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A tale of three cities:Washington‐Paris‐Bonn andtriangular asymmetryJolyon Howorth aa Professor of French Civilisation and JeanMonnet Professor of European Political Union ,University of Bath ,Published online: 03 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Jolyon Howorth (1997) A tale of three cities:Washington‐Paris‐Bonn and triangular asymmetry, West European Politics, 20:3,219-226, DOI: 10.1080/01402389708425212

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Review Article

A Tale of Three Cities:Washington-Paris-Bonn and Triangular

Asymmetry

JOLYON HOWORTH*

De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Appraisal. Edited by ROBERT O.PAXTON and NICHOLAS WAHL. Oxford: Berg, 1994. Pp.320, biblio., index. £49.95(cloth); £19.95 (paper). ISBN 0-855496-998-5 and 1-85973-066-3.

France-Germany 1983-1993: The Struggle to Cooperate. Edited by PATRICKMcCARTHY. London: Macmillan, 1994. Pp.224, biblio., index, £45 (cloth). ISBN 0-33361-356-2.

France, Germany and the Western Alliance. By PHILIP H. GORDON. Boulder:Westview, 1995. Pp.128, notes, biblio., index. £29.50 (cloth); £9.95 (paper). ISBN 0-8133-2555-2 and-2554-4.

The key element in the history of the West since 1945 has arguably been the triangularbut highly asymmetrical relationship between Paris, Washington and Bonn. Therelationship between Paris and Washington has defined the fundamental options facingpolicy makers on both sides of the Atlantic in the two crucial areas of foreign/securitypolicy and economic/trade policy. The relationship between Washington and Bonn hasinformed both the agenda and the orientation of these fundamental policy options. Therelationship between Paris and Bonn has conditioned not only the relative success orfailure of those transatlantic options, but also the rate of progress of the new Europewhich has lain at the heart of them. The entire complex matrix of bilateral objectivesand multilateral outcomes has been characterised by asymmetries of various sorts. Thefirst derives from the fact that, on both fronts, the driving force has been France. Parishas pushed constantly for a rebalanced political relationship with Washington and hasattempted to harness the economic muscle of Bonn to that end. Paris has also pushedBonn to enter into a political arrangement which would allow Europe to challenge theexisting balance of transatlantic relations. This overwhelmingly French politicalagenda introduces the second asymmetry since Washington has supported Europeanintegration primarily as an economic strategy which would facilitate the growth of UStrade and investment and thereby perpetuate the strength of US hegemony in Europe.Bonn has considered the EC/EU both as a vehicle for political legitimacy and as anincreasingly propitious system for the domination of Europe's economic and industrial

* Professor of French Civilisation and Jean Monnet Professor of European Political Union,University of Bath

West European Politics, Vol.20, No.3 (July 1997), pp.219-226PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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performance. During the Cold War, these asymmetrical objectives were all potentiallycompatible because the political nature of the French agenda allowed for a positivesum game. In the post-Cold War period, they may prove to be rather less compatiblesince economics has superseded politics as the main pillar of international relations.This has created a third asymmetry in the sense that the subordinate role (formerlytaken by Germany) is increasingly being assumed by France, even while Francecontinues to pursue its traditional political objectives. The often paradoxical outcomesof the complex interplay of these relations between shifting patterns of fundamentallyunequal partners is the most interesting lesson to be learned from these threesignificant books.

Just as Washington regarded Paris as an indispensable but subordinate partner in theshaping of the US-led Western alliance, so France has regarded Germany as a crucial butsubordinate player in the great strategic objective of forging the French-led unitedEurope which would allow for greater balance in the transatlantic relationship. Bonn hasneeded Washington in order to escape the potentially stifling embrace of Paris and hasused Paris as a necessary partner in securing the European legitimacy which would allowGermany to re-acquire international status. But the most significant struggle has beenthat between Washington and Paris. France's basic objective since 1945 has been tocreate a European entity capable of standing as an equal with the USA. The key to thatstrategy has been the unequal relationship between Paris and Bonn, based on theassumption that the political, diplomatic and military clout deployed by the formerwould always weigh heavier than the economic and industrial muscle flexed by the latter.The French strategy has involved a two-pronged campaign in which the German rolewas central. On the security front, France's constant pursuit of an effective Europeanpillar within the alliance has taken on a multiplicity of forms, from de Gaulle's 1940snotions of a 'European bloc', through the 1950s debates on the EDC, and the 1960sdiscussions on the Fouchet Plan, through EPC in the 1970s and the revitalisation of boththe Elysee Treaty and the WEU in the 1980s, to current proposals on CFSP. Bonn, whileremaining tactically content (as part of Germany's general European policy) to play asecondary role in this French drama, nevertheless continued, right through the 1980s, togive ultimate strategic priority to the American connection. At the same time, France'sother campaign to rebalance the Western world, which was conducted on the front ofeconomics, saw the 1960s onslaught on the dollar followed by the creation of the EMSin the 1970s and the drive for EMU in the 1980s and 1990s: all mounting an essentiallypolitical challenge to American economic hegemony, through a gradual Europeanharnessing of the power of the D-mark.

This essentially political strategy amounted to an attempt on the part of Paris tomaximise French independence from Washington through increasing interdependencewith Germany. The strategy involved two not inconsiderable intrinsic risks. The firstwas that changing geo-political circumstances (e.g. the end of the Cold War) mightinvert the comparative significance of politics over economics. The second,exacerbated by the first, was that through embracing German economic success,France would find itself subordinated to it. The irony of history appears to havedecided that the US, through its involuntary relationship with a 'subordinate' France,has finally agreed to bring into existence forces which may actually secure the Frenchagenda (i.e. a more balanced transatlantic relationship) while France, through its'unequal' relationship with Germany, has created the conditions which will result inthat illusive 'greater balance' being dominated not by Paris but by Bonn. This processhas, throughout, ultimately been arbitrated by the partner which began with theweakest hand but which has emerged as the apparent winner: Bonn.

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The three books under review tell the story of this complex triangular asymmetry.The Paxton and Wahl volume emerged out of a conference at New York Universityand Columbia in the context of the 1990 centenary celebrations of de Gaulle's birth. Itcontains many valuable nuggets which help elucidate the Franco-American side of thefundamental problematique outlined above. Most of the contributions offer useful andoccasionally new data on de Gaulle's multi-faceted relationship with the USA. Oneimportant point must be stressed immediately. These chapters offer clear testimony tothe fact that de Gaulle's titanic struggle with a succession of American presidents fromFDR to LBJ was neither motivated nor fuelled by personal antagonisms or pique. Thisconclusion needs highlighting because the concentration, in the first one hundredpages, on the period prior to 1945, by focusing on de Gaulle's tempestuousrelationship with FDR, actually tends - misleadingly - to give the oppositeimpression. At its crudest, this was a struggle about rank. At its most sophisticated andrefined level, it was about two contrasting views of the structure of the post-war worldand of the nature of political leadership. The similarities between France and the USA(revolutionary republican origins, liberal democratic systems, capitalist economies,rheotorical emphasis on human rights and the rule of law) added to the fact that onlythese two nations have ever purported to offer to all others a universal model ofcivilisation, tend to mask the real and deep-rooted differences between the two systemsat the level of values, citizenship and governance.

On the basics, the two nations were in fundamental agreement. As RichardChallener shows in his revealing piece on the - actually rather good - relationshipbetween Dulles and de Gaulle: 'from Dulles's perspective, de Gaulle had provenreliable on the gut issues of the Cold War' (p. 164). This basic harmony allowed for avigorous challenge on most of the details, and particularly on the balance within thealliance. Frank Costigliola, in an excellent re-appraisal of de Gaulle's relationship withJKF, recounts the president's comments (shortly before his death) after a meeting withde Gaulle's long-serving foreign minister: 'We confirmed, Mr Couve de Murville andI, that we agreed on nothing, but we agreed that this total lack of accord should notharm Western countries.' And Costigliola concludes on the crucially important pointthat such Franco-American tensions as did arise stemmed essentially from the simplefact the 'American officials believed that French independence conflicted with USinterests' (p. 193). The French always insisted that this was not so. With the help of theGermans, history seems recently to have come down on the side of the French.

What is absent from this volume (hardly surprisingly given the title) is a chapteron 'De Gaulle and Europe'. What is present, however, in many of the best chapters, isthe explicit recognition that de Gaulle's struggle to rectify what he saw as theimbalances in the Alliance was not merely a Franco-American struggle but above alla struggle between the USA and Europe. This is stressed in one way or another byChallener (p.165), Costigliola (p.194), Kuisel (p.212), Calleo (p.241), Gardner(p.258), Pierre (p.292), Kissinger (p.340) and others. The volume is disappointing inits coverage of de Gaulle's security quarrels with Washington. Recent Frenchscholarship1 has transcended the old chestnuts about independence and grandeur andshown convincingly that the general's strategic objective was a re-balanced alliancewhich would be all the stronger for the emergence of a meaningful European pillar.The fact that Washington could not see how to square the circle of devolving power toEurope in order to strengthen both sides of the Atlantic does not mean that Frenchobjectives were either unreasonable or unrealistic. But as Andrew Pierre notes (p.292),they came 'a generation too early'. In view of recent security developments in Europewhich appear to offer historical vindication of the General's vision, it is perhaps time

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to invite Anglo-Saxon scholars to engage in a more radical re-appraisal of Gaullistsecurity policy than has hitherto been forthcoming. I shall return to this issue shortly.

Two excellent chapters by Kuisel and Calleo do succeed in laying to rest thecontinuing misconceptions that de Gaulle neither understood nor was interested ineconomics. Kuisel makes four crucial points in summarising de Gaulle's economicstrategy. First, his motives were primarily political. Second, he considered the strategyto be so important that he placed himself at the centre of economic decision making.Third, he proved extremely flexible in taking up what Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiberwas later to dub 'the American challenge'. De Gaulle had no difficulty in shifting fromprotectionism to competition in order to accept the challenge head-on. Fourth, 'heemployed both a French and a European strategy' (p.212). The former involved adirect monetarist onslaught on American economic hegemony. David Calleoconcludes that such a strategy was 'correct but impractical' against a US approachbased on power domination of capital markets which was 'wrong but predominant'(p.253). De Gaulle himself, but above all his successors, were, in their (European)strategy with regard to the D-mark to learn the lessons of this early failure: instead ofchallenging it, they chose to embrace it.

Economics is the heart and soul of the Franco-German relationship. This emergesstarkly from the excellent volume by Patrick McCarthy. The focus, in most of the tenseparate chapters which examine the relationship from a variety of different angles, isheavily on economics. The strategy, however, remained political: 'a way for one powerto control the other and for the other to control itself (p.2). Not only did France aimto 'embrace-enmesh' Germany, but Germany itself actively welcomed such anarrangement.

What is so fascinating in this story is, as Roger Morgan notes, that there is nothingnew in it. In the 1920s, Briand and Stresemann engaged in a similar pas de deux, theFrenchman hoping for a static relationship which could consecrate French superioritywhile the German aimed at a dynamic relationship which would release Germany fromher subordination. The story is one of France's permanent quest to embrace andenmesh the irresistible expansiveness of Germany. In an excellent introductory chapterentitled 'Condemned to Partnership', Patrick McCarthy offers a carefully craftedinterdigitation of both the foreign/security policy and the economic/monetary policyof the Fourth Republic and of the first three presidents of the Fifth Republic. Hesuggests that de Gaulle's strategy of demanding of the Germans 'that they choosebetween France and the US', while expecting the French to 'treat the franc as a weaponin the struggle against American hegemony' (p.11) was - at least in the General'slifetime - a double failure. But it offered a constant and compelling agenda for hissuccessors. Pompidou, by revising de Gaulle's security priorities in favour of theeconomic front, was ultimately more successful largely because the General, throughthe intransigent austerity policy which provoked May 1968, gave him the means tostruggle from a position of strength.

Throughout the 1970s, the essential problem became that of harmonising Frenchand German macro-economic policy. A constant leitmotif in these chapter is thecompetition between the monetarist approach preferred by Paris and the economistpolicies pursued by Bonn: 'France believed in the capacity of monetary integration tobring economic convergence in its train, whereas the German view was basically thatmonetary integration could only succeed once a substantial degree of genuineeconomic convergence had already taken place' (pp. 105-6). Plus ca change ... AsMcCarthy convincingly demonstrates, this clash was in fact illusory 'because only theeconomist approach could work' (p. 17). The lesson was learned by both Giscard and

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Mitterrand, both of whom began their septennats with expansionary, inflationistpolicies which, within two or three years (and a change of prime minister), werereversed in favour of tying the French economy to the policy of the Bundesbank.Although this consecrated German economic supremacy in Europe, France at the sametime gained proportionately in strength. The positive sum game was neverthelessshifting the European balance in favour of Bonn. Mitterrand adopted the same strategyof 'seeking to expand [France's] margin of sovereignty through embracing Germany'(p.55). Although the high risks involved in this strategy are still evident ('a monetaryorder which would condemn France to permanently high unemployment' (p.55)), thepolicy, as Jorg Boche shows in a masterly analysis of Franco-German macro-economicrelations, proved mutually beneficial. The co-operation which allowed both countriesto strengthen their economic position (anti-inflationary norms; a Europe-wideregulatory framework; emphasis on the high-technology sector; closing of ranks inGATT) also created a type of interdependence for Germany which necessitatedgenuine sacrifice (as in 1983 and 1993 when Bonn, threw a lifeline to the franc) inorder to keep the vital French partner in the game. Interdependence, in this analysis,really works. Germany 'has repeatedly shown that it would rather compromise thanrisk the survival of the system' (p.84). The compromise over the 'Stability Pact' at theDublin summit in December 1996 was further evidence of this reality, while at thesame time suggesting that, in the battle between 'monetarism' and 'economism',Germany does not always get things precisely the way it would like.

The primacy of Franco-German economic relations notwithstanding, this volumeoffers two additional areas of analysis. The attitude of the USA towards theseeconomic manoeuvrings; and the whole security relationship which underpinned it. Inan incisive chapter devoted to the former issue, Bill Friend stresses America'sfundamental ambivalence. Support for European economic integration (and thusFranco-German economic convergence) was as genuine and unstinting as wasnervousness about its commercial consequences. American attempts to secure a 'seatat the table' on EU trade-policy discussions (whether via Henry Kissinger's ill-fated'Year of Europe' initiative or via Commerce Secretary Mosbacher's 1989 demand(p. 175)) were all condemned to failure. The true test of the strength of the Franco-German relationship can be seen in the fact that US attempts to drive a wedge betweenthe two countries on GATT or other trade issues ultimately proved ineffective. In thenew global structures of the WTO, remaining tensions between the two sides of theocean are scheduled to be resolved via the Transatlantic Policy Network and theTransatlantic Business Partnership.2 The success of discussions in those fora will be ascrucial to the future of the Atlantic community as has been the outcome of Franco-German discussions for the future of the European Union.

But what of security policy? Philip Gordon, editor of Survival, has recentlyestablished himself as a leading authority on French security policy. His A CertainIdea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (1993)3 is set tobecome the standard textbook on the subject. The chapter which he offers for theMcCarthy volume is in effect a brief resume of the thesis of his important new book,France, Germany and the Western Alliance. The book offers a superb overview of thetriangular relationship between the three countries, combining impressive command ofdetail with a significant interpretive thesis. The thesis, in one word, is sceptical.Gordon takes issue with one conventional view on both sides of the Atlantic whichtends to see the Franco-German security partnership as a major new force withpotential to undermine the cohesion of the Alliance. I stress that this is oneconventional view, because there are many in Europe and the USA who take a more

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detached (and relaxed) view, seeing Franco-German harmonisation as a normal,indeed welcome, historical development. In fact, one of the problems with Gordon'sthesis is that he tends to overstate both sides of his own argument. Thus, in theMcCarthy volume, he begins by posing a 'paradox': despite vastly divergent nationalperspectives on international security, France and Germany have 'managed to developthe closest bilateral security cooperation in all of Europe' (p. 139). This, he suggests inhis book, has been greeted with ambivalence on both sides of the Atlantic. Prior to1989, the positive aspects of Franco-German reconciliation were offset by fears (inEurope) of 'condominium', and (in America) of NATO disruption; since 1989, thepositive aspects of the emerging 'European Pillar' are offset by worries that the twocountries might in reality prove unable to reconcile their historical differences. Thus,Gordon argues, squaring his first circle, 'the problem for the West is not so much thatFrance and Germany have formed a cohesive political-military force within Europebut that they have failed to do so' (p.5). This is the basic 'message' of Gordon'sanalysis. I believe it is too negative and too hasty a judgment, but that does notdetracted from the very real value of this work as the most complete analysis of recentdevelopments in Franco-German security co-operation set in the context of the entirepost-war period. And Gordon's worries about the health of Franco-German securityco-operation merit careful consideration.

At times, Gordon seems himself to be in two minds about whether the Franco-German security relationship contained any real substance. In an initial chaptercovering the entire period from 1949 to 1989, he rehearses the many instances ofattempted security 'convergence' (1950-54, 1963, 1974-76, 1982), duly noting thevery real limits which existed to genuine co-operation and correctly emphasising thatpolitical symbolism took constant precedence over military reality. He is at pains tostress that a 'partnership' was developing, yet he concludes, ambivalently, by notingthat, on the eve of 1989, 'Franco-German military cooperation was perhaps at its peak'(p.23), while at the same time recognising that this was 'mehr Schein als Sein' (moreappearance than substance). The problem seems to derive from the dichotomoussource of the convergence: Cold War imperatives and European integration, the formerresponding to strategic requirements, the latter to political will. In the conclusion to theMcCarthy chapter Gordon recognises that 'the Franco-German military couple hasbeen a product of political will prevailing over geopolitical realities' (p.156). Heregards this as unrealistic. Hence his scepticism about the future. In his book, he offersfour reasons for that scepticism. First, the removal of the Soviet threat, which he insists(while recognising the endogenous political element in Franco-Germanreconciliation), was the 'main reason' behind it. Second, the reduced US interest inperpetuating its protectorate in Europe. Third, the new assymetry in the Franco-German relationship. Fourth, the new complexity of the European security agenda.These factors, he argues 'have seriously begun to challenge the ability of the Franco-German couple - and the West as a whole - to function effectively' (p.34).

In support of this thesis, he examines four case studies: the 1991 Gulf War,Eurocorps, the problem of central and eastern Europe and the Bosnia crisis. On theGulf War, Gordon again appears to be in two minds. He regularly accepts that, giventhe totally different historical experiences of the two countries in the Gulf region, notto mention their totally different security standing in the post-war world, diversity intheir approach to the problem 'should not have been surprising' (p.37). And yet, hismain conclusion is that 'for two intimate neighbors, who claimed to represent asecurity "couple", and who hoped to form the nucleus of a European defence, the GulfWar must have been a sobering experience' (p.39). It undoubtedly was, but the lessons

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that Paris and Bonn drew from that experience were not (as Gordon implies theyshould have been), that 'a European security identity was an unachievable goal' (p.39).They were, precisely, that such a goal was a political imperative if the European Unionwas ever to become a serious force in the world. The drive for a European commonforeign and security policy (CFSP) dates from the post-Gulf experience and isenshrined in the joint Kohl-Mitterrand letter of April 1991. But Gordon is unimpressedby political, will. Similarly, in Gordon's analysis of Eurocorps, he stresses the differentintentions behind the development (Bonn, he argues, saw it as the basis of theEuropean pillar of NATO, Paris as a symbol of 'autonomy' - a dichotomy which wasvery much overplayed at the time and which has in any case now been overtaken byevents) and, while recognising the very real political significance of Eurocorps, heconcludes by highlighting its very real military inadequacies (p.45).

In all of this, one has the strong impression that the author, writing in the midst ofrapidly shifting historical developments, is being over-hasty in his judgments, losingsight of significant elements of long-term process through over-emphasis on short-term detail and/or on the legacy of a past which many may feel to be more buried thandormant. Similarly, in assessing the different Franco-German policies on central andeastern Europe, or on the Bosnian crisis, Gordon's 'pessimism' is more a function ofconjuncture than of structure. Yes, Mitterrand's plan for the European Confederationcame adrift in part (but only in part) because of unresolved Franco-Germandifferences; but Balladur's successful Stability Pact, which happened after Gordon'sbook went to press, demonstrated that the two countries were capable of settling thosedifferences. Moreover, while Bosnia does demonstrate total chaos in the initialEuropean response, the learning curve has been prodigious and it is difficult in1996-97 to place a cigarette paper between the policies of Paris, London, Bonn andWashington. History has moved on very fast since the winter of 1993 when this bookwent to press and while it remains true that 'pluralism will be a more difficultarrangement than hegemony' (p.65) in a multipolar world of multiple risks, there arenow many signs that the political will to prevail which Gordon views with suchmisgivings may yet win out.

The structural imperatives of the Franco-German relationship which McCarthy'svolume brings out so clearly strike this reviewer as being highly positive andconstructive features, ultimately more significant than the negative dimensions of thehistorical legacy and the geostrategic diversity which preoccupy Gordon. There arestill many important differences between Paris and Bonn on the definition of aEuropean CFSP. But these are far fewer in 1997 than they were in 1993. The structuralsecurity links between the French and the German capitals are stronger now than theyhave ever been and there are many signs that, in the ongoing struggle between Parisand Washington, Bonn is increasingly opting to side with the former. That has beentrue for a long time on the economics front. Since the NATO Berlin meeting in June1996, it has also been increasingly true on the security front. Gordon's book should beread - for the mine of condensed analysis which it offers - by anybody interested inEuropean and Atlantic security. But its overly sceptical interpretation must await theverdict of the historical jury.

Paris, Bonn, Washington. These three volumes demonstrate how the fates of boththe Atlantic Alliance and the European Community/Union have been essentiallyplayed out in this triangular relationship. London gets hardly a look-in. But there isstill time ...

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NOTES

1. See Institut Charles de Gaulle (ed.) De Gaulle en son Siècle, Vols. 4 and 5 (Paris: Plon 1992);Frédéric Bozo, Deux Stratégies pour l'Europe: de Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l'AllianceAtlantique (Paris: Plon 1996); Maurice Vaisse and Frédéric Bozo, La France et l'OTAN(Bruxelles: Complexe 1996).

2. These organisations, which were established as a result of the Transatlantic Declaration of1991 and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 have European offices at 133, rue Froissart,Brussels, 1040.

3. Princeton University Press, 1993.

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