, the Minister of

the Imperial Court and confidant of the Shah, the monarch intended to make nuclear

weapons and, to that end, Alam says, Iran had in 1976 discussed with Gabon the

purchase of uranium‘ (Tarock, 2006). It is safe to assume that the Shah saw a nuclear

program in its future by fostering a goodwill partnership with the West that would

eventually lead to nuclear arms under his control.

Seeing the situation in such a way, the Shah invested his time into

cooperating with the United States and agreed to join the International Atomic Energy


50

Agency on 16 September 1959 (IAEA) (Sabet, 2013).The IAEA oversaw inspections

of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that came online in 1967 and was managed by

the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TRR was originally conceived

as a 5 megawatt-thermal (MWth) pool-type light water research reactor at Tehran

University for the production of medical isotopes. The United States and West

Germany supplied the TRR with weapon-grade uranium fuel for the reactor until the

Iranian Revolution on 1979 (Tarock, 2006). Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty

one year later in 1968 and ratified it in 1970.Washington was particularly enthused

with the idea of a nuclear powered Iran with President Ford offering the Shah a full

nuclear cycle in 1976. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which ran

the Tehran Research Reactor, was tasked with converting the existing gas and oil

powered energy producing facilities within Iran into nuclear facilities (Amuzegar,

2006).

3.4 The Islamic Republic Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran's nuclear program was started in the 50s with considerable Western

resources, in large part due to the political machinations of the Shah who fostered

positive relations with the West and was viewed by some as a sentinel of American

policy in the region. This perceived goodwill between Iran and the West, however,

came to an abrupt ending in February 1979. The Iranian revolution that would

eventually force the Shah into exile and usher in the formation of an Islamic

government of that year completely changed the conversation about Iran‘s nuclear

ambitions. Those who opposed the manner in which the Shah ran the country and

emerged victorious with control of the nation had earlier criticized the Shah's nuclear

plans and scaled back Iran‘s nuclear program until the newly Islamic republic came

into conflict with its neighbor Iraq. In the midst of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

those in charge decided to reconstitute its nuclear program. On the world stage, under

the auspices of being purely non-military, Iran now presented itself as focusing on a

nuclear program for its own energy needs (Chubin, 2006). Successive leaders since

the revolution have insisted that the aim of Iran‘s nuclear program is purely for

peaceful, civilian purposes and that they have no interest in constructing a nuclear


51

armament. Iran‘s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has gone so far as to issue

a fatwa, a religious decree, against nuclear weapons. Western representatives,

especially America and Israel, look upon such proclamations with some measure of

skepticism (Zarif, 2014).

The Iranian revolution had an immediate impact on Iran‘s nuclear

program as ties with the US were effectively severed with extreme prejudice.

Overnight, the Tehran Research Reactor was cut off from American supplies. The

TRR was the same small reactor, the nuclear zygote that Eisenhower and the Atoms

for Peace gave to the Shah and helped birth Iran‘s nuclear program. After the 1979

revolution, America was now the ‗Great Satan‘ and Iran could not rely on the

demonic state for its weapons grade uranium. This was perfectly fine with the

Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who in his ascension to power

ordered all work and progress on Iran's nuclear program be stopped as he found this

new technological development distasteful to his stringent and fundamentalist Islamic

interpretations, if not directly blasphemous. Khomeini, however, changed his mind

soon after, perhaps as he saw the relief that nuclear power could give to his country as

a balm to expedite the export of its oil or as a weapon against Iraq‘s chemical

weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, but by then the West would give no quarter to

Iran‘s desires and was much more weary of Iran's intentions (Milani, 2010). The Iran-

Iraq war made a sizable impression on the Ayatollah as Vali Nasr writes, ‗It

dominated the first decade of Khomeini's revolution, ravaged Iran's economy, and

scarred Iranian society‘ (Nasr, 2006). It is rather clear to see how a government (or

single leader) in such a predicament could be encouraged to change their minds.

Unable to solicit such material from either the ‗Great Satan‘ or Europe,

Iran had to look to other places for its nuclear fix. In 1987, the Atomic Energy

Organization of Iran (AEOI) looked south at Argentina‘s Applied Research Institute

(INVAP) to keep the TRR humming along. The AEOI compensated the INVAP

US$5.5 million to transmute Tehran‘s residual fuel from 90% enriched uranium to

just below 20%, barely short of the cutoff for highly enriched uranium (HEU). As a

consequence, the TRR has been working with LEU fuel since 1993 at 3 MWth, even

though it was designed with an output of 5 MWth, partially due to a shortage of fuel

caused by the political fallout following the Iran revolution and the lasting friction left


52

behind. Of the original US-supplied uranium, about 15 pounds of irradiated HEU

remains stored at the reactor site (―Tehran research,‖ n.d.).

The subterfuge and shadow policies that happened since then has played

in the background of most people‘s lives with little effect on the average world

citizen‘s view or thoughts. It was not until some twenty years later that the ordinary

member of society was informed of the stakes which were quickly escalating. As

Farzan Sabet puts it,

―Despite concerns about the Iranian nuclear program since 1979, the

precise origins of the current nuclear crisis can be traced to August 2002

when the Iranian opposition group, the Mujahideen-e Khalgh

Organization (MKO), revealed the existence of the Natanz uranium

enrichment facility near Esfahan. Iran had failed to declare this facility to

the IAEA even though it was bound to do so under its safeguards

agreement‖ (Sabet, 2013).

These actions are not technically in and of themselves violations of the

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that Iran had signed in 1968 as the agreement states

that Iran must announce the existence of such facilities 180 days before introducing

any nuclear material. Iran had by then not introduced such materials at the Natanz

plant. What upset Western officials was that Iran had not declared these facilities‘

existence to the IAEA, and thus constituted a falsehood. This, however, was also the

same tactic employed by Israel, Pakistan and India who kept their nuclear programs

confidential. The difference between those nations and Iran is that at the time that this

report came out, Iran had been declared a member of the ‗Axis of Evil‘ alongside Iraq

and North Korea by President Bush (Tarock, 2006)


53

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF OIC ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR ISSUE

Iran‘s nuclear program is akin to a risk to US's partners in Middle East

region, particularly Israel, as Iran‘s aggressive leaders repeatedly declared their

intentions to wipe out Israel from the map (―The Iranian,‖ n.d.). In addition,

America's moderate Arab partners, for instance Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and others including the OIC members, are at present

terrified of aggressive regional policy of Iran. They sense progressively endangered

from Iran‘s nuclear program. Iran‘s neighbours country has raised their weapons

purchasing due to the military position of Iran, and this is not good for the region. The

Iran‘s nuclear program would possible stimulate the Middle East‘s arms race in which

lead to even more instability in this volatile and vital region. Whether Iran‘s nuclear

development is strictly civilian-oriented or whether the country is in pursuit of

weaponization will be investigated through the OIC‘s lens in this chapter.


In order that the discussion reach a meaningful conclusion, we will study

the OIC‘s role from two theoretical frameworks: the Muslim Ummah approach and

the Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach. The contemporary IR realism theory is

inappropriate in this study since neither the idealism nor the realism of contemporary

international relations is in complete harmony with the politico-religious values and

natures of Islam as per Dr. Mohammad Mohibul Haque‘s presentation at the

European Conference on International Relations. Working within the traditional

confines of International Relations theory will more than likely make it difficult to

analyze Islam in isolation, as states in the Middle East have since their formation in

the post-colonial era acted, with a few exceptions, in their own self-interest. In

addition, abstract perceptions such as the Ummah (community of believers) and

assabiya (group feeling) are key components that constitute Islamic concepts of world

order and give it a unique perception. Interstate bargaining and institutional


54

compliance along with the theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal

theories of international interdependence are the key parameters to this study.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory is used in this work instead of

Multilateral Theory recommended by many scholars because there are a few

differences between the two.

Multilateral Intergovernmental

Many countries from various regions

work in concert on a specific issue or

issues.

Selected group of like-minded

countries work in concert on a specific

issue or issues.

All the respective players have a say

(even small and weak players get to

participate in decision making, E.g. WTO

Doha Round of Negotiations 2008 were a

failure because of India).

Intergovernmental groups constitute

a unique set of players working towards

a common cause (they are mostly like-

minded).

Decisions are made mostly by

majority vote.

Decisions are made by consensus.

Multilateralism encourages members

to bury differences for the greater good.

Everything depends on the objectives

of the group.

From this perspective, it will be more applicable to use Liberal

Intergovernmentalism Theory to discuss the role of OIC as an intergovernmental

organization on Iran‘s Nuclear Issue.

4.1.1 Muslim Ummah Approach

Muslim Ummah is the viewpoint of Islamic on global community

developed from the principle that the Muslims establish an individual and diverse

society (Hasan, 2012). As a political community the Ummah is welcome to every

people who commit to its attitudes and ideologies and are willing to take on the


55

possible responsibilities. The members are obliged to a Madinah Compact. Many

angles of Ummah are supposed to be understood. As a framework, the Ummah

describes distinct norms and political act (Ahmed, Ahsani, & Siddiqui, 2005). The

Ummah‘s Islamic political feature promotes the religious autonomy that link to the

choice of belief for everyone in the community. Ummah, as a Compact, stipulates

sovereignty. Adherents would not depend on the leaders or certain community except

on the regulation created on integrity, legitimacy and the maintenance of dignity of

all. In addition, they must condemn injustice and tyranny. For the Compact of

Madinah, it can be viewed as an Islamic approach to conflict resolution.

Based on the Ummah principle, the OIC was created. OIC, for its member

states, is an instrument to pursue and advance their own individual foreign policy

interests. The OIC in its Ten Year Program of Action which was launched in June

2006, promises concrete steps to confront ideologies that claim to use Islamic rulings

to justify extremism (The Organization of the Islamic Conference, n.d.). It requires

that the member states preserve Islamic values of peace, compassion, tolerance,

equality, justice, and human dignity and contribute to international peace and security,

understanding, and dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions. They need to

promote and encourage friendly relations mutual respect and cooperation. In short,

OIC Charter‘s fundamental principles of the Muslim World aspire for good

governance, the rule of law, the promotion of human rights, fighting corruption and

the expansion of political participation and comprehensive development.

To meet its principle and charter, the OIC is required to play a significant

role as a religious-based organization to promote true information about Islam and

defend Muslim sat large (Ummah) from such a stigma, i.e., ‗the dangerous others‘ or

‗the potential enemy‘. ‗The OIC can play an active role in solving disputes in the

international arena and be effective in regional problems,‘ Organization for Islamic

Cooperation (OIC) Secretary General Dr. Iyad Madani said at a joint press conference

with the Iranian foreign minister (―OIC Secretary-general,‖ 2014).

This relates to Iranian Nuclear program. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy,

irrespective of whether or not an Islamic bomb can or cannot, or should or should not,

exist, the concept behind the term is of Muslim origin (Hoodbhoy, 1993). The idea of

a nuclear weapon was articulated and advocated by Muslim leaders for collective


56

defence of the entire Muslim Ummah. Also Rana Banerji, Distinguished Fellow, IPCS

& Special Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat commented in No. 191, May 2012

IPCS Issue Brief (Banerji, 2012), while not overtly declaring their desire to acquire or

gain access to nuclear weapons as an essential step to eventual State power,

fundamentalist and ‗jehadi‘ organizations/ actors/ groups have been strong supporters

of acquiring a military nuclear capability so that the Ummah can counter Israel‘s

alleged nuclear capability. In this context, Iranian‘s nuclear arsenal could be justified

as an Islamic bomb, of which use should be available to the entire Ummah. However,

whether Iran could build a nuclear bomb if it chose to, requires further investigation.

On the inside, Iran appears to move to a hard line stance. However, Iranian President

Hassan Rouhani expressed under his policy of moderation and easing tensions with

the outside world that the very possession of nuclear weapons is a sin (―Iran stopped

nuclear,‖ 2014). Iran would not compromise on its rights to augment uranium to

produce nuclear fuel for power generation, as well as to produce radioisotopes to treat

cancer patients. This action was supported by OIC. OIC has shown trust on Iran

Nuclear Program that it is for the civilian purpose and will not become weapons. As

far as this study has explored, this bomb issue towards Iran has been raised for more

than 30 years since 1983, and there is no prominent proof of nuclear weaponization. It

is apparent that Nuclear bomb is not only a political excuse from the Great Powers but

also the Islamic World. Therefore, it is unavoidable for the OIC to stand firm on its

support.

According to the Muslim Ummah, Ayatollah Khamenei saw the nuclear

program of Iranian nation as an example for other nations in returning to the straight

path of God and to use the numerous political and geographical advantages in order to

resist against the enemies and achieve Islamic glory, power, and progress while

preserving unity and solidarity. He pointed out that the Iranian nation was the pioneer

of opposing the Zionist regime and proud of its resistance against the bullying of the

most insolent arrogant power in the world (―Leader rejects nuclear,‖ 2009).

The ex-chief of the 57-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference,

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, said on the Voice of America (VOA) in London on 3

November 2006 that only through diplomacy can the West solve the Iran nuclear

program. This was to avoid a new conflict in the Middle East in order to achieve unity


57

in Muslim Ummah. This OIC‘s statement represents the will not only of the political

leadership of these countries, but it is also a reflection of views in the Gulf Arab

states. OIC also actively asked the United States to end its economic sanctions against

three member states, Sudan, Iran, and Libya, explaining that they pose a ‗direct threat‘

to Islamic security. The new OIC Secretary General Iyad Madani named as A

Chairman Who Will Catalyze Tehran-Riyadh Détente (Nasseri, 2014) emphasized

that closer cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, as two

influential countries in the Islamic world, would further strengthen the Muslim

Ummah. He has also made efforts to establish a Middle East free of weapons of mass

destruction zone, a plan which Iran has also actively cooperated in. The OIC is now

recognized for its potential strength, second to only the largely dormant Non-Aligned

Movement, and is ‗poised to assume a paramount historical role in shaping the new

world order‘ (Richey, 1997).

In summation, the rationale for the OIC role towards Iran‘s nuclear

program is to support the Program in order to support its mission to invoke solidarity

within the Muslim Ummah and to make an impact in the international community.

There is a saying regarding the power that in tandem with fear is the want for power

and influence (Epstein, 1977), with nuclear capabilities even an inferior state could

become a formidable enemy.

Although to the world, Muslims are no different. However, in fact, there

are divisions inside the OIC originally due to their fight towards religious leadership

and the dispute over succession to Muhammad in the history. The conflicts exist in

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Iraq,

Libya, Palestine and Syria. Internal conflicts-division is the Nationalism -Regionalism

(Arab, Non-Arab or Arab, African). The OIC, with its international weight, can take

effective steps to remedy the current state of division among the Islamic Ummah, the

most important challenge facing the Ummah. Without unity, the Islamic Ummah

would face a Common Threat of their survival. Inter and intra country economic

disparity, disparity between population and physical area and distributed political,

military and economic strengths make it impossible for each individual country to

fight against tyranny‘s coercion alone. In achieving this, OIC needs Iran to engage in

all-out cooperation with other member states of the OIC for the implementation of


58

major developmental projects among member countries through the support of the

Islamic Development Bank. Existence of their common grounds between two Muslim

countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will make this quite possible despite differences that

Iran and Saudi Arabia have on certain issues.

According to the news on OIC in 2014, the secretary general of the OIC,

Iyad bin Amin Madani from Saudi Arabia paid his first visit to Iran soon after he took

office. This portrayed the profound relations that exist between Iran and the OIC.

Iranian influence in the OIC was founded on the principle of mutual benefits.

OIC thinks its role is to support Iran‘s nuclear program since Iran also

plays a significant role in regional political equations. On the present Syria crisis, OIC

seriously needed cooperation with Iran for its principle position after the participants

in the Geneva II conference did not achieve much resolution (United Nations, 2014).

Moreover, in finding a final solution to the Palestine sovereignty issue, Iran has also

possessed a strategic significance for certain Arab countries and the secretary general

of the OIC (Nasseri, 2014).

4.1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach

From the IR theory studied by Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal

Intergovernmentalism describes interstate cooperation and particularly regional

integration (e.g. EU) as a function of the arrangement of state interests and

preferences combined with power. That is, opposing to the expectations of

functionalism and neofunctionalism, integration and cooperation are essentially

caused by rational self-interested states bargaining with one another. Furthermore, as

would be expected, those states with more ‗power‘ possible will have more of their

interests fulfilled. For instance, with regard to the EU, it is not surprising that many of

the agreed-upon institutional arrangements are in line with the preferences of France

and Germany, the so-called ‗Franco-German core‘ (Moravcsik, 1993).

Iran‘s importance to the OIC was not a gift from heaven. Iran‘s leaders,

like all heads of state, first and foremost valued regime survival, which they could not

take for granted as they were faced with credible threats to their sovereignty from

both external and internal forces (Tope, 2012). Iran‘s nuclear program is the result of

it being banished from the rest of the international community and its mistrust of


59

western powers as the United States emerged as the unilateral world power after the

culmination of the Cold War (Diamond, 2012). Khomeini enshrined this general

attitude of distrust with the western world within the Iranian Constitution, as outlined

in Article 152:

“The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the

rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and

submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country

in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defense of the rights of

all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic

superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations

with all non-belligerent States” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic

of Iran, Ch. X, Art. 152).

Originally, the OIC was seen as simply a platform against Israel that did

not focus on the need for internal Muslim reform, but on defending Muslim Diasporas

in the West from Islamophobia. In fact, the Palestinian issue is its ‗central cause‘ of

Islamophobia, and OIC member states have successfully lobbied UN agencies to

prohibit religious insult and discrimination. However, since 2005, the OIC‘s work has

seen a dramatic shift in its approach to international affairs with a markedly reformist

character. The man who drives this approach is Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who was

appointed OIC Secretary-General in 2005. He is a leading Turkish academic and

public figure. Ihsanoglu‘s entire career focused on generating a renewed vision of

Islam as co-extensive with a flexible culture of science, pluralism and dialogue, a

dynamic and progressive intergovernmental network. His landmark achievements

were the creation of an Independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights in the

OIC — effectively the world‘s first Muslim human rights commission — to promote

internationally recognized civil, political, social and economic rights; the adoption of

a clear and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms; as well as official

recognition of the need for interfaith and intercultural dialogue, and perhaps more

radically, mutual acceptance and co-existence.

In analyzing OIC role towards Iran‘s nuclear program, interactions of

rational, self-interested states under anarchy; and the variation consisting in

assumptions about the nature of state preferences, the severity of the security


60

dilemma, and the role of international institutions in OIC and world politics will be

assessed. The OIC Secretary-General, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, in supporting Iran‘s

Nuclear Program, addressed the nuclear program that ‗…the OIC‘s position on the

need to respect the inalienable right of developing countries, including that of Iran, to

engage in the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

without discrimination and in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty‘ (Jawetz,

2010). In the OIC‘s view, according to the international norms of non-interference the

sovereignty of the member states, the Iran‘s nuclear program is its own domestic

affairs, and the OIC would not interfere this. Furthermore, the OIC also supports

Iran‘s nuclear program as the right of a sovereign states since nuclear energy has

become potential alternative energy resources for states with green energy-oriented

aims. The Middle East States, including Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. also were

all interested and ‗…have proposed to operate nuclear power plants in their countries‘

with the reasoning that they wish to boost their clean energy supply to meet the never-

ending demand for energy.

On the other hand, the OIC approached the issue of nuclear program by

employing international regulations, principles, norms, and laws to regulate its

member states. In the Iran nuclear case, there are two connected issues: (1) the nuclear

power enrichment, and (2) the proliferation. The OIC, through several international

rules, treaties, and regulations kept an eye on the nuclear issue as well as directed the

behavior of Iran. On the one hand, the nuclear peaceful technology regulation,

initiated by the IAEA, is utilized by the OIC as a pathway to manage the enrichment

of uranium of its member states. On the other hand, the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Middle East of a Nuclear-Weapon-

Free Zone are also initiated and utilized by the OIC in order to manage the member

states on the issue of nuclear proliferation. By looking into the behavior of the OIC

through these lenses, it could be interpreted that the OIC approached the Iran‘s

nuclear program through the international organization theories of International

Regimes.

According to Stephen D. Krasner, the international regimes could be

defined as ―…sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms rules, and decision-making

procedures around which actors‘ expectation converge in a given area of international


61

relation…‖ (Krasner, 1982). Thus, using the international regimes on the nuclear issue

would ease the intergovernmental organization like the OIC to manage certain issues

which not only Iran but also many other member states are also interested in. In other

words, for the OIC to work together on the issue under the same recognized rules, the

international regimes on the nuclear weapons and nuclear power must be adopted.

The nuclear program, for the OIC, is also to help balance external power.

The Israel-Saudi Arabia conflict is still ongoing. Through the OIC‘s limited support

of the Iran Nuclear Program, the OIC attempt to utilize the threat of military power as

a lever against Israel‘s secret nuclear power (shown in figure 4.1). The organization

also called on the corporation of international regimes on nuclear issues. The

Secretary General addresses several times the openness of Israel on the nuclear

program.

Figure 4.1

The World Nuclear States

Note. From ―Estimated number of warheads,‖ by Arms Control Association, 2004.

The OIC‘s stance on the balance of power is not only towards Israel, but

also towards external foreign powers. The OIC Secretary-General pointed out during

the Doha Conference in 2011, that western accusations on the Iran nuclear program


62

lacked concrete evidence. Furthermore, the Secretary General also pointed out that the

interferences from foreign countries are unlikely to be effective ―…as the case of

[military operations in] Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan.‖ In other words, the

preemptive operation of the United States in Iraq is one of the reasons that influenced

the OIC‘s position. The OIC‘s role on Iran‘s nuclear issue is to deter external powers

from exercising military options, interfering in the Middle East region and influencing

the outcome of Israel‘s suspicious nuclear programs.

Overall, the OIC‘s stance on the Iran nuclear program indicates that the

OIC relies on the Liberal Intergovernmentalism approach to balance the external

powers in order to stabilize the region. The OIC‘s approach to the issue displays that

its intention as an Intergovernmental organization is not only to find resolutions to

certain issues, but also to protect the interests of its member states.

4.2 The Two Islamic Republic of Iran’s Presidents from 2005-Present

The OIC‘s role towards Iran‘s nuclear program was highly influenced

during the two Islamic Republic of Iran‘s Presidents. Iran‘s new president-elect

Hassan Rouhani and his cabinet have already promised that their moderate and

constructive foreign policy will be pursued throughout his term in office. Rouhani is

expected to pursue a foreign policy which may ultimately lead Iran‘s relations with

the United States (US) to be more cooperative (Przeczek, 2013). However, at the end

of the two presidential terms of Mohammad Khatami, no matter how much goodwill

there was towards the US, the long-standing distrust, divergent interests, and of

course, ideology between the two states prevented them from enhancing cooperation

in political and economic areas (Przeczek, 2013). He is currently assuming the

position of the rotating presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an

international organization with 120 member states that is not formally aligned with or

against any major power bloc. Also, in a meeting with the Secretary-General of the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Ekmeledd Ihsanoglu, Rouhani stressed that Iran

should be prepared to boost cooperation with the OIC in different fields of education,

science, and technology as well as trade. Ihsanoglu, for his part, said that Iran is one

of the member states with preferential trade in OIC. This denotes the implication of


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OIC‘s support for Iranian in its nuclear program during Rouhani‘s term. The

organization stated that it is ‗the collective voice of the Muslim world‘ and works to

‗safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting

international peace and harmony‘. Hence, the President was firmed on his rejection to

sign a nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries that would allow foreign access to the

country‘s scientific and military secrets.

Rouhani is similar to the present President Ahmadinejad, but the latter

takes on a more belligerent approach. President Ahmadinejad‘s colourful rhetoric

tends to convey an Iranian drive for nuclear development that was rebellious,

belligerent, and hostile towards Israel and the west. The two aspects of the President

Ahmedinejad‘s foreign policy were ‗accommodating policy‘ and ‗alliance policy‘.

With the ‗accommodating policy‘, Ahmadinejad aimed at ‗expanding cooperation

after Saddam‘s fall with the main Arab world actor… and seeking direct talks with the

US‘ (Przeczek, 2013). Indeed, President Ahmadinejad‘s plans for regional relations

was aimed at making the Middle East, including Central Asia and Caucasus, self-

reliant and free of interference from extra-regional powers (such as the US) in the

region. On the other hand, with the ‗alliance policy, Ahmadinejad allied Tehran with

regional and extra-regional states to avert a possible US attack, and also to

‗regionalize‘ the nuclear issue so that Iran‘s nuclear program would be justified vis-à-

vis Israel‘s nuclear capabilities and the conflict with Palestinians. In addition to this

pragmatic policy, President Ahmadinejad‘s chanting ‗wipe Israel off the map‘ was

very radical, yet still far from materialization, as even the new right recognized that a

less belligerent approach was the best way to ensure Iran‘s ascendance in the Middle

East. President Ahmadinejad collaborative approach was publicized in his historic

first Egypt visit since the Islamic revolution in 1979 during his term on the occasion

of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit. His influence in the OIC

no doubt makes the OIC‘s role on Iran‘s nuclear program favourable. The OIC, in

return, gained international recognition partly through Iran‘s nuclear program, an

unseen element of interaction in conflict resolution.


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4.3 The OIC Significance

An analytical examination of the political behaviour of the three key

players, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan,

within the OIC demonstrates a practical register of rationales, ideas, and ambitions in

keeping with the real politics in the OIC. The OIC was originally founded to

safeguard Islamic World interests which are to promote international peace and

harmony, and ensure security and progress demanded by the collective voices of the

Islamic world. Initially, there were some differences in Shia (represented by Iranian

majority) and Sunni (Saudi Arabian) beliefs. The international Saudi ‗Petro-Islam‘

influence has made the Saudi conflict of Shia and Sunni extends beyond the borders

of the kingdom. Saudi Arabia showed their opposition against Shia movements

through their support of Iraq‘s 1980–1988 war with Iran and militants sponsored in

Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan, with the second largest number of Shias after Iran

while populated with Sunnis majority, played global politics as an Islamic center due

to its geographical location on the Islamic edge, its non-Arab ethnicity, and its status

as a historical novice.

However, to assume that religious belief-structures immediately translate

into policy rationale would take more interpretation. Certainly, for the Saudi

establishment, the concept ‗over-the-horizon-power‘ has always implied (Sheikh,

2003) ‗beyond a heavenly Divine‘. In fact, the inception, consolidation and

development of the Saudi dynasty were based on big-power patronage. The very

nativity of the Saudi Kingdom was the result of inter-Islamic confrontation and extra-

Islamic alliances, involving both British, American and, until 1938, Soviet

connections. In principle, the extra-territorial arrangement has been the very motive of

Saudi foreign policy, since the 1915 Darea Treaty with the British and later the 1943

lease of the Dhahran airbase to the US.

In contrast, as Khomeinism put it in 1979, the Iranian transformation

amounted to no less than a ‗twin revolution‘, for its target was both the domestic

establishment and foreign politico-cultural penetration. The clerical Iran originally

just wanted to disconnect itself from both the Western block and, significantly, the

Islamic world. Naveed S. Sheikh put in his article that ‗In post-revolution Iran, the


65

subservient Islam of the Saudi brand, prostrating to the idol of superpower patronage,

was represented as a perverted polytheism (shirk), anathematic to the pristine pact

with the Almighty‘ (Sheikh, 2002). In the eschatological (a part of theology

concerned with the final events of history, or the ultimate destiny of humanity) Shtite

‗Kingdom of God‘, there was no monarchy. Thus, the discourse of Iranian Islam,

faithful to its Manichaean (a major religion that was founded by the Iranian prophet

Mani) legacy, made it as a dualistic binary to the Saudi monarchy: the latter's

reactionary disposition was contrasted with its own revolutionary capacity, and the

latter's regression contrasted its own Islamic liberation.

The OIC‘s role for Pakistan is prevalent, the trauma of the 1971 Bengali

withdrawal and the constant Indo-Pakistani cold war confirmed an obsession with

national security. Pakistan, a key player in the OIC, has been able to attain an OlC-

resolution either in condemnation of the government of India or in the support of the

people of Kashmir since the third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in

1972. Although security has thus been the constant theme of Pakistan's foreign policy

activism in the OIC, periodically the revelation has recurred that no ‗special

relationship‘ could be cultivated by virtue of religion alone (this is why Liberal

Intergovernmental Theory is essential to understand the countries‘ motive). In time,

initial pan-Islamic enthusiasm has turned to be clear and mature in its understanding

of the prospects of a pan-Islamic security community—illustrated so dramatically in

the nuclear solo.

The Saudi Kingdom, on the other hand, has been the depoliticization and

desecuritization of Islamic internationalism. Saudi Arabia tired of the US tyranny has

insisted on an institution building approach within the OIC and created a lot of organs

and agencies. The status quo of the Saudi regime, insisting on a de-politicization of

international Islam, has readily clashed with both the clerical Iran‘s ideal and the

Pakistan‘s security optimization. This is not to say that the OIC remains a non-

political forum for the host country, only that the strategy here is less intense. Pre-

1969, Saudi Arabia had in the period used pan-Islamism as a counter-discourse to

Nasserite pan-Arabism, but during an Iran-Iraq war, reversed its allegiances by

promoting pan-Arabism to counter an increase pan-Islamist outgrowth from the

pulpits of Persia. The overturn of loyalties was augmented by the fact that Egypt was


66

readmitted at the Casablanca summit, January1984—long before it was invited back

in the Arab League (Sheikh, 2003). Likewise, the specialized Al-Quds Committee of

the OIC, with a permanent Moroccan chairmanship, came about as a Saudi-Moroccan

disengagement of terrorist agreement in the face of radical currents in the Islamic

world.

The deep-rooted state-centrism of the two key players in the OIC has

disallowed the formation of any synthetic pan-political rationale and has retarded the

development of a solitary pan-Islamic foreign policy. Whereas the Saudi aims with

the inception and expansion of the OIC was to create a framework which could

bestow legitimacy (domestically as well as internationally) to the regime, for Iran, the

OIC was no instrument of stabilization, but rather a potential venue for both political

subversion and ideological expansion. This was echoed in Khomeini's continued

declarations seeking a new synthesis of Islamic internationalism and the world of

states. A radical and political realist, Khomeini, was doing to Shitism exactly what

Lenin had done to Marxism (Sheikh, 2002). Thus, in the OIC Iran tended to remain

the ideological mobilization pertaining to its idiosyncratic liberation theology. It is

apparent in its early revolutionary zeal, or more recently in a self-projection as the

global Islamic superego. In the post-Khomeini Iranian Second Republic, President

Khatemi has kept Islamic internationalism, the dual policy of containment (of Tehran

by Riyadh and of Riyadh by Tehran) that was both self-defeating for the idealists, and

self-revealing for the realists.

The OIC to the Muslim minorities for its credential was so doubtful as the

minorities are being increasingly victimized in flashpoints like Bosnia, Chechnya,

Kashmir, Kosovo, and Palestine. Adopting a low-profile stance in world affairs, pan-

Islamic summits have routinely invoked the authority, and authenticity, of the U.N.

not the OIC as the normative guardian of the world community; thus, collapsing

entirely the notional peculiarity of the Ummah in an international society.

This trichotomy of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan must not be taken to

illustrate a confusion or uncertainty in OlC-policy, rather it illustrates the policy of the

OIC. In effect, the tripartite relationship is a triangle of neutralization. Not only that

their chief political concerns (legitimacy, ideological expansion and geo-strategic

balance, respectively) are different, but also their operation mode within the OIC (in


67

the form of reactive, assertive, and defensive strategies) together with their typical

normal vision of the post-Caliphatic ummah (as an economic, political and security

community, respectively) are not in the same line. The absence of any pan-Islamic

rationale is striking, and at most cultural predilections have informed an otherwise

secular extension of financial rather than ideological markets.

OIC approach, in other words, involves a de-engagement in matters that

can adversely affect the interests of one of the crucial member-states. However, since

the OIC, as the incarnation of global Islam, cannot remain silent, it must utter words

deprived either of sense or, at least, of direction. This, then, expresses the honesty of

the OIC; that it remains an embryonic extension of the geo-political arena, providing

‗Islamic legitimacy‘, rather than being, as if convinced by any ‗Islamic rationale‘, the

benefits of the chief Islamic actor. Surely, the latter may require as prerequisite not

only a predefined identity and behavioural codex for pan-Islam, but also necessitate

the identification of pan-Islamic interests as more than random aggregates of state

interests. Understanding the OIC in terms of an arena rather than actor would provide

conceptual clarity both to the function and action (as well as limitation) of the regime.

As such, ‗The role of OIC on Iran‘s Nuclear Issue‘ in this perspective and the new

Secretary General‘s mission pronounces the significance of the OIC as the moderator

to lessen the challenges from external tyranny‘s and internal Ummah‘s drives and the

nonpolitical forum to assert the collective Islamic direction on the international arena.

4.4 The Role of OIC on Iran’s Nuclear Issue

There is still plenty of room for the OIC to assert its stance on the

international arena with its Iranian Nuclear Program issue, with its social capital-

Geostrategic importance, combined location of most Islamic states, universal religion,

99% literacy rate in CARs, 57 % in Pakistan, high scientific publication growth rate in

2009 in Iran, Civilizations in Muslim Countries-and its economic capital-1.6 billion

Collective population of member states, Combined GDP of $ 13 Trillion, OPEP: 34%

oil contribution comes from Muslim world, 575 B$ contribution of Arab world in

insurance banking and stock exchange in Euro Zone. Should the OIC be able to

implement collaboration and unity and eliminate underlying internal conflicts of


68

nationalism and sectarian in the organization, it can attain a firm and influential stance

against tyrannical regimes in the political world., As for nuclear weapons, even when

they are not used as a weapon in conflict or resolution, they remain an unseen element

of the interaction in both conflicts and resolutions that influence outcomes (Goldman,

2010). Robert McNamara explained that nuclear weapons served no military purpose

but to deter one‘s opponent from using them (―Mcnamara calls,‖ 1983). Another

reason for supporting Iran‘s Nuclear Program is simply of international prestige

(Barnaby, 2004: pp. 4-5; Epstein, 1977, 17). Prestige offers influence, recognition and

diplomatic clout- important tools in any state's workshop. Developing nuclear

weapons and possessing them require large amounts of resources and a core of

highly-trained and educated scientists and technicians. In other words, they offer the

perfect way to show-off a nation's wealth and ability (Waltz, 1995: 9). The question

remains as to how the Great Powers would react to this Liberal Intergovernmentalism

organization if it exerted such a policy?


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CHAPTER 5

THE ROLE OF GREAT POWERS ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR ISSUE

In order to understand the Iranian nuclear issue, the relationships between

Iran and other players will be analyzed. There are many parties, including both

international organization and states involved with the Iranian nuclear program

including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU)

3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), the United Nations, China, Russia,

and the United States.


There is no doubt that the US, EU/ EU-3, Russia and China (together

called P5+1) would each take a very different approach concerning the Iranian nuclear

issue. Meantime, this paper will examine each party‘s individual role on Iran‘s

nuclear issue. This research compares the US, EU/ EU-3, Russia and China and P5+1

policy towards Iran‘s nuclear issue through the realist theoretical approach, which is

considered to be the most suitable approach to explain their foreign policy decision-

making process.

According to realism, an international relations approach, realists tend to

highlight systemic factors when considering what holds the most influence on foreign

policy making. Such factors include the international system as well as the relative

amount of power a sovereign state has.

The first concept of realism is defensive. Offensive realists acknowledge

that anarchy dominates the form of international system, which refers to an absence of

any kind of centralized authority higher than states. This is in line with the second

concept that states are sovereign and are the main actors within the system. The

sovereignty that such states believe themselves to possess causes them to see

themselves as the only suitable authority to control its own domestic affairs in

whatever way they want. A third assumption, self-help, refers to the standard that

influences a state‘s behaviour. In other words, states will do what is necessary to


70

guarantee their own survival in an international system that is anarchical. Since the

belief is that states will take appropriate steps to survive, the fourth assumption is that

the main currency in the international system is power. Thus, in order to better

understand any form of foreign policy of a state, one must consider its relative level of

power.

The realist approach will only lead us to an international system and

sovereign states, whilst the balance of power approach is derived from

realist/neorealist theories. Subscribers of the balance of power approach argue that in

this competitive world order, states remain suspicious of one another and will

cooperate only when they have to. Hence, after understanding the concept of the

realist approach, this research will then examine how the Great Powers‘ interests

influence their policies toward Iran according to the balance of power angle. The

international distribution of power is basically an independent force, which has a

direct impact on a state‘s behaviour.

5.1.1 Realist Approach

In the perspective of the US, Iran‘s activity of nuclear power is perceived

to have two negative effects on US‘s interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. The

first is that when Iran attains nuclear weapons, it is believed to use it as a deterrent

against others, especially the US, in the form of conventional military coercion and

so. Also, such weapons will allow Iran to increase its confidence and lead to the same

aggression it had in the early 1990s. The concept that geopolitics Liberal

Intergovernmentalismcs today is mostly dictated by energy security is at least true for

US foreign policy as the current US military presence in Afghanistan, Iraq and many

areas of the Gulf region gives some level of excuse. Nevertheless, if Iran manages to

attain a nuclear deterrent, it could counter the credibility of US‘s action in the Middle

East (Tam, 2010).

As mentioned in the above paragraph, there were two threats to US

interests if Iran attains nuclear weapons. The second threat is the activation of a

nuclear arms race, both in the Middle East and elsewhere. This is because many

neighbouring countries are frightened that Iran will apply an expansionist foreign

policy when it has nuclear weapons, especially Saudi Arabia who may choose to do


71

the same to prevent an Iranian attack. The countries outside of the Middle East that

are considering whether or not to obtain nuclear weapons, for instance North Korea

and Pakistan, could learn from the Iranian circumstance that the consequences for

pursuing nuclear weapons are tolerable and far less threatening than what they

initially thought.

The US role towards the issue can be seen obviously as a big brother (All

countries, cutting across ethnic or cultural lines, seek resources, investment or military

aid either directly from US or through institution financed by it) to stop terrorism

from the Middle East and human rights abuses. Historically, the US relations with

Iran seemed to depend much on the status quo of the US economy and political

power. Presently, there is no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries

(US Department of State, 2011). During British and Russian colonialisms, Iran was

very wary and the United States was seen as a more trustworthy Western power, and

thus relations were strong. Until the Iranian Revolution, a dramatic reversal and

disagreements between the two countries were provoked due to US arrogance

(Sadjadpour, 2009). In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's oil revenues grew considerably and

weakened US influence which declined considerably in domestic Iranian politics and

policies. In 1979, the United States cut all diplomatic relations with Iran, ended all

nuclear agreements with Iran and imposed economic sanctions. While in 1986, there

was an American effort to sell arms to Iran as a way of raising funds for anti-

Communist fighters (known as Contras) in Nicaragua. This action of the US revealed

that the US sold weapons to its own enemy to fulfill another agenda. Yet, with the

election of reform-minded Iranian President Khatami in 1997, the US shifted its

policy from 'dual containment' to 'limited rapprochement.' (Freedman, 1999, 71; Katz

1998) Thus, there was more optimism about the improvement of relations between the

US and Iran. That was not long before G.W Bush took the office when the optimism

ended. Relations soured even more following the 9/11 attacks in New York City.

Thus, to the realist approach, one has to look at the US power and

economy to evaluate US role. As mentioned above, states will do what is necessary to

guarantee their own survival in an international system that is anarchical. In addition,

the main currency in the international system is power. Iran does not support the US

dollar as the world reserve currency, so it trades in Petrodollars. With Iran‘s nuclear


72

program, it deters the US power over the flow of oil in the region. Therefore, the US

role on Iran‘s nuclear issue cannot be passive.

There are many options for the US to take regarding Iran‘s nuclear issue

in the international system. The US role to lead the war against Iran would involve the

launching of a military attack against Iran. Of course, such an attack may mean a war

with heavy costs and damage to US interests and stimulate the very development of

an Iranian nuclear weapon to a higher degree. Thus, there is strong need for proof of

Iran‘s nuclear energy program intention as a basis for developing nuclear weapons.

This, however, has been ambiguous for more than 50 years. The Iranian regime, as

assessed by the US intelligence community, has not even decided to build such a

weapon (Risen & Mazzetti, 2012). Although the United States would take action to

support its closest allies, like Israel, against those who violate the IAEA and

international nuclear agreements, military strikes are likely to cause a disruption of

the oil flow from the Persian Gulf and price increases. With the fragile economy of

the US and the world in general, and the dependence on oil from this region, war

would likely deter economic recovery or even spark another global economic crisis.

Cohen specifically cites the statement from the Iranian president in 2012:

―Let's even imagine that we have an atomic weapon, a nuclear

weapon. What would we do with it? What intelligent person would fight

5,000 American bombs with one bomb?‖ (Greenwald, 2012).

Another role the US should probably take is to overthrow Iran‘s

government as it was the case during the Shah‘s era. Furthermore, the US has a long

history of overthrowing democracies and any other forms of government (Guatemala-

1954, Congo-1960, Dominican Republic-1961, etc.). The justification for such actions

is to maintain international security since the US, as a world power, must take this

responsibility. To the international perspective, Iran‘s government is a danger to the

United States, Israel, and the rest of the Middle East, and democracy is the only

solution to stabilize the region. This role will protect US access to oil in the Persian

Gulf in the long-term and is believed to end a regime that abuses human rights and

supports terrorism. It will also lend US support to Iranian democratic protesters which

will give positive effects to US in the future. There is evidence by Carl Herman that

Abdolmalek Rigi, leader of the assassination/terrorist group captured by Iranian


73

government, testified that the US was engaged in state-sponsored terrorism to

overthrow Iran‘s government through funding him to get weapons and providing him

assistance with logistical management (Herman, n.d.). However, in this economic

climate, the American public will not support military force since it creates a bulk of

deficit spending similar to the Iraq war under Bush's presidency.

The US, then, should probably take a positive and diplomatic approach

like normalizing relations with Iran. As a world superpower, the United States is

responsible for a more peaceful world and should engage more positively with friends

and foes alike. The last few years have shown that there has been a mix of informal

diplomacy and formal policy-level statements communication through second-track

diplomacy by various unofficial groups, informal contacts between officials on both

sides, and the efforts of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense

Robert Gates, and various senior US commanders to clarify that the United States

prefer diplomacy to war (Cordesman, 2008). Not only is the United States able to

address the nuclear weapons issue through a broad diplomatic effort, but it can also

address the issues of human rights and sponsorship of terrorism. This way will bring

mutual benefits to both Iran and the US to avoid destructive war. Nevertheless, the

question is whether there can be enough trust between the two parties that will make

this maneuver work.

In contrast, China pursues its foreign policy towards Iran in favour of its

own national interest. The demand for energy and resources has dramatically risen

and directed China‘s foreign policy. The main goal of China‘s policy towards Iran is

to use diplomatic ways to improve their relationship for sustaining smooth trade

routes. During the 1990s, China pressured Iran for a chance to be part of founding oil

contracts. Such persistence resulted in a signing of a memorandum of understanding

in October 2004, which provided Sinopec a leading position to develop the new

Yadavaran area in the southwest of Iran. That site was expected to have oil reserves of

3 billion barrels, and the overall contract was expected to have a value of US$100

billion (Tam, 2010). Iran is ranked as the second largest in the world in terms of the

amount of oil and gas reserves it occupies (Berman, 2011). In 2006, Iran, as China‘s

third largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia and Angola, provided China with 11%

of its oil imports (Rakel, 2009).


74

Furthermore, China‘s economic interests in Iran not only concern energy,

but also non-hydrocarbon industries. 13% of Iran‘s total imports are from China,

which contains huge amounts of steel and machine equipment. Trade numbers

between Iran and China demonstrate that there has been a steady increase in Iran‘s

non-oil exports as nearly two billion US dollars worth of goods have gone to China

throughout 2009, which is a 26% growth compared to the previous year. Chinese

firms have dramatically invested in Iran‘s non-hydrocarbon industries. For example,

Cherry, the Chinese automobile firm, and Majmoeh Mazi Toos from Iran were in a

joint venture and started producing as of 2007. China‘s largest steel firm, China

Metallurgical Group, since 2008 has constructed factories in Yazd province.

Iran to China is a bargaining chip with the US on Taiwan and the Middle

East oil supply since US needs China to support its policy towards the Iranian nuclear

program. China‘s policy on Iran‘s nuclear program must be evaluated whether it is

favourable to the US or not, therefore reflecting its relationship with the US (Djallil,

2011). This, in turn, is referred to as conflicting cooperation. China‘s role on the Iran

nuclear issue, hence, must maintain good relationships with Tehran, an important

component in Beijing‘s Middle Eastern policy. At the same time, China must balance

its economic ties with the US as the US is the leading importer of Chinese products.

Iran‘s nuclear issue has also been on the EU/ EU-3‘s radar. When the US

needs support from Great Powers like the EU, and the EU has an ambition to become

a global player, the coercive policy from the EU against the proliferation of Iran‘s

nuclear program is inevitable. In October 2003, the EU-3 took an initiative to have its

representatives make it clear to Tehran that they did not accept Iran as a nuclear

weapons state and later broke-up negotiations in August 2005 (Sauer, 2007). The

opportunity for the EU to step in as the main negotiator with Iran arose from the US

rejection for diplomatic talks with Iran. At that time, the EU was already negotiating

with Iran on trade and associations. Later, the EU suspended the bilateral negotiations

on trade and associations because Iran declined their offer to sign the Additional

Protocol of the IAEA. Many negotiations between Iran and the EU were conducted

and stumbled between 2003 and2005, and a few agreements were signed. However,

Iran learnt that it was only the carrot that the EU might turn back on Iran anytime

when the situation changed. For example, in 2004 when the US made claims that Iran


75

was violating the October 2003 agreement, the EU did not help Iran convince the

world that its missing parts in the Iranian declarations were not significant. Hence, the

act of mistrust pushed the Iranians to resume uranium conversion and to build a heavy

water plant. Trust has been a failing in political capital. In both parties‘ perceptions,

trust is something that has to be adequately built and strengthened (Santini, 2010).

The EU has been playing as a mediator on the Iran nuclear issue when the situations

become grim between Iran and the US or IAEA, or Russia and China. Apparently,

being in that role, the EU has shaped negotiations framework, which has undergone

subsequent enlargements, consistent with its securitised but multilateral discourses.

Russia, in the Iranian‘s eyes, on the other hand, seems to be another tyrant

called small ‗Satan‘. Their relations have never been simple. Rather, they have been

in many conflicts. During the 19th

to 20th

century, Iran, Russia‘s important partner,

lost its territory to the Russian empire. Iran was intervened in its succession by Russia

and the neighbours were invaded. Between Iran and Russia, the latter always employs

the carrots and sticks approach with the former. The agreement to complete the

Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP) was followed by momentous protocols on the

construction of a centrifuge plant in Iran using Russian technology. Massive

deportations of Iranian spies from Moscow soon gave way to another rapprochement,

which became especially obvious against the backdrop of the chill in Russian-

American relations under George W. Bush (Vladimir & Ivan, 2011). The selling of its

S-300 air defence system missile from Russia to Iran at the beginning of this year sent

the message to Iran the benefits of sticking with the nuclear negotiations (al-Jadeed,

2015). These few samples and the recent Russia‘s admission of Iran to the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization, which counter balances the US role in Asia exemplify

Russia‘s role towards Iran‘s nuclear program as to gain leverage in relations with the

US.

Besides their individual motives, collectively as the P5+1, these Great

Powers also moved to stop Iran‘s nuclear proliferation. In 2006, the E3 were joined

by Russia, China and the U.S. This group is also alternatively known as the E3+3 or

the P5+1, referring to the three European powers + Russia China and America, or the

five world powers plus Germany. They released a joint statement in 2006 reaffirming

the principles of peaceful nuclear technology under strict supervision by the


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international community. To force Iran to corporate with IAEA, they imposed

sanctions. Negotiations with the world powers, beginning in 2003 with the three

European powers (Great Britain, France and Germany) and later joined by the U.S.,

Russia and China (P5+1), aimed to reach a lasting settlement which would enable Iran

to pursue peaceful nuclear energy while preventing the development of nuclear

weapons (Arms Control Association, 2016).

An interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the group of six

countries mentioned above) was signed on November 2013. In it, Iran agreed to stop

the enrichment of uranium to 20% purity in exchange for limited relief of economic

sanctions. The deal came into effect on January 20, 2014 and was set to expire on

June 20, 2014. The agreement has a provision for renewal without change for a

further six months should the parties wish it (Arms Control Association, 2016).

In order to gain a better view of the P5+1 approach to Iran‘s Nuclear

Issue, a chronological recount of the most important developments in Iran‘s nuclear

program, international attempts to negotiate a settlement to address this controversial

issue, and implementation of the agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 on July 14

will be explored (Arms Control Association, 2016).

From the day the P5+1 proposed a framework agreement to Iran offering

incentives for Iran to stop its enrichment program for an indefinite period of time in

2006, Iran did not completely reject the condition, declaring that the package

contained ―elements which may be useful for a constructive approach‖. Later in 2008,

the P5+1 offered a new comprehensive proposal to Iran, updating its 2006 incentives

package. Maintaining the same basic framework as the one in 2006, the proposal

emphasized an initial ―freeze-for-freeze‖ process wherein Iran would stop any

expansion of its enrichment activities while the UN Security Council agreed not to

impose further sanctions (Arms Control Association, 2016). Nothing happened.

During Obama‘s administration in 2009, another initiative to fuel Tehran Research

Reactor was proposed. The proposal from the US was backed by IAEA required Iran

to export the majority of its 3.5 percent enriched Uranium in return for 20 percent-

enriched uranium fuel for the TRR, which Iran had exhausted much of its supply. The

proposal was not met. In 2010, Iran began the procedure of producing 20 percent

enriched uranium, allegedly for the TRR (Arms Control Association, 2016).


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Other P5+1‘s efforts to work out with Iran in the meeting in Istanbul

failed to reach a substantive agreement. The P5+1 rejected Iran‘s preconditions of a

fuel-swap plan and transparency measures, recognition of a right to enrichment along

with the lifting of sanctions. However, talks in Istanbul in 2012 with the P5+1 showed

positive signs. Both parties, the P5+1 and Iran, agreed on a framework to continue

negotiations with a step-by-step process and joint actions. Many meetings followed in

2012 until Iran and the P5+1 met again in Almaty for a second round of talks in 2013.

At the end of the meetings, negotiators announced that no further meetings were

scheduled and the sides remained far apart. However, after the new election of Iran‘s

President, Hasan Rouhani, the new president called for the resumption of significant

negotiations with the P5+1 on Iran's nuclear program (Arms Control Association,

2016).

In early November 2013 at the Geneva talks, there was another failure to

reach an agreement on a first-phase deal of both parties. This time, both the P5+1 and

Iran announced that talks would continue on November 20 in Geneva with the belief

that the differences were narrowed . Early on November 24, Iranian Minister Javad

Zarif and Catherine Ashton, leader of the P5+1 negotiating team, signed an agreement

called the Joint Plan of Action. It laid out certain steps for each side in a six-month,

first-phase agreement, and the broad framework to guide negotiations for a

comprehensive solution. Iran needed to hold off on its nuclear program. In return, it

would receive limited sanctions relief, repatriation of limited assets frozen abroad,

and an obligation that no new nuclear-related sanctions would be imposed on Iran for

the duration of the agreement (Arms Control Association, 2016).

A few more meetings were held after that Joint Plan of Action agreement

to discuss technical implementation. The program became active a month later. After

its first successful action, in May 2014, Iran and the IAEA announced an additional

five actions for Iran to complete before August 25, 2014. Iran and the P5+1 continued

talks in Vienna on a comprehensive nuclear agreement (Arms Control Association,

2016). On June 19, the parties announced additional actions that Iran would take,

namely converting 25 kg of uranium powder enriched to 20 percent into fuel plates

and blending down about 3 tons of uranium enriched to less than 2 percent. In return,


78

the P5+1 would also repatriate $2.8 billion in funds. Many talks between the P5+1

and Iran continued and exhibited positive progress (Arms Control Association, 2016).

In December 2014, U.S. State Department officials said the talks are

"good and substantive." Even in February 2015, a report by the Director General of

the IAEA confirmed that Iran upheld its commitments under the interim deal,

including additional provisions from the November 2014 extension. The report noted

―Iran has continued to provide the Agency with managed access to centrifuge

assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.‖

Nevertheless, there was evidence of a minor clash in March 2015 when Prime

Minister Netanyahu delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress. His speech

claimed that the Iran deal would all but guarantee that Iran receives substantial

nuclear weapons (Arms Control Association, 2016). This speech aroused the US

Senate; Senator Tom Cotton and 46 other senators signed an open letter to the

Parliament of Iran warning that any deal reached without legislative approval could be

revised by the next president ―with the stroke of a pen.‖ As a consequence, the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed legislation authored by Senator

Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) that would require the President to submit the deal to Congress

for a vote of approval or disapproval, and the President would not be able to waive

sanctions during the 30-day Congressional review period.

On July 19,2015, after Iran and the P5+1 announced a comprehensive deal

on Iran‘s Nuclear program, the Obama administration sent the comprehensive deal

and supporting documents to Congress, beginning the 60-day review period mandated

by the Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act. The 34th Senator announced support for the

nuclear deal with Iran, meaning that Congress would not have the support to overrule

a presidential veto on a resolution to disapprove the deal. This significant indicator

would prevent the Senate from reaching the 60-vote threshold required to end the

debate and move to vote on a resolution of disapproval. Nonetheless, a vote on a

resolution of approval failed in the House of Representatives, 269-162, with 25

Democrats joining the Republicans in voting against the measure. The congressional

review period ended without passage of a resolution of approval or a resolution of

disapproval (Arms Control Association, 2016). Everything in 2015 seemed to be

promising. The IAEA had no credible indication that nuclear material was diverted


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from Iran's declared program in the comprehensive deal or that any activities

continued after 2009. The IAEA verified that Iran met its nuclear related

commitments. After the announcement of the conclusion of Iran's nuclear deal on July

14, 2015, questions rose whether there was a theoretical explanation of the genuine

reasons that led to this agreement.

Attention should be paid to special words and subjects like reconciled

conception, the polical influence, statism, national interests, the diplomacy institute,

and great power‘s relationships. What are the existing and potential trends of the

agreement? From the chronological events above, there were many events that

confirmed the consequences of the decision-makers‘ human nature when it comes to

the deal between P5+1grop and the Iranian nuclear program. It can be seen in Iran's

suspicion of the intentions, objectives, measures and proposals of the member states

of the P5+1 group. Iran saw that all of the above items were in conflict with its own

structure, nature and goals and, obviously, member states of the P5+1 had already

provided grounds for the imposition of all kinds of sanctions against Iran. However,

the P5+1 group were uncertain about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

Moreover, during nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries, each

side moved along the lines of its own national interests, so Iran sought to obtain the

right to enrich uranium on its soil recognized by the P5+1 group, to have sanctions

removed, and to secure the right continue with its nuclear activities. However, the

P5+1 group sought to work out powerful and serious guiding mechanisms to oversee

Iran's nuclear program in order to make sure that there are no diversions in that

program regarding the production of nuclear weapons (Khoshandam, 2015). Yet,

given the fact that policies consist of negotiation approaches, the diplomatic subject

like the Iran agreement is appropriate ideal for this area. In spite of moral discussions

and local conflict in US and Iran, these two major aspects of the nuclear debates could

remain because of ethical reasons. The US and Iran foreign governors succeeded the

deal by spent long hours of negotiation (Khoshandam, 2015).

Hence, from a Realist perspective, it is unadvisable to analyze the Iran‘s

Nuclear issue on power and economics alone without additional tools of diplomacy,

national power, balance of power, international ethics, global public opinion, and

international law. Understanding the actions of Iran toward the world is complex and


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problematic due to its deep psychological and historical backgrounds. Future

viewpoint of the negotiation on Iran nuclear issue requires common respect, and

government‘s actions that give the realistic clarification on the causes and prospect of

Iran deal (Khoshandam, 2015). In addition to the consequence of Iran agreement,

Islamic state is going to make the new pattern for interactions toward Western state

and it different from the pattern toward Germany, Russia, Japan and Vietnam.

In summary, America wants to defend the hegemonic position and

integrity with many states and that will not let Iran a chance to develop the capacity of

nuclear program. China wants to sustain the energy and financial income, therefore,

merely benefit to its current economy. Despite the Great Powers‘ differences of their

interests, all states engaged their policies concerning the nuclear program of Iran

merely regarding their own survival and individual advantage. Therefore, the research

finds that motivation for the states to use the contradictory methods is due to their

own national material benefits. The national interest of the United States mainly

concerned with whether Iran can attain the nuclear deterrence or not. As for China,

however, its national interests are subjected to economic modernization and energy

security. Russia is to leverage its status quo with Washington and its relation with Iran

for oil. The EU uses a diplomatic approach just to secure its position in the world

power and to shape the framework of negotiations. Last but not least the P5+1, they

should take it seriously that the agreement will lift the sanctions as well as Iran can

incorporate with the economic world. Also Iran could possible increase both of its

international and regional power. Furthermore, the American competitors like China

and Russia, will probable gain from the agreement throughout trade with Iran in both

military and oil products. Among various circumstances, opponents are able to attain

their objective security from the strategy of collaboration thus they should take the

collaboration when these circumstances occur.

5.1.2 Balance of Power Approach

As mentioned above, the realists will approach Iran‘s nuclear weapon

international policy of the Great Powers in way that protects their own sovereignty

and interests. Further investigation into the issue via the balance of power approach


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will lead us to see that there is a concealed power matching move (the use or threat of

military force) in an individual policy.

The relationships of the US and Iran in the past era involved the economic

issue, the leader Shah mainly interested in the corporation from the United States,

especially the financial, aerospace and oil industry. In 1970 the Shah was the leading

buyer military good from the United States which involved selling oil in exchange for

buying armed products. While for Shah, he just wanted to maintain the support of the

monarchy from the US. During the Shah‘s period, the US relation with the Shah was

very supportive, even human rights issues were of no concern to US president Jimmy

Carter who was seen as the ‗champion of human rights‘ to the world. In 1978 during

the Shah‘s dictatorship, Carter said ‗Iran is an island of stability in one of the more

troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your

leadership and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you.

There is no leader in the world for whom I feel such deep gratitude and personal

friendship as the deep gratitude and personal friendship as the Shah‘ (G. & J.T, 1978).

Their relationship turned sour because of Khomeini when the US invoked the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to freeze all Iranian

government assets and properties. The development of the relationship between the

US and Iran and its nuclear program must be examined after the Shah‘s collapse. The

imposing of the IEEPA was followed by the Algiers Accord in 1980 to settle the

financial claim between Iran and the US. Also in the same year, the US had a dual

containment policy to restrain military and economic of Iraq and Iran for the benefit

to the US‘s client countries in Middle East, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. However,

this policy was to use the stressed the Iran and Iraq conflict relationship and to start

the war. Iran perceived that US was behind the war between Iran and Iraqi. From

Robert Parry‘s document, ‗It was also interesting to confirm that President Carter

gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through Fahd‘(Parry,

2003), it is apparent that the US wanted to overthrow and weaken the Iranian

government. Although the US tried to prove to the world that it is neutral in this war,

there was ample evidence that the US supported both sides with military arsenals,

acting as a double agent. The US supplied much of what Saddam needed in building

chemical weapons, including anthrax (see, Denver Post, October10, 2001,


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Washington Post, December 30, 2002). Later, the US removed Iraq from the terrorist

nations list, but put Iran on it instead. This again illustrated that the US would like to

weaken Iran‘s power or government even it had to break its own Algiers Accord

agreement. The sanctions put on Iran by the US influenced by Israel were to bring

down the Iranian government and replace it with a US-Israeli friendly one. Numerous

sanctions passed against Iran, each tougher than the next. However, the intensity and

frequency of sanction bills slowed because the US sanction laws had become too

extreme and non-enforceable, and also the many US associations became active in

opposing the sanctions as the sanctions affected their economic benefits. During

Bush‘s administration, the Israelis and their ‗neoconservative‘ counterparts in the US

government changed the direction of the US foreign policy toward Iran using the

Nuclear program issue to do to Iran what had been done to Iraq. The news of the

nuclear program threat fabricated by the US and Israel was to create public security

concern, the psychological warfare and move against Iran to justify their further

aggressive action. Nevertheless, a military attack against Iran is difficult and could

have long term consequences. Therefore, such an attack has never been the first

option of the US-Israel, but they aimed to overthrow the Iranian government. This

sense of power threat to invade Iran‘s administration from the Super Powers makes

the Iran nuclear program resolution far from possible. In reality, retrieve to the

military sites of Iran for inspection has not been a problem of numerous occasions,

both on the nuclear front and, even more frequently, as part of Iran‘s obligations

under the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. However, the request must not be

excessive, but on an equal basis and not be purely based on interrogations. This

reaction from Iran is seen as its rejection to the US for trying to reduce the balance of

power from Iran. Having the ear of US Republicans controlling both houses of

Congress, Netanyahu being terrified of the shift of Middle East‘s power balance,

recently paused of the nuclear development deal between US and Iran, asking that the

states discussing with Iran to include a nonexchangeable requirement that Iran

recognizes the right of Israel (Lewis, 2015, April 3). This speech arose after the

agreement between America and Iran early this year to waive sanctions in Iran.

To the US hegemonic order, China and Russia pose long-term threats to

the global balance of power, strengthening Iran (and India, Japan, etc.) relations


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would then be its long-term strategy. Iran appeared to China to be a way of earning

foreign currency on nuclear and missile corporation, and also as a way to punish the

US for Taiwan transgressions while gaining political capital. Consequently, China

prefers that Iran-US relations be tense over its nuclear projects and that sanction

against Iran remain in place. The sanctions will deter Iran from its ability to rebuild its

naval power that would give them an edge over China. Inherently, China wants Iran to

remain as a weak state as well as limited Iran nuclear program to a certain level to

prevent Iran from the capability to determine India‘s power balance over Pakistan.

China concerns when Iran and the West harmonies and that would impede Asian‘s

power balance before it can presume hegemonic position in term of both military and

economy. Therefore, compare to the cooperation of military among Iran and India or

Iran and the West, China become more insecure to the possible settlement of Iran

nuclear (Shabaneh, 2015).

As an oil rich country in Europe, Russia is focusing the problem of energy

as ‗a changeable power resource‘ (Nye, 1990) to force the EU countries to grant or

deny particular resolutions on Iran, Ukraine, Syria, Georgia, and Chechnya. Super

power of Russia and aggression on European countries persuaded the EU countries to

find the substitute energy resourse (Wilson, 2014). Iran is viewed by the European

leaders as a reliable alternative. This competition is overwhelming to long run views

of Russia to become a leading of regional power. Keeping the unsettled disagreement

between Iran and the West on nuclear issue benefits the Russians. Therefore, Iran will

not be pressured by Russia, and this will not speed up any negotiation by Iranian and

Western nuclear issue. This rationale proves persistence of Russia to supply and

develop Iran nuclear capacities. Thus, Russia is insensitive to any reform in system of

balance of power in the Muslim world and can adapt much better than China. Iran to

Russia has no economical or military benefits to Russia. Russia gains a profit from

selling weapon to compensate for its reduced oil revenues. Moreover, Russia has been

a dominant power and can recover its status with the capacity which means much

more easily and faster than China can. Russia has massive caches of arms and

possesses many nuclear weapons. Russia is very assertive to engage in arm trading on

a global scale. Unlike China, Russia is prepared to fight the West, whereas China is so

cautious due to concerns over their supplies and enhancement. China would like to


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keep its status in traditional way as a rising power rather than assume an encountering

status on political conflict throughout the globe.

5.2 Multilateral Relations

There was recent news on the Iran nuclear issue. After 20-longmonths of

negotiations by President Obama, on 14 July 2015 Iran and P5+1, directed by US,

achieved a historical treaty to limit extensively Iranian nuclear capability for more

than 10 years in exchange to get rid of the sanction of financial issue and global oil

supply (Gordon & Sanger, 2015).

If we reflect back to history, this deal, to Iran, will lift crippling

international sanctions, which have seriously reduced its currency value. However,

whether this deal is going to materialize still depends largely on the reaction of the

key international players and the US Congress. It appears immediately after the

accord that Republican lawmakers may fight to derail this nuclear deal (Weisman &

Davis, 2015).

Iran‘s decision to enter into negotiations has directed outcome of the

international sanctions pressure which was built on economy in Iran. Many people did

not think it would be possible for Iran‘s leaders to agree to accept restrictions to their

nuclear program unless these pressure sanctions regimes were forced by UN, United

States, and EU. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran due to its

increasing of nuclear actions. United States imposed sanctions oppose companies

which finance in energy sector in Iran and have included them in the NDAA (National

Defense Authorization Acts) of 2012 and 2013, that directly affected the Iranian

Central Bank and oversea organizations having business with the Iranian Central

Bank. US intentionally attacked key purchaser of Iran‘s oil, pushing the buyer to

reduce extensively the oil quantities purchased from Iran.

The EU has prohibited all oil imports from Iran and any investments made

by EU-based business in energy sector in Iran since October 2010.

For a number of years, the leader global powers followed two policies:

supporting Iran to involve in diplomatic discussions, whereas forcing more intensive

sanctions oppose the financial and energy segments of Iran. Most active were both the


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United States and Israel. This final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

agreement was proposed on 2 April 2015 by P5+1 (with EU assistance). It is

important to note that the framework deal of both the US and Iran have discrepancies.

This include issues regarding the disposal of 9,700 kg decreased uranium by Iran; the

unequal expiration period of some aspects of the agreement that will last 10 years

while certain aspects will last 15 years; the centrifuges currently installed at Fordow;

the mechanisms of the international inspection; and the volume of retrieve of

information that will be permitted by IAEA.

Moreover, the differences of the versions between US and Iran also

involve the period for sanctions lifting. While US talks about contingency on Iran

having further actions to reverse its nuclear power, the sanctions in Iran will be

cancelled once the agreement is implemented. The discrepancies make the JCPOA

(The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) seen as an agreement that ‗kicks the can

down the road‘, meaning that the world will revisit the issue of Iran‘s unhindered

nuclear program in ten or fifteen years. The Great Powers were aware that Iran might

use this agreement to justify its rights to nuclear power for safety reasons toward the

related the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) issue while without the agreement,

the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not give Iran the right to enrich uranium or separate

plutonium (Blake, 2013).

There has been mixed reactions, including sharp criticisms from many key

country leaders on the JCPOA. While Obama saw this as the deal to restructure one of

the United States‘ deepest adversarial relationships, Israel‘s P.M. Benjamin

Netanyahu thinks Iran nuclear weapons as a potentially existential risk. The US

House Speaker, John A. Boehner, himself believed contrarily to P.M. Obama that

rather than creating the more peaceful world, this would just in sprit Iran, the globe‘s

biggest support of terror, by assisting steady its system (―What key players,‖ 2015).

The Russians, however, seemed to be very supportive of this agreement. President

Vladimir V. Putin, said that ‗We are confident that the world today breathed a sigh of

relief‘. His motive emphasized Russia‘s plans to be a major partner with Iran in the

development of its ‗exclusively peaceful‘ nuclear power. Even the P.M. Bashar Al-

Assad of Syria who is a proxy supported by Iran also said that ‗We have no doubt that

the coming days will see momentum for the constructive role of the Iranian Islamic


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republic to support the rights of the people and strengthen the bases of peace‘. He

believed the stressful US citizen interests in nuclear negotiation as a de facto

identification of Iranian power since the emerge of the Islamic country and Qaeda-

linked groups such as the Nusra Front in Syria had directed the US to view Iran as an

important alliance.

Was Obama aware of the gain Iran received is the loss Saudi Arabia may

perceive? Less than a week, not long after the announcement of the deal reached by

P5+1 and Iran, there was a meeting between Obama and Al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia

Foreign Minister, requested by the Saudi‘s King Salman. The source said that the

discussion was raised by Al-Jubeir on how to boost security cooperation between the

US and Saudi Arabia, an important bilateral relationship that has long been in good

terms.

The realism may look at this as a good sign of international policy for

peace, but if we view it from the balance of power perspective, the firm stance of

President Obama on JCPOA came from his strategic move to ally with Iran as a

regional power. Obama also did not think that any European countries attempt to

prohibit nuclear development in Iran with power rather than ethical resolution, even

when taking into consideration Iran‘s assistance of terror and the development of

nuclear. However, Obama has a role to prove that he is not alienating allies while

romancing adversaries by having economic interests overriding security interests.

Nevertheless, the UNSC (UN Security Council) approves JCPOA which was

generally considered a formality, as all the five permanent members of the UN were

partners to the negotiations with Iran and the JCPOA.

From 2006 to 2010 all nations in the UN and P5+1 forced several UN

policies including sanction punishment. For more than a decade, international powers

have raised concerns that Tehran is using its nuclear enrichment program to build a

nuclear weapon (National Intelligence Council, 2007) (Kirgis, 2008) breaking the

terms outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 and

ratified it in 1970, which was subject to IAEA verification. Iran consequently allows

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect, but there has not been

confirm that Iran did not have the nuclear weapon development. mentioned Iran was


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mentioned by IAEA to the UNSC for not be able to follow the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) restriction in 2005.

In 2005 UNSC has implemented six policies acquiring Iran stopping

nuclear enrichment, some compelling sanctions (United Nations, 2012). In 2012,

United States and European Union started forcing more sanctions on oil export and

bank of Iran, pressing Iran to compromise.

The all five permanent members of the UNSC has nuclear power thus

UNSC was viewed as the political tool and it is used to predominately indicate the

interest policy and politic motivation of those countries who do what benefits them

most— such as, in 1991 protecting the Kuwait‘s oil even it rich in resources but in

1994 ignorance of protection in Rwandans‘s resources (Rajan, 2011). The former

Chair of United Nations Association Westminster, Titus Alexander, explained UNSC

as a main supporter of global apartheid (Alexander, 1996).

The relevance and effectiveness of UNSC has been questioned by some,

especially the Iran nuclear issue in which there was a lack of proof for not following

UNSC policy. The threat analysis of Iran nuclear program is considerably less urgent

regarding Iran‘s capabilities to deploy ballistic missiles, which could threaten the

international community more than the development of a nuclear device. In his

inaugural speech at the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in August 2012,

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei criticized the United Nations Security Council as having an

‗illogical, unjust and completely undemocratic structure and mechanism‘ and called

for a complete reform of the body (―Supreme Leader‘s,‖ 2012).

While international consensus was being built for robust action at the UN,

the P5+1, especially the US in this JCPOA deal, pursued its own unilateral measures

and enforced it through the UN. As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to not see

that the Obama‘s motive may be economic interests over security interests that make

him overlook all the small issues that lie in the deal and even jeopardize his long-term

relationship with Saudi Arabia and Israel. In fact, US and Israel relationships have

been uncomfortable for a few years. Israel‘s motion to back Romney and the

difference in their religious beliefs may have caused the deterioration in their

relationship. The Iran nuclear issues are all about power. The US wanted to convey a


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message to Israel. The real issues concerned the money in the Middle East region,

thus, all decisions made were based on politics.

In summary, the Great Powers‘ approach towards Iran‘s nuclear issue has

never been absolute. In fact, examining the issue from various angles or frameworks,

using either Realism or Balance of Power, the Great Powers regard Iran more in terms

of its economic value than a threat. In particular, the US strives to maintain a stable

economy while ensuring its hegemonic power is in place. The US has never exercised

any military force against Iran and prefers to use a diplomatic approach.


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CHAPTER 6

THE MUSLIM WORLD’S VS THE GREAT POWERS’

RESPONSE TO IRAN’S NUCLEAR POWER

As discussed in the previous chapter, it is noteworthy that the Muslim

World‘s response and the Great Powers‘ response to Iran‘s nuclear power are on the

same page, but for differing purposes. To really be able to compare their approaches

to Iran‘s nuclear power from the Muslim World‘s and the Great Powers‘ perspectives,

three levels of analysis to illustrate international concerns and reactions should be

used. According to Christopher Pang, it is necessary to analyze the case from the

international, regional, and domestic levels in order to be able to understand relevant

aspects regarding the response of individual groups on Iran‘s nuclear program and

nuclear intentions (Interview with Dr. Christopher Pang, 2008).

In order to analyze this issue, however, it is necessary to assess power

struggles and the key players. It is not merely Sunni and Shia conflict. This is a game

of the balance of power; however, it is not a game based on matching the different

states‘ military power on the battlefield. Linkages can be made among three

parameters: regional country ambitions, transnational affinities and internal wars,

(Salloukh, 2013). Only power struggle combination and the key players allow for an

assessment to help shed light on the distinct approaches between the Muslim World

and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear issue.

6.1 International Level

The Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the P5+1, and the UN

play an important role in the international community as inter-governmental

organizations. The OIC at the international level approach the Iran nuclear program as

a measure to illustrate solidarity with the Islamic nations to deal with the challenges

while pressing Israel signing in the NPT as well as allow the UN supervise

comprehensively the nuclear weapon. UN stance at the international level is that Iran

did not obtain nukes which is a positive development for world security; now, the UN


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approved the JCPOA. However, the question is: what is in it for the UN? It is,

therefore, obvious that the Great Powers approached the Iran nuclear program due to

their strategic interests instead of addressing their concerns over world security.

6.1.1 Power Struggle

The economic in China is the bigger scale than the economic in the US,

and it is something which the Chinese can use as political leverage on the

international stage. In other words, this is a geopolitical earthquake. After the post-

World War II period, the US with its leading role, could force the previous European

powers to agree with a multilateral economic system which were close to the UN

system. Since then, the US has shown that its hegemonic interests involved ensuring

the world‘s stability. The realist theory believed that for global stability to succeed,

the hegemonic power is necessary as it can impose specific regulation of behaviour in

global affairs. Since the hegemonic country in this case can achieve long-run benefits

(Nabudere, 2004). Until 9/11, the world systems of the international relations were

critically experimented. Currently, New World Order is prone to creating strategic

and political turbulence.

Samuel Huntington, in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of World Order (1997), located the rise of radical Islamism (Huntington,

1997). This was mainly the discontent linked to western dominance in the local oil

business in the region, with the support of the original rule oppose many population

interests. Although 9/11 was probably a situation which was beyond US expectation

of oil interests in the region, it still linked to the situation remarkable (Onyango-Obbo,

2002). Geostrategic and geopolitical implications of the nuclear issue in Iran have

become obviously that the Great Powers aim to control energy-rich regions as well as

vibrant and dynamic economies. The US is now aware of the global power shift

resulting from Asia‘s economic and financial strengths. The nuclear accord is an

indication of the increasing issues that hegemonic country is facing because this

works its way to violence and conflict to destroy the economic relation power and to

encounter increasing challenges to US. Many of America‘s partners, UK as a leader,

challenged the United States and shifted their corporation from the US to China. For

instance, earlier this year many countries participated as establishing partners of the


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Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. The US now must find an

effective plan to cope with this change.

Iran positions among three regions, Asia, Africa and Europe, because it

produces 40 percent of oil globe exporting. This region possesses the natural gas as

the second and oil reserve as the fourth largest in the world. US now chose to be

diplomatic on the Iran nuclear issue, seeing that it can gain much leverage over Iran

and much strategic flexibility. To maintain its dominance in the Eurasia region, US

relations are involved with the world‘s major powers who are themselves principal

competitors in the zone. Two of these competitors are China and Japan, two countries

that obtain much of their oil supply from Iran. US prefer to abandon sanctions in

favour of all-out war instead of a military encounter with Russia or China. The

JCPOA accord helps prevent Iran from being drawn into closer partnerships with

China and Russia who are actively supporting Iran economically and militarily.

Should the Accord prove effective, the US would elevate its relations with Iran which

in turn would stabilize the Middle East region under Washington‘s leadership. Only a

day after a nuclear agreement with Iran, President Obama said that ‗it‘s important for

Tehran to be part of the conversation‘, commenting on the resolution of Syria‘s

conflict (Lucas, 2015). Hence the Iran deal gives the US a better position to withstand

challenges to its dominance, including through military means, from its more

formidable opponents, not only Russia and China, but also Germany, Japan and other

imperialist powers.

On the other hand, the Muslim World viewed the nuclear deal with mixed

reactions. Iran‘s allies may praise the deal while other countries are welcoming it.

Nevertheless, enemies of the Islamic Republic have expressed concerns. Although at

the international level, the OIC, which is the second largest inter-governmental

organization, may perform like the representative of the Muslim World as well as

support the deal. On the contrary, the world knows precisely well that the members

who make up the organization are divided into two major camps: Sunni and Shia. The

approach of the OIC to the Iran nuclear program at the international level may be seen

as its steadiness and the peaceful purpose throughout the world and the region to

support ‗the rights of people‘, but those not aligned with Iran were not convinced.


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The Muslim World to the Great Powers is a geostrategic ally. The Muslim World is

significant as it encompasses of the Muslim world in North Africa, South East Asia,

the Middle East and which are home to strategic international waterways. These

strategic routes in pursuing strategic goals are so serious which the Great Powers have

stressed its need to control them. The controlling of marine routes has played a vital

role in gaining global power within long cycles of world politics. The Middle East is

also the center of the Muslim religion. All these features and their oil reserves make

the Muslim World powerful according to the Great Powers‘ perception. The power

resources equate the economic power of the Muslim World which can be used as a

balance tool to enforce the opinions on others, such as the effect of oil crisis in 1973

and the OIC‘s ability to mobilize the Muslim population to support the resolution of

international problems, e.g. Iraq during the Gulf War. All Muslim countries are well

aware of this, and internationally they need to cooperate with the direction of the OIC.

The influencer in the OIC is obviously Iran. With the support of the US to placate its

allies who do not have alliances with Iran by offering the modern weapons

techniques, raising confidential military collaboration. The Muslim World‘s approach

to the Iran nuclear program as an Ummah will be to support the nuclear deal and its

nuclear program in order to benefit collectively from the politico-economic power.

6.1.2 Key Players

China, Russia and the US with some of the EU are the prominent players

in terms of the international geopolitical power at present based on the above study.

The EU has been looking to expand its own ideals by diplomatic way. As for the Iran

nuclear issue, its soft policies are being set successful in the world agenda. The EU is

strongly agreed with state-building after the conflict and recently after the deal, the

Vice-President/High Representative Federica Mogherini of the EU arrived in Tehran

on an official visit to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zariffor. Th

two discussed the implementation of the agreement, including bilateral relations with

Saudi Arabia and other regional issues (Mogherini, 2015).

As China does not have close relationship with Iran, its voice on the Iran

nuclear Issue is not strong. In addition, they do not have much joint activities.

However, Chinese petrol businesses could success in biding to develop large petrol


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industries in Iran during sanctions. After the agreement, China became more

interested by holding in-depth meetings, and Iran‘s new president, Hassan Rouhani,

and Chinese President, Xi Jinping, met at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Summit. A few high-level exchanges occurred between Iran and China which signals

the positive nature of their bilateral relationship as well as Iran‘s approval of China‘s

position on the Iranian nuclear issue. China‘s anti-war stance supports Iran‘s good

relation approach towards China and increases their energy collaboration.

Accordingly, the recent deal of the nuclear issue of Iran has created China the good

outcomes. Whether the future of the Iran-China relationship will threaten the US and

lead to more positive influences on this issue is yet to be seen. In the meantime, China

is closely following the deal to ensure that Iran is able to limit their use of uranium

and that the Iran nuclear program will not create to war.

In contrast, Russian may lose its position on the global stage and become

more isolated internationally if there is an improvement in relationship between Iran

and US. Russia treats Iran as gateway to influence the politics and economy in the

Middle East region. Hence, it is Putin‘s priority to strengthen Iran-Russia bilateral

ties. To avoid being left out, Russian officials have made great efforts throughout the

nuclear talks to reveal themselves as being vital to the decision-making. Russia is

unable to go against the tide; it is also facing challenges due to the economic

consequences in Iran as its economy depends largely on oil exports. Therefore,

Russian international policy from now must ensure that there are economic gains from

logistical benefits and the selling of nuclear technology can help offset its loss from

oil exports.

6.2 Regional Level

In considering the issue of the Muslim World‘s response and the Great

Powers‘ response to the Iran nuclear power at the regional level, it is interesting to

summarize that it relates to the new balance of power in the Middle East challenge.

Regionally, the Middle East has no single dominant and acknowledged regional

power. However, Iran is the country where we can study to understand the Middle

East‘s future. Despite contenders who were not always united such as Egypt, Saudi


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Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Turkey, Iran is the winner in this region probably for the long

run. Take the US move to confirm this in light of the Iran deal to safeguard its

relationship with regional allies. Nevertheless, there is still turbulence in the region

due to intra-regional power struggles between regional powers like Saudi Arabia,

Turkey and Iran.

Although an accord deal is on the way, in the new Middle East, it will be

premature to say that US and Iran are being the partner but this is not what they wish

for. However, they start their communication on their mutual benefits. In a next ten

years, they will increase cooperation for the same objectives using the nuke as

leverage. Iran will be a major player to change the new region, with much more

consent from the US than would have seemed possible a decade ago.

Figure 6.1

Complication of the Middle East Key Players and Notable Relationship

Note: Reprinted from ―The Middle East: Key players & notable relationship,‖ (n.d.) Retrieved

from http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/the-middle-east-key-players-

notable-relationships/


95


The major players in the Middle East have been Iran, Egypt, Turkey and

Saudi Arabia with Syria including Iraq as important regional determinants. From its

geopolitical and geostrategical position, Iran is now becoming a main player who has

a potential dominant power.

For the long time, there has not been only one major power in the Middle

East. In the past, it was Arab power politics — Egypt, Syria, and Iraq — but they

have now deteriorated, collapsed by policy failures and divisional societies and do not

have significant role. Saudi Arabia wants to lead and with Iran, they are playing a

balance of power game. Saudi Arabia had hoped to lead. However, with a raising

uncertainty domestic role and an approaching change leadership, it may gain power.

Nonetheless, the inability to stop their citizens from protesting is a vulnerability and

insufficient legitimacy signal which will lead to repression. This is not a sign of new

power. In addition, Saudi Arabia‘s failures in Syria, where all the regional players

have been drawn in, have already shown its limitations. Needless to say, its low

population, weak institutions and oil dependency make it seem not to have a leading

role in the region.

The non-Arab states in the region are also not likely to assume the role of

dominant power. Turkey is working to be a regional leader, but it collapsed and

damaged over Syria and internal conflict. Israel has minor dominant and works

behind the sense by keep an eye on Iran and the US carefully observes the perception

of their solutions with the Palestinians. For 21st century, Israel also sees that the

Middle East poses a real challenge. However Israel may have the army and weapons

capability to dominate this region, it lacks religion and identity bonds across borders,

making it difficult for it to reach such a status.

The changes in the region‘s strategic balance occurs when the two major

regional powers with military significance, Turkey and Iran, have combined in this

Turkey-Iran-Syria grouping of geopolitical and geostrategic significance. As highly-

militarized nations of the Middle East, the grouping imparts a strategic significance in

unsettling the balance of power in the Middle East region. Additionally, Iran-

Pakistan-Afghanistan group is another periphery of the Middle East; this triangular

configuration illustrates that both these politico-strategic regional configurations


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demonstrate how Iran emerges as the strategic magnet to which other participant

nations have been drawn to. Obviously, the member states of this alignment relate to

Israel. Politically, Pakistan has moved closer to Iran who gained more revenue from

the Iran-Pakistan Pipeline.

Besides the Syria issue, Turkey is not a major player in the Middle East

due to its geography and culture. Plus, Turkey does not have the thorough contact like

Iran has.

The regional power has also a religious element which is now the cause of

Middle East conflict. Islamic countries take seriously consideration to Islamic sharia

once creating a new political regulation (Kazmi, n.d.). Leaders of many Middle East

countries realize that the deployment of technology in Western side, but not Western

social structure, is important for success in the world community. Most communities

in the Middle East think there is the Western social system which creates a war from

their religious and traditional perspective. However, many of leaders in the Middle

East take benefit from their people by abusing this sentiment. It is unavoidable that in

the future religion is still keep playing a major position for the Middle East because

the fate of Palestinian/Israeli conflict, role of Persian nation of Iran, and position of

the region as a leader in international relation depends largely on it. Although ISIS

may try to abolish countries and found a new direction, Iran itself, similar to that of

high ranking Catholic clergy in Italy, the highly-sophisticated clergy Islamified the

current nation institutions who paved the way for new ends. Iran, with its nuclear

capacity, is exclusively prepared to support steady the Middle East in anything which

it begin after the rearrangement period. Iran has proved to the Muslim World in cases

like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah, Sunni militant. It assisted

Afghanistan in countering Pakistan‘s mischief. It helped Iraq and Syria from being

invaded by the Levant (ISIS) and Iraq. In Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, it exhibited

full security support.

Politically, Iran stands against Saudi Arabia in a power tussle for

leadership in the Middle East. US, before the JCPOA deal, used to strengthen the

support of its Sunni enemies, particularly Saudi Arabia in marginalizing Iran, but Iran

is very important as an oasis of solidity in a desert of weak nations due to its

consistency and point of naturalness like China to the East Asia. Hence, the US


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realized that it is wiser to go with the flow since Saudi Arabia and its Sunni partners

are a greater risk to Middle East solidity than Iran. The Arab states are vulnerable and

unsteady. Eventually, US and Iran have a similar situation when it comes to encounter

the risk. The fact is that the nuclear problem will not be the main issue for a certain

period.

6.2.2 Key Players

Besides Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia play leading roles in the regional

level within a group of player in the region, both states and non-state actors. However,

they will not encounter each other in the battle field. It is over simplified and distorted

to conclude that it is about Sunni and Shia. Their dispute is hardly sectarianism but

regional influence. Nevertheless, sectarianism is an essential element to gain regional

support. It is still playing the major role to determine the Middle East‘s future because

they determine the Palestinian/Israeli‘s fate, decide the role of Iran, and build the

leader position in the region of world.

Iran has its dependencies: the Iraqi regime (to a limited degree), Bashar al

Asad‘s regime in Syria, and Hizballah in Lebanon while Saudi Arabia‘s allies are in

the Gulf, Egypt under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria.

After the JCPOA accord, there is now increasing uncertainties within

other Arabs and Saudis regarding their alliances with the USA, concerning its

regional policy, and the American ability to commit itself in the Middle East and the

Gulf.

Regionally, key players that can influence the outcome of the Iran nuclear

issue are obviously using sectarianism to gain support. Different in belief from the

rest as a Jewish state, Israel may face the threat of not being able to keep Iran at a

relatively safe distance from a breakout point after the JCOPA. Its intention to act

militarily has been concealed by the consensus developed by the P5+1 and Iran. We

learn from the history that Jews similar to Christians and Muslims use the religion to

explain and the right of development in combat. (Kazmi, n.d.).

The Muslim World‘s approach and the Great Powers‘ approach now look

into the Iran nuclear issue as a strategic move to gain regional power since it is the

region home to some 20% of all world oil exports and 35% of all oil shipped by sea


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move through the Strait of Hormuz, along with substantial amounts of gas. Millions

more barrels move through the Red Sea and an increasing flow of oil moves through

Turkey, trans-shipment routes that are also affected by regional instability.

6.3 Domestic Level

Comparing the Muslim World‘s approach and the Great Powers‘ approach

towards the nuclear issue in the Middle East, one must understand the underlying

power of local disputes for that direct local player to search for assistants in the region

who are able to provide the budget, weapons, and political support to them. All those

domestic politics arose from institutional incompetence suffered by most of all the

states in the Middle East. The states look for regional allies whose political and

ideological positions are, in some way, in common on ideological or identity grounds.

The key to success in the region is that the power can assist these non-partner states in

their own political conflict.


The power struggle in the domestic politics is even more graphically clear

because of their struggling from inability of country, struck in politic, and failed

govern. Libya, Yemen and Syria, are the case of the area where it must encounter the

trouble to other countries. Libya suffered from a kidnapping of the prime minister;

Yemen is facing rising southern separatism; and the Syrian government cannot

reassure the controlling over a crushed state controlled by rising established domestic

army.

Even in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, an internal enemy, makes it

difficult for Egypt to re-direct country control by an army. In addition, the state also

lacks capability for personal security, developed economy, and political agreement. It

is really Egypt‘s economy that would determine a country‘s course -- whether it can

regain its status as a player in the region and significantly bolster the Arab world.

Most of the countries in the region had trouble controlling their own

societies, and local players sought regional allies against their own domestic

opponents. Effective patronage of regional allies requires transnational ideological


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and political connections that make potential allies open to a relationship with the

patron. This phenomenon is now more important than conventional military strength

for the country in affecting the course of regional politics.

The direction of the Middle East‘s domestic politics is controlled by the

powerful states that play out in the domestic political systems of the region‘s weak

states. Israel is a good example of a country that tried to use its military strength to

gain political connection in Lebanon, but it proved ineffective. Israel does not have

natural allies. The best it can do is press the United States to take positions that it

prefers.

Turkey, although with a strong military, is a good case study to prove that

‗soft power‘ to be used as the new means for increasing a country‘s international

influence was not useful when it comes to civil wars. As a result, Turkey is not being

able to play very effectively.

With no military strength and a small population, Qatar on the other hand,

has an impact on the new Middle East. Its Al Jazeera and its joining Sunni Islamists,

particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, are the key elements of its strategic influence.

However, Qatar is scaling down its regional strategy with a new leader and relies on

the United States as its ultimate security guarantor.

Although the inconsistency and the most insecure in Gulf leaders, such as

Bahrain‘s, are ordering more canisters of tear gas than they have citizens. They

cannot stop their citizen from protesting. The Muslim Brotherhood is facing its

existential crisis although it used to be the greatest strength in many Arab states.

Saudi Arabia, since 2003, experiences Al Qaeda with the threats in

Yemen. This threat is considered a rising in domestic security powers and new

attempts at a work establishment program and gaining other prospects. While the

UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar have sufficient capital to buy off increases in mature

populations that create unemployment pressures for the short period, Bahrain, Saudi

Arabia, and Oman do not to support this regime. Most of them have to cope with an

increasing of income inequality, hyper-urbanization, fraud, governance failure, and

major obstacles to progress.

In the Gulf region, Yemen and Jordan are remaining low amid their

impending crisis as all are effectively facing serious threats to their internal stability.


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Sectarian threats present domestic security issues in each Gulf country, partly due to

the economic, religious, and political discrimination. Shi‘ite unrest in the Arab Gulf,

as well as particularly in Bahrain and Yemen, are proof of a motivating aspect in view

of the Arab states Iran is a risk.

The status and power pressures from younger fighters and seekers because

of the economic problems can fuel a challenge. Currently they have experience and

weapon because their loyalty is often as much to what people are ordered to pay

attention of the new position in their own ethnic group or their tribe. Political and

internal aggression stopped greatly of a country‘s improvement and worsens

economies, and driven many people away from their countries and peaceful life while

many people were pushing towards a slowly developing white-collar class. Ineffective

abilities and political framework to regulate and progress, the countries excluding

local actors would not be able to gain regional power without the proper conditions

for its success. The leader power in the region was considered their capacity to

influence the struggles in local political of nearby countries

6.3.2 Key Players

In the center of the Middle East, there are two groups of countries and

political forces with opposing objectives. First is the Islamic group in Iran, Qatar,

Turkey, and the Muslim Brotherhood, aiming for Muslim Ummah. The unifying

conviction of the group is that political Muslim is the unique structure for governing.

In the region, the members consider that together they are able to gain the assistance

from social groups and sustain it.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies supported by Egypt, Israel, and

Jordan, lead the other group is the Arab world for example the United Arab Emirates

and Kuwait. They think Ummah would create more conflict in some states, like Syria,

Iraq and Lebanon, and; political and social disagreement in others like Egypt; and the

solidarity of jihadist groups throughout the region. This group depends on financial

support, security devices, media, and militaries and other organizations to impose

national conservation.

The key local actor from the first group is Iran and from the second group

is Saudi Arabia with Israel at its back. Their power struggle is country and regime


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specific. Political Islam has already shaped Egypt‘s politics since the fall of President

Hosni Mubarak. The regime which can change political challenges in the countries

benefits, by rebounding disorder as well as imposing its result in other regimes, could

be winning in place.

6.4 The Muslim World’s vs the Great Powers’ Response to Iran’s Nuclear Power

From the international perspective to regional and domestic perspectives,

the response to the Iran nuclear power issue from the Muslim World and the Great

Powers are complicated by its complex relationships in the region in those three

different levels. All of this is making the order system in the Middle East less clear

and more complex.

USA‘s and Iran‘s relationship does not prove productive because not only

to the US alone, but also because of Iran‘s miscalculations in its foreign policy which

needs to be reviewed periodically. It failed because solidarity in the Islamic World

never gave up opposing to the Sunni-Shia enemy, particularly after the development

of Sunni military groups over the past decade and Saudi Arabia‘s policies. Blaming

Israel and the US is not the best strategies now internationally. The harmony and a

possibility of Persian nationalism revival, and the clear perception of which countries

are its enemies are more important to the Muslim World than anything else should

they want to gain global power. The tendency of Westernization and liberalism will

increase and will be powerless the Islamists. In addition, incompetent technological

development, quality of education and costs of energy together with water crises

threat in the Jordan and Nile River basins make most of major states in the region

experience with socioeconomic instability that will weaken a traditionalist regime,

which relies on structured authority.

It is the regional states in the Middle East that are increasingly setting the

tone, and it is the West that must redefine its relationship with these regional powers.

This is even truer since the battle against IS, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are two

things at once: part of the problem and part of the solution.

While people in Europe continue to look to Obama hoping that he will

come up with a military or political solution to the crisis that has arisen with IS, in


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reality, it is the regional states that hold the key in their hands. The moment Iran,

Saudi Arabia and Turkey reach agreement on how to solve the crisis in Syria and Iraq

by political and not military means, will it then be the beginning of the end of this

crisis.

Islamism is a religious not a political issue, thus it can be recognized

within the nation-state framework. The response to the Iran nuclear power

internationally for the Muslim World is to gain recognition for Ummah, while for the

Great Powers it is to prove their hegemony. Regionally, it is all about resources and

economic benefits to the Great Powers, but about regime and power to the Muslim

World. To achieve the regional power of the Muslim World, the allies and support

must be sought from neighbouring states. However, sectarianism and the rise of a new

youth rebellion from socioeconomic turbulence complicate the relationship and make

the region instable. The response of the Muslim World to the domestic population

needs to exhibit solidarity for the benefit of internal stability. The Great Powers also

need to go along this route in order to obtain regional and international benefits in the

end.


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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This study aims to understand the political events taking place between

the Muslim World and Great Powers, and to compare the approaches of both the

Muslim World and Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear program. The current

situations as well as the disputed settlements on Iran‘s nuclear program are more

complex and do not just simply that involve politics or national security. The

approaches of both the Muslim World and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear

program possess both similar and different qualities.

It started from the states that were considering developing nuclear

weapons because of security reasons. Nuclear weapons would enhance these states‘

security. However, there have been situations where the intention to initiate a nuclear

program was to deter a US and Israeli engagement. This is due to the fact that Iran

still perceives a high risk to others benefits and the survivability of its regime. Iran‘s

nuclear program could deter a US or Israeli attack, and would further improve Iran‘s

regional and international power and prestige as the second Islamic nation with

nuclear power and the tenth nuclear armed state in the world. This prestige and power

could be utilized to gain public support at the domestic level. Iran‘s ambition of

regional predominance was understandable when Iran claimed to represent all

Muslims and to defend their interests.

7.1 Summary

So far, this work has provided a brief theoretical discussion on the Muslim

World‘s and the Great Powers‘ approaches towards the Iran‘s nuclear program. Two

frameworks, the realist and the balance of power where different schools of thought

including ‗Muslim Ummah‘ and ‗ Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach‘, were

taken into consideration for the Muslim World. Now, this conclusion will answer the

three questions raised in the introduction: 1). what is/are the Muslim World‘s

approach(es) towards Iran‘s nuclear issue?; 2). what is/are the Great Powers‘


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approach(es) towards Iran‘s nuclear issue?; and 3). what is/are the different

approaches between the Muslim World and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear

issue?

7.1.1 What Are the Muslim World’s Approaches towards Iran’s

Nuclear Issue?

The realist theory emphasizes the state‘s self-interest when responding to

an issue on a relative-gain basis. Muslim Ummah, in the form of the OIC, illustrates

to the Muslim World that Iran‘s nuclear issue is for collective defence, and its mission

is to invoke solidarity within the Muslim Ummah. The basic argument is that a

Muslim World will probably consider Iran‘s nuclear issue as a measure to counter

Israel‘s alleged nuclear capability and the US threat. It is a sign to oppose the Zionist

regime and show its pride in resisting against the bullying of the most insolent and

arrogant power in the world by preserving its unity and solidarity. The Muslim World

believes that with the strength of the OIC and the relationship between Saudi Arabia

and Iran, they can presume a potential task to shape the new global direction and

make an impact in the international community. Whether the unity and solidarity of

Muslim Ummah is warranted depends largely on the OIC‘s international weight.

Hence, the OIC engaged Iran in collaboration with the OIC member countries to

implement the major of project development among themselves through and with the

support of the Islamic Development Bank. The Muslim World, through the OIC,

approaches and considers Iran‘s nuclear issue as being significant in regional political

equations.

In the balance of power perspective, the OIC revealed to the world that

Iran‘s nuclear program was its own domestic affairs and that the OIC would not

interfere. The Muslim World and the OIC supported the Iran nuclear program. They

utilize the threat of military power as leverage against Israel‘s secret nuclear power

and call on the corporation of international regimes on nuclear issues. Their stance is

to deter interference in the Middle East region and to influence the outcome of Israel‘s

suspicious nuclear programs. However, if Iran wanted to develop nuclear weapons, in

the region of the Middle East, it would cause an imbalance of power and a change of

the status quo, which would increase the risk of preemptive strikes. In addition, its


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enhancement of the nuclear weapon programs exists in the region, as well as increases

dangers of nuclear arms races. In this case, in order to manage the member states on

the issue of nuclear proliferation and stabilize the region, the OIC approached the

Iran‘s nuclear program through IAEA regulations as well as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free

Zone in the Middle East of NPT‘s treaty. In reaching Muslim Ummah‘s solidity and

unity, OIC can attain the firm and influential stand against tyrannical regimes in the

political world with its Iranian nuclear program issue. This is the prestige the OIC and

the Muslim World can enjoy by supporting Iran‘s nuclear program for civil purposes

(Maluleem, 2012, p. 163).

7.1.2 What Are the Great Powers’ Approaches towards Iran’s Nuclear

Issue?

To the realists, states act to maximize their security in order to survive.

Economic and military terms are measures of the states‘ ability to be self-sustaining

and powerful. For US foreign policy, US relations with Iran depends much on the

status quo of the US economy and political power. Geopolitics is mostly dictated by

energy security. In military terms, the US needs to remain as a big brother to stop

terrorism. Hence, its actions towards Iran‘s nuclear issue would be to maintain the

credibility of American actions in the Middle East. However, to the Great Powers, a

military strike is not an option as it may interrupt the oil flow and price increases from

the Persian Gulf which can spark another global economic crisis.

The individual states of the Great Powers have not reached a consensus in

their policy towards Iran‘s nuclear issue. All states‘ foreign policies towards Iran‘s

nuclear issue are aimed merely at reaping benefits and ensuring their survival. China‘s

policy on Iran‘s nuclear program, whether it is favourable to the US or not, reflects its

relationship with the US on the Taiwan issue and its economic ties with the US as the

US is the leading importer of Chinese products. The EU, on the other hand, wanting

to be a global player, has been playing the role of a mediator on the Iran nuclear issue

and shaping the negotiation framework. On the contrary, Russia‘s policy towards

Iran‘s nuclear issue is to gain leverage in relations with the US. For example, Russia

sold its S-300 air defence system missile to Iran in order to maintain its relations with

Iran for oil.


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In the balance of power perspective, in order to maintain a relatively

powerful state among competitors, states are constantly trying to increase their

relative power with the aim of achieving regional or even world hegemony or trying

to maintain the status quo and balance of power. In this case, states have to be very

sensitive in order to reap relative gains. For a long time, the US has been trying to

reduce Iran‘s balance of power through sanctions. However, the intensity and

frequency of sanction bills affected the US economic benefits. As Iran senses threats

from the Super Powers‘ invasion into its administration, it put the development of the

nuclear deal between Iran and the US on hold. Seeing China and Russia as threats to

the global balance of power, the US prefers to strengthen its relations with Iran.

China, on the contrary, would prefer Iran-US relations to be tense over its nuclear

projects and the Iran sanctions to remain in place in order to keep Iran weak against

China‘s interests and goal to achieve hegemony in Asia. In fact, Russia also sees that

keeping the unresolved Iranian-Western dispute over nuclear and other regional issues

in place is beneficial. It would leverage Russia‘s power balance with the EU. Russia is

less sensitive to any changes in the balance of power system in the Middle East and

can adapt much better than China. The difference between China and Russia on Iran‘s

nuclear issue is that China prefers to continue its traditional role as an emerging

power in hiding while Russia is more confrontational.

In summary, the Great Powers‘ approaches towards Iran‘s nuclear issue

point to how power is leveraged among the states, and how Iran deals with the Great

Powers globally and in the region for economic benefits. Even in Obama‘s recent deal

with Iran to lift sanctions under the JCPOA deal, Obama‘s motive was focused on

economics rather than over security interests. Another factor for Obama‘s move also

stemmed from political pressure for America‘s deteriorated relationship with Israel.

7.1.3 What Are Different Approaches between the Muslim World and

the Great Powers towards Iran’s Nuclear Issue?

Differences in approaches between the Muslim World and the Great

Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear issue were examined in three dimensions: domestic

conflicts, regional state ambitions and international affinities. The OIC at an

international level approached the Iran nuclear program in order to show its solidarity


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with Islamic nations to deal with challenges, but the Great Powers‘ approach the issue

from the perspective of global security by ensuring the existence of a hegemonic

power which can use particular regulations of behaviour in international associations.

This is why the hegemonic country in this case can achieve long-run benefits. For the

Great Powers, geostrategic and geopolitical implications of Iran‘s nuclear issue is to

control energy-rich regions as well as vibrant and dynamic economies. However, the

global power shift to Asia has made the US pay more attention to the nuclear issue to

encounter various issues to its hegemonic role in the world. The current JCPOA

enables the US to maintain relations with the world‘s major powers who are its

principal competitors, including China and Japan. JCPOA is also advantageous to the

US as it prevents Iran from becoming partnerships between Russia and China.

Furthermore, the Great Powers need to control the strategic marine route which is

vital in gaining the status of Global Power. Between the Great Powers and the Muslim

World, the former views the later as economically powerful because their power

resources can be used as leverage to impose their views on others and the OIC‘s

capacity to move the populations in Muslim world assisting the resolutions of

international problems. Hence, internationally, Iran‘s nuclear issue to the Muslim

World helps them gain solidarity and leverage in international issues, while to the

Great Powers it is about hegemony and money.

Regionally, the study showed that the Middle East has no single dominant

and acknowledged power. There is still turbulence in the region due to intra-regional

power struggles and also economic conflicts. There is no consensus in the Muslim

World towards Iran‘s nuclear issue. In fact, there is a potential arms race in term of

proliferation in Iranian nuclear issue. However, Iran may be only country that can be a

major player in changing the new Middle East region. The Muslim World‘s

sentiments towards western culture is the key to counter the fragmentation in the

Muslim World by emphasizing religious structures and sectarianism. Iran has a

highly-sophisticated clergy whose power was placed in their hands after the Islamic

Revolution. The clergy has proven itself to be strong and influential to the new

Muslim World similar to that of high ranking Catholic clergy in Italy. Iran is also a

well-developed, strong, and cultured state. Hence, the Muslim World‘s and the Great

Powers‘ approaches towards Iran‘s nuclear issue are similar in a desert of weak states.


108

A diverging approach between the Muslim World and the Great Powers

towards nuclear issue in Iran within the country is that Muslim World depends largely

on the political conditions of each Islamic country in the region. Islamic countries

have their own conflict of its community, as well as its actors seek the regional

cooperation fighting the local people who have different opinion. Religious,

economic, and political discrimination makes it difficult for the OIC, or the Muslim

World, to take an absolute stance towards Iran‘s nuclear issue. In fact, domestically,

people are ordered to pay attention to loyalty of the new position in their own ethnic

group or their tribe. Therefore, the regional leader‘s ability affects local political

conflict in nearby countries and divided into two camps: the Islamic group and the

Arab World. Iran seems to be a regime which may be able to change political

challenges for their benefits. Therefore, the Muslim World‘s approach at this level is

for political and security interests. As for the Great Powers who have been influenced

by the US, they focus on economic reasons.

In conclusion, the responses to the Iran nuclear power from the Muslim

World and the Great Powers are complicated by its complex relationships in the

region in those three different levels. Solidarity in the Islamic World never holds up.

The trends in Westernization and increased liberalism will not stop or weaken the

Islamists. Islamism is not a religious issue but it is a political issue. The response to

the Iran nuclear power internationally for the Muslim World is to gain recognition in

Ummah while for the Great Powers it is to prove their hegemony. Regionally, it is all

about resources and economic benefits to the Great Powers. However, for the Muslim

World, it is about regime and power. The response of the Muslim World to the

domestic population requires them to exhibit solidarity for the benefits of internal

stability. The Great Powers also need to proceed along this route to benefit regionally

and internationally in the end.

7.2 Recommendation

While conducting research for this paper, on July 14, 2015 a

comprehensive deal on the Iranian nuclear program has been signed. The Iranian

nuclear negotiations have been on and off since 2002. Therefore, further study is


109

required to understand what changes the deal will generate in the domestic dynamics

of the individual actors, the Muslim World and the Great Powers, as well as the

international and regional balance of power. One should find out if the strategic

interests will arise as a consequence of the deal. In addition, studies should examine

the Great Powers‘ approach to Iran‘s nuclear issue. Finally, answers should be found

to shed light on whether the majority of sanctions will be lifted after the so-called

‗Implementation Day‘, which is anticipated to arrive sometime in mid-2016.


110

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BIOGRAPHY

Name Mr. Sakhanan Rattanarungsun

Date of Birth December 6, 1982

Educational Attainment

2008: Bachelor's Degree in Management Studies,

The University of Waikato, New Zealand

Double Major: Marketing and Economics

Work Position Finance Assistant

United Nations Economic and Social Commission

for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)

Work Experiences August 2014 - Present: Finance Assistant

United Nations Economic and Social Commission

for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)

March 2013 - August 2014: Finance Assistant

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations (FAO-UN)

Jul 2008 - Oct 2012: Export Manager

Great Family Garment Co., Ltd.